

**CEPA DP No. 17**

FEBRUARY 2020

Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?

Lisa Bruttel  
Werner Güth  
Ralph Hertwig  
Andreas Orland



**CEPA Discussion Papers**

**Center for Economic Policy Analysis**

<https://www.uni-potsdam.de/cepa>

University of Potsdam

August-Bebel-Straße 89, 14482 Potsdam

Tel.: +49 331 977-3225

Fax: +49 331 977-3210

E-Mail: [dp-cepa@uni-potsdam.de](mailto:dp-cepa@uni-potsdam.de)

**ISSN (online) 2628-653X**

CEPA Discussion Papers can be downloaded from RePEc

<https://ideas.repec.org/s/pot/cepadp.html>

Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect views of the Center of Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA). CEPA Discussion Papers may represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion.

All rights reserved by the authors.

Published online at the Institutional Repository of the University of Potsdam

<https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-44446>

**Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?\*****Lisa Bruttel**

University of Potsdam, Germany

**Werner Güth**

Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany

**Ralph Hertwig**

Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany

**Andreas Orland**

University of Potsdam, Germany

ABSTRACT

---

Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people's payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person's payoff, an individual's envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people's payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant's payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.

**Keywords:** envy, emotion regulation, deliberate ignorance, punishment, experiment**JEL Codes:** C91, D23, D63, D83, D91**Corresponding author:**

Andreas Orland

University of Potsdam

Department of Economics

August-Bebel-Str. 89

14482 Potsdam

Germany

E-mail: aorland@uni-potsdam.de

---

\* We are grateful for comments we received at the Berlin Behavioral Economics Workshop (March 2019), the Thurgau Experimental Economics Meeting 2019, and the 2019 IAREP/SABE Conference. We are grateful to the WZB/TU Lab for the provision of lab resources. Luis Koch, Fenja Meinecke, Birte Röttges, and Max Padubrin provided excellent research assistance. Declarations of interest: none. This study was preregistered in an Open Science Framework repository and can be accessed under [https://osf.io/fxc48/?view\\_only=8368d9f1d1084d8e8b295a6c9fad36fa](https://osf.io/fxc48/?view_only=8368d9f1d1084d8e8b295a6c9fad36fa).

# 1 Introduction

Envy is “an unpleasant, often painful emotion characterized by feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a desired attribute enjoyed by another person or group of persons” (Smith and Kim, 2007, p. 46). As the word “awareness” implies, one prerequisite of envy is information about other people’s attributes—their qualities, achievements, or possessions. In this article, we study whether individuals actively avoid such information (although they could retrieve it at no cost) in order to protect themselves from envy and its damaging effects. In so doing, we contribute to the more general debate on circumstances in which many people prefer “not to know”—a phenomenon known in economics and psychology as “information avoidance” (Golman et al., 2017; Sweeny et al., 2010) or “deliberate ignorance” (Hertwig and Engel, 2016).

There are at least two important motives for deliberate ignorance in situations that may trigger envy. First, envy and its correlates, such as feelings of hostility and resentment (Gross and John, 2003; Gross, 2007), are unpleasant emotions that impair individual well-being (see Diener et al. 1999). Someone who anticipates this emotional response to information about others’ attributes may try to avoid it by remaining uninformed.<sup>1</sup> Second, envy can prompt behaviors that are individually and socially undesirable. For example, an individual may be tempted to destroy the object of envy.<sup>2,3</sup> This second motive entails more cognitive effort because it requires the individual to anticipate not only their own potential negative emotional response but also the ensuing behavioral impulse and its detrimental consequences.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>An example lies in the context of socially upward comparisons on social media: One strategy to deal with people triggering envy is to block their posts and messages (or to avoid them entirely; see Wenninger et al. 2019). Social comparison theory provides many other examples where deliberate ignorance may be used to avoid feeling unpleasant emotions (Wood, 1989; Morse and Gergen, 1970; Festinger, 1954).

<sup>2</sup>The literature on inequality aversion provides much evidence for such destructive behavior (see, e.g., the literature reviewed in Fehr and Schmidt 1999). See also Kirchsteiger (1994) for an early example of this strand of the literature that proposes an envy model to explain observed behavior in ultimatum games. See Bosman and van Winden (2002) for a study that identifies “emotional hazard” as a source of economic inefficiency in power-to-take games (envy is among the emotions measured in the experiment).

<sup>3</sup>Ronayne and SgROI (2018) report on another channel through which envy can harm welfare: They show that envious participants in an online experiment take good advice less often if the adviser is richer than the advisee. At the same time, envious advisees are more willing to accept good advice in general.

<sup>4</sup>Both of these motives may also have implications for a person’s self-image (Baumeister, 1999). Envy may cause self-contempt and be met with social disapproval (Parrott and Smith, 1993). Few people wish to be diagnosed by themselves or others as feeling envious or as acting resentfully toward others because they are envious. These potential risks to a person’s self-concept—self-contempt and others’ disapproval—may also trigger the belief that one is better off not knowing. In other words, the goal to protect one’s self-concept may be a third motive for actively avoiding information that could trigger envy. One example for self-contempt as a motive for deliberate ignorance was examined by Dana et al. (2007): In their experiment, dictators had the opportunity to avoid information about the consequences of their choice for a recipient’s payoff in a binary dictator game. By avoiding information, many dictators in the experiment behaved with self-interest while maintaining the illusion of fairness (see also Grossman 2014).

We begin by considering the first motive for deliberate ignorance in situations that may elicit envy: to avoid painful emotions. Emotions and affects, especially negative ones such as fear, anger, and jealousy, are often portrayed as having a strong impact on judgment, reason, and behavior (e.g., see the references in Clore and Huntsinger 2007; Gino and Schweitzer 2008). However, people are flexible in dealing with their emotions. They can control virtually every aspect of emotional processing, including how emotion directs attention (Rothermund et al., 2008), the cognitive appraisals that shape emotional experience (Gross, 1998), and the physiological consequences of emotion (Porges, 2007). These and other processes whereby people manage their emotions are commonly referred to as “emotion regulation.” Emotion regulation has been linked to important life outcomes such as mental health (Gross and Muñoz, 1995), physical health (Sapolsky, 2007), relationship satisfaction (Murray, 2005), and work performance (Diefendorff et al., 2000).

Carstensen et al. (1998) and Urry and Gross (2010) reported that older adults are better at emotion regulation than younger adults, and Nielsen et al. (2008) found that older adults are better at forecasting dynamic changes in their future emotional states. Research also demonstrates that chronological age is among the best predictors of deliberate ignorance: Older survey participants have been shown to avoid information in various scenarios across many domains of life (Hertwig et al., 2018). The fact that older adults are both better at regulating their emotions *and* more likely to avoid potentially uncomfortable information raises the question of whether there is a causal relationship between these two findings. In other words, could deliberate ignorance be one tool in the toolbox of strategies used to regulate emotions (see also Carstensen 1995)?

We now turn to the second motive for deliberate ignorance: to avoid harming oneself or others. The literature on deliberate ignorance in the context of self-regulation and self-discipline has focused primarily on situations without social and strategic interaction. For example, Falk and Zimmermann (2016) reported that some participants preferred not to be informed about unpleasant future consumption in order to avoid anticipatory disutility. Andries and Haddad (2017) formally modeled the relationship between deliberate ignorance and disappointment aversion in an investment context. In their model, disappointment-averse agents checked their portfolios less frequently when the risky asset’s volatility increased, which is also in line with empirical observations. In the experiment of Grossman and van der Weele (2017), individuals avoided information about the negative consequences of their actions in order to protect their self-image. It has also been shown that the option to avoid information can have positive or negative effects on self-discipline, depending on the context. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) found that strategic ignorance

---

In the present article, we do not consider this third motive for deliberate ignorance as it is covered by the articles mentioned here.

can facilitate self-discipline. Similarly, Huck et al. (2018) reported experimental results showing that individuals put more effort into their work when not gathering information about their piece rate. In contrast, participants in the field experiment of Thunström et al. (2016) harmed their future self by avoiding information about their caloric intake.

The literature has mainly considered deliberate ignorance in interactive situations as a means to avoid being punished. In these studies, the acting party (e.g., the proposer in the ultimatum game) hides information from others to prevent being punished for selfish behavior. In Conrads and Irlenbusch (2013), responders in an experimental ultimatum rejected the same unfair offer less often when the proposer decided to remain ignorant about the responder’s payoff—and about 40% of the proposers indeed opted for such strategic ignorance. Remotely related is a formal model by Brocas and Carrillo (2007). In a leader–follower context, they showed that even if both parties obtain the same information about the payoffs of the interaction, it is an advantage for the leader to have the power to decide how much information remains unexplored.

Envy has also been studied in the experimental economics literature in “envy situations.” In an ultimatum envy game, for instance, the responder’s payoff is fixed ex ante and the proposer chooses the size of the total pie instead of choosing which offer is made to the responder. Casal et al. (2012) compared rejection rates in envy situations, varying the consequences of a rejection by the responder. Rejection rates were generally quite low. They were highest (about 30%) in impunity envy games—that is, when rejection led to the proposer going away empty-handed, but did not affect the responder’s fixed payoff.

Other experimental studies have examined altruistic punishment (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000; Gintis et al. 2003; Engelmann and Strobel 2004, 2007; Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009; Leibbrandt and López-Pérez 2011, 2012). These studies allowed participants to punish other participants as a way of expressing discontent with an individual’s previous behavior and/or making the punished individual behave in a socially desirable way in the future.<sup>5</sup> Altruistic punishment can be executed by a second or third party, but the punisher does not typically have a personal monetary benefit from inflicting harm on the punished individual.

Studies on altruistic punishment generally provide full information by design. One exception is found in Bartling et al. (2014). They conducted experiments using binary dictator games where the dictator’s interest was either in conflict or aligned with the

---

<sup>5</sup>Another form of punishment found in experimental studies is punishment with the intention of taking revenge, such as counterpunishment. Nikiforakis (2008) showed that the opportunity to punish the punisher(s) decreases punishment of free-riders. Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) disentangled the effects of counterpunishment and sanction enforcement (the punishment of nonpunishers). Such punishments are more closely related to our study because they do not intend a change in future behavior. However, as in the case of altruistic punishment, the reason for punishment is the behavior of another individual, not their monetary superiority, as is the case in our study.

receiver. A third party could punish at a cost. In two treatments, the dictator was either informed about the consequences of their actions for the receiver or had to acquire this information. Bartling et al. focused on the third party’s punishment behavior. Their results showed that dictators who avoided information deflected some punishment when the outcome with negative consequences for the receiver occurred. However, dictators received some punishment for avoiding the information when their behavior had (unknowingly) good consequences for the receiver. In a similar context, Stüber (2019) allowed the third party to avoid information: After the binary dictator game (where the dictator could choose either a fair or an egoistic option), the third party could obtain or avoid information about the dictator’s behavior before deciding about punishment. Stüber found that 36% of the third parties avoided the information when given the opportunity (which in turn lowered overall punishment). Hence, always providing information overstates the importance of altruistic punishment; some punishers prefer not to be informed about a norm violation. Had they had the option of not knowing, they might have abstained from punishment.

In our experiment, we considered both motives for deliberate ignorance: avoiding painful emotions and avoiding one’s own harmful behavioral responses. In a first step, we searched for evidence that individuals indeed avoid information about others’ payoffs and that this deliberate ignorance is driven by their desire to protect themselves from feeling envy; we also tested whether the ability to avoid envy in this way is explained by an individual’s ability to regulate emotions. In a second step, we analyzed to what extent individuals use deliberate ignorance as a cognitive tool to shield themselves from the temptation of responding to the negative emotion with behavior that is individually and socially undesirable.

To study the impact of the two outlined motives on both avoiding information and harming others, we conducted a computerized, monetarily incentivized laboratory experiment with three treatments. In all treatments, two participants (Person A and Person B) were randomly paired. Person A was the potentially envious participant we are interested in; Person B was passive and served solely as the target of Person A’s envy. Person A received a fixed monetary endowment  $a$ . Person B’s endowment  $b$  was either equal to Person A’s endowment or higher. Depending on the treatment, Person A was either automatically informed about  $b$  or had the opportunity to avoid that information—here information was endogenous. In a final step, Person A did or did not have the opportunity to reduce Person B’s payoff, again depending on the treatment.<sup>6</sup> In addition, we assessed

---

<sup>6</sup>Instead of a full 2x2 factorial design, we implemented only three treatments; to test our hypotheses, there was no need for a treatment where Person A can neither avoid the information nor reduce Person B’s endowment.

participants’ dispositional envy according to the malicious envy scale (part of the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale, or BeMaS) by Lange and Crusius (2015) and their ability to regulate their emotions according to the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) by Gross and John (2003).

In comparison to similar studies, we observed a relatively low proportion of subjects who avoided information about the other subject’s payoff when given the opportunity to do so (20% when they had the opportunity to reduce the other subject’s payoff; 13% when they did not). Psychological measures do not explain this behavior. Finally, voluntarily uninformed subjects did not deduct less from their partner’s payoff than did compulsory informed subjects.

## 2 Methods

Participants were randomly assigned to pairs composed of Person A and Person B. They were informed about their role from the outset. Apart from the role assignment, each member of the pair received identical instructions. We were only interested in Person A’s decisions.

In three experimental treatments, we varied Person A’s opportunities to both avoid information and reduce Person B’s payoff. Table 1 provides an overview of the treatments and the number of participants in each treatment. We determined the number of required subjects in a power calculation (see Appendix). We excluded some subjects who needed too many tries to answer the control questions (see Section 2.2 for details).

		Person A informed about $b$	
		By choice	By default
Payoff deduction	Not possible	<i>Info Choice &amp; No Deduction</i> Collected: 103 <b>Included: 102</b> Required: 99	
	Possible	<i>Info Choice &amp; Deduction</i> Collected: 84 <b>Included: 82</b> Required: 80	<i>Full Info &amp; Deduction</i> Collected: 39 <b>Included: 38</b> Required: 36

Note: We do not include four Person A participants who needed more than three trials to answer the control questions in our analyses.

**Table 1:** Experimental design with numbers of Person A participants

The first treatment, *Info Choice & No Deduction*, in combination with both subscales of the ERQ and the malicious envy scale of the BeMaS, tested whether our participants

used deliberate ignorance to protect themselves from being envious. This treatment had two stages. In the first stage, endowments were determined. Person A received a fixed endowment of  $a = 3$  euros.<sup>7</sup> Person B's endowment  $b$  was determined by a random draw:  $b = 3$  euros with 15% probability;  $b = 15$  euros with 85% probability.<sup>8</sup> The probabilities and possible outcomes were common knowledge, but the outcome of the random draw was observed by neither Person A nor Person B. In the second stage, Person A decided whether or not to be informed on  $b$ . If Person A chose to be informed, the sum was shown on the computer screen. At the very end of the session, both participants got feedback about their payoff. Person A learned their payoff  $a$ . Person B was shown  $b$  (and was not informed about Person A's decision to be informed).

The second and third treatments, *Info Choice & Deduction* and *Full Info & Deduction*, provided data to test our second hypothesis. In *Info Choice & Deduction*, the initial setup was the same as in *Info Choice & No Deduction*, but in a final, third stage, Person A could deduct  $0 \leq d \leq 12$  euros from Person B's account ( $d$  could be entered in 10-cent increments). If Person A had chosen to be informed about  $b$ , it was revealed at the beginning of this stage. Otherwise, Person A decided on  $d$  without knowing  $b$ . We ensured that decisions to deduct from a Person B who was randomly endowed with  $b = 3$  euros did not become effective (i.e.,  $b - d \geq 3$ ). The participants were informed about this rule in the instructions. This feature is important; without it, we might have induced additional reluctance on the part of Person A to deduct from Person B's endowment, since Person A may have wanted to avoid harming Person B by mistake if  $b = 3$ . Again, feedback about payoffs was given at the very end of the session. Person B learned their final payoff  $b - d$ , but we did not provide information about  $b$  and  $d$  separately. Person A was shown  $a$ .

The order of decisions in *Full Info & Deduction* was the same as in *Info Choice & Deduction*, with one exception: Person A could not avoid receiving information about  $b$ . Hence, there was no second stage, and Person A was always informed about  $b$  before deciding on the deduction  $d$  (again, deducting was only possible when  $b = 15$ ).

After all decisions were made but before being informed about their payoff, participants filled out questionnaires that measured their ability to regulate their emotions, using the ERQ by Gross and John (2003) in a German translation by Abler and Kessler (2009). The ERQ has 10 items and distinguishes between two strategies by which emotions can be regulated: cognitive reappraisal (six items) and expressive suppression (four items). We measured dispositional malicious envy (defined as the motivation to harm an envied person's success) by using the five-item BeMaS malicious envy scale by Lange and Crusius

---

<sup>7</sup>The exchange rate was approximately US\$1.14 per euro when we conducted the sessions.

<sup>8</sup>We chose probabilities that ensure (i) that a low endowment was not too improbable, and (ii) that we could collect sufficient observations where Person A was allowed to deduct payoff from Person B.

(2015) in a German translation by the original authors.<sup>9</sup> Finally, we administered the Iowa–Netherlands Comparison Measure (INCOM) by Gibbons and Buunk (1999) in a shortened and translated version by Schneider and Schupp (2014). It consists of six items.

## 2.1 Hypotheses

The ERQ consists of two subscales, (cognitive) reappraisal and (expressive) suppression. According to Gross and John (2003), reappraisal is an antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy—that is, the individual manipulates the situation, potentially triggering the emotion. Suppression, in contrast, is a response-focused strategy: It targets the emotion from the moment the individual actually feels it.

In the context of our research questions, we expected the effects of these two facets of emotion regulation on deliberate ignorance to be opposed to each other because participants in the role of Person A with a high score on the reappraisal scale would have a relatively high ability to anticipate the negative emotion they might feel in a situation, and could therefore change that situation from the outset. This precisely describes what we thought our Person A participants would do when they avoided information about  $b$  because they did not want to feel envious. In contrast, Person A participants with a high score on the suppression scale should not be particularly worried about a situation in which they may feel envious, because they anticipate that once the emotion arises they can easily suppress it. Put differently, Person A participants with a high suppression score may inform themselves more often about  $b$  (e.g., because they are curious)<sup>10</sup> than those with a low score.

The treatment *Info Choice & No Deduction*, where Person A can choose whether or not to be informed about  $b$  but cannot reduce Person B’s payoff, potentially proves the existence of deliberate ignorance that can only plausibly be explained by envy: As there is no possibility to reduce Person B’s payoff in this treatment, avoiding the information about Person B’s endowment cannot be driven by the second motive, preventing resentful behavior toward others. To test our first hypothesis—that such deliberate ignorance is driven by the desire to prevent feeling envy—we examined whether the choice to avoid information correlated (i) positively with a high level of emotion regulation as measured by the reappraisal scale, (ii) negatively with a high level of emotion regulation as measured by the suppression scale, and (iii) positively with a psychological measure of malicious envy.

---

<sup>9</sup>The BeMaS also contains questions eliciting benign envy, defined as the motivation to invest more effort in order to improve one’s own position. As this measure is not relevant for our research questions, we did not administer it.

<sup>10</sup>See, for instance, Golman and Loewenstein (2018) for a discussion on how curiosity counteracts deliberate ignorance.

The latter of the three predictions was motivated by the simple argument that people who are prone to feeling envious are those who can benefit the most from deliberate ignorance. Hence, we expected they would prefer to stay uninformed more often than the people who are less prone to feeling envious.

**Hypothesis 1:** Consider the treatment where Person A cannot reduce Person B’s payoff. We expect that Person A participants who choose not to be informed about  $b$  would score (i) higher on the ERQ reappraisal scale, (ii) lower on the ERQ suppression scale, and (iii) higher on the BeMaS malicious envy scale than those who choose to be informed.<sup>11</sup>

Our second hypothesis concerns the role of deliberate ignorance in preventing the behavioral impulse of destroying the object of envy. This motive is related to self-control, an aspect of inhibitory control. Self-control is the ability to regulate one’s emotions, thoughts, and behavior in the face of temptations and impulses (Diamond, 2013). In our setup, a measure for the importance of this motive was provided by the comparison between the two treatments in which Person A can reduce Person B’s payoff, but the possibility for Person A to avoid information about  $b$  differs.

**Hypothesis 2:** Consider treatments in which Person A can reduce Person B’s payoff. We expect that Person A participants who, by choice, avoid information about  $b$  would deduct on average less payoff from Person B than those who, by design, are informed that  $b$  is high.<sup>12</sup>

To test Hypothesis 2, we compared the amounts deducted by Person A participants who remained voluntarily uninformed in *Info Choice & Deduction* with the amounts deducted by Person A participants who learned that  $b = 15$  in *Full Info & Deduction*. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the former group would deduct, on average, a smaller amount than the latter. We thus excluded two groups of Person A participants from the main part of our analysis: First, those who chose to be informed in *Info Choice & Deduction*, because they did not provide observations that could be used to test Hypothesis 2. (However, they enter the exploratory part of our analysis.) Second, we excluded Person A participants in *Full Info & Deduction* who learned that  $b = 3$ , because, by design, they could not deduct anything from Person B participants who were randomly endowed with  $b = 3$  euros. Uninformed Person A participants in *Info Choice & Deduction* could not distinguish

---

<sup>11</sup>In the statistical testing of this hypothesis we additionally controlled for the participants’ gender as well as the interaction of gender and the ERQ suppression score. This is important because both Gross and John (2003) and Abler and Kessler (2009) documented a lower suppression score for females.

<sup>12</sup>In the statistical testing of this hypothesis we did not control for any additional variables. As we compared a group that was endogenously selected to remain uninformed to a group that was informed by design, we expected that these two groups would differ with respect to their psychological traits. Including measures for such traits as controls into our analysis could wrongly capture the main treatment effect.

whether their counterpart had  $b = 3$  or  $b = 15$ , but they knew that a deduction would only be effective if  $b = 15$ . We thus assumed that they targeted the latter sum when deducting from Person B’s endowment. The relevant comparison group in *Full Info & Deduction* is thus Person A participants who learned that  $b = 15$ .

However, such selection criteria described above would also produce an effect similar to the one predicted in Hypothesis 2 if an individual’s social preferences and their deliberate ignorance were positively correlated. To avoid reporting a potential artifact of the design, we also compared the deduction decisions of all Person A participants in the two treatments where they could deduct, *Info Choice & Deduction* and *Full Info & Deduction*.

## 2.2 Procedures

Each participant took part in only one of the three treatments. We used a pre-existing database (based on ORSEE by Greiner 2015) to recruit participants to attend our experimental sessions at the Potsdam Laboratory for Economic Experiments (PLEx) at the University of Potsdam and at the WZB/TU Lab at the Technical University Berlin. The ORSEE database contains contact details of several thousand potential subjects, mostly students from various disciplines at universities in Berlin and Potsdam. When the students registered in the database, they knew only that they would be invited to economic experiments with monetary incentivization. Invitation emails contained no details about the experiment apart from the time, place, and duration of the experimental session. We invited a random selection of registered participants until a session was filled in order to limit self-selection into sessions.

The experimental sessions were conducted in January 2019. The approximate duration of an experimental session was 30 minutes. Participants received a show-up fee of 5 euros in addition to the amount earned in the experiment. After the experiment, participants received their payment in private. On average, they earned 12.40 euros (including the show-up fee; minimum 5 euros, maximum 20 euros).

Upon entering the laboratory, each participant was randomly assigned to a computer workstation. These workstations were visually isolated so that no participant could observe any other participant’s behavior during the experiment. Before the experiment started, we asked participants who had not taken part in a previous experiment in the laboratory to sign a data privacy statement as required by law. All participants signed an informed consent form required by the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. The study was approved by the institute’s ethics committee.<sup>13</sup>

The experimental sessions were fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).

---

<sup>13</sup>The ethics committee approved our study on 18 September 2018 (reference A2018/30).

The computer randomly assigned the roles of Person A and Person B to participants and matched each Person A randomly with a Person B. Participants were then shown instructions on screen.<sup>14</sup> After reading the instructions, they had to answer a set of control questions in order to demonstrate that they understood the rules of the experiment. Only data from Person A participants who needed no more than three trials to answer all questions correctly were included in the analysis. Those who needed more trials were nevertheless allowed to participate in the experiment because exclusion at this stage might have stigmatized them.

Table 2 shows summary statistics of the subjects' characteristics. Besides the variables mentioned in the Introduction, such as the information decision, the deduction amount, the gender and the scales, we also recorded the decision times (in seconds) in all stages of the experiment and asked the participants in the questionnaire whether they had heard about the experiment before (possible answer: yes/no) and how many subjects they knew personally in their experimental session (possible answer: integers from zero up to the maximum numbers of seats in the laboratory minus one).<sup>15</sup> We included a dummy variable that took the value 1 for all subjects who participated in the PLEx laboratory (all other subjects participated at the WZB/TU Lab).

Tables A.1 through A.8 in the Appendix present reliability calculations and inter-item correlations of the BeMaS, ERQ reappraisal, ERQ suppression, and INCOM items (Cronbach's alpha of the four scales range between 0.77 and 0.71). Table A.9 displays the correlation coefficients of the four scales with each other (the malicious envy scale is positively correlated with both the ERQ suppression scale and the INCOM scale; all other correlation coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero). Figures A.1 through A.4 in the Appendix present histograms of the four psychological scales.

---

<sup>14</sup>On-screen instructions, control questions, and screenshots of all stages are supplied in the Experimental Instructions Appendix.

<sup>15</sup>There are 20 workstations for subjects at PLEx, and 24 at the WZB/TU Lab.

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Median	Maximum
Female	0.453	(0.498)	0	0	1
BeMaS	2.231	(0.930)	1	2	5.2
ERQ reappraisal	4.909	(1.005)	1	5	7
ERQ suppression	3.684	(1.223)	1	3.75	7
INCOM	3.577	(0.749)	1	3.667	5
Participated at PLEx <i>dummy</i>	0.441	(0.497)	0	0	1
Known experiment <i>dummy</i>	0.092	(0.289)	0	0	1
# known subjects	0.440	(1.283)	0	0	19
Profit (without show-up fee)	7.435	(5.667)	3	3	15
# subjects	448				

**Table 2:** Summary statistics of control variables

### 3 Results

Table 3 shows information decision in the two treatments where subjects had the option to avoid information about their partner’s payoff. In *Info Choice & No Deduction*, 13.7% of Person A participants avoided information about  $b$ . In *Info Choice & Deduction* the share of information avoiders increased to 20.7%. The difference between the treatments is not statistically significantly different from zero (Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 1.5927$ ,  $p = 0.207$ ). These numbers are considerably smaller than the extent of deliberate ignorance in Huck et al. (2018), where 31.6% of the subjects decided to stay uninformed about the piece rate before working on a real-effort task, and in the interactive setting of Stüber (2019), where 36% of the third parties avoided information.

Participants’ mean scores in the psychological scales are relatively similar when we compare information avoiders and obtainers, although, in *Info Choice & Deduction*, the BeMaS scale was significantly lower for information avoiders—contrary to our hypothesis for *Info Choice & No Deduction*. As hypothesized, the ERQ Suppression scale (and the INCOM scale, which was not part of Hypothesis 1) was significantly lower for information avoiders. Thus, the evidence for our first hypothesis is mixed.

	<i>Info Choice &amp; No Deduction</i>			<i>Info Choice &amp; Deduction</i>		
	Avoid info	Obtain info	<i>p</i> -value	Avoid info	Obtain info	<i>p</i> -value
	13.7%	86.3%		20.7%	79.3%	
BeMaS	2.214 (0.847)	2.175 (0.791)	0.8645	1.835 (0.742)	2.471 (1.032)	0.0198
ERQ reappraisal	4.607 (1.253)	5.030 (0.949)	0.1422	4.755 (1.238)	4.662 (0.938)	0.7340
ERQ suppression	3.946 (1.019)	3.759 (1.361)	0.6223	3.441 (1.106)	4.046 (1.122)	0.0506
INCOM	3.556 (0.789)	3.561 (0.756)	0.9961	3.186 (0.981)	3.631 (0.684)	0.0332

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. *p*-values on differences are based on two-sided two-sample t-tests.

**Table 3:** Summary statistics of Person A participants' scores on the psychological scales

Table 4 provides an overview of the deduction decisions for the two treatments where deductions were possible. In *Info Choice & Deduction*, Person A participants deducted 3.40 euros on average. Neither the average deducted amount  $d$  nor the share of Person A participants who deducted  $d > 0$  were statistically different for information avoiders than for information seekers.<sup>16</sup> If any difference exists at all, it is opposed to the one predicted in Hypothesis 2. (In *Full Info & Deduction*, the amounts deducted were (insignificantly) lower than in *Info Choice & Deduction*.<sup>17</sup>)

<sup>16</sup>A two-sided t-test shows that  $d$  is not significantly different between the avoiders and seekers,  $p = 0.6322$ ; the share of those who set  $d > 0$  is also not significantly different between the two groups, Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 0.7114$ ,  $p = 0.399$ . When we compare the deductions of all Person A participants in the two *Deduction* treatments, we find that they are not statistically significant (according to a two-sided t-test,  $p = 0.0747$ ); but the share of subjects with  $d > 0$  is higher in the *Info Choice* treatment (Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 4.5289$ ,  $p = 0.033$ ).

<sup>17</sup>The difference between the information seekers in *Info Choice & Deduction* and all Person A participants in *Full Info & Deduction* is not significantly different from zero; two-sided t-test with  $p = 0.1198$ .

	$d$	Share with $d > 0$
<i>Info Choice &amp; Deduction</i>		
All ( $n = 82$ )	3.396 (4.637)	43.9% (49.9)
- Info avoiders ( $n = 17$ )	3.906 (4.937)	52.9% (51.5)
- Info seekers ( $n = 65$ )	3.263 (4.587)	41.5% (49.6)
<i>Full Info &amp; Deduction</i>		
All ( $n = 38$ )	1.921 (3.928)	23.7% (43.1)
- with $b = 15$ ( $n = 30$ ) -	2.433 (4.289)	30.0% (46.6)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

**Table 4:** Summary statistics of Person A participants' deduction decisions

Figure 1 additionally displays histograms of the deducted amounts for the different groups in the two *Deduction* treatments. All distributions are similar with modes on  $d = 0$ .

The evidence therefore speaks against both of our hypotheses. In the following, we present the results of regression analyses testing on our hypotheses.


### 3.1 Hypothesis 1: Deliberate ignorance to avoid envy

This section considers the question of whether deliberate ignorance for the sake of not becoming envious was a factor in our experiments. Did information avoiders in *Info Choice & No Deduction* score differently on the psychological scales than information seekers?

Table 5 shows the results of linear probability models. In Model 1 we regressed an information avoidance dummy on the mean scores of the three scales we administered (and a female dummy and its interaction term with the ERQ suppression scale).<sup>18</sup> The results show that the three scales do not correlate with information avoidance.

Model 2 extends the first model and also includes the INCOM score, the decision times in the information acquisition stage and the instructions (participants might have already considered whether to seek or avoid information about  $b$  when they learned their role in the instructions), the number of personally known subjects, and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the subject stated that they had heard about the experiment before.

<sup>18</sup>As in previous studies, we also found a gender gap in the ERQ suppression score. Females had an average score of 3.340; males 3.935. This difference is highly statistically significant (one-sided t-test,  $p < 0.0000$ ).



**Figure 1:** Histograms of deductions  $d$

Model 2 provides a better fit than Model 1 as the adjusted R2 is higher.<sup>19</sup> The results from Model 1 are robust to including these additional variables.

**Result 1:** In contrast to Hypothesis 1, neither BeMaS, ERQ reappraisal, nor ERQ suppression explains information avoidance.

<sup>19</sup>Note that the coefficient of the decision time in the information acquisition stage is significant at the 5-percent level: Participants who avoided information about  $b$  spent more time contemplating their decision.

	Information avoided	
	Model 1	Model 2
ERQ reappraisal	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.066* (0.035)
ERQ suppression	0.018 (0.036)	0.029 (0.035)
BeMaS	-0.004 (0.045)	-0.019 (0.047)
Female	0.048 (0.218)	0.111 (0.214)
Female * ERQ suppression	-0.025 (0.057)	-0.036 (0.056)
INCOM		0.041 (0.050)
Time instructions & control questions		0.002 (0.001)
Time info choice		0.017** (0.008)
Known subjects		-0.005 (0.048)
Known experiment		-0.186 (0.131)
Constant	0.346 (0.247)	-0.004 (0.308)
R2	0.029	0.149
Adj. R2	-0.022	0.055
AIC	80.878	77.433
BIC	96.628	106.308
N	102	102

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: \*  $p < 0.1$ ;  
\*\*  $p < 0.05$ .

**Table 5:** Determinants of information avoidance in *Info Choice & No Deduction*

We found no evidence for a gender gap in deliberate ignorance. Gneezy et al. (2003) found that females were more likely than males to avoid competitive situations. One aspect of such competitive situations is that the competing parties receive information about the other’s income level. Avoiding competition could therefore be a way to protect oneself from the negative emotional response that may be generated by this information. In our regressions in Table 5, we did not observe such a gender gap.<sup>20</sup> This is in line with other studies that found no clear evidence for a gender effect in deliberate ignorance or

<sup>20</sup>We also calculated correlation coefficients for the two treatments that show no gender gap. In *Info Choice & No Deduction* the correlation coefficient between information avoided and female is -0.072 ( $p = 0.474$ ). In *Info Choice & Deduction* this correlation coefficient is 0.093 ( $p = 0.405$ ).

information acquisition (see McCloud et al. 2013 and Yang and Kahlor 2013).

### 3.2 Hypothesis 2: Deliberate ignorance to avoid envy’s detrimental effects

In this section, we test whether Person A participants who avoided information about  $b$  (in *Info Choice & Deduction*) deducted less than participants who observed that  $b = 15$  (in *Full Info & Deduction*). In addition to comparing the amounts deducted, we also compare the frequency of such payoff deductions.

Table 6 shows the results of OLS regressions. For Model 1, we regressed  $d$  on an “Info avoided” dummy. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, information avoiders tended to deduct more, not less, than participants who could not choose to avoid information in *Full Info & Deduction* and observed  $b = 15$  (though the difference from zero is not statistically different from zero).

	$d$		$\mathbb{1}_{d>0}$	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Info avoided <i>dummy</i>	1.473 (1.375)	-0.053 (1.936)	0.229 (0.147)	0.209 (0.213)
Time instructions & control questions		-0.021 (0.020)		-0.003 (0.002)
<i>Info Choice &amp; Deduction</i> * Time info choice		0.154 (0.191)		0.004 (0.021)
Time deduction		0.112*** (0.040)		0.011** (0.004)
Constant	2.433*** (0.827)	2.120 (2.430)	0.300*** (0.088)	0.353 (0.267)
R2	0.025	0.205	0.051	0.181
Adj. R2	0.003	0.129	0.030	0.103
AIC	277.343	273.734	67.096	66.209
BIC	281.043	282.984	70.796	75.460
N	47	47	47	47

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 6:** Determinants of deduction in *Info Choice & Deduction* and *Full Info & Deduction*

Model 2 extends Model 1 by also including the decision times of the deduction stage and previous stages. The time spent in the deduction stage correlates positively with the decision of how much to deduct: With every additional second in this stage, Person A participants deducted on average 11 cents more from Person B participants.<sup>21</sup> Models

<sup>21</sup>Figures A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix show scatterplots of  $d$  over decision times for *Info Choice &*

3 and 4 consider the frequency of deductions in linear probability models (where the dependent variable in the regressions is a dummy if  $d > 0$ ). These estimation results confirm our findings regarding the deducted amount.

**Result 2:** In contrast to Hypothesis 2, voluntarily uninformed participants did not deduct less than the participants who observed the high endowment when they could not avoid the information.

## 4 Discussion and conclusion

We hypothesized that (i) participants in our experiments would use deliberate ignorance to avoid the unpleasant emotion envy, and (ii) that those who avoided potentially envy-triggering information would deduct less from the endowment of another subject. We found no evidence for either hypothesis. There are several interpretations of this lack of evidence.

First, we might have failed in inducing envy. A payoff differential alone might not have been enough to trigger a negative emotional response. It seems that people simply accept inequalities when endowments are allocated randomly.

Second, envy (or anger about inequality) might target the person causing the inequality (see Stüber 2019). In our setup, inequality was not caused by the potential subject of envy, but by an anonymous experimenter, and the participants could not direct a negative emotional response toward the experimenter.

These first two interpretations are supported by Fehr et al. (2018). In a lab experiment, Fehr et al. (2018) manipulated the inequality of a real-effort task's payment scheme in three treatments and let subjects subsequently play a trust game. They found evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on trust. However, this finding critically depends on the context: if a well-off person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the worse-off person, then trust is not negatively affected.

Third, we might not have found evidence for our hypotheses because curiosity might have counteracted envy. The effects discussed in Golman and Loewenstein (2018) might have been stronger than the motive to avoid becoming envious.

Finally, using deliberate ignorance as a tool to avoid becoming envious requires some sophistication in the sense that people must anticipate their own emotional and behavioral response. The participants might not have been sophisticated enough to form correct beliefs. Relatedly, the monetary stakes in our experiments might have been too low in

---

*Deduction and Full Info & Deduction.* Linear and quadratic fits in Figure A.5 lie almost exactly on top of one another. The quadratic fit in Figure A.6 is concave. But when confidence intervals are compared (not shown in these graphs), they mostly overlap.

order to trigger envy.

## References

- Abler, B., Kessler, H., 2009. Emotion Regulation Questionnaire—Eine deutschsprachige Fassung des ERQ von Gross und John [Emotion Regulation Questionnaire—a German version of the ERQ by Gross and John]. *Diagnostica* 55 (3), 144–152.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1026/0012-1924.55.3.144>
- Andries, M., Haddad, V., 2017. Information aversion. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23958.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.3386/w23958>
- Bartling, B., Engl, F., Weber, R. A., 2014. Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study. *European Economic Review* 70, 512–524.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.016>
- Baumeister, R. F., 1999. *The self in social psychology*. Psychology Press, Philadelphia, PA.
- Bosman, R., van Winden, F., 2002. Emotional hazard in a power-to-take experiment. *The Economic Journal* 112 (476), 147–169.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.0j677>
- Brocas, I., Carrillo, J. D., 2007. Influence through ignorance. *The RAND Journal of Economics* 38 (4), 931–947.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00119.x>
- Carrillo, J. D., Mariotti, T., 2000. Strategic ignorance as a self-disciplining device. *The Review of Economic Studies* 67 (3), 529–544.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00142>
- Carstensen, L. L., 1995. Evidence for a life-span theory of socioemotional selectivity. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 4 (5), 151–156.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.ep11512261>
- Carstensen, L. L., Gross, J. J., Fung, H. H., 1998. The social context of emotional experience. In: Schaie, K. W., Lawton, M. P. (Eds.), *Annual Review of Gerontology and Geriatrics: Focus on Emotion and Adult Development*. Vol. 17. Springer Publishing Company, New York, NY, pp. 325–352.
- Casal, S., Güth, W., Jia, M., Ploner, M., 2012. Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*

84 (3), 857–865.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.008>

Clore, G. L., Huntsinger, J. R., 2007. How emotions inform judgment and regulate thought. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 11 (9), 393–399.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.08.005>

Cohen, J., 1988. *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences*, 2nd Edition. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ.

Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., 2013. Strategic ignorance in ultimatum bargaining. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 92, 104–115.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.05.010>

Dana, J., Weber, R. A., Kuang, J. X., 2007. Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. *Economic Theory* 33 (1), 67–80.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z>

Denant-Boemont, L., Masclet, D., Noussair, C. N., 2007. Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment. *Economic Theory* 33 (1), 145–167.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0212-0>

Diamond, A., 2013. Executive functions. *Annual Review of Psychology* 64, 135–168.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143750>

Diefendorff, J. M., Hall, R. J., Lord, R. G., Streat, M. L., 2000. Action–state orientation: Construct validity of a revised measure and its relationship to work-related variables. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 85 (2), 250–263.

URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.85.2.250>

Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E., Smith, H. L., 1999. Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress. *Psychological Bulletin* 125 (2), 276–302.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.276>

Engelmann, D., Strobel, M., 2004. Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments. *American Economic Review* 94 (4), 857–869.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002741>

Engelmann, D., Strobel, M., 2007. Preferences over income distributions: Experimental evidence. *Public Finance Review* 35 (2), 285–310.

URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142106294713>

- Falk, A., Zimmermann, F., 2016. Beliefs and utility: Experimental evidence on preferences for information. IZA Discussion Paper 10172.  
URL <http://ftp.iza.org/dp10172.pdf>
- Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., Buchner, A., 2007. G\* power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behavior Research Methods* 39 (2), 175–191.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146>
- Fehr, D., Rau, H., Trautmann, S. T., Xu, Y., 2018. Inequality, fairness and social capital. University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics Working Paper Series 650.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00025085>
- Fehr, E., Gächter, S., 2000. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. *American Economic Review* 90 (4), 980–994.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.4.980>
- Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. M., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114 (3), 817–868.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151>
- Festinger, L., 1954. A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations* 7 (2), 117–140.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001872675400700202>
- Fischbacher, U., 2007. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. *Experimental Economics* 10 (2), 171–178.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4>
- Gibbons, F. X., Buunk, B. P., 1999. Individual differences in social comparison: Development of a scale of social comparison orientation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76 (1), 129–142.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.1.129>
- Gino, F., Schweitzer, M. E., 2008. Blinded by anger or feeling the love: How emotions influence advice taking. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 93 (5), 1165–1173.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.93.5.1165>
- Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., Fehr, E., 2003. Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. *Evolution and Human Behavior* 24 (3), 153–172.  
URL [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138\(02\)00157-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5)

- Gneezy, U., Niederle, M., Rustichini, A., 2003. Performance in competitive environments: Gender differences. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118 (3), 1049–1074.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360698496>
- Golman, R., Hagmann, D., Loewenstein, G., 2017. Information avoidance. *Journal of Economic Literature* 55 (1), 96–135.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20151245>
- Golman, R., Loewenstein, G., 2018. Information gaps: A theory of preferences regarding the presence and absence of information. *Decision* 5 (3), 143–164.  
URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dec0000068>
- Greiner, B., 2015. Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. *Journal of the Economic Science Association* 1 (1), 114–125.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4>
- Gross, J. J., 1998. The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. *Review of General Psychology* 2 (3), 271–299.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.3.271>
- Gross, J. J. (Ed.), 2007. *Handbook of emotion regulation*. Guilford Press, New York, NY.
- Gross, J. J., John, O. P., 2003. Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 85 (2), 348–362.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348>
- Gross, J. J., Muñoz, R. F., 1995. Emotion regulation and mental health. *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice* 2 (2), 151–164.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2850.1995.tb00036.x>
- Grossman, Z., 2014. Strategic ignorance and the robustness of social preferences. *Management Science* 60 (11), 2659–2665.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1989>
- Grossman, Z., van der Weele, J. J., 2017. Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions. *Journal of the European Economic Association* 15 (1), 173–217.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvw001>
- Hertwig, R., Engel, C., 2016. Homo ignorans: Deliberately choosing not to know. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 11 (3), 359–372.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616635594>

- Hertwig, R., Woike, J. K., Schupp, J., 2018. Prevalence and correlates of deliberate ignorance. Mimeo.
- Huck, S., Szech, N., Wenner, L. M., 2018. More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, belief design and performance. Working Paper.  
URL [https://polit.econ.kit.edu/downloads/papers/BeliefDesignAndPerformance\\_WP.pdf](https://polit.econ.kit.edu/downloads/papers/BeliefDesignAndPerformance_WP.pdf)
- Kirchsteiger, G., 1994. The role of envy in ultimatum games. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 25 (3), 373–389.  
URL [https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681\(94\)90106-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)90106-6)
- Lange, J., Crusius, J., 2015. Dispositional envy revisited: Unraveling the motivational dynamics of benign and malicious envy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 41 (2), 284–294.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214564959>
- Leibbrandt, A., López-Pérez, R., 2011. The dark side of altruistic third-party punishment. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (5), 761–784.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711408010>
- Leibbrandt, A., López-Pérez, R., 2012. An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 84 (3), 753–766.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.018>
- McCloud, R., Jung, M., Gray, S., Viswanath, K., 2013. Class, race and ethnicity and information avoidance among cancer survivors. *British Journal of Cancer* 108, 1949–1956.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1038/bjc.2013.182>
- Morse, S., Gergen, K. J., 1970. Social comparison, self-consistency, and the concept of self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 16 (1), 148–156.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0029862>
- Murray, S. L., 2005. Regulating the risks of closeness: A relationship-specific sense of felt security. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 14 (2), 74–78.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00338.x>
- Nelissen, R. M., Zeelenberg, M., 2009. Moral emotions as determinants of third-party punishment: Anger, guilt and the functions of altruistic sanctions. *Judgment and De-*

- cision Making 4 (7), 543–553.  
URL <http://journal.sjdm.org/91001/jdm91001.pdf>
- Nielsen, L., Knutson, B., Carstensen, L. L., 2008. Affect dynamics, affective forecasting, and aging. *Emotion* 8 (3), 318–330.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.8.3.318>
- Nikiforakis, N., 2008. Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (1–2), 91–112.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008>
- Parrott, W. G., Smith, R. H., 1993. Distinguishing the experiences of envy and jealousy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64 (6), 906–920.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.6.906>
- Porges, S. W., 2007. The polyvagal perspective. *Biological Psychology* 74 (2), 116–143.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2006.06.009>
- Rentzsch, K., Gross, J. J., 2015. Who turns green with envy? Conceptual and empirical perspectives on dispositional envy. *European Journal of Personality* 29 (5), 530–547.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2012>
- Ronayne, D., Sgroi, D., 2018. Ignoring good advice. The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series 1150.  
URL [https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2018/twerp\\_1150\\_sgroi.pdf](https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2018/twerp_1150_sgroi.pdf)
- Rothermund, K., Voss, A., Wentura, D., 2008. Counter-regulation in affective attentional biases: A basic mechanism that warrants flexibility in emotion and motivation. *Emotion* 8 (1), 34–46.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.8.1.34>
- Sapolsky, R. M., 2007. Stress, stress-related disease, and emotional regulation. In: Gross, J. J. (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation*. Guilford Press, New York, NY, pp. 606–615.
- Schneider, S. M., Schupp, J., 2014. Individual differences in social comparison and its consequences for life satisfaction: Introducing a short scale of the Iowa–Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure. *Social Indicators Research* 115 (2), 767–789.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-012-0227-1>

- Smith, R. H., Kim, S. H., 2007. Comprehending envy. *Psychological Bulletin* 133 (1), 46–64.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.46>
- Stüber, R., 2019. The benefit of the doubt: Willful ignorance and altruistic punishment. *Experimental Economics*.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09633-y>
- Sweeny, K., Melnyk, D., Miller, W., Shepperd, J. A., 2010. Information avoidance: Who, what, when, and why. *Review of General Psychology* 14 (4), 340–353.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0021288>
- Thunström, L., Nordström, J., Shogren, J. F., Ehmke, M., van't Veld, K., 2016. Strategic self-ignorance. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 52 (2), 117–136.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-016-9236-9>
- Urry, H. L., Gross, J. J., 2010. Emotion regulation in older age. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 19 (6), 352–357.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721410388395>
- Wenninger, H., Cheung, C. M. K., Krasnova, H., 2019. College-aged users behavioral strategies to reduce envy on social networking sites: A cross-cultural investigation. *Computers in Human Behavior* 97, 10–23.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.02.025>
- Wood, J. V., 1989. Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal attributes. *Psychological Bulletin* 106 (2), 231–248.  
URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.231>
- Yang, Z. J., Kahlor, L., 2013. What, me worry? The role of affect in information seeking and avoidance. *Science Communication* 35 (2), 189–212.  
URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547012441873>

# Appendix

## Power calculation

This section supplies information on the statistical analyses we used to test our hypotheses and on how we determined the number of required participants, as displayed in Table 1. For these power calculations, we used the software package G\*Power (version 3.1.9.2) by Faul et al. (2007). We always set power,  $1 - \beta$ , equal to 0.8 and required statistical significance,  $\alpha$ , equal to 0.05.

Hypothesis 1 predicts that Person A participants in the *Info Choice & No Deduction* treatment who choose to avoid information will score higher on the ERQ reappraisal scale, lower on the ERQ suppression scale, and higher on the malicious envy scale than those who choose to acquire information. We tested this hypothesis using a linear probability model where we regressed the information choice on the three mean scores stated above and two covariates (a *female* dummy variable as well as the interaction term of this dummy variable and the ERQ suppression score).

Responses to the ERQ items are given on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The reappraisal scale consists of six items, the suppression scale consists of four items. In line with Gross and John (2003) and Abler and Kessler (2009), we calculated the mean reappraisal and suppression scores separately over the relevant items. Responses to the malicious envy scale are given on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). In line with Lange and Crusius (2015), we calculated the mean score over the five items.

We assumed an effect size of  $f^2 = 0.15$  for the power calculation for Hypothesis 1.<sup>22</sup> As we wanted to test three variables separately, we used a Bonferroni adjustment and corrected  $\alpha$  to 0.0167 ( $= 0.05/3$ ). G\*Power calculated that we needed 99 Person A participants to test our hypothesis with three tested predictors and two covariates. Thus, the number of required subjects in treatment *Info Choice & No Deduction* was 198 (one Person B per Person A).

---

<sup>22</sup>Our assumption of a medium-sized effect—according to the categorization in Cohen (1988, pp. 413–414) in the context of regression analysis—is based on the literature that found large effects when subjects’ answers to an envy scale were compared in an experimental setting. One treatment group in Study 4 in Rentzsch and Gross (2015) faced an envy-triggering situation; the other group faced a neutral situation. Based on the authors’ reported data, we calculated an effect size of  $d = 0.75$  ( $= (2.36 - 3.26)/1.206255$ ). The gender difference of the ERQ suppression score had a medium-sized effect. Gross and John (2003) reported that females in all their samples scored lower on the ERQ suppression scale than did males (with an average effect size of  $d = 0.47$ ; Study 1, p. 352). For the German translation of the ERQ, we found a similar effect. Based on the the data reported by Abler and Kessler (2009), we calculated an effect size of  $d = 0.51$  ( $= (2.92 - 3.45)/1.029393$ ). Cohen’s  $d = 0.5$  is, according to Cohen (1988, p. 40), also a medium-sized effect when a t-test for means is considered. Hence, our assumed effect size of  $f^2 = 0.15$  is comparable to the effect size of  $d = 0.5$ .

Hypothesis 2 predicts that information avoiders in *Info Choice & Deduction* will deduct less payoff from Person B participants than will Person A participants in *Full Info & Deduction* who observe that Person B receives the high endowment of  $b = 15$  euros. We tested this hypothesis using an OLS regression where we regressed deducted points  $d$  on a treatment dummy variable. In this regression, we did not include any covariates.

For the power calculation for Hypothesis 2 we again assumed an effect size of  $f^2 = 0.15$ . G\*Power calculated that we needed at least 55 observations in the two treatments combined. As we had to split this number between two treatments, we decided to collect data for 25 Person A participants in *Info Choice & Deduction* who remain uninformed and for 30 Person A participants in *Full Info & Deduction* who observe  $b = 15$ . This was not yet the final number of participants, because we had to take into account that not all Person A participants in *Info Choice & Deduction* would choose to remain uninformed and not all Person A participants in *Full Info & Deduction* would observe  $b = 15$ . Using the share of information avoidance reported by Huck et al. (2018), we expected to need 80 ( $= 25/0.316$ ) Person A participants in *Info Choice & Deduction* in total. In *Full Info & Deduction*, the total number of required Person A participants was 36 ( $= 30/0.85$ ). To account for the Person B participants, we had to double these numbers; we therefore needed 232 participants for these two treatments.

## Tables

Item	N	Sign	Item–test corr.	Item–rest corr.	Avg. inter-item corr.	alpha
BeMaS1	448	+	0.6609	0.4542	0.4304	0.7514
BeMaS2	448	+	0.6856	0.4883	0.4156	0.7399
BeMaS3	448	+	0.7992	0.6549	0.3476	0.6806
BeMaS4	448	+	0.7196	0.5364	0.3953	0.7233
BeMaS5	448	+	0.7286	0.5493	0.3899	0.7188
Test scale					0.3958	0.7661

**Table A.1:** Reliability of the standardized BeMaS test scale

	BeMaS1	BeMaS2	BeMaS3	BeMaS4	BeMaS5
BeMaS1	1.0000				
BeMaS2	0.3660***	1.0000			
BeMaS3	0.3520***	0.4285***	1.0000		
BeMaS4	0.2604***	0.3029***	0.6297***	1.0000	
BeMaS5	0.3968***	0.3666***	0.4619***	0.3931***	1.0000

Note: Significance level: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.2:** Inter-item correlations of the BeMaS items (obs=448 in all pairs)

Item	N	Sign	Item–test corr.	Item–rest corr.	Avg. inter-item corr.	alpha
ERQ1	448	+	0.6239	0.4291	0.3367	0.7173
ERQ3	448	+	0.6384	0.4481	0.3309	0.7121
ERQ5	448	+	0.6073	0.4076	0.3433	0.7232
ERQ7	448	+	0.7495	0.6004	0.2869	0.6680
ERQ8	448	+	0.6017	0.4006	0.3454	0.7252
ERQ10	448	+	0.7382	0.5842	0.2914	0.6728
Test scale					0.3224	0.7406

**Table A.3:** Reliability of the standardized ERQ reappraisal test scale

	ERQ1	ERQ3	ERQ5	ERQ7	ERQ8	ERQ10
ERQ1	1.0000					
ERQ3	0.4714***	1.0000				
ERQ5	0.1584***	0.2211***	1.0000			
ERQ7	0.3868***	0.2833***	0.3489***	1.0000		
ERQ8	0.1122***	0.1846***	0.3221***	0.3874***	1.0000	
ERQ10	0.3164***	0.3646***	0.3378***	0.5201***	0.3770***	1.0000

Note: Significance level: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.4:** Inter-item correlations of the ERQ reappraisal items (obs=448 in all pairs)

Item	N	Sign	Item-test corr.	Item-rest corr.	Avg. inter-item corr.	alpha
ERQ2	448	+	0.7728	0.5618	0.3400	0.6072
ERQ4	448	+	0.6481	0.3732	0.4616	0.7200
ERQ6	448	+	0.8293	0.6574	0.2849	0.5445
ERQ9	448	+	0.6761	0.4132	0.4343	0.6973
Test scale					0.3802	0.7105

**Table A.5:** Reliability of the standardized ERQ suppression test scale

	ERQ2	ERQ4	ERQ6	ERQ9
ERQ2	1.0000			
ERQ4	0.3519***	1.0000		
ERQ6	0.5627***	0.3970***	1.0000	
ERQ9	0.3567***	0.1576***	0.4724***	1.0000

Note: Significance level: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.6:** Inter-item correlations of the ERQ suppression items (obs=448 in all pairs)

Item	N	Sign	Item-test corr.	Item-rest corr.	Avg. inter-item corr.	alpha
INCOM1	448	+	0.6747	0.4974	0.3220	0.7037
INCOM2	448	+	0.6790	0.5031	0.3203	0.7021
INCOM3	448	+	0.6429	0.4550	0.3347	0.7155
INCOM4	448	+	0.6754	0.4983	0.3218	0.7035
INCOM5	448	+	0.7359	0.5818	0.2977	0.6795
INCOM6	448	+	0.5679	0.3587	0.3645	0.7415
Test scale					0.3269	0.7445

**Table A.7:** Reliability of the standardized INCOM test scale

	INCOM1	INCOM2	INCOM3	INCOM4	INCOM5	INCOM6
INCOM1	1.0000					
INCOM2	0.5130***	1.0000				
INCOM3	0.4429***	0.4815***	1.0000			
INCOM4	0.2500***	0.2416***	0.2381***	1.0000		
INCOM5	0.3032***	0.3181***	0.2794***	0.5628***	1.0000	
INCOM6	0.1717***	0.1336***	0.1111**	0.3796***	0.4480***	1.0000

Note: Significance level: \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .


**Table A.8:** Inter-item correlations of the INCOM items (obs=448 in all pairs)

	BeMaS	ERQ reappraisal	ERQ suppression	INCOM
BeMaS	1.0000			
ERQ reappraisal	-0.0187	1.0000		
ERQ suppression	0.0928**	-0.0180	1.0000	
INCOM	0.1953***	0.0621	-0.0595	1.0000


Note: Significance level: \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table A.9:** Correlation coefficients of the scales (obs=448 in all pairs)


## Figures




**Figure A.1:** Histogram of the malicious envy scale (BeMaS)




**Figure A.2:** Histogram of the ERQ reappraisal scale




**Figure A.3:** Histogram of the ERQ suppression scale



**Figure A.4:** Histogram of the INCOM scale



**Figure A.5:** Scatterplot of  $d$  by decision time with linear and quadratic fit in *Info Choice & Deduction*



**Figure A.6:** Scatterplot of  $d$  by decision time with linear and quadratic fit in *Full Info & Deduction*

# Experimental Instructions Appendix

## Simplified Screenshots with English Translation

Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment.

Please read these instructions very carefully. From now on we ask you to remain seated and to stop communicating with other participants. Please turn off all your mobile devices during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your seat and answer your questions in private.

These instructions are the same for all participants in this room.

Your earnings in this experiment will be calculated in euros. You will be paid in cash directly at the end of the experiment.

**Each participant will receive 5 euros in addition to their earnings from the experiment for showing up on time.**

continue

In this experiment, you will interact with another participant. The computer will allocate this participant randomly to you. You will not be informed who this other participant is, nor will he or she learn your identity.

There are two different roles in this experiment. These roles will be called "Person A" and "Person B".

**You take the role of Person A [Person B].**

continue

[The text in parentheses in the first line depends on the treatment.]

The experiment consists of two [three] stages.

In the **first** stage both persons receive an endowment:

Person A receives a fixed endowment of 3 euros.

Person B's endowment will be determined by a random draw by the computer program.

- With 15% probability (i.e., in 15 out of 100 cases), Person B also receives 3 euros.
- With 85% probability (i.e., in 85 out of 100 cases), Person B receives 15 euros.

At this first stage, neither Person A nor Person B will be informed about the outcome of the random draw, i.e., whether participant B receives 3 or 15 euros.

back

continue

[This screen appears in treatment *Info Choice & No Deduction*.  
This screen appears in treatment *Info Choice & Deduction* without the content in parentheses.  
This screen does not appear in treatment *Full Info & Deduction*.]

In the **second** stage, Person A can choose whether he or she wants to be informed whether Person B received 3 euros or 15 euros in the first stage.

[If Person A decides to be informed about the endowment of Person B, the endowment will be shown.]

[If Person A decides not to be informed about the endowment of Person B, the experiment is finished.]

back

continue

[This screen appears only in treatment *Info Choice & Deduction*]

In the **third** stage, Person A can deduct up to 12 euros from Person B's account. This deduction can be entered in 10-cent increments.

If Person A has chosen to be informed about Person B's endowment, it will be revealed to Person A at the beginning of this stage. Otherwise, Person A will decide on a deduction without knowing Person B's endowment.

Only if Person B's endowment is 15 euros the deduction has an effect. Deductions from Person Bs who were randomly endowed with 3 euros will have no effect. That means that, regardless of Person A's deduction choice, Person B will never receive less than 3 euros in this experiment.

Deductions are costless for Person A. However, Person A will not gain the deducted amount.

back

continue

[This screen appears only in treatment *Full Info & Deduction*.]

In the **second** stage, Person A will be informed about Person B's endowment.

When Person B received an endowment of 15 euros, Person A can deduct up to 12 euros from Person B's account. This deduction can be entered in 10-cent increments.

When Person B received an endowment of 3 euros, Person A cannot deduct from Person B's account.

Deductions are costless for Person A. However, Person A will not gain the deducted amount.

back

continue

[The content in the parentheses only appears in the treatments *Info Choice & Deduction* and *Full Info & Deduction*.]

After reading these instructions, you will be asked to answer some control questions.

Only after answering all questions correctly, the experiment will start.

After the experiment, we will ask you to answer a short questionnaire.

At the end of the questionnaire, you will be informed about your own total payoff from the experiment. [If you are in the role of Person B, you will be informed about your total payoff, but not about how this amount results out of your initial endowment and a possible deduction.]

Your payoff will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the experiment.

**Again, as a reminder: You take the role of Person A [Person B].**

back

continue

[In treatment *Info Choice & No Deduction* only the first four statements are shown.  
In treatment *Info Choice & Deduction* all statements are shown.  
In treatment *Full Info & Deduction* statement four is not shown.]

Please indicate whether the following statements are correct or wrong.

**Please think very carefully before entering your answers.**

Your answers will not affect your payoff. In order to make sure every participant is familiar with the procedure, the experiment will not start until all participants have completed the control questions.

You are Person A.	correct <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> wrong
Person A will receive an endowment of 15 euros.	correct <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> wrong
Person B's endowment can be higher than Person A's.	correct <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> wrong
Person A can choose whether being informed about B's endowment.	correct <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> wrong
Person A can deduct euros from Person B's endowment.	correct <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> wrong
Person B can deduct euros from Person A's endowment.	correct <input type="radio"/> <input type="radio"/> wrong

back to instructions

ready

[This screen is shown only to Person A.]

The experiment starts now.

**You are in the role of Person A.**

You receive an endowment of **3 euros**.

continue

[This screen is shown only to Person B.]

The experiment starts now.

**You are in the role of Person B.**

Please wait while Person A makes his or her decision(s).

(Please press the continue-button now.)

continue

[This screen does not appear in treatment *Full Info & Deduction*. It is shown only to Person A.]

Do you want to learn the endowment of Person B?

- Yes
- No

continue

[This screen appears only in treatment *Info Choice & No Deduction*. It is shown only to Person A, if he or she chose to be informed.]

Person B has received 3 [15] euros.

continue

[This screen does appear in the *Full Info & Deduction* treatment. It is shown only to Person A if  $b=3$ .  
This screen does appear in the *Info Choice & Deduction* treatment. It is shown only to Person A if  $b=3$  and if A chose to be informed.]

Person B has received 3 euros.

You cannot deduct from Person B.

continue

[This screen does not appear in treatment *Info Choice & No Deduction*. It is shown only to Person A.  
The text in parentheses in the middle only appears if Person A chose not to be informed in *Info Choice & Deduction*]

The other participant received 3 [15] [either 3 or 15] euros.

You can now deduct euros from Person B's endowment.

Any number between 0 and 12 is allowed. If you do not want to deduct, please enter a zero. You can enter an amount with up to one decimal point. (Please use a dot [.] instead of a comma [,] then.)

[The deduction only gets effective when B's endowment is 15 euros. When B has been endowed with 3 euros, any deduction will have no effect.]

Deductions are costless for you. Nevertheless, you will not gain the deducted amount.

How many euros would you like to deduct from Person B's endowment?

Please enter the number in euros here:

continue

The experiment is now finished.

Please answer the questions on the next screens.

Afterwards, you will be informed about your total payoff from the experiment.

(Please push the continue-button now. Otherwise the questionnaire cannot be started.)

continue

Below you will see a list of statements. You will probably agree completely with some of them and not at all with others. You also may be undecided on others. Please answer according to the following scale. If you do not agree with a statement at all, select the button on the left. If you agree with a statement completely, select the button on the right. With the buttons in between you can grade your opinion. Please state what you really think. You don't have to impress anybody. The results will only be of scientific value if you answer honestly.

	strongly disagree	strongly agree
I wish that superior people lose their advantage.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
If other people have something that I want for myself, I wish to take it away from them.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
I have hostile feelings towards people I envy.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
Envious feelings cause me to dislike the other person.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
Seeing other people's achievements makes me resent them.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	

continue

We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below relate to two distinct aspects of your emotional life. One is your **emotional experience**, or what you feel like inside. The other is your **emotional expression**, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer using the following scale:

	strongly disagree	strongly agree
When I want to feel more <i>positive</i> emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I'm thinking about.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
I keep my emotions to myself.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
When I want to feel less <i>negative</i> emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I'm thinking about.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
When I am feeling <i>positive</i> emotions, I am careful <i>not</i> to express them.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	
When I'm faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me stay calm.	○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	

continue

(Continued from previous page.)

	strongly disagree	strongly agree
I control my emotions by <i>not expressing them</i> .	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I want to feel more <i>positive</i> emotion, I try to change the way I'm thinking about the situation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I'm in.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I am feeling <i>negative</i> emotions, I make sure not to express them.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When I want to feel <i>less negative</i> emotion, I try to change the way I'm thinking about the situation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

continue

Most people compare themselves with others from time to time. For example, they may compare the way they feel, their opinions, their abilities, and/or their situation with those of other people. There is nothing particularly "good" or "bad" about this type of comparison, and some people do it more than others.

We would like to find out how often you compare yourself with other people. To do that we would like you to indicate how much you agree with each statement below, by using the following scale:

	strongly disagree	strongly agree
I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often compare how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity) with other people.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am not the type of person who compares often with others.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often try to find out what others think who face similar problems as I face.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I always like to know what others in a similar situation would do.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what others think about it.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

continue

Please answer the following questions.

Please tell us your gender.

- Male
- Female
- Other

How many participants in this room do you know personally?

Do you know someone who has previously participated in the same experiment?

- Yes
- No

continue

Thank you !

**You have earned XX euros in this experiment. (5 euros will be added in addition for showing up on time.)**

We now prepare your payment. Please fill in the receipt with your particulars. Please fill in your name and your address and the amount of YY euros as expense allowance. We will call you individually for the payment.

Thank you for your participation!

# Original Screenshots of Treatment *Info Choice & No Deduction*

## Instructions and Control Questions

Willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment.

Lesen Sie diese Instruktionen bitte sehr aufmerksam durch. Von jetzt an bitten wir Sie, an Ihrem Platz zu bleiben und die Kommunikation mit den anderen Teilnehmer\*innen einzustellen. Bitte schalten Sie während des Experiments Ihre mobilen elektronischen Geräte aus. Sollten Sie Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. Wir werden dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Fragen persönlich beantworten.

Diese Instruktionen sind für alle Teilnehmer\*innen im Raum identisch.

Ihr Verdienst in diesem Experiment wird in Euro berechnet. Sie erhalten Ihren Verdienst unmittelbar nach diesem Experiment in bar ausgezahlt.

**Für rechtzeitiges Erscheinen erhält jede/jeder Teilnehmer\*in zusätzlich zu dem Verdienst aus diesem Experiment fünf Euro.**

[zu den Instruktionen](#)

In diesem Experiment werden Sie mit einer/einem anderen Teilnehmer\*in interagieren. Diese/Dieser Teilnehmer\*in wird Ihnen vom Computer zufällig zugeordnet. Sie werden nicht darüber informiert, wer diese/dieser andere Teilnehmer\*in ist. Auch er oder sie wird nicht über Ihre Identität informiert.

Es gibt in diesem Experiment zwei verschiedene Rollen. Diese Rollen werden mit "Person A" und "Person B" bezeichnet.

**Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.**

[weiter](#)

Das Experiment besteht aus zwei Stufen.

In der **ersten** Stufe erhalten beide Personen eine Ausstattung:

Person A erhält eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 3 Euro.

Die Ausstattung von Person B wird durch einen Zufallsmechanismus durch den Computer bestimmt.

- Mit 15% Wahrscheinlichkeit (d.h. in 15 von 100 Fällen) erhält Person B ebenfalls eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 3 Euro.
- Mit 85% Wahrscheinlichkeit (d.h. in 85 von 100 Fällen) erhält Person B eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 15 Euro.

In dieser ersten Stufe werden weder Person A noch Person B über das Ergebnis des Zufallszugs informiert, also darüber, welche Ausstattung Person B erhält.

zurück

weiter

In der **zweiten** Stufe kann Person A entscheiden, ob er oder sie darüber informiert werden möchte, ob Person B in der ersten Stufe 3 Euro oder 15 Euro erhalten hat.

Wenn sich Person A dafür entscheidet, über die Ausstattung informiert zu werden wird die Ausstattung angezeigt.

Wenn sich Person A dafür entscheidet, nicht über die Ausstattung informiert zu werden ist das Experiment beendet.

zurück

weiter

Nach dem Lesen dieser Instruktionen werden Sie gebeten, einige Kontrollfragen zu beantworten.

Erst, wenn Sie alle Fragen richtig beantwortet haben, beginnt das Experiment.

Nach dem Experiment werden wir Sie bitten, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen.

Nach dem Fragebogen werden Sie über Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment informiert.

Ihre Auszahlung wird Ihnen nach dem Experiment in bar ausgezahlt.

**Noch einmal zur Erinnerung: Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.**

zurück

weiter

Bitte markieren Sie bei jeder der folgenden Aussagen, ob diese richtig oder falsch ist.

**Bitte denken Sie sorgfältig nach, bevor Sie Ihre Antwort eingeben.**

Ihre Antworten haben keinen Einfluss auf Ihren Verdienst. Um sicher zu gehen, dass jede/jeder Teilnehmer\*in mit dem Ablauf des Experiments vertraut ist, beginnt das Experiment erst, wenn alle Teilnehmer\*innen die Kontrollfragen richtig beantwortet haben.

Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.  richtig  
 falsch

Person A erhält eine Auszahlung in Höhe von 15 Euro.  richtig  
 falsch

Die Ausstattung von Person B kann höher sein als die von Person A.  richtig  
 falsch

Person A kann sich aussuchen, ob er oder sie die Ausstattung von Person B erfahren möchte.  richtig  
 falsch

zurück zu den Instruktionen

fertig

## Screens for Person A

Jetzt startet das Experiment.

**Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.**

Sie erhalten eine Ausstattung von **3 Euro**.

[weiter](#)

Möchten Sie wissen, welche Ausstattung Person B erhalten hat?  ja  
 nein

[weiter](#)

If Person A chose to be informed (if not: no screen):

Person B hat **15 Euro** erhalten.

weiter

Das Experiment ist jetzt beendet.

Bitte beantworten Sie jetzt noch die Fragen auf den folgenden Bildschirmen.

Nach der Beantwortung werden Sie über Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment informiert.

(Bitte klicken Sie jetzt noch auf den Weiter-Button. Sonst kann der Fragebogen nicht gestartet werden.)

weiter

# Original Screenshots of Treatment *Info Choice & Deduction*

## Instructions and Control Questions

Willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment.

Lesen Sie diese Instruktionen bitte sehr aufmerksam durch. Von jetzt an bitten wir Sie, an Ihrem Platz zu bleiben und die Kommunikation mit den anderen Teilnehmer\*innen einzustellen. Bitte schalten Sie während des Experiments Ihre mobilen elektronischen Geräte aus. Sollten Sie Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. Wir werden dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Fragen persönlich beantworten.

Diese Instruktionen sind für alle Teilnehmer\*innen im Raum identisch.

Ihr Verdienst in diesem Experiment wird in Euro berechnet. Sie erhalten Ihren Verdienst unmittelbar nach diesem Experiment in bar ausgezahlt.

**Für rechtzeitiges Erscheinen erhält jede/jeder Teilnehmer\*in zusätzlich zu dem Verdienst aus diesem Experiment fünf Euro.**

zu den Instruktionen

In diesem Experiment werden Sie mit einer/einem anderen Teilnehmer\*in interagieren. Diese/Dieser Teilnehmer\*in wird Ihnen vom Computer zufällig zugeordnet. Sie werden nicht darüber informiert, wer diese/dieser andere Teilnehmer\*in ist. Auch er oder sie wird nicht über Ihre Identität informiert.

Es gibt in diesem Experiment zwei verschiedene Rollen. Diese Rollen werden mit "Person A" und "Person B" bezeichnet.

**Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.**

weiter

Das Experiment besteht aus drei Stufen.

In der **ersten** Stufe erhalten beide Personen eine Ausstattung:

Person A erhält eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 3 Euro.

Die Ausstattung von Person B wird durch einen Zufallsmechanismus durch den Computer bestimmt.

- Mit 15% Wahrscheinlichkeit (d.h. in 15 von 100 Fällen) erhält Person B ebenfalls eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 3 Euro.
- Mit 85% Wahrscheinlichkeit (d.h. in 85 von 100 Fällen) erhält Person B eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 15 Euro.

In dieser ersten Stufe werden weder Person A noch Person B über das Ergebnis des Zufallszugs informiert, also darüber, welche Ausstattung Person B erhält.

zurück

weiter

In der **zweiten** Stufe kann Person A entscheiden, ob er oder sie darüber informiert werden möchte, ob Person B in der ersten Stufe 3 Euro oder 15 Euro erhalten hat.

zurück

weiter

In der **dritten** Stufe kann Person A von Person B's Ausstattung bis zu 12 Euro abziehen. Dieser Abzug kann in 10-Cent-Schritten eingegeben werden.

Wenn Person A entschieden hat, über die Ausstattung von Person B informiert werden zu wollen, dann wird diese Ausstattung Person A zu Beginn dieser Stufe mitgeteilt. Andernfalls entscheidet Person A über den Punktabzug, ohne zu wissen, welche Ausstattung Person B erhalten hat.

Der Abzug hat nur dann einen Effekt, wenn Person B eine Ausstattung von 15 Euro erhalten hat. Der Abzug hat für diejenigen Personen B im Experiment, für die der Zufallsmechanismus eine Ausstattung von 3 Euro bestimmt hat, keinen Effekt. Das heißt, dass Person B unabhängig von der Abzugsentscheidung niemals weniger als 3 Euro in diesem Experiment erhält.

Der Abzug ist kostenlos für Person A. Person A erhält den abgezogenen Betrag aber auch nicht.

zurück

weiter

Nach dem Lesen dieser Instruktionen werden Sie gebeten, einige Kontrollfragen zu beantworten.

Erst, wenn Sie alle Fragen richtig beantwortet haben, beginnt das Experiment.

Nach dem Experiment werden wir Sie bitten, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen.

Nach dem Fragebogen werden Sie über Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment informiert. Wenn Sie in der Rolle der Person B sind, erfahren Sie nur Ihren finalen Auszahlungsbetrag, nicht aber, wie sich dieser Betrag aus Ihrer anfänglichen Ausstattung und einem eventuellen Abzug zusammensetzt.

Ihre Auszahlung wird Ihnen nach dem Experiment in bar ausgezahlt.

**Noch einmal zur Erinnerung: Sie sind in der Rolle der Person B.**

zurück

weiter

Bitte markieren Sie bei jeder der folgenden Aussagen, ob diese richtig oder falsch ist.

**Bitte denken Sie sorgfältig nach, bevor Sie Ihre Antwort eingeben.**

Ihre Antworten haben keinen Einfluss auf Ihren Verdienst. Um sicher zu gehen, dass jede/jeder Teilnehmer\*in mit dem Ablauf des Experiments vertraut ist, beginnt das Experiment erst, wenn alle Teilnehmer\*innen die Kontrollfragen richtig beantwortet haben.

Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.  richtig  
 falsch

Person A erhält eine Auszahlung in Höhe von 15 Euro.  richtig  
 falsch

Die Ausstattung von Person B kann höher sein als die von Person A.  richtig  
 falsch

Person A kann sich aussuchen, ob er oder sie die Ausstattung von Person B erfahren möchte.  richtig  
 falsch

Person A kann Euros von der Ausstattung von Person B abziehen.  richtig  
 falsch

Person B kann Euros von der Ausstattung von Person A abziehen.  richtig  
 falsch

zurück zu den Instruktionen

fertig

## Screens for Person A

Jetzt startet das Experiment.

**Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.**

Sie erhalten eine Ausstattung von **3 Euro**.

weiter

Möchten Sie wissen, welche Ausstattung Person B erhalten hat?  ja  
 nein

### If Person A chose not to be informed:

Person B hat entweder 3 Euro oder 15 Euro erhalten.

Sie können jetzt einen Euro-Betrag von Person B's Ausstattung abziehen.

Jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 12 ist erlaubt. Wenn Sie nichts abziehen möchten, geben Sie bitte eine Null ein. Sie können den Betrag in 10-Cent-Schritten eingeben. (Bitte benutzen Sie dann einen Punkt [.] anstelle eines Kommas [,] für die Dezimalstelle.)

Der Abzug hat nur dann einen Effekt, wenn Person B eine Ausstattung von 15 Euro erhalten hat. Wenn Person B mit 3 Euro ausgestattet worden ist, hat der Abzug keinen Effekt.

Für Sie ist der Abzug kostenlos. Sie erhalten den abgezogenen Betrag aber auch nicht.

Wie viele Euro möchten Sie von Person B's Ausstattung abziehen?

Bitte geben Sie die Zahl in Euros hier ein:

weiter

If Person A chose to be informed and  $b = 3$ :

Person B hat **3 Euro** erhalten.

Sie können keinen Abzug bei Person B vornehmen.

weiter

If Person A chose to be informed and  $b = 15$ :

Person B hat **15 Euro** erhalten.

Sie können jetzt einen Euro-Betrag von Person B's Ausstattung abziehen.

Jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 12 ist erlaubt. Wenn Sie nichts abziehen möchten, geben Sie bitte eine Null ein. Sie können den Betrag in 10-Cent-Schritten eingeben. (Bitte benutzen Sie dann einen Punkt [.] anstelle eines Kommas [,] für die Dezimalstelle.)

Für Sie ist der Abzug kostenlos. Sie erhalten den abgezogenen Betrag aber auch nicht.

Wie viele Euro möchten Sie von Person B's Ausstattung abziehen?

Bitte geben Sie die Zahl in Euros hier ein:

weiter

Das Experiment ist jetzt beendet.

Bitte beantworten Sie jetzt noch die Fragen auf den folgenden Bildschirmen.

Nach der Beantwortung werden Sie über Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment informiert.

(Bitte klicken Sie jetzt noch auf den Weiter-Button. Sonst kann der Fragebogen nicht gestartet werden.)

weiter

## Original Screenshots of Treatment *Full Info & Deduction*

### Instructions and Control Questions

Willkommen und vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment.

Lesen Sie diese Instruktionen bitte sehr aufmerksam durch. Von jetzt an bitten wir Sie, an Ihrem Platz zu bleiben und die Kommunikation mit den anderen Teilnehmer\*innen einzustellen. Bitte schalten Sie während des Experiments Ihre mobilen elektronischen Geräte aus. Sollten Sie Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. Wir werden dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Fragen persönlich beantworten.

Diese Instruktionen sind für alle Teilnehmer\*innen im Raum identisch.

Ihr Verdienst in diesem Experiment wird in Euro berechnet. Sie erhalten Ihren Verdienst unmittelbar nach diesem Experiment in bar ausgezahlt.

**Für rechtzeitiges Erscheinen erhält jede/jeder Teilnehmer\*in zusätzlich zu dem Verdienst aus diesem Experiment fünf Euro.**

[zu den Instruktionen](#)

In diesem Experiment werden Sie mit einer/einem anderen Teilnehmer\*in interagieren. Diese/Dieser Teilnehmer\*in wird Ihnen vom Computer zufällig zugeordnet. Sie werden nicht darüber informiert, wer diese/dieser andere Teilnehmer\*in ist. Auch er oder sie wird nicht über Ihre Identität informiert.

Es gibt in diesem Experiment zwei verschiedene Rollen. Diese Rollen werden mit "Person A" und "Person B" bezeichnet.

**Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.**

[weiter](#)

Das Experiment besteht aus zwei Stufen.

In der **ersten** Stufe erhalten beide Personen eine Ausstattung:

Person A erhält eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 3 Euro.

Die Ausstattung von Person B wird durch einen Zufallsmechanismus durch den Computer bestimmt.

- Mit 15% Wahrscheinlichkeit (d.h. in 15 von 100 Fällen) erhält Person B ebenfalls eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 3 Euro.
- Mit 85% Wahrscheinlichkeit (d.h. in 85 von 100 Fällen) erhält Person B eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 15 Euro.

In dieser ersten Stufe werden weder Person A noch Person B über das Ergebnis des Zufallszugs informiert, also darüber, welche Ausstattung Person B erhält.

zurück

weiter

In der **zweiten** Stufe wird Person A über die Höhe der Ausstattung von Person B informiert.

Wenn Person B eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 15 Euro erhalten hat, kann Person A von Person B's Ausstattung bis zu 12 Euro abziehen. Dieser Abzug kann in 10-Cent-Schritten eingegeben werden.

Wenn Person B eine Ausstattung in Höhe von 3 Euro erhalten hat, kann Person A keinen Abzug vornehmen.

Der Abzug ist kostenlos für Person A. Person A erhält den abgezogenen Betrag aber auch nicht.

zurück

weiter

Nach dem Lesen dieser Instruktionen werden Sie gebeten, einige Kontrollfragen zu beantworten.

Erst, wenn Sie alle Fragen richtig beantwortet haben, beginnt das Experiment.

Nach dem Experiment werden wir Sie bitten, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen.

Nach dem Fragebogen werden Sie über Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment informiert. Wenn Sie in der Rolle der Person B sind, erfahren Sie nur Ihren finalen Auszahlungsbetrag, nicht aber, wie sich dieser Betrag aus Ihrer anfänglichen Ausstattung und einem eventuellen Abzug zusammensetzt.

Ihre Auszahlung wird Ihnen nach dem Experiment in bar ausgezahlt.

**Noch einmal zur Erinnerung: Sie sind in der Rolle der Person B.**

zurück

weiter

Bitte markieren Sie bei jeder der folgenden Aussagen, ob diese richtig oder falsch ist.

**Bitte denken Sie sorgfältig nach, bevor Sie Ihre Antwort eingeben.**

Ihre Antworten haben keinen Einfluss auf Ihren Verdienst. Um sicher zu gehen, dass jede/jeder Teilnehmer\*in mit dem Ablauf des Experiments vertraut ist, beginnt das Experiment erst, wenn alle Teilnehmer\*innen die Kontrollfragen richtig beantwortet haben.

Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.  richtig  
 falsch

Person A erhält eine Auszahlung in Höhe von 15 Euro.  richtig  
 falsch

Die Ausstattung von Person B kann höher sein als die von Person A.  richtig  
 falsch

Person A kann Euros von der Ausstattung von Person B abziehen.  richtig  
 falsch

Person B kann Euros von der Ausstattung von Person A abziehen.  richtig  
 falsch

zurück zu den Instruktionen

fertig

## Screens for Person A

Jetzt startet das Experiment.

**Sie sind in der Rolle der Person A.**

Sie erhalten eine Ausstattung von **3 Euro**.

[weiter](#)

If  $b = 3$ :

Person B hat **3 Euro** erhalten.

Sie können keinen Abzug bei Person B vornehmen.

[weiter](#)

If  $b = 15$ :

Person B hat **15 Euro** erhalten.

Sie können jetzt einen Euro-Betrag von Person B's Ausstattung abziehen.

Jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 12 ist erlaubt. Wenn Sie nichts abziehen möchten, geben Sie bitte eine Null ein. Sie können den Betrag in 10-Cent-Schritten eingeben. (Bitte benutzen Sie dann einen Punkt [.] anstelle eines Kommas [,] für die Dezimalstelle.)

Für Sie ist der Abzug kostenlos. Sie erhalten den abgezogenen Betrag aber auch nicht.

Wie viele Euro möchten Sie von Person B's Ausstattung abziehen?

Bitte geben Sie die Zahl in Euros hier ein:

weiter

Das Experiment ist jetzt beendet.

Bitte beantworten Sie jetzt noch die Fragen auf den folgenden Bildschirmen.

Nach der Beantwortung werden Sie über Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment informiert.

(Bitte klicken Sie jetzt noch auf den Weiter-Button. Sonst kann der Fragebogen nicht gestartet werden.)

weiter

## Screens for Person B (All Treatments)

After answering the control questions correctly:

Jetzt startet das Experiment.

**Sie sind in der Rolle der Person B.**

Bitte warten Sie, während Person A seine oder ihre Entscheidungen trifft.

(Bitte klicken Sie jetzt noch auf den Weiter-Button.)

[weiter](#)

After Person A had made their decisions:

Das Experiment ist jetzt beendet.

Bitte beantworten Sie jetzt noch die Fragen auf den folgenden Bildschirmen.

Nach der Beantwortung werden Sie über Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Experiment informiert.

(Bitte klicken Sie jetzt noch auf den Weiter-Button. Sonst kann der Fragebogen nicht gestartet werden.)

[weiter](#)

# Original Screenshots of Questionnaire

Im Folgenden finden Sie eine Liste mit Aussagen. Wahrscheinlich werden Sie einigen vollständig zustimmen und anderen vollständig widersprechen. Wieder anderen werden Sie vielleicht unentschieden gegenüberstehen.

Bitte antworten Sie anhand der folgenden Skala. Wenn Sie einer Aussage vollständig widersprechen, dann markieren Sie den Punkt ganz links. Wenn Sie einer Aussage vollständig zustimmen, dann markieren Sie den Punkt ganz rechts. Mit den Punkten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Meinung abstimmen.

Bitte sagen Sie uns, was Sie wirklich denken. Es gibt hier niemanden, den Sie beeindrucken müssen. Die Ergebnisse können nur wissenschaftlich genutzt werden, wenn Sie ehrlich antworten.

Ich wünsche mir, dass Menschen, die mir in etwas überlegen sind, ihren Vorsprung einbüßen.  
widerspreche völlig         stimme völlig zu

Wenn andere Menschen etwas haben, was ich auch gern hätte, möchte ich es ihnen am liebsten wegnehmen.  
widerspreche völlig         stimme völlig zu

Ich habe feindselige Gefühle gegenüber Menschen, auf die ich neidisch bin.  
widerspreche völlig         stimme völlig zu

Neidgefühle bringen mich dazu, die andere Person nicht zu mögen.  
widerspreche völlig         stimme völlig zu

Die Leistungen anderer Menschen zu sehen, löst bei mir Missgunst aus.  
widerspreche völlig         stimme völlig zu

Wir möchten Ihnen gerne einige Fragen zu Ihren Gefühlen stellen. Uns interessiert, wie Sie Ihre Gefühle unter Kontrolle halten, bzw. regulieren. Zwei Aspekte Ihrer Gefühle interessieren uns dabei besonders. Einerseits ist dies Ihr *emotionales Erleben*, also was Sie *innen* fühlen. Andererseits geht es um den *emotionalen Ausdruck*, also wie Sie Ihre Gefühle verbal, gestisch oder im Verhalten nach *außen* zeigen. Obwohl manche der Fragen ziemlich ähnlich klingen, unterscheiden sie sich in wesentlichen Punkten. Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen, indem Sie folgende Antwortmöglichkeiten benutzen:

Wenn ich *mehr positive* Gefühle (wie Freude oder Heiterkeit) empfinden möchte, ändere ich, woran ich denke.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht         stimmt vollkommen

Ich behalte meine Gefühle für mich.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht         stimmt vollkommen

Wenn ich *weniger negative* Gefühle (wie Traurigkeit oder Ärger) empfinden möchte, ändere ich, woran ich denke.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht         stimmt vollkommen

Wenn ich *positive* Gefühle empfinde, bemühe ich mich, sie *nicht* nach außen zu zeigen.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht         stimmt vollkommen

Wenn ich in eine stressige Situation gerate, ändere ich meine Gedanken über die Situation so, dass es mich beruhigt.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht         stimmt vollkommen

(Fortsetzung der vorherigen Seite.)

Ich halte meine Gefühle unter Kontrolle, indem ich sie *nicht* nach außen zeige.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht           stimmt vollkommen

Wenn ich *mehr positive* Gefühle empfinden möchte, versuche ich über die Situation anders zu denken.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht           stimmt vollkommen

Ich halte meine Gefühle unter Kontrolle, indem ich über meine aktuelle Situation anders nachdenke.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht           stimmt vollkommen

Wenn ich *negative* Gefühle empfinde, Sorge ich dafür, sie *nicht* nach außen zu zeigen.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht           stimmt vollkommen

Wenn ich *weniger negative* Gefühle empfinden möchte, versuche ich über die Situation anders zu denken.  
stimmt überhaupt nicht           stimmt vollkommen

weiter

Die meisten Menschen vergleichen sich ab und an mit anderen. Zum Beispiel vergleichen sie wie sie sich fühlen, ihre Meinungen, Fähigkeiten und/oder ihre Situation mit der anderer Menschen. Es gibt nichts was besonders "gut" oder "schlecht" wäre an dieser Art von Vergleichen und einige Menschen tun dies öfter als andere.

Wir möchten nun herausfinden, wie oft Sie sich mit anderen Menschen vergleichen. Um dies zu erfahren, möchten wir Sie bitten, uns mitzuteilen wie sehr Sie den folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.

Bitte antworten Sie anhand der folgenden Skala:

Ich achte immer sehr stark darauf, wie ich Dinge im Vergleich zu anderen mache.  
stimme überhaupt nicht zu           stimme voll and ganz zu

Ich vergleiche häufig meine sozialen Fähigkeiten und meine Beliebtheit mit denen anderer Personen.  
stimme überhaupt nicht zu           stimme voll and ganz zu

Ich bin nicht der Typ Mensch, der sich oft mit anderen vergleicht.  
stimme überhaupt nicht zu           stimme voll and ganz zu

Ich versuche häufig herauszufinden, was andere denken, die mit ähnlichen Problemen konfrontiert sind wie ich.  
stimme überhaupt nicht zu           stimme voll and ganz zu

Ich möchte immer gerne wissen wie sich andere in einer ähnlichen Situation verhalten würden.  
stimme überhaupt nicht zu           stimme voll and ganz zu

Wenn ich über etwas mehr erfahren möchte, versuche ich herauszufinden was andere darüber denken oder wissen.  
stimme überhaupt nicht zu           stimme voll and ganz zu

weiter

Bitte beantworten Sie jetzt noch die folgenden Fragen:

Welches Geschlecht haben Sie?

- männlich
- weiblich
- divers

Wie viele Teilnehmer hier im Raum kennen Sie persönlich?

Kennen Sie jemanden, der zuvor am gleichen Experiment teilgenommen hat?

- nein
- 
- ja

Vielen Dank!

**Sie haben in diesem Experiment 14.00 Euro verdient. (Dazu kommen noch 5 Euro für rechtzeitiges Erscheinen.)**

Wir bereiten gerade die Auszahlung vor. Bitte füllen Sie schon einmal die Quittung mit Ihren Angaben aus. Bitte tragen Sie Ihren Namen und Ihre Anschrift ein und den Betrag von 19.00 Euro als Aufwandsentschädigung. Wir rufen Sie dann einzeln zur Auszahlung.

Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!