Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance

  • This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.

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Author:Helge Sanner
Series (Serial Number):Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge (Bd. 044)
Document Type:Monograph/Edited Volume
Year of Completion:2001
Publishing Institution:Universität Potsdam
Release Date:2007/06/04
RVK - Regensburg Classification:QD 100
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Notes extern:Sanner, Helge: Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance / Helge Sanner. - Potsdam : Univ., 2001. - 15 Bl. : graph. Darst.
(Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge : Diskussionsbeitrag ; 44)