Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperativeCooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation.…
Verfasserangaben: | Leonie Heuer, Andreas OrlandORCiDGND |
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DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.182142 |
ISSN: | 2054-5703 |
Titel des übergeordneten Werks (Englisch): | Royal Society Open Science |
Untertitel (Englisch): | an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies |
Verlag: | Royal Soc. Publ. |
Verlagsort: | London |
Publikationstyp: | Wissenschaftlicher Artikel |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Datum der Erstveröffentlichung: | 10.07.2019 |
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2019 |
Datum der Freischaltung: | 07.10.2019 |
Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | Prisoner's Dilemma; cooperation; experiment; human behaviour |
Band: | 6 |
Seitenanzahl: | 9 |
Fördernde Institution: | Universität Potsdam |
Fördernummer: | PA 2019_52 |
Organisationseinheiten: | Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
DDC-Klassifikation: | 5 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik / 50 Naturwissenschaften / 500 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik |
6 Technik, Medizin, angewandte Wissenschaften / 60 Technik / 600 Technik, Technologie | |
Peer Review: | Referiert |
Fördermittelquelle: | Publikationsfonds der Universität Potsdam |
Publikationsweg: | Open Access |
Lizenz (Deutsch): | CC-BY - Namensnennung 4.0 International |
Externe Anmerkung: | Zweitveröffentlichung in der Schriftenreihe Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe ; 107 |