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This dissertation consists of four self-contained papers that deal with the implications of financial market imperfections and heterogeneity. The analysis mainly relates to the class of incomplete-markets models but covers different research topics.
The first paper deals with the distributional effects of financial integration for developing countries. Based on a simple heterogeneous-agent approach, it is shown that capital owners experience large welfare losses while only workers moderately gain due to higher wages. The large welfare losses for capital owners contrast with the small average welfare gains from representative-agent economies and indicate that a strong opposition against capital market opening has to be expected.
The second paper considers the puzzling observation of capital flows from poor to rich countries and the accompanying changes in domestic economic development. Motivated by the mixed results from the literature, we employ an incomplete-markets model with different types of idiosyncratic risk and borrowing constraints. Based on different scenarios, we analyze under what conditions the presence of financial market imperfections contributes to explain the empirical findings and how the conditions may change with different model assumptions.
The third paper deals with the interplay of incomplete information and financial market imperfections in an incomplete-markets economy. In particular, it analyzes the impact of incomplete information about idiosyncratic income shocks on aggregate saving. The results show that the effect of incomplete information is not only quantitatively substantial but also qualitatively ambiguous and varies with the influence of the income risk and the borrowing constraint.
Finally, the fourth paper analyzes the influence of different types of fiscal rules on the response of key macroeconomic variables to a government spending shock. We find that a strong temporary increase in public debt contributes to stabilizing consumption and leisure in the first periods following the change in government spending, whereas a non-debt-intensive fiscal rule leads to a faster recovery of consumption, leisure, capital and output in later periods. Regarding optimal debt policy, we find that a debt-intensive fiscal rule leads to the largest aggregate welfare benefit and that the individual welfare gain is particularly high for wealth-poor agents.
Start-up incentives targeted at unemployed individuals have become an important tool of the Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP) to fight unemployment in many countries in recent years. In contrast to traditional ALMP instruments like training measures, wage subsidies, or job creation schemes, which are aimed at reintegrating unemployed individuals into dependent employment, start-up incentives are a fundamentally different approach to ALMP, in that they intend to encourage and help unemployed individuals to exit unemployment by entering self-employment and, thus, by creating their own jobs. In this sense, start-up incentives for unemployed individuals serve not only as employment and social policy to activate job seekers and combat unemployment but also as business policy to promote entrepreneurship. The corresponding empirical literature on this topic so far has been mainly focused on the individual labor market perspective, however. The main part of the thesis at hand examines the new start-up subsidy (“Gründungszuschuss”) in Germany and consists of four empirical analyses that extend the existing evidence on start-up incentives for unemployed individuals from multiple perspectives and in the following directions:
First, it provides the first impact evaluation of the new start-up subsidy in Germany. The results indicate that participation in the new start-up subsidy has significant positive and persistent effects on both reintegration into the labor market as well as the income profiles of participants, in line with previous evidence on comparable German and international programs, which emphasizes the general potential of start-up incentives as part of the broader ALMP toolset. Furthermore, a new innovative sensitivity analysis of the applied propensity score matching approach integrates findings from entrepreneurship and labor market research about the key role of an individual’s personality on start-up decision, business performance, as well as general labor market outcomes, into the impact evaluation of start-up incentives. The sensitivity analysis with regard to the inclusion and exclusion of usually unobserved personality variables reveals that differences in the estimated treatment effects are small in magnitude and mostly insignificant. Consequently, concerns about potential overestimation of treatment effects in previous evaluation studies of similar start-up incentives due to usually unobservable personality variables are less justified, as long as the set of observed control variables is sufficiently informative (Chapter 2).
Second, the thesis expands our knowledge about the longer-term business performance and potential of subsidized businesses arising from the start-up subsidy program. In absolute terms, the analysis shows that a relatively high share of subsidized founders successfully survives in the market with their original businesses in the medium to long run. The subsidy also yields a “double dividend” to a certain extent in terms of additional job creation. Compared to “regular”, i.e., non-subsidized new businesses founded by non-unemployed individuals in the same quarter, however, the economic and growth-related impulses set by participants of the subsidy program are only limited with regard to employment growth, innovation activity, or investment. Further investigations of possible reasons for these differences show that differential business growth paths of subsidized founders in the longer run seem to be mainly limited by higher restrictions to access capital and by unobserved factors, such as less growth-oriented business strategies and intentions, as well as lower (subjective) entrepreneurial persistence. Taken together, the program has only limited potential as a business and entrepreneurship policy intended to induce innovation and economic growth (Chapters 3 and 4).
And third, an empirical analysis on the level of German regional labor markets yields that there is a high regional variation in subsidized start-up activity relative to overall new business formation. The positive correlation between regular start-up intensity and the share among all unemployed individuals who participate in the start-up subsidy program suggests that (nascent) unemployed founders also profit from the beneficial effects of regional entrepreneurship capital. Moreover, the analysis of potential deadweight and displacement effects from an aggregated regional perspective emphasizes that the start-up subsidy for unemployed individuals represents a market intervention into existing markets, which affects incumbents and potentially produces inefficiencies and market distortions. This macro perspective deserves more attention and research in the future (Chapter 5).
Three Essays on EFRAG
(2018)
This cumulative doctoral thesis consists of three papers that deal with the role of one specific European accounting player in the international accounting standard-setting, namely the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). The first paper examines whether and how EFRAG generally fulfills its role in articulating Europe’s interests toward the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The qualitative data from the conducted interviews reveal that EFRAG influences the IASB’s decision making at a very early stage, long before other constituents are officially asked to comment on the IASB’s proposals. The second paper uses quantitative data and investigates the formal participation behavior of European constituents that seek to determine EFRAG’s voice. More precisely, this paper analyzes the nature of the constituents’ participation in EFRAG’s due process in terms of representation (constituent groups and geographical distribution) and the drivers of their participation behavior. EFRAG’s official decision making process is dominated by some specific constituent groups (such as preparers and the accounting profession) and by constituents from some specific countries (e.g. those with effective enforcement regimes). The third paper investigates in a first step who of the European constituents choose which lobbying channel (participation only at IASB, only at EFRAG, or at both institutions) and unveils in a second step possible reasons for their lobbying choices. The paper comprises quantitative and qualitative data. It reveals that English skills, time issues, the size of the constituent, and the country of origin are factors that can explain why the majority participates only in the IASB’s due process.
The present dissertation investigates profit-maximizing behavior in different phases of the negotiation process. Over the last decades, research dealt in detail with behavior of negotiation actors with the aim of identifying performance enhancing factors. The majority of those studies focused on behavior within the main negotiation phase. This work, however, considers phases which are, so far, underrepresented in research but show an impact on the negotiation process and outcome. Those phases are the pre-negotiation, the first offer, and the main negotiation phase which is further divided by breaks into several rounds. Within these phases, traits of behavior are analyzed that can be used strategically in order to impact the negotiation outcome. The dissertation contains three papers, each one dealing with a specific strategy within one phase. The first paper investigates communication behavior in the pre-negotiation phase. Content analysis of a negotiation experiment shows that the employment of positive communication elements such as the generation of enthusiasm for an upcoming project results in an increase of agreements on entering a negotiation and also leads to a higher willingness to make concessions. The second paper explores the impact of a semantic first anchor, which does not contain a specific number but only gives a numerical direction, on the opponent’s concession behavior and the final outcome. By means of two scenario-based questionnaires and a negotiation experiment it is demonstrated that semantic offers reveal an anchoring effect and lead to better negotiation outcomes. The third paper deals with the introduction of breaks and their effect on the following negotiation process. Therefore, content and outcome of another negotiation experiment are investigated. The analysis shows that breaks evoke a dominant impression but can negatively impact the atmosphere and thereby also the outcome. Finally, the gathered insights are brought together and discussed. The dissertation closes with implications for practice, limitations of the work, and ideas for future research.
Bad governance causes economic, social, developmental and environmental problems in many developing countries. Developing countries have adopted a number of reforms that have assisted in achieving good governance. The success of governance reform depends on the starting point of each country – what institutional arrangements exist at the out-set and who the people implementing reforms within the existing institutional framework are. This dissertation focuses on how formal institutions (laws and regulations) and informal institutions (culture, habit and conception) impact on good governance. Three characteristics central to good governance - transparency, participation and accountability are studied in the research.
A number of key findings were: Good governance in Hanoi and Berlin represent the two extremes of the scale, while governance in Berlin is almost at the top of the scale, governance in Hanoi is at the bottom. Good governance in Hanoi is still far from achieved. In Berlin, information about public policies, administrative services and public finance is available, reliable and understandable. People do not encounter any problems accessing public information. In Hanoi, however, public information is not easy to access. There are big differences between Hanoi and Berlin in the three forms of participation. While voting in Hanoi to elect local deputies is formal and forced, elections in Berlin are fair and free. The candidates in local elections in Berlin come from different parties, whereas the candidacy of local deputies in Hanoi is thoroughly controlled by the Fatherland Front. Even though the turnout of voters in local deputy elections is close to 90 percent in Hanoi, the legitimacy of both the elections and the process of representation is non-existent because the local deputy candidates are decided by the Communist Party.
The involvement of people in solving local problems is encouraged by the government in Berlin. The different initiatives include citizenry budget, citizen activity, citizen initiatives, etc. Individual citizens are free to participate either individually or through an association.
Lacking transparency and participation, the quality of public service in Hanoi is poor. Citizens seldom get their services on time as required by the regulations. Citizens who want to receive public services can bribe officials directly, use the power of relationships, or pay a third person – the mediator ("Cò" - in Vietnamese).
In contrast, public service delivery in Berlin follows the customer-orientated principle. The quality of service is high in relation to time and cost. Paying speed money, bribery and using relationships to gain preferential public service do not exist in Berlin.
Using the examples of Berlin and Hanoi, it is clear to see how transparency, participation and accountability are interconnected and influence each other. Without a free and fair election as well as participation of non-governmental organisations, civil organisations, and the media in political decision-making and public actions, it is hard to hold the Hanoi local government accountable.
The key differences in formal institutions (regulative and cognitive) between Berlin and Hanoi reflect the three main principles: rule of law vs. rule by law, pluralism vs. monopoly Party in politics and social market economy vs. market economy with socialist orientation.
In Berlin the logic of appropriateness and codes of conduct are respect for laws, respect of individual freedom and ideas and awareness of community development. People in Berlin take for granted that public services are delivered to them fairly. Ideas such as using money or relationships to shorten public administrative procedures do not exist in the mind of either public officials or citizens.
In Hanoi, under a weak formal framework of good governance, new values and norms (prosperity, achievement) generated in the economic transition interact with the habits of the centrally-planned economy (lying, dependence, passivity) and traditional values (hierarchy, harmony, family, collectivism) influence behaviours of those involved.
In Hanoi “doing the right thing” such as compliance with law doesn’t become “the way it is”.
The unintended consequence of the deliberate reform actions of the Party is the prevalence of corruption. The socialist orientation seems not to have been achieved as the gap between the rich and the poor has widened.
Good governance is not achievable if citizens and officials are concerned only with their self-interest. State and society depend on each other. Theoretically to achieve good governance in Hanoi, institutions (formal and informal) able to create good citizens, officials and deputies should be generated. Good citizens are good by habit rather than by nature.
The rule of law principle is necessary for the professional performance of local administrations and People’s Councils. When the rule of law is applied consistently, the room for informal institutions to function will be reduced.
Promoting good governance in Hanoi is dependent on the need and desire to change the government and people themselves. Good governance in Berlin can be seen to be the result of the efforts of the local government and citizens after a long period of development and continuous adjustment.
Institutional transformation is always a long and complicated process because the change in formal regulations as well as in the way they are implemented may meet strong resistance from the established practice. This study has attempted to point out the weaknesses of the institutions of Hanoi and has identified factors affecting future development towards good governance. But it is not easy to determine how long it will take to change the institutional setting of Hanoi in order to achieve good governance.