Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition

  • This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.

Download full text files

Export metadata

  • Export Bibtex
  • Export RIS
  • Export XML

Additional Services

Share in Twitter Search Google Scholar
Author:Kai Andree
Series (Serial Number):Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge (Bd. 104)
Document Type:Book
Year of Completion:2011
Publishing Institution:Universität Potsdam
Release Date:2011/11/18
RVK - Regensburg Classification:QD 100
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):License LogoKeine Nutzungslizenz vergeben - es gilt das deutsche Urheberrecht