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Irrwege der Klimapolitik
(2012)
Inhalt I. Einleitung II. Es gibt kein Normalklima III. Folgen des Klimawandel IV. Folgen der Klimapolitik V. Schlußfolgerungen
This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement.