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Lars Eckstein | Dirk Wiemann

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Towards a Cultural Politics of Passion

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## Introduction: Towards a Cultural Politics of Passion

Dirk Wiemann and Lars Eckstein

### **Prologue: The Passion Plays of Capital**

In his 2009 play *The Power of Yes*, British dramatist David Hare sends a playwright named David Hare through a series of interviews and conversations with finance experts and stock market tycoons in an attempt to understand the 2008 financial crisis. Even after being initiated into the shibboleths of the ‘Black-Scholes formula’ and the arcana of ‘securitised credit arrangements’, ‘light-touch operations’ and a range of further specialist technical terms, the questing author ends up clueless – not because he were not given answers to his questions but because those answers do not provide what he, naively as it were, expects: a *rational* explanation for the financial crisis. Banking, investment and the stock market, it seems, are neither governed by “structural rationality” (Nida-Rümelin 1997: 35) nor run by actors who make deliberate, well-calculated decisions according to rational-choice theory. Therefore, instead of being caused by some failure of economic reason, Hare’s on-stage alter ego learns that the crisis is induced by the disequilibrium of two strong emotions that pull into different directions: “Capitalism works when greed and fear are in the correct balance. This time they got out of balance. Too much greed, not enough fear” (Hare 2009: 6). Lucy Prebble’s *Enron* (2009), another British drama on the dynamics of postmodern capital, theatrically enacts this affective substratum of ‘the market’ as a ballet of brokers on the trading floor, one of whom (“sweating, filled with testosterone and joy”) explains in a direct audience address that stock

trading is “something ... primal. [...] Closest thing there is to hunting. Closest thing there is to sex. For a man, that is” (Prebble 2009: 26-27).

To be sure, if Hare and Prebble simply reduced capitalism to a passion play of basic instincts, they would run the risk of oversimplification. Nor is there anything excitingly new about the description of market dynamics in terms of affect. For the past ten years or so, “behavioural finance” theorists have taken strong interest in the emotive elements involved in investment decisions, superseding the dominant neoclassical model of *homo economicus* as a purely rational utility maximiser with the alternative model of the trader or investor as feeling animal whose agency is at least in part determined by “emotions and associated universal human unconscious needs, fantasies and fears” (Taffler and Tuckett 2010: 96).

Accordingly, behavioural finance pioneer Hersh Shefrin asserts that “all financial practitioners eventually let bias, overconfidence, and emotion cloud their judgement and misguide their actions,” and he urges portfolio managers and finance planners to “factor in these fundamentals of human nature” (Shefrin 2002, 34). Two unquestioned premises are striking: first and most obviously, the postulation of affect and emotion as universal and natural components of the human condition; secondly, the ‘factoring in’ of this apparently given and universal feature that the practitioner inevitably brings to an otherwise fully rational trading floor. Passion, then, cannot be evicted from the market, where it tends to subvert the rule of rational choice. It is the task of behavioural finance to contain the damaging potential that inheres in this reservoir of ‘unconscious needs, fantasies and fears’. In other words: while right before everybody’s eyes markets either bloat into the “irrational exuberance” (Alan Greenspan) of bubbles about to burst any minute, or turn with accelerated frequency from ‘tense’ to ‘nervous’ to ‘panicky’, the reason for this increasingly permanent crisis is not systemic but lies in the psychic condition – read: fallibility – of the all-too-human practitioners: assuming what Sara Ahmed calls an “inside-out model of emotions” (Ahmed



2004: 9), this approach asserts that passions are lodged in the human interior from where they move outwards towards objects and others.

Both Hare and Prebble beg to differ, of course. Even while they affirm the notion of the finance market as a site of deeply affective dynamics, *The Power of Yes* and *Enron* do not stop short at the postulation of a naturally given ‘emotionality’ that, inside-out fashion, inevitably emanates from the interior and clouds participants’ judgments. To the contrary, both plays are crucially about how these passions are *generated by* the scripted dynamics in which bankers, investors and analysts alike are entrapped like hamsters on wheels. As a character in *The Power of Yes* puts it, finance is an “adrenaline business,” a “dancing marathon [in which] you couldn’t take a break” (Hare 2009: 65, 39). The choreography of the trading floor in Prebble’s *Enron* is a whipping up of on-the-spot transactions into the crescendo of an “orgy of speculation” that brings “everyone and everything to fever pitch” (Prebble 2009: 20; 78). Eerily, this outburst of hormones is far from spontaneous but highly regulated and actually inscribed by the rhythm of bidding and stock price visualisation updates into the very bodies of the traders. It is not they who bring to business their ‘primal’ affects which then simply move outwards. To the contrary, it is the market itself that is revealed as the ‘abode of production’ of these passions. Far from disturbing the smooth run of business as usual or disrupting ‘economic reason’, these fabricated and choreographed passions are an integral and indeed essential part of the logic of ‘the market’. Finance trade, it appears, is thus exposed as dynamic and volatile interaction that is performed within a given set of rules and rhythms which structure and regulate the moves of buy and sell, bids and gamble.

What these passion plays of capital make apparent is crucial for our enquiry into a more general politics of passion in at least two important respects: first, against the privatisation of affect irreducibly lodged in the individual body (or some assumed ‘human

nature'), this emphasis on the scriptedness of passion alerts us to *the fundamentally public and political status of feeling*. This, of course, is not limited to financial passions only, even if these have particularly obvious political effects: in Prebble's play, e.g., the deregulation of the US electricity supply is the result of precisely those testosterone trading-floor tumults that form the centrepieces of the play. Moreover, however, these passions are strictly choreographed and indeed indispensable for the achievement of the mission which, without them, would certainly fail. In their collective bidding for "buying as much electricity as we can and taking it out of the state" (Prebble 2009: 76), the Enron traders appear to undergo the aggressive, sexualised and intensifying psychic dynamics through which a crowd transforms into a mob; and yet what appears as the breakthrough of some 'basic instincts' on a collective scale precisely coincides with the realisation of the intended project: the control over the energy supply of the state. In an inversion of David Hume's dictum that "reason is, and only ought to be the slave of the passions," the passions are here enlisted in the service of some ulterior rationality that could not be enacted without them. For what would happen if the Enron traders kept their cool, if they were immune to the whipping up rhythm of the floor? Would, perhaps, the whole dynamics of buying and selling come to a halt and "the system freeze"?

Secondly, the implication of the passions in the unfolding of the logic of the market effectively belies "*the ontological and practical separation of reason from passion* that was the hallmark of modern thought" (Schiff 2010). In the field of finance trade that we have so far used for an example, the discarding of *homo economicus* as agent of purely rational choices does not engender a model of capitalist performance as irrational: whether in behavioural finance theory or contemporary drama, the prevalence of passion on the trading floor does not undo 'economic reason' but fuels it, even if by default. Contrary to modernity's self-description grounded in an entrenched Cartesianism, there is no such thing as a combat of

passion and reason nor even a clear demarcation line that would hold the two apart as distinct opposites. However, even if this opposition is virtual, it persists experientially. This is true not only for the mechanisms of ‘the market’ or the empowered enactors of its dynamics; on the receiving end, where people are affected by those operations, capital’s crises and corruptions collide with forces of resistance that are articulated through registers of passionate reason, too. Tellingly, the demonstrators who in spring 2011 kept the main squares of Spanish cities blocked for weeks on end called themselves *los indignados* (‘the indignant’), signalling by that very name the affective substratum that invigorated their protests against massive unemployment and welfare cuts enforced by European Union structural adjustment policies – protests that even Spanish prime minister Zapatero had to acknowledge as reasonable. Meanwhile, the emotive eddies of other contemporary social protest movements from Athens to Tel Aviv and Santiago de Chile similarly indicate how oppositional responses to the politics of capital are fuelled by passions without, however, being reducible to them: As instances of affective reason, they rather form arenas of political intervention in the name of redistributive claims that are manifested (mostly) outside the institutionalised political structure proper and at the same time a far cry from the ideality of the public sphere as locus of dispassionate *Raisonnement* of private persons. Of course, the phenomenon of affectively mobilised publics is neither specifically new nor restricted to direct engagements with the passional politics of capital. Moreover, the passionate rationale of mobilisation is not necessarily ‘good’ but has, indeed, all too often triggered racist, anti-Semitic, casteist, communalist, sexist, homophobic or religiously encoded forms of violence couched in the affect-soaked rhetoric of communal purity.

We will briefly name only three very different, indeed incomparable instances of a politics of passion in which conflicts over redistribution are played out through an outrage with ‘corruption’ and the attendant urge for some kind of ‘cleansing’.

The intense and sustained public debate on the spectacularly staged impeachment trial of Warren Hastings can viably be reconstructed as a conflict between different variants of capitalist value extraction: The rapacious rogue-state practices of the East India Company produced a parvenu class of colonial profiteers whose ascendancy threatened the hegemony of the traditional ruling elites at home. Rhetorically, this conflict was played out through a widespread anxiety with the contamination of Britain's alleged 'integrity' by the corrupting impact of empire, producing an impassioned public sphere that, through the register of moral outrage and self-purgation, organised the removal of the blemish of scandal from the British name and thereby effectively contributed to "the regeneration of the imperial idea" (Dirks 2006: 85). The public display of passion and compassion – Lady Sheridan famously swooning at Edmund Burke's vivid in-court descriptions of East India Company atrocities – is an integral and indispensable performative of this process of an imperial power's self-refashioning in a genuinely modern, thoroughly law-governed and humanitarian guise, that, once accomplished and consolidated, will present itself as purely rational. We could here reconstruct a politics of passion that leads to an evacuation of passion from politics.

A more appalling form of passionate anti-'corruption' politics manifests itself in the Nazi rhetoric and literal enactment of the German people's ostensibly spontaneous 'popular wrath' (*Volkszorn*) with the demonised 'corrupt' and 'corrupting' Jews. The well-organised nation-wide pogroms of November 9, 1938, which ushered in the most intense phase of Nazi persecution and extermination policies, were counterfactually staged as an unmediated outburst of raw passion. As historians have repeatedly pointed out, however, the almost unanimous compliance, and all too often active participation, of the vast majority of non-Jewish Germans in this state programme of discrimination and ultimately genocide cannot be explained by mass psychology alone but had a disturbingly cool and calculating element to it: As the expropriation and ousting of the Jewish minority involved a massive programme of

redistribution (the so-called ‘Aryanisation’ of Jewish property; the replacement of Jewish professionals by non-Jews, etc.) that, cynically, had the effect to redress some of the more blatant social and economic inequities that persisted under the Nazi regime.

The bitter divide over the anti-corruption ‘crusade’ (going on all over India while we are writing these introductory notes) is an other, and certainly very different case in point. While many urban streets and public spaces in India have seen passion-driven multitudes on a scale not seen after the freedom struggle and the pre-Emergency days, the significance and portents of this ‘development’ (if it is in fact an unfolding process) have also sharply divided intellectuals and activists concerned about progressive politics. At a simple (yet consequential) level, the open assertion of people’s sovereignty over an uncaring protocol-/platititude-mongering state feels like a distinctly new moment. Could this be, or at least be seen and pushed as, an opportunity to raise and deepen other urgent questions about probity and justice at the margins and the bottom of Indian society; or, on the contrary, does this media-supported resurgence signal the consolidation of a difference-blind legislative and technocratic power based on the Indian privilegentsia’s desires and designs for a ‘corruption’-free society? In other words, whose politics of passion is it that is being articulated here? More generally, where is the locus of the passions in the arena of the political?

### **Passions In-Between**

According to Fredric Jameson’s powerful and influential analysis, one of the crucial symptoms of the postmodern condition is the “waning of affect”: after “the end of the bourgeois ego,” the demise of the self-centred subject equipped with a richly complex yet somehow coherent interiority, and its replacement by fragmented and discontinuous decentred subjectivities, “there is no longer a self present to do the feeling” (Jameson 1991: 10, 15).

Obviously, Jameson does not really suggest that the postmodern subject were completely devoid of emotion but rather that the experience of emotion had substantially changed. In fact, the “waning of affect” is only one among various instances of the shift from the (modern) “depth model” to a (postmodern) “surface model.” As far as affect is concerned, this shift discards of the traditional idea that emotions and passions are located inside the subject, emanate from within and then move outwards towards desired or repulsive objects and others. As soon as in postmodernity the inside/outside dichotomy gets destabilised, affects and emotions are no longer ‘expressions’ of an otherwise invisible, underlying deep structure but simply surface phenomena. Simply? As a matter of fact, twenty years after the publication of *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, a veritable boom of emotion studies is in full swing not only in the areas of cultural theory, philosophy or literary studies, but also in sociology, anthropology and the neurosciences. Whether or not it makes sense to speak of a genuine “Affective Turn” (Clough 2007), there can be no doubt that, for the time being, the spotlights are fully on emotion in the humanities and the social sciences. The most inspiring contributions to this debate can be read as attempts to come to grips with the very enigma that Jameson somewhat slyly glosses over in his elegant, nostalgic and suggestive formula of the ‘waning of affect’: the enigma of the persistence of affect *after* the death of the subject, when apparently nobody is left to do the feeling.

To be sure, the oft-announced ‘death of the subject’ claimed more casualties than the phrase concedes: Descartes’s *cogito*, Locke’s individual based on “property in one’s person”, Leibniz’s monad, Kant’s transcendental subject, the world-historical hero of Hegelians of all shades and colours, the utilitarians’ *homo economicus* and even Freud’s ego precariously astride an unruly id – they all were declared passé along with their concomitant grand narratives, (if only) in theory. In the process, the bounded self got not only porous but its ontological solidity and rigidity deconstructed into a set of open-ended dynamics, discursive

regimes, regulatory fictions and power relations. It is by way of this constitutive processual relationality of subjectivities, superseding older, ontological models of the subject, that the categories of the passions (now posited as surface phenomena instead of expressions of some deep structure) and the political become commensurate in a new way.

The site of passion is now no longer the individual's interiority but the contact zones of intersubjective encounters. It is "in relations rather than in subjects" (Terada 2002: 45) that emotions occur: As ways of responding to, attaching to, or shrinking back from others (both subjects and objects), emotions are shaped by contact. Hence they are 'resident' neither in the subject nor the object but in the relation between them. These relations "do not necessarily presuppose a meeting between two already constituted beings" (Ahmed 2000: 143); to the contrary, if sociality ('being with') precedes ontology ('being'), then "identity itself is constituted in the 'more than one' of the encounter. [...] given that the subject comes into existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject's existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered" (Ibid. 7). As surface phenomena in productive encounters, emotions are thus prior to the subjectivities they generate: They

create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside and an outside in the first place. [...] it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made: the 'I' and the 'we' are shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others. (Ahmed 2004: 10)

This process tends to "*expand the space of the subject*" (Ibid. 128) that takes shape – comes into existence as an entity – through contact in the emotive encounter and undergoes an "extension of self" (Ibid. 126). Given that "the subject comes into existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject's existence cannot be separated from the

others who are encountered” (Ahmed 2000: 7), and is hence ‘more than one’, in other words: a de-singled, composite subject that is never autarkic but constitutively dependent on its porosity towards the other. This is precisely where a post-ontological theory of emotion forms links with the political: for, as Sianne Ngai argues, “the making of compound subjects *is* political” (Ngai 2005: 167).

In the Western tradition of political thought, the political community as well as the political actor have generally been envisaged as such compound subjects. Contemporary Western nomenclature for politics derives, as Wendy Brown explains, from the ancient Greek concept of *politeia* which marked “the singularly human practice of *constituting* a particular mode of collective life through the generation of multiple associations” (Brown 1995: 38). In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle confirms this filiative character of the political community as a collective made up of non-monadic political subjects who are affectively cathected to others in the medium of friendship: the “good man” is “related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self)” (Aristotle 2009: 169); friendship of this self-transcendent force functions as “the bond that holds communities together” and, by inevitably bringing in the obligation to do justice to others, coincides with politics itself:

Friendship and justice seem [...] to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every community there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at least men address as friends their fellow-voyagers and fellow soldiers, and so too those associated with them in any other kind of community. (Ibid. 182)

In her brief but highly instructive glosses on Aristotle, Leela Gandhi reminds us that neither this conceptualisation of “politics as friendship” nor the fundamental ‘openness’ of the non-



monadic political subject of ancient Greek theory can guarantee an open or equitable concept of politics. Rather to the contrary, the Aristotelian paradigm rests on the mutual buttressing of two highly discriminatory and exclusory domains: friendship as “a *homophilic* bond owing principally, if not exclusively, to fellow citizens” (Gandhi 2006: 28) serves as a model for (and simultaneously re-enforcement of) a politics grounded on the “fundamental categorial pair [...] of bare life/political existence, *zoë/bios*, exclusion/inclusion” (Agamben 1998: 8). The affective domain of self-transcending, reciprocal bonding among friends is therefore as narrowly circumscribed as the political arena of the polis: Aristotle’s ethics prescribes affective affinities among equals and thus rules out any friendship across class, age and gender demarcations; likewise, not only Agamben’s *homo sacer* is excluded from the polis but also, far more generally, anybody who is not endowed with the prerequisite independence to participate in the agora. As Jacques Rancière points out, the polis establishes menial “work as the necessary relegation of the worker to the private space-time of his occupation, his exclusion from participation in what is common to the community” (Rancière 2004: 42-43). It is all the same noteworthy how “political thought [...] possessively captures friendship as its founding metaphor” (Gandhi 2006: 27), thereby establishing a link between the affective and the political that remains crucial, albeit in a very different avatar, in the inauguration of genuinely modern political theory by Thomas Hobbes.

Likening the state to an “Artificiall Man” (Hobbes 1996: 9), Hobbes rehearses the notion of the political subject as compound: certainly it is not friendship that provides the glue for this composite super-subject in which all individuals of a polity engage in a “Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person” (Ibid. 120), a political structure composed of and made by ‘man’ (“the *Matter* thereof, and the *Artificer*, both which is *Man*”; Ibid. 10). As is well known, Hobbes’s genealogy of the state as absolute sovereignty builds on the postulation of an essentially and ineluctably belligerent natural condition of man before the institution of a

‘common power’ which derives from every individual subject’s discharge of their power and liberty onto the sovereign. Interestingly this heuristic act of self-subjection is motivated by emotion since it is scripted by the “Passions that encline men to Peace,” especially the “Feare of Death” (Ibid. 90) that inevitably attends to the anarchic pre-political state of nature. Hobbes names his model commonwealth after the all-devouring biblical sea-monster leviathan; aptly so, since in his conception, the modern state – unlike the Aristotelian polis – includes everyone. Nonetheless, Agamben’s assertion that politics depends on exclusion applies here too: for the state’s apparently unlimited intension requires the complete and consensual evacuation of “the Right of Governing my selfe” (Hobbes 1996: 120). Whoever does not succumb to this renunciation by definition denies his/her status as subject and is hence arrested in the pre-political natural condition of perpetual war of everyone against everyone, and thereby not part of the compound subject of the ‘artificial man’. It is clearly in a rhetorical move to imply in a consensus as many of his calculated readers as possible that Hobbes illustrates this ‘brutish’ natural condition with a reference to non-European civilisations: “the savage people in many places of *America* [...] have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner” (Ibid. 89). Even if the other is now removed to the scene of emergent overseas imperialist engagement, his exclusion from the body politic remains crucial for the construction of the collective self. As in Aristotle, then, “the political gesture *par excellence*, at its purest, *is* precisely the gesture of separating the Political from the non-Political, of excluding some domains from the Political” (Žižek 2000: 95).

While the Hobbesian ideal of a rigidly welded “unitie” forms an exceptionally robust and highly contentious deduction of the necessity of absolute state sovereignty, the principal definition of politics as the making of ‘compound subjects’ (not necessarily through Aristotle’s exclusive friendship) has been rediscovered, time and again, and often appropriated for very different purposes by political theories of liberation, redistribution or

redress, and not less by emancipatory politics from working class movements to the various waves of feminism, from anti-racist and anti-casteist movements to ecological or anti-war campaigns. Productive of coalitions, affiliations, associations, parties and other forms of affective ‘compound subjects’, these political forces, no doubt, are the necessary ground on which such theoretical elaborations rest. Gramsci, to give just one example, occasionally deploys the figure of “collective man” that may at certain points, in Hobbesian style, denote the state-induced, ideological subjection of individuals into “social conformism” (Gramsci 1998: 242), at other times however give a name to any politically articulated group in the process of asserting and possibly enacting their specific claims. As in Hobbes, but to very different effects, passion is essential for this process of ‘welding’:

An historical act can only be performed by ‘collective man’, and this presupposes the attainment of a ‘cultural-social’ unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in transitory bursts (*in emotional ways*) or permanently (where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that *it becomes passion*). (Ibid., 349; *emph. ours*)

Political group formation, in this light, produces new subjectivities on the basis of a shared “structure of feeling” that, as a strongly felt internalised commitment to a common goal, takes on the quality of an apparently oxymoronic permanent passion into which, again an apparent oxymoron, the ‘intellectual base’ gets transmogrified. Passionate reason, reasonable passion: perhaps we have a formula here that allows for a different glimpse into the hidden abode of production of political passion beyond the interpellative rhythms of the trading floor. For in

Gramsci, the otherwise impossible idea of “passion being organised permanently without its becoming rationality and deliberate reflection and hence no longer passion” (Ibid, 139) becomes *possible* precisely through its dialectical entanglement with the “‘permanent and organic’ terrain of economic life”: political passion does not (as in later thinkers like Alain Badiou) come from some complete elsewhere that does not belong to ‘the situation’ itself, but is to the contrary constitutively grounded in the most permanent and ideologically naturalised dimension of social being, namely, economic existence. It is, therefore,

an immediate impulse to action which is born on the ‘permanent and organic’ terrain of economic life but which transcends it, bringing into play emotions and aspirations in whose incandescent atmosphere even calculations involving the individual human life itself obey different laws from those of individual profit, etc. (Ibid. 140).

Welded together by political passion into the compound subject of Hobbes’s (authoritarian) ‘Artificial Man’ or Gramsci’s (insurrectionist) ‘collective man’, erstwhile individuals are translated into something they were not before their insertion into the new ‘unity’: Hobbes’s belligerent savage of the natural condition becomes socialised through his subjection to the sovereign authority, while in Gramsci possessive individualism gives way to different political desires. The very process of articulation, fuelled and driven by passion, engenders a transformation of the particles involved. Most principally, these narratives of the production of compound subjects describe the itineraries of what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have called ‘articulation’: not merely the combining of existing elements into new patterns, but “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 105). In this process of insertion into the pattern, the ‘element’ becomes something it was not before: a ‘moment’ of

that structure. From the perspective of this model, the forging of political groups and coalitions consists primarily of a “collective form of identification” which is not “a matter of establishing a mere alliance between given interests but of actually modifying the very identities of these forces” (Mouffe 2005: 70). The social agent is again conceived “not as a unitary subject but as the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions” (Ibid. 71), for “in the field of politics, it is groups and collective identities that we encounter, not isolated individuals” (Ibid. 140). Political articulation, through which ‘elements’ integrate as ‘moments’ of a structured pattern, are decisively contingent on “the predominant role of passions as moving forces” (Ibid.), the “affective dimension which is central to the constitution of collective forms of identification, identifications without which it is impossible to grasp the construction of political identities” (Mouffe 2008: 97).

No doubt this new tendency in theory to acknowledge the roles of the affects in politics has everything to do with the impact of a wide range of movements – decolonizing, feminist, ecological, ... – that keep providing the political ground on which the ‘affective turn’ within and outside the academy gets sharpened. Focusing on a wide range of political praxes of affective reason, the articles presented in this volume are intended to contribute to this sharpening process.

### **Speaking Passions**

Located in the contact zones *between* bodies instead of *inside* bounded selves, and essentially facilitating the processes of political identification and articulation, passions are decidedly social. This, however, raises the further question of how exactly it is that passions become intelligible and hence available to intersubjective processes, that is, how they circulate and how they can be ‘communicated’. More than that, it remains to be reflected to what extent

passions, in their turn, get modified and are ‘given shape’ in the process of their symbolisation in language. For if passions as social phenomena or events can be conceived as the product of “the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience [...] into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning,” then passion partakes of, and is itself subject to, the fundamental constitutive and productive effects of language (Massumi 2002: 28). To address this problem, we will now briefly turn to the notion of representation where, as far as we can see, the sociality of emotions is located at its most fundamental.

According to Baruch Spinoza’s influential conceptualisation, emotion is a double event that comprises physiological affect (“modifications of the body”) and its representation in the mind in the form of “the idea of these modifications” (Spinoza 1993: 83). It is, in other words, simultaneously “a certain state of the body along with a certain mode of thinking” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 108). For illustration, Spinoza postulates the affect of *appetite* – the principal physiological striving towards self-preservation – as “the essence of man,” which at the same time appears to be common to all parts of the unified whole of Spinoza’s vitalist universe in which “each thing endeavours to persist in its own being” (Ibid. 90). What is specific to human appetite is its immediate link to its mental representation, which translates the affect of appetite into the emotion of *desire*: “Now between appetite and desire (*cupiditas*) there is no difference but this, that desire usually has reference to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite; and therefore it may be defined as appetite with consciousness thereof” (Ibid. 91). Whereas ‘each thing’ in Spinoza’s system is affected by appetite, humans are aware of their being affected by virtue of the mental representation (the ‘idea’) of the affect. Emotion thus denotes an affect that cannot be delinked from structured representation and hence function and meaning (Grossberg 1992); affect, “though having its source somewhere in the body, can only be known via its attached mental representation” (Carveth

1996: 32). In this sense, emotion traces “a logic in the flesh simultaneously with a logic in history” (Brennan 2004: 116).

It may be noteworthy at this point that Spinoza’s tripartite representational model of emotion involves a notion of articulation already at the level of the individual precisely because, for Spinoza, the individual is “not distinguished with respect to substance. But that which constitutes the form of an individual consists of a union of bodies” (Ibid. 51-52). As a ‘compound body’, the individual is “individuated by – its essence consists in – the way its parts are related to one another” (Della Rocca 2008: 148). The individual’s principal appetite for self-preservation is therefore most fundamentally the striving for the persistence of a distinctive pattern of the ‘moments’ that constitute the complex body of the individual; affect as the ‘modification of the body’, is then better grasped as the rearticulation of the body’s composition, that is, the rearrangement of the relations of its ‘moments’. Is it saying too much that this model, even if Spinoza himself designs it exclusively for ‘the individual’ as compound body, allows for an early glimpse of the political ideas of both ‘artificial man’ and ‘collective man’? And does the centrality of affect and emotion in Spinoza’s concept of the compound body not strikingly prepare for a politics of passion in which “affective labour produces [...] social networks, forms of community, biopower” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 293)? In order to clarify this articulatory capacity of emotion in Spinoza, and hence his model’s usefulness for our purposes, we need to briefly touch upon one further twist in his argumentation: emotions require to be grasped not only as the combination of bodily processes and their attendant ‘ideas’, for “it is only when the idea of the affection is doubled by an *idea of the idea of the affection* that it attains the level of conscious reflection” (Massumi 2002: 31). Insofar as “the human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body [affect], but also the ideas of these modifications [emotion]” (Spinoza 1993: 59), the ‘idea of the modification’ becomes itself available to the perceiving mind as an object of

representation, hence an “idea of an idea” (Ibid. 58). By extension, if for the individual ‘feeling’ subject the affect becomes a meaningful emotion inasmuch as its ‘idea’ attaches to it in the mind, that idea is also perceived by the mind as a determinate form of an ‘idea of the idea’. As a second-order representation, then, does the emotion become available to social discourse and fully enter into social circuits of sense-making. It is through these processes that emotions become the object of philosophical and critical speculation, get inserted into the discursive arsenal of a given historical conjuncture, and may become operative in political identification and articulation. While the first level (where an affect gets cathected to an ‘idea’) pertains to the representation of a bodily phenomenon or process in the individual mind, the second level – the one that relates to the ‘idea of the idea’ – brings up the whole cultural repertoire of evaluating and making sense of that emotion. It is here, at the interstices of external and internalised systems of validation, that particular emotions can be encouraged or criminalised, ennobled or degraded. Nor is the link between the first and second levels of representation an organic one: the ‘idea of the modification’ and the ‘idea of the idea’ are as arbitrary and historically contingent as any other signifying process. Neither at the level of the ‘idea of the modification’ nor at the level of ‘the idea of the idea’ can any individual sign adequately ‘express’ or ‘indicate’ the specifics of an emotion. The mental representation of the bodily affect will always fall short of its referent, of that which it is ‘about’, but is at the same time all there is to make the otherwise unavailable affect symbolically ‘present’. Always and necessarily inadequate, the designation of emotion thus occurs not as ‘authentic’ expression but as constant misnaming within the “differential network” of textuality, “and différance, its driving force” (Terada 2001: 45). On this ground, emotions are ineluctably subject to “the *inadequation of the designation*” (Derrida 1976: 275), but exactly by this constant deferral of some illusory ‘adequate expression’ they are dragged into “the true sociability of language” (Riley 2005: 25). This sociality-as-textuality constitutes a network



whose members constantly ‘modify’, reallocate or rearticulate their dynamic differential relationalities: a network that is aptly captured in the concept metaphor of the social text itself, provided that one does not reify the notion of ‘text’ into the chimera of some inert given structure. This kind of sociality, then, cannot be grasped “as either a positive election, a reciprocal esteem of subjects, or as the coercion of a pure force” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1989: 207) but as the site of an agency that is derived from “the ongoing interpellations of social life” (Butler 1997: 38), in other words, from the performativity of “the affect-soaked power of language” itself (Riley 2005: 5).

This emphatically includes the centrally important question of intelligibility and, perhaps even more crucially, the negotiation of intelligibility: For the struggle over whether or not an utterance counts as political speech is in fact itself part and parcel of Žižek’s arch-political ‘gesture of separating the Political from the non-Political’. In this light, the recognition (or denial of recognition) of the status of intelligibility is at the very heart of politics: “the account by which a sonorous emission is understood as speech, capable of enunciating what is just, whereas some other emission is merely perceived as noise signalling pleasure or pain” (Ibid. 23). Hence for Rancière, politics as democratic redistribution consists of the conflict “over the designation [...] of subjects as having the capacity of a common speech” (Rancière 2009: 24). It is important that democratic speech in this constellation is therefore always also about the boundaries of ‘common speech’. Defined neither by its formal rationality nor by the universality of the principles it proclaims, nor even by the rhetorical techniques of argumentation deployed according to established rules, democratic speech, instead, is the medium for the marginalised to “present themselves as equals” and demand their inclusion into the community of capable and legitimate speakers. It thus renders flexible the rigid boundaries between ‘speech’ and ‘noise’, between what is and what is not acknowledged as politically legitimate or relevant. Clearly, this basic aspect of what Rancière

calls the ‘distribution of the sensible’ is crucially important for many of the diverse activities at the core of most of the essays in this collection. If the politics of passion can now be conceived as a politics of locution, it remains to be clarified how it is also a politics of location.

### **Passions from Above – Passions from Below**

It should have become clear that we are not proposing an inherently liberating potential of political passion. Even if it is true that, despite the examples to the contrary briefly touched upon above, much political thought has denied the political status of emotion (as Jörg Meyer’s article in this volume demonstrates), this does not automatically mean that there were anything desirable *per se* about the degraded and suppressed passions. The rehabilitation of the passions as political forces is, in our view, simply the acknowledgement of an actuality and not the realisation of some programmatic desiderate. A politics of passion, we hold, is not necessarily emancipatory; but a politics that denies the political status of passion can hardly expect to be so.

In Aristotle and Hobbes, the deployment of the passions is clearly in the service of a questionable status quo; in Gramsci as in Mouffe, in the name of the self-assertion of hitherto excluded and marginalised groups. Passions may, in other words, be implemented ‘from above’ but they may also be mobilising forces for movements ‘from below’. Neither of these politics are enacted in splendid isolation from one another but will be intimately related as any politics of passion *from above* will not only coexist with, but be refracted in often unexpected and unpredictable ways by a multiplicity of locally specific enactments of politics of passion *from below*. The term “politics of passion from above” gives a name to a wide range of practices of power from Frankfurt School culture industry to Foucaultian biopolitics

and Judith Butler's framing of affect. It is understood that any politics of passion 'from below' must necessarily be articulated within the frameworks established 'from above'. Importantly, however, such frameworks can never fully determine that articulation: while "frames structure modes of recognition, [...] their limits and their contingency become subject to exposure and critical intervention as well" (Butler 2009: 24). To repeat: Our heuristic distinction between 'above' and 'below' does not seek to unreservedly sanction or participate in the numerous and influential moral/epistemological distinctions that circulate in and structure many political mobilizations, but does seek to point to and engage with the cause/effect implications of this tiering.

Without necessarily sailing under the flag of a politics of passion, postcolonial theory offers a variety of valuable models for thinking such intimate interaction of asymmetrically empowered logics. Walter D. Mignolo's concept of modernity as inextricably based on coloniality, e.g., posits a coercive interplay of "global designs" and "local histories." The former term refers to the universalised ideological underpinnings of "hegemonic projects for managing the planet" (Mignolo 2000: 21) that were historically implemented in the name of Christianity, 'civilisation', or 'the market'. In this scenario, 'local histories' refer to the coerced recipients of such global designs that with the advent and success of decolonisation have begun to assert themselves and to engage in "building macronarratives from the perspective of coloniality [...], narratives geared towards the search for a different logic" (Ibid. 22). Mignolo insists that such macronarratives are not to be misunderstood as 'counterparts' (let alone dialectical antitheses) of the universalist *grands récits* of global designs but rather projects that aim at "the rearticulation and reappropriation of global designs from the perspective of local histories" (Ibid. 39).

A distinctive marker of such 'local histories' is what one might term a 'transparent' dialectics between reason and passion in which, in Gramsci's terms again, passion always

stops short of fully “becoming rationality and deliberate reflection and hence no longer passion” (Gramsci 1998: 139). The conceptions of passion and reason implied here are crucially bound to a “pluritopic hermeneutics” (Mignolo 2000: 17) in which multiple points of enunciation across ‘the colonial difference’ are taken into account: reason, just as passion, is perceived to be relational, plural, and beyond the claims of the universal – Mignolo accordingly speaks alternatively of “the subaltern perspective of ‘cultural reason’” (Ibid. 39), or of “postcolonial reason” (Mignolo 1994). Cultural or postcolonial reason are thus pitted against the “hidden logic of modernity” where “all possible loci of enunciation (from religious to economic, from legal to political, from ethical to erotic)” have either been disavowed or set in dependency to a singular, European, locus of enunciation (Mignolo 2003: 442), not least in the name of “universal reason” (Mignolo 2000: 39). Mignolo’s ‘local histories’ accordingly unmask the global design of the Enlightenment in particular as a hegemonic project built on the unspoken disavowal of various subaltern speaking positions (Tania Meyer exemplarily explores this in this volume in a reading of another ‘passion play’ about the life of Anton Wilhelm Amo, an Enlightenment philosopher and the first Black German professor), yet also on the creation of a “European South” and the marginalization of earlier imperial narratives which still openly invested in the colonial difference and cultural passions (cf. Mignolo 2003).

What we have framed as a ‘cultural politics of passion’ has an invariably global geopolitical dimension in this sense. Mignolo addresses this explicitly by taking recourse to the work of Tunisian writer Hélé Béji, who posits the “triumph of cultural passions” as a “nostalgic” backlash against the failed promises of the *grand récits* of “globalization” and “civilization” (Mignolo’s ‘global designs’). Here is Béji at some length in Mignolo’s translation from the French original:

The triumph of cultural passions is very revealing of the disappointments that people experience when confronted with the promises made in the name of civilization. The West is today confronted with the nostalgic revival of identity that presents itself as the true face of humanity. The word *culture* discloses, more and more, a sense of being human where each identity, to avoid being dissolved by globalization, closes itself on a given tradition, a given religion, a belief, an origin, to the point of reducing itself, as identity, to a rudimentary figure of memory that civilization continues to erase relentlessly. (Béji 1997: 46, qtd. in Mignolo 2000: 39)

“[T]radition,” “religion,” “origin” as the work of cultural passions – the list is striking, no doubt, as an accumulation of the usual suspects of (post)modern epistemological critique and deconstruction – and indeed, Béji’s statement implies a keen awareness of reductive processes of cultural ‘invention’ and identity construction. However, “[t]he modern critique of modernity (postmodernity)” is by no means all that is at stake, here. As Mignolo puts it, such critique from the ‘centre’ “is a necessary practice, but one that stops short where the colonial difference begins” (Mignolo 2000: 37). Following Mignolo’s notion of a pluritopic “border gnosis,” then, demands a reading of Béji in which we take cultural passions *seriously* rather than deconstruct them as discursive and insubstantial. Border thinking asks us to investigate passionate constructions of tradition, religion, origin from their various loci of enunciation and to critically analyse how their ‘politics of passion’, always already oscillating between what Homi Bhabha refers to as the “two times” of pedagogy (from above) and performativity (from below) (Bhabha 1990: 297), are intricately bound to the exclusionary and obscured passions of global designs.

Similarly, in his critique of hegemonic historiography, Dipesh Chakrabarty makes out a tense configuration of universalised models of thought and subalternised local

epistemologies. Interrogating the silencing of “other formations of self and belonging,” Chakrabarty argues from a dissident standpoint that the undeconstructed Hegelianism of orthodox Marxism has established a universalist narrative of progress based on the idea of a necessary succession of modes of production. In that perspective, all human development leads inevitably towards the establishment of capitalism and its (later) sublation into the ‘next’ mode of production, communism. The consequences of this mechanic determinism for historiography are devastating as they reduce all past pluralities to the status of a prehistory of the present; thus the heterogeneities of manifold pasts are schematically unified and “posited by capital itself as its precondition” (Chakrabarty 2000: 63), engendering a world-historical narrative of progress that Chakrabarty labels “History 1”.

Those pasts “that do not lend themselves to the reproduction of the logic of capital” (Ibid. 64) constitute “History 2”: “a category charged with the function of constantly interrupting the totalizing thrusts of History 1” (Ibid. 66). The unilateral narrative of transition, the ‘only story’ of historicism, is thus replaced by a principal pluralism, given that History 2s are not misused “for writing histories that are alternatives to the narratives of capital” (Ibid.) which would again relegate them to the status of the dialectical Other of capital. Instead,

[t]he idea of History 2 allows us to make room, in Marx’s own analytic of capital, for the politics of human belonging and diversity. It gives us a ground on which to situate our thoughts about multiple ways of being human and their relationship to global capital. (Ibid. 67)

Readers of *Subaltern Studies* will recall that Ranajit Guha had, as early as 1989, taken recourse to Marx’s *Grundrisse* for disclaiming the myth of capital’s universality in a

“devastating [...] critique of the universalist pretensions of capital,” revealing the “discrepancy between the universalizing tendency of capital as an ideal and the frustration of that ideal in reality” (Guha 1989: 224). This reading of Marx enables a conceptualisation of a present that is shot through with historical difference, a present that cannot be unified into a single ‘History 1’ since “no global (or even local, for that matter) capital can ever represent the universal logic of capital, for any historically available form of capital is a provisional compromise made up of History 1 modified by somebody’s History 2s” (Chakrabarty 2000: 70). On this terrain, where ‘global designs’/‘History 1’ are being constantly refracted, reappropriated and rearticulated by ‘local histories’/‘History 2s’, a politics of passion from above tensely interacts with manifold politics of passion from below. Chakrabarty links this configuration expressly with the expectation of “more *affective* narratives of human belonging where life forms, although porous to one another, do not seem exchangeable through a third term of equivalence [...] that makes generalized exchange possible” (Ibid. 71). The passion plays of capital enact precisely that ‘generalised exchange’ in which, as Hare and Prebble dramatise, individual bodies become ‘porous to one another’ under the prescriptive rules of ‘History 1’. Not accidentally is Prebble’s trading-floor cacophony ultimately a choreographed mass performance coerced into unity by the rhythm of a dancing chorus: the politics of passion from above involved in this body-merging procedure produces the tightly scripted “*choreographic* form of a community that sings and dances its own proper unity” (Rancière 2004: 14) to the beat of virtual capital. The submerged and subalternised ‘History 2s’ that yet persist and continuously rearticulate this choreography in multiple forms of politics of passion from below are what this volume is all about with its contributions that attempt to demonstrate the entanglements of affective rationalities as politics of locution and location in a wide range of social fields of human interaction – from individuals’ everyday choices of ways of life to the public discourses of race, gender, citizenship, from the aesthetic to the

political as such. Thus, *The Politics of Passion* is intended as a contribution to further exploration, in the fields of politics, culture and the everyday, of the essentially political status of the affects beyond the dichotomy of passion and reason.

### **The Contributions to this Volume**

The ‘choreographic form’ of this volume arranges its contributions in three sections accordingly. The first, devoted to *Instrumental Passions*, sets out by investigating *affective politics from above*, that is emotions that are articulated in the service of various national pedagogies – be it in the name of ‘the people’, civilisation or capital – yet which invariably also transcend the nation and relate to and resonate with larger geopolitical designs.

ANKE BARTELS begins her reflections in “The East is Red: The Politics of Mobilising Passions in the Chinese Cultural Revolution” by following Sara Ahmed’s observation that emotions do not reside in the individual body, but rather in the relationality between bodies as the objects of emotion. She carefully investigates how the Maoist revolutionary guards tried to establish a highly politicised “affective economy” by instigating a specific “circulation of objects” (Ahmed 2004: 45, 8) throughout the various phases of the revolution. By looking at CCP propaganda posters in particular, she shows how the propagandists associated fervent ‘passion’ for Chairman Mao with a particular representational politics of the body which at a first glance seemingly erases distinctions of class and gender in favour of a new collective subjectivity. Only at a second glance, as Anke Bartels exposes, do the posters fail to challenge the ‘male gaze’ and maintain a conservative, if transformed, politics of gender beneath the surface of a passionate “socialist androgyny.”

Yet how are instrumental passions choreographed in a less centralised systemic environment? RÜDIGER KUNOW discusses this in his essay ““Watching one another out of



fear': Affective Communities and Medical Emergencies in the United States," which takes us into the heart of the cultural 'Other' against which the CCP geared its affective politics. Again building on Ahmed, Kunow proposes that the corresponding self-address of 'we, the people of the United States' needs to be investigated beyond the scope of rationalist political thought. Instead, he introduces the term "affective communities" which operate, not unlike Anderson's "imagined communities," through mediatised events and across long distances. Drawing on the affect of 'fear' in particular, Kunow guides us through two historical medical crises in the US – the 1899 bubonic plague in Hawai'i and San Francisco (attributed to Chinese migration) and the 1918 Spanish Flu (linked to the volatility of the body politic engaged in a foreign war) – and one fictional one as narrated in Phillip Roth's 2010 novel *Nemesis*, before reflecting on the ambivalences of instrumental passions and the exclusionary politics of affective communities more generally.

Next, SHASWATI MAZUMDAR in many ways builds on Rüdiger Kunow's insights by opening with Chantal Mouffe's critique of political theory which critically overlooks "the predominant role of passions as moving forces" in current geopolitical designs (Mouffe 2008: 71). For a different perspective, Mazumdar recommends a closer look at the articulation of passion in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when, as she writes, "the adversarial model of politics still had a firm place in the public imagination" (while the neoliberal hegemony of late capitalism evades adversarial politics in the name of a global human rights regime) "though the moral discourse of controlling and taming the passions had already started to take shape." In "Representing the Indian Rebellion of 1857: The Politics of Passion in German Popular Fiction" she takes us through three representative German novelistic accounts of the 1857 Rebellion by focussing how the writers portray not only the violent passions of the subaltern Indians, but significantly also various atrocious actions of the colonising British. The essay reveals how the sensationalist attribution of violent passions in the popular novels subverts

the received binarism of ‘civilised’ West vs. ‘savage’ East in a more intricate, triangular geopolitical constellation. It also demonstrates, however, how the narratives need to be understood in the context of Germany’s own revolutionary as much as imperial aspirations, and how they lobby their own affective communities in the name of a purportedly unentangled, rational and heroic ‘third’ party in the global colonial game.

The first section then closes with FLAMINIA NICORA’s “Libyan Landscape: The Passion and the Politics of its Representation.” Taking up Anke Bartels’s focus on the affective economy of propaganda, Rüdiger Kunow’s interest in the dynamics of affective communities, and Shaswati Mazumdar’s perspective on popular fiction, she focuses on the ways in which Italian writers of the 1910s staged a passion for Libya’s geography and soil in order to prepare Italy’s imperial expansion into Africa. As in the popular narratives of the 1857 rebellion, what is striking here is the degree of fictional invention, both in view of the supposed fertility of the (desert) soil as a ‘natural’ extension of Italian ground, and in terms of the tradition of Roman imperialism in Libya which the Italian state is to naturally revive. Such discursive inventions, Nicora exemplarily shows, easily silenced more ‘rational’ accounts of the Libyan landscape in a passionate climate of imperial frenzy. The closing sections of “Libyan Landscape,” focussing on Tuareg writer Ibrahim al-Koni’s 2002 novel *The Bleeding of the Stone*, then offer a postcolonial and ecocritical counterpoint to the imperial fantasies about the Libyan landscape, and thus provide the transition to second section of this volume.

Under the title *Feeling Beyond Governmentality*, this section is devoted to readings of cultural practices and phenomena which challenge or evade the pedagogy of instrumental passions as investigated in the first section in what we have termed an *affective politics from below*. The first essay in this section is a programmatic reflection on “Governmentality and the Enthusiasm for Democracy” by SATISH PODUVAL. It opens with a discussion of a 1939 intervention by Ambedkar in view of a Congress-led initiative against India’s cooptation in

the War without its people's consent, an intervention which questioned the validity and applicability of the purportedly universal "principles of democracy" on behalf of the untouchables and other minorities. What is at stake, here, is precisely the complex interference between global designs (Mignolo) or History 1 (Charabarty) on the one hand, and local histories or History 2 on the other, both speaking "under the sign of democracy." Poduval intricately traces the "enthusiasm" (in the Kantian definition, ironically an inherently 'disinterested' passion) for democracy on both ends – the "escalation of governmentality as a mode of power" and local, "passionate mobilisation [...] responding to *and* going beyond governmentality" – through the case study of the Narmada Dam project, focussing in particular on Sanjay Kak's nuanced documentary film *Words on Water*.

MADHUMEETA SINHA, in her essay "Rereading 'Draupadi': Text, Intertext, Context," takes on from here by continuing to investigate the complexities of "passionate mobilisation" from below in a related but different context. Her focus is on different forms of feminist protest against institutional violence against women in India which models its affective politics on the mythical figure of "Draupadi" from the epic *Mahabharata*. First guiding us through the short story "Draupadi" set during the 1967 Naxalbari rebellion and its 2000 stage adaptation by Mahasweta Devi, the essay then concentrates on a widely mediatised public event in Manipur in 2004. In yet another intertextual reframing of "Draupadi," a group of mothers, the Apunba Manipur Kanba Ima Lup (Mothers' Association to Save Manipur), publically disrobed themselves in front of the headquarters of the Assam Rifles regiment in Imphal to protest against the atrocious rape, torture and killing of a young Manipuri woman in army custody. While discussing the affecting force of the naked, middle-aged female body in the political debates over governmentality and local histories of resistance in the north eastern States of India specifically, Sinha also debates the ambivalent

figuration of the mother figure in feminist protests not only in India, but also in similar mothers' movements across the globe.

In his article on the afterlives of 1970s West-German left-wing terrorism, DIRK WIEMANN addresses the affect-soaked representations of the Red Army Faction in contemporary German cultural expressions. Drawing on Thomas Elsaesser's speculation that the contemporary fascination with the long-disbanded urban guerrilla bespeaks a perceived 'agency deficit' in the present, Wiemann highlights how the Red Army Faction gets retrospectively (and counterfactually) invested with the appeal of a recklessly daring and uncompromising politics of passion that appears entirely inaccessible today. The dazzling combination of countercultural hedonism with ascetic cadre discipline, of happy-go-lucky anarchism with austere authoritarianism renders these militant figures post-fact (and in most cases, posthumously) as complex icons similar to media stars. While this perspective allows to interpret the 'cult' of the Red Army Faction as a complicated consumerist trend triggered by an omnivorous culture industry, other facets of the terrorist 'star image' seem to exceed such cooptation: As Wiemann argues, a crucial feature that makes the '70s militants so vibrantly attractive today is the passionate determination to act in the horizon of what, with Alain Badiou, could be called a life-long 'truth-process'.

The third and final section of this volume is titled *Affective Orthodoxies and Their Limits*. It builds on the discussions of the various affective politics from above and below in the first two sections, yet attempts to more systematically address various politics of passion from the angle of specific epistemological traditions and disciplinary perspectives. What is at stake here, then, are the 'orthodoxies' of speaking (or, as it were, silencing) passion in case studies which examine the framing of emotion in Idealist philosophy, the social sciences, the political sciences, and political and legal philosophy respectively.

TANIA MEYER opens this section with a review of the passionate exclusion of various non-European speaking positions in the philosophy of the Enlightenment and its legacy in contemporary German politics through a reading of the intercultural theatre project *Amo*, which premiered in Münster in 2005. *Amo* is set in two time frames: on the one hand, it stages the life of Anton Wilhelm Amo, a philosopher and the first black German professor to teach at a university between 1727 and 1740 in Halle, Wittenberg and Jena. On the other hand, all characters of this ‘play within the play’ double as actors of a contemporary German theatre company rehearsing *Amo*, thus allowing the production to mirror various practices of racism between then and now. Under the title “En/Countering the Enlightenment: Staging Counter-Voices in Theatre Against Cultural Racism,” Meyer draws particularly on Judith Butler’s *Excitable Speech* in order to analyse how the play discloses the tacit orthodoxies of speech and silencing which underlie cultural practices acting on behalf of Enlightenment reason, yet also to demonstrate how silence may be “reordered” in such a way that it ‘speaks’ in the name of an as yet unrealised, culturally inclusive, other Enlightenment.

RAJNI PALRIWALA then reviews the place of passion in the social sciences, where the emotions have only relatively recently emerged as a valid object of study in a disciplinary framework which no longer reads them as “universal, natural facts known through [...] the human body,” but as “culturally and socially constructed, named, experienced, and cognised within and through their context,” and thus imminently political. Locating herself in the latter camp, Palriwala takes the reader through an exemplary sociological case study which carefully addresses the ‘knowability’ of emotion for the social science researcher. Under the title “Loving and Leaving: Single Parents in the Netherlands,” she takes the hegemonic conceptions of love in Western societies as a starting point for a nuanced qualitative investigation of “shifts and congealed structures of feeling” among single parents in Netherlands, thus implicitly commenting both on what we have termed the relational “in-

betweenness” of passion, and on the interplay between pedagogic orthodoxies (here, the hegemonic concept of romantic and passionate love perpetuated by popular culture) and performative everyday practices within the social order.

While Rajni Palriwala’s essay demonstrates the productivity and validity of studying passions in the social sciences, their standing in political sciences, as JÖRG MEYER reveals in an extended review essay, is much more precarious. In “Making Peace with Passions? The Removal of Emotion and Affect from International Relations, and Some Perils of Bringing Them In,” he addresses a range of the most influential contributions to the study of international relations which in one way or the other purport to include passion in their research designs. The main problem identified by Meyer, here, is that the disciplinary orthodoxy of the political sciences requires the researcher to integrate any conception of the emotions – be they conceived of as “universal, natural facts known through [...] the human body” or as “culturally and socially constructed” – into the operational mode of causal analysis. In an almost Wittgensteinian attendance to the details of the causal arguments, Meyer carefully unravels the internal contradictions and conceptual incongruities of these approaches, before tentatively sketching an interdisciplinary path for a more consistent inclusion of the passions into the framework of the political sciences.

In the final essay of this collection, LARS ECKSTEIN then closes by addressing some of the conceptual ambiguities of the relationship between politics and passion by investigating the figure of the refugee or illegal migrant in the latest stages of neoliberal globalisation. In “Politics of Passion and the Production of Human Illegality,” he critically investigates recent legal and political designs which systematically exclude refugees from the protection of the state in Western industrial nations on a mass scale, and illuminates such designs by successive readings of the political philosophies of Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben, and legal scholar Catherine Dauvergne. He is particularly interested in the ways in which these thinkers

variously place *compassion* in a highly problematic relation to an emancipatory politics, and tries to orchestrate their voices to arrive at larger conclusions about the complex relationship between passion, sovereignty, and globalisation. In his reading, an orthodox politics of compassion is eventually complicit with the mass production of human illegality, and unwittingly puts itself in the service of sovereignty under siege by globalising forces.

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