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Social segregation in cities takes place where different household groups exist and when, according to Schelling, their location choice either minimizes the number of differing households in their neighborhood or maximizes their own group. In this contribution an evolutionary simulation based on a monocentric city model with externalities among households is used to discuss the spatial segregation patterns of four groups. The resulting complex spatial patterns can be shown as graphic animations. They can be applied as initial situation for the analysis of the effects a rent control has on segregation.
Inhalt 1 Einführung und Grundlagen 1.1 Problemstellung und Vorgehensweise 1.2 Ordnungsökonomische Systematisierung 1.3 „Neue“ Besonderheitenlehre für Netzindustrien 2 Ansatzpunkte zur Liberalisierung in Netzindustrien 2.1 Liberalisierung durch Privatisierung 2.1.1 Interdependenz von Privatisierung und Marktöffnung 2.1.2 Privatisierungsstufen 2.2 Liberalisierung durch Deregulierung und Re-Regulierung 2.2.1 Abgrenzung des relevanten Marktes: Netzinfrastruktur versus Netzdienstleistungen 2.2.2 Lokalisierung und Kontrolle von Marktmacht bei Netzinfrastruktur 2.3 Modelle zur Gewährleistung eines diskriminierungsfreien Netzzugangs 2.3.1 Verhandelter Netzzugang mit Missbrauchsaufsicht im Sinne der Essential-Facilities-Doktrin 2.3.2 Staatliche Regulierung des Netzzugangs 2.4 Theorie der vertikalen (Des-)Integration 2.4.1 Allokativ-statische, wohlfahrtsökonomische Analyse vertikaler Integration 2.4.2 Institutionenökonomische Analyse vertikaler Integration 2.4.3 Dynamische, wettbewerbsökonomische Analyse vertikaler Integration 2.4.4 Konsequenz: Vertikale Desintegration 3 Institutionelle Ausgestaltung der Wettbewerbsaufsicht 3.1 Systematisierung der Träger und Kompetenzabgrenzung 3.2 Kriterien für eine effiziente Wettbewerbsaufsicht 4 Schlussfolgerungen und intersektoraler Vergleich des Liberalisierungsprozessesin Netzindustrien
This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
In Mikro- und Industrieökonomik ist scheinbar gewiss, dassWettbewerb zu niedrigeren Preisen führt und dass Konsumenten von Wettbewerb profitieren, während die etablierten Unternehmen einen Nachteil erleiden. Dieser Beitrag verwendet ein raumwirtschaftliches Standardmodell, um zu zeigen, dass dies nicht immer so sein muss. Der Grund ist, dass durch den Marktzutritt gerade die Konsumenten, deren Preiselastizität am größten ist, von dem Unternehmen bei der Preisbildung nicht berücksichtigt werden.
From an active labor market policy perspective, start-up subsidies for unemployed individuals are very effective in improving long-term labor market outcomes for participants. From a business perspective, however, the assessment of these public programs is less clear since they might attract individuals with low entrepreneurial abilities and produce businesses with low survival rates and little contribution to job creation, economic growth, and innovation. In this paper, we use a rich data set to compare participants of a German start-up subsidy program for unemployed individuals to a group of regular founders who started from nonunemployment and did not receive the subsidy. The data allows us to analyze their business performance up until 40 months after business formation. We find that formerly subsidized founders lag behind not only in survival and job creation, but especially also in innovation activities. The gaps in these business outcomes are relatively constant or even widening over time. Hence, we do not see any indication of catching up in the longer run. While the gap in survival can be entirely explained by initial differences in observable start-up characteristics, the gap in business development remains and seems to be the result of restricted access to capital as well as differential business strategies and dynamics. Considering these conflicting results for the assessment of the subsidy program from an ALMP and business perspective, policy makers need to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of such a strategy to find the right policy mix.
This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.
This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement.
Das Cluster-Modell von Krugman und Venables (1996) erklärt im Rahmen der Neuen Ökonomischen Geographie die Bildung von Agglomerationen bei regional immobilen Arbeitskräften. Die resultierenden Gleichgewichte hängen von der Höhe der Transportkosten ab, die allerdings in beiden Sektoren als gleich hoch unterstellt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag erweitert dieses Modell um die Möglichkeit sektoral unterschiedlicher Transportkosten. Da eine analytische Lösung nichtmöglich ist, wird eine geeignete Simulationsmethode entwickelt. Anhand von Abbildungen wird dargestellt, welche Gleichgewichte sich bei verschiedenen Werten für die beiden Transportkostensätze ergeben.