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Social segregation in cities takes place where different household groups exist and when, according to Schelling, their location choice either minimizes the number of differing households in their neighborhood or maximizes their own group. In this contribution an evolutionary simulation based on a monocentric city model with externalities among households is used to discuss the spatial segregation patterns of four groups. The resulting complex spatial patterns can be shown as graphic animations. They can be applied as initial situation for the analysis of the effects a rent control has on segregation.
Usually, in monocentric city models, the spatial patterns of segregated ethnic groups are assumed to be ring-shaped, whereas in the 1930ies Hoyt showed that empirically wedge-shaped areas predominate. In contrast to Rose-Ackerman.s discussion of the in.uence within a ring-shaped pattern which the aversion which different households in the context of racism have, Yinger showed that, depending on the population mix, a wedge-shaped pattern may arise if it is border length which causes the spatial pattern. In this contribution, a simulation based on a monocentric city model with two or more different household groups is used to derive spatial patterns. Wedge-shaped segregation is shown to be the result of positive externalities among similar households. Differences between households only lead to ring-shaped patterns if the e¤ect of a city center on spatial structure dominates neighborhood e¤ects. If more than two groups of households are being considered, mixed patterns of concentric and wedge-shaped areas arise.
Optimal spatial patterns of two, three and four segregated household groups in a monocentric city
(2004)
Usually, in monocentric city models the spatial patterns of segregated household groups are assumed to be ring-shaped, while early in the 1930ies Hoyt showed that wedge-shaped areas empirically predominate. This contribution presents a monocentric city model with different household groups generating positive externalities within the groups. At first, border length is founded as a criterion of optimality. Secondly, it is shown that mixed patterns of concentric and wedge-shaped areas represent multiple equilibria if more than two groups of households are being considered. The welfare optimal segregated pattern depends on the relative purchasing power of different household groups.
Irrwege der Klimapolitik
(2012)
Inhalt I. Einleitung II. Es gibt kein Normalklima III. Folgen des Klimawandel IV. Folgen der Klimapolitik V. Schlußfolgerungen
Textbook wisdom says that competition yields lower prices and higher consumer surplus than monopoly. We show in two versions of a simple location-product differentiation model with and without endogenous choice of products that these two results have to be qualified. In both models, more than half of the reasonable parameter values lead to higher prices with duopoly than with monopoly. If the product characteristics are exogenous to the firms, consumers may even be be better off with monopoly in average.
Instability in competition
(2005)
In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the equilibrium proves stable for a sizeable interval of parameters, however. Even though this procedure is most common in analyzing Hotelling's location problem, it is not satisfying because it exhibits an inconsistent informational structure. The search for a better concept of stability is imperative.