Instability in competition
- In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the equilibrium proves stable for a sizeable interval of parameters, however. Even though this procedure is most common in analyzing Hotelling's location problem, it is not satisfying because it exhibits an inconsistent informational structure. The search for a better concept of stability is imperative.
Author details: | Helge SannerGND |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14299 |
Subtitle (English): | hotelling re-reconsidered |
Publication series (Volume number): | Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge (79) |
Publication type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Publication year: | 2005 |
Publishing institution: | Universität Potsdam |
Release date: | 2007/06/18 |
RVK - Regensburg classification: | QD 100 |
Organizational units: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
DDC classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
External remark: | Sanner, Helge: Instability in competition : hotelling re-reconsidered / Helge Sanner. - Potsdam : Univ., 2005. - 10 S. : graph. Darst. (Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge : Diskussionsbeitrag ; 79) |