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Scholars have long recognised the importance of contexts of reception in shaping the integration of immigrants and refugees in a host society. Studies of refugees, in particular, have examined groups where the different dimensions of reception (government, labour market, and ethnic community) have been largely positive. How important is this merging of positive contexts across dimensions of reception? We address this through a comparative study of Vietnamese refugees to West Germany beginning in 1979 and contract workers to East Germany beginning in 1980. These two migration streams converged when Germany reunified in 1990. Drawing on mixed qualitative methods, this paper offers a strategic case for understanding factors that shape the resettlement experiences of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants in Germany. By comparing two migration streams from the same country of origin, but with different backgrounds and contexts of reception, we suggest that ethnic networks may, in time, offset the disadvantages of a negative government reception.
The conception of property at the basis of Hegel’s conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of “possessive individualism.” It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the “true right” that life possesses against the “formal” and “abstract right” of property. Ultimately, Hegel’s account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right.
In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus- character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism.
The art of second nature
(2022)
Purpose:
Modern food technology allows designing products aiming to simulate and replace traditional food. In affluent societies there is a rising tendency to consume foods derived from plants including milk imitations or plant drinks based on cereals, nuts, legumes, oil seeds or other plant families. Herein we review production and composition of such drinks, summarize consumers' motivations to change from milk to plant drinks and highlight nutritional and health implications of consuming plant drinks instead of milk, in particular if non-fortified and if consumed by infants, children, adolescents and the elderly.
Results:
Whereas the macronutrient concentrations of some plant drinks (soy) may approach in some cases (protein) that of cow's milk, the nutritional quality of most plant drinks, e.g., the biological value of protein and the presence and amount of vitamins and essential minerals with high bioavailability does not. If cow's milk is exchanged for non-fortified and non-supplemented plant drinks consumers may risk deficiencies of calcium, zinc, iodine, vitamins B2, B12, D, A, and indispensable amino acids, particularly in infants and toddlers who traditionally consume significant portions of milk. The vegetable nature, appearance and taste of such plant drinks may be appealing to adult consumers and be chosen for adding variety to the menu. However, in young children fed exclusively such plant drinks severe metabolic disturbances may occur.
Conclusion:
Parents, dietitians, physicians and consumers should be aware of such potential risks, if non-fortified plant drinks are consumed instead of milk.
I argue that Hegel’s Logic traces an emergent-purposive, logical method that entails two key identities in reason. These identities are (1) between a logic of freedom and necessity, and (2) between the possibilities of a priori and a posteriori reasoning in a purposive method. The purposive method of the Logic is the basis for these identities and, in Hegel’s view, facilitates the transition from Kant’s transcendental idealism to absolute idealism. I suggest that this method is Hegel’s attempt to rework a critique of philosophy according to Kant’s insight about the principle grounding the formal purposiveness of the faculties, what Hegel calls, “one of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy.”
Introduction
(2021)
Kant wrote in the Critique of Pure Reason, “For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth.” This unity of reason, taken as a holistic condition, was central to the convictions of the idealists. To them, Kant layed bare the right path forward, but also fundamental failings in his execution of a critique of reason which needed to be overcome in order for reason to secure its own, internal end. In this chapter, I discuss key themes in the positive inheritance of Kant’s thought in classical German philosophy and offer an overview of the arguments and significances of each contribution to this volume. The aim is not to minimize important differences between Kant and post-Kantian Idealists, but rather to emphasize core retentions of Kant’s thought.
Scholarship on German Idealism typically couches the systems of Idealism in terms of a rejection of or departure from Kant's critical philosophy. The few accounts that do look to the positive influence of Kant on the Idealists typically focus on the perceived need among the Idealists to revise Kant's system due to various shortcomings arising from his dualism. This volume seeks to reverse this norm. It does this by bringing together an original set of critical reflections on the ways in which the German Idealists maintain specific and fundamental Kantian qualities in their own systems. At the same time, the aim of this volume is not a reduction of German Idealism to Kant's thought. Instead, this volume highlights a set of core ways in which the German Idealists retain specific, fundamentally Kantian principles and qualities. To that extent, this volume paves the way for new interpretations by laying the ground for identifying those significant components of German Idealism that can defensibly be called "Kantian.