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  • In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society whichIn which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it.zeige mehrzeige weniger

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Thomas KhuranaORCiDGND
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0023
ISSN:0012-1045
ISSN:2192-1482
Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Deutsch):Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung
Untertitel (Deutsch):Zur Sozialität der menschlichen Lebensform
Verlag:De Gruyter
Verlagsort:Berlin
Publikationstyp:Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
Sprache:Deutsch
Datum der Erstveröffentlichung:16.07.2022
Erscheinungsjahr:2022
Datum der Freischaltung:04.11.2022
Freies Schlagwort / Tag:G. W. F. Hegel; Karl Marx; Stanley Cavell; recognition; sociality; species-being
Band:70
Ausgabe:3
Seitenanzahl:27
Erste Seite:373
Letzte Seite:399
Organisationseinheiten:Philosophische Fakultät / Institut für Philosophie
DDC-Klassifikation:1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Peer Review:Referiert
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