Despite new challenges like climate change and digitalization, global and regional organizations recently went through turbulent times due to a lack of support from several of their member states. Next to this crisis of multilateralism, the COVID-19 pandemic now seems to question the added value of international organizations for addressing global governance issues more specifically. This article analyses this double challenge that several organizations are facing and compares their ways of managing the crisis by looking at their institutional and political context, their governance structure, and their behaviour during the pandemic until June 2020. More specifically, it will explain the different and fragmented responses of the World Health Organization, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund/World Bank. With the aim of understanding the old and new problems that these international organizations are trying to solve, this article argues that the level of autonomy vis-a-vis the member states is crucial for understanding the politics of crisis management. <br /> Points for practitioners <br /> As intergovernmental bodies, international organizations require authorization by their member states. Since they also need funding for their operations, different degrees of autonomy also matter for reacting to emerging challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The potential for international organizations is limited, though through proactive and bold initiatives, they can seize the opportunity of the crisis and partly overcome institutional and political constraints.

Using a novel agent-based model, we study how US withdrawal might influence the political process established by the Paris Agreement, and hence the prospects for reaching the collective goal to limit warming below 2 degrees C. Our model enables us to analyze to what extent reaching this goal despite US withdrawal would place more stringent requirements on other core elements of the Paris cooperation process. We find, first, that the effect of a US withdrawal depends critically on the extent to which member countries reciprocate others' promises and contributions. Second, while the 2 degrees C goal will likely be reached only under a very small set of conditions in any event, even temporary US withdrawal will further narrow this set significantly. Reaching this goal will then require other countries to step up their ambition at the first opportunity and to comply nearly 100% with their pledges, while maintaining high confidence in the Paris Agreements institutions. Third, although a US withdrawal will first primarily affect the United States' own emissions, it will eventually prove even more detrimental to other countries' emissions.

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert, wie Organisationen Algorithmen, die wir als digitale Beobachtungsformate verstehen, mit Handlungsfähigkeit ausstatten und damit actionable machen. Das zentrale Argument lautet, dass die soziale Relevanz digitaler Beobachtungsformate sich daraus ergibt, dass und wie sie in organisationale Entscheidungsarchitekturen eingebettet sind. Diesen Zusammenhang illustrieren wir am Beispiel des österreichischen Arbeitsmarktservice (AMS), der 2018 einen Algorithmus einführte, um die Integrationschancen arbeitsuchender Personen zu bewerten. Der AMS steht dabei stellvertretend für aktuelle Bestrebungen vieler Organisationen, algorithmische Systeme einzusetzen, um knappe öffentliche Ressourcen vermeintlich effizienter zu distribuieren. Um zu rekonstruieren, wie dies geschieht, zeigen wir, welche Operationen des Kategorisierens, Vergleichens und Bewertens das algorithmische Modell vollzieht. Darauf aufbauend demonstrieren wir, wie das algorithmische Modell in die organisationale Entscheidungsarchitektur eingebunden ist. Erst durch diese Einbindung – die Möglichkeit, Unterschiede für andere, relativ stabil erzeugte Entscheidungen zu machen – entfaltet das digitale Beobachtungsformat soziale Relevanz. Abschließend argumentieren wir, dass algorithmische Modelle, wie sie am Fall des AMS beobachtet werden können, dazu tendieren, sich in Organisationen zu stabilisieren. Dies begründen wir damit, dass die organisationalen Lernchancen im Umgang mit dem Algorithmus dadurch reduziert sind, dass dieser in einem Bereich zum Einsatz kommt, der durch Technologiedefizit und koproduktive Leistungserstellung geprägt ist.

Learning rates are a central concept in energy system models and integrated assessment models, as they allow researchers to project the future costs of new technologies and to optimize energy system costs. Here we argue that exchange rate fluctuations are an important, but thus far overlooked, determinant of the learning-rate variance observed in the literature. We explore how empirically observed global learning rates depend on where technologies are installed and which currency is used to calculate the learning rate. Using global data of large-scale photovoltaic (>= 5 MW) plants, we show that the currency choice can result in learning-rate differences of up to 16 percentage points. We then introduce an adjustment factor to correct for the effect of exchange rate and market focus fluctuations and discuss the implications of our findings for innovation scholars, energy modellers and decision makers. <br /> Learning rates are a measure of reduction in costs of energy from technologies such as solar photovoltaics. These are often estimated internationally with all monetary figures converted to a single currency, often US dollars. Lilliestam et al. show that such conversions can significantly affect the learning rate estimates.