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Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition

  • This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.

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Metadaten
Author details:Kai Andree
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927
Publication series (Volume number):Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge (104)
Publication type:Working Paper
Language:English
Publication year:2011
Publishing institution:Universität Potsdam
Release date:2011/11/18
RVK - Regensburg classification:QD 100
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
DDC classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
License (German):License LogoKeine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
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