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Evidentiality and (Inter-) Subjectivity as (Non-) Competing Dimensions

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Abstract
The present paper discusses the relationship between evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity and argues that the two semantic-functional categories need not be mutually exclusive. In the use of certain means of expression and in certain contexts, both evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity may be conveyed simultaneously. I thereby differentiate between two meanings of intersubjectivity, namely ‘intersubjectivity₁’ and ‘intersubjectivity₂’. Intersubjectivity₁ refers to the notion of common or general knowledge: certain means of expression are seen as being intersubjectively used when the speaker shares or assumes sharing knowledge with the interlocutor. Intersubjectivity₂ is related to particular discourse functions of certain means of expression in interactional settings, paying attention to the speaker-hearer constellation.

In order to substantiate the theoretical part of the paper, I then present a qualitative analysis of Portuguese, Spanish and English examples, which are taken from the Corpus do Português, Corpus del Español and the Corpus of Contemporary American English.

1 Preliminary remarks
In this paper I concentrate on the relationship between evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity, arguing that both dimensions, or rather semantic-functional categories, need not be mutually exclusive. They are not necessarily competing dimensions. In other words, in the use of certain means of expression, both evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity may be conveyed. The following assertion by Cappelli (2007) serves as the starting point for this study:

Evidentiality and subjectivity have been traditionally seen as competing dimensions. On the one hand, there would be subjectivity, i.e. the evaluator’s point of view, the expression of his/her stance towards the state of affairs; on the other hand, there would be evidentiality, the evidence that can back an evaluation or an assertion. If no evidence is provided, subjectivity predominates, otherwise subjectivity decreases […] (Cappelli 2007: 132-133)

The theoretical remarks are substantiated by a qualitative analysis of Portuguese, Spanish and English examples, which are taken from the Corpus do Português, Corpus del Español and the Corpus of Contemporary American English.

2 Theoretical background: Relating evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity
2.1 A brief discussion of the term ‘evidentiality’
In Hennemann (2013a) I argue that evidentiality – just as epistemic modality, (inter-) subjectivity, deixis and polyphony – is one subordinate category of the superordinate category speaker’s perspectivisation:

The categories of evidentiality, epistemic modality, subjectivity, deixis and polyphony are encompassed by the notion of speaker’s perspectivisation because they all bring to the fore the speaker’s perspective of the narrated event – even in the case of polyphony, where the speaker shows that he is able to include further perspectives. Speaker’s perspectivisation is the
superordinate category, while the strategy of *perspectivising* a certain \( p \) represents the process. The outcome of this process consequently is the verbalised *speaker’s perspective*. (Hennemann 2013a: 125)

Thus, I define evidentiality as follows:

[...] evidentiality is to be defined as one category of *speaker’s perspectivisation*, whereby evidentiality *may overlap* with other linguistic categories that are also subordinate to the category of *speaker’s perspectivisation* and it *does overlap* with deixis and subjectivity. In languages that do not possess a grammatical system of evidentiality, evidentiality is expressed by evidential expressions which may be lexical or grammatical in nature. Whether an expression is evidential or evidentially used is determined by meaning aspects that are encoded by a particular expression and possibly additionally by meaning aspects that are contributed by contextually provided information. An expression is evidential or evidentially used if it expresses the source of information, i.e. evidence, for the transmitted information. So evidentiality should be defined as one category of *speaker’s perspectivisation* and as the category of *speaker’s perspectivisation* that is defined in terms of the notion of evidence. (Hennemann 2013a: 127)

In defining evidentiality in terms of evidence, I subscribe to Boye’s (2010) definition, who defines evidentiality “as covering meanings – and expressions with meanings – that can be described in terms of familiar distinctions between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect evidence’”, which comprise ‘visual evidence’, ‘non-visual direct evidence’ as well as ‘reportive evidence’ and ‘inferential evidence’ (Boye 2010: 291-292). However, I add ‘quotative evidence’ as well, since ‘reportive’ does not necessarily refer to direct citations, which is covered by the notion of ‘quotative’).

### 2.2 A brief discussion of the term ‘(inter-) subjectivity’

According to Benveniste (1966), the expression of subjectivity is inherent in language, and all utterances are somehow subjective because they originate in the respective speaker / writer: “Le langage est marqué si profondément par l’expression de la subjectivité qu’on se demande si, autrement construit, il pourrait encore fonctionner et s’appeler langage” (Benveniste 1966: 261). However, I agree with Gévaudan (2010) that the “Feststellung [...] dass jede Äußerung subjektiv ist, bringt als solche zunächst einmal keine besonderen Einsichten” (‘the observation that every utterance is subjective does not lead to remarkable insights’; Gévaudan 2010: 45). I refer thus to definitions of (inter-) subjectivity in which the expression of this semantic-functional category is bound to particular means of expression.

Lyons defines subjectivity as “the way in which natural languages, in their structure and their normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of himself and of his own attitudes and beliefs” (Lyons 1982: 102). Defining the dimension of subjectivity, Nuyts (2001a) differentiates between subjectivity and objectivity on the one hand and between subjectivity and intersubjectivity on the other hand, thus establishing a second opposition pair as well as taking and refining Lyons’ subjectivity-objectivity opposition:

(i) [...] in (my reassessment of) Lyons’ view, the dimension [of subjectivity] concerns the quality of the speaker’s evidence for an epistemic evaluation: does (s)he have good, mathematically or formally reliable evidence (i.e., objectivity), or does (s)he have poor or vague, intuitive evidence (i.e., subjectivity).

(ii) Alternatively, the dimension can be defined [...] as follows: one pole involves the speaker’s indication that (s)he alone knows (or has access to) the evidence and draws conclusions from it; the other pole involves his/her indication that the evidence is known to (or accessible by) a larger
The most influential line of research concerning (inter-) subjectivity – and (inter-) subjectification as the diachronic process – is based on grammaticalisation theory and is proposed e.g. by Traugott (1986, 1999 or Traugott & Dasher 2002).¹ According to Traugott, intersubjectivity is – roughly speaking – represented in meanings that mark “attention to the addressee’s self-image” (2010: 29), that is, meanings involving “a communicative relationship between speaker and hearer” (Cuyckens, Davidse & Vandelanotte 2010: 13). Traugott, who mentions certain uses of hedges such as sort of, well and perhaps as serving intersubjective functions (2010: 37), clearly applies her understanding of intersubjectivity to communicative situations, to speaker exchange. For Cornillie (2010), who is concerned with discourse functions of Spanish epistemic adverbs and adverbial phrases, the notion of intersubjectivity – even though not mentioned explicitly – is of prime importance as he shows that certain means of expression “invite the co-participant to approve or reject the hypotheses put forward” (Cornillie 2010: 313). He shows that speakers use certain linguistic devices to involve the addressee’s self, which is one feature that constitutes intersubjectivity. Traugott & Dasher also pay more attention to the interactional setting, and thus to the addressee’s perspective. They focus on “coded expression[s] of [speaker’s / writer’s] attention to the image or ‘self’ of [addressee / reader]” (2002: 22). While Traugott or Traugott & Dasher and Cornillie clearly address its discourse function in interactional settings, mentioning the speaker-hearer relationship, Nuys – despite doing so as well – also relates the concept of intersubjectivity to notions as common (general) knowledge, mentioning that certain linguistic devices are used when the speaker assumes sharing knowledge with the hearer (cf. Nuys 2001b: 37). Hence, his understanding of intersubjectivity is quite broad. De Cock (2014: 12) considers subjectivity and intersubjectivity “gradient phenomena”.

In sum, the notion of intersubjectivity is used with (at least) two different meanings in the literature, which I call ‘intersubjectivity₁’ and ‘intersubjectivity₂’. The former refers to the notion of common or general knowledge so that certain means of expression are interpreted as being intersubjectively used when the speaker shares / assumes sharing knowledge with the interlocutor. This is the understanding of intersubjectivity found, for instance, in Nuys (2001a). Having analysed Dutch and German examples that contain modal adverbs such as the following one,

Alle Sterne in einem solchen Sternhaufen sind sehr wahrscheinlich etwa gleichzeitig aus einer gemeinsamen großen Gaswolke entstanden

‘All stars in such a star cluster have very probably developed more or less simultaneously out of a common big gas cloud’ (Nuys 2001b: 65; my emphasis; cf. also Nuys 2001a: 389),

¹ In the diachronic process of subjectification, in “the semasiological development of meanings associated with a form such that it comes to mark subjectivity explicitly” (Traugott 1999: 179), “meanings tend to become increasingly situated in the speaker’s subjective belief state or attitude toward the proposition” (Traugott 1989: 31). Such meanings she describes as enriched with the speaker’s perspective (cf. Traugott 1999: 188). Traugott & Dasher (2002: 6) explain that “especially the discourse processes” are involved in change that lead to meanings expressing subjectivity: “meanings tend to come to refer less to objective situations and more to subjective ones (including speaker point of view), less to the described situation and more to the discourse situation” (Traugott 1986: 540). Hence, Traugott & Dasher (2002) and Traugott (1986) – who firstly proposed her notion of subjectivity in 1982 – establish a connection between the concept of subjectivity and its appearance in discourse.
Nuyts concludes that the dimension of intersubjectivity is not conveyed by the modal adverb alone but by “a contextual effect, due to our general knowledge that there has been very substantial scientific research on space […]” (Nuyts 2001b: 65).

Intersubjectivity, by contrast, is clearly related to particular discourse functions of certain means of expression in interactional settings, paying attention to the speaker-hearer constellation. To illustrate this, particular uses of certain means of expression are interpreted as politeness strategies. Aijmer (2002), for example, describes a certain use which is considered a “politeness strategy” and explains that “I think can, for instance, be used as a strategy redressing an action threatening the hearer’s negative face such as criticism or advice” (Aijmer 2002: 8).

The notions of subjectivity – the expression of the speaker’s evidence for an epistemic evaluation and intersubjectivity – the assumption of sharing knowledge with the interlocutor on behalf of the speaker – as well as intersubjectivity – the expression of the speaker’s awareness of the addressee’s ‘self’ – represent the dimensions dealt with in the present study.

2.3 On the relation between evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity

In Hennemann (2013a: 77-78) I argue that an evidentially marked utterance is always subjective in a certain way. Even if the evidence or rather the information source for the proposition is objective in nature, i.e. that something was visually perceived and this source was thus accessible to other speakers, the visually perceived information source for a certain state of affairs has to be verbally expressed; it has to be encoded. And if it is verbalised by the speaker, it has to be cognitively processed, and consequently interpreted. I propose the following example (Hennemann 2013a: 77-78): Imagine speaker A watching speaker B and C talking to each other with raised voices. Speaker A then tells speaker D about the event he had observed. He may now say:

(a) *I have seen that speaker B and C were verbally fighting with each other;*
(b) *I have seen that speaker B and C were discussing with each other;*
(c) *I have seen that speaker B and C were having an intense discussion with each other;*
(d) *I have seen that speaker B and C were having a small dispute or*
(e) *I have seen that speaker B and C were having a big dispute.*

So even visually perceivable information, which is commonly acknowledged as objective evidence, runs, if the information is cognitively processed, through the subjective ‘filter’ of the observing individual. Therefore, even though a speaker may deal with an obviously objective evidence or source of information for a state of affairs because e.g. it was visually perceptible, an utterance containing an evidential expression can never be totally objective, but at least subjective, at most intersubjective (Hennemann 2013a: 78).

According to Cappelli (2007: 133), the ‘most subjective’ utterances are those that contain an evidential expression indicating affective evidence, whereby – in my view – metaphorically used lexemes such as ‘fighting’ in sample sentence (a) cannot be said to be less subjective. A similarly high degree of subjectivity is expressed via inferential expressions because inferences drawn by the speaker’s ego represent his cognitive results, although they may rely on objectively perceivable evidence. Cappelli (2007: 131) also raises the following question: “If the speaker can encode reference to the external source of information, why cannot he/she encode reference to the absence of such external evidence?”, and explains:

The speaker can signal that he/she is uttering a personal judgement based on no other evidence but his/her own personal evaluation, his/her feeling or some other type of vague evidential

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2 Here, the fact that evidence may also be based on the speaker’s intuition (only) is included.
3 The speaker’s expression of his awareness of the interlocutor’s ‘self’ can mostly be interpreted as a politeness strategy.
information. This sort of evidence is here labelled “affective evidence”, and it is taken to include impressions, “irrational judgements” and any type of evidence depending on the ego of the evaluator or for which the evaluator cannot provide a precise definition. (Cappelli 2007: 132)

So in expressing affective evidence, subjectivity and evidentiality clearly meet. But, as mentioned before, a scalar relationship between the two concepts should be assumed: before an information source for the state of affairs is verbalised by the speaker, it was cognitively processed, evaluated and interpreted. Consequently, an utterance containing an evidential expression can never be totally objective; at most it can be intersubjective if the information source and its interpretation are (assumed to be) shared with other speakers, including the addressee. Hence, a proposition that contains an evidential expression is always – at least to a very small extent – subjectively marked. The reason is that the perception of the state of evidence is already in itself subjective (at most intersubjective). It is only possible to look through one’s own eyes and to hear with one’s own ears etc. (Hennemann 2013a: 85). As a consequence, even if arguing that in the use of certain means of expression evidentiality and subjectivity exclude each other, it is meant that they are almost competing dimensions. They can never completely exclude each other. The subjectivity dimension, however, decreases if the domain of intersubjectivity increases – intersubjectivity in the meaning of ‘shared knowledge’. Cornillie also explains that a “statement is subjective when the evidence is restricted to the speaker’s realm, while a statement is called intersubjective when the speaker (assumes (s)he) shares it with other people” (Cornillie 2007: 124). He regards the concept of intersubjectivity as a fruitful addition to the notion of subjectivity, whereby both are related to evidentiality:

Since intersubjective statements have broader support than subjective ones, the former are seen as more reliable and are, hence, considered to express “near-factivity”, while, based on the speaker’s inference only, the latter lead to a “non-factive” interpretation. (Cornillie 2007: 126-127)

In summary, this leads to two conclusions: 1. In subscribing to Cappelli’s words and relying on my former line of argumentation (cf. Hennemann 2103), I regard evidentiality and subjectivity not necessarily as competing dimensions, which will be shown by different examples from Portuguese, Spanish and English orality, retrieved from different corpora. 2. If speaking about ‘intersubjectivity’ in the present study, I follow my conceptual distinction between intersubjectivity and intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is bound to common or general knowledge: certain linguistic elements are interpreted as being intersubjectively used when the speaker shares / assumes sharing knowledge with the interlocutor or other speakers. Intersubjectivity, by contrast, is bound to discourse functions of certain linguistic elements in interactional settings, whereby the speaker expresses his awareness of the interlocutor’s self.

3 Corpus Analysis

3.1 The data

This corpus analysis is qualitative in nature since it is not my intention to show in how many instances a certain means of expression is used with meaning X or meaning Y in a fixed amount of words. Rather, selected examples are used to verify the hypothesis regarding the relationship between evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity. The examples are ‘conceptually oral’, even though they are characterised by ‘medial writtenness’ (cf. Koch & Oesterreicher 1994: 587). Generally, as with regard to the conception of an utterance, the terms ‘oral’ and ‘written’ denote the endpoints of a continuum (cf. Koch & Oesterreicher 1994: 587). Hence, the examples are retrieved from the respective oral parts of the corpora Corpus do Português, Corpus del
With regard to the examples containing cognitive verbs, it should be highlighted that the analysis of these verbs in their performative use is preferred, that is, “when they truly encode the subject’s [cognitive] attitude” (Cappelli 2007: 112), appearing in the 1st person singular of the simple present tense. Hence the verbs are non-descriptive and have a qualificational function (cf. Cappelli 2007: 112).

3.2 The examples

3.2.1 Evidentiality and subjectivity

In the following examples affective-evidential creo / acho / I think is only added to mitigate the propositional content [p]. For Spanish, De Saeger (2007: 275) explains that the “adición de creo o pienso al final del enunciado no aporta ninguna información nueva. Sirve sobre todo para destacar la subjetividad de la proposición” (‘addition of creo or pienso at the end of the utterance does not contribute any new information. It serves above all to highlight the subjectivity of the proposition’). In my view, however, final creo (or acho / I think) indeed does represent new information (in the sense of ‘additional information’). The content of the proposition is, up to the point where the cognitive verb is added, represented as a fact (cf. also Hennemann 2016: 461). Hence, creo / acho / I think is of high importance, as the speaker wishes to show that he does not want to be fully responsible for the content of the proposition. Sperber & Wilson (1995: 181) also explain: “A speaker who communicates that she believes that P does not automatically communicate that P”, and Urmson (1952: 484) argues that “the whole point of some parenthetical verbs is to modify or to weaken the claim to truth which could be implied by a simple assertion p”. Hence, the propositional content is ‘subjectively tinged’, even though the speaker may rely on evidential knowledge while uttering [p] (the following examples are also found in Hennemann 2016: 461-462):

(1) ¿Eh? La abuela viene esta noche, creo. (España Oral: ACON023A)

(2) Nos dirigimos a una iglesia fantástica llamada “Santo Domingo”. Románica, creo. (España Oral: AENT027A)

(3) [...] cuántos años tiene ese primo? Pues diez, creo. (España Oral: CEDU029A)

(4) [...] Está desde la diez kilos, creo. (España Oral: ETEC002A)

(5) Pedro II foi o maior presidente que tivemos, acho. (19Or:Br:Intrv:ISP: Elomar)

In the following Portuguese example postposed acho is even accompanied by the subject pronoun:

(6) Se você não está mergulhado naquele meio, é muito complicado, eu acho. (19Or:Pt:Intrv:ISP: Sergio Monteiro)

The following text passages represent examples from English orality:

(7) And I think he’s going to - he might even beat Paul in the state, I think. (Roundtable; Debate Report Card; ABC_ThisWeek)
I couldn’t -- my wife -- she fell asleep in the bathtub, **I think.** I was downstairs. (The Bathtub Mystery [...]; NBC_Dateline)

KOTB: So pack your bags. We are going -- when are we going? GIFFORD: Two weeks, **I think.** (Today’s Talk; Kathie Lee and Hoda discuss current events; NBC_Today)

Every single content of the propositions above does not represent a fact but the subjective perspective of the speaker’s mental state. Willems & Blanche-Benveniste (2014: 135) also explain that “[the] weak verb construction typically appears as a second thought” and that “[in] spoken language weak verbs are for the speaker often the locus of particular attention and metalinguistic reflection”. By using creo / acho / **I think**, the speaker indicates that the transmitted information may also be wrong: It is possible that the grandmother arrives this night or another one (1); it is possible that the church is from another epoch (2); the cousin could also be younger or older (3) or it possibly weighs 11 or 12 kilogrammes (4); it is possible that it was not Pedro II (5); it is possibly not (very) complicated (6); it is possible that the person is not able to beat Paul (7); the speaker’s wife was possibly murdered (and didn’t fall ‘asleep’ or she fell asleep elsewhere and was then put in the bathtub, 8); the answer ‘two weeks’ might be wrong or miscalculated (9). In every single case the speaker marks the propositional content subjectively by the postposed cognitive verb. The construction’s “specific pragmatic role is to allow the speaker to put some distance between him/herself and the simple statement, often considered otherwise too strong” (Willems & Blanche-Benveniste 2014: 135).

Generally, the use of cognitive verbs is considered subjective (affective evidence). However, the degree of subjectivity seems to decrease if the speaker provides – maybe intersubjectively comprehensible – reasons for this thinking so that the evidential domain becomes more prominent. Compare the examples containing Creo que vs. Creo que... porque, Acho que vs. Acho que... porque and **I think that** vs. **I think that... because**:

(10) **Yo lo adoro. Creo que** influyó mucho en nuestros demás compositores, incluso en Verdi. Yo me inclino ante la música del gran maestro. (Entrevista (ABC): RUBIO JOSE LUIS)

(11) **Yo creo que** sí, **porque... ella fue la que contribuyó... a hacerme salir la primera vez de Caracas.** (Habla Culta: Caracas: M25)

The following text passage contains an instance of No creo que... **porque**, which is even accompanied by a question requiring back-channel behaviour:

(12) **No creo que** sea capitalista **porque** era feudalista, se servían de la servidumbre, ¿**no es cierto?** […] (Habla Culta: La Paz: M31)

So the speaker in example (12) provides a reason for his way of thinking, at the same time signalling that he is not sure whether this is the correct reason.

Compare example (13) with the following examples that contain Portuguese **achar** and **porque**:

(13) **Acho que** humor ou mau humor nasce com a gente. Eu não faço nada além para exercer as minhas atividades profissionais. (19Or:Br:Intrv:Cid: Leda)

(14) **Eu acho que** estamos em um momento difícil, **porque** o basquete vive de patrocinadores e com a economia atual o pessoal não solta dinheiro. (19Or:Br:Intrv:Cid: Vânia Teixeira)
(15) Olha, não posso afirmar que sim, acho que não. Porque entre essas forças que estariam aliadas, o PT é o mais forte, tem a hegemonia. (19Or:Br:Intrv:Pov: Luíza Erundina)

(16) Acho que ela tomou essa atitude porque não concordou com o transporte dos presos. (19Or:Br:Intrv:ISP: Marília Mendonça)

Example (15) shows that the reason may also be found beyond the sentence level. Instead, the speaker initiates the succeeding sentence with Porque (see also example 23).

The English example containing I don’t think indeed sounds highly subjectively without provided reason(s):

(17) GAYLE-KING# How are things with you and Mitch McConnell these days, I’m wondering? SENATOR-RAND-PAUL: I don’t think that we need counseling, yet. (Critics from both parties accused Paul of grandstanding. […] ; CBS)

Examples (18) and (19), by contrast, contain I (don’t) think (that)… because:

(18) BAIER# George, is there any positive you see in this speech, any silver lining to what he said tonight? WILL# I don’t think so because what he didn’t say, for example, is […] (State of the Union and Republican Response; Fox)

(19) MS-ANDREA-MITCHELL: He didn’t close the door. I think that because of the Medicare -- the toxicity really of what he’s proposed on Medicare in terms of politics […] (MR. DAVID GREGORY: We’re back, joined now by our roundtable […] ; NBC_MeetPress)

The following dialogue text passage contains an evidential use of I think that, even though it is not followed by an explicit causal conjunction. However, the speaker provides the reason, why he thinks that it is ‘a trap for Hillary Clinton’, in the following sentences:

(20) SCHIEFFER# Mm-hmm. Do you think Hillary Clinton is inevitable? AXELROD# Well, inevitable is a very tough word. And I actually think that’s a trap for her. she is highly likely to be the Democratic nominee. I can’t see another scenario. But this is exactly what got her in trouble the last time because with inevitability becomes caution […] (Interview With Texas Governor Greg Abbott; CBS)

The statement “And I actually think that’s a trap for her” and the succeeding one (“she is…””) could perfectly be combined via the causal conjunction because.

In sum, comparing the examples in which the speaker somehow justifies his thoughts with the examples containing a cognitive verb without provided reason(s), the relationship between evidentiality and subjectivity is different. The more affective the evidence seems, that is, when no intersubjectively comprehensible reason is provided, the more prominent the dimension of subjectivity seems.

In the following Portuguese example containing acreditar, the verb is not only accompanied by porque but also by two instances of the synthetic future (será / ocorrerá). All these means of expression together lead to the decrease of subjectivity and to the increase of the evidential dimension:

(21) Acredito que o euro será adotado por um grande número de países europeus. Isso ocorrerá, em primeiro lugar, por motivos de necessidade política, porque, a esta altura […] (19Or:Br:Intrv:ISP: Romano Prodi)
The Romance synthetic future was already shown to be used to mark inference\(^4\), that is, an evidential subcategory, which varies in its degree of subjectivity (depending on the kind of evidence). Consider example (30), for instance, which is regarded as very interesting because *tal vez* and the synthetic future (*pasará*) are indicators of modality or rather inference (cf. also Hennemann 2013a: 381-399), so that in the use of *pienso yo* (inferential) evidentiality and subjectivity overlap:

\(\text{(22)}\) Enc. - Pero, ¿por qué está dolida con ustedes? Inf.a. - No, no precisamente con nosotros. *Tal vez* por la muerte de mi madre y... ya se le *pasará*, *pienso yo*. (Habla Culta: La Paz: M8)

In the following two examples Portuguese *será* also appears in inferential contexts:

\(\text{(23)}\) […] para competir com a industria audiovisual europeia, e sobretudo produzir em português ou nas variantes do português para o futuro espaço lusófono. Esse espaço *será* um espaço privilegiado para o documentário. *Porque* isto envolve países com muito poucos meios […] (19Or:Pt:Intrv:Web: Fernando Lopes)

\(\text{(24)}\) […] enquanto a Polícia Civil é protegida por uma série de legislações corporativistas que acabam inibindo a possibilidade de se sanear com maior agilidade esse organismo. No futuro, *creio*, isso *será* possível. (19Or:Br:Intrv:Pov: Ciro Gomes)

The English *will*-future is also to be found in inferential contexts, where evidentiality and subjectivity overlap or, in other words, where they represent non-competing dimensions:

\(\text{(25)}\) Yes. Well, this *will* work *because* green tea contains L- theanine, which has been proven to calm you down. (For February 28, 2011, CBS)

In the following two examples *probably* and *I think* mitigate the speaker’s assumption expressed by *will… because*:

\(\text{(26)}\) Israel is in big trouble. *Probably* something *will* happen *because* Israel, I don’t know how Israel can live with that deal. (Hillary in Trouble? […]; CNN)

\(\text{(27)}\) *I think* it *will* pass *because* even the two guys competing to be chairman of the House Appropriation Committee, […], they are now against earmarks. (Special Report with Bret Baier; Fox)

### 3.2.2 Evidentiality and intersubjectivity\(^1\)

The following text passages – containing the adverbs *supuestamente*, *supostamente*, *supposedly*, *alegadamente* or *allegedly*, forms of direct and indirect quotations and the conditional form – serve as examples to illustrate the relationship between evidentiality and intersubjectivity\(^1\) – when the speaker knows that he shares (i.e. in the case of quoting) or

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\(^5\) It was shown that the evidential meaning aspect can be “regarded as inherent in *supuestamente*. This adverb is notably frequently found in contexts treating crimes or juridic questions. The adverb was shown to combine the reported reading and the inferential one, albeit not the ‘classical’ inferential reading. […] the speaker / journalist transmits the inferentially gained information of another person” (Hennemann 2013a: 421).
assumes sharing knowledge with other speakers. In certain cases, the speaker even knows that he shares the information with the information source:

(28) **Supuestamente** tiene inmovilizados en Suiza unos doce mil millones de pesetas, **supuestamente**, naturalmente. (Esta noche cruzamos el Mississippi, 22/10/96, Tele 5)

(29) E aumentando os prazos de pagamento, empurrando o pepino para os Estados, para salvar o quê? **Supostamente**, para salvar os bancos. (19Or:Br:Intrv:Web: ROBERTO REQUIÃO)

(30) TIM-STACK# Yeah. **Supposedly**, the Prius in front of him stopped on the PCH which you just can’t […] (We all got to know actress Kim Cattrall […]; NBC)

(31) Well, we don’t know. **Supposedly** Channing Tatum will be one of the producers -- (Meantime, it’s big day for Madonna; NBC)

(32) First of all, Rebecca Mansour writes her Facebook posts for her. **Allegedly**, I believe, so, usually when you write something yourself you don’t write, “I thought that was the best part of the post.” (Hot Topics; ABC)

Example (33) is taken from (orally performed) breaking news headlines:

(33) UNIDENTIFIED-FEMAL# Dead from a single gunshot wound to the head. UNIDENTIFIED-FEMAL# **Allegedly** during a violent encounter with his own son. (Did Princeton Grad Murder Millionaire Dad? […]; CNN)

These evidential adverbs (*supuestamente*, *supostamente*, *supposedly* and *allegedly*) are not only found sentence-initially as sentence adverbs but also in other syntactic positions, thus having a different scope, often a smaller one (cf. also Böhm, Haßler & Hennemann 2017):

(34) Por lo que hace a las afirmaciones **supuestamente** técnicas de la Senadora Garavito sobre el artículo cuarenta y seis […] (Sesión pública ordinaria de la Honorable Cámara de Senadores, celebrada el domingo 13 de diciembre […]])

(35) Já no principio da época houve quem tivesse preconizado o fim dos carros de quatro rodas motrizes, **alegadamente** por questões financeiras, mas não se passou disso. (19Or:Pt:Intrv:Jrnl: Afonso Dhlakama)

If *alegadamente* is used to introduce quoted words as in the following text passage, the dimension of intersubjectivity is characterised by the fact that the speaker knows that he shares knowledge with the quoted source:

(36) (Impedir o voto das populações radicadas em zonas de Moçambique **alegadamente** “atrasadas”, economicamente fracas ou carecidas de logística). (19Or:Pt:Intrv:Jrnl: Afonso Dhlakama)

(37) Eleven of the twelve balls **allegedly** were underinflated. (Our Eye on Money series […]; CBS)

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* In the oral part of the *Corpus do português* the adverb *alegadamente* is not found to be used sentence-initially.
(38) It was **allegedly** written there by the attackers. (Royal Sex Scandal: Prince Andrew; CNN)

(39) CLEMENTS# Yes, you know what, what a coincidence. Her hair dresser is **supposedly** this ear witness. (Prom Date Murder […]; CNN)

In sentence-final position such adverbs are also regarded as sentence adverbs, having scope over the entire sentence:

(40) […] debemos de puntualizar mucho sobre esto porque no quisiéramos que hubiera una cacería de brujas, una persecución, amenaza, tal vez desaparición, encarcelamiento de los indígenas que estuvieron participando dentro del Ejército Zapatista, **supuestamente**… . (Tal cual, 11/03/94, TVE 2)

(41) I do not want to blame social media for that. I blame these gals, **allegedly**. OK? (Royal Sex Scandal: Prince Andrew; CNN)

In the following we will have a look at ‘direct forms’ of quotation, even though the quotation type itself may be indirect as in the following example from Portuguese, which contains an epistemic / inferential use of *penso eu* because the speaker indirectly quotes the words of a third person and expresses to what that person – according to him – referred to:

(42) E **lembro-me** de uma entrevista do Jorge Coroado, em que ele negava a existência da corrupção material mas admitia a corrupção moral, querendo referir-se, **penso eu**, às influências que os dirigentes podem ter nos árbitros. (19Or:Pt:Intrv:Jrnl: Jesus Costa)

The quoting speaker assumes to share the transmitted information at least with the person he quotes so that evidentiality and intersubjectivity overlap. Examples from pt. *disse* demonstrate that the speaker’s epistemic commitment may vary from being uncertain -> less sure -> relatively sure -> fairly certain -> certain:

(43) **Creio que** foi o Tayllerand que **disse** isto mas para todas as palavras. (19Or:Pt:Intrv:Web: António Manuel Baptista)

Quoting a person as in example (43) and introducing the foreign words by *Creio que* signals that the speaker is not so certain with regard to the quoted person.

Generally, comparing indirectly quoted speech (44) and directly quoted speech (45) leads to the conclusion that the latter is bound to a higher epistemic commitment of the current speaker:

(44) Ele **disse** que não havia problema com o facto de eu ser estrangeiro. (19Or:Pt:Intrv:Web: Jorge Rino)

(45) Mas mesmo com todas as explicações, ele me **disse**: “mas, deputada, esse projeto legitima a união homossexual e mostra que eles existem” (19Or:Br:Intrv:Cid: Marta Suplicy)

These examples containing direct or indirect quotes show that evidentiality and intersubjectivity are overlapping dimensions. The speaker knows that he shares knowledge with other speakers (at least with the quoted person). Clearly, if the quoting speaker and the
quoted speaker are congruent – if a speaker cites himself – he is (in most cases) absolutely certain:

(46) Já **disse** para todos que não quero que suma nada dos processos. (19Or:Br:Intrv:Cid: Izzo Filho)

The speaker simply knows that he shares knowledge with himself.

The ‘most famous’ linguistic means of expression in which evidentiality and intersubjectivity overlap is the (journalistic) conditional (Squartini 2001, 2004; Kronning 2002, 2004; Wachtmeister Bermúdez 2004, Pietrandrea 2005; Sullet-Nylander 2006; Giacalone Ramat / Topadze 2007; Hennemann 2013a, 2013b, 2014a; Böhm / Hennemann 2014). Especially in journalistic discourse, the conditional is used to mark foreign words, that is, to mark indirect speech. In the following, however, a few examples from Portuguese and Spanish orality are offered:

(47) Entonces eh - doctor, **según - todo esto**, lo - lo importante **sería** conseguir una serie de tratamientos genéticos, ¿no? […] (España Oral: BENT015B)

(48) Su coche, **según apuntan fuentes policiales**, ya lo sabrán, **podría llevar acoplado** un artefacto listo para detonar por el sistema del péndulo. (A todo Madrid, Madrid, 06/06/91, Onda Madrid B)

(49) Ciento once setenta y cinco **sería**, **según nuestras cuentas**, la nota de Miguel Ángel Rubio. (Retransmisión deportiva, Madrid, 20/05/91, TVE)

In Spanish, as the examples above illustrate, the **según**-phrase or another type of source of information indication often accompanies the reportive use of the conditional. This can also be said for Portuguese **seria**:

(50) […] o desejo de conhecer a admiração como ele diria no sentido grego né? - ele jamais poderia filosofar - então uma das causas primeiras do filosofar **segundo** os gregos **segundo** Platão **segundo** Aristóteles - **seria** o admirar – então […] (Linguagem Falada: Recife: EF 339)

The following text passage represents a dialogue. The speaker poses a question, but the interlocutor utters a counter question using **seria**. By using this verbal form the interlocutor indirectly quotes the first speaker and by reformulating his words, his words are cognitively processed by the interlocutor. So in example (51) the evidential categories ‘Reportive’ and ‘Inference’ overlap and the interlocutor shares knowledge with the first speaker (intersubjectivity):

(51) Se você desmilitariza, amanha vamos estar com um sindicato na frente do quartel fazendo greve. Você deve permitir greve em um serviço que é essencial? JC - Então, manter-se militarizado **seria** uma barreira contra as greves? (19Or:Br:Intrv:Com: Coronel Humberto Viana)

In English, the reportive conjunctive is also often accompanied by an **according-to** phrase, showing that the conditional is a means of expression that is found in contexts of quotation, so that evidentiality and intersubjectivity are seen as non-competing dimensions:
According to media reports the plan would not exclude Assad from running in those elections [...] (Kurdish Forces Fighting to Retake Sinjar [...] ; CNN)

According to Jim, the answer would be yes. (“Dangerous Beauty”; CBS)

According to the same poll, Hillary would beat Romney in double digits. (Israeli-Hamas Conflict [...] ; Fox)

According to HealthCare.gov, she would pay two hundred and thirty-one dollars a month [...] (For October 23, 2013, CBS)

The examples illustrate that the conditional and the conjunctive are used to mark an external source to the speaker. The quoting speaker, in turn, knows that he shares knowledge (about the transmitted information) at least with the respective quoted information source.

3.2.3 Evidentiality and intersubjectivity

In Spanish and Portuguese, cognitive verbs may be accompanied by the explicitly mentioned subject pronoun or may come without it. Researchers agree, that “the choice between expression and omission of the subject is hardly random or arbitrary, but rather proves to be closely linked to discursive and pragmatic factors” (Aijón Oliva & Serrano 2010: 7). Posio’s study shows that especially “mental or cognitive verbs such as the verb creer ‘think’ are associated with a significantly higher rate of expressed subject pronouns than other verbs” (Posio 2014: 5). And while comparing creer with other cognitive verbs, it is obvious that with creer “the expression of the subject pronoun yo is very frequent” (Posio 2014: 16). Aijón Oliva & Serrano show that the explicit formulation of the subject is especially frequent in radio programmes or debates, where the expression of opinion and valuation is of high importance to the speakers. Hence, most instances of the construction are found in dialogues (cf. Aijón Oliva & Serrano 2010: 27). The omission of the subject pronoun is generally linked to “hypothetical contexts and introducing propositions considered to be of a more general scope” (Aijón Oliva & Serrano 2010: 7; also 27). Or, as Posio puts it: “In contexts where creo rather serves a mitigating function, expressing cautious epistemic stance, the subject pronoun is omitted” (Posio 2014: 13).

For the post-verbal position of the subject pronoun – for creo yo – Posio explains: “the post-verbal placement of the pronoun can be interpreted as contrastive, as it typically marks the modified utterance as representing the speaker’s point of view but not necessarily being shared by others” (Posio 2014: 15). Hence, yo (eu) fulfils a contrastive function: besides expressing the speaker’s perspective, by the use of post-verbal yo (eu) the speaker implicitly states ‘this is definitely my view. You, addressee / interlocutor may have another opinion. I am prepared to debate my epistemic evaluation / opinion’. This leads, in my view, to the assumption that the structure [cognitive verb + subject pronoun] represents an invitation for the interlocutors to comment upon the speaker’s utterance. Hence, because of the use of yo (eu) the domain of intersubjectivity is more present so that the examples where yo (eu) is to be found can be described in terms of ‘(higher) intersubjectivity’. Interestingly, Davidson (1996: 547) argues that the interpretation of (parenthetically used) cognitive verbs in terms of subjectivity is only applicable to those uses without a subject pronoun. By implication, yo (eu) must have another function. Thus, I would like to add that in the use of postposed creo yo (or with regard to achar / pensar), the intersubjective dimension is present, while it is absent in the use of cognitive

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7 For this part of the paper see also Hennemann (2016).
verbs without subject pronoun. Furthermore, in sentence-final position, the cognitive verb + subject pronoun invites the addressee to comment upon the speaker’s utterance or to ask a question.

Even though this study was not a quantitative analysis, it is striking that many uses of sentence-final creo yo are accompanied by a question requiring back-channel behaviour on behalf of the interlocutor (59-62). In examples (56)-(58) sentence-final creo yo is used, and the interlocutor starts to represent his contradictory opinion (56) or asks another question (57-58):

(56) Inf.b. – Este año va a pasar lo mismo, creo yo. Inf.a. – No, tal vez... mira [...] (Habla Culta: Bogotá: M34)

(57) Eso influyó mucho, creo yo. Enc. – Bien eh... ¿usted se siente satisfecho con esta profesión? (Habla Culta: Santiago: M18)

(58) Inf.a. – Es sólo para llamar la atención, no más, creo yo. Enc. – Pero usted ¿lo ve negativamente eso o...[?] (Habla Culta: Santiago: M20)

It is assumed that the addition of yo invites the interlocutor to represent his perspective regarding a particular information or to ask another question more than postposed creo Ø does. Hence, it is considered a construction expressing intersubjectivity. The following examples may underline this assumption as creo yo is accompanied by an explicit question asking for the interlocutor’s opinion (59, 60), by a particle (61) or a discourse marker (62) which even emphasise that [p] represents the speaker’s mental state, thus inviting the interlocutor to utter his view or to ask another question (62):

(59) [...] la distancia de la vivienda a los centros de trabajo, todas estas cosas, ¿no?, se podrían tratar, creo yo, ¿qué te parece, X.? Inf.a. – Claro, sí. (Habla Culta: Bogotá: M22)

(60) Inf. B. – ... en gran parte, creo yo, ¿no? Inf. A. – ... y a veces... agarran una pieza literaria interesante que [...] (Habla Culta: Caracas: M26)

(61) – Sí. – pero – tiene usted que pensar, creo yo Sí. (España Oral: PPOL007C)

(62) Inf.a. – Sin nominación política determinada, creo yo, pues. Inf.b. – ¿En la... la ideología, dice usted? (Habla Culta: Santiago: M48)

In example (63) the speaker not only adds the question requiring back-channel behaviour by asking ¿no? but also adds an explanation starting with por ‘for (because)’, which is thought to underline his opinion:

(63) [...] no es com..., no es el... el Bonnie and Clyde auténtico, creo yo, ¿no? por los convencionalismos de la sociedad española [...]’ (Habla Culta: Madrid: M4)

Example (64) shows that the speaker is not only unsure with regard to [p] because he adds no sé (‘I don’t know’) to the construction under survey. He also adds the question ¿ah? but does not wait for the interlocutor’s opinion. Instead, he keeps on talking just as in example (65), where the speaker not only finishes his utterance with creo yo but also introduces it by yo creo que (‘I think that’):
(64) Y parece que es esto (no tanto el tema mismo, creo yo, no sé ¿ah? el gusto de las personas [...] (Habla Culta: Santiago: M12)\(^8\)

(65) [...] yo creo que también está en la... en... en todas las capas sociales... y... e... está en todos los países, creo yo. Aquí hay una crisis [...] (Habla Culta: Caracas: M10)

It is important to note that back-channel behaviour does not have to be in verbal form but may also be non-verbal. Unfortunately, the present study can only deal with transcribed oral texts. If, however, the back-channel behaviour is non-verbal in nature, it is not surprising that the speaker keeps on talking, not waiting for a verbally expressed agreement or question. However, examples (63)-(65) underline the intersubjectivity hypothesis with regard to creo yo. The construction is accompanied by an explicit question asking for the interlocutor’s opinion (examples 63 and 64) or by an additional expression in example (65) (yo creo que) to explicitly mark [p] as the speaker’s opinion, which is considered to have an intersubjective function because in stressing one’s own opinion the speaker is aware of the interlocutor’s ‘self’ (just as is the case with no sé in example 64). Additionally, the statement in (65) could have been equally introduced by creo que (‘[I] think that’), but the subject pronoun is used.

The following examples also represent instances of creo yo, penso eu or I think which are combined with questions requiring back-channel behaviour or which are combined with intersubjectivity markers signalling that the speaker is ready to negotiate [p] such as vamos in example (67):

(66) Hombre, el problema es que tan pron/ en esta época nunca ha hecho buen tiempo, creo yo, ¿no? Bueno, no. [...] (España Oral: CCON031B)

(67) [...] sin embargo, yo creo que ella no - no es capaz de fiarse de alguna persona que no conoce o al menos que - haya visto pocas veces, vamos, pienso yo. (España Oral: CENT013A)

(68) Y son los dueños de esas acequias, que para esta época seguramente vienen, y los invocan, y les hacen of... ofrendas, y incluso, se supone que habla con ellos, que podría ser una especie de espiritismo pienso yo ¿no? (Habla Culta: Lima: M21)

(69) Después yo pienso que eso no es bueno también, porque... lógicamente ese chiquillo sabe más del país, lo quiere más... Enc. - Mhm. Inf. - Y trabaja más (risas) y tiene, verdad por qué luchar. Pienso yo... ¿verdad? Enc. - Sí. (Habla Culta: San José (CR): M33)

The following two English examples contain propositions marked by I think, whereby the text passages are accompanied by a question requiring back-channel behaviour. Thus, the speaker is aware of the addressee’s self, which characterises intersubjectivity:

(70) In fact, Karl Malone, some -- a basketball player for another team -- I think it’s Portland -- who -- is that right? Utah Jazz [...] (Ind_Limbaugh / 19930621)

\(^8\) According to De Cock (2014), in expressions like no sé subjectivity and intersubjectivity overlap. In general, both categories, she argues, are closely linked: “To briefly illustrate [the] intertwined relationship [between subjectivity and intersubjectivity], consider epistemic parentheticals and forms of address. Epistemic parenthetical no sé ‘I don’t know’ is situated in the realm of subjectivity […] yet it is often being analysed as attenuating […], pointing at an intersubjective functioning taking into account the addressee’s attitudes and beliefs” (De Cock 2014: 12).
Novello: […] we should put some strings behind this, I **think, you know?** Simon: **Uh-huh.** (“Lazlo Toth Writes Again”: Novello “Book”: NPR_Weekend)

As a last example, consider the interesting case where the speaker emphasises that she not only *thinks* that [p] but she *knows* it:

KING You think he forged your name? Ms. HELMSLEY: **I don’t think, I know. I know, all right?** Number two, there was a young man there that ordered engineering parts […] (Leona Helmsley (R-#131); CNN_King)

Of course, here the question requiring back-channel behaviour is to be interpreted differently. The speaker does not signal her unsureness. This would be contradictory after emphasising her knowing. She seems to be a little bit furious instead.

4 Conclusion and Outlook

The empirical analysis has shown that evidentiality and subjectivity as well as evidentiality and intersubjectivity are not necessarily competing dimensions. As subjectivity and intersubjectivity are best described as gradient phenomena (cf. De Cock 2014), these concepts are perfectly combinable with evidentiality. Following Cappelli’s (2007) line of argumentation concerning affective evidence, the examples containing propositions that are marked e.g. by cognitive verbs are to be interpreted as the ‘most subjective’ utterances. Accordingly, as the evidential expressions *acho (que)*, *creo (que)* and *I think (that)* indicate affective evidence in the sense of “impressions, ‘irrational judgements’ and any type of evidence depending on the ego of the evaluator or for which the evaluator cannot provide a precise definition” (Cappelli 2007: 131-132). For the Romance languages, the use of the subject pronoun is regarded an indicator of intersubjectivity2. The examples of *eu (acho) que* and *yo creo (que)* or postposed *creo yo / penso eu* have clearly demonstrated that they show up in interactive contexts and that the speaker signals his awareness of the interlocutor’s ‘self’ (cf. also Hennemann 2016). Hence, in the structure *[subject pronoun] + cognitive verb in 1st pers. sg. + (subject pronoun)] evidentiality and intersubjectivity2 may meet. While a cognitive verb in 1st pers. sg. without subject pronoun is considered a construction expressing subjectivity, a cognitive verb in 1st pers. Sg. + subject pronoun is regarded as representing the domain of intersubjectivity2, inviting the interlocutor to comment upon [p] or to ask a question regarding [p]. This is also underlined by the short questions or particles that are means of expression requiring back-channel behaviour, questions or comments. The use of the conditional / conjunctive and the adverbs *supostamente / alegadamente, supuestamente and supposedly / allegedly*, for instance, are, by contrast, clearly instances of a ‘meeting point’ of evidentiality and intersubjectivity1.

Future studies could focus on the gradient overlapping of evidentiality and (inter-) subjectivity in written texts and have a detailed look at these (non-) competing dimensions, for instance in academic writing (cf. also Chafe 1986, Ebrahimi & Allami 2012 or Yang 2014). Contrastive analyses between, on the one hand, (conceptual) orality and conceptual / medial writtenness as well as between more different languages are also desired.
5 References


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