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A Blueprint for Successful Peacekeeping? The Italians in Beirut (Lebanon), 1982–1984

Bastian Matteo Scianna

ABSTRACT
On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines’ barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.

KEYWORDS
Peacekeeping; Italy; Lebanon; Middle East; Beirut

Introduction
The Lebanon War in 1982 and the Multinational Force (MNF) operations in Beirut between August 1982 and February 1984 have received little attention in contrast to other peacekeeping missions. This is even more surprising as one can identify characteristics of many conflicts in the decades to come: set in a densely populated urban-littoral environment, local and foreign fighters linked to international terrorism and supported by rogue states engaged Western forces with small arms fire, mortars, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and suicide attacks.¹ In the 1980s, however, such missions were a novelty, particularly for Italy, it marked the first deployment of soldiers since the Second World War. It was a fundamental experience that shaped the subsequent Italian approach to peacekeeping. It started the army’s professionalisation for greater deployability in overseas missions, led to a ‘soldiers for peace’ narrative on the political level and marked the beginning of a special Italian relationship with Lebanon.² Yet, the MNF is still poorly researched – especially the actual happenings on the ground – or merely seen through the US lenses, where it equals disaster.

The aim of this article is therefore to contribute with archival research to on-going questions about when and how ‘peacekeeping works.’³ While Italian files will remain classified for at least another twenty years, the existing scholarship has never analysed the Italian case more closely. Thus, relying on published memoirs, magazines and newspapers offers new insights, which can be supplemented by foreign primary sources. The British
National Archives hold several documents that provide another objective angle on the Italian operations. The following will provide first, a brief overview on the situation in Beirut and the Italian force structure, second, analyse the different phases of the mission, before third, looking at its legacy. The main argument proposed in this article is that there was a specific Italian approach on the ground which – combined with political and diplomatic manoeuvres – resulted in a qualified success. The MNF did not bring lasting peace or stability to Lebanon and the deployment ended with a retreat and renewed bloodshed, but one should analyse the Italian operations in Beirut according to the envisaged goals, not their strategic outcomes.

War in Lebanon

After the expulsion from Jordan, the PLO had gained a stronghold in southern Lebanon since the early 1970s. The internal rifts in Lebanon, ruled by Maronite Christians, led to the 1975–1976 civil war, which then brought Syrian and Israeli interventions. To prevent further bloodshed, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was installed in 1978, but encountered many problems. The PLO was also strongly involved in internal Lebanese violence, recruited fighters among refugees and conducted cross-border operations against Israel. On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) invaded southern Lebanon with the initial aim to establish a 40-kilometre security zone and to remove the PLO from its border. Soon, however, Operation ‘Peace for Galilee’ turned into a full-scale offensive with nearly 100,000 soldiers. The IDF won a series of quick victories and started a gruesome siege of the predominantly Muslim-populated West Beirut, where their casualties mounted in urban clashes. An internationally brokered ceasefire in August guaranteed a protected withdrawal for the PLO and the Syrian forces. The USA and the French – both with traditionally strong ties to the Christian community in Lebanon – led to diplomatic initiatives and decided to dispatch troops to Beirut. Thus, the MNF was envisaged to safeguard the evacuation and the security of the Palestinian civilians for thirty days. On Israeli insistence, the MNF held no UN mandate, but operated upon invitation of the Lebanese government. The Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, had announced the country’s support for such a mission – even without UN authorisation – during a stay in Washington. In fact, the Lebanon War coincided with a time of elevated Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean, and Rome had an eye on attaining a special relationship with the USA. Each nation signed bilateral treaties with the Gemayel government that defined their roles and goals. The Italians were envisaged to function as ‘interposition force in a number of sensitive areas; to assist the Lebanese government and armed forces in restoring their sovereignty in the Beirut area, to protect the civilian population in the sector and to put an end to bloodshed.’ It is according to these goals that we should judge the mission outcome. The operations can be divided into five phases:

(1) The MNF (I) overseeing the evacuation of Palestinian and Syrian soldiers (25 August 1982 to 10–13 September 1983);
(2) The return of the MNF (II) after Gemayel’s assassination and the refugee camp massacres (after 24 September 1982);
(3) A period of relative calm until spring 1983;
(4) The deterioration of the security situation in summer and autumn 1983, the barrack bombings on 23 October, escalating retaliation and direct assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF);

(5) The race to the exit door until March 1984.

The deployment of MNF I was very short-lived. The first French and American forces disembarked on 21–22 August 1982. The US Marines were to defend the airport area in the south, the French to patrol and to monitor West Beirut in the north (including the Sabra camp), while between them, the Italians protected the refugee ‘camps’ Chatila and Bourj al-Barajneh. MNF I achieved its task despite the highly dangerous situation: the Palestinians and Syrians left Beirut within eighteen days. Arafat and 8144 PLO fighters were evacuated from the port (under American and French guidance) and the Italians protected the overland withdrawal of 6254 Palestinian and Syrian forces.15 The MNF declared its mission accomplished and sailed home on 13 September, instead of staying the agreed-upon one-month minimum.

On 14 September 1982, the Maronite President-elect, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. Hereafter, the Israelis entered West Beirut and Christian Lebanese militias massacred around 800 Palestinians in the Sabra and Chatila camps between 16 and 18 September. An outraged world public demanded the redeployment of the MNF. The Western governments were thus pressured to return within less than two weeks after their departure. Similar to the agreements before, their main aim was to prevent further massacres, stabilise the government, work towards a Syrian and Israeli withdrawal and broker a peace agreement. Still, the MNF lacked a ‘clear mandate or mission.’ In essence, it became an interposition force in a country that slipped into full-out civil war between different Lebanese factions and outside supporters. Indeed, the Israeli presence must not be forgotten. ‘While the arrival and deployment of the reconstituted MNF established an aura of stability, it was the massive armed presence of the IDF that ensured whatever stability there was.’ Yet, there were downsides: the Israeli’s ‘draconian countermeasures’ fuelled further violence and their hard-handed approach led to problems with other MNF contingents. Particularly the Marines were repeatedly involved in quarrels as the main Israeli supply road crossed their perimeter. The successive efforts to improve cooperation entailed the danger of losing the impression of neutrality. Also the Italians suffered from harsh Israeli reconnaissance by fire and had to shield their zone against Israeli incursions. Originally, the British considered the Italian problems as negligible, before they started to encounter similar troubles with the Israelis.

The MNF’s composition and its mission

The MNF had neither a unified command nor a shared headquarters; therefore, each contingent despatched one liaison officer to the other nations. The Americans had problems finding an officer who spoke passable Italian, but the ad hoc system of information exchange and even joint training worked satisfactorily. Still, there was little cooperation on the political and tactical levels. Even though more efforts were undertaken on the latter level, the Italian contingent’s commander thought a unified command would have caused even more troubles, as each government had particular interests and none was willing to cease control over one’s contingent. Another example of disunity was the
different rules of engagement (ROE). The Italian rules were simple: only use force in appropriate self-defence if the attacker can be clearly and readily identified – quite similar to the American ones, which, however, have been described as ‘highly circumscribed [and more] adequate for an operation absent hostility.’ The British deemed the US Marines’ the most timid and the French ROE as ‘most pugnacious’ (any attack within 30 metres of a French patrol called for a reaction). However, the wording of the ROEs was just one factor and the Italian and US example will show that much depended on how ‘appropriate self-defence’ was interpreted.

The MNF never numbered more than 6000 thousand men: The Americans deployed one Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), consisting of one over-strength battalion and logistics units with around 1800 on shore, the French two battalions plus engineers and tail services of around the same size, the British a squadron of around 120 men, and the Italians three combat and one logistic battalion with a maximum of 2175 men. The US contingent was inexperienced in peacekeeping, ill prepared, and very young. The French contingent (mainly consisting of the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment) was arguably most experienced (having seen combat in Zaire in 1978) and professionally trained for this situation. It had over 460 vehicles and enough firepower thanks to their MILAN missiles and numerous mortars. The Americans thought that:

from the start the French kicked ass. It was a matter of style. They immediately put armed patrols on the streets of the central city and enforced an even-handed but no-nonsense discipline upon the residents of their sector. They were never loved, nor even admired, but they were respected.

The British were latecomers and made by far the smallest contribution. However, British sources offer intriguing insights into the MNF, as their contingent was geographically placed on an important juncture and took part in the multinational meetings. The British arrived on 8 February 1983 with 98 Queen’s Dragoon Guards, who had fulfilled a peacekeeping role in Cyprus before. They were based near the south-east suburb Hadath in a Druze and Amal area.

The Italians called the MNF missions ‘Libano 1’ and ‘Libano 2’ respectively. The first 900 ‘Bersaglieri’ landed on 23 August 1982, and returned after seventeen days. ‘Libano 2’ stayed from 26 September 1982 until 26 February 1984. Besides support arms, it encompassed three combat battalions (light infantry ‘Bersaglieri’, ‘Folgore’ paratroopers and ‘San Marco’ marine infantry). Additionally, the Italians deployed the ‘Col. Moschin’ Special Forces (six officers and 47 non-commissioned officers [NCOs]), who were trained for infiltration, observation and night assaults. The commander of the Italian contingent (ITAMNF or ITALCON), Franco Angioni (‘1933), became the most important individual of the whole Lebanon endeavour. After attending military academy, he had served in the ‘Bersaglieri’ and Special Forces. He also accomplished US Ranger School in 1964 and the Canadian War Academy (1969–1970) – where he was sent to gather ideas for reorganising the Italian Special Forces. Angioni had also led the operations section of the army’s general staff for three years and was intended to take over the ‘Folgore’ Brigade in Livorno. He personally knew many officers of the ‘Folgore’ and ‘Col Moschin’ who served in Beirut for years and they shared beliefs and ideas about operational procedures. In 1979, he was ordered to oversee the deployment of Italian helicopters to the UNIFIL mission. On 1 January 1983, he became the youngest general, and has been described as ‘one of the
The article will later analyse his portrayal as hero, but it is vital to apprehend that the Italian army chose – what they considered – their most capable officers for the Beirut mission.

The average force level was around 2000 and, in total, 8345 Italian soldiers served in Beirut (495 officers, 1150 NCOs and 6470 men, plus 100 medical officers and 130 Red Cross nurses) supported by 583 vehicles of which three Leopard tanks (two modified as ambulances, one in the combat engineering version), 94 armoured personnel carriers VCC-1, VCC-2, M113A1 (with a mounted Browning M2 fifty calibre machine gun), and LVTP-7 amphibious assault vehicles (later renamed AAV-7A1). The men could draw on modern computer technology to prevent logistical bottlenecks, and on 120 mm mortars and 105 mm guns in case the situation worsened. ITAMNF was the only contingent that used symbolic white helmets and all vehicles were painted white (with an Italian flag) to be easily visible and distinguishable. Particularly the American and British press ridiculed this approach, comparing them to ice vending cars and the ‘Bersaglieri’ feathers (which they attached to the white helmets) as opera-like appearance. A further difference to other contingents was the force composition. The ITAMNF consisted of career soldiers and conscripts – both had to volunteer for the mission. Thus, the required strength levels were often only reached by supplementing disposed men from other units. At the peak time in September 1983, the ITAMNF consisted of 450 professional soldiers and 1594 conscripts – neither group had seen combat before, and the latter received additional training. Consequently, the Italian contingent has to be seen as less experienced than other MNF forces.

A calm start, autumn 1982–spring 1983

The Italians’ sector bordered the French to the north, the Americans to the south, the sea to the east and the green line – that divided West and East Beirut – to the west. It was the same area in which ‘Libano 1’ had left a good mark. The zone included the Palestinian refugee ‘camps’ of Chatila and Bourj al-Barajneh and with 30 square kilometres, six thousand buildings and 600,000 inhabitants it was the largest and most crowded of all MNF contingents. The labyrinth of alleys and little streets, as well as the ‘maze of tunnels’, which the PLO had developed for storage, arms smuggling and hideouts, reminded senior US officers of Vietnam. The only benefit was that the sector was populated – apart from the around 30,000 Palestinian refugees – by a single religious group (95 per cent Shiites). All areas were permissive environments, i.e. open to civilian traffic. This, in turn, created a highly dangerous security situation with little protection against possible attacks. In sum, it was a difficult sector with a delicate task: preventing renewed bloodshed.

On 27 September 1982, the three Italian battalions manned their positions: the ‘San Marco’ secured the beach area, the ‘Folgore’ the Chatila camp and the ‘Bersaglieri’ Bourj al-Barajneh. Angioni decided to put the ‘Bersaglieri’, the logistic units and the field hospital on an easily defendable wide square on the road towards the airport, while the ITAMNF HQ was based in an old city palace around 300 metres from the square. Thus, both entrenchments lay between the Chatila and Bourj al-Barajneh camps (less than 1 kilometre from the respective entrances). The next step was to place the paratroopers and the ‘San Marco’ as flank protection in ideal terrain. The ‘Folgore’ occupied high ground in a school on a gentle hill towards the presidential palace (already in Christian territory),
and the ‘San Marco’ was based in the engineering faculty close to the coast to keep a supply (and possible escape) route open.60 Thereby, the ITAMNF was decentralised: while the ‘Bersaglieri’ were able to protect the field hospital and the HQ, the ‘Folgore’ and ‘San Marco’ functioned as flank protection and tactical reserve that could also observe possible hostile movements and the main roads. The bay of Beirut functioned as strategic hinterland for Italian vessels and air cover was provided from bases in Cyprus.61

Initially, all contingents portrayed the contacts with the local population as promising and optimism flourished.62 It was so quiet in late 1982 that the Marines faced ‘interminable boredom’, which was only interrupted by routine patrols.63 The calmness was also reflected in the low level of press (and public) interest in the mission, which was criticised by Italian army publications. The Italian soldiers were depicted as unprofessional and uniformed tourists next to martial looking French legionnaires,64 which the military perceived as the habitual ‘complex of national inferiority, a tendency to self-degradation even if foreign comments provide well-deserved positive feedback.’65

One of the most immediate tasks was the clearing of mines and unexploded ordnances: to increase safety, promise a better future and augment the manoeuvrability of Italian servicemen.66 In fact, the Italians placed an emphasis on mobility from the very beginning and immediately started to gather information on their zone with help of their embassy, Lebanese authorities, and, not least, from people on the ground.67 Angioni used the calm period to practice urban operations, and issued a guide to the country’s culture, history and politics to every soldier.68 He benefitted from many specialists at the Italian embassy and men with prior UNIFIL experience, but the numerous militias created a highly blurred and dangerous situation and it ‘took months for the Italian contingent to understand every aspect of the intricate situation in Lebanon.’69 Likewise, the British pre-deployment reconnaissance team concluded as late as January 1983 that ‘it is difficult to tell who is who!’70

The fact that the Italians had a good start was not least thanks to their commander. On 22 September 1982, Angioni was reconnoitring the Italian sector when he saw a brawl of Phalange members and Palestinians. His jeep ‘came to a screeching halt and the colonel jumped to the roadway, pistol in hand, and ordered the area cleared. The news of Angioni’s rescue of the Palestinians electrified the camps and assured the Italians a safe and pleasant stay in what might have been Beirut’s most troublesome hot spot.’71 Also subsequently, Italian soldiers repeatedly stepped in when Lebanese militias or government forces maltreated Palestinians or arbitrarily arrested civilians.72 The Italians lived amongst the people and came to associate themselves with their fate, daily needs, and started a cohabitant routine that fostered trust73 – in contrast to the French, British and Americans who resided either more isolated, or, in the French case, in a friendly neighbourhood.74 The ITAMNF preferred to ‘merge into the local environment as an active element in restoring normal living conditions’,75 which they deemed more likely to succeed than separating oneself completely from civilian life. The Italians did so, according to Angioni, ‘modestly and without much fuzz’, not looking at the locals with an arrogant mental distance.76 The Italians undertook their patrols (also during night-time) in a respectful manner in order to establish trust and good contacts to the Palestinians, which were still daunted by the shocking massacres.77 Additionally, every road incident or damage afflicted to locals was immediately paid back in dollars,78 and the carriage of weapons
was prohibited for civilians, which they accepted, according to Angioni, not least ‘after the first arrests when they saw that we were not joking.’

From the beginning, the Italians also focused on providing humanitarian assistance and protecting the civilian population. When the weather deteriorated over winter, the MNF launched several relief missions to the northeast of Beirut, which increased their popularity.

Initially, it was only designated for Italian soldiers while two ambulances were placed near Chatila and Bourj al-Barajneh to aid the populace. But starting in October 1982, the Italians treated 16,746 adults and 46,321 children until the end of the mission, which notably improved the health standards and the Italian prestige. Another soft power tool was a radio station, which played news in Italian and Lebanese, but mainly music, which made it very popular across Beirut. Thus, protecting the Palestinian refugees and the Shiite population, and even providing them with medical relief, constituted an invaluable service for how the Italian contingent was seen.

At the same time, however, the strategic situation changed: the fighting in the Shouf mountains intensified and slowly spread to Beirut. Several explosions and attempted bombings in the Italian sector in December 1982 foreshadowed later developments.

In February 1983, the British still described the situation as ‘fairly relaxed’ and ‘generally quiet’ as the ceasefire appeared to be holding. Yet, the inactivity appeared to have bothered the soldiers, as there was a widespread desire across the MNF contingents to extend their patrolling, and disappointment about political caveats preventing them from doing so. In order to improve coordination, a liaison mission including all MNF contingents, the Lebanese army and the Israelis was established in early February 1983 and biweekly meetings were held under President Amin Gemayel’s chairmanship. For obvious political reasons, the British hoped to ‘keep its existence secret’, but from a military standpoint it was deemed ‘invaluable.’

In mid-February 1983, the Lebanese government demanded joint patrols, MNF deployment outside the city, and the erection of MNF strongpoints in East Beirut, which would have exposed the soldiers to more dangers and was likely to diminish the role as neutral interposition force. At the beginning of March, the Lebanese asked all contingents – except the French – to double their troop levels – to which the Italians seemed ‘disposed to concur.’ It is noteworthy that Italy seemed willing and capable to deploy a force of close to 5000 men to Beirut. Yet, none of the MNF contributors was willing to deploy troops outside of Beirut, not least due to political concerns, the heavy fighting between Druze and Maronites, and the continuing Israeli presence. General Angioni emphasised the inadequacy of his means for this task, citing his rather immobile force structure and lack of helicopters.

However, these Lebanese demands hint at a deteriorating security situation on the ground. Indeed, a Marines convoy was attacked with a RPG, and on 18 April 1983, a van carrying almost 1000 kilogram of explosives hit the US embassy, leaving 63 dead. Among those were ‘only’ seventeen Americans, but the victims were vital CIA operatives, which subsequently hampered intelligence gathering. Subsequently, the American ROEs were loosened for embassy guards, but no retaliation efforts were taken when the scale of violence increased in the coming weeks, which ‘signalled those opposed to the MNF that their attacks would go unpunished.’
On 15 March, also an Italian patrol of the ‘San Marco’ Battalion came under attack. Two vehicles were driving from the airport to the central sector, when a RPG fired from a Shiite mosque construction site hit the second car. Four soldiers were wounded; two of which seriously.\(^97\) The marines of the ‘San Marco’ immediately returned fire and Angioni launched a mission to find the supposedly three attackers. He wanted to demonstrate the Italian ability – even at night – to react to such a hostile act, without retaliating with indiscriminate violence.\(^98\) Despite the quick arrival of reinforcements and ambulances, the twenty-year-old conscript Filippo Montesi died days later in a Roman hospital. He would remain the sole Italian killed in action (KIA) in Beirut and the first soldier of the Italian army to die in combat since the Second World War.\(^99\)

For the Italians, this attack posed several problems: Mothers wrote open letters demanding the return of their sons, the press questioned the mission’s financial costs and the employment of (volunteering) conscript soldiers raised many legal questions and political quarrels\(^100\) – especially as the ITAMNF was repeatedly targeted in the Chatila sector in the following days. Small arms fire out of driving cars and hand grenades were directed on their positions, which lightly wounded several ‘Bersaglieri’. Yet, they immediately fired back with all their M113 could muster – a ‘policy’ of escalatory retaliation the Italians also used in July to remain respected.\(^101\) It is vital to underscore Angioni’s advantageous situation. In contrast to other MNF commanders, he had complete autonomy from his government and military superiors in deciding necessary tactical questions on the ground, such as returning fire, evacuation and artillery or naval support.\(^102\) Yet, Lebanese inquiries on some of the incidents of 15 and 17 March indicated that these ‘were not an attack but indiscriminate firing by Italians following an Italian soldier’s negligent discharge’ and the British considered the:

> “Wound sustained by Italians was [caused by a] soldier falling over and cutting [his] head! Civilian vehicle concerned with incident was bakers van carrying Egyptian/Palestinian workers, one of whom was wounded. Lebanese also dispute Italian version of second incident on night 15/16 March 1983 […] and believe it was a landmine/Italians firing at one another. The Italians are sticking to their version, which may yet prove to be true but there is room for doubt. At the very least it is clear that the Italians are in a nervous state and that there was a large amount of indiscriminate firing last night from a number of Italian positions.”\(^103\)

While the real events during these incidents need clarification from Italian sources or might never become clear, one has to note that accidental discharges and shooting incidents were, for example, also common in the US contingent.\(^104\) The British had been critical of Italy’s conscript forces from the beginning and considered low morale within their contingent as logical upshot of sending conscripts to such an environment, as they lacked training, experience and sense of purpose and were, additionally, not even led by experienced officers.\(^105\) The British also argued against the formation of ad hoc formations for the mission – which the Italians did – since their experience had shown that ‘such units lack cohesion and can have problems of morale, administration and discipline.’\(^106\) Yet, these statements should be confronted with subsequent highly positive assessments on the Italians. Moreover, the British also deemed themselves superior to the Americans in regards to counter-insurgency operations, and second, generally looked down at conscript armies. On the other hand, the Italians seem to have acknowledged low morale as a possible source of trouble. One psychologist and an analyst accompanied the units to Beirut to continuously measure their mood.\(^107\)
The hypothesis that the attacks in March were rather an accident and comparatively low is supported by the following events, in which the Italian contingent – despite its size and location – was hardly ever mentioned in context of assaults. When the British noted a general ‘high level of activity’ in the first week of May, they reported no incidents concerning the ITAMNF. Nonetheless, the Italians grasped the deteriorating security situation in Beirut and tightened their protective measures around barracks and on patrols. The ‘Col Moschin’ guarded the most dangerous zones in Bour al-Barajneh, provided cover for convoys, infiltrated, and operated outside of the Italian zone at night-time to follow militia snipers and to prevent IDF incursions.

In fact, the civil war between the Druze and Maronites had intensified since spring 1983 and the main American objective – a Syrian and Israeli retreat with the conclusion of a Lebanese–Israeli peace agreement – had become less likely. When the Israelis withdrew from Beirut and the Shouf in late August, the ‘Western powers were now trapped’ in supporting the losing side in a civil war. The more the tables turned against the Maronite militias, the more they cooperated with the LAF – and as its very idea had been to uphold the Gemayel government, this led to a de facto support of the Lebanese army and the Christian militias. The Italians had suggested MNF backing for the LAF in areas abandoned by the Israelis (considering a joint approach with the Syrians, Israelis, and maybe the Saudis), but the Gemayel government dismissed the idea and asked for Italian and Greek troops as interposition force in the Shouf. While it demonstrated the trust in the Italians, decision-makers in Rome rejected the proposal, as it was considered too dangerous. With the LAF in ‘control’, the Lebanese infighting completely escalated during the so-called Mountain War (or September War). It became evident that the IDF had functioned as an interposition force and with them gone – gun battles between militias and the US forces became an almost daily routine. For the Marines, it became apparent that the incoming fire on their positions, which had been declared as accidental, now became intentional. Since 10 August, the Americans started shooting back more frequently, also with their M198 155 mm howitzers, but had to suspend patrols at the end of August and began concentrating their men in the headquarters to protect them from gunfire. Because politicians in Washington feared casualties, the military was not allowed to operate as they pleased and could not reconnoitre on the ground and collect vital intelligence, as tours were restricted to the ‘immediate vicinity of USMC positions.’ Yet, this duck-and-cover approach did not result in the Americans being left alone.

The ITAMNF shared their fate: patrols, transports and positions were attacked; several soldiers were wounded in August, including General Angioni. Over 500 artillery and mortar shells rained down on Italian positions during the night of 28 August, and numerous soldiers were wounded over the subsequent days and weeks. Still, the intensity was low in comparison to other contingents if one looks at the British war diary – despite the fact that the Italians continued their patrols. Most of the firing and shelling on 30 August primarily targeted the airport (USA) and the area east of the hotels (French). When on 12 August an Italian convoy with fifty soldiers came under attack, the British commented that ‘the Italians did not return fire and it is thought that the fire may not have been directed against them. It is possible that a Kataib [militia] gunman may merely have been letting off steam and firing into the air.’ Also when the Italian HQ was hit on 4 September 1983, lightly wounding one soldier, the British were not convinced that it
had been deliberate, which is striking given that other MNF HQs were also attacked in this period.\textsuperscript{124}

However, the Italians might have influenced this perception of being left alone. On 23 September, their main ammunition depot was hit.\textsuperscript{125} Even though Angioni argued it was evident that the targeting had been as deliberate as the shelling of other Italian logistic installations in the preceding days,\textsuperscript{126} he decided not to employ naval artillery against Druze positions unless an Italian soldier was injured; thereby preventing further escalation.\textsuperscript{127} The restraint when Druze shelling hit ‘Folgore’ positions, albeit seen as weakness by some Lebanese, was intended to deescalate. The Italians thought the Druze militias were targeting adjacent government buildings and accidently hit them\textsuperscript{128} – or at least they claimed so publicly to avoid being dragged into an all-out conflict.\textsuperscript{129} Particularly in early and late September 1983 (and later in February 1984), Angioni came close to ordering retaliatory actions,\textsuperscript{130} but the incoming fire could be downplayed, because no casualties had resulted, which would have called for immediate Italian counter-actions. Enrico Mannucci has argued that a fatality during this period would have destroyed the humanitarian narrative and public support would have crumbled.\textsuperscript{131} Thus, it would be highly desirable to investigate the Italian files for this period – especially as the Marines were also advised to downplay the combat intensity due to political sensitivities.\textsuperscript{132} For now, however, it appears that the ITAMNF was less targeted and mostly not intentionally. Their tactical deterrence and little retaliation seem to have prevented further escalation. Additionally, all contributors were lucky that the militia’s small arms fire was generally rather inaccurate.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{Worsening situation: summer and autumn 1983}

Even during the bleak situation in autumn 1983, Andreotti tried again to set up a neutral observer mission. It failed due to conflicting political interests,\textsuperscript{134} but helped to raise the image of the Italian’s as ‘honest brokers’, trying to implement a neutral interposition force and maintained an aura of impartiality, which provided Rome (and London) with more leverage in the peace process.\textsuperscript{135} In fact, the Lebanese only asked the British and Italians to guard the ceasefire committees – and ceasefire violations sub-committees.\textsuperscript{136} The Italians kept their neutral stance – on the ground and politically – and remained focused on the original goals on their mission, in contrast to the French and Americans who increased their military commitment by using naval artillery on 19 September 1983 and airstrikes in the following days to lend direct fire support to the LAF.\textsuperscript{137} But despite US and French training since December 1982 – which had further undermined their impartiality\textsuperscript{138} – the LAF remained too weak to prevent the Druze artillery from targeting American positions and could not tilt the balance in the civil war.\textsuperscript{139} Again, the Italians had taken a different approach and not directly partaken in training missions. Like the French, they had mounted joint patrols – with the LAF in the unscattered (Christian) East Beirut – to demonstrate impartiality.\textsuperscript{140} Thus, Robert Fisk noted how the Italians remained true to the original commitment as an ‘interposition force’, as:

\begin{quote}
only the Italians held their ground, and they were allowed to. Of all the contingents, they principally stayed true to that original moral issue; that they had come to Beirut to protect people. [...] That the Italians showed as much sympathy for the Palestinians as the French felt for the Christian Lebanese was undeniable. The difference, however, was that the Italians were at
\end{quote}
least abiding by their initial instruction to protect the survivors of the massacre. And as a result, no doubt, they were spared the suicide bombings of 23 October 1983.\textsuperscript{141}

**The barrack bombing of October 1983 and the subsequent race to the exit door**

On Sunday, 23 October 1983, a truck loaded with 950 kilogram explosives devastated the Marines’ Battalion Landing Team (BLT) barracks\textsuperscript{142} resulting in 241 casualties, while an analogous detonation killed 59 French soldiers. The lack of precaution and defensive measures has been described at length.\textsuperscript{143} The US commander, Colonel Geraghty, later claimed that the ‘Italians and the British actually occupied more vulnerable positions than the US and French forces did.’\textsuperscript{144} Indeed, the Italians were in shock, feared an attack on their compounds and increased security measures – but the assault never came.\textsuperscript{145} After the barrack bombings, both the US and France increased their direct aid to the LAF and their policy of retaliation with naval and aerial bombardments. The commanders on the spot realised quickly, however, that even artillery and naval gunfire could neither deter, nor silence the enemy.\textsuperscript{146} Also the focus on erecting defensive positions meant ‘physical absence and dispersal’\textsuperscript{147} and was hardly a better way to control the situation and to gather information.

On the political level, the visit of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to Washington (27–29 November) marked a decisive turning point in US policy. It led to closer cooperation with Israel and more force application in a de facto proxy war against Syria and Iran. Both London and Rome agreed that this ‘perceived shift in US/Israeli relations had damaged the Americans’ neutral stance and by extension that of the other MNF contributors.’\textsuperscript{148} In a discussion with the Americans, Foreign Minister Andreotti had ‘counselled caution and insisted on being assured of advance warning’ in case of bombardments (which both Italians and British deemed to become ‘messy’ rather than ‘surgical’, especially if the Israelis were involved), ‘because of dangers for the Italian MNF contingent.’\textsuperscript{149} In fact, subsequent attacks against MNF forces also hit their positions,\textsuperscript{150} and their dissatisfaction with the low level of MNF cooperation grew.\textsuperscript{151} Particularly the French retaliatory strikes on 17 November led to much ‘coldness’ between Paris and Rome, as the French had not informed their partners in advance.\textsuperscript{152} Thereafter, the Italians complained about another unannounced French withdrawal and Lebanese actions in the vicinity of Sabra and Chatila. It was an area of Italian control, after all, and they considered an influx of the Lebanese army as highly dangerous – a view to which the British concurred.\textsuperscript{153} Indeed, there was a clear divide in the approaches between the USA and the French on the one hand, and the British and the Italians on the other. The latter demanded ‘the need for considerable restraint even in legitimate self-defence.’\textsuperscript{154} The British referred to their experience in wars of decolonisation in advising the Americans to ‘absolute patience and self-restraint in a peacekeeping role, even under the severest provocation’\textsuperscript{155} and criticised that neither objectives, nor ways to achieve them had been aligned.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, both the British and the Italians opposed the strategic shift as it endangered their positions and reduced their chances to achieve the mission goals on the ground.

It soon became apparent that the October bombings had triggered a race to the exit door.\textsuperscript{157} The Italians stated that their contingent would leave Beirut ‘as soon as the
Geneva reconciliation talks end, whatever their result.158 Before Christmas, President Alessandro Pertini accused the USA of defending Israeli interests and not peace in Lebanon and argued for an Italian withdrawal.159 In fact, looking at the happenings in a counterfactual way one could raise the question if an attack on the Italian HQ – even accidentally – would have triggered an immediate retreat or similar escalation policies. The British answered this question affirmatively, noting a ‘general feeling that had the Iranian terrorists attacked the Italians rather than the French and Americans, the Italian contingent would have left by now.’160

The fighting over Christmas 1983 constituted the ‘three hardest days’ for the Italians, who were shocked about the unannounced French retreat from the Sabra camp. The LAF readily entered the void and clashed with Shiite factions.161 The Italian checkpoints now lay highly exposed and in close vicinity to bitterly contested areas. Angioni reinforced his positions to provide a deterrent and to show resolute force, if necessary, in defending civilians. Even during tense encounters with militias, the situation never escalated, because the Lebanese factions upheld an alleged dictum: ‘one does not shoot at the Italians.’162 Still, 70 people were killed and 350 wounded in Chatila over Christmas. Seven Italians were lightly wounded, which reflected badly with Italian public opinion, but was not an exceptional high number in light of overall Italian casualties.163 In sum, the result of the deteriorating situation and the political quarrels, as described by the British embassy, was that ‘French and the Italians can be seen around the city digging themselves in behind even greater earthworks, and the Americans are invisible outside their airport fortress. BRITFORLEB are taking all necessary precautions, and so are we.’164

The French initiated their force drawdown in January 1984, swiftly followed by the Americans and Italians. The straw that had broken the Camel’s back was the LAF’s retreat from the Shouf and its crumbling control over West Beirut and the airport.165 When the militias entered West Beirut and the Muslim suburbs on 6 February, the MNF’s position became unsustainable and necessitated withdrawal. As the Marines were entrenched at the airport, the Italians were effectively the only interposition force left in a city that was turning from bad to worse: sixteen Italian soldiers were wounded during the last ten days before withdrawal.166 Moreover, the US stopped their commitment to the Lebanese government rather on a brief notice and left the Europeans with ‘no option but to follow the uncertain American lead.’167 In overall, the MNF had suffered heavy casualties: during the eighteen-month deployment 279 Americans had lost their lives (of which 241 in the embassy and barracks bombings).168 The French mourned 86 dead (59 in the bombing of 23 October 1983) and over 100 wounded, the British had only two lightly injured soldiers.169 Filippo Montanesi remained the ‘only’ Italian casualty; besides 75 wounded.170 Thus, the MNF suffered a total of 366 KIA and over 300 WIA.171

The Italian narrative on the Beirut mission

Despite the MNF’s strategic failure, the Italians forged a narrative of success after the deployment. President Alessandro Pertini was a vital figure and helped overcome a widespread scepticism towards the armed forces. He had served as an officer during the First World War, fought as a partisan against Mussolini, and became a highly popular President (1978-1985) after a distinguished socialist party career. He had shown great interest in the
events and visited Beirut on 4 November 1983 (Armed Forces Day). He recalled foreign praise for the Italian conduct and warmly greeted the troops upon their return. Pertini bridged the gap between pleasing the military, appealing to their professionalism, and at the same time, appeasing civil society that their boys were humanitarian ‘soldiers for peace’. Also Defence Minister Spadolini emphasised the ‘perfect fusion […] of military and civilian virtues.’ The chosen person to embody this ideal between warrior and humanitarian was the contingent’s commander: Franco Angioni.

Already during the operations, he had become the widely known face of the mission. Even the Communist Il Manifesto praised him as atypical modern general and vital character for the obtained results. Subsequently, he was depicted as fatherly figure, but also as tough warrior. Angioni’s memoirs (published in June 1984) and contributions in edited volumes fostered his image as an outstanding soldier diplomat and he further perpetuated the narrative of success. Initially, he repulsed the idea of entering politics, but later he became a senate member. In a speech in Rome on 29 May 1984, Angioni depicted the mission as largely successful: the ITAMNF had done as much as they could for the population and did especially well in comparison to other contingents. In fact, the comparison to the French and Americans were vital to sustain the idea that the Italians had performed ‘better’ – a statement sustained by hinting at international testimonials. Also the media, military journals and public figures repeatedly cited approval from international news outlets, US and French politicians, and other commanders at length. This foreign and domestic praise was much welcomed to improve historically founded biases against the Italian army’s military competence. It was balm for Angioni’s soul, as he had always felt belittled as Italian soldier abroad. He knew no misstep was allowed to happen in Beirut, if not, the Italians would be ridiculed even more. Not surprisingly, therefore, most Italian soldiers were proud of their achievements, and a vast majority was willing to return to Beirut – including the conscripts, who were lauded for their ability to perform – at the very least – on eye-level with such professional units as the French Foreign Legion and the US Marines. Nonetheless, Angioni also noted deficiencies and demanded the creation of a specialised mobile task force for rapid overseas deployments, modernisations in command and control technology, and improved training for the rank-and-file before such missions. These and other developments were encapsulated on the political level with new guidelines in the defence ‘White Book’ in 1985. Yet, Angioni was vital to establish the narrative of a peacekeeping all’italiana, which blended military efficiency with a genuine humanitarian impetus, and he contributed to the long lasting legacy of the Lebanon operation. The positive memories were a major factor for Italy’s lead role in UNFIL II, which started in 2006, where their contingent has been described as ‘by far the most popular.’

Conclusion

The 1982 operations were vital for the Italian army – and arguably for the country’s image at large – it remains a trauma for the Americans. How can we explain such different memories? As mentioned earlier, the mission outcome should be evaluated according to the MNF’s goals as interposition force and one must differentiate between the political (strategic) levels from the tactical and operational conduct in Beirut. The following remarks should be seen as first historical analysis of the conflict. The release of Italian
documents will hopefully provide more definite answers and improve our understanding of ‘success’ in peacekeeping.

Before turning to the Italians, it is intrusive to first analyse the other contingents. The Americans were troubled on the strategic level by their closeness to Israel, the sour relations to Syria and Iran, as well as the 1958 invasion and support for the Maronites hereafter. While political caveats certainly played a role, Daniel P. Bolger has chiefly blamed the local commanders. Instead of seizing the initiative through dispersion, intelligence gathering, patrols or strongpoints, the US forces were passively wasting time with ‘a non-military state of mind, lack of dispersion, weak defensive works, and imprecise intelligence [that] increased the scale of the eventual enemy success.’ Further, there had been no mission development when the situation deteriorated. The Americans were repeatedly described as the least mobile contingent with a habit to ‘sand-bag themselves into fixed positions’, whereas the British considered their own effort as ‘successful because it has been highly mobile.’ The British were less troubled by their strategic stance and had by far the smallest contingent – based in an isolated position. Strict ROEs and reaching out to all factions secured the British benevolence and they were, like the Italians, accepted for guarding duties. The French were also burdened by their historical links to the Lebanese Christian community and their role in UNIFIL. In Beirut, they had the loosest ROE and operated in searches and sweeps with the LAF from the beginning (the Italians only observed these). After the barracks bombings, the French exercised massive retaliation and became openly allied to the losing side in the civil war. Some authors have suggested that the French (and Americans) were increasingly targeted by pro-Iranian groups due to their role in the Iraq–Iran War. Italian deliveries were on a much lower scale than the USA, France or Britain, but this in itself appears to be no convincing argument for the greater tranquillity they enjoyed in Beirut.

The Italians had a starting advantage on the strategic level. Their pro-Palestinian stance provided a lead over the Americans and French and their traditional regional affiliation. Yet, this alone is not enough to explain the operational outcomes. In general, the Italians combined several successful approaches: active patrols and interaction with the population. Without disturbing everyday life, they brought back tranquillity and normality. The protection of the Palestinian refugees (mostly children, women and elderly) and the Shiite population brought them many sympathies. Strict defensive ROEs did not automatically turn them into sitting ducks. When the Italians were attacked, they did return fire, but always in local self-defence and never escalated retaliation with heavy weapons, let alone air strikes – as for example, the Americans who had very similar ROEs. As Angioni later stressed:

Italian soldiers were always timely in replying to the enemy’s automatic fire using the proper weapons. However, they never prolonged an action, because to delay a reaction or to carry out an area action meant crossing the undefined line that divides self-defence from retaliation.

Angioni benefitted from the fact that he had much more freedom on tactical decisions than other contingent commanders, and thus political influence was restricted. Thus, the ITAMNF remained true to the original task even when the strategic situation and the balance of power in the civil war changed: act as an interposition force to support the government and to protect the population – without becoming aligned to a side in the civil
war. An approach that was also noted abroad and, for example, the Syrian Foreign Minister ‘warmly praised’ the Italian (and British) role in Beirut. Thus, the Italians were not perceived as political or pursuing their own interests in the country, and therefore ‘there was no pretext to target them.’ Yet, the ITAMNF understood the importance to adapt to circumstances and to use force to remain respected – without escalating violence or undisciplined behaviour of individuals.

In fact, scholars have described predictability and continuity as key factors in stabilisation missions. The local population appreciated the Italian approach: they could predict Italian (re-) actions and they were trusted to be neutral. The protection of the Palestinian and Shiite population might not have assured the Italians many sympathies within the Gemayel government or Christian militias, but it contributed to their perception as ‘honest brokers.’ In terms of continuity, the Italian contingent scored high. Angioni remained in charge throughout the mission and aimed to prevent rotations – particularly of his senior commanders. Hence, many officers and NCOs remained in Beirut for the whole sixteen-month MNF II period. In regards to visibility and patrolling, the British described the Italians, besides their own contingent, as only MNF contributor that had done a ‘magnificent job.’ Angioni brought in outside expertise and briefed his men on the local culture. Virgiliollari, an authority on Italian military affairs, has also added that the Italian secret services worked effectively. Yet, Pier Luigi Sambo, commanding officer of the ‘San Marco’, declared ‘we never had a clue who was who.’ There were press allegations that the Italians had sealed deals with local militias in a sort of non-aggression pact – which Angioni (unsurprisingly) categorically denied. In short, the existing evidence on Italian intelligence operations is too diverging to make any claims.

It is an oversimplification to see the Italians as bravagente or cite an alleged Mediterranean communality, which made their stay more pleasant. It was mainly tactical decisions on the ground that improved the Italian balance sheet in contrast to the French and Americans. However, the British sources also hint at a certain Italian desire to portray their mission as more successful than it actually was. Defence Minister Spadolini’s statement (in February 1984) that the Italians were the only force whose ‘military vehicles are circulating without interference in West Beirut’ is slightly exaggerated and Angioni admitted that the ITAMNF had downplayed incoming fire on its positions. Yet, the British archival documents also make clear that the Italians were regarded as most successful contingent, so it was not merely a rosy Italian post ex facto portrayal to augment their standing. This does not mean that the ITAMNF excelled at everything they did. However, it appears that they were less targeted – intentionally or unintentionally – than other contingents and also lost fewer soldiers in comparison (an unstated, but implicit goal of any mission). The lower number of incidents and casualties does, however, not appear to have been rooted in a duck-and-cover-approach. Quite the opposite, active patrolling and close contact with the civilian population assured a better grasp of the situation and less trouble within one’s sector.

Additionally, the measured Italian retaliation was certainly no driver of the conflict and the deteriorating security situation, which strongly influenced the strategic outcome, can hardly be blamed on the ITAMNF. Did they fail to stabilise the government and put an end to the bloodshed? Yes, Lebanon did not become an oasis of peace and the government failed to restore order. However, supporting the Lebanese government would have come at the cost of aiding Christian militias – the route taken by the USA and the French,
which worsened the situation even faster. The Italian approach of primarily protecting the civilians in their sector – also against the government forces and their proxies – prevented further violence and improved the local situation until surrounding events nullified the achievements.

For the Italians, the mission in Beirut gained importance beyond mere operational outcomes. The President, the media and international observers praised the army’s professionalism – which raised its prestige both at home and abroad. Some stereotypes and reservations about its capabilities were thereby overcome. Therefore, the mission led to a can-do mentality, boosted morale, and laid the foundation for a new brand – the ‘Italian Way of Peacekeeping.’ To what extent this ‘Italian way’ existed beyond Lebanon – and how narrative and reality coalesced – remains subject to further research. For now, one can conclude that there was a genuine Italian footprint and a qualified success of their contingent on the ground.

Notes

1. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains. The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (London: Hurst, 2013); Samy Cohen, Israel’s Asymmetric Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 55. Additionally, the Israelis became the first army to use drones for reconnaissance and to locate surface-to-air missiles.


4. On details about the varying conflict parties, which cannot be dealt with here, see e.g. Adam B. Lowther, Americans and Asymmetric Conflict. Lebanon, Somalia, and Afghanistan (London: Praeger, 2007), 83ff; David Hirst, Beware of Small States. Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (London: Faber & Faber, 2010), 99ff.


14. Of the latter district also ‘most of it had been destroyed in the Israeli air raid’, Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 326.
16. The term ‘camp’ is misleading, as the areas were permanently and densely inhabited slums.
17. The Israeli role in this is still debated, Schiff and Ya’ari, *Israel’s Lebanon War*, 250–85.
21. Washington to FCO, 5 May 1983, TNA Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) 19/1074; Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 475.
22. Dombrowski, *Peacekeeping in the Middle East*, 89.
33. Lebanon: British contingent for the Multinational Force, 26 Jan. 1983, TNA FCO 46/3651. A line the British wanted to follow. Yet, their ROE (based on the ones used in Northern Ireland) only allowed the use of firearms if British lives were in danger or those of other MNF nations on joint patrols, MoD Report, 20 Jan. 1983, Annex E, Rules of Engagement for British Forces stationed in Lebanon, TNA FCO 46/3651.
36. Hammel states that most of the 200 soldiers who had served in Beirut were under twenty-years of age and apart from some senior officers, who had fought in Vietnam, 90 per cent of the troops had no combat experience, Hammel, *The Root*, xiv, xxv, 12, 90.
40. For a full list, including all supporting units, Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 228–9.
44. Ibid. 78.
45. Also the Italian contingent’s lead press officer, Cpt. Corrado Cantatore, had served with UNIFIL since 1979 and Angioni benefitted from his thorough knowledge of the country, see Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 130f.
48. In Rome, Colonel Bonifazio Incisa di Camerana, was responsible for the Beirut operations and was arguably one of the most competent officers of his generation. He later became Chief of the Army’s General Staff; see Lagorio, *L’ora di Austerlitz*, 68.
49. Numbers in Virgiliollarlari, *Storia militare della prima repubblica 1943-1993* (Rome: Nuove Ricerche, 1994), 186. The VCC-1 and 2 were Italian license built versions of the American M113. Like the M113, they were designed to protect infantry against small caliber fire and were vulnerable to RPG attacks.
58. Ibid., 30.
59. They also faced the trouble of finding suitable headquarters and housing – which the LAF was meant to provide to the MNF contingents. Angioni had planned to use the former post office and had it cleared off mines and other niceties for days, but the LAF insisted on using it themselves, Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 33; Angioni, *Un soldato*, 31ff.
61. Rome to FCO, 11 Feb. 1983, TNA FCO 46/3652. Initially they had relied on MNF partners, but the British accepted to host a maximum of six Italian F-104S Starfighters at the RAF base in Akrotiri – overruling Cypriot reservations, FCO to The Hague, 19 Sep. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1075.
66. The first Italians were wounded when their patrol ended up in a minefield. In sum, the Italians removed or safely detonated 8214 cluster bombs, mortar and medium and large calibre artillery shells, as well as thousands of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines; see Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 60, 65ff; Angioni, *Un soldato*, 63–7.
68. Ibid., 54–5; Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 71.
73. Italian soldiers had initially not been allowed to accept Lebanese dinner invitations, but Angioni gradually allowed it; see Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 125.
74. Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 124.
76. Isman, Angioni, 112–3.
77. Angioni, Un soldato, 51–2; Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 39; Isman, Angioni, 23, 55.
78. Isman, Angioni, 101. Isman recounted twelve such incidents during the first months, for which the Italians paid in each case between 90 and 160 thousand lire, equivalent to around 100 dollars.
80. Hammel, The Root, 68; Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 58.
82. Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 44ff.
83. Diab, Le rôle, 89; Isman, Angioni, 86; Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 229; Angioni, Un soldato, 68. The Italians even provided blood for Lebanese civilians and left all their facilities to the Shiite council when they withdrew. The Americans had installed a smaller medical facility to help the Shiite population, but their efforts never reached the same scale, Hammel, The Root, 73. In fact, Italian doctors also habitually treated US Marines. Vice-President Bush thanked the Italians (and Angioni personally) for their quick help after the devastating blast on 23 October 1983, see ‘Il grazie di Bush al generaleAngioni’, La Stampa, 27 Oct. 1983, 4.
84. Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 149ff; Isman, Angioni, 102. The Italians repeated this initiative with great success one decade later in Somalia.
87. BRITFORLEB Weekly SITREP No3, 28 Feb. 1983, TNA FCO 46/3652. Yet, the report also noted that the USMC was shelled with rockets, and the IDF undermined the LAF’s credibility.
90. Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 36.
92. Italian parliamentary approval for the MNF confined the deployment zone to Beirut proper; yet the Italians were more concerned about the general deterioration of security and ‘changes in the population mosaic’, remarks by Foreign Minister Andreotti as cited in Athens to FCO, 12 Sep. 1983, TNA FCO 46/3655.
93. BRITFORLEB to MoD, 30 June 1983, TNA FCO 46/3654. Under the Lebanese proposal the Italians would have been responsible for controlling the coastal road between Beirut and Tripoli (up to the border) in case of a Syrian withdrawal, BRITFORLEB to MoD, 6 July 1983, TNA FCO 46/3654.
94. The five injured Marines returned to full duty the next day, Hammel, The Root, 75.
95. The LAF field intelligence was rated as ‘generally accurate’ and warnings were handed over to the MNF contingents, see Hammel, The Root, 148. Yet, the US and French relied to a large extent on Lebanese information, which had a clear Phalangist bias, see Robert Fisk, “If We Take Fire... We’re Gonna Return It”: How a Peacekeeping Force Took Sides’ in McDermott and Skjelsbaek (eds), The Multinational Force, 169–83, here 172 (see note 13).
96. Lowther, Americans and Asymmetric Conflict, 92–3.
97. Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 75.
98. Ibid., 76; Angioni, Un soldato, 89–90.
99. In 1961, thirteen Italian airmen had been killed during a UN Blue Helmet mission in Congo.
101. Ibid., 82, 95.
102. Angioni, *Un soldato*, 102. Angioni also had command over the vessels in Beirut bay. The guided-missile destroyer ‘Ardito’ was led by Captain Guarnieri, an old comrade of his; see Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 108.
111. Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 484, 491.
113. Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 114. The four ‘Alpini’ observers on the ground, however, were keen on such a task in the mountains; see Egidio Genise, ‘Solo quattro, ma in gamba. Alpini in Libano’, L’Alpino, lxv (1984), 12–3.
115. Hammel claimed that ‘a typical September afternoon saw the expenditure of 6000 or more 155 mm artillery rounds by LAF or Christian Phalange forces against Druze or Shiite positions, and at least an equal response by Druze and Shiite mortars, rockets, and artillery’, see Hammel, *The Root*, 215–6.
116. Ibid., 112, 153–68.
117. Hammel, *The Root*, 204. On 24 September, another Sunday – when fighting usually peaked – a small US combat outpost expended over 8000 rounds of small arms ammunition within three hours, Ibid., 242
121. TNA War Office (WO) 305/5345.
124. Lebanon: Multinational Force, 8 Sep. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1075. Three US servicemen were killed and five wounded in a similar attack, the French suffered three casualties on 6 September.
128. Ibid., 122–3.
133. Ibid., 164.
136. Beirut to FCO, 28 Dec. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1077. The demand for a 24-hour guarding was respectfully declined, however, as neither MNF contingent was ‘able (or willing)’ to do so, lacking gear for night surveillance. ITAMNF provided eighty men of the ‘Folgore’, ‘San Marco’ and
'Col Moschin’ to guard the Ministry of Health, where the talks were held, Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 114.

137. Fisk, Pity the Nation, 505–9. Indeed, there were so many (almost thirty) US, French and Italian ships in Beirut bay that it looked as if it was a ‘NATO base’, Ibid., 466.

138. To make matters worse, the Marines and the LAF soldiers wore almost identical uniforms ‘making the two virtually indistinguishable at checkpoints,’ Friedman, From Beirut, 194.

139. Even battalion-sized units trained and equipped by the US crumbled according to Fisk, Pity the Nation, 498. For a more positive view Hammel, The Root, 58–9, 166, 217; Geraghty, Peacekeepers, 58. On French efforts see Diab, Le rôle, 35.

140. The Americans mostly went alone on their sporadic patrols in East Beirut, which reduced their effectiveness, Hammel, The Root, 56. More positive is Bolger, Americans at War, 199–200.


142. Strictly speaking, it had not been the headquarters, although it is often referred to as such.


144. Geraghty, Peacekeepers, 95. A Senate commission named Colonel Geraghty as the main scapegoat for the devastating attack. His point of view can be found in Ibid., 138ff.

145. Angioni, Un soldato, 114. Rumours circulated that two M113, which had been stolen from the LAF, were painted white (like the Italian ones) and were ready for an attack on Italian positions, see Isman, Angioni, 118. In fact, earlier reports indicated that the Marines were fired at with fifty calibre rounds from armored personnel carriers (APCs); see Hammel, The Root, 164. Additionally, an alleged plot to target the ITAMNF had been decisively disturbed before, Mannucci, In Pace, 66–70.

146. Geraghty, Peacekeepers, 69.

147. Beirut to FCO, 18 Nov. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1076. The airport was closed for landings after 17 November 1983, when the US had confirmed reports that Muslim rebels possessed SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, Michael Petit, Peacekeepers at War. A Marine’s Account of the Beirut Catastrophe (London: Faber & Faber, 1986), 207.


149. An assurance the Americans gave ‘without great conviction’ as the British noted, Rome to FCO, 8 Nov. 1983, TNA FCO 46/3656.

150. Nebiolo, Gli Italiani, 145–6. On 11 November 1983, Italian soldiers ‘shot at a car trying to evade one of their vehicle check points (VCPs) and two Lebanese civilians were wounded’, Commanders Diary, HQ BRITFORLEB Nov. 1983, TNA WO 305/5529, fol.6.

151. Ambassadors met on a weekly basis hosted by President Gemayel; the Italians had pushed for a stronger institutionalization, see FCO to Rome, 24 Nov. 1983, TNA FCO 46/3657.

152. FCO to New Delhi, 28 Nov. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1076. The British had also not been informed before, and probably the decisions had been taken ‘over the heads of the Quai’ [d’Orsay], see Paris to FCO, 18 Nov. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1076.


154. FCO to Beirut, 8 Dec. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1077. At the same meeting, Donald Rumsfeld described the US retaliation measures as ‘modest’ and useful.

155. UKDEL NATO to FCO, 8 Dec. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1077.

156. FCO to Beirut, 8 Dec. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1077.

157. In fact, most contingents thought about withdrawing options in September and set up contingency plans to ‘redeploy’ offshore, BRITFORLEB – Options for emergency withdrawal, 2 Sep. 1983, TNA FCO 46/3655. The initial MNF agreement did not entail an obligation for coordinated withdrawal, and thus the whole procedure became a rather chaotic and uncoordinated affair, see Migliorino, ‘Il coordinamento fra i contingenti’, 111; Angioni, Un soldato, 140ff.

158. FCO to New Delhi, 28 Nov. 1983, TNA PREM 19/1076. The Italians were not as united as the British thought. Pertini had told Angioni that French and US reprisals would automatically lead to an Italian withdrawal, while Spadolini wanted to await the results of the Geneva talks, Antonio Maccanico, Con Pertini al Quirinale. Diari 1978–1985 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2014), diary entry 13 Nov. 1983.

159. Ilari, Storia militare, 169.
161. Angioni, *Un soldato*, 123ff; Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 152–3. The French relocated to the Christian areas of Beirut, which caused several militias to re-concentrate their attacks on the USMNF, see Ibid., 168.
171. In comparison, the UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon had led to 103 fatalities and 146 wounded between March 1978 and April 1985; Thakur, *International Peacekeeping*, 47. The IDF lost over 500 men, while the deaths of the varying militias are estimated in the tens of thousands; Schiff and Ya’ari, *Israel’s Lebanon War*, 301.
183. Isman, *Angioni*, 121; Angioni, *Un soldato*, 25–6. Upon embarkation, the gates of the ‘Caorle’ supply ship would not open and had to be lifted by hand, while the international press and other contingents were waiting in the harbour area.
189. See e.g. Lagorio, *L’ora di Austerlitz*, 127ff.
194. In 1983, the French exported 29 Mirage F1 fighter aircraft to Iraq, but also the Italians were delivering helicopters, landmines (to both sides) and provided financial loans, Kenneth R.

195. Their bombardment of Beirut during the Italo-Ottoman War (1911–1912) played no role.


197. In French newspapers, e.g. see Nebiolo, *Gli Italiani*, 133–4.


200. Angioni stated that – despite minor drug problems – there had been not a single case of insubordination or neglect of one’s duty, Isman, *Angioni*, 97ff.


207. Rome to FCO, 8 Feb. 1984, TNA PREM 19/1297.