Public Procurement in the European Union
- Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.
| Author details: | Alexander Rohde |
|---|---|
| ISBN: | 978-3-658-28072-7 |
| Title of parent work (German): | Schriften zum europäischen Management |
| Subtitle (English): | How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tenders |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| Place of publishing: | Berlin |
| Reviewer(s): | Uta HerbstORCiDGND, Eric KearneyORCiDGND |
| Supervisor(s): | Uta Herbst |
| Publication type: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Language: | English |
| Publication year: | 2019 |
| Publishing institution: | Universität Potsdam |
| Granting institution: | Universität Potsdam |
| Date of final exam: | 2019/08/20 |
| Release date: | 2019/11/15 |
| Tag: | Anchor effects; Anchoring; Contracting Authorities; Precision effects; Price ranges; Public procurement; Public tender; Starting prices; Tender; Tender performance |
| Number of pages: | 279 |
| Organizational units: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| DDC classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| License (German): |  Creative Commons - CC0 1.0 - Universell - Public Domain Dedication |
