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Breaking New Ground in Hangberg, Cape Town?

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ABSTRACT

Despite its many challenges the concept of (unconventional) *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements has become one of the most promising approaches to the housing crisis in the 'Global South'. Due to its inherent principles of incremental *in situ* development, prevention of relocations, protection of local livelihoods and democratic participation and cooperation, this approach, which reflects principles of a 'support paradigm', is often perceived to be more sustainable than other housing approaches that often rely on quantitative housing delivery and top down planning methodologies. While this thesis does not question the benefits of the *in situ* upgrading approach, it seeks to identify and analyse problems of its practical implementation within a specific national and local context. The thesis discusses the origin and importance of this approach on the basis of a review of international housing policy development and analyses the broader political and social context of the incorporation of this approach into South African housing policy. It further uses insights from a recent case study in Cape Town to capture and analyse complications that can arise when applying *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements in a complex local context. On that basis benefits and limitations of the *in situ* upgrading approach are extracted and prerequisites for its 'successful' implementation formulated. The thesis concludes that despite its limitations *in situ* upgrading can be, the adequate circumstances provided, an important and more appropriate approach to the housing crisis in South Africa as well as in the 'Global South' in general.

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ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
BNG	Breaking New Ground
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CIUP	Community Infrastructure Upgrading Programme
DA	Democratic Alliance
DAG	Development Action Group
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
HiDA	Hangberg *in situ* Development Association
HWP	Housing White Paper
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
ISN	Informal Settlement Network
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMBY	Not-In-My-Backyard
OPP	Orangi Pilot Project
PMF	Peace and Mediation Forum
RAHB	Resident Association Hout Bay
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RWG	Redistribution with Growth
SANParks	South African National Parks
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
TRA	Temporary Relocation Area
UISP	Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

1 INTRODUCTION

An apparent feature of urbanisation and globalisation trends in most countries of the 'Global South'[1] is the spatial expression of socio-economic exclusion in the form of informal settlements and slums[2]. While both globalisation and urbanisation have contributed to national economic growth and to poverty alleviation and socio-economic development of a large share of the population in some of these countries, especially in Asia, most urban dwellers still remain poor and marginalised. Furthermore, ongoing natural population growth as well as continuing rural-to-urban migration patterns of impoverished people lead to an overall growth of the urban population in virtually all cities of the 'Global South' and thus contribute to a trend termed the 'urbanisation of poverty' (cf. UN-Habitat 2003a, XXVI). This phenomenon can be understood as a continuous struggle of a growing number of poor people for land, housing and livelihoods in an often challenging urban environment.

While formal land and housing markets are dominated by economic interests of the urban elite (cf. Durand-Lasserve 2006) and while they are overregulated in most 'developing countries' (Arnott 2008, 14), poor urban dwellers and sometimes even the middle-classes do not have the means to participate in these markets. For the excluded the only way to access land and housing is via the informal sector which provides either pieces of developable land, houses or rental arrangements in existing informal settlements, in backyards or in deteriorated formal housing stock. New land to settle can often only be acquired through (unlawful) land invasions. Whilst satisfying basic human needs for shelter and giving access to the wider urban environment – including the access to transport, jobs and social facilities – the living conditions in these settlements are often unhealthy, insecure or even live-threatening. Infrastructure and public services are missing or substandard and residents are often vulnerable to shocks, such as job loss or disease.

In cooperation with national governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders, international bodies such as the World Bank and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) have been trying to find answers to this urban (housing) crisis for decades now, often in a technocratic manner while not truly understanding and/or acknowledging poor people's needs. In summary, project-based approaches, ranging from 'slum clearance' and redevelopment in the 1950s and 1960s to site and service schemes and *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements since the 1970s, were only partially successful and hardly met the quantitative and/or qualitative demand. Indeed, projects have often proved to have negative impacts on the affected population such as the disruption of social networks or the imposition of additional costs. Typical failures include, inter alia, a top down delivery approach of implementing

1 The term 'Global South' is used here to refer to both so-called 'developing countries' and 'emerging countries'.
2 The original term 'slum' refers to dilapidated formal housing stock, whereas the term 'informal settlement' refers to 'spontaneous' settlements that are perceived to be 'unplanned' and 'illegal'. UN-Habitat's wider definition of 'slums' comprises both informal settlements and 'slums' (cf. 2003, 79).

one-off housing projects that neglects the specific needs of the affected project beneficiaries, a neglect of specific local contexts, wrong assumptions about the beneficiaries and a failure to consider long-term effects of respective projects. In response to these failures the 'international policy consensus' (cf. Pithouse 2009) increasingly promotes a more holistic and support-driven approach that shifts the focus from technical infrastructure and service delivery more towards social key aspects. These include, amongst others, reducing insecurity of tenure, protecting existing social networks and livelihoods, understanding peoples' specific local needs, fostering local economic development and allowing for active and comprehensive participation of beneficiaries. With regard to informal settlements this finds its expression in the promotion (e. g. through UN-Habitat 2003a) of participatory and incremental *in situ* upgrading of existing settlements as alternative approach to improve living conditions of informal dwellers, to reduce poverty and to integrate them into the wider urban society. While neither the upgrading approach nor the discussion about its key aspects are new, it has often proved to be difficult to implement it in a comprehensive way, as one or more of its key aspects have frequently been neglected and/or as financial, administrative and management capacities have not met the required level. Inappropriate regulatory frameworks, the lack of political will and the dominance of macro-economic policy goals are further constraints to its implementation (cf. Huchzermeyer 2004; Payne/Majale 2004; Pillay 2008). Viewing informal settlements from a more holistic perspective and acknowledging the complexities of incremental settlement development is thus fundamental. Tackling institutional and capacity constraints as well as promoting political will are other important criteria.

In South Africa international approaches to low-income housing are reflected in national housing policies and programmes. However, the housing situation to which these policies and programmes are meant to respond to is strongly influenced by South Africa's apartheid era, which has led to racial divide, huge socio-economic inequalities, spatial fragmentation and exclusion as well as a lack of housing. Housing itself, understood as a broader concept not only meaning shelter, is seen by many as a medium through which poverty alleviation and overcoming the aforementioned types of exclusion can be achieved. Securing a decent home for everyone has thus become one of the key issues in the South African socio-political debate about creating an integrated society. Nevertheless, as it is the case internationally, in South Africa the adopted top down approach of housing delivery, supported by a capital subsidy system, has neither met the quantitative nor the qualitative demand. Although more than 2.7 million state-subsidised houses have been built between 1994 and 2010 (Republic of South Africa 2011, 294), the number of informal settlements and the number of informally housed people have increased over time, thus indicating the limitations of this approach. While in current practice most housing projects still replicate this

conventional delivery approach of the first post-apartheid decade, the revised national housing policy of 2004 ('Breaking New Ground') calls for a change and has adapted to the international housing consensus, although with much delay (Huchzermeyer 2004). It promotes support for the *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements and has via the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme, for the first time, introduced a concrete policy instrument to put this into practice. It is assumed that in addition to existing programmes the new instrument can contribute to overcoming the South African housing crisis and to achieve the national governments' goal of 'eradicating' all informal settlements by 2014.

This ambitious goal, however, is not only questionable but in fact also seems unrealistic considering the massive housing backlog in South Africa. Moreover, the implementation of even a single *in situ* upgrading project on the ground proves to be vastly difficult. Experience with this type of informal settlement intervention is rare and compared to conventional housing projects on 'greenfield' sites or conventional 'rollover upgrades'[3] of existing settlements, only a few cases can be identified where informal settlements were selected for incremental *in situ* upgrading in a support-driven, participatory kind of way. One example can be found in Cape Town where the local authorities, in terms of the national Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme, initiated an *in situ* upgrading project in the Hangberg informal settlement in Hout Bay in 2006. Several challenges which have slowed down the process occurred during the implementation of the project that has, at the time of writing (in early 2012), not much advanced beyond its initiation phase. Instead of an upgraded housing environment, four years after its initiation the project has resulted in misunderstandings, broken promises, feelings of insecurity, and intense and even violent conflict between the community of Hangberg and local authorities that needed interference by a peace and mediation process. Meanwhile, the residents are still waiting for improved housing, infrastructure and services.

The Hangberg case not only reveals the difficulties of implementing *in situ* upgrading in a highly complex local context but also reflects general challenges and key aspects that need to be considered when realising it in a specific national context as well as in general.

3 Rollover upgrading leads to the complete replacement of existing informal settlement layouts and structures.

1.1 Research Objectives and Questions

It is the aim of this study to understand the challenges of informal settlement upgrading, which is internationally promoted as alternative approach to overcoming the housing crisis in the 'Global South', by using empirical insights from a case study in the South African context. At first, it is essential to trace the origin of the concept by analysing the broader development of international housing policy and practice. Secondly, to put the case study into its specific national context, it is necessary to trace the development of South African housing policy, while considering the specific historical and political context. Thirdly, it is assumed that the implementation of incremental *in situ* upgrading in a specific locality is not only influenced by international thinking or national housing approaches and the legislative and administrative frameworks that accompany it, but also by the specific (and possibly complex) local context in which such projects take place. Local complexities might thus add to the already mentioned constraints that obstruct the implementation of a support-driven *in situ* upgrading approach. It is therefore another aim of this study to identify and understand these local constraints and compare them with international experiences. The main research questions that informed this study can thus be summarised as follows:

» *How does the international housing discourse respond to the housing crisis in the 'Global South' and what role does the concept of in situ upgrading of informal settlements play? What are general challenges of this approach?*

» *What is the broader political and social context of the incorporation of this approach into South African housing policy? What are constraints to its implementation?*

» *What complications arise when applying in situ upgrading of informal settlements in a complex local context in South Africa? What does this imply?*

1.2 Structure of the Study

From an international perspective to a national and then local level the study follows a hierarchical pattern of explaining informal settlement interventions and the challenges that accompany these. Chapter 2 deals with the international context and Chapter 3 with the South African context of housing problems and policy approaches, while Chapter 4 analyses informal settlement intervention in a local context using insights from a case study in Cape Town. Chapter 5 discusses the implications that can be derived from this analysis.

First of all, Chapter 2.1 discusses general challenges that accompany globalisation and urbanisation processes in the Global South which have, in addition to other factors, resulted in the growth and persistence of informal settlements. Often seen as a negative aspect of urban growth that needs a 'formal solution', the meaning of these settlements for their inhabitants has at the same time been neglected and misunderstood. Chapter 2.2 thus discusses characteristics of informal settlements and explains in what way these settlements themselves are a 'solution' for the many people, who live there. Nevertheless, as living in informal settlements also poses risks and dangers for the people who inhabit them, it is also necessary to understand the challenges that these people face. This is followed by Chapter 2.3 which examines how international development agencies have been trying to find solutions to these problems, which concepts and policies have been applied for that reason, which ones were successful and which ones were not and how the current 'international policy consensus' influences housing practice. Chapter 3 descends to the national level and analyses the South African housing context. Using a similar structure as before, at first general challenges that have led to a national housing crisis are explained in Chapter 3.1. This again is followed by a discussion of approaches to housing provision that have been developed to counter this crisis in Chapter 3.2 before proceeding to the case study in Chapter 4.

After the introduction of the case study of the Hangberg informal settlement in Hout Bay in Chapter 4.1, Chapters 4.2 and 4.3 present the city-wide and the settlement contexts of the Hangberg *in situ* upgrading project, respectively.

Chapter 4.4 then presents the background and characteristics of the housing project, while Chapter 4.5 documents and analyses key challenges and conflicts that have come up before and during the initiation of the project. Chapter 4.6 finally analyses recent attempts to solve conflicts that have emerged between stakeholder groups of the project.

The results of the study are finally discussed in Chapter 5. Firstly, Chapter 5.1 discusses the implications of the case study and Chapter 5.2 then explores benefits and limitations of the *in situ* upgrading approach by comparing the results of the case study with other experiences of informal settlement intervention. Furthermore, prerequisites for 'successful' informal settlement intervention, identified in that way, are discussed in Chapter 5.3, before conclusions are drawn in Chapter 6.

2 URBAN HOUSING CHALLENGES IN THE 'GLOBAL SOUTH' – DISCOURSES, CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

To begin with, the international housing context is broadly explored. At first, underlying forces that lead to the formation of informal settlements are discussed. This is followed by an exploration of the functions and challenges of informal settlements. Thirdly, the development of international housing policy is illustrated before insights into international housing practice are given in an excursus at the end of the chapter.

2.1 Underlying Challenges: Globalisation, Urbanisation and Poverty

Living in informal settlements and 'slums' is, to a great extent, congruent to living in deprivation and poverty. However, the concept of poverty is not easy to conceive as there are various definitions and understandings of the term as well as a number of ways to measure it. One of the most common indicators in poverty measurement is income-related and calculates the number of people who live on less than US$1 a day[4], adjusted to local purchasing power, and thus live in 'extreme poverty' (UN-Habitat 2003a, 30). But numerical approaches to measure poverty are more helpful when combined with qualitative indicators of poverty that focus on what it actually means for those who are poor. In this respect, a general poverty definition by the World Bank suggests the following:

> *"Poverty is pronounced deprivation in well-being, and comprises many dimensions. It includes low-incomes and the inability to acquire the basic goods and services necessary for survival with dignity. Poverty also encompasses low levels of health and education, poor access to clean water and sanitation, inadequate physical security, lack of voice, and insufficient capacity and opportunity to better one's life." (World Bank 2011)*

In addition, UN-Habitat (2003, 29) lists four likely dimensions of poverty: low-income in terms of a nominal poverty line, low human capital (e. g. low education), low social capital in terms of having only weak social support networks, and low financial capital that restricts investment in income generating opportunities. Although these aspects or dimensions of poverty can be identified in almost all informal settlements and slums and although poverty and 'slum' conditions are correlated and mutually reinforcing, it has to be noted that most but not all informal or 'slum' dwellers are poor and suffer from these conditions (UN-Habitat 2003a, 28).

The growth and persistence of informal settlements and 'slums' can directly and indirectly be linked to globalisation and urbanisation trends and the prevalence of poverty in many parts of the world. Informal settlements and 'slums' not only result from but also represent and/or reproduce socio-economic inequalities and exclusion, competition for urban space and failed urban management. At the same

4 This used to be the official international poverty line as proposed by the World Bank (1990) in their *World Development Report*. A new international poverty line of US$1.25 a day which "is both more up to date and more representative of developing economies, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa" has recently been adopted (Ravallion et al. 2009, 179).

time they reflect the efforts of poor urban dwellers to gain access to the urban environment and its facilities and to enforce their 'right to the city' (UN-Habitat 2010, 122).[5] The situation is exacerbated by natural population growth as well as by rural-to-urban migration which lead to an overall urban population growth in the 'Global South'. To better understand and explain the existence of informal settlements and 'slums' these indicated underlying challenges need to be considered and are briefly reviewed in the following.

2.1.1 Population Growth and the Urbanisation into Poverty

According to estimates of the United Nations Population Division the world's total population in the year 2010 amounted to about 6.896 billion people.[6] The absolute majority of these lived in 'less developed' and 'least developed' countries where population growth rates are generally the highest, e. g. with a growth rate of about 2.3 % for Africa as a whole and a growth rate of about 2.45 % for Sub-Saharan Africa (UN Population Division 2010). Although urban growth rates in 'developing countries' have declined considerably (cf. UN Population Division 2009) the growth of urban regions will continue, mainly due to natural population growth but still also due to ongoing rural-to-urban migration (UN-Habitat 2010, 22). Looking at urbanisation trends it can be recorded that in 2009 about 2.56 billion of the 3.5 billion global urban dwellers lived in 'less developed' countries. Approximately 321 million of those lived in Sub-Saharan Africa. Forecasts predict that by 2050 these numbers will have doubled in the case of the urban population living in 'less developed' regions and will have tripled in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, making it nearly a billion urban dwellers only in this part of the world (cf. UN Population Division 2009).

Many urban dwellers in these 'less developed' regions live in informal settlements and 'slums'. The recent UN-Habitat's *State of the World's Cities* report lists estimates of the worldwide urban 'slum' population: It is assessed that in 2010 over 827 million people lived in 'slums' in 'developing regions'.[7] Sub-Saharan Africa's share is estimated to be close to 200 million people. While the proportion of urban dwellers living in 'slums' ranges from only 13.3 % in North Africa to 35 % in Southern Asia, in Sub-Saharan Africa the urban 'slum' population accounts for 61.7 %, compared to an average of 32.7 % in 'developing regions' (UN-Habitat 2010, 32). Although the report states that due to efforts undertaken by many

5 The notion of the 'right to the city' originates from Henri Lefebvre's book *Le Droit à la ville* that was published in 1968.
6 The 'milestone' of 7 billion people has officially been reached on 31st October 2011 (UN News Centre 2011).
7 Estimates for 2001 offer a total slum population of 924 million in 'developing countries' and 'developed countries' combined (UN-Habitat 2003, 2).

countries[8] 227 million people "have moved out of slum conditions" (UN-Habitat 2010, 33) between the years 2000 and 2010, the overall number of slum dwellers has increased by 61 million people in the same period and might have grown by another 61 million by 2020 (UN-Habitat 2010, 31–33 and 42). The prior *Challenge of Slums* report forecasts that the number of worldwide 'slum' dwellers will have doubled by 2030 if no proper action is taken (UN-Habitat 2003a, XXVI). These demographic trends have strong implications for urbanisation processes in the 'Global South'.

Urbanisation is generally seen as a contributor to economic growth and vice versa (Jenkins et al. 2007, 25 and 29). While urbanisation in 19th century Europe was fostered by industrialisation and strong economic growth, this was (and is) not the case in most countries of the 'Global South', where national economies often stagnate and governments are not capable of effectively dealing with urbanisation. Furthermore, the growth of urban populations in these countries takes place within a complex framework of combined factors such as existing poverty, economic inequalities and a lack of affordable formal housing opportunities (UN-Habitat 2003a, 17 and 24–25). This in turn leads to 'urbanisation into poverty', a trend that is reflected in socio-economic and spatial exclusion in the form of informal settlements and 'slums'.

Cities in the 'Global South' are also often characterised by a divide between the formal and the informal sectors. Although both types are often interrelated, the informal sector especially caters for those who lack formal employment and/or access to formal social services and housing. Contributing to the latter are inappropriate regulatory frameworks such as those that influence urban planning, land transactions and residential building construction. These are meant to serve the purpose of 'orderly development' but were often inherited from colonial governments and designed to serve the interests of an urban elite, while at the same time neglecting the interests of the poor majority (cf. Payne/Majale 2004, 45–46; Tranberg Hansen/Vaa 2004). Therefore, most people in these countries are not able to follow the frameworks. Thus, they rely on informal ways to gain access to housing and to secure a livelihood, thereby experiencing stigmatisation and further exclusion.[9]

8 This can be seen as response to the Millennium Development Goal 7 Target 11 of improving "the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020" (UN-Habitat 2010, 30).

9 With regard to this UN-Habitat and UNEP state that: "Although cities are home to diverse populations, the dominant population groups are generally those whose values, interests and needs are reflected in the built environment, formal institutions and regulatory regimes. Over time, this predominance has effectively marginalised or excluded large groups within cities such as poor residents and new migrants, who face varying degrees of deprivation because they cannot afford to comply with systematic regulations that lie outside their reach in every possible way. Consequently, they are left with little option but to operate in the administrative or illegal margins. These excluded groups can only build informal shelter, often in hazardous locations shunned by the wealthier, while carving out livelihoods in ways that are often described as substandard, illegitimate or illegal" (2010, 18–19).

2.1.2 Globalisation, Poverty and Inadequate Housing

Current forms of globalisation, fostered through economic liberalisation, free trade, the spread of information technologies and other factors such as the end of the Cold War, have long been perceived as contributing to worldwide prosperity and socio-economic development. And indeed, this was and still is true for some economies. However, over time it has also become clear that new wealth tends to spread unevenly and that the global gap between poor and rich countries is rather increasing under globalisation dynamics. In addition to the factors of urbanisation and population growth, other key factors contributing to this are presumed to be increasing inequality and the withdrawal of the state, amongst others (UN-Habitat 2003a, 34–35 and 52). Income inequality initially had decreased in the post-war period and until the early 1970s in an era of economic growth, full employment and Keynesian economic policy. But in the context of the oil crises of 1973 and 1980 the general costs for countries in the 'Global South' increased dramatically, which they could only meet through deficit-spending. Most such countries thus increased their debts, although interest rates were very high. This had an influence on the international debate about economic policy. While in light of the worldwide economic crises the confidence in the effectiveness of Keynesian government spending decreased, neoliberal thoughts began to dominate economic policy-making more and more and a return to *laissez-faire* economics took place (UN-Habitat 2003a, 36). But the associated market liberalisation had consequences for economic growth, income distribution, inequality and poverty in most countries all over the world:

> *"The neo-liberal agenda of state withdrawal, free markets and privatization achieved pre-eminence in English-speaking countries, and soon was exported to the world at large. This agenda was to have a very negative impact on income distribution and also, in a number of countries, an equally negative impact on economic growth and poverty. From 1973 to 1993, inequality, however measured, increased between countries, within most countries and in the world as a whole." (UN-Habitat 2003a, 36)*

The interrelation of globalisation, poverty and inequality and the question whether globalisation has positive or negative effects for the world's poor is greatly contested in literature and there are often contradictory views on whether poverty and inequality have actually increased or decreased and to what extent. This surely also depends on the choice of the type of measurement which can, for instance, focus on within-country inequalities in terms of the distribution of income, such as the widely-used *Gini-coefficient* does (cf. Basu 2006, 1362–1363; Bhalla 2002; Nissanke/Thorbecke 2008, 2; Milanovic 2007; Ravallion

2002). However, according to certain statistics worldwide income poverty[10] has decreased from about 40 % in 1981 to about 21 % in 2001 while inequality seems to have increased: Although the number of people living on less than US$1 a day decreased between 1980 and 2001, mainly due to poverty reduction in Asia and especially in China, the total number of people living on less than US$2 a day increased. Inequalities also increased within China and India but especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty, too, increased in absolute numbers and in relative terms (Basu 2006, 1363; Nissanke/Thorbecke 2008, 1–2 and 11).

It is fair to reason that increasing inequality especially results from rapid forms of globalisation, since expected trickle-down effects of market openings take time to materialise. Within 'developing economies' the already advantaged (e. g. through higher levels of skills and education) thus may benefit disproportionally more than their less-skilled fellow citizens who may even experience disadvantages, e. g. due to the exclusion from markets or stagnating wages for unskilled work (Basu 2006, 1364). This is also true in the event of economic crises:

> *"The downside of globalization is most vividly epitomized at times of global financial and economic crises. The costs of the repeated crises associated with economic and financial globalization appear to have been borne overwhelmingly by the developing world, and often disproportionately so by the poor who are the most vulnerable." (Nissanke/Thorbecke 2008, 2)*

It also has to be noted that increasing global trade and capital movement, while according to theory can generate wide-ranging advantages such as improved incomes, in fact mainly benefited the 'developed economies' so far, whereas the majority of the population in the 'Global South' hardly benefited at all. Amongst other things this was because of worsening terms of trade and remaining trade barriers for 'developing countries' plus heavily subsidised agricultural sectors in 'developed countries' (UN-Habitat 2003a, 39–43).

Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) also had strong effects on 'developing economies'. They prompted, as a consequence of neoliberal argumentation, the retreat of the state. SAPs were a reaction to the fiscal and debt crises of many countries in the 'Global South' that had previously received loans from the international development community. They were introduced from the 1980s onwards to foster austerity and to secure reimbursement. They thus became a precondition for receiving World Bank loans and they implied budget cuts and a decline in all sorts of government spending, which contributed to economic stagnation especially in many African countries (UN-Habitat 2003a, 36–37 and 43). According to critics the SAPs offered "a poisoned chalice of devaluation, privatization, removal of import controls and food subsidies, enforced cost-recovery

10 This is based on an international poverty line of US$1.08 in 1993 purchasing power parity.

in health and education, and ruthless downsizing of the public sector" (DAVIS 2007, 153). These measures led to a series of outcomes with negative effects on the already marginalised population, while pushing further parts of the population into marginalised conditions. Especially in the case of African economies SAPs resulted in "capital flight, collapse of manufactures, marginal or negative increase in export incomes, drastic cutbacks in urban public services, soaring prices, and a steep decline in real wages" (DAVIS 2007, 155). Another result was the decline in formal sector jobs which led to a growth of the informal economy (UN-HABITAT 2003a, 40).

Whilst globalisation, certainly in theory but also in practice, does have positive impacts and largely contributes to human development under certain conditions, it has become obvious that measures undertaken 'in the name of globalisation' can have negative outcomes as well. They might even lead to socio-economic exclusion if the balance between securing social welfare and fostering global competitiveness is shifted too far to the latter:

> *"To a large extent, it is not globalization per se that has caused countries and cities to abandon redistributive policies that benefit the majority of their citizens, but the perception that they need to be competitive [...] In the end, the growth in inequality has happened because national governments have abdicated their responsibilities to their citizens to promote fairness, redistribution, social justice and stability in favour of a chimera of competitiveness and wealth for the few. It is also the outcome of international organizations that have adopted a dominant neo-liberal philosophy, which has failed to deliver on most of its promises almost everywhere that it has been applied." (UN-HABITAT 2003a, 53; emphases in original)*[11]

A side-effect of these indicated dynamics is the growth and persistence of 'slums' and informal settlements. People who are excluded socio-economically and who do not have the means to compete in the globalised urban economy live in or move to these types of settlements as a result of affordability concerns and hence as a result of their own 'logical' market decisions. To formulate it differently one can stick to an older 'slum' definition by STOKES: "The function of the slum at any moment in city development is to house those classes which do not participate directly in the economic and social life of the city" (1962, 188). In the next chapter, informal settlements which are the focus of this study are looked at more closely and it will be discussed how they serve the needs of those urban dwellers who inhabit them.

11 In light of global competitiveness, cities generally try to position themselves in the global economy by strengthening competitive advantages and by increasing their attractiveness to draw foreign investments (JENKINS et al. 2007, 26). Urban renewal, gentrification and beautification are means to achieve this, but they often have considerably negative effects on the poor. This is highlighted by human rights violations such as forced evictions of informal dwellers in relation to preparations for mega-events, which also occurred in advance of the FIFA Soccer World Cup 2010 in South Africa (cf. NEWTON 2009; UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 2009).

2.2 Discussing Informal Settlements

When discussing informal settlements and 'slums', respectively, time and again generalisations are produced to reduce complexity in order to better understand their dynamics and the way they are interconnected with the 'outside world'. However, it has to be noted that this is not only extremely difficult but can also lead to wrong assumptions about the nature of informal settlements and 'slums'. It can even have negative consequences when efforts are made to formulate strategies for intervention, no matter if one tends to be too optimistic or extremely pessimistic regarding these types of human settlements. At the same time the use of the term 'slum' seems inappropriate (GILBERT 2009). In his recent critique of common thinking about 'slums' GILBERT states that:

> *"Generalizing about slums fails to recognize the awkward exceptions and tends to reduce the lives of all poor people to the lowest common denominator. It perverts our understanding of the nature of poverty and distorts policy-making. [...] Authoritarian mayors and government ministers may use the negative image of the slum to demolish slums in order to 'help' the people. The use of a word with as long and disreputable a history as the 'slum', is risky and typifies the current tendency to generalize and trivialize." (2009, 38)*

The same is almost certainly true when discussing the category of informal settlements in particular. Perceptions about them can be contradictory and might focus either on the will and capability of poor dwellers to secure a livelihood[12] or, in contrast, on the negative (physical) characteristics of them. "According to perceptual and visual images squatter settlements can be 'seen' as aesthetic accomplishment by some or as eyesores fit for the bulldozer blades by others" (PUGH 2000, 332). In this latter sense, 'squatter settlements' or 'informal settlements' are reduced to their illegal status, health problems and social ills that are associated with them. The functions that these types of settlements fulfil for their inhabitants are neglected at the same time. While physical aspects are definitely of critical importance when examining them, informal settlements should be seen in a more holistic way. The various social, economic and cultural functions that they provide are equally important, particularly when there are attempts to upgrade these settlements and to improve living conditions of their

12 The concept of livelihood is a fairly loose one, as it can have different meanings and can be subject to various definitions. For instance, one brief – and non-comprehensive – definition by CHAMBERS suggests the following: "Livelihood refers to the means of gaining a living, including livelihood capabilities, tangible assets and intangible assets. Employment can provide a livelihood but most livelihoods of the poor are based on multiple activities and sources of food, income and security" (1995, 174).

inhabitants. Thus, informal settlements are not necessarily a problem to which a 'proper solution' needs to be found, but they themselves can present a 'solution' to those people who, as a consequence of their socio-economic situation and a lack of affordable formal housing, do not find a better place to stay. It is the purpose of this brief chapter to approach this discrepancy and to not only depict a number of common problems and challenges but also to explore basic functions and opportunities of informal housing.[13]

2.2.1 'Squatting' as Human Needs-Led Development

Although informal settlements tend to be very complex and they can differ in their size, structure, formation phase, population composition, availability of social facilities, legal status and various other aspects, some similar characteristics can be identified time and again. This is especially true for the multi-dimensional crucial functions that their residents find in informal settlements: They are often well-located regarding the access to economic opportunities, transportation and social facilities such as public schools and health clinics. They informally provide rental accommodation or affordable land for self-build shelter and they are "aimed at accessing income, increasing well-being, reducing vulnerability[14] and improving food security" (Smit 2006a, 104). Moreover, they grant access to social networks that can be employed to improve access to substantial services and livelihood opportunities. In terms of rural-to-urban or intra-urban migration they are also beneficial to migrants in terms of getting initial support and/or gaining access to the wider urban environment (cf. Misselhorn 2008, 5; UN-Habitat 2003a, 67–68). In this regard informal settlement formation can be interpreted as "human needs-led development" (Huchzermeyer 2009, 62), although the formation process of particular settlements itself can be quite different.[15] On the other hand, it has to be noted that in some cases even the middle classes have to rely on informal housing. This is particularly due to the limited availability of formal housing opportunities and to inappropriate land delivery systems in many countries of the 'Global South' (Pugh 2000, 326).

Considering the economic situation it can be stated that many informal dwellers do have formal employment but they depend to a great extent on informal

13 This sub-chapter is partly based on experiences and insights the author gained when visiting various informal settlements in Dar es Salaam (2009) and in Cape Town (2011).

14 As with the concept of livelihood (cf. footnote 12), the concept of vulnerability can have diverse meanings and be subject to various definitions. By borrowing another definition from Chambers (1995, 175), one can define vulnerability as follows: "Vulnerability means not lack or want but exposure and defencelessness. It has two sides: the external side of exposure to shocks, stress and risk; and the internal side of defencelessness, meaning a lack of means to cope without damaging loss."

15 For instance, Alsayyad (1993, 35, cited in Huchzermeyer 2004, 38) lists four types of formation processes: a gradual process of spontaneous land invasion by individuals, a communal process of coordinated and collective invasion of land, a politically motivated process of land invasions by socially mobilised people and finally a generated process, unofficially or officially approved by the government.

job opportunities. This is especially true for women who often have to combine several tasks such as housework, child rearing and income generation which becomes much more feasible by participating in neighbourhood or women support networks (cf. HUCHZERMEYER 2004, 39–40). Income generating activities that are in particular carried out by women can range from child care, cooking and catering, home-based handcrafting to retailing in home-based shops. Altogether, there is a wide range of possible income opportunities for female and male workers. Many work as hairdressers, small shop owners or sales assistants, some run internet cafes, while others work as cobblers or as construction workers and day labourers. Some are craftsmen or carpenters and sell their goods in front of their home-based workshops. Others collect refuse and clean the roads and pathways within their settlements and receive small contributions from other residents in exchange. The collection of scrap metal or empty plastic bottles that can be sold to scrap dealers and recycling stations is another way of securing some basic income. Renting out rooms is a further important economic activity. It can provide affordable and flexible rental accommodation for those in need and at the same time can contribute to a family's monthly income. There are many more opportunities to think of but this brief list of occupations already indicates that informal settlements can be vibrant places of (informal) economic activity that can secure poor people's livelihoods and moreover fulfil certain social functions that the formal sector does not provide for the poor (cf. UN-HABITAT 2003a, 70).

2.2.2 Challenges, Opportunities and Limitations of Informal Housing

Despite all the critical functions informal settlements provide, most informal dwellers live in poverty. The physical conditions of informal settlements and their informal status itself often pose serious threats to their inhabitant's well-being. In this regard UN-HABITAT (2003, 12) lists some key characteristics within its wider 'slum' definition: On the one hand, 'slums' *can* be characterised by "inadequate access to safe water; inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure; poor structural quality of housing; overcrowding; [and] insecure residential status". Especially insecurity of tenure is a major concern, as land is held illegally/informally – although sometimes with unofficial or official approval by the owner or the state – and there is usually a constant threat of eviction. On the other hand, settlement locations themselves can pose risks. Many informal settlements are located on unsuitable land, e. g. on steep slopes, on land that is close to dump stations and hence might be contaminated or on land that is prone to flooding (UN-HABITAT 2003a, 69 and 82). When informal settlements get flooded there is always the threat of the spread of diseases such as diarrhoea or even cholera when there is no proper sanitation, sewers and storm water channels. Moreover,

in tropical cities such as Dar es Salaam, there is also a risk of the spread of malaria as standing water presents an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes. Health threats are also caused by high settlement densities as they impede the proper circulation of air, which might lead to respiratory diseases, and by the lack of proper public waste collection services. In that case, waste is often dumped on roadsides, in creeks and stormwater channels or is burned and thereby discharges toxic substances. The often inferior building constructions also bring hazards about as they, for example, are not constructed in a way that prevents water from flowing in when heavy rains and/or flooding occur. Besides, because they are not properly insulated, such buildings expose their inhabitants to hot temperatures in summer and cold temperatures in winter – obviously depending on the climate zone. The often dense and irregular settlement structures in combination with inferior and inflammable construction materials also cause fire hazards as frequent 'shack fires' in informal settlements illustrate (cf. Smit 2006a, 110–111; UN-Habitat 2003a, 74).

However, the physical form of informal settlements can vary greatly according to the people's needs and demands (Figure 1). Some settlements are made up of 'shacks' built from corrugated metal, wood and other light materials while other (more consolidated) settlements might consist of permanent buildings ('brick and mortar') or both. In addition, some settlements are more densely built than others; some include roads, open spaces and vegetable gardens, while others only allow for small pathways between building structures and have no open spaces at all. The different physical forms and settlement structures thus also implicate different levels of physical vulnerability. Densely built settlements with their often small and curved pathways pose security threats to residents who, for example, pass along at night in the absence of street lighting. Social problems and criminal activity such as mugging, drug dealing and illegal gang activity are a fact in many informal settlements and are sometimes linked to the physical conditions, being it small labyrinth – like pathways or the impossibility of properly locking up a 'shack'. Women are particularly vulnerable and often face humiliating realities in informal settlements. They are subject to psychological and sometimes domestic violence and are also in danger of getting raped and thereby infected with HIV, as studies in Kibera – Nairobi's largest 'slum' – reveal (Amnesty International 2010).

Alongside physical vulnerability stands social and economic vulnerability, which can vary from household to household and depends on aspects such as human capital, productive assets, social capital and household composition (Moser 1995, 1997, cited in Huchzermeyer 2004, 42). Although informal settlements offer a wide range of opportunities, unemployment rates are generally high and informal activities often only secure a very small income. Individuals and families have to cover the costs for food, rental fees, transport, school fees for their children and

other urgent expenses from the low household incomes. A day without income and the loss of a job thus can have serious impacts on people's livelihoods. From this perspective mutual support networks and community organisations seem vital for many informal dwellers as they can contribute to reduce vulnerability. They can take the forms of saving networks, women groups, neighbourhood watches and other types of organisations that represent the interests of the wider settlement community, e. g. in terms of service provision and housing. Besides, there might also be community committees, which control access to the settlement as well as to plots and houses within the settlement by approving or disapproving informal tenure arrangements, which facilitates some (informal) control of settlement growth and development (Misselhorn 2008, 8).

Figure 1: Informal settlements 'Dassenberg Drive' in Cape Town (top left and bottom left) and 'Kwa Kopa' in Dar es Salaam.
Source: Own photographs (2009, 2011).

The physical conditions of informal settlements, the social and economic environment, the degree of organisation of the respective community and also the type of land (state land or private land) and the way in which the land is held (e. g. illegally or with approval of the owner) are important aspects when the opportunity of *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements is considered (see 3.2). Certain conditions can improve or worsen the possibility of upgrading. Categories of thought are for instance: Is the land suitable or not? Do the people within the community have an interest in staying permanently or not? Is the community

well organised and do committees exist with whom the authorities can work together or is the community divided and are there insuperable conflicts? Does the land belong to the state or does it belong to a private owner who would have to agree to transfer it and who would then need to be compensated? And finally, are formal jobs and social facilities available?

Nonetheless, no matter if the respective settlement conditions allow for permanent settling or not, informal settlements present an important point of entry into the urban environment as they grant certain economic and social opportunities for the people who have to live there. In that way they can be understood as a social process rather than a manifested condition (HUCHZERMEYER 2009). At the same time, the physical conditions of informal settlements, their environmental impacts and potential social problems such as crime, diseases and poverty might pose threats to their inhabitants or even to the society at large. The latter are decidedly negative aspects of informal housing that were focused on in particular when interventions in informal settlements and 'slums' were debated in the past. Later on, the perception of informal settlements shifted towards the acknowledgement of the benefits of these types of settlements for their inhabitants. Chapter 2.3 takes a closer look at this and analyses how such discussions influenced international housing policy and practice in the past and at present.

2.3 A Review of International Housing Policy Development

By the 1970s housing had become an important aspect of the international development discourse in which the importance of 'adequate housing' with regard to poverty alleviation and socio-economic progress in the 'Global South' was increasingly acknowledged. The World Bank's entry into the housing sector in 1972 and the founding of the United Nations Human Settlement Programme in 1976[16] underpinned this tendency, making housing a key area of development cooperation. Since then international housing policies have been influencing national housing programmes and local projects to a great extent. This chapter gives a broad overview of the development of international housing policy since the second half of the 20th century.

2.3.1 The 'Provider' and the 'Support Paradigm'

Following HAMDI (1995, 26–32) two different approaches to secure low-income housing provision can be distinguished. They focus either on the technical provision of shelter ('provider paradigm') or understand housing as a broader concept including shelter and other social aspects ('support paradigm'). Generally speaking, the provider model focuses on the reduction of housing deficits and at the same time on the improvement of housing quality. However, its bias is predominantly quantitative and it aims at realising economies of scale based on capital-intensive mass production of standardised houses or components and a large consumer market. "Providers argue that to mass produce effectively is to mechanize, to mechanize effectively is to standardize, to standardize effectively enables better control of quality, quantity, and cost" (HAMDI 1995, 29). According to this line of thought the mass provision of housing through governments and private industry also contributes to employment and profit generation and thereby fosters economic growth and indirectly improves living standards. Moreover, the compliance with building regulations and the enabling of planning control seems best achieved this way. Nonetheless, 'supporters' criticise the provider model for being too consumerist-orientated, conducive to speculation and profit-maximisation, for mainly serving capitalist interests of the private industry, for neglecting human needs and for being inappropriate with regard to individual poor communities (e. g. because of high costs due to inappropriate building regulations).

16 The founding of this programme was one of the outcomes of the first *Habitat* conference in Vancouver in the same year.

Hence the 'support paradigm', which is the one more favoured by international agencies nowadays, has a different bias. Among other things it emphasises the benefits of informal housing supply that contributes to the reduction of housing deficits and provides shelter to those who cannot afford anything else at present. Supporters stress the need for better and effective resource management and the need for providing access to the resources necessary for building production, such as building materials or affordable credits, to a wide range of small-scale producers. In so doing manufacturers, suppliers, small building firms and also individual homebuilders who want to but are not able to self-produce houses could be supported. In addition, urban development in a broader sense is stimulated:

> *"The large-scale production of houses [...] can best be achieved by increasing the participation of small builders and ordinary people – by building their capacity to deliver houses, services, and even some utilities located close to their market [...] In contrast to the instant delivery of houses, supporters argue that scaling up the supply of housing without risking bankruptcy and without displacing entire populations means building incrementally, precisely as people in informal developments do. It means cultivating an environment in which housing, small businesses, and communities will grow, consolidate, and change and where production and building can provide opportunities for employment, for accumulating wealth, and for improving health. To supporters, housing [thus] becomes an integral part of a larger system of urban development." (HAMDI 1995, 31–32)*

The 'provider paradigm' as well as the 'support paradigm' find their expression in different housing approaches that are part of wider development strategies. In the following these strategies as well as associated housing concepts are discussed to trace the broader development of international housing policy.

2.3.2 Modernisation, Public Housing and 'Slum Clearance'

In the post-war period and up into the 1960s the provider model dominated housing strategies in the 'Global South'. This was a time when colonial powers released their colonies into independence and when modernisation theories were influencing the development discourse. Keynesian economic growth strategies were adopted and the goal was to increase the per capita Gross National Product which had to be significantly higher than the growth rate of the population. In fostering economic growth and in 'modernising' societies, new independent governments followed the example of the industrialised countries and hoped to be able to rapidly neutralise the socio-economic gap between their own countries and the 'developed world'. Thus, modernisation meant the transformation

from agricultural to modern urban and industrialised societies with increasing employment in manufacturing and services. To meet these goals, the 'developing countries' welcomed development aid and technical assistance. With regard to housing this resulted in the transfer of Western planning ideas, cultural and architectural styles and technologies to the 'developing countries'. Addressing housing backlogs through industrialised mass construction of public housing was the common recipe and fitted in the wider development scheme: "[...] subsidised public sector housing was seen as part of a general strategy of stabilisation of labour and the creation of skilled working and middle classes as a means to rapid economic development" (Jenkins et al. 2007, 155). While Western experts for that purpose provided technical advice, the new independent governments created their own public housing programmes and master plans for urban development and at the same time refused 'non-modern' and traditional ways of housing supply. This resulted in negative perceptions of informal settlements and 'slums' ('slums of despair'[17]) that were considered as substandard and were to be eradicated and replaced by modern housing (Burgess 1992, 76–77; Huchzermeyer 2004, 28–29; Jenkins et al. 2007, 36–37 and 154–155; cf. UN-Habitat 2003a). This conventional public housing approach also had a symbolic value as the outcome – sufficient or not – was highly visible and expressed modernisation. It also underscored governments' efforts to support their citizenry, though this might be criticised as a form of 'window-dressing' that distracted from other prevailing problems (Njoh 1999, 186–187).

From this it can be argued that the interactive link of economic growth, social development and housing was gradually realised at that time which explains why housing eventually became a key area of development cooperation. "However, [...] low cost public housing projects largely failed to meet the target population's need in scale, cost and location, thus never effectively replacing informal settlements" (Huchzermeyer 2004, 28). Due to efforts to eradicate settlements and evict their inhabitants in fact even more housing opportunities have been destroyed than were built, while at the same time the demand for low-income housing grew due to ongoing population growth. This indeed increased the housing deficits and also had negative impacts on the survival strategies of informal dwellers. Moreover, in most cases the modern public housing tenements were located in the urban periphery to reduce the costs of land acquisition. The periphery, though, proved to be an unfavourable location in terms of access to social services and employment opportunities and costs of transportation. Also, the units themselves were culturally and practically inadequate as they did not provide open spaces for

17 The terms 'slums of despair' and 'slums of hope' (see below) originally stem from a famous article on 'slums', which was written by Stokes (1962). Based on his insights from 'slums' in Boston, Chicago, Guayaquil and Lima he distinguishes different 'slum' dweller groups that have either more potential to escape slum conditions (escalators) or do have less potential (non-escalators). Both groups may either live in 'slums of hope' that are likely to disappear with the socio-economic development of their inhabitants (mainly immigrants) or they live in 'slums of despair' that are likely to remain, even if 'escalators' are able to escape from them. Moreover, according to his theory a proportion of 'escalators' and 'non-escalators' which are not able to escape the 'slums of hope' finally end up in 'slums of despair'.

communal activities and for creating home-based income opportunities. Repairs were difficult to carry out for inhabitants, maintenance was not sufficiently funded and the design of the housing units did not allow for extensions in the case of changes in family composition. Furthermore, although rent controls were applied, public housing proved to be too expensive for the poor. This often resulted in the sale of public housing units to higher income groups. Additionally, the delivery systems of public housing themselves suffered from various problems such as "[...] corruption, political interference, inefficiency, inflexibility, unfair allocation and extensive delays [...]" (UN-Habitat 2003a, 125). Finally, it has to be noted that rapid urbanisation paced out economic development which hindered the creation of a sufficient amount of employment opportunities. The outcomes were high unemployment rates, increasing income inequalities and a rise in poverty levels. It also led to a lack of investment capabilities in housing and infrastructure and thus increased the gaps in low-income housing provision which was then filled by an increase in informal housing supply (Arnott 2008, 21; Burgess 1992, 78; Jenkins et al. 2007, 155–158; UN-Habitat 2003a, 124–125).[18]

2.3.3 Basic Needs, Redistribution with Growth and the Rise of Self-Help Housing

Resulting from the increasing realisation that public housing and also the wider framework of Keynesian policies based on state-intervention had mostly failed to improve living and housing conditions of the poor, the development discourse and with it the housing discourse were realigned and new development strategies evolved. Through the *Basic Needs* as well as the *Redistribution with Growth* (RWG) strategy the focus of the development discourse was shifted more towards the poor and economic growth was combined with the idea of social justice. It was argued that instead of redistributing existing wealth the poor should benefit from the redistribution of the gains of new economic growth. Part of the RWG strategy therefore was to increase the costs of capital and lower the price of labour so as to create incentives for the application of labour-intensive technologies in production. This was meant to improve the access to employment for the poor. Increase of absolute income could be achieved through subsidies, transfers and granting better opportunities to satisfy basic needs by improving access to goods and services. In addition to addressing poverty concerns including income, inequality and unemployment, the new strategies contained a range of related policy

18 Jacobs (1961/2011, 6), here referring to the North American context in the 1950s and 1960s, suggests that the technocratic approach to housing delivery often also failed to succeed in the 'Western world': "There is a wistful myth that if only we had enough money to spend – the figure is usually put at a hundred billion dollars – we could wipe out all our slums in ten years, reverse decay in the great, dull, gray belts that were yesterdays' and day-before-yesterday's suburbs, anchor the wandering middle class and its wandering tax money, and perhaps even solve the traffic problem. But look at what we have built with the first several billions: Low-income projects that become worse centers of delinquency, vandalism and general social hopelessness than the slums they were supposed to replace."

goals. Amidst increasing productivity and output of production, incentivising expenditures on public servicing and strengthening small-scale enterprises, for example by improving access to finance and technical assistance, another goal was to encourage aided self-help housing[19] (Burgess 1992, 80–81; Jenkins et al. 2007, 41–43; Lohnert 2002, 54–55; Steinbrink/Schneider 2001, 99–101):

> *"[Indeed] [...] the rise of self-help housing policies in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America, Africa and Asia can only be explained in the context of the broader goal of redistribution with growth and basic needs strategies that dominated the lending policies of the international development agencies in this period." (Burgess 1992, 81)*

This will become clearer when one looks closer at the development of the concept of self-help housing, an issue that has seen published a vast amount of related literature by now. When the debate about self-help in housing provision became a popular topic in academics and policies, the concept was nothing new at all and had been applied in different contexts throughout history and yet also in the 20th century.[20] However, circa in the 1960s the idea was (re-)discovered and promoted by a group of academics and housing experts. Most influential was the work of the British architect John F. C. Turner[21] who had made experiences with Peruvian communities that had successfully improved their housing conditions through self-help and mutual support over time. Derived from his experience in Peru Turner "[...] concluded that urban squatters in the developing world are the best judge of their own needs, and are better able than anyone else (including governments) to address them" (Harris 2003, 248). He thus stressed the ability of poor communities to self-build and argued that self-help housing would be more flexible, more affordable, would satisfy individual needs and allowed for the expression of human creativity. Moreover, economic opportunities would be created during the construction phase. But self-help housing or "second-best housing" as Njoh (1999, 184) terms it, in the sense of Turner not only and not necessarily meant the contribution of sweat equity in the construction process. It primarily implicated greater control in decision-making in design and in the construction process in general. Turner thus suggested "[...] that the ideal we should strive for is a model which conceives housing as an activity in which the users [...] are the principal actors. This is not to say that every family should build its own house [...] but rather that households should be free to choose their own housing, to build or direct its construction if they wish, and to use and manage it in their own ways" (1972, 154). It has to be noted, however, that to be effective

19 This is to be seen in contrast to spontaneous self-help housing, which is a strategy informal dwellers would follow when the access to formal housing markets is restricted for them and when there is no state-assistance.
20 See, for example, Harris (2003) and Pugh (2001).
21 Another influential work was Charles Abrams' book *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* that was published in 1964.

incremental self-help housing also requires constant employment and economic growth, as well as basic services and secure tenure arrangements for which external support is needed. While in his earlier works, Turner emphasised individual self-building and the need for an extensive level of autonomy from the state, he later stressed the arguments of self-management, community organisation and the supporting role of the government. He identified restricted and specified tasks for the government: "Turner argued for reducing the government's role to ensuring security of tenure for land and housing, applying lower official standards, and providing access to financial and appropriate technological support" (Jenkins et al. 2007, 159). Turner also emphasised the progressive character of housing provision and argued that adequate housing is nothing that could be achieved within timely restricted one-off projects but rather over time. His accentuation of phrases such as 'housing as a verb' became well-known and contributed to a change in perceptions of slums and informal settlements ('slums of hope'[22]). They soon were considered as being a first step in a natural urban and socio-economic development process, indeed a solution rather than a problem. The principle of 'aided self-help' therefore became the central aspect of an internationally promoted housing approach towards these types of settlements (Harris 2003, 248; Jenkins et al. 2007, 158–161; Lohnert 2002, 53–54; Pugh 2001, 402; Steinbrink/Schneider 2001, 70–72; Turner 1972 and 1986; cf. UN-Habitat 2003a). Hence, informal or 'slum' dwellers were now to be supported with materials, technical advice and tenure security in so-called 'site and service' and '*in situ* upgrading' projects.

2.3.4 Aided Self-Help: Site and service and *in situ* Upgrading

The forms such projects can adopt may differ to a great extent and there may be variations in financing, infrastructure and service provision, tenureship etc. (Fiori/Ramirez 1992, 25). Still, three general types can be distinguished within the 'twin-approach' of site and service and upgrading:

a) projects that provide rights to occupy or a full property title for a serviced site on which a house can be self-built out of self-acquired or supplied materials;

b) projects that provide in addition to this a core house component that may need to be completed and can be extended; and

22 See footnote 17.

c) *projects in which existing settlements are formalised and upgraded with technical infrastructure, in which services are provided, plots demarcated and tenure arrangements made. In cases where not all informal dwellers can be accommodated within one project and relocations are inevitable, combinations of in situ upgrading and site and service components are possible (cf. Lohnert 2002, 57; Njoh 1999, 186–187).*

In the early 1970s the World Bank was about to become the main sponsor of these types of projects. The World Bank entered the housing sector in 1972 under the presidency of Robert McNamara, but not before basic key principles for its engagement had been set. Cost recovery as well as affordability and replicability of projects became central to this institution's policies (Pugh 2001, 2004; World Bank 1993). The ideas of Turner seemed compatible with this and hence were incorporated into World Bank housing strategies:

> *"The Bank's finances depended upon creditworthiness in raising funds from international capital markets and from the allocations provided by the leading developed countries for low-interest lending to the very poorest countries. Accordingly, the Bank relied upon loan repayment and building up its reputation for effectiveness and efficiency in its loan assistance programmes. All of this steered the Bank towards the assisted self-help theories of John F. C. Turner, especially because they were more economical and appropriate than formal sector public housing." (Pugh 2001, 404)*

However, while the self-help concept became the mainstream and Turner was credited as one of its main inventors, his ideas were quite distorted in the process. Especially his key principle of greater dweller control over the construction process was widely neglected.[23] One reason for this might be the implicit consequences of the need for changes in power structures in favour of the poor (i. e. empowerment) and thus reduced control of authorities over the settlement development process. Furthermore, responsibilities and costs for housing were transferred from the state onto the poor and cost recovery, economic efficiency and individualism instead of collective action were promoted as this fitted into the World Bank's neoliberal framework (cf. Huchzermeyer 2004, 30 and 34; Jenkins et al. 2007, 163).

23 Turner himself, while longing "to shake off the 'self-help housing' label" (Turner 1992, XI) became a critic of the way that site and service and upgrading were put into practice. With regard to this Harris speaks of a 'double irony' of Turner's reputation: "The first is that the aspect of his argument that was most original, namely his emphasis on dwelling control, is the one that was least influential. This aspect has only rarely been discussed by those who have written about housing policy in the developing world, and it has not been embodied to any significant degree in the recommendations and policies of international agencies. The second, and related, irony is that Turner is credited with bringing into being site-and-service projects of which he himself was, from the very beginning, quite sceptical." (2003, 263)

Aided self-help housing and associated site and service and upgrading projects were in general (and still are) criticised for a number of failures of which a few important shall be named here. First and foremost, such projects never satisfied the massive demand for housing (Burgess 1992, 83; Jenkins et al. 2007, 163). Also, the way housing developments in housing projects were financed – through mortgage financing – seemed problematic for the users as "[...] mortgage financing, demanding the use of the property as collateral, undermines the single most powerful motive for low-income investment – security of tenure" (Turner 1986, 15). In addition, the associated costs of formalisation processes, such as fees, taxes or service charges resulted in higher costs (and risks) that proved too expensive for the low-income target groups. Hence projects that were based on this finance system in many cases were down-raided by higher income groups. This was additionally fuelled by the transfer of ownership titles to beneficiaries, through which properties and houses became attractive and subject to speculation on commodity markets (Burgess 1992; Lohnert 2002, 61; Turner 1986, 15). Moreover, due to cost recovery concerns, the very poor were often not eligible and thus excluded from site and service projects, while *in situ* upgrading projects in existing settlements were easier to access. Nonetheless, it was generally difficult to achieve the goal of cost recovery. And also, if they even were achieved in self-help projects overall cost savings proved to be negligible (cf. Pugh 2001, 405; Jenkins et al. 2007, 166).

Neo-Marxists, the main critics of the self-help idea, criticised the concept not only for the incorporation into the capitalist system but among other things also for its cost-recovery concerns and the reduction of standards within projects. Moreover, as the costs for the reproduction of labour were, by the means of self-help, transferred to the subsistence sector, the poor would become subject to 'double exploitation' by the capitalist system. Another point of criticism was the argument that the self-help idea would not acknowledge the need for broader social change to overcome poverty, thereby de-politicising the matter, and accordingly, could not lead to a permanent improvement of living conditions. Finally, it would be questionable if governments, that were thought to support the poor with technical assistance and materials, would actually be willing or able to do so. The Neo-Marxist critique, however, never offered any alternative solutions to the housing problems in 'developing countries' and the debate slowly died away at the end of the 1980s (cf. Burgess 1992; Fiori/Ramirez 1992, 25–26; Jenkins et al. 2007, 164–165; Lohnert 2002, 60–62; Steinbrink/Schneider 2001, 88–90).

Nevertheless, despite the criticism, it has to be mentioned that some projects were quite successful, although, due to their project-linked conception, only on a small geographical scale. And, still today "[...] aided self-help remains the dominant paradigm, as it has been since the mid 1970s" (UN-Habitat 2003a, 125).

2.3.5 Policy Adjustments, Newer Concepts and Agendas

In the early 1980s economic and debt crises as well as the rise of neoliberal thinking led to the application of Structural Adjustment Programmes – with all its consequences – and again to adjustments of the development paradigm. This also influenced the housing discourse in which the prevailing site and service and upgrading projects were criticised due to their limited success. The World Bank's focus now shifted towards increasing efficiency and efficacy of housing finance, amongst other things: "As with other economic management issues in this paradigm, structural reforms were seen as necessary in housing finance markets, to deal with 'excessive' regulation and subsidised interest rates" (Jenkins et al. 2007, 168). This, as a component of a general adjustment of the macro-economic strategy, was seen as finally contributing to an increase of total housing supply. The World Bank adjusted its policies from the early 1980s onwards, withdrew from direct involvement in housing projects and shifted its lending policies towards supporting housing policy reforms and the development of new or the revision of existing finance systems to fund housing development. Direct financing of housing investments thus became a central aspect to interventions within the housing sector. Additionally, due to growing awareness of occurring disasters in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere, relief efforts became another field of intervention, including shelter assistance and measures to reduce housing vulnerabilities. The funding of site and service and upgrading schemes instead declined sharply and in cases where it was funded the focus was on comprehensive urban development programmes rather than on single projects (Buckley/Kalarickal 2006, 10 and 15–16; Jenkins et al. 2007, 168; Lohnert 2002, 58; Pugh 2001, 409–410; Steinbrink/Schneider 2001, 106). The composition of World Bank shelter lending thus experienced considerable changes (Figure 2) and became increasingly diversified during the 1980s and 1990s. With regard to international policy development Pugh (2001, 406) summarises:

> *"The 1983–98 period was characterised by progressive innovation and reform, in terms of both strategic policy development in international housing and urban policy and in the operational design and implementation of programmes. In housing this meant change from pre-identified projects towards a more comprehensive understanding, represented in whole sector housing development. Approaches to residential infrastructure and in situ slum upgrading also experienced broader conceptualisation and operation in this period."*

Whole sector housing development meant a new focus on property rights in terms of subsequent regularisation of informal settlements, institutional and regulatory reforms, and increasing cooperation of the state and the private, voluntary and

popular sectors – however, with a more important role of the private sector and at the same time a withdrawal of the state. Whole sector housing development also was an important step towards a holistic support approach in housing interventions as the goal was to combine economic and social ends (Jenkins et al. 2007, 168–169; Pugh 2001, 407):

> *"The idea of whole sector housing development has been conceived for instrumental and remedial purposes. It is meant to be systemic and effectively so in advancing economic growth and social development. The several constituent parts including land policy, housing finance, the expansion of infrastructure services, self-help, urban governance, pro-poor orientations and housing delivery are expected to be both effective in their own terms and in their systemic relationship to each other." (Pugh 2001, 411)*

The whole sector housing development approach was also highlighted by a World Bank strategy paper of 1993, named *Housing – Enabling markets to work*. Enablement became a key concept within the whole sector housing discourse and was itself underpinned by growing concerns about (urban) poverty in the late 1980s. In the World Bank's sense it meant pro-poor policies and continued lending to the poor in terms of limited and targeted subsidies such as one-off capital grants which, for example, were applied in site and service housing projects in Chile and South Africa (cf. Smit 2006b).



Figure 2: Composition of World Bank shelter lending 1972–1986 and 1987–2005

Source: Own design, based on Buckley/Kalarickal (2006, 17)

The poor thus still had to be supported with mortgage loans, property rights, and residential infrastructure provision, though, this time within a wider programmatic framework. Moreover the altered approach implicated the creation of adequate institutional arrangements (e. g. legislation with regard to land transfers and town planning) to foster private sector as well as community and individual entrepreneurship. However, it has to be noted that while the initial definition of 'enablement' by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme in 1986 had,

in a similar vein as John F. C. Turner, emphasised the role of the community as the key actor (in terms of self-management, self-help, participation etc.), which led to a focus on community participation in the 1980s (cf. Abbott 2002b), the World Bank's bias was predominately on macro-economic concerns and structural adjustment. In this sense the poor were first and foremost seen as private producers and consumers of (housing) products. However, there were hindrances to this new approach, including partly resistance of governments to adopt enabling strategies, weak government institutions and the lack of appropriate skills and capacity to effectively manage the housing sector market (cf. Huchzermeyer 2004, 48; Jenkins et al. 2007, 168–172; Pugh 2001, 407 and 410; World Bank 1993). Moreover, the general effects of structural adjustment, as already indicated, had considerable negative effects for the poor. Population growth and urbanisation also continued to constrain efforts.

To draw conclusions from this it has to be stated that both, state provision as well as market-oriented provision of housing, face considerable limitations and have not yet achieved notable success in scale with regard to solving the housing crises in the 'Global South'. Aided self-help as well as non-aided self-help thus seem to remain important approaches (and often the only available options) which have – in the fitting circumstances – the potential of empowering the poor and creating chances for their future socio-economic upliftment (cf. Jenkins et al. 2007, 173; Mathey 1992, 1–2).

Newer concepts and agendas have emerged from the international development discourse since the early 1990s. At that time the focus slowly shifted from programmatic approaches in housing development to the search of best practices "[...] as a means to accumulate and disseminate experience" (Jenkins et al. 2007, 179). In contrast to previous expert-orientated approaches it was now assumed that experts were not able to suggest 'optimal solutions' to housing problems which in the past often had made situations even worse. Instead practical approaches were now sought, focussing on what actually worked in a specific local context. Deriving from this no ultimate solutions but 'tools' were to be identified that could be used in other local contexts as well. A key aspect of this was the increasing participation and cooperation of local authorities, NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) and the private sector in development processes and also the acknowledgement of local experience, knowledge, methods and resources. Development now should also take place within public-private partnerships (Tranberg Hansen/Vaa 2004; Turner 1996, 339–340).

This came along with the embracing of tenure security and notions of good governance, sustainability and once again poverty alleviation and enablement, which are issues that have been promoted in a range of international campaigns

and conferences throughout the 1990s. Among them[24] are the *UN Conference on Environment and Development* in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which resulted in the adoption of the *Agenda 21*[25] and the *Habitat II* conference in Istanbul in 1996, which resulted in the adoption of the *Istanbul Declaration* and the *Habitat Agenda*.[26] "This series of conferences paved the way for an attempt to form a broad co-ordinated alliance between governments and other partners in development around specific goals as the world entered the new millennium" (Jenkins et al. 2007, 180). At the turn of the millennium the world summit in 2000 where the *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs) were adopted received specific attention (Jenkins et al. 2007, 178–180). The Millennium Development Goals, partitioned in eight goals and several sub-targets, are also related to housing and human settlements. Goal 7 Target 11 of the MDGs directly concerns the living conditions of 'slum' dwellers as it "commits governments significantly to improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020" (UN-Habitat 2010, 49). As will be shown later on, the here mentioned agendas and concepts also found their way into South African housing policy.

2.3.6 Excursus: Insights from International Housing Practice

As pointed out, international housing policies and shelter lending through international institutions such as the World Bank have undergone important changes over time, but not only due to limited success or criticism. They also had to be adapted to ever changing circumstances such as growing poverty, economic crises, and heterogeneous development of lending countries and to the emergence of new development concepts and agendas.

Altogether the World Bank, as the biggest shelter lending agency, has financed some 278 housing-related projects or programmes between 1972 and 2005 with a total amount of US$14.3 billion or around US$51 million spent on average (Buckley/Kalarickal 2006, 11–13). However, as mentioned above, direct involvement of the World Bank in site and service and/or upgrading projects has declined considerably over the years. Nevertheless, the general idea of self-help and its practical implementation within site and service and upgrading projects and programmes remains a constant feature of international housing practice.

24 In addition Jenkins et al. (2007, 179) list the following: *the Global Strategy for Shelter for the Year 2000* (adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1988), the 1990 *World Summit for Children in New York, the 1993World Conference on Human Rights* in Vienna, the 1994 *International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and the 1995 World Summit for Social Development* in Copenhagen.

25 The *Agenda 21* addresses global challenges, such as poverty, hunger, health problems, illiteracy, and the deterioration of ecosystems and inter alia promotes the integration of developmental and environmental concerns (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2009).

26 These documents promote concepts, ideas and policy goals such as 'adequate shelter' for all, 'sustainable human settlements' and cooperation of public, private and civil society actors (UN-Habitat 2003b and 2006).

In situ upgrading will be in focus in the following. To gain a better understanding of the way such projects work and what their challenges, benefits and limitations are, a few broad insights of two upgrading programmes are given. The examples comprehend the *Orangi Pilot Project* (OPP) in Karachi, Pakistan (since 1980) and the more recent *Community Infrastructure Upgrading Programme* (CIUP) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (since 2004). These programmes moreover shed light on general key aspects of informal settlement intervention.

Before discussing the examples, it has to be noted that *in situ* upgrading can mean different things and can focus on different aspects of informal settlements that are to be upgraded. Broadly speaking, two types of *in situ* upgrading approaches can be distinguished: Comprehensive upgrading that is externally designed and support-based upgrading that is initiated either by a government or by an NGO. Externally designed, project-linked upgrading tends to focus on technical upgrading within a relatively short timeframe (in a formal project cycle) and concentrates on shelter and infrastructure provision as well as tenure. Rollover upgrades, whereby existing settlements are gradually replaced are an example of this type of upgrading. This can also include temporary relocations of the beneficiary community to make way for the new development. Early World Bank projects can be placed in this broad category. Support-based or non-conventional upgrading instead, which is mainly emphasised by NGOs, embraces 'development from below' and strongly depends on extensive community participation. It can provide interim services and initial upgrading measures (e. g. provision of toilets) or it can entail a complete upgrade of the settlement using alternative tenure options and providing service levels that might deviate from the norm (cf. Abbott 2002a, 307–308; Huchzermeyer 2004; Misselhorn 2008, 11).

The *Orangi Pilot Project* in the 15 million metropolis of Karachi, Pakistan, was initiated by a local NGO under the directorship of Akhtar Hameed Khan in 1980. The project area Orangi back then was the largest informal settlement in Karachi and according to estimates was home to about 800,000 squatters in 1989. While there was not an immediate shelter problem, the area primarily lacked proper sewerage and rainwater channels which, due to affordability concerns, could not be provided by the government. Isolated unaided self-help efforts of local residents to improve the situation had also failed as there was neither technical advice and government support nor communal organisation. These circumstances led to sanitation and then health problems and to the occurrence of diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea and typhoid fever. Looking for viable solutions to this crisis, "Khan [...] envisaged an alternative strategy for development. Its main thrust has been on "development from below". In this method, the creation of effective local organisations and dissemination of technical skills among local people has been the key [...]" (Hasan/Vaidya 1986, 226). This way it was presumed that the

costs of infrastructure improvements could be reduced to a level affordable by the poor who were supposed to self-finance the improvements. What was needed was on the one hand technical support and guidance, and on the other hand people who were motivated to establish local organisations and participate in them. To reduce mistrust among the people – which at first were sceptical of the proposed collective efforts – it was suggested that the people create small clearly arranged 'lane' units of 20 to 30 households. Within these units they could discuss the need for infrastructural improvement, and could organise themselves and plan small projects on a voluntary basis (Environment and Urbanization 1995, 228; Hasan/Vaidya 1986, 226–227 and 230; Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute 2010):

> *"The process of planning and implementation of a sanitation system in a typical lane is as follows. First, the social motivators of OPP convince the residents of the lane regarding the importance of sanitation in their lane. Then the heads of lane households get together, discuss the problems of sanitation and the need to rectify it. When they all agree and are willing to contribute their share of the cost, they form an organisation and elect, select or nominate a lane manager who then makes a formal application to the OPP office for technical assistance. The OPP sends its technical team which surveys the lane and prepares the design and cost estimates. Then the residents collect funds and give the money to the lane manager. The manager buys the material and organises the work. Full accounts of expenses are maintained and a copy is submitted to the OPP office. Sociological problems arising from this procedure are overcome by the lane organisation itself and technical problems are referred to the OPP." (Hasan/Vaidya 1986, 227)*

This way of organising infrastructure provision or improvement reduced the costs of the sanitation system to about a quarter of the original costs compared to when implemented by the government. This was because the design of manholes and septic tanks had been improved and the costs of contracting professionals such as engineers had been reduced. The overall outcome was positive. The involved residents of the OPP not only benefited from the improved infrastructure but also improved their managerial and technical skills and, through their cooperation with different stakeholders, also their political bargaining power. It also needs to be underlined that the leading NGO was not directly involved in the construction, which was organised by the people themselves. Instead the OPP was responsible for guidance, assistance and research (in the sense of identifying what works and what does not work) in order to allow for project extension. And indeed, the original OPP has extended considerably by now, not only in geographical scale and but also in its programmatic bias. Partnerships have been established with government institutions as well as with partner NGOs in other cities in Pakistan

to which the OPP has been extended. It now also includes other initiatives such as support for women, family planning, education, micro-lending to support home-based enterprises, and low-cost housing. Furthermore, formalisation processes of properties are under way in order to secure tenure. By now 35 % of the houses have already received a land title while the rest is still being processed (Hasan/Vaidya 1986, 227; Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute 2010).

A second example is the government-initiated *Community Infrastructure Upgrading Programme* in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (since 2004), which is part of a comprehensive *Local Government Support Project*. The programme aims at upgrading technical infrastructure and includes 31 unplanned settlements in all three municipalities of Dar es Salaam that are being upgraded between 2005 and 2008 (phase I, 16 settlements) and since 2009 (phase II, 15 settlements). The project's focus is on community participation and strong cooperation between affected communities and local authorities. In each settlement Community Planning Teams have been established, which consist of elected members of the respective community. These teams play an important role in the planning and implementation process and in mediating between the inhabitants of the settlements and local authorities and external supporters, respectively (Government of Tanzania 2004).

The CIUP is being implemented in cooperation of the World Bank, all administrative levels of government in Dar es Salaam, inhabitants of the respective settlements, NGOs as well as private and state-led companies. The main goal is the improvement of living conditions in 31 informal settlements that suffered from a range of environmental and health problems before, which resulted from seasonal flooding, improper sanitation facilities, the lack of refuse collection and the like. Another important goal is capacity building among inhabitants and local authorities to enable them to carry out future infrastructure upgrading self-dependently. The main principle is intensive participation of local communities in the planning, implementation, monitoring and maintenance phases of each project. Possible upgrading measures, depending on decision-making by the inhabitants, include the building or improvement of trunk roads, footpaths, sewers, streetlights, sanitation facilities and the setting up of waste containers. The principle of participation also concerns the funding of the 31 projects: the World Bank finances 90 % of the costs, local authorities cover 5 % and the respective inhabitants contribute another 5 % of the costs.[27] The beneficiaries also take part in the maintenance of the newly built infrastructure, e. g. cleaning sewers, roads and footpaths. It is thought that this participation not only creates a sense of project ownership among the inhabitants of the settlements but also leads to increased motivation to cooperate with different stakeholders, which in turn

27 Each home-owner initially contributed about 30,000 Tanzanian Shilling (now about US$20).

would increase the sustainability of the project. Another important aspect of the programme is the regularisation of tenure rights (Dar es Salaam City Council 2005, 2008; Government of Tanzania 2004). The projects, however, do not include self-help components in terms of self-building or direct participation in other construction works.

Despite remaining problems, the overall results of the CIUP seem quite positive so far. In the project settlement Uzuri[28], for example, which in 2004 had a population of around 15,000, several key infrastructures have been built: 2.05 km of gravel road, 1.22 km of footpaths, 3.34 km of sewers, four waste containers and a number of streetlights. Moreover, state-led companies ensured the construction of several drinking-water kiosks (Dar es Salaam City Council 2008, 3 and 7–8). These technical improvements already had wide-ranging social as well as economic effects: Because of better access to transportation through extended roads and footpaths, there is a better access to social infrastructures such as medical services and education facilities. Furthermore, the extended roads help petty traders and small-shop owners within the settlement to better organise their product supply, while their customers have better access to their stores. In addition, the extended network of drains prevents flooding of the settlement which reduces risks of malaria and cholera outbreaks, as rain water does not get contaminated with faeces and there is no standing water that could serve as breeding ground for mosquitoes. Material losses are also reduced because of this. Moreover the formalisation of property rights leads to secure tenure and potentially to investments in existing housing stock. As land prices have been rising since the infrastructure has been upgraded, house owners are now supposed to have better access to loans in order to invest in businesses or house constructions and extensions.

On the other hand increases in property values lead to an increase of rents that could in turn lead to exclusion of poorer tenants. Due to financial constraints it also remains to be seen if the municipalities can ensure regular maintenance of the infrastructure. What is more, despite the setting up of four waste containers, waste removal has not been properly organised yet, while (informal) dump stations have already reached their maximum capacity. Waste is therefore still dumped in creeks and on roadsides. Another negative aspect is related to waste water treatment. The municipality has installed a couple of public toilets, using septic tanks to store the effluents and once in a while these tanks are emptied by municipal disposal trucks. However, homeowners often cannot afford to commission a company to empty their private tanks and many thus tend to built new sanitation facilities instead, leaving the waste water of older facilities in the ground. It remains to be seen if the communities that were part of the CIUP

28 This section is partly based on the results of a household survey (n=100) which the author conducted in the Uzuri settlement after project implementation in June and July 2009 as well as on personal conversations with city officials who were involved in the CIUP.

and the local authorities can find solutions to these remaining problems and if they can manage to secure maintenance in the long-run. After all, the CIUP is not a one-off solution, but instead part of a dynamic development process that requires constant monitoring and further communal upgrading activities in order to improve living conditions permanently.

The brief discussions of these two examples have indicated some key issues and general complexities of upgrading projects and programmes, respectively. Many more could be identified by looking deeper at these and by considering other successful and less successful examples. Nonetheless, deriving from this, it can be stated that besides addressing physical problems, other aspects need to be taken into account as well when intervening in informal settlements: Sustainable funding for the initial installation of infrastructure and later for maintenance as well as affordability for the poor are required to secure cost-recovery and long-term functioning of the infrastructure. Security of tenure is important as it not only reduces risks for the residents but can also stimulate investments in houses or businesses and thereby have positive effects on socio-economic development. This, however, also requires access to loans, e. g. through micro-lending, to finance such investments. At the same time solutions need to be found to prevent displacements of the poor through extensive downward-raiding of improved and formalised settlements that become attractive to higher income groups and hence experience increases in property prices and rents. Furthermore, it must be added that upgrading efforts might also entail relocations of some residents, especially in high-density settlements, as new infrastructure needs additional space.

Projects that are based on an extensive level of community participation seem to be most successful. This not only benefits the project itself but also the long-term development of the community in terms of capacity building, improvement of technical and social skills and socio-economic development. The participatory approach can, however, also create problems and conflicts among the project stakeholders, as for example current (political) power-relations might need to change – within the settlement as well as regarding relations to public authorities. This will be taken up again at a later stage when presenting the results of the case study and discussing and comparing it with other examples in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

3 URBAN HOUSING IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA – CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES

This chapter explores the broader context of informal settlement intervention in South Africa to create a basis for the presentation and discussion of the case study in Cape Town. Therefore, general urban housing challenges are debated and set into the historic and socio-political context before housing policies and programmes of the post-apartheid era are discussed.

3.1 Urban Housing Challenges

Housing challenges and strategic approaches to housing provision in South Africa are to a certain degree equivalent to international experiences that were discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the South African housing discourse is also conditioned by the specific national context and by the long-term effects of the apartheid era. It is the aim of this chapter to discuss urban housing challenges in light of this specific socio-historical background and identify its influence on the South African housing discourse. Furthermore, the challenges of migration and population growth and their implication for existing housing backlogs are discussed. This provides the basis for the discussion of national approaches to solve the urban housing crisis in Chapter 3.2.

3.1.1 Socio-Spatial Exclusion and the Legacy of Apartheid

The aim of the apartheid regime (1948–1994) was to separate 'white' and 'non-white' South Africans spatially and to secure 'white' domination in political terms and with regard to economic and social development. The regime complemented and extended existing racial legislation of the pre-war era and added a wide range of new laws in order to support these goals. The *Group Areas Act* and the *Population Registration Act* were two key instruments to achieve complete separation. While in accordance with the *Population Registration Act* the entire population was classified according to race and ethnicity, the *Group Areas Act* was used to establish residential segregation in urban areas according to the previously identified racial classes ('grand apartheid'). In cities that were mainly classified as 'white areas', 'black'/'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' South Africans[29] were only allowed in demarcated areas and all residential segments were divided by expanded buffer zones such as highways or railway lines (Figure 3). "Even future growth was to occur outwards from each segment, thereby preserving the pattern" (Simon 1992, 37).

Furthermore, 'black' South Africans were actually deprived of their South African citizenships and had to reside in specific reserves – sarcastically termed *Bantustans* (meaning 'homelands') by the apartheid regime – according to the race/ethnic group they had been assigned to. They were allowed in urban areas only when their labour power was needed and when they had a proof of employment. To

29 The author acknowledges that by using these terms he will contribute to reproduce their language usage. It is neither assumed that they should be used to categorise social groups, nor is their usage endorsed by any accepted social theory. As a consequence of the socio-political and historic context of South Africa where these terms have a specific meaning and implication and where they are still common in everyday language usage it is, however, unavoidable to use these constructs when referring to the various social groups within this work.

prevent 'unwanted' migration of 'black' people to the cities influx controls were put in place.[30] For the purpose of accommodating the 'black' labour force, workers' hostels and 'black' townships – with inferior housing and infrastructure – were established by the municipalities in the outskirts of the South African cities or in other locations that often proved inconvenient in terms of distances to employment sources. The establishing of separate residential areas also meant 'slum clearance', forced evictions and dispossessions of 'non-white' property owners and led to the relocation of about 600,000 people within urban areas in South Africa. Moreover, in order to fully separate the society and keep interracial contacts to a minimum, separate social facilities were established ('petty apartheid'). The consequence of all of this was not only spatial exclusion but, as social and economic development of 'non-whites' was in fact actively restricted, also socio-economic exclusion and poverty of the vast majority of the South African population (cf. Adebayo 2010; Guelke 2005; Louw 2004).

Although much has been done to reverse the negative outcomes of decades of apartheid-ruling, the spatial if not the socio-economic structure of the 'apartheid city' remains a constant feature of South African cities. Mixed residential areas are rare and settlements can still be identified as being predominantly 'black', 'coloured', 'Indian' or 'white'. On the one hand this can be seen as socio-political consequence of separate development under apartheid. On the other hand this is due to the limited availability of and the difficult access to land in urban areas for the economically disadvantaged that have to resort to existing (peripheral) townships or informal settlements in their search for affordable shelter. This illustrates the limited success of the land reforms since 1994 that were aimed at compensating the previously dispossessed, granting 'black' South Africans access to land and increasing tenure security (Ley 2009, 25). Case studies such as that of 'Ethembalethu', where a local 'black' community has been struggling for years to acquire land in a peri-urban area near Johannesburg to establish a mixed-use settlement facing strong political opposition make clear how difficult land acquisition for low-income groups actually is (cf. Berrisford et al. 2008). In urban areas the situation might be even worse as the general competition for scarce land increases prices and renders it unaffordable for the poor (Landman/Napier 2010, 304).

More problems arise when it comes to low-income housing projects. For social reasons and as a consequence of market interests, in fact mixed residential developments or low-income housing projects in more affluent areas frequently face strong political opposition by so-called 'ratepayer associations'. The fear of decreasing property values and an increase in crime as alleged consequences of the presence

30 Influx control was enabled by the introduction of pass laws (cf. Guelke 2005). These laws compelled every person to carry an ID book that contained information about which race or ethnic group he/she had been assigned to.

of poorer residents seems to legitimise xenophobic attitudes. 'Not-in-my-backyard' (NIMBY) is thus a frequent reaction to the attempt of mixing different racial and social classes. These concerns of the urban elite prove to have a strong influence on politicians and urban developers and often seem to be more prioritised than the socio-political goal of overcoming the legacy of apartheid. The prospect of a reduced tax rate by the settling of poorer residents within certain areas might also be a reason for partial resistance of municipalities to such integrated projects. Besides, the aim of securing (global) competitiveness (between cities) by securing land for economic investments is another example of the strong competition for land in South African cities, which has an influence on the availability of and the accessibility to land by the poor (cf. ADEBAYO 2010, 5; HUCHZERMEYER 2009; LEMANSKI 2006; SMITH 2011, Interview). Low-income housing projects are thus often realised in the urban periphery or in less attractive locations, thereby perpetuating apartheid-like residential segregation (cf. 3.2.2).



Figure 3: Apartheid city model

Source: SIMON (1992, 38), based on DAVIES (1981)

3.1.2 Migration, Population Growth and Housing Backlogs

The competition for land is also fuelled by natural population growth as well as rural-to-urban migration that have led to an overall population growth in South African cities. These dynamics and a lack of housing opportunities for the poor, inherited from the apartheid era, have moreover contributed to a massive housing backlog altogether.

Extensive migration to the cities only became possible because of the repeal of the influx control of the apartheid era in 1986[31], which allowed for the realisation of the right to free movement. However, even when influx control was still in existence it could never fully discontinue migration to the cities. In fact, due to deteriorating living conditions in the economically disadvantaged 'homelands' and due to ongoing urbanisation processes, migration to the cities was indirectly encouraged. The 'illegal' migrants then found shelter in informal settlements, while measures of the apartheid regime since the 1970s to lessen housing pressures in urban areas[32], such as providing public housing and implementing site and service projects, were too limited in scale and hence not effective (cf. ADEBAYO 2010, 2–3).

Cape Town, which had an estimated total population of about 3.7 million in 2010, is one of the main recipient metropolitan areas for migrants, especially receiving poorer work-seeking migrants from the Eastern Cape. It is estimated that in 2007 a share of 19.4 % of the total population of Cape Town had been born in the Eastern Cape. Overall Cape Town received an inflow of more than 190,000 people between October 2001 and February 2007. The local authorities are thus under pressure to provide infrastructure, services and housing opportunities of which there is already a massive backlog. Statistics make this clear: In 2011, according to the municipal housing database, a total of about 385,000 households were waiting for a housing opportunity. In addition to this it is estimated that another 185,000 households have not yet registered their names, although they have the same need (CITY OF CAPE TOWN 2011a, 25; SMALL 2008, 10 and 12).

Overall population pressure in South Africa, however, might be on the decline in recent years: Both natural population growth as well as annual migration streams have decreased. With reference to a total national population of about 50.6 million, the annual growth rate has declined slowly but continuously from 1.33 % in 2001–2002 to 1.1 % in 2010–2011, which is considerably lower than the average in Sub-Saharan Africa[33] (see 2.1.1). The natural population growth is complemented by migration inflows or outflows, respectively. Looking at estimates of migration patterns, it has to be noted that only two of the nine provinces, namely Gauteng

31 This is the year of the abolishment of the pass laws (see footnote 30).

32 This was presumably a reaction to the growing political resistance and the anti-apartheid struggle.

33 The comparably low growth rate might partially be explained with the high number of annual AIDS related deaths, ranging from about 216,000 to 356,000 between 2001 and 2011, which make up between 40.5 % and 52.5 % of the total annual number of deaths (STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA 2011, 7).

and Western Cape, received a considerable net inflow of migrants between 2006 and 2011 while other provinces experienced negligibly low inflows or even net outflows of migrants. Inflows of migrants have even diminished in Gauteng and the Western Cape Province: While they experienced a net migration of about 440,000 and 150,000 between 2001 and 2006, the numbers declined to about 367,000 and 96,000 in between 2006 and 2011, according to recent estimates (Statistics South Africa 2011, 3, 7 and 12–13).

It has also to be stated that, in line with the results of the national *Community Survey 2007*, the *percentage* of informally housed people has actually decreased in the Western Cape Province from 16.2 % in 2001 to 14.2 % in 2007, which meets the level of the overall proportion of informally housed people in South Africa, which declined from 16.4 % in 2001 to 14.5 % in 2007 (Statistics South Africa 2007, 10).[34] However, it is estimated that in Cape Town alone, the prime population agglomeration in the Western Cape, more than 291,000 households are accommodated informally in an estimated number of 223 informal settlements or in backyards of public and formal private housing stock[35] (City of Cape Town 2011a, 26 and 94). Existing housing backlogs and the need for more affordable housing opportunities can thus not be disregarded. The continuing inflow of migrants and the natural population growth, although rates are in general on the decline, puts additional pressure on public authorities to more effectively deal with urbanisation and common housing needs. As will be shown in the next chapter, population pressures and the lack of appropriate housing opportunities are not the only challenges within the housing context in South Africa, though. Instead, government approaches to solve problems of housing shortages prove to have various limitations, produce their own obstacles and in part even exacerbate existing problems.

34 It is not clear if these figures are correct. Huchzermeyer (2010, 134–135), for example, doubts that it is possible to make any suggestions about the growth or decline of informal settlements in South Africa on the basis of the surveys that underlie them (Census 1996 and 2001, *Community Survey 2007*). This is due to the fact that these surveys would be limited by several flaws, such as the partial unavailability of data and terminological confusions, e. g. regarding the use of the term 'informal dwellings', which can be found not only in informal settlements but also in backyards and *Temporary Relocation Areas* (TRAs), i. e. transit camps.

35 In 2009 the City of Cape Town estimated the number of households in informal settlements alone to be approximately 150,000 (City of Cape Town 2009, 14).

3.2 National Housing Policies, Programmes and Politics

After having identified basic challenges within the national housing discourse, key housing policies and programmes of the post-apartheid era are explicated within this chapter. Moreover, the emergence of a debate about *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements, which is principally a new approach in the South African context, as well as constraints to its implementation are discussed.

3.2.1 A Review of National Housing Policy Development

Not only the equitable access to land but also the access to adequate housing, as a constitutional right, became one of the central socio-political issues of the post-apartheid era. Since 1994 several legislative documents, policies and programmes have therefore been put in place, of which the most central are briefly introduced at this point.

The *Housing White Paper* (HWP) of 1994 was the first post-apartheid policy document that in the following served as a framework for the formulation of subsequent national housing policies and strategies. It formulated a national housing vision as well as a national housing goal. The vision entailed "the establishment of viable, socially and economically integrated communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, educational and social amenities" (Department of Housing 1994, 4.2). Furthermore, the vision included access to basic services, such as potable water and domestic electricity supply, access to a permanent building structure that protects against the elements and security of tenure for all South Africans. In addressing security of tenure and also in envisaging specific stakeholder roles and cooperative governance structures in housing provision, the HWP comprised international policy notions of 'good governance' and security of tenure (see 2.3.5). The document also acknowledged the need for employment creation and economic growth to realise its housing vision. Moreover, it formulated a national housing goal of building one million houses within a five-year period from 1994 onwards (cf. Adebayo 2011, 3–4; Department of Housing 1994, 4.2–4.3 and 5.2). These issues were later inter alia addressed by means of the *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) of 1994 (see 3.2.2).

The *Housing Act* of 1997 legislated the provisions made in the *Housing White Paper* and as supreme law replaced previous housing legislation. It also entails

key principles of housing development, such as socio-economic and spatial integration, stakeholder participation as well as 'good governance' and it defines roles and functions of the different tiers of government (national, provincial and local) within the housing development process: Among other things they must prioritise the needs of the poor and their housing needs, ensure that the development of housing is affordable and sustainable in economic, fiscal and social terms, and promote the establishment of viable communities in terms of safety, health and socio-economic development. This also includes the prevention and reduction of 'slums' and 'slum'-like conditions (Ley 2009, 29–30; Republic of South Africa 1997, 2.1).

In accordance with the *Housing Act* the national minister for housing is obliged to publish a *National Housing Code*. This code sets principles, norms and standards for the various national housing programmes[36] and provides guidelines concerning "(i) the effective implementation and application of national housing policy; [and] (ii) any other matter that is reasonably incidental to national housing policy" (Republic of South Africa 1997, 4.1–6). The code is legally binding for provincial and local governments and the national housing ministry is obliged to keep the code updated in cases of policy changes. In this regard, a new version of the National Housing Code was published in 2009, which replaced the earlier version. The code now contains the *Comprehensive Plan for Sustainable Human Settlement*, also referred to as 'Breaking New Ground' (BNG) (see 3.2.3), which itself is a revision of the national housing programme of 1994 (Department of Human Settlements 2009a, 9–10; Republic of South Africa 1997, 4.1–6).

South African housing policy is also linked to international housing policy documents, such as the *Millennium Development Goals* of 2000, the *Habitat Agenda* of 1996 and the *Istanbul Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements* of 1996. Its focus on addressing people's need for adequate housing and the increasing focus on informal settlement upgrading, for which a new planning instrument has been created, is in line with these international policies and policy goals (Department of Human Settlements 2009, 8). Within the National Housing Code the new instrument is referred to as the *Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme* (UISP) (see 3.2.4).

36 The national housing programmes include amongst others: The *Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme* (see 3.2.4), the *Gap Housing Programme* that caters for families which earn between 3,500 and 10,000 Rand per month, the *People's Housing Programme* (PHP) that supports households that choose to self-organise and/or self-build their homes, the *Social Housing Programme* that provides rental housing opportunities for households that earn between 3,000 and 7,000 Rand per month, the *Community Residential Units Programme* (CRU) which provides rental housing opportunities (including hostels) for households that earn less than 3,500 Rand per month, and BNG housing (quasi site and service) that provides single family units (City of Cape Town 2009, 25).

3.2.2 The Reconstruction and Development Programme

The *Reconstruction and Development Programme* was developed as a broader policy framework for socio-economic development. Its aim was to overcome the challenges that resulted from South Africa's socio-political history and to ensure democratisation, social transformation and the creation of "a sustainable and environmentally friendly growth and development path" (Republic of South Africa 1994, 7). The objective of housing development was also incorporated into this wider programmatic framework, while at the same time it envisioned a strong role for the local government (cf. Ley 2009, 36–37). Moreover, the programme focused on meeting basic needs of the population, which resembled international strategic approaches:

> *The RDP "[...] committed government to meeting the basic needs of all South Africans. Housing and services such as water and sanitation, land, jobs and others were counted as basic needs. The RDP also included the commitment to the restructuring of local government with a view to meeting these needs. The ANC recognised the key role of local government in delivering services and promoting economic development [...]." (Pillay 2008, 115)*

Housing provision and the goal of mass-delivering one million houses within a five-year-period was provided for by the adoption of a capital subsidy scheme as advocated in the HWP (Department of Housing 1994). This was meant to especially enable the poorest households, which usually would have lacked the financial means, to access adequate housing. The subsidy scheme provided non-repayable one-off capital grants according to certain qualification criteria. Eligible for a full subsidy were those households that met the following preconditions: having dependents, being South African resident, having a monthly income of less than 3,500 Rand and never having owned a house before. The programme's main focus was on large-scale housing developments on 'greenfield' sites which could be accessed through project-linked subsidies. Later additional subsidy mechanisms were introduced such as institutional subsidies for rental housing construction or for self-building within the *People's Housing Process*.[37] However, no direct provisions were made for *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements (Huchzermeyer 2004, 3; Rust 2006, 6–7).

Within the large-scale housing projects the subsidy scheme provided a fixed package of a serviced site, a freehold title and a starter house of 30 m^2 that could be incrementally upgraded or expanded (Adebayo 2011, 8; Ley 2009, 30). The approach thus entailed (aided) self-help components and in principal followed

37 See footnote 36 (*People's Housing Programme*).

the internationally accepted 'support paradigm' – although with a focus on the delivery of houses:

> *"[...] the [post-apartheid housing] policy's reliance on the use of capital subsidy to provide basic services, a site and starter dwelling, and it's [sic!] pledge of continuing support to beneficiary households to incrementally improve such dwellings, characterises it as being rooted in the supporter paradigm, and embracing of incremental housing ideals." (*Adebayo *2011, 7)*

Incremental self-building approaches had, although on a limited scale, already been used by the previous colonial and also by the apartheid governments. For example, an early site and service scheme, addressing housing needs of 10,000 people in Soweto/Johannesburg, was experimented with in the post-war years and other self-building initiatives followed in the decades to come. In the 1980s core housing projects were initiated, e. g. in the township of Khayelitsha in Cape Town. Based on these experiences another pilot scheme was initiated during the political transformation phase in 1991 by the *Independent Development Trust*, which provided 100,000 serviced sites for incremental self-building and was based on a capital subsidy scheme. These experimentations strongly influenced the approach that was then adopted in the post-apartheid era (Adebayo 2010, 2–3 and 2011, 5).

Incremental development and housing consolidation was and still is seen as a vital step towards creating household assets and improving the socio-economic standing of the household. According to this view housing as asset could be used to gain access to mortgage lending[38] in order to invest in business opportunities, to further improve and consolidate houses or to reach the 'next step on the housing ladder' by accessing an even better housing opportunity and selling the 'starter house' on a secondary housing market in RDP project areas (Adebayo 2011; Cross 2008). This was in line with the social and economic development goals that were incorporated into the HWP and the RDP.

Although the mass-delivery of subsidised houses was significant in quantitative terms, with 20 % of the overall population living in subsidised housing in 2008 (Cross 2008, 3), this housing approach and its supporting capital subsidy scheme possessed various problems and limitations. First and foremost it has been accused of perpetuating socio-spatial structures of the apartheid era as the subsidies were not sufficient to acquire well-located and hence more expensive land in urban areas. To ensure that quantitative delivery targets would be met, projects were implemented on cheap peripheral land and thus at the expense of 'qualitative' aspects such as access to transportation and availability of job opportunities which

38 In fact, many banks were (and still are) reluctant to lend to low-income households in project areas, which is a severe constraint to the 'housing as asset'- principle (cf. Adebayo 2011).

then had negative implications for household incomes. ROYSTON, for example, criticises the lack of integration of these projects into the wider urban development: "To a very large extent, housing projects are being carried out in isolation. They are not resulting in integrated developments, which include the provision of a range of necessary public facilities and amenities" (2003, 243). The general difficulty to acquire well-located land and to allow for integrated development can be attributed to a number of constraints. To name but a few it can be stated that, in addition to the cost factor, it resulted from a failure of public authorities to press forward the identification of land for possible housing projects, which inter alia resulted from a lack of databases that inform about land availability. Another reason for peripheral developments is that housing developers usually favoured large 'greenfield' sites, which were to be found in the urban periphery, as this facilitated the delivery of standardised housing products and therefore helped to save costs. Furthermore, NIMBY concerns put pressure on local authorities not to pursue low-income housing projects in well-located areas (ADEBAYO 2011, 8; ROYSTON 2003).

The impossibility of acquiring enough well-located land can also partly be explained by a failure to provide sufficient funding. While the HWP set the goal of making 5 % of total government expenditure available for housing, the actual and projected expenditures lay in most cases only between 1.2 % and 1.9 % in the financial years of 1995/1996 to 2010/2011. In spite of the massive quantitative delivery outcomes that were nevertheless achieved, it has to be recorded that massive housing backlogs still persist. For example, it is estimated that in 2004 between 17 % and 28 % of households in South Africa's major cities lived in informal settlements, while the total number of households in informal settlements was estimated to be over 1.5 million in 2008 (DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING 1994, 4.3; MISSELHORN 2008, 14 and 18; SMIT 2003, 169).

Finally, also on the beneficiary household level, challenges and contradictions occurred (and still occur). The impact of unfavourable locations in social and economic terms has already been mentioned. However, also the housing packages that beneficiaries received and the responsibilities that came with it were often not appropriate for the individual household situation for many reasons. Inter alia, formal housing and individual homeownership implicated the payment of rates and service charges that often proved to be unaffordable to many households, who at the same time were faced with higher transportation costs and limited economic opportunities in the periphery. Another reason is that in many cases individual homeownership was not necessarily the aim of especially those beneficiaries who came as migrant workers to the cities (particularly to Cape Town) and had the intention of returning permanently to their places of origin after an indefinite period of 'circulating' between their rural homes and the urban areas, i. e. 'circular migration' (cf. WICKRAMASEKARA 2011). They had thus no incentives to accept the higher costs that came with it or to invest in their

new homes.[39] These reasons led to the fact that many beneficiaries tended to sell their subsidised houses and moved back to informal settlements or backyards instead.[40] Moreover, there were also proofs of inadequacy of the design, size and quality of the so-called RDP houses which for example restricted house extension or home-based enterprises. These and many other problems led to the question whether this type of housing delivery was appropriate with regard to the actual needs of the target group (Adebayo 2010, 2011; City of Cape Town 2011, 94; Cousins et al. 2005; Olivier 2011, Interview; Smith 2011, Interview). As these limitations of the RDP approach became increasingly clear in the new millennium, the national housing policy was revised. This resulted in the formulation of *A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements*, also referred to as 'Breaking New Ground' (BNG).

3.2.3 A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements

In reaction to the problems and limitations of the housing approach of the first post-apartheid decade and in consideration of the various challenges urban areas were facing (unemployment and other social problems, population growth, housing backlogs etc.), the new BNG plan sets a number of policy goals.[41] As shown in Figure 4 these concern the fast-tracking of housing delivery and its combination with social, economic and employment objectives. Moreover, BNG pursues improvements in the functioning of the property market to prevent exclusion of low-income and low middle-income groups. These policy goals are set to realise "[...] the vision of the Department of Housing, to promote the achievement of a non-racial, integrated society through the development of sustainable human settlements and quality housing" (Department of Housing 2004, 7). BNG also emphasises the role of housing in supporting spatial restructuring and the need to integrate informal settlements by means of upgrading (Department of Housing 2004; Rust 2006, 10–11). Regarding this latter aspect, the policy document states that:

39 The study of Steinbrink (2009), for example, indicates that these migrant workers tend to transfer shares of their income to their places of origin to support their families and relatives instead of investing it in the urban areas.
40 This does still happen under the revised housing policy of 2004 as the underlying causes of this process have not been addressed (see below).
41 Of great influence was also the so-called 'Grootboom case'. In 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of Mrs. Grootboom, an informal dweller in the Wallacedene informal settlement in Cape Town, who challenged the (former) Tygerberg Municipality to comply with its responsibilities of securing adequate shelter for all. The court ruling obliged municipalities to extent their housing programmes in terms of providing temporary shelter and services for those who live in intolerable conditions, e. g. in informal settlements. This court ruling resulted from the realisation that formal housing delivery alone would not help to provide adequate shelter for all (Graham 2006, 231; Huchzermeyer 2003, 81).

> *"There is [...] a need [to] acknowledge the existence of informal settlements and recognize that the existing housing programme will not secure the upgrading of informal settlements. There is also a need to shift the official policy response to informal settlements from one of conflict or neglect, to one of integration and co-operation, leading to the stabilization and integration of these areas into the broader urban fabric. The new human settlements plan adopts a phased in-situ upgrading approach to informal settlements, in line with international best practice." (Department of Housing 2004, 12)*

'Breaking New Ground' envisages a number of instruments and institutional changes in order to realise its objectives. Amongst other things, municipalities are conceded a more important role through "overall responsibility for housing programmes in their areas of jurisdiction, [and] through a greater devolution of responsibility and resources [...]" (Department of Housing 2004, 21). In addition, BNG calls for greater coordination and cooperation between national, provincial and local government institutions to achieve greater efficiency and efficacy in housing delivery. BNG also encourages the private sector to engage in the subsidised housing market. This is a reaction to "the withdrawal of large construction groups from the state-assisted housing sector due to low profit margins [...] [which] has left capacity gaps in construction, project management, financial management and subsidy administration" (Department of Housing 2004, 5). BNG furthermore addresses the problems of land access, land acquisition and funding constraints. It calls for the transfer of land, owned by state and parastatal institutions, to municipalities at no costs, a new strategy to acquire privately-owned land, and a new funding mechanism to finance land acquisition (Department of Housing 2004; Pithouse 2009, 9).[42] Moreover, due to increases of the subsidy quantum and the separation of funding for land acquisition, there is now more funding available for the actual house construction and thus to improve the quality of subsidised houses. The new BNG houses are therefore bigger (40 m^2), have two instead of one bedroom, have better finishes and are more flexible in design opportunities. However, as this minimises the need for immediate improvements and extensions, it might be contrary to the principle of self-help incremental housing consolidation and might decrease incentives for individual household investments[43] (cf. Adebayo 2011, 11–12; Department of Housing 2004).

42 This is supported by the Housing Development Agency that was founded in 2009 and according to its website is "a public development agency whose mission is fast-tracking the acquisition and release of state, private and communally owned land for human settlement developments" (Housing Development Agency 2011).

43 Within the new approach Adebayo (2011) even identifies a turn towards a state-led delivery model of complete housing units, instead of keeping the focus on self-help housing consolidation by households as was the case in RDP projects.

OBJECTIVES OF 'BREAKING NEW GROUND' (BNG)

* *Accelerate the delivery of housing as a key strategy for poverty alleviation*
* *Utilise the provision of housing as a major job creation strategy*
* *Ensure that property can be accessed by all as an asset for wealth creation and empowerment*
* *Leverage growth in the economy*
* *Combat crime, promote social cohesion and improve quality of life for the poor*
* *Support the functioning of the entire single residential property market to reduce duality within the sector, by breaking the barriers between the first economy residential property boom and the second economy slump*
* *Utilise housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable human settlements, in support of spatial restructuring*

Figure 4: Objectives of 'Breaking New Ground' (BNG)
Source: Own design, based on Department of Human Settlements (2004, 7)

In addition to already existing instruments, BNG also makes new tools for housing development available in order to "[...] provide flexible solutions to demand-side needs. The new instruments focus attention on sectors which have been previously neglected. These instruments place greater emphasis on flexibility and responsiveness to local circumstances [...]" (Department of Housing 2004, 16). This implicates not only a strengthening of the rental housing programme but, as highlighted above, also a new approach to deal with informal settlements (Department of Housing 2004).

3.2.4 The Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme

The *Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme* (UISP) is the designated instrument to finance and facilitate this new policy approach with regard to informal settlement intervention. Its key objectives are firstly, to secure tenure rights of residents in informal settlements, secondly, to promote secure and healthy settlement environments by the means of infrastructure provision, and thirdly, to empower communities, promote economic and social integration as well as social capital building within participative (planning) processes (Department of Human Settlements 2009b, 13). The programme has several underlying principles of which a few essential ones are highlighted in the following. Among others, it strives for a holistic development approach:

> *"[It has] [...] an area and/or community wide focus, fostering holistic development of the settlement with minimum disruption of existing fragile*

> *community networks and support structures. To the greatest extent possible, settlements should be upgraded in a holistic, integrated and locally-appropriate manner. Engagement between community members and their local authorities is of the utmost importance to ensure locally appropriate solutions [...].” (Department of Human Settlements 2009b, 13)*

The UISP is in principle applicable to all informal settlements, provided that the land is publicly owned or can be acquired through negotiation with private owners or through expropriation (!) where necessary and appropriate. It is also a requirement that the particular settlement is located in an area of an approved *Integrated Development Plan* (IDP)[44] and that the land on which the settlement is located is suitable for permanent occupation. If not, funding is available to rehabilitate the land, where appropriate, through measures such as storm water intervention and steep slope engineering. These measures not only reduce vulnerability but also contribute indirectly to the preservation of existing socio-economic structures and poverty reduction as they minimise the need for relocations. However, in cases where rehabilitation is not possible, (partly) relocations might be indispensable, but then only as a last resort, which also necessitates the approval of the residential community. Moreover, the UISP applies to the respective relocation area. The programme is generally quite flexible in terms of plot sizes, tenure options and housing solutions as well as in terms of national norms and standards, which do not apply to the programme. Funding is available for interim and permanent engineering services, while social and economic facilities are funded through the *National Housing Programme: Social and Economic Amenities*. This again helps to address physical and social vulnerability as well as poverty concerns. Furthermore, the UISP follows a cooperative governance structure, not only entailing extensive community involvement and thereby contributing to social inclusion, but also entailing cooperation between all three tiers of government from the national to the local level (Department of Human Settlements 2009b, 13–15, 37 and 51; Huchzermeyer 2006, 49–57). In addition to this, the formalisation of the land and the arrangement of tenure, for which a range of options exists, increase household security and might foster socio-economic development and financial investment in the settlement:

> *The UISP “[...] supports in-situ replacement of such settlements in desirable locations with medium density social housing. Where such desirable locations already integrate the poor spatially and economically, the benefits of in-situ upgrading would evolve around their being so integrated legally.*

44 The IDP is a municipal planning instrument, “guiding the [...] ongoing planning, management and development actions.” (City of Cape Town 2011, 12) In Cape Town, for example, it addresses eight specific strategic fields: economic development, infrastructure and services, energy, transportation, human settlements, safety and security, health and social development, good governance and regulatory reform (cf. City of Cape Town 2011).

Their secure tenure would then allow them to invest in housing improvement, access credit, realise their asset value of their housing and move up the housing ladder." (Adebayo 2010, 10)

According to its determination of criteria for settlements that qualify for the programme, the UISP especially focuses on those informal settlements that face multiple threats and challenges. These comprehend:

1. *Illegality and informality with regard to land occupation and settlement layout;*

2. *Adverse locations in the (urban) periphery or on unsuitable land;*

3. *Restricted investment of the public sector as regards engineering services and social and economic facilities;*

4. *Poverty and vulnerability in terms of education status, risk of diseases, and access to formal jobs; and*

5. *Social stress, e. g. as a result of crime and exploitation. (Department of Human Settlements 2009b, 26)*

Once an informal settlement is targeted for *in situ* upgrading in terms of the UISP, all residents qualify for the first three phases of the programme, while the fourth phase is covered and financed by other national housing programmes. Here each household has to meet certain criteria to qualify for subsidies. The four phases of the UISP (Figure 5) comprehend the application phase (municipalities apply to their respective provincial government for funding), the initiation phase (inter alia pre-planning studies, compilation of socio-economic and demographic profile, installation of interim services), the implementation phase (amongst other things initiation of planning process, installation of social and economic facilities and permanent engineering services and formalisation of land rights) and the consolidation phase (notably house construction) (Department of Human Settlements 2009b, 43f.).

However flexible and appropriate the UISP is in its approach concerning its practical implementation, social inclusion, poverty and vulnerability reduction and empowerment of people, it has to be noted that it also has several limitations. In Cape Town, for example, most informal settlements are located on unsuitable land, are very densely populated and/or are situated on land that is reserved for non-residential uses such as dump stations or road reserves. This requires substantial funding to rehabilitate the site and/or to acquire new or additional land to allow for relocations if these are unavoidable. This is, however, limited by the

scarcity of land which also restricts the establishing of proclaimed townships, a programme requirement, as this implicates that enough land must be available to formalise the area and provide each person or household with a plot and a serviced site (Adlard 2011; Johnson 2011, Interview).

There are also no provisions for long-term support of upgraded settlements as the programme is conceptualised in phases within one-off projects. The policy document only states that long-term maintenance is the responsibility of the respective municipality. Moreover, the programme does not address other types of informal housing such as backyards within formal settlements, in which a growing number of people in South Africa resides (Department of Human Settlements 2009b, 16 and 19–20; Huchzermeyer 2006, 48; South African Institute of Race Relations 2008, cited in Huchzermeyer 2010, 135).

UISP PROJECT PHASES

Phase I: Application

* *Municipalities apply for funding to the provincial government; this requires the submission of interim business plans, which should include details of the IDP and the Housing Development Plan as well as pre-feasibility studies of the project*
* *Member of Executive Council may approve the project*

Phase II: Initiation (8–12 months

Municipalities receive funding to …

* *acquire land where required*
* *undertake a socio-economic and demographic profile*
* *install interim engineering services (water, sanitation)*
* *conduct pre-planning studies to determine detailed geotechnical conditions and to undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment to support planning processes*

Phase III: Project Implementation

Municipalities submit the final business plan and, if approved, receive funding to …

* *establish project management capacity*
* *establish Housing Support Services*
* *initiate planning processes*
* *formalise land occupational rights and resolute land disputes*
* *assist with relocation if necessary*
* *rehabilitate land*
* *install permanent engineering infrastructure*
* *construct social amenities, economic and community facilities*

Phase IV: Consolidation
After completion of the phases I-III commencement of ...
* *final phase of township establishment finalisation*
* *ownership registration*
* *house construction, for which a variety of options is available (PHP, rental housing, individual ownership etc.)*

Figure 5: UISP project phases
Source: Own design, based on DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (2009b, 43–44)

One of the main points of criticism, however, is that the consolidation phase of the programme is linked to existing conventional housing programmes and thereby to the subsidy scheme for which not every household or individual qualifies. As UISP projects are generally understood as complete developments, including the fourth phase of the programme, a number of people are thus excluded[45] from the consolidation phase (cf. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2009b, 34 and 67–68; HUCHZERMEYER 2006, 55–56). It remains unclear how this can work out in practice as it implicates that new social housing must be integrated in existing settlement patterns, while a considerable number of people might have to remain in their 'shacks' (cf. DONOVAN 2011, Interview).

Finally, it has to be stated that there is little experience with the type of *in situ* upgrading that is laid out in the UISP. In cases where UISP has been applied, the programme has mostly been used to carry out conventional housing projects on 'greenfield' sites instead (JOHNSON 2011, Interview; SMITH 2011, Interview; MISSELHORN 2008, 16). The non-implementation of the UISP might be due to the above mentioned limitations that are partly inherent to the programme. Otherwise it might also be due to the political climate and the broader institutional framework to which the UISP has to adhere.

3.2.5 Constraints to the Implementation of *in situ* Upgrading in South Africa

Prior to the formulation of BNG *in situ* upgrading as an approach to informal settlements was ignored, because the delivery of new houses was perceived to be superior. Informal dwellers were thus relocated to new housing projects or to TRAs, i. e. transit camps. In the new millennium the outcome of the national policy revision promised an entirely new approach to informal settlements – at least according to policy documents. In actual practice, though, the new informal

45 For example child headed households and single persons without dependants. In addition previous owners of residential property might not necessarily qualify, while 'illegal' immigrants are not allowed individual ownership status (DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 2009b, 67–68).

settlement approach could never gain ground (cf. Huchzermeyer 2009). This might be due to a range of different factors as explained below. Noticeable is the notion of 'eradicating' *all* informal settlements by 2014[46], a goal the ruling ANC set in its *Vision 2014*. This rhetoric bears a resemblance to a 'direct approach' to informal settlements that focuses on repressive measures, control and symptom-fighting in the form of forced evictions and relocations, which stands in contrast to the 'indirect approach' of upgrading informal settlements and protecting livelihoods, as promoted in BNG (Huchzermeyer 2010, 129–133). The parallel existence of these two approaches illustrates "a contrast between housing policy and housing politics" (Huchzermeyer 2010, 130).

The 'direct approach' has, however, not only been adopted in public government rhetoric but has also found its way into provincial legislation. In various legislative and policy documents as well as government speeches there is the talk of 'slum clearance', 'slum eradication' or 'slum elimination'. For example, in reaction to a statement made by the Premier of the Gauteng Province with respect to the treatment of informal settlements, former housing minister Lindiwe Sisulu stated in her 2004/2005 budget speech that the Premier had just "fired the first salvo in our *war against shacks*. His bold assertion that informal settlements in his province will have been *eradicated* in ten years, is the best news I have ever heard in my tenure as Minister" (Sisulu 2004, emphases by the author). In 2006 the KwaZulu-Natal Province enacted the *Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Bill*, which on its website is referred to as the *Slum Clearance Act* (KwaZulu-Natal Department of Housing 2006). The Limpopo Province followed in 2011 with its *Prevention and Control of Informal Settlements Bill* in which it seeks to 'eliminate' informal settlements while the City of Johannesburg has adopted a 'zero tolerance' policy towards informal settlements (cf. Huchzermeyer 2009, 61; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2011). Although these documents claim to be in line with national legislation and policies, they have been criticised for, among other things, criminalising informal settlements, encouraging forced evictions which resemble apartheid strategies and policies[47], discouraging upgrading efforts and for violating the Constitution (Pithouse 2009; Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa 2011).

Although the main reasons for adopting this contradictory approach remain vague, it might partly be explained by a deliberate or unwitting misinterpretation of the MDG 7 Target 11 (to improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020) and its attached 'Cities without slums' campaign. As the total 'slum' population worldwide amounted to more than 900 million in 2000, the

46 In public documents it is also sometimes referred to as 'upgrading' all informal settlements (cf. Republic South Africa 2011, 295).

47 For example the *Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 1951*, which permitted "eviction, the mandating of municipalities and land owners to institute eviction proceedings, forced relocation to controlled transit camps, active control over informal settlement expansion and criminalization of land invasions" (Huchzermeyer 2010, 133).

year of the MDG formulation, the intention of MDG 7 could not have been to actually achieve 'slum-free' cities by 2020 but rather to improve living conditions of 'slum' dwellers. The ANC government nevertheless pushed forward the goal to eradicate *all* informal settlements/'slums' even by 2014. The choice of the year 2014, however, has to be understood as being a rather symbolic date, as it marks the end of the second decade of democratic rule and the end of the fourth ANC presidency in a row (Huchzermeyer 2010, 129 and 133–134).

Aside from this political campaigning there is also a range of other factors on a local level that might help finding explanations for the parallel adoption of a repressive approach towards informal settlements. The NIMBY symptom and problems of land availability and land access have already been mentioned. Institutional constraints and a lack of political will might be other factors. Misselhorn states that *in situ* upgrading is a difficult undertaking as it for example "[...] requires extensive and often challenging social engagement with local residents [...] is time consuming, typically taking between 7 and 12 years (or even longer) [...] [and] has become increasingly more complex [...] as a result of the ongoing densification of informal settlements, increasing scarcity of alternative land, and growing dissatisfaction and political conscientisation of the urban poor (more challenging social processes)" (2008, 10). This contributes to the frequent refusal of such projects by public authorities. However, there are more constraints to the implementation of *in situ* upgrading such as human resource constraints within the state (e. g. management skills, corruption, no motivation), general funding constraints, slow bureaucratic processes (e. g. project approvals), refusal to accept informal developments and low levels of interdepartmental cooperation of public authorities that is necessary to realise complex *in situ* upgrading (Misselhorn 2008, 19–31).

Concerning the lack of political will Huchzermeyer, for example, cites the case of the Durban-based *Abahlali baseMjondolo* movement, which actively opposes evictions of informal dwellers and promotes more responsive approaches to informal settlements and which therefore experienced strong political interference by the local ANC branch:

> *"[...] the local ANC unleashed violence to crush a grassroots social movement that successfully contested repressive legislation and negotiated for upgrading and improvement of the lives of its members across several informal settlements. The ANC has sought to replace Abahlali [...] with a party structure, even using Abahlali's offices and equipment to this end." (Huchzermeyer 2010, 130)*

It might be suspected that the growing strength of civil society organisations thus stand in the way of the top down approach the ANC, itself a civil society

movement in former times, has adopted in the post-apartheid era.[48] This is not an environment in which one can imagine participative *in situ* upgrading to work, which in fact needs strong grassroots/community organisations. For different reasons, city administrations currently rather apply conventional top down upgrading methods anyway:

> *"[...] cities such as Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni (the former East Rand), and Ethekwini (Durban), while professing to upgrade informal settlements in situ, do not apply the principles and funding mechanisms of the Informal Settlement Upgrading Programme. Instead, they deal with informal settlements in the conventional project-linked subsidy approach (based on subsidy eligibility of individual households), resulting in relocation or at best disruptive 'shack shifting' or rollover upgrading, mostly with the displacement of non-qualifiers of the housing subsidy. Thus city officials consciously or unwittingly act as servants of orderly development, global competitiveness and the market [...]." (Huchzermeyer 2009, 65)*

Conventional methods of housing delivery might also be favoured by local authorities as well as by politicians because related projects are much easier and faster to implement and quantitative results easier to achieve. This in turn adds to the abuse of the housing delivery system as a political instrument of securing power in the sense of 'a vote for a house' (Graham 2006; Smith 2011, Interview).

Nonetheless, the City of Cape Town seems to be in the process of adopting an indirect approach towards informal settlements, although this is again constrained by a range of local political and institutional impediments. It has formulated an own strategy towards indirect informal settlement intervention (see 4.2.2), is the first municipality in South Africa that has established an individual *Informal Settlement Department* and is actively working with local informal settlement communities through a network of civil society organisations (Bolnick 2010, 12; Byrne 2011, Interview). It has also piloted the UISP in form of an *in situ* upgrading project in the Hangberg informal settlement in Hout Bay. This seems to be an exception to the widespread non-implementation of the new upgrading approach, although the project's outcome is yet unclear considering the challenges it currently faces. This will be analysed in the following.

48 With regard to this Pithouse (2009, 7) states "[...] that after its unbanning in 1990 the African National Congress (ANC) moved swiftly to demobilise the popular organisations that had done vastly more to break the iron fist of apartheid than the ANC's fantasies of armed struggle. But it is also important to understand that the significant degree of autonomy that had been developed by popular organisations was lost completely as they were brought under the control of top down party structures. In the case of ANC aligned shack settlements each local organisation had to reconstitute itself as a 'Development Committee' affiliated to and under the control of the ANC aligned South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO)."

4 HOUSING IN CAPE TOWN – *IN SITU* UPGRADING OF THE HANGBERG INFORMAL SETTLEMENT IN HOUT BAY

In this chapter the Hangberg *in situ* upgrading project in Hout Bay/Cape Town is used as an occasion to analyse the difficulties of applying *in situ* upgrading in form of an indirect support-driven approach to informal settlements (i. e. prevention of social disruptions, protection of local livelihoods, active community participation in decision-making etc.). These difficulties have to be seen in the political context as described above. However, local complexities, administrative constraints as well as social and political conflicts also play a role in hampering its implementation.

4.1 Introducing the Case Study

Before beginning with the analysis of the upgrading project, reasons for the selection of Hangberg as a case study are briefly outlined. This is followed by the presentation of the detailed research questions that have been addressed by the empirical study, the presentation of the research methods that have been applied and by the presentation of the structure of the study.

4.1.1 Case Study Selection and Research Questions

To begin with, the main reasons for the adoption of the Hangberg project as a case study are outlined: Firstly, the Hangberg informal settlement is a pilot for the implementation of UISP in the Western Cape and one of the few settlements in Cape Town that have been deemed suitable for *in situ* upgrading under UISP. Secondly, there is little experience with the indirect approach of *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements in South Africa and more insights are needed on a local scale. Thirdly, the Hangberg community is relatively homogeneous and many residents have been living in the area for decades.[49] This leads to the assumption that there should be strong community-wide support for the project, which in turn should increase the chance for 'successful' implementation.

Finally, the project is interesting, as the suburb of Hout Bay is perceived to be a 'microcosm' of the South African society, reflecting its entire social challenges regarding socio-spatial segregation, socio-economic inequalities, racial tensions etc. Moreover, the Hangberg settlement is located on 'prime land' which in itself is valuable to a number of parties. Realising a low-income housing project on this land and in this challenging environment is a unique undertaking and might be a signal towards strengthening the standing of South Africa's poor and homeless.

The main aim of the case study is to analyse specific social, organisational and institutional constraints and other complications that may arise when applying the concept of *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements in the form of aided self-help in a complex local context. To achieve this objective and also to structure the case study, the main research questions have to be put in concrete terms. The

49 The term 'community' is here understood as referring to a territorial as well as a socio-organisational unit. 'Homogeneous' in this case refers to the community's broader demographic and socio-economic profile (although income variations occur), to its rootedness in the area and the livelihood challenges of its members. However, it does not exclude divergent interests of individuals or groups within the community.

subsequent presentation and analysis of the case study results shall therefore help to answer the following secondary questions:

» *What is the social and historic context of the Hangberg project and what are general challenges in the project area?*

» *How is the project organised and what are the roles of the project stakeholders?*

» *Who might benefit from the project in what way (and who might not)?*

» *What are administrative and organisational constraints to the project implementation?*

» *What kinds of social and political conflicts occur?*

» *What is done to solve these conflicts and what is the outcome?*

4.1.2 Research Methods

To answer the above listed questions qualitative research techniques have been applied in the empirical study[50] of the Hangberg informal settlement upgrading project: Firstly, as preparation for the actual field study, content analyses (cf. Atteslander 2008, 181) of project documents, news articles and visual resources (photos, video reports etc.) were undertaken. This served to gain first insights into the complex matter of the project. Informal conversations with community members, who were directly involved in the project, as well as informal conversations with city officials, who could put the project into the wider urban context, were carried out to complement this.

Secondly, a total of 18 expert talks were conducted with 16 dialogue partners. These included city officials, community members, NGO representatives and others who were directly involved in the project or were assumed to have expert knowledge about the project and/or its context (Appendix). These interviews therefore served to gain deeper insights and to obtain opinions and evaluations concerning the project from different angles – those of the community, of the local authority and of those actors mediating between them. The interviews were non-standardised, partly structured and contained open questions in order to enable the respondents to express their full thoughts and knowledge concerning the case. For each interview a separate interview outline was prepared accord-

50 The empirical study took place in the context of an internship the author completed with the Northern Region Housing Office/City of Cape Town between March and June 2011.

ing to the respective expert's type of involvement and/or assumed knowledge regarding the project. The interviews were recorded and then transliterated and categorised in order to establish a basis for the analysis (cf. ATTESLANDER 2008, 134f. and 196f). For reasons of confidentiality the names of the interview partners were later rendered anonymous.

Thirdly, the method of participant observation was applied (cf. KAWULICH 2005). With the help of local guides site inspections were undertaken to get to know the structure and other physical features of the settlement, such as building conditions and the level of existing infrastructure. In so doing, insights into the complex set of problems the community of Hangberg faces on a regular basis could be acquired. The visits also served to meet and establish contacts with inhabitants of the settlement, which offered the opportunity to arrange conversations and deepen the understanding of the complex social context. At a later stage, after a range of contacts had been established, the author attended group meetings and field visits of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum (see 4.6) as an "observing participant" (KAWULICH 2005 [21]). This gave the opportunity to not only learn more about the recent developments but also about existing social and organisational conflicts within the Hangberg community and within the mediation process itself.

4.1.3 Structure of the Case Study

Chapter 4.2 sets the upgrading project into the urban context by looking in more detail at challenges resulting from city and population growth and by looking at recent local government efforts to intervene in informal settlements in Cape Town. In Chapter 4.3 the local and settlement contexts are described, thereby giving an overview of the historic background, the settlement structure and the difficult livelihoods of its residents which led to the initiation of the UISP project in Hangberg. This is followed by a depiction of the project characteristics in Chapter 4.4 which looks at stakeholder roles, the organisation of land access and land management and the previous planning process. It also looks at initial achievements of the project before it was interrupted due to the occurrence of conflicts. Chapter 4.5 then analyses underlying challenges and causes of conflict, which relate to the socio-economic situation of the Hangberg residents, social insecurity, broader housing needs in Hangberg, internal community conflicts, conflicts with the local authorities, social and residential exclusion and administrative and other institutional constraints. It also discusses the recent escalation of conflict that has brought the project to a momentary halt and made the establishing of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum obligatory. Finally, the organisation and work of this forum and recent developments in Hangberg are explored in Chapter 4.6. The results of the case study are then discussed and compared with international experiences in Chapter 5.

4.2 The Urban Context: Cape Town

Ahead of discussing the actual case study the broader urban context needs to be explored. After having investigated the larger South African housing context and the challenges that derive from it, the specific situation in Cape Town is now looked at. In this sense general urbanisation and housing challenges are briefly examined before limitations of the local government's housing approach and present policy adaptations are considered. This is followed by a discussion of the informal settlement intervention approach the City of Cape Town (the 'City' hereafter) has recently adopted.

4.2.1 Urbanisation and Housing Challenges

Addressing the housing needs resulting from the challenges of urbanisation and migration is one of the priorities of the local government. Simultaneously, other urbanisation issues, which compete for financial and other resources such as urban land, are of utmost significance, too. They include, amongst other things, economic development and job creation, social development, global competitiveness, attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourism and the improvement and extension of transportation routes. At the same time, Cape Town's urban development takes place within an already challenging environment of infrastructure and public service backlogs, high unemployment rates, socio-economic underdevelopment in parts of the city, high HIV/AIDS infection rates, and continuing rural-to-urban migration etc. (City of Cape Town 2011).

Moreover, to make way for new developments, additional space is needed. The provision of housing for the approximately 400,000 households, which are currently in need of a housing opportunity, would require circa 10,000 hectares of suitable land (40 units per hectare on average) if one assumes the 'one family, one plot'- philosophy of the RDP period that is still being replicated under BNG. This is however limited by the topography (e. g. the Atlantic Ocean and surrounding mountains), difficulties of land acquisition, and also by statutory and administrative planning frameworks, such as the City's *Spatial Development Framework*[51] that inter alia aims at limiting urban sprawl. Further spatial growth is thus restricted and in turn contributes to higher land prices. In trying to address this situation the City has recently managed to acquire smaller and larger pockets of land within its jurisdiction (over 500 hectares) and also constantly engages with

51 The *Spatial Development Framework* embraces principles of urban planning, management and development, such as environmental conservation, efficient infrastructure provision and city growth, cross-sectoral planning, mixed land use etc. (cf. City of Cape Town 2011, 41).

other government institutions, for instance the Housing Development Agency and the provincial government, to acquire additional land. However, this does not seem sufficient in the long run and there might be no alternative to develop the periphery in the future and/or to create secondary towns if one assumes continuing urbanisation and population growth (City of Cape Town 2009, 16 and 27; City of Cape Town 2011, 95–96; Smith 2011, Interview). Regarding the land issue and low-income housing development, it is stated in the City of Cape Town's recent *Integrated Development Plan* that:

> *"The scarcity of suitable located and affordable vacant land for low-cost housing development, coupled with limited state funding, means that housing remains a huge challenge for the City. Currently, the City makes no provision for additional funding or space for the annual in-migration of 18,000 households [...]. The majority of these households are poor and rely on the state to provide them with subsidised housing opportunities and, as a consequence, most of these families end up having to find living space in already poor and overcrowded suburbs and townships." (City of Cape Town 2011, 94)*

The approximately 8,000 housing opportunities the City builds per annum thus do not satisfy demand by far, which implicates a growing housing backlog in the future (City of Cape Town 2011, 94; Smith 2011, Interview). The lack of infrastructure and service delivery is a related issue. Although the overall availability of public services (sanitation, electricity, access to water etc.) has clearly improved in recent years in Cape Town and the Western Cape and is much higher compared to the average service availability in South Africa, infrastructure in general and public services, especially in Cape Town's informal areas, have not yet reached sufficient levels. This has already led to frequent service delivery protests by disadvantaged communities (City of Cape Town 2011; Cross 2006; Statistics South Africa 2007).

As discussed in Chapter 3.2, the actual housing crisis can to some extent be attributed to the failures of national housing policy and the capital subsidy system. The partial inappropriateness of this system is, for example, underscored by the frequent and often immediate sale of subsidised houses, which in effect undermines intrinsic intentions of fostering long-term socio-economic development of the poor by creating assets. With regard to the Cape Town context a city official stated that:

> *"[...] under the BNG and the old RDP system people are receiving houses and shortly thereafter they are selling the houses, go back to live in an informal settlement or in a backyard and the problem just spills out of control. Now*

without being judgemental one can certainly understand if the person is unemployed there's no livelihood but he has a house which is an asset. There are unscrupulous people who would come and offer him some money and then buy the house from him. And you can't blame that person, because he has no money to survive. But it becomes part of the ongoing process." (DONOVAN 2011, Interview)[52]

Besides the people with a direct need and the intention to simply improve their housing situation, more people might thus be attracted to invade land, build up shacks and wait for an opportunity to receive a government house which can later be sold.[53] The fact that other people buy these subsidised houses, however, illustrates again the actual demand for low-income housing. This and the ongoing migration inflows create additional pressure on the housing sector, which might become a potential source of conflict, as more people compete for the local government's attention:

"I definitely foresee more conflict [...] people coming into Cape Town, they are not originally from Cape Town and they invade land and they become vulnerable to environmental and health hazards [...]. So we find as government we have to react and help those people who are most vulnerable whereas there are people who are originally from Cape Town, who have not broken any law, who have not invaded any land but they just get pushed further back in the queue because we can't help them, we got very limited resources [...]. We have already seen this xenophobic violence that we had here when people that have refugee status from other countries are also adding to the housing backlog and also adding to the burden in informal settlements [...]. So I see conflict but positive conflict that will cause us to do things differently." (SMITH 2011, Interview)

To deal with the housing dilemma, the City has taken a number of steps in recent years, partly as a response to the BNG plan. According to its IDP as well as its *Integrated Housing Plan*[54] the City has, for instance, formulated the goals of

52 Another city official explained the context as follows: "[...] you have a beneficiary that has received a housing opportunity from government that has never owned a housing opportunity before [...]. So he or she might not fully understand the responsibilities that comes along with owning a property. So they are easily pushed into giving up the house as soon as they are approached with some monetary compensation. They are eager to sell. Sometimes for 800 Rand, 1,000 Rand. They are eager to sell because they can either not maintain the house, they don't know how to maintain the house. They don't fully understand their rights. So they are easily convinced that they should sell their house, take the money and go back to the informal settlements. They are led to believe that if they go back to the informal settlement they get another house [...]. Or they are either bullied into selling their houses by drug lords or people with influential powers within the community, they are pushing out people or their houses get high-jacked fraudulently, they are forced to sign over" (OLIVIER 2011, Interview).

53 In the words of a city official: "[...] people are building more and more shacks with the hope of one day getting a house, a free house from government" (SMITH 2011, Interview).

54 This document depicts the City of Cape Town's housing vision and housing strategies for the period 2009/2010 to 2013/14 (cf. CITY OF CAPE TOWN 2009).

achieving higher densification and integration of human settlements. This is to make more efficient use of urban land on the one hand and to achieve a better balance of quantitative aspects (addressing the housing backlog) and qualitative aspects (e. g. providing social facilities) of housing development on the other hand. The City therefore has revised its housing programmes and, for example, has extended its focus to the creation of more rental housing opportunities[55], the redevelopment of workers-hostels and the creation of other formal housing opportunities (City of Cape Town 2009, 22 and 2011, 95–97).

The City has also taken a new approach to informal settlement intervention. As discussed in the following, this entails an emergency servicing strategy (now improvement strategy), partnerships with informal dweller associations and the piloting of the UISP.

4.2.2 Informal Settlements and *in situ* Upgrading

As already indicated, there is little experience with informal settlement *in situ* upgrading in Cape Town or in South Africa in general. More often than not upgrading was (and in part still is) understood as the replacement of informal settlements through the conventional delivery of housing units on 'greenfield' sites or through formalisation and 'rollover upgrades' of existing sites (cf. Huchzermeyer 2009; Misselhorn 2008). The continuing housing crisis made a different approach necessary, though, and other attempts to address informal settlement upgrading were undertaken from 2004 onwards.

In that year the then ANC-led local government adopted a strategy to service all informal settlements in Cape Town (Figure 6) in response to the progressing housing and service backlogs. Prior to this strategy the City had only reacted to immediate service needs or disasters such as shack fires by spontaneous support initiatives and the ad hoc delivery of services like drinking-water and sanitation. These initiatives were, however, not framed by a concrete policy instrument nor were they part of a comprehensive informal settlement approach. To the contrary, former attempts by city officials to formulate a programme for continuous support of informal settlements had even faced political opposition. However, as the political attitude towards informal settlement began to change over time, city officials were finally instructed to bring forward a comprehensive strategy for informal settlement intervention. With the *Emergency Servicing of Informal Settlements* (ESIS) project a first citywide informal settlement upgrading initiative was then launched in early 2004 (Graham 2006, 234–235).

55 With regard to rental housing in Cape Town one city official stated that "[…] not everyone […] wants to own a house. Some people are just here, wanting to get shelter and for three, five, ten years of their lives in Cape Town and from there move on, but they are here just to get some income generation going for themselves and then they can go somewhere else and retire or start a business. So those people are definitely ideal for rental" (Smith 2011, Interview).



Figure 6: Informal Settlements in Cape Town 2007 (map extract)

Source: City of Cape Town (2008a)

To summarise it, this project was to be undertaken in three succeeding phases and targeted all informal settlements within the metropolitan area. In the first phase these settlements were provided with access to potable water and basic sanitation facilities (container toilets) and in addition a weekly waste collection service was established. The project furthermore distinguished between settlements that were not suitable for permanent upgrading and those that were suitable, which then received slightly better services. The settlements suitable for permanent upgrading were also selected to receive full services in the second and third phase of the project. Tenure arrangements were also to be made within these later phases (Graham 2006, 234–235).

Despite some initial success, e. g. the *basic* servicing of 90 % of all informal settlements in Cape Town by mid-2004, the implementation of the ESIS faced several challenges that originated from (still existing) institutional and political constraints on the local level. They include a general lack of political support for support-driven approaches towards informal settlements, the neglect of a need for a long-term strategic approach to informal settlements, a lack of common understanding of what 'upgrading' should actually mean, and reluctance to allow for extensive community engagement as a precondition for informal settlement upgrading. Tensions between politicians and city officials about goals that were to be achieved by the upgrading measures and tensions between local authorities

and informal settlement communities about how to implemented them mark other constraints (cf. GRAHAM 2006).

Despite this, the general approach was retained in the following. Under the now Democratic Alliance (DA)-led local government (since 2006) the City follows, in addition to the experimentation with UISP, a strategy that connects to the former ESIS project:

> *"[...] our strategy here is an informal settlement improvement strategy [...] we upgrade where we can but there are very few opportunities to do this. And one of the things linked to that is that all the national programmes and the finance that goes with it are all about upgrading and its meaning that it's gotta produce a proclaimed township. So, that's really no help to us. So, we're having to use municipal funds to improve informal settlements in partnership with their residents. And to do that incrementally step by step. That's our strategy." (JOHNSON 2011, Interview)*

This *Informal Settlement Improvement Strategy* (ISIS) does not concentrate on the formalisation of informal settlements but rather on the improvement of living conditions. It aims to achieve this through the upgrading and/or provision of basic technical infrastructure and services as well as the arrangement of institutional support. The strategy therefore involves the establishment of support offices within informal settlements, the improvement of tenure security, service delivery and dwelling quality, the optimisation of land availability, the establishment of partnerships with informal settlement communities, coordinated implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Figure 7).

An example for a partnership between the City and civil society actors is the cooperation with the Informal Settlement Network (ISN), which is a support network of a number of informal settlement communities in Cape Town, and the NGOs Ikhayalami and the Community Organisation Resource Centre. These NGOs in collaboration with ISN try to restructure informal settlements by using a re-blocking method. In this way building structures within the settlement are shifted and rearranged, where necessary, in order to create new and additional spaces within the settlement. These serve to prevent the spread of shack fires, to increase security, to allow emergency vehicles to enter the settlements and to enable community activities in the open. Moreover, for the rebuilding of shacks better construction materials are provided in order to improve building quality and to provide better protection from the elements. Meanwhile, the City's role is to provide services and infrastructure according to the respective communities' needs and to arrange tenure solutions (BYRNE 2011, Interview; JOHNSON 2011, Interview).

The improvement strategy thus entails a comprehensive approach to informal settlement intervention in Cape Town under which most such settlements can be addressed. Alternatively, in cases where the establishment of permanent settlements (i. e. township proclamation) is possible, the UISP might be applied. However, to allow for this type of *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements, at least two further preconditions need to be met, which concern the characteristics of the land and those of the community:

> *"[...] another thing [...] which has more to do with the physical features, the terrain of the land: If it's got a good drainage capability, currently as it is, then yes, there is a good, strong motivation for us to do in situ. But if they are in a bit of a dip [...] and they've been there for a long time and every year there is flooding that happens, then it's in their best interest that we move them so that we can backfill and raise the level and shape it in such a way that the drainage can also assist them. So you have to bring all of those factors into play. The community socially must be ready for it, they must be deserving of it and number two: the physical features of the terrain must also be of such that they don't need a lot of engineering work." (Smith 2011, Interview)*

The readiness of a community to engage in a project is a critical point. It can be assumed that by far the most informal dwellers live in informal settlements because of actual need and a lack of alternative opportunities (cf. Smit 2006a, 117). And it can also be assumed that most of them thus would have the intention of finding a permanent housing solution, either through a conventional housing project or through an alternative approach such as upgrading. However, as mentioned earlier, many other informal settlement dwellers in Cape Town might not have the intention of permanent residence in their respective areas, e. g. because they are (circular) migrants and intend to return to their places of origin in the foreseeable future. These informal dwellers are presumably not interested in investing their resources into settlement development, nor might they have the time to engage in a complex and lengthy upgrading project that is based on extensive participation of the beneficiary community. Another hindrance might be the inability to take the responsibilities (e. g. maintenance, service charges) that come with ownership of the state-subsidised houses. In some other cases the unfortunate presence of local strongmen, drug lords, mafia groups etc. is another constraint, as these do not want the local government to upgrade and interfere in the settlement, which they are in control of. They might try to actively prevent such an intervention from happening or might even encourage new land invasions and the creation of new informal settlements as their criminal activities depend on the informal environment (Olivier 2011, Interview; Smith 2011, Interview).

MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE INFORMAL SETTLEMENT IMPROVEMENT STRATEGY (ISIS)

1. Establish permanent offices in informal settlements
The Directorate will deploy its Informal Settlement Management personnel in permanent premises within or adjacent to informal settlements, where space can also be made available for the local leadership to meet. These offices will become the physical hubs of communication and integration, which will lead to the creation of development partnerships [...].

2. Improve Security of Tenure
The revised consolidated land use regulations [...] include [...] zoning for informal settlements which not only provides a measure of legal recognition to such settlements but offers an appropriate and useful platform for the improvement of informal settlements and of their constituent dwellings [...] it is intended that occupational rights for individuals be not premised on township registration but be on a more simple locally-administered basis that recognises both the fluidity of resident populations and the need for physical flexibility in an incremental upgrading process.

3. Improve Service Delivery
The establishment of local offices enables improved monitoring of service levels and the operation of infrastructure, and provides the opportunity to facilitate improvements in both standards and community 'ownership' [...].

4. Optimise Land Availability
The extent to which dense informal settlements can be physically improved is substantially dependent upon the possibilities for relocating some residents elsewhere. This depends upon the availability of land which is not only suitable for that purpose but which does not further prejudice residents' livelihood prospects. A process to identify and release such land and then package it for development will be undertaken. Linked to this will be a process to maximise the possibilities of rehabilitating marginal land in informal settlements so that it can safely be dwelt upon.

5. Improve the Quality of Dwellings
As one of the most disadvantageous features of Cape Town's informal settlements is the universally poor quality of dwellings it is intended to promote and facilitate the application of increased investment and improved technologies to construction in informal settlements.

6. Establish Development Partnerships
[...] it is [...] intended to establish development partnerships that involve the City, the resident community and civil society agencies that are involved constructively in such settlement. As a first step the City will promote and facilitate improvements in inclusive and representative leadership of communities and thereafter facilitate the creation of partnerships that will engage in participative research and planning processes before embarking upon the design and implementation of projects and programmes.

7. Coordinate Implementation
Participative research and planning process are likely to produce a wide variety of improvement proposals. It is intended that their implementation will be organised and managed by coordination rather than by conventional individual project management, to ensure an holistic, integrated approach [...].

8. Monitoring and Evaluation
The process will be monitored, evaluated and appropriately modified in order to optimise the value of the City's investment and the effectiveness of the incremental improvement strategy."

Figure 7: Main elements of the City of Cape Town's Informal Settlement Improvement Strategy
Source: Own design, based on Adlard (2009).

Considering these and other complex aspects of social community characteristics and also the limited land suitability (and availability) for *in situ* upgrading in Cape Town, it can thus be stated that the UISP type of upgrading can only be applied to a limited number of informal settlements. It nevertheless poses an important option. For all other informal settlements the City's incremental improvement strategy might be a more viable solution. However, both approaches are compatible with the principles of indirect informal settlement intervention in terms of the 'support paradigm' as they aim at keeping relocations to a minimum and protecting existing social networks and livelihoods.

4.3 The Local Context: Hangberg in Hout Bay

After having outlined the broader urban context in which the Hangberg *in situ* upgrading project takes place and before proceeding to the analysis of the actual project, the local context is introduced. At first, the historic background and the establishment of the Hangberg informal settlement is briefly examined. This is followed by a discussion of the socio-economic situation and livelihood strategies of the Hangberg residents. It also has to be noted that the informal settlement is adjacent to a larger formal area. As there is a strong social relationship between the residents of the formal and informal areas, it is essential to analyse the upgrading project within this wider settlement context.

4.3.1 Historic Background and Informal Settlement Growth

Hangberg is a long-established residential area that is located in the South-Western suburb of Hout Bay, an idyllic (former) fishing village with an approximate population of between 25,000 and 35,000[56] (Monaco 2008, 126), which is flanked by mountains to the East, North and West and by the Atlantic Ocean to the South. Hangberg, also known as the 'Harbour Area' because of its proximity to the local harbour, is a 'coloured' low-income settlement that is made up of former workers hostels, row houses, flats (rental housing), private single houses and an informal area on the slopes of the Sentinel Mountain above the formal part of Hangberg. Informal structures, however, also exist in the formal area of Hangberg in the form of front- or backyards or other non-registered single family houses. In the Northwest, Hangberg is neighboured by a racially mixed middle-income settlement ('whites' and 'coloureds'), known as Hout Bay Heights. Hout Bay in general is highly segregated with regard to race, ethnicity and socio-economic standing. People in 'the valley' are mainly middle- and high-income earners, while the residents of Hangberg are mainly low-income earners. On the slopes of the mountains to the East exists another low-income settlement, known as Imizamo Yetu, where mainly 'black' people reside. This area, too, consists of a formalised area and a larger informal settlement and the people have been settling there since the early 1990s.[57] Despite its segregation, Hout Bay's socio-spatial composition seems unique: "In this racially divided city, it is unusual to have the three different communities of blacks, whites and coloureds, with their three vastly

56 Population estimates for Hout Bay generally vary to a great extent.
57 Own field notes April 2011; informal conversation with a Hangberg resident on 10th May 2011.

different standards of living, in such close quarters to each other, in one area" (Suter 2011).

During the apartheid era this was unthinkable. In the late 1950s when the *Group Areas Act* was put in practice, Hout Bay was in actual fact proclaimed a 'white residential area'. Due to the *Coloured Labour Preference Policy* that was pursued in the Western Cape, there was however one exception. Hangberg was set aside for 'coloured' people to accommodate 'cheap labour' that was mainly needed in the local fishing-industry. The 'coloured' people already residing in other areas of Hout Bay were hence evicted and relocated to the harbour area, while some were moved out of Hout Bay (Kapembe et al. 2007, cited in Ackelman/Andersson 2008, 29; Monaco 2008, 66; Soeker/Bhana 2011, 8; Tefre 2010, 155; Van Dyk 2011, Interview).

Due to the need for additional labour power and caused by natural population growth, the demand for accommodation quickly rose up and housing problems emerged over the years. To address the growing demand, new workers hostels were built in the 1970s to accommodate the fishers and their families.[58] These were later followed by 'council flats' that were built by the local authority in the 1980s. These efforts were, however, not sufficient as continuous household growth and new household formations kept the housing demand high, which soon resulted in overcrowded living conditions. In reaction to this, Hangberg residents began to build up additional structures on the vacant land above the original settlement area with the approval of the then City Council. The local authority provided the informal dwellers with permissions to occupy the mountain slope, but under the condition that only non-permanent structures were built, using light materials such as wood and corrugated metal (cf. Rubin/Royston 2008).

These (unaided) self-help efforts started with the building of only a few 'shacks' or 'bungalows', as they are locally known. However, due to the failure of the local government to develop a strategic long-term approach for housing development in the area (cf. Soeker/Bhana 2011) the settlement has been growing over the years and currently approximately 1,200 people of Hangberg's total population of circa 6,000 now reside in it (Monaco 2008, 127; Rubin/Royston 2008, 26). Unsolved housing problems (e. g. regarding the dilapidated rental housing units) and further population growth in the wider low-income area of Hangberg aggravate the situation. The residents of Hangberg and especially those of the informal part now face a number of physical and socio-economic challenges that are, on the one hand, partially typical for informal settlements in general but, on the other hand, result in part also from the specific local context. These challenges,

58 State housing had already been built in the 1940s to accommodate people who worked at the harbour (Soeker/Bhana 2011).

which finally led to the initiation of an informal settlement upgrading project in 2006, are briefly captured and analysed in the following.

4.3.2 Local Livelihoods, Physical and Social Vulnerability[59]

The physical challenges are mainly a result of the difficult topography of the mountain slope, service and infrastructure backlogs, inadequate dwelling qualities and the dense settlement layout. The steep gradient of the Sentinel Mountain causes problems, especially in winter, when frequent rains lead to rainwater streams that run down the slope. As there is no adequate drainage system above the formal area bungalows get flooded frequently, which negatively affects private property and more seriously the health of the residents. Due to wind erosion and denudation of the sandy soil, the unstable ground is further ablated and until now residents have to find their own solutions to this problem. To prevent erosion and severe flooding, some residents use rocks, sandbags and old tyres to divert rainwater streams and to fortify pathways in the settlement or the slope in general. The topographic and soil conditions also have an effect on the stability of the bungalows. Although the informal structures in Hangberg do not follow planning regulations, some bungalows are built quite properly using permanent materials, which is in fact a contradiction to the original agreement with the City. However, most bungalows are built of inferior non-permanent materials, are not properly insulated and not of the quality to protect effectively against the elements. Walls and roofs often get moist and rain water runs in, which in turn contributes to the spread of respiratory diseases such as bronchitis. Moreover, it is also difficult to have privacy in the bungalows because of the thin walls, the high settlement density and the fact that often more than one family share a single house (Development Action Group 2008, 21; Tefre 2010; van der Merwe 2011a, Interview).

There is also a lack of technical infrastructure and public services. To alleviate these backlogs, the City has provided the informal area with some basic services in recent years: Electricity is available to almost all residents (sometimes informally connected), as is potable water (via public taps). Most households, though, have private water connections and these are partly shared with other households. About 60 % of all households in the informal part of Hangberg use private sanitation facilities. Some have pit latrines, while others have connected to the sewage system of the formal area. Many private sanitation facilities are, however, not connected and waste water remains untreated in the ground or is channelled away by the storm water drainages and hence might lead to groundwater contamination. Interim sanitation facilities are available in the form of

59 This sub-chapter is partly based on own field notes (May and June 2011) and on informal conversations with two Hangberg residents on 26th May 2011.

free-standing waterborne toilets, but these are in a very poor condition, due to a lack of maintenance, vandalism or misuse. There are also indications that these facilities are not sufficient as many households have to share one public toilet. Solid waste removal is another problem (Figures 8 and 9). The City has provided few public waste containers, but these are insufficient and, moreover, are only emptied once a week or sometimes even less frequently. As a result waste is often dumped in the pathways, storm water channels or in open spaces (Andersson/Ackelman 2008, 31 and 35; Development Action Group 2008, 21; Salim 2011, Interview; van der Merwe 2011a, Interview; Winter et al. 2008, 10–11).[60]

These physical challenges lead to social stress as do the social and economic problems, which also concern the wider community in the formal part of Hangberg. Unemployment, for instance, is a constant problem. The residents who are employed primarily work in the local fishing industry – the men mainly fish, the women work in the fish processing facilities. But due to the competition with low-skilled workers from other areas (e. g. Imizamo Yetu) and because of a lesser need for workers due to the closing-down of factories, the job availability in the fishing industry is on the decline. Other Hangberg residents are self-employed and have for instance established 'spaza' shops, 'shebeens' or other small (informal) enterprises within the Hangberg area.[61] Some operate as landlords and rent out rooms of their self-built houses or follow other informal activities. However, most residents do not have a regular income. Youth unemployment also seems high. As higher education is almost inaccessible the youth drops out of school early and has difficulties to enter the job market. While many residents seem to find informal economic activities to compensate the lack of formal employment, others turn to illegal activities such as subsistence fishing. This is outlawed as there are government-set fishing quotas that are exploited by the large fishing companies. However, many residents see no other alternatives: "The most of the people, like I said, poach [...] like even me myself. There's nothing I can do. I would take my line and could just go over the mountain to get some crayfish to put food on the table. That's the only thing I know [...]. Just to survive" (Roberts 2011, Interview). Some other residents even engage in drug dealing. The Hangberg residents, mostly the youth, are also alleged to be engaged in burglaries and also to steel equipment from fishing boats, which is then sold on or used for poaching activities.[62] This already had negative effects on the relationship to the wider Hout Bay community (Reynolds 2011b, Interview; Roberts 2011, Interview; Salim 2011, Interview; Van Dyk 2011, Interview; van der Merwe 2011a, Interview; see 4.5.5).

60 For more details see Kapembe et al. (2007), cited in Ackelman/Andersson (2008, 31).

61 See also Ackelman/Andersson (2008).

62 Drug abuse is also a severe problem among the Hangberg youth, as one resident stated: "Most of the kids drug [...] they have nothing to do, there's no work, there's nothing. So what they do they steel and that money they get from that steeling stuff, they do drugs" (Salim 2011, Interview).

There are also problems with local education facilities. Classes of the existing pre- and high-school are overcrowded with up to 67 pupils in one class (Fredericks 2011) and the rooms are dilapidated due to a lack of maintenance and renovation works. Teachers are overstrained and many pupils stay away from school and often drop out early. Moreover, children in Hangberg grow up in a difficult social environment as their parents are often unemployed, and there are incidences of home violence, drug abuse and crime. Although some residents engage in youth work to get the children off the streets there is a general unavailability of safe playgrounds and other recreational youth facilities. Existing playgrounds are dilapidated and unhygienic conditions may have negative effects on the children's health. There are also limitations with regard to the availability of other social facilities, especially health centres. Only one smaller clinic exists in Hangberg where services are available for the low-income households of the area. As residents of the Imizamo Yetu settlement also use the services, the clinic is thus often overcrowded and it takes a long time to access health services there. Other health facilities are not affordable to the residents or are located elsewhere in the City and are difficult to reach as this implicates additional transportation costs (Reynolds 2011b, Interview; Salim 2011, Interview; van der Merwe 2011a, Interview).

Figure 8: Non-maintained public toilets in the Hangberg informal settlement
Source: Own photographs (2011)

Figure 9: Infrastructure and services in the Hangberg informal settlement
(informal water-connection, dumping station, electricity connections and sanitation facility)
Source: Own photographs (2011)

Altogether, there seems to be a common feeling of social insecurity, especially in the informal area of Hangberg. This might be due to the socio-economic hardship but also because of the fact that land and tenure regularisation has still not taken place. In fact, there has been a constant fear of displacement until recently, which was fortified by market interests and a competition for the land on which the Hangberg community resides. Although there are agreements by now that nobody will be evicted from the area, there is yet no overall solution for tenureship or housing (Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum 2011; van der Merwe 2011b, 2011c, Interviews; Williams 2011). The key challenges that were indicated here and other constraints to the implementation of the *in situ* upgrading project will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 4.5.

4.4 Initiation of the Hangberg *in situ* Upgrading Project

In reaction to the difficult and partially unhygienic living conditions and after long years of mostly unaided self-help efforts, the informal settlement community with support of the Cape Town based NGO Development Action Group (DAG) convinced the City of Cape Town in 2006 to initiate an upgrading project in Hangberg. Although there were originally plans to relocate the community, e. g. due to the perceived difficulties of upgrading the area, the City finally agreed to the proposal and reached an accord with the community to implement an *in situ* upgrading project in terms of the UISP (Ackelman/Andersson 2008, 32; City of Cape Town 2008b, 5; Development Action Group 2008, 17–18; van der Merwe 2011a, Interview).

According to a project document, the Hangberg informal settlement has been selected for the application of UISP funding for several reasons: Amongst others this include the aim to protect existing social networks, the need to incorporate non-qualifiers for housing subsidies into the project to prevent displacements, and the proceeding consolidation of the settlement in which many households have invested to improve their bungalows, often using permanent materials. Moreover, as a result of the complex settlement layout, density and differing plot sizes there is a need for flexible tenure solutions and deviance from planning norms and standards in order to allow for *in situ* upgrading, while acknowledging and incorporating the community's previous self-help efforts (cf. City of Cape Town 2008b, 6–7; Figure 10).

In the following the organisation and main characteristics of the project are presented. Chapter 4.4.1 gives an overview of the project stakeholder roles in the planning process and initial achievements in the first two years after project initiation and before the project came to a halt. Chapter 4.4.2 then looks at early preparations for the regularisation of tenure, i. e. the registration of project beneficiaries, and at efforts to organise land management prior to the project implementation.

4.4.1 Stakeholder Roles, Participatory Planning and Initial Achievements

The agreement between the City of Cape Town and the Hangberg community contained several key principles that emphasised a holistic project approach. These principles embraced the fostering of social and economic development,

inclusion of non-subsidy-qualifiers, public safety, prevention of relocations, and community participation amongst other things (Figure 10). Moreover, from a technical and administrative point of view the upgrading project was aimed at improving the physical infrastructure and services and also at formalising the area, i. e. land regularisation, in order to grant the residents security of tenure. Finding solutions for the housing problems was another main goal:

> *"[...] we were going to sort of formalise the area. And that consisted of the provision of potable water, sanitation, sewage systems, adequate storm water control, access paths. We won't be able to get any vehicle access in there because of the topography. And then to sort of subdivide the area and then provide security of tenure to the residents of the informal settlements. And those who did not qualify for a housing subsidy because they earn too much money or whatever would be allowed to either retain their existing structure or to build a structure using their own finances. And people who qualified for subsidy housing were allowed to do so." (*Donovan *2011, Interview)*

In order to represent the informal settlement community's interests in the upgrading project the *Hangberg in situ Development Association* (HiDA) was founded. The settlement was then divided into six different blocks (50–60 bungalows at a time) and each block elected community representatives to become members in the HiDA committee and to promote each block's specific interests and needs (Donovan 2011, Interview; Flanagan 2011, Interview). The committee played a crucial role from the very beginning: "HiDA played mainly an advocating role and a coordinating role. So [...] being the voice [...], being the mouthpiece and the earpiece for the residents within the project" (van der Merwe 2011b, Interview). To enable the HiDA members to represent the community, DAG supported the community through leadership workshops and capacity building efforts (Development Action Group 2008; Donovan 2011, Interview):

> *"DAG was instrumental in providing [...] skills development. Capacity building amongst the leadership of the in situ Development Association that was formed in terms of holding workshops, empowering the leadership in meeting procedure, record keeping, minute keeping [...] conflict resolution [...]. They ran various programmes with the leadership, you know, and inform them about the objectives of the various UISP projects [i. e. the four phases]. And I think they also focused on things like livelihoods, you know, and we were looking together with the community as to how they could develop some kind of sustainable livelihoods programme in conjunction with the City [...]. They [...] were also instrumental in talking to academic institutions like UCT [i. e. University of Cape Town] to come on board and have a look at alternative sanitation solutions [...]." (*Donovan *2011, Interview)*

The HiDA members then played a key role in the planning process and developed a settlement layout plan in conjunction with the City. This also required the involvement of the broader informal settlement community. It was therefore fundamental to explain to the residents how big plot sizes would be, how plots would be demarcated and what would happen in the different UISP project phases. HiDA did that by organising field surveys in addition to the more than 140 community meetings and workshops that were held in the first three years after project initiation (Development Action Group 2011; van der Merwe 2011b, Interview):

> *"Instead of just talking about numbers and figures in a meeting, we actually made time right throughout the project and [...] took tape measures and showed people the square meterage and what we also did was, we for instance would go to someone with a small bungalow and measure around the persons bungalow that square meterage [...] of what the plot might be at the end of the day [...]. And we had overwhelming support from people when they actually saw [...] what we were really busy with, you know?" (van der Merwe 2011b, Interview)*

HiDA was also responsible for registering the residents of the informal settlement within a community register that was supposed to serve as a basis for the regularisation process later on (see 4.4.2). However, not only the elected leaders but the whole community was supposed to be involved in all stages of the project and to participate in decision-making processes. They were also thought to voice their opinions regarding social and economic development, service delivery, housing, land regularisation etc. (Richards 2011, Interview; van der Merwe 2011b, Interview). Furthermore, the community and its leaders were supposed to support the City by preventing further settlement growth, by promoting the project measures within the community and by taking ownership of the infrastructure, i. e. protecting it from misuse and cleaning it where necessary in order to keep the need for maintenance to a minimum (Donovan 2011, Interview). The City in turn was responsible for administering the planning process as well as for organising the technical aspects of the project implementation:

> *"Our role and responsibility was to make sure that we are able to provide the engineering services as well as look at the tenure options, the town planning, legislative requirements in terms of environmental impact assessments as well as the town planning land use requirements. So we appointed a town planner who worked closely with the community to develop a conceptual layout plan which we then used to inform the environmental impact assessment application. And we have already received environmental authorisation.*

The town planning layout has been completed and one of the three versions has been accepted by the community [...].” (Donovan 2011, Interview)

Although the project later came to a standstill, it can be recorded that in the first two years after project initiation quite a few things have been achieved. The project submission had been approved in mid-2008 by the provincial government, funds had been granted for the first two project phases, a settlement layout plan had been completed by the end of 2009 and the *Environmental Impact Assessment* (EIA)[63], a key requirement, has been carried out and approval has been granted (Department of Local Government and Housing 2008; Donovan 2011, Interview).

REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF UISP FUNDING IN HANGBERG

* *High levels of settlement consolidation (significant number of permanent structures)*
* *Non-uniform plot sizes present a huge challenge in ensuring equity*
* *The site is currently accessed via footpaths and there is only one possibility for a road (i. e. a ring road on the southern boundary of the settlement) and hence the need to deviate from national norms and standards*
* *Household incomes are significantly higher than the average informal settlement (R2600/month) and there is a high level of variability which presents an opportunity for a mixed income upgrade without excluding non qualifiers*
* *Prevention of relocations*
* *Need for applying innovative tenure options (e. g. sectional title, cooperative tenure, rental, rights to occupy)*
* *Non-qualifiers within the project need to be accommodated innovatively*
* *Formalising the settlement too rapidly could result in displacement of households and potential conflict.*

63 According to a city official “[...] you get two types of EIA: You get the basic environmental impact assessment and then you get the full EIA assessment. Your basic EIA can take anything from six months to a year and the full can take you anything from 18 months to 2 years [...]. The full basic application you have to submit if it’s in a nature conservation area or it’s really outside the urban edge and ... your basic is if it’s a previously serviced site but housing construction never took place. Say for example within a built area your open piece of land was [...] serviced in terms of infrastructure, sewer pipes etc., but it was never allocated and top structure never took place. In other words you’ve got an open piece of land and [...] roads and storm water and sewer lines but nobody lives there. It’s just an abandoned project [...]. For that you need a basic assessment to be done there” (Olivier 2011, Interview).

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE HANGBERG *IN SITU* UPGRADING PROJECT

* *Holistic, integrated and incremental development approach*
* *Community participation and management in project planning and implementation*
* *Prevention of market-related displacements; no relocations out of Hangberg*
* *Necessary relocations only within the settlement and ideally only within the block to prevent social and economic disruption*
* *Innovative tenure and town planning*
* *Upgrading as a vehicle for social and economic upliftment; inclusion of social and economic facilities*
* *Equitable protection of community investments*
* *Mixed-income and mixed-use development*
* *Upgrading and house construction must be affordable to all*
* *Inclusion of the most vulnerable (female headed households and non-subsidy qualifiers)*
* *Environmental protection and rehabilitation; mitigation of environmental and health risks*
* *Safe and easy accessible footpaths into the settlement; safety of children with attention to visibility and positioning of public open space*

Figure 10: Reasons for the application of UISP funding in Hangberg and basic principles of the Hangberg *in situ* upgrading project.
Source: Own design, based on City of Cape Town (2008b)

Moreover, community members who were part of the HiDA committee had the opportunity to participate in capacity building measures of the DAG leadership programme and thereby to improve their management and advocating skills. As a result they were able to negotiate with local government representatives and other stakeholders of the project and to promote their community's interests. Another achievement was the initiation of a locally managed storm water project and a sanitation programme with the guiding support of DAG (Development Action Group 2008, 2010; Flanagan 2011, Interview). The NGO also supported the HiDA committee in establishing the community land register in order to prepare the regularisation and formalisation of the Hangberg informal settlement and to establish a provisional basis for communal land management (Ruben/Royston 2008). This will be briefly examined in the following.

4.4.2 Land Registration and Land Management

The land register contained information about the 302 households that lived in the informal settlement at the time when the project was initiated. It provided de facto secure tenure for these households as they were now officially registered as beneficiaries of the upgrading project. The informal bungalows were numbered, characterised and demographic information about the owners were recorded: "The register is geo-spatially referenced and provides data on who owns what, as well as the size and precise location of each unit [...] It has also been used to keep track of changes of ownership or inheritance within the settlement" (RUBIN/ROYSTON 2008, 26). These land and house transfers are mostly limited to community members as the Hangberg community is fairly tight-knit and many households are interrelated and often live in close vicinity to each other. Foreigners seem to be accepted only to a limited degree and hence there are few people residing in the area that are not originally from Hangberg. However, because there is still an active land market within the settlement, the land register contained a mechanism to incorporate land sales. Sale forms were therefore handed out, police affidavits were required and the transactions were filed and included into the land register by the HiDA committee (RUBIN/ROYSTON 2008; VAN DER MERWE 2011c, Interview). This possibility to transfer land and houses as well as the prospect of an upgraded settlement have already led to an increase in property prices:

> *"At the moment the cost of a shack or bungalow can be anything between R3000-R40 000 but with the promise of future development and the Mayoral commitment to upgrading, there are reports of properties fetching up to R50 000. It is [however] also important to note that what is actually being sold is not the land per se but rather the number on the register, which provides access to future housing and development rights and potentially formal ownership in the future." (RUBIN/ROYSTON 2008, 28)*

It was supposed that the land would be officially transferred to the beneficiaries at a later stage of the project. For the time being the official ownership of the land remained with the City as well as with other stakeholders who owned parts of the land. These included the Western Cape Province and South African National Parks (SANParks). It also has to be noted that households who were not included into the land register kept an insecure tenure status and thus cannot claim future rights to the land. This pertains to households who have either failed to register their land transfer or who have erected a bungalow after project commencement without consulting the HiDA committee. According to a moratorium signed by the community and the City, the HiDA committee in its role as land manager was also responsible for preventing further 'illegal' squatting in the settlement as

well as on the fire break above the settlement. As a consequence, infringements were reported to the City, which then sent in its Anti-Land-Invasion-Unit to tear down the new structures (DONOVAN 2011, Interview; RUBIN/ROYSTON 2008). This, however, has created severe problems and conflicts as will be explained in Chapter 4.5. It also needs to be added that, because the project came to a halt after 2008, the community register has not been used and updated since.

4.5 Underlying Challenges, Constraints and Conflicts

The difficulties of implementing the *in situ* upgrading project in Hangberg can be attributed to a number of direct and indirect challenges, constraints and conflicts. They encompass challenges resulting from physical characteristics of the settlement, internal and external community conflicts, governance failures, social and tenure insecurity, fear of displacement, socio-racial tensions, miscommunication and misunderstandings that finally even led to violent clashes between the wider Hangberg community and police forces in September 2010. It is the aim of this chapter to approach and analyse these challenges, constraints and conflicts in order to understand in what way they hindered and disrupted the implementation of the project.

4.5.1 Physical Challenges, Housing Consolidation and Security of Tenure

Physical challenges of the Hangberg informal settlement and their impact on the well-being of the residents have already been discussed above and they prompt a comprehensive infrastructure and service upgrade in order to substantially improve living conditions. However, the physical conditions also influence the possibility of overcoming the very same challenges through settlement upgrading. In this sense, the topography of the area as well as the physical settlement structure need to be considered. Individual land holdings and tenure arrangements become another fundamental aspect as soon as upgrading of the area is about to take place.

The Hangberg informal settlement is generally characterised by high densities and a complex layout, although the densities are not as high as in other informal settlements in Cape Town. There are about 120 dwelling units per hectare and these are arranged in irregular patterns for the most part (cf. Figure 11). As the settlement has consolidated over time, new bungalows have been erected where there was space left. This has led to differing plot sizes and layouts in the settlement. In terms of accessibility the settlement is crossed by a number of mostly small pathways via which individual bungalows can be accessed. The main road in the formal area, close to the informal settlement, can also be accessed via the footpaths. It has to be mentioned, though, that some pathways, especially those that lead up the slope, are difficult to pass because they are only partially reinforced and thus unstable which is caused by the sandy ground. Due to the

complex and dense settlement layout and the intention to keep relocations to a minimum there are thus limitations to the installation of services and infrastructure. The same is true for the creation of wider pathways and open spaces that can be used for recreation and communal or economic activities. However, despite the physical constraints, it might be even possible to construct a ring-road in the southern part of the settlement to improve accessibility. In any case, there is a need to deviate from national norms and standards to enable alternative and innovative planning solutions in order to adapt to the gradually consolidated settlement structure (Ackelman/Andersson 2008; City of Cape Town 2008b; Flanagan 2011, Interview).[64]

Figure 11: Inside the Hangberg informal settlement
(complex and dense layout, illegal structures on the fire break, view on the Sentinel Mountain, view on Hout Bay)
Source: Own photographs (2011)

Besides infrastructure and service installation, opportunities for housing consolidation will need to be examined in the future. The City already has bought land from a fishing company close the harbour to construct housing via the *Community Residential Unit Programme*.[65] Further opportunities for land acquisition are explored but this is obviously limited due to the natural boundaries and a lack of suitable land. According to a recent agreement it is planned to build a total of 210 new houses in the Hangberg area and people from the formal as well as the informal area of Hangberg might find accommodation there (City of Cape Town 2009; Williams 2011). Many residents will also remain in the now informal part of Hangberg. Although the goal of UISP is to achieve overall

64 Own field notes, May 2011.
65 See footnote 36.

housing consolidation in the form of brick-and-mortar houses, it is also possible to include informal structures into the project. This can be understood as a key principle of incremental upgrading and is indeed necessary, as not all Hangberg residents will qualify for subsidies. The inclusion will be a complicated process, though, as most of the bungalows do not have a proper foundation on the steep and sandy ground – some of the bungalows are even slowly pushed downwards. Extensive rehabilitation works would therefore be inevitable. However, while the topography and soil make the housing consolidation difficult, the steep slopes, at least in principle, make it easy to provide drainages and sewages as the natural gradient can be exploited to bring waste and rain water down to the bulk lines (Ackelman/Andersson 2008; Donovan 2011, Interview; Flanagan 2011, Interview).

In addition to the physical challenges social conflicts that might arise from them also have to be overcome. For instance, it constitutes a challenge to find solutions for land ownership and the equitable access to land within the settlement as current individual plot sizes vary to a great extent. People who have lived for a long time in the settlement usually own the biggest plots due to incremental extensions (cf. Ackelman/Andersson 2008; City of Cape Town 2008b). In contrast, other community members reside on fairly small plots. Additionally, new efforts to start building or to extent existing houses can be observed here and there.[66] While aiming at equitable distribution of land within the settlement, the individual household investments need to be considered and included in new developments if possible: "You're working backwards on a site [...]. You're working with people that have really made investments, have established themselves [...] [Some] people have invested substantial amounts of money and in some cases it's not just money but it's also time and energy effort" (Flanagan 2011, Interview).

What further complicates the issue of land distribution is the fact that the land register has not been updated for a while now and more recent land transfers consequently have not been registered. Demographic information has changed, too, and some people have sold their future rights to the land. Others have invaded the land on the fire break above the settlement or have started a completely new structure within the settlement boundaries but without official recognition. Moreover, some households consist of actually two or more families of which not all have been registered or households might have grown and household compositions might have changed. Furthermore, some bungalows are sublet and it is unclear whether those tenants can stay when the settlement gets its upgrade. A comprehensive re-examination of the community land register has therefore to be done (Donovan 2011, Interview; Fourie 2011, Interview; van der Merwe 2011c, Interview).

66 Own field notes, April and May 2011.

All these complex issues around service provision, plot sizes and individual land holding need to be discussed in detail on a settlement-wide as well as on an individual household level once the project is revived. "It means that [...] every single person on the site has to have a role to play in making decisions on what it looks like, what level of service provision get provided. There's a lot of decisions that have to be made right down at the local level and the household level as well" (FLANAGAN 2011, Interview).

Another important administrative aspect is the discussion about tenure options. From international as well as national experiences the effects of granting individual land ownership are well known: Low-income groups are vulnerable to downward-raiding by higher income groups and in Hangberg the same problem arises if one considers the attractiveness of the land. On the other hand it has to be emphasized that Hangberg is a fairly cohesive community and people seem to prefer to reside in the area. Hangberg residents now and in the future thus will have to decide "between the temptation to sell property and land at inflated prices and the sense of community" (RUBIN/ROYSTON 2008, 29).

While the housing subsidy system, which is applied in the consolidation phase of UISP, requires individual ownership, other solutions need to be found for the first three phases of the project as well as for non-qualifiers of housing subsidies in the fourth phase. The challenge here is to find solutions which distract speculators from acquiring land within the community as this would severely undermine the project goals. Besides individual ownership there are several other tenure options available. A possible long-term option for Hangberg would be the establishment of leasing arrangements that include a future right to purchase. This would reduce the risk of downward-raiding and thus contribute to protecting existing community networks. The right to purchase would then become valid after a certain period of time, possibly 20 years. The advantage in this case would be the fact that households would have de jure security of tenure and thus an incentive to invest in the property on which they reside.[67] The socio-economic development that is supposed to come with the upgrading in the long run would then reduce household insecurity and increase social mobility. When the households finally get the permission to buy the property each household could then decide on its own, independent from socio-economic pressures, whether to stay in the settlement or to sell the property and move to a better housing opportunity (ADLARD 2010; DONOVAN 2011, Interview).

This discussion about tenure security is one of the key aspects of the upgrading process and secure tenure is one of the main objectives of the UISP. However, it only becomes relevant when the project is taken up again. Therefore a number of

67 It has to be reiterated that due to perceived de facto security of tenure many households already have invested large sums in their properties.

other challenges, constraints and conflicts need to be addressed which are taken into consideration in the following.

4.5.2 Internal Community and Leadership Conflicts

A key principle of the intended upgrading project in Hangberg is the extensive participation of the community in all stages of the project. A general requirement for participation in turn is to get "community buy-in". While at first it was perceived that the HiDA project would receive extensive support from the wider Hangberg community, after a while it turned out that many residents of the wider Hangberg community in fact refused the project owing to a number of reasons. This and other social conflicts within the settlement – which partially still exist – finally led to the temporary disruption of the project.[68]

One of the main reasons why several community members opposed the project is that there are at least two other groups of residents, which also face considerable housing problems: Firstly, those residents that live in poorly maintained and partly dilapidated council flats and secondly, the group of informal backyard dwellers in the formal area of Hangberg. These residents seem to have felt ignored when the City initiated the upgrading project in the informal part of Hangberg: "[...] the project was always be seen as an isolated project. It was never part of the rest of the community development. That's the perception from the community side" (Du Plessis 2011, Interview). Another and related reason for the (indirect) protest against the upgrading project was hence to fight for recognition of the City to also receive support for the improvement of their own housing situation (Fourie 2011, Interview). At the same time, as many people living in the informal settlement are related to the residents of the formal area by kinship, a large portion of these residents nevertheless supported the project.

> *"[...] there are those who support the project because it's their relatives that are living in the project, you know. It's their sons, daughters, nephews, cousins and nieces, fathers and mothers. And then there are others that are not supportive because they are also living informally and many have patience. They are living informally much longer than some of the residents in the project. And now these people gonna get ownership over the land and they gonna get the house. So there's quite a lot of insecurity." (van der Merwe 2011b, Interview)*

The community was obviously divided about the issue from the very beginning, mostly because many people were in fear of not benefiting from the project or

68 This sub-chapter is partly based on information obtained from an informal conversation with a mediator of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum on 10th June 2011.

being forgotten. The project also created a sense of jealousy and envy among many residents in the formal part of Hangberg, but especially among those who own a formal house in Hangberg and had been paying rates for years:

> *"The ratepayers are not cool with the upgrading project because they say that the upgrading project [i. e. the informal dwellers] just want everything for free. And they are supposed to pay for the houses, they are supposed to pay for rates and whatever. So they are not so cool with what's happening in the upgrading project." (Fourie 2011, Interview)*

There are also indications of organised crime within the informal settlement, especially drug dealing. People involved in these activities might therefore generally refuse the project as it interferes with their business. With regard to this, a group of Rastafarians that reside in the settlement was publicly alleged to be part of that business and to have actively contributed to prevent the project from being implemented (Donovan 2011, Interview).[69] However, this allegation is not confirmed and might also stand for the conflict between the local authorities and the community, which in some cases has led to reciprocal denunciations (see 4.5.3)

Other community conflicts derived from the leadership within the wider Hangberg community. This not only includes the HiDA committee but also a range of leaders from other community organisations, which had been negotiated with before HiDA was elected to prevent competition (Development Action Group 2011). Nevertheless, here also, a sense of jealousy arose among some of the leaders who were not part of the HiDA committee.

> *"[...] when this project was initiated and its own committee was elected ... other organisations' leaders also became a bit insecure, a bit frustrated and maybe even jealous because here is a project that is getting attention, you know. And it's gonna make some progress, so those people are now gonna get the credit. And yes, maybe they have been involved now doing community work for some time and they haven't had a project which would give them some credibility. So that becomes a challenge, you know, and people become insecure and then they start to challenge each other or they start to put obstacles in the way of that particular leadership, you know. And we've experienced that with the in situ project [...]." (van der Merwe 2011a, Interview)*

Other leadership conflicts derived from the difficult social complexities in Hangberg and in part also from the pursuit of personal agendas. This includes struggles

69 This information is partly obtained from the recent documentary 'The Uprising of Hangberg' (2010) by Dylan Valley and Aryan Kaganof.

for decision-making power, exploiting financial incentives (partly by means of corruption) and also political interests. There are, for example, signs of political interference by members of the local ANC branch in Hout Bay, which tried to take control of the upgrading project or at least to influence decision-making related to it (Reynolds 2011a, Interview; Salim 2011, Interview; van der Merwe 2011a, Interview).[70]

Another conflict, that over time put a strain on the relationship to the City, resulted from the fact that people from other areas in Hangberg (or possibly even from outside Hangberg) were infiltrating the project (Du Plessis 2011, Interview; Fourie 2011, Interview). It was mainly the task of the HiDA committee to police the settlement and prevent this type of land invasion. The committee, however, was neither able to effectively carry out the task nor to agree on a consistent approach: "In the hands of HiDA the leaders itself is difficult, because there's people saying 'Don't let them come in', then there is people saying 'Oh, but they are with me. So I think it's fine'" (Fourie 2011, Interview).

Finally, as the project implementation process slowed down over time and people lost their confidence in the project management, the community's level of commitment and accountability concerning the project decreased. This might partly be due to the slow implementation process and the limited project success but also due to the fact that all project activities were unpaid and took much time. Over several years many residents devoted a lot of voluntary hours to take part in meetings, planning sessions, workshops etc., while they could have spent the time on income generation instead. Moreover, other pressing issues needed to be addressed, too. There is, for example, a community fishing committee that deals with all issues regarding the interests of the local fishers. This is a very important and time consuming activity as fishing is the main source of income for many households. However, as some of the community members were active in both the fishing committee and in the upgrading project, this reduced the time they could actually spend on the housing issue. Furthermore, erupting personal conflicts among the leaders of the fishing committee negatively affected the relationship among the leaders of the HiDA committee, where cooperation was hence obviously more difficult (Salim 2011, Interview; van der Merwe 2011a, 2011c, Interview).

All these indicated conflicts seem to have negatively affected the upgrading project so far, also because they corrupted the relationship between the community and the City of Cape Town. In addition, institutional constraints on the administrative level as well as political conflicts also contributed to this.

70 Most of the other local civil society organisations were also aligned with the ANC (Du Plessis 2011, Interview).

4.5.3 External Community Conflicts and Governance Failures

One of the key conflicts between the City of Cape Town and the Hangberg community arose from the illegal occupation of land. The HiDA committee and the residents of the informal settlement in general failed to prevent land invasions and the building of further bungalows within the settlement and especially above the settlement on the fire break, despite the moratorium that was agreed upon with the City. According to a member of the HiDA committee, however, "[...] it was a very unfair expectation from the City to have expected people to actually do that, take that kind of responsibility. Because it let a lot of people at risk. It turned families against each other [...] it's their [*i. e. the City's*] ignorance that was to blame for [...] the problem of people jumping into the project [...]" (VAN DER MERWE 2011b, Interview) This refers to the City's obvious failure to acknowledge the needs of the residents from other areas of Hangberg and to develop a community-wide plan for housing development or rehabilitation. Most of the older rental units are to a great extent dilapidated and need urgent renovation, while solutions also need to be found for the many backyard dwellers within the formal area of Hangberg.[71] The land invasions can thus partly be seen as resulting from the City's neglect of these other housing problems in Hangberg.

For HiDA it was practically difficult to effectively patrol the settlement and prevent shack building and/or land invasions on a daily basis as no law enforcement was present. Irrespective of this the City held the community accountable for the prevention of further land invasions and threatened several times to withdraw from the project as more land invasions took place (DEVELOPMENT ACTION GROUP 2009, 2011).

Generally speaking, with regard to the many problems in Hangberg, it seems that there has not been a sufficient level of political will, accountability and commitment on the part of the local authorities to effectively address these problems. A few single examples indicate this:

One member of the HiDA committee, for instance, alleged the local councillor of the area to not have supported the upgrading project, as she ostensibly had never turned up on important community meetings concerning the project (RICHARDS 2011, Interview). A second example is the non-acceptance of the HiDA committee as legitimate representative of the community by the City's Planning Department. Furthermore, the City took a long time to deliver interim services. For instance, it took the City more than one and a half years to start delivering additional sanitation facilities (FLANAGAN 2011, Interview). If this was due to bureaucratic obstacles then at least the City failed to explain to the community

71 Prior to the upgrading project the last public housing project in Hangberg had taken place in 1992 (DU PLESSIS 2011, Interview).

the obligatory administrative steps that were involved in this service delivery. Because of this lack of transparency the community generated the feeling that the City was failing to stick to its promises and was consciously slowing down the project (see below). Another related issue is the failure to actively engage with the project on the ground and to regularly have an official on site to be in close contact with the community. However, this might have been constrained by a general lack of funding and/or because of understaffing (Flanagan 2011, Interview). The following statements of three Hangberg residents underscore the community's perception of the City's (lack of) commitment to the upgrading project and its general accountability:

> *"Every year they go on. Why do people get angry? They didn't start yet. They are just telling us every year, every year 'In two months time we gonna start, in six months time we gonna start'. Every year the same story." (Salim 2011, Interview)*

> *"We did have a lot of workshops with the City... but nothing happened. Nothing came out of this [...]." (Richards 2011, Interview)*

> *"[...] from the community side it's the City's slackness, you know? The fact that the City is dragging the whole process. The fact that the City is not transparent or transparent enough with regards to certain issues, that the City is not in a sense accountable to some of the promises [...] and slow service delivery." (van der Merwe 2011c, Interview)*

There was also a lack of sufficient communication and understanding between the City and the Hangberg community. This can be exemplified on the basis of an example of failed service installation: When the City recently sent workers to install new communal toilets in the informal area, the community prevented the installation from happening, chased the service workers away and vandalised the toilets. While this at first seems difficult to understand, the following arguments might help to explain the refusal by the community: Firstly, the City had failed to inform the HiDA committee and the community about the forthcoming installation. Secondly, the community hadn't been presented with the opportunity to participate in the selection of the contractor who was ordered to install the services, and thirdly, the community had been lobbying the City before to employ local workers for the installation of services in the settlement – a fact the City obviously had ignored. It thus seems that the community did not refuse the installation of services *per se* but rather the way the installation took place, i. e. without community involvement in decision-making and implementation (Donovan 2011, Interview; Flanagan 2011, Interview; Richards 2011, Interview).

Moreover, not only a lack of commitment and accountability but also capacity constraints and possibly a lack of skills seem to have hampered the effective engagement of the City in Hangberg. City officials, who were engaged in the project prior to its disruption, mostly had a technical background (e. g. being engineers and town planners). To activate the community, to get community buy-in, to allow for effective community participation etc., however, social facilitation skills are required, too. Moreover, issues such as education and crime prevention need to be addressed. Concerning this, other administrative institutions (e. g. the Social Development Department) need to support holistic projects like the one in Hangberg (DONOVAN 2011, Interview). This apparently has not been the case prior to the project's disruption and the approach to the Hangberg project only seems to have changed recently in the context of the Peace and Mediation process. Now extensive interdepartmental cooperation within the City administration and between local and provincial governments has been established, which might allow for more effective addressing of (housing) development issues in Hangberg in future (see 4.6.1).

In addition to these conflicts within the Hangberg community and between the community and the local authority, other social conflicts had an influence on the upgrading project, too. They did not constrain its practical implementation directly, but they contributed to an increasing feeling of social insecurity within the community and had a negative impact on the relationship of the Hangberg community to the City and also to the wider community of Hout Bay.

4.5.4 Competition for Land and Social Insecurity

The development of social conflicts was partly reinforced by the community's underlying constant fear of displacement. This fear might be explained with the increasing competition for land in Hout Bay and the growing opposition against informal settlement growth in the suburb in the past two decades. Moreover, land sales and upmarket residential development in Hangberg, accompanied by public rhetoric that indicated possible evictions and relocations of informal dwellers in Hout Bay, contributed to this. As a result, the Hangberg residents developed a sense of insecurity and assumed that they would have to literally defend their land against market interests and unresponsive local authorities (see 4.6). To better understand this fear of displacement the above indicated factors are examined, using a few apparent examples.

Hout Bay is, as a consequence of its favoured location in a valley surrounded by mountains of the Table Mountain Nature Reserve and by the Atlantic Ocean, an attraction to many South Africans and also to foreigners. Locals, newcomers and tourists alike favour this southern Cape Town suburb for its natural beauty,

the fresh sea breeze and its Mediterranean flair. It also seems a good location for property investments. New single residential units as well as gated housing complexes have sprung up in recent years and the overall population keeps growing. Besides, Hout Bay is more affordable to the middle class than other high income areas in Cape Town and many young families with children have moved here (cf. Suter 2011).

Hout Bay also has become attractive to 'black' migrant workers (mainly) from the Eastern Cape, but also 'illegal' immigrants from other African countries, who hope to find job opportunities here. The township of Imizamo Yetu on the slope of the Skoorsteenkop Mountain to the East and the informal settlements that surround it is where these migrants find shelter, mainly in shacks on unserviced sites. Population estimates vary to a great extent but presumably up to 20,000 people live there and population influx remains steady (cf. Joubert 2007a; Rostron 2010; Suter 2011). Imizamo Yetu residents live in conditions that in part seem to be even worse than those in Hangberg. Health and environmental problems, resulting from severe overcrowding and a lack of proper sanitation facilities, pose a threat to the inhabitants themselves and to the wider Hout Bay community. The lack of sanitation has already led to ground water contamination. The City's Health Directorate, for example, has warned that the local Disa River in Hout Bay is contaminated with bacteria and poses a threat to public health. The river supposedly "has the highest number of e. coli bacteria [...] ever recorded in South Africa" (Saving Water SA 2010). And the unresolved sanitation problems in Imizamo Yetu have been identified to be the main reason for this contamination (City of Cape Town 2009b). Fires are also a constant threat as a recent 'shack fire' in 2010 illustrates: 60 informal dwellings burnt down which left 250 residents homeless (City of Cape Town 2010).

Crime is another issue that generally affects both residents of the wider Hout Bay community as well as residents of the low-income settlements of Imizamo Yetu and Hangberg. The high levels of crime in Hout Bay are directly associated with the presence of low-income settlements in Hout Bay and frequently lead to socio-racial tensions (see 4.5.5). The situation has led to increasing resistance, mostly from the 'white' community of Hout Bay and local ratepayer associations.[72] It is frequently demanded that people be removed from the area and that further land invasions need to be prevented (cf. Kemp 2001; Swimmer 2010). The Resident Association Hout Bay (RAHB), for example, allegedly supports a court action of a local environmental organisation to relocate 5,000 households from Imizamo Yetu to another site (Suter 2011). In 2007 the councillor of Hout Bay publicly responded to the growing concerns of illegal land invasions and informal settlement growth in Imizamo Yetu and, according to a media report,

72 However, almost all residential developments in Hout Bay are observed with increasing scepticism as even environmental conservation areas by now are in danger of being sacrificed to new housing estates (see below).

announced that the only solutions she can foresee for these problems is to forcibly remove people from the area as there is not enough suitable land available to accommodate all of them.[73] Then Cape Town Mayor Helen Zille supported the statement (JOUBERT 2007a). Although the councillor referred to Imizamo Yetu in her announcement, this public discussion of forced removals in Hout Bay is an indicator of the mind-set towards informal dwellers in the area that many people seem to have acquired.

Public statements like this contributed to the spread of a certain rumour among Hangberg residents that the City was preparing plans to evict the community and relocate the people to 'Blikkiesdorp' (meaning 'Tin Can Town'), an infamous TRA on the outskirts of Cape Town. Here people are housed in one-room containers and far away from job opportunities and social facilities. The rumour circulated even until recently (BAKKES 2011), although the threat of evictions of Hangberg residents had been averted by negotiation of the current Peace and Mediation Forum in the meantime (see 4.6.1). From the Hangberg community's perception these threats still appear to be real though, no matter if they take the form of direct evictions or result from exclusionary land markets:

> *"[...] there's always been a shortage of land and [...] land's got a massive value in South Africa, specifically in Cape Town. And [...] if there's land close to the sea [...] they call it prime land. So the pricing will always determine for [...] certain type of needs [...]. And maybe that's why they would always feel that poor people doesn't need to stay next to the sea. They need to be [removed] somewhere or away from beauty. That is a perception that a lot of people got. So it's an economic aspect where the poor people always [...] take the second, the back part of the sea [...]. That's why I'm saying that the competitiveness for land, in specific on the coast lines, is quite [...] controversial and quite intimidating towards the poor." (DU PLESSIS 2011, Interview)*

Another factor that underpinned the Hangberg community's fear of displacement, were perceived plans of upcoming beautification measures in the area and the development of upmarket residential units within Hangberg or close by. The closing-down of several fish factories in the harbour area in recent years, for example, has been interpreted by a community member as an indication of a beginning sell-out of Hangberg: "[...] they tried to close all the factories down for the fish [...] smell" (REYNOLDS 2011b, Interview). By these means the area would then supposedly become more attractive and the replacement of low-income residential units through high-class developments would become possible: "They would put a

73 The low-income communities of Imizamo Yetu and Hangberg combined, which make up nearly three quarters of the overall population, occupy about 4 % of the land in Hout Bay (JOUBERT 2007a, 2007b).

hotel there or whatever [...]. That's why they showed us, they gonna move us out, we going all to Blikkiesdorp [...]" (Reynolds 2011b, Interview). And indeed, a single upmarket apartment block can be found at the lower end of the Hangberg residential area, right next to the main road that leads into Hangberg, and close to the industrial area at the harbour. As usual, the complex is fenced and equipped with security alert and appears like a small enclave in between the low-income area. The community does not know who resides there, but it is allegedly no one who is originally from Hangberg as hardly anyone from Hangberg could afford it (Reynolds 2011b, Interview; Salim 2011, Interview).

The notion of displacement (through eviction or market forces) does not seem too unrealistic as there were indeed plans to remove the community and rebuild the area.[74] For instance, before the HiDA project had been initiated, speculators had tried to corrupt members of a local civic association in Hangberg to gain access to the settlement and buy parcels of the land (Rubin/Royston 2008). A more concrete example resulted from the auction of a parcel of land on the Sentinel, in close proximity to the Hangberg informal settlement. In 2009 the private owner of the land organised an auction and intended to sell the piece of land to an investor. Although the Hangberg community would not have been directly affected, this led to protests by the residents as they feared that their settlement would be under threat. The community then marched to the Chapman's Peak Hotel in Hout Bay, where the auction took place, and interrupted the meeting. As violence erupted, the auction was called off without the parcel of land being sold. The sentiments went so far that a member of HiDA was attacked by community members as they alleged him to have struck a deal with the auctioneer and to have sold out the community's interests (Du Plessis 2011, Interview). The announcement of the sale of the mountain also led to another form of community protest that had a direct negative impact on the relationship to the City:

> *"Because the rumour went that [...] someone wanted to buy that piece [of land]. And then the community stood up and said that 'No, this is our heritage and we wanna keep it' and so that's where the first fight started. And then the evictions started [...]. Because the people then from there just [...] started building on the fire break [...]. The building on the fire break was actually somehow [a] way [...] to stop the entrepreneurs or whatever to start building there." (Fourie 2011, Interview)*

Another example of the tight and unequal competition for land is the controversial approval of an upmarket housing complex in a sensitive environmental conservation area on the Karbonkelberg, next to the Sentinel, which is moreover

74 Informal conversation with a mediator of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum on 10th June 2011.

opposed by the Resident Association Hout Bay (RAHB 2010). The approval by the provincial government became public while bungalows, which Hangberg residents had illegally built on the fire break above the informal settlement, were torn down in a brutal strike that left many residents and police officers injured. This "socio-political irony" (SUTER 2011) seems a matching reflection of the complex situation in Hout Bay as pointed out above.

4.5.5 Socio-Economic Exclusion, Crime and Socio-Racial Tensions

Besides the intense competition for land, the relationship between the 'black', 'coloured' and 'white' communities in Hout Bay is also negatively influenced by other factors. While the 'white' community seems to be predominantly concerned with crime and negative effects of the squatter settlements on the environment, the 'black' and 'coloured' communities compete with each other for resources and external support.[75] Moreover, cooperation does not seem very intense and often there are no social contacts between the communities at all. It can be assumed that this also has effects on the likelihood of a 'successful' implementation of the Hangberg *in situ* upgrading project as it reduces the possibilities for mutual support and for the creation of social capital. Opportunities for social and economic development might thus be missed.

Interactions of any kind between the Hangberg community and the other communities in Hout Bay seem to be rare as a Hangberg resident stated: "We don't actually meet with that people" (REYNOLDS 2011a, Interview). Another Hangberg resident sensed that the other communities do not accept the people of Hangberg: "They are very arrogant in their [attitude] towards our people. Same with IY [*i. e. Imizamo Yetu*]" (VAN DYK 2011, Interview). A further Hangberg resident expressed his feeling that there are generally negative perceptions about his community, specifically among the 'white ratepayers' in Hout Bay:

> *"But unfortunately, with the different class issues you have, that those who got money will always look down onto the poor and the poor will always look at those who have money [...]. So you will find that [...] some of the ratepayers will tell that they're better than people that stay informally, which include actually the in situ project people [...]. Because it was an issue of saying 'It doesn't matter where you stay in Hangberg'. It's a negative perception of the residents of that area." (DU PLESSIS 2011, Interview)*

75 It is of course *not* assumed that these three communities are homogeneous in the way that they generally share the same views and interests.

Nevertheless, there are also examples of cooperation between the different communities, e. g. with regard to environmental conservation and problems of overcrowding in Imizamo Yetu. The Sinethemba Civic Association, for example, which is based in Imizamo Yetu and fights for the interests of those residents that first settled there (JOUBERT 2007b), works together with the Residents' Association Hout Bay to address these problems by challenging the City to speed up development of the area (SAVING WATER SA 2010). There is also an economic relationship and interdependency between the communities. Especially Imizamo Yetu residents find jobs as casual labourers or as domestic workers in the 'white' community. The 'white' community also profits as it can exploit the benefits of cheap informal labour, which is obviously in abundance in Hout Bay. Other examples of individual cooperation between the different communities could certainly be added.

The inter-communal relationship between Hangberg residents and the 'black' community of Imizamo Yetu is characterised by competition for jobs and resources. Hangberg residents feel that the 'black' community takes all the jobs and receives full attention of the City when it comes to development of houses and infrastructure. By contrast, Hangberg residents feel neglected and unfairly treated as the following statement of a Hangberg resident implicates:

> *"I don't know that much about Imizamo Yetu, but all I know is the world is so unfair because all that people who are staying in Imizamo Yetu is people that don't even grew up here. They are all incoming. They are all incoming here. They come from Soweto, KwaZulu-Natal and all of that other places but they are there. They will get the first privilege to moving into a brick house, see? But they are still building up bungalows there. And they went so far up in the mountain where you won't even believe how far the people is." (REYNOLDS 2011a, Interview)*

Access to jobs is an important aspect in Hout Bay, where about 40 % of the low-income residents are unemployed (JOUBERT 2007b). The resulting strong competition for low-income jobs is intensified by the fact that workers from other low-income areas in Cape Town are brought into Hout Bay to work for the fishing industry at the harbour.[76] There is also a competition for access to educational facilities. As there is no school in Imizamo Yetu, many children from that area attend school in Hangberg, which leads to overcrowded classes (RICHARDS 2011, Interview; SALIM 2011, Interview; VAN DYK 2011, Interview).

76 One Hangberg resident observed that most "[…] of the people are from other places, working here in Hout Bay, in our territory. You have three buses, four buses when you come up here […]. You see the buses standing there. Now, those buses are every day full up, overloaded from people of Langa, Nyanga, Khayelitsha come and work here. That four buses, not even seated, I think there's hundred people going in a bus" (SALIM 2011, Interview).

One of the most serious issues in Hout Bay, which has a deep impact on the relationship between the three communities, is crime. Although residents in the low-income areas are also severely affected by criminal activities and other social ills such as violence, sexual and child abuse[77], the frequent break-ins and burglaries especially affect the affluent 'white' residents (cf. TEFRE 2010). This is a severe burden and negatively affects the mutual trust and respect between the three communities, as the following two examples indicate. An anonymous individual (presumably a Hout Bay resident) harshly commented an article about crime in Hout Bay that was posted on a local website as follows:

> *"[...] the Hangberg community is rotten to the core. They quite clearly support the illegal activities in the area, since the rapid illegal expansion of the squatter camp behind the council flats, Harbour Heights have been hit by an unprecedented wave of crime. The poaching fuels the drug trade, and evils such as dog fighting and the prostitution of young women in the area is well known of. Their youth is rotten with tik and other drugs and they prey on the so called rich people. I hope that this makes it clear to the city that the only way to stop this is to remove the entire Hangberg community with their rotten to the core poaching fishermen and drug dealers, the whole lot, out for good. They do not deserve the right to live next to a world heritage site and the most beautiful nature reserve in South Africa [...]."*[78]

It is not affirmed that a majority of the 'white' community shares radical views like this one, although more statements like this can be found on the internet. However, it shows the difficult relationship between the communities and the mistrust and suspicion that obviously derive from it. These issues seem difficult to resolve, especially when intense material losses occur and personal livelihoods are severely affected.

On a public Peace and Mediation Forum meeting, for instance, a 'white' Hout Bay resident complained about the many incidences of crime in the area and the personal losses he experienced. In his complaint he specifically alleged the Hangberg youth of stealing equipment from vessels of the fishing industry to use it for poaching activities or to sell it. This had not only been very costly for the companies but has also cost a lot of jobs in recent years. According to the resident, who stated to be an entrepreneur in the fishing industry himself, further jobs in the sector would be in danger if the stealing would continue.[79] Hangberg residents blame the unemployment, poverty and lack of alternatives among their commu-

77 Informal conversation with a Hangberg resident on 26th May 2011.
78 This comment was posted on 790tv, a local internet platform containing news on Hout Bay, and is accessible at http://790tv.co.za/wordpress/?p=662 (29.12.2011).
79 Own field notes, June 2011.

nity for these criminal activities. However, it negatively affects the relationship between the communities and is an issue that urgently needs to be addressed.

These examples, however, do not implicate that the relationship between the communities is generally one of conflict. A Hangberg resident, when asked for the relation to other communities in Hout Bay, sensed that the relation to the 'white' and 'black' communities is not that bad after all. He was actually of the opinion that there is support from the other communities for the development efforts in Hangberg, although he judged the relationship to the 'white' community to be a rather distanced one:

> *"I would say, in a sense there's a lot of support from the white community and the black community in Hout Bay [...] the white community do respect and feel that, you know, this is the oldest community in Hout Bay [...] the indigenous community of Hout Bay. And, you know, many people in this community descent from the indigenous people of the Cape region. But also they feel very comfortable if our people are just situated here and houses are just built here in Hangberg away from them, you know? Then they don't need to deal with issues of us being neighbours to them [...]. While we are here it's fine and all supported. Once we challenge them on a piece of land or the City on a piece of land that is right next to them then we had an issue, you know? So, yah, from the black [community] [...] I guess it's a bit more genuine. Those people live under the same circumstances as we do, you know?" (VAN DER MERWE 2011c, Interview)*

Although there are individual examples of support and cooperation, altogether the Hangberg community has yet failed to establish effective support networks with the other communities of Hout Bay[80], especially with the 'black' community of Imizamo Yetu: "Sadly, the two poor areas – black and coloured – do not link up and unite. Instead, they feel they must constantly compete against each other for scarce resources" (ROSTRON 2010). Cooperation presumably would have important advantages: firstly, the Hangberg community could stand together with the Imizamo Yetu community to challenge the City for comprehensive support regarding infrastructure, services and housing provision. And secondly, a good relationship to the affluent 'white' community could help to establish social and economic support networks and thereby improve access to jobs and other opportunities. This would not only contribute to reducing crime levels, which would benefit all residents of Hout Bay, but would also create an environment in which the chances for a 'successful' holistic upgrading project in Hangberg would be much better – especially because there seems to be a lot of support from the 'white'

80 A detailed analysis of the failure of the Hangberg community to establish such networks can be found in TEFRE (2010).

community for the housing projects in Imizamo Yetu and Hangberg (RICHARDS 2011, Interview; SWIMMER 2010; VAN DER MERWE 2011c, Interview). The lack of cooperation might also result from the fact that in general "most people in Hout Bay don't know what is going on in Hangberg", as another 'white' Hout Bay resident stated on a recent Peace and Mediation Forum meeting.[81]

81 Own field notes, June 2011.

4.6 From Conflict Escalation to Project Reinvigoration

In September 2010 the conflict between the City of Cape Town and the Hangberg community escalated. Due to the various housing needs, the neglect of the community by the City and the perceived threat of displacement, the community had invaded land above the informal settlement on the fire break. Because the community refused to tear down the newly built structures, the City sent in its Anti-Land-Invasion-Unit to remove them. The following clash of the community and the police forces, that where sent in to protect the City's workers, ended in violence and left many community members and police officers injured. In reaction to this outbreak of violence the provincial high court ordered the installation of a Peace and Mediation Forum in order to solve the conflict. The forum posed the opportunity to address many of the underlying conflicts and also to revive the *in situ* upgrading project. In the following, the escalation of conflict and the work of the Peace and Mediation Forum and its outcome are explored.

4.6.1 Place Identity, Violence and Conflict Resolution

The escalation of conflict followed several incidences of violence that had happened before. They are connected to the land invasions on the fire break that started after the initiation of the Hangberg *in situ* upgrading project. In 2008, for instance, the HiDA committee had informed the City about land invasions above the informal settlement and the authorities replied to this by sending in their Anti-Land-Invasion-Unit. Members of the Hangberg community then defended the land invaders and attacked the City workers and the police officers that accompanied them. One of the police officers was in fact shot through the hand with live ammunition during the protests. Hostilities also erupted during the auction of the Sentinel Mountain when furious Hangberg residents interrupted the auction and threw stones at the police. The police responded to this by firing rubber bullets and stun grenades at the protesters (City of Cape Town 2008c; Donovan 2011, Interview; Fourie 2011, Interview; Prince 2009).

In 2010 the conflict escalated as the conflict parties could not solve their disputes. It all evolved around the City's request to have the bungalows on the fire break removed and the community's refusal of this appeal. In early September 2010 the community had given a mandate to the original Hout Bay Civic Associ-

ation[82], a local community organisation, to represent the community's interests and to resolve the conflict with the City. This initiative was also a reaction of the community to the feeling that the government would not take them and their plight seriously (Du Plessis 2011, Interview). The attempt, however, failed:

> *"And the City ignored the community's request. It's on that basis when the City and provincial government demanded for people to break their structures down without any alternatives, without even listening to the request of the community [...] the City thought they could come in with their forces [...] to stamp, put their foot down onto this community and it became the result of poor people losing their eyes [...] people being injured. We had ... a lot of actually property damages." (Du Plessis 2011, Interview)*

The events took place on the 21st and 22nd of September 2010, after a last try of conflict resolution had failed a couple of days before when the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, had delivered a speech to the Hangberg residents in which she had demanded that all illegal structures had to be torn down by the community. The community then had refused and the meeting had ended without a compromise being reached. The week after that the City's Anti-Land-Invasion-Unit again entered Hangberg accompanied by police forces. When members of the community and the police forces clashed, both sides resorted to violence. Community members threw stones and Molotov cocktails onto the police, private houses were stormed by the police, several people were injured and many were arrested. Human rights violations also occurred as the police forces intimidated Hangberg residents and shot rubber bullets at peoples' faces which led to three people losing an eye. The City also did not have a court order, which is a requirement when authorities choose to evict informal dwellers. The court order was applied for only afterwards. The outbreak of violence, which led to injuries among many innocent persons, left the community traumatised and the prospect for the upgrading project to continue looked poor at this stage (Donovan 2011, Interview; Fourie 2011, Interview).[83]

There a several underlying reasons that accounted for this escalation of conflict and the use of violence of both conflict parties in Hangberg: Decade-long neglect of the housing needs in Hangberg, slow and bureaucratic project process, a feeling of social insecurity and fear of displacement, the community's initiatives to invade land above the informal settlement and political interference. Miscommunication and misunderstandings between the community and the City further added to this (Naidoo 2011, Interview). According to one Hangberg resident:

82 A new Hout Bay Civic Association has been founded recently. It is currently opposing the work of the Peace and Mediation Forum (see below).

83 This information is partly obtained from the recent documentary 'The Uprising of Hangberg' (2010) by Dylan Valley and Aryan Kaganof.

"[...] it's a combination of ... things that happened which brought the war to Hangberg as [...] you had that issue of a housing need [...]. You had the mountain that came up to auction and you had [...] a [housing] waiting list that stretches as far as deep into 70s and 80s. [It is] the full combination itself that ended up [...] in the war. But the biggest part was people saying 'Why did [...] they identify the 302 people [as] beneficiaries [...] while other people are waiting for long periods to be provided with houses in the area?'" (Du Plessis 2011, Interview)

Another factor which influenced the situation was perceived place identity and place attachment, respectively.[84] The Hangberg residents in general feel that they belong to the area, not only because their families have been living there for decades but also because many of the residents derive from the indigenous people of the Cape region:

"You see, we are the descendants from the Khoi and from the San people [...]. We are not coloured people but we are the Khoisan people, you see? And this land is been given up [...]. And you see, we realise now [...] the only thing [...] is to become a nation and to be yourself and to take really up what is yours." (Roberts 2011, Interview)

This place identity and the reference to the Khoisan culture had both positive and negative effects. On the one hand it was "[...] just to remind you of your roots of your culture" (Van Dyk 2011, Interview) and to unite the community, stand together and campaign for the community's 'right to the city'. On the other hand it was abused as an instrument by political forces in the competition for votes between the ANC and the DA as the local government elections were forthcoming in May 2011:

"[...] the ANC [...] cause they think they gonna win this election [...] give some jobs to the rastas and some on the harbour and to brainwash their minds and they say 'Listen, do you feel we are Khoisan people? [...] We are Khoisan people. But you can't let that white guy, Zille, own the Western Cape.'" (Salim 2011, Interview)[85]

84 According to Kornienko: "People can feel attachment to a place but not claim identity from there. Conversely, they can believe that their identity reflects a place but not want to live there. When born and brought up in a place, residents often feel both attachment and identity to it [...]. These concepts of place attachment and place identity, whether social or spatial, reflect the bond between residents and the communities they live in, therefore should be part of the upgrading dialogue" (2008, 4). Moreover, Fried inter alia speaks of 'territorial identity': "Many societies maintain a true *identity* between place and people: a latent assumption that *people belong to the land* as in the feudal area, not the land to the people. This social image is the primeval core of *territorial identity* with its many functions and dysfunctions" (2000, 193, emphases in original).

85 The Western Cape Province and the Cape Town municipality are both DA-led. Helen Zille used to be the Mayor of Cape Town between 2006 and 2009 before she became Premier of the Western Cape Province.

This political conflict continues to interrupt the development process of Hangberg (see below), even now after the Peace and Mediation Forum has taken up its work. The launch of the Peace and Mediation Forum itself followed a decision by the provincial high court, which appointed a mediator to resolve the conflicts between the Hangberg community and the authorities. Altogether 39 community representatives, among them former HiDA members, were elected from the different areas of Hangberg to restore peace and to revitalise community development. Representatives of the City, the provincial government and SANParks are also on the forum and the mediation process is supported by a range of other actors and institutions, such as local universities and private persons who have offered their assistance. Within the forum, housing is a dominant issue as is social and economic development (Naidoo 2011, Interview; Roberts 2011, Interview).

The Peace and Mediation Forum, which is meant to be a non-political grassroots institution, began its work with the signing of a preliminary agreement on the 31st of January 2011. The agreement inter alia states that there will be no relocations of the community to 'Blikkiesdorp', that the involved government institutions will take the community seriously and that they are committed to work with its elected representatives. It also commits the City to proceed with the HiDA project in the informal settlement and to develop new housing opportunities in Hangberg. Moreover, housing, services and development issues are addressed via an all-encompassing project team (Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum 2011). With regard to housing development four different project streams are now in existence and each project stream has a coordinator from within the community. According to a progress report of April 2011, the HiDA project is about to be revived and a Project Steering Committee is therefore to be elected that includes members of the settlement. The steering committee then has to adopt the already completed layout plan for the settlement before a consultant for the service design and later a civil contractor for the service construction works can be appointed. The commencement of construction works was planned for early 2012. The other project streams deal with the maintenance of the rental flats and row houses, the transfer of ownership of 61 row houses, the development of new housing opportunities and service delivery in all areas of Hangberg (City of Cape Town 2011b; Donovan 2011, Interview).

Besides the restart and reorganisation of the *in situ* upgrading project and the addressing of other housing challenges in Hangberg, also a few other important things have been achieved through the forum's work as will be briefly explored in the following. However, it will also be shown that despite the peace and mediation process some conflicts still remain.

4.6.2 Peace and Mediation: Achievements and Perpetual Conflicts

The peace and mediation process helped to settle the violent conflict between the City and the Hangberg community and also to reunite the community that was in dispute about the isolated upgrading project: "[...] with this mediation process everything changed. Because everything falls now under the mediation process [...] there is no division anymore" (Richards 2011, Interview). All pressing issues are now addressed via different project teams and each resident can approach his/her respective representative on the PMF if assistance is required with anything. Due to the commitment of the City, the provincial government and SANParks, the community now has access to various resources and external support, which also helps to start or revive different development initiatives besides the housing projects (Donovan 2011, Interview; Naidoo 2011, Interview). These include a community-wide cleaning campaign, the opening of a drug rehabilitation centre in Hangberg, and plans to build a Khoisan information complex to remind of the Khoi and San cultures and also to attract tourism. The community also receives support from the University of the Western Cape to allow Hangberg residents access to education programmes (Hendricks 2011a; Naidoo 2011, Interview; Roberts 2011, Interview). Business opportunities are also considered. Local businessmen, corporate companies and PMF community representatives, for instance, recently held a brainstorming meeting to evaluate possibilities of job creation and other forms of assistance for Hangberg residents (Hendricks 2011b). There are also plans to establish a market hall in the harbour area from which Hangberg residents might benefit. Reportedly ten stalls have been promised to the community for the purpose of selling goods (Reynolds 2011b, Interview). Furthermore, some community members also developed plans for economic activities, for example establishing tourist facilities such as backpacker lodges and organising guided tours to the Sentinel Mountain (Donovan 2011, Interview).

In September 2011, eventually, a final accord was signed by the Peace and Mediation Forum, which is legally binding for all involved parties since it became a final court order in October. The key features of this accord comprise the following: 1. Tenure security for the residents who still live on the fire break and agree to move to another area within Hangberg until new houses are built; 2. Transfer of title deeds to 60 families who currently reside in City owned rental housing units; 3. Commencement of upgrading measures in the informal settlement that will benefit the 302 registered households; 4. Building of 210 new houses that can be occupied in 2013; 5. Economic and social development initiatives as well as measures to improve or create health services, sports and recreation facilities, education and public safety; and 6. Expropriation of all private land on the Sentinel Mountain by SANParks and its incorporation into the Nature Reserve (Williams

2011). These agreements will thus secure that there will be no displacement of Hangberg residents and that the community will be able to remain in the area.

Despite these obvious successes, conflicts that constrain the whole process still remain. These conflicts seem to result from a lack of information as well as from the spread of misinformation by opponents of the Peace and Mediation Forum. During house-to-house visits in the informal settlement in Hangberg in June 2011, for example, half a year after the PMF had taken up its work, it became clear that many of the households had not received sufficient and correct information about the processes that were going on and many seemed to be uncertain about the upcoming developments.[86] On the one hand this resulted from the fact that by the time the house-to-house visits took place, no community meeting of the informal settlement residents had taken place and that the people where simply not properly informed (Reynolds 2011a, Interview). On the other hand "[...] some of the people lack the right information about the Peace and Mediation Forum because of those individuals that are still fighting this Forum [...]" (Roberts 2011, Interview).

The opposition against the forum's work seems partly politically motivated as the people who lead the opposition are affiliated with the ANC. It might also result from the fact that comprehensive upgrading and development measures would possibly interfere with criminal activities in the area. Another reason might be the fact that former community leaders who were not elected representatives of the community have lost decision-making power over community issues, as the PMF is the only legitimate and officially accepted community organisation at the moment and there is a lot of (decision-making) power vested in its leader's hands.[87] The opponents of the PMF not only publicly denounce mediators, community representatives and community members who support the PMF but go as far as to intimidate and physically threaten them. Officially, one of their main points of criticism is that the families on the fire break still have to immediately remove their bungalows from there and have to move to other areas in Hangberg. It has to be noted, though, that 30 out of 32 people agreed to this and that it is also a criterion of the official accord now (Hendricks 2011c; Williams 2011).

It remains to be seen if the outstanding conflicts and challenges can be overcome in the future.[88] They include the choice of tenure options for those in the upgrading project, the incorporation of non-qualifiers for subsidies, the physical challenges of the upgrading process, and the many social problems that cannot be resolved within a short time frame, especially drug abuse, crime, and unem-

86 Own field notes, June 2011.

87 Informal conversation with a mediator of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum on 10th June 2011.

88 According to various news articles from July/August 2013 the conflicts regarding partial and temporary relocations within the settlement still continue, while many inhabitants of the informal area of Hangberg remain uncertain about the future of the upgrading project.

ployment. Notwithstanding, there seems to be overwhelming support from the Hangberg community for the PMF's work as this forum is community-driven and no major decisions can take place without the community's approval (NAIDOO 2011, Interview).[89]

89 Informal conversation with a mediator of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum on 10th June 2011.

5 THE CHALLENGE OF *IN SITU* UPGRADING OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

This chapter discusses the challenges of the *in situ* upgrading approach that has been the focus of this study. At first, conclusions are drawn from the case study. The results are then compared with other experiences of informal settlement intervention to explore general benefits and limitations of *in situ* upgrading. Finally, major prerequisites for 'successful' implementation of this approach are discussed.

5.1 Lessons Learned from the Case Study

The upgrading of the Hangberg informal settlement is influenced by two kinds of factors: First of all, the physical challenges that pertain to the topography, the geological characteristics and the layout of the existing settlement structures, and secondly, the social and organisational aspects of the project. These latter aspects can be further divided into internal and external facets.

Physical suitability is a major precondition for the initiation of an *in situ* upgrading project, while the unsuitability of land can be a major constraint to the application of this type of informal settlement intervention. The physical constraints that exist in Hangberg can be overcome by rehabilitation efforts, for which funding is available via the UISP. The UISP also allows for flexible planning and engineering solutions because national norms and standards do not apply. Physical upgrading thus at first seems to be a merely technical problem, which however needs consent of the project stakeholders and especially of those who are supposed to benefit from it. The aspired equal land distribution and the incorporation of existing individual plots and land uses (houses, yards, open spaces etc.) also pose challenges. Solutions for this can only be found through intensive community consultation and participation in decision-making to agree on compromises and to prevent further conflicts.

Ownership of the land is another aspect. As the land on which the Hangberg settlement is located is owned by different public authorities (City of Cape Town, provincial government and SANParks) the land can be transferred completely to the City and be made available for residential purposes. This is supported by BNG, which calls for intergovernmental cooperation regarding land acquisition. The private land question, although not directly affecting the Hangberg residents, is being resolved by negotiations between the local authorities and the owner. The land will be expropriated and the owner compensated. This means that there will be no 'elite developments' as feared by the community and no displacements as the community's right to stay has been fortified by recent agreements via the peace and mediation process. This contributes to social security, although downward-raiding of the settlement is still a threat, at least as long as there is no final agreement on tenure. Because of the strong community cohesion and also because support measures in the medium- to long-term might lead to economic development of the area, the community might be able to resist downward-raiding in future.

Other aspects of the implementation of *in situ* upgrading are related to internal and external social as well as organisational factors. First of all, the intention of permanent residence is a basic requirement for a possible long-term success of

such a project. The Hangberg community, indeed, seems generally more cohesive and homogeneous than many other informal settlement communities in Cape Town are perceived to be. There is strong place identity and attachment, most families have been staying in the area for decades and they are closely related to the wider Hangberg community (often via kinship). They seem to have a 'mindset of permanence' and are determined to stay in the area. This is a crucial aspect as this contributes to the creation of community-wide support for development efforts and thus is supposed to contribute to 'successful' upgrading. Residents are willing to contribute their time and labour power to these developments. This has been proved by the work of the HiDA committee and later by the work of the Peace and Mediation Forum.

However, constraints and resistance arise from the pursuit of personal interests, political interference and possibly by criminal activities that seem to undermine the efforts of the community. It also seems important to consider the needs and interests of the wider residential community as neglect might lead to opposition against the project.

External factors also play an important role. Intense cooperation between the community and the local authorities as well as the project management, transparent processes, and the strong involvement of the community seem important aspects. Although the Hangberg community was a central actor in the development process during the first phases of the upgrading project, over time a lack of commitment by the City and missing transparency in the project cycle hampered the process. Capacity constraints, a possible lack of certain skills and a lack of commitment on the local authority's side led to a slow progress in project implementation and hence to frustration among the Hangberg residents. The community sensed a lack of support and in the following began to question the local authority's commitment to the project. As no considerable improvements of the living conditions in the area took place, members of the community began to invade further land above the original settlement, which was the main reason for the local government's withdrawal from the project. The community, moreover, obviously felt the need to actively defend its interests by blocking other types of development that were intended to take place in close vicinity to *their* land by invading further land.

Other social conflicts pertain to the community's relation to the 'white' and 'black' communities in Hout Bay. The competition for jobs and resources (i. e. government support) with the residents of Imizamo Yetu as yet prevented the establishing of mutual support networks with a community that faces the same challenges as the Hangberg residents do. The relationship to the 'white' community is bedevilled by the high incidences of crime that the 'white' community partly associates with the Hangberg community. Generally, the three communities seem not to know much about each other and barely interact at all.

Therefore, other social groups of the area need to be better informed, sensitised and if possible involved in the project as well. This might reduce opposition to the project, such as NIMBYism, and can moreover lead to fruitful cooperation, the creation of social capital and possibly the creation of economic opportunities, which would reduce the dependency on criminal activities. Prior to the founding of the Peace and Mediation Forum cooperation between the Hangberg community and these other two communities barely took place. This might change now as the Peace and Mediation Forum has established a comprehensive support network from which the wider Hangberg community might benefit.

Insights from the Hangberg case[90] implicate that there are several key aspects that need consideration when intervening in informal settlements. Moreover, certain preconditions (e. g. community support, land suitability) have to be met and not many informal settlements in Cape Town (and presumably in general) fulfil these. In cases where they do, however, *in situ* upgrading might be a promising approach to contribute to the relief of severe housing needs in the city. Although this was preceded by intense and violent conflicts, the recent positive outcomes of the work of the Hangberg Peace and Mediation Forum indicate what can be achieved when there is sufficient commitment and support of *all* stakeholders.

The Hangberg case, even though being framed by its own specific local context, parallels many other (international) examples of *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements, not only because similar principles (e. g. community participation) are applied but also because similar challenges and constraints (e. g. internal conflicts) occur. In spite of its challenges *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements is seen as an important concept within the 'support paradigm'. To assess this approach important benefits and limitations, which have been indicated at different stages of this study, are briefly discussed in the following.

90 For further empirical insights and an assessment of the governance structures framing the project see Fieuw (2011).

5.2 Key Benefits and Limitations of *in situ* Upgrading

First of all, technical upgrading of informal settlements can have immense positive effects on the respective beneficiary community's well-being: Through installation of rainwater drainages, sanitation facilities, sewages and the provision of potable water, health conditions can improve greatly. In the CIUP areas in Dar es Salaam, for example, the spread of malaria could be confined as the new drainages now contribute to prevent flooding in the rainy seasons. Proper sewage systems also contribute to environmental conservation and the prevention of groundwater contamination and thus also benefit the population beyond the upgraded settlements.

However, to be able to upgrade a settlement in the first place, the type of land on which the settlement is located must be suitable for permanent settlement or be made suitable through rehabilitation. If the land is suitable and publicly-owned it can, as in the Hangberg case, be made available for residential purposes. If it is designated for other uses such as transportation and industrial use, if it is private land or if it is prone to flooding and other hazards, then upgrading would not be possible or at least very difficult to realise. At least in Cape Town this severely limits the possibilities for comprehensive *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements.

Another advantage of upgrading informal settlements *in situ* is that existing self-help efforts of communities can be incorporated and their investments be protected. However, to ensure subsequent service and infrastructure delivery, some building structures might need to be moved or plot boundaries changed, especially when densities are high. This might lead to conflicts as the affected residents have to agree to this and then need to be compensated. They might consider it as unfair and disturbing and therefore might resist destruction and/or relocation of their houses as has been the case in the CIUP in Dar es Salaam, where some properties needed to make way for community roads, pathways and public spaces. In Hangberg similar challenges occurred and new ones might arise when service installation and housing consolidation finally commence.

The protection of social and livelihood networks, which are often crucial to secure basic needs and can also lead to long-term socio-economic development, is a major advantage of *in situ* upgrading. The strong interdependence of informal settlements and the informal economy is thereby acknowledged. Assuming that informal settlements are more often than not well-located in terms of access to (formal/informal) employment opportunities, social facilities and transportation (not necessarily in terms of physical suitability), the importance of location is

another aspect that can be acknowledged by upgrading *in situ*. *In situ* upgrading is also thought to contribute to the wider local economy (in the long-run):

> *"The arguments for improving informal settlements in terms of benefits for the local economy include increased revenue collection and the better functioning of the land and housing markets [...]. However, there has been no study to document increased revenue that is derived from the improvement of informal settlements. Moreover, the lower 'transaction costs' associated with better functioning markets should have led to lower housing costs. Nowhere has this happened." (*Marx *2003, 306)*

A discussion of the causes of these indicated failures cannot take place here. However, it can be stated that despite these limitations, at least individual households can benefit from the formalisation and the arrangement of de jure tenure security. Formal tenure arrangements (e. g. individual ownership or land lease) first of all increase household security as they prevent displacements, acknowledge already made household investments and can stimulate further investments. Perceived or de facto rights of tenure (e. g. being accepted by the local authority), as has been the case in Hangberg, are often sufficient to stimulate such investments. However, in the debate about tenure, individual ownership is controversially discussed as it can have negative effects, too. Individual ownership often leads to downward-raiding of settlements by higher income groups who often pay below market prices for the houses/the title deeds as is often the case in Cape Town (Cousins et al. 2005; Olivier 2011, Interview). Beneficiaries then move back to other informal settlements and the upgrading only benefits those original inhabitants who have the means to resist (i. e. sufficient household income, financial and/or social capital). Inappropriate tenure arrangements can thus have severe impacts on the (long-term) success of *in situ* upgrading.

An *in situ* upgrading project moreover strongly depends on the acceptance of the project by the respective beneficiary community and its willingness to participate in it (e. g. in decision-making, layout planning). The *Orangi Pilot Project* that has been introduced above has been quite successful in regard to this. The respective communities that already benefited from the OPP had to self-organise their individual projects and contributed their own resources and their labour power during project implementation.[91] Considerable improvements in infrastructure have been achieved by this. As has been indicated, the CIUP in Dar es Salaam also depended on community participation in decision-making. The community stated their most urgent needs with regard to service delivery and the subsequent

91 The latter point would be subject to criticism from a Neo-Marxist point of view regarding the 'double exploitation of labour' (see 2.3).

project measures that followed this input could indeed contribute to improving local living conditions.

Extensive community participation, which is also said to lead to capacity building, skill development and the build-up of social capital, does not necessarily lead to 'successful' project implementation, though, as the Hangberg case implicates. Internal conflicts can occur when there are different stakeholder groups in the settlement that pursue contradicting interests or value personal benefits more than the possible success of the project. If the settlement is used to cover criminal activities, public interference through upgrading measure might even be unwanted. Conflicts might also arise from the competition between local leaders and existing CBOs as "the process reduces the number of community-based organisations (which results in in-fighting for a reduced number of positions) because the authorities prefer to deal with only one organisation" (Marx 2003, 306). This loss of power has led some former community leaders in Hangberg to challenge the HiDA committee that was founded when the project was initiated. Although community participation is often perceived to be a precondition for 'successful' upgrading, it can thus at the same time be a constraint to it. It can be misused by political forces and personal interests, it can be ineffective when it is only considered as an onerous but necessary feature in the project cycle and done improperly or it can be stalled by other (internal) social and organisational problems as many studies show (e. g. Lizarralde/Massyn 2008). Abbott, for instance, identifies several failures of the participative approach:

> *"Firstly, it is situated within an empirical framework, leaving it open to the same criticism as the technocratic approach, namely that success is viewed subjectively. Secondly, it tends to be strongly ideological. Hence alternatives that do not agree with the principles [...] tend to be dismissed without consideration of their merits. Thirdly, there is the issue of the principles themselves. It is suggested here that policies underpin development; they do not drive development forward. Hence a reliance on principles will not of itself lead to the upgrading of informal settlements on a scale that will be significant. Finally, there is the issue of a community taking all the decisions." (Abbott 2002a, 308, emphasis by the author)*

As Emmett (2000) discusses, community participation can also be limited by a mistaken perception of the 'community' and its abilities and willingness to participate. Communities may be inhomogeneous and divided into different interest groups, such as tenants and landlords or backyard dwellers and other informal dwellers. If a community does not exist as a homogeneous stakeholder group the conflicts and diverging interests that result from this can limit the prospects for success. If the community, however, is more homogeneous, has a sense of strong attachment and the aim of permanent residence, upgrading efforts will

have better chances to be supported. A critical point is whether the participation is externally or internally induced. Externally induced participation might be ineffective as the "[...] institutionalisation of participation is a 'condition that is built' rather than a 'mandate that is issued' and depends on democratic decentralisation" (Marx 2003, 314).

In the South African housing context the new upgrading policy has its own constraints, besides the general benefits and limitations that have been mentioned. If even possible to implement, the limitations of the UISP especially pertain to the consolidation phase, in which the programme 'turns conventional' as it relies on the subsidy eligibility of individual beneficiaries. Although different subsidies are possible, many potential beneficiaries, such as single households and 'illegal' immigrants, are excluded as they do not meet the qualification criteria. It will be seen how this works out in practice and if indeed bungalows of non-qualifiers can be incorporated into new settlement layouts. This might, however, be constrained by the fact that UISP projects should include all four phases, which might in turn lead to political and/or administrative pressure on city officials to pursue housing consolidation.

Financing of upgrading, although not discussed in detail within this study, is another aspect. As has been shown in the discussion of the 'provider' and the 'support paradigm', the mass-delivery of housing on large 'greenfield' sites – which is also done under RDP and BNG in South Africa – has its benefits. Through large-scale implementation and the delivery of standardised housing products, impressive quantitative achievements can be reached and at the same time expenditures can be saved.[92] It has been proved to be socially inappropriate in many cases, though, and has not been able to effectively reduce the need for informal housing. Within South African housing policy informal settlement upgrading has thus been identified as an important alternative to this approach. Prior to the UISP, no funding mechanism for the implementation of *in situ* upgrading had been in existence. The UISP thus offers new possibilities to include socially more appropriate housing solutions into the national housing programme.

Nonetheless, as the UISP leads to the formalisation of settlements, this is a restriction to the many informal settlements that are not suitable for permanent residence. In Cape Town, these types of settlements are subject to the City's improvement strategy, which leads to incremental upgrading/improvements of services, infrastructure and housing materials. It focuses on 'basic needs' and the improvement of living conditions but it will not lead to the 'eradication' of informal settlements in the City in the short- or medium-term nor will it be able to 'eradicate' the housing backlog on its own.

92 Nonetheless, this depends on the type of conventional/alternative project approach. Werlin (1999, 1524), for example, cites a study that indicates that earlier World Bank upgrading projects had a much more favourable price than site and service projects that contained core housing units (US$38 compared to US$1,000–2,000).

5.3 Prerequisites for 'Successful' *in situ* Upgrading

As has been argued, *in situ* upgrading has several advantages over conventional 'greenfield' housing developments and might be much more appropriate in many cases despite its limitations. It is a complex undertaking but it can lead to promising results if it takes place in the matching context and if certain preconditions are met. In the following, major prerequisites for 'successful' *in situ* upgrading are therefore discussed.

A number of key aspects have been identified throughout this study, which need consideration when intervening in informal settlements by means of *in situ* upgrading. These aspects encompass physical upgrading, tenure security, social and economic development, protection of social networks and livelihoods, participation, capacity building, managing and financing of these interventions. Measures to secure long-term success, e. g. maintenance and the financing of it, are also important to consider.

An essential precondition obviously is to have a good understanding of the beneficiary community and its specific needs and interests. This implicates a need for extensive community surveys[93] in order to gather relevant quantitative and qualitative information, including: social, demographic and economic facts, livelihood strategies, social networks and the level of community organisation, power relations, possible conflicts within the particular area and physical characteristics and suitability of the settlement (regarding soil conditions, hazards etc.). Landownership is another important category. The (local) government might need to purchase the land on which the respective settlement is located or might even need to acquire additional land for service installation or in cases when (partial) relocations are necessary. This of course, depends on land availability and the administrations' financial budget. On the basis of these evaluations it might be possible to decide whether *in situ* upgrading is an appropriate intervention strategy or if not, which other housing solution might be more suitable (Marx 2003, 314; Smit 2006a; Smith 2011, Interview).

As has been indicated at several stages of this study, infrastructure and service delivery are crucial to improve health and living conditions of informal dwellers. Often it is of utmost importance to install proper sanitation facilities, sewage and rainwater drains as well as granting access to potable water. These technical aspects of upgrading, however, which were the main focus of earlier World Bank projects (Abbott 2002a, 306), are not to be seen independently from other

93 With regard to upgrading projects in Cape Town Graham (2006, 237), however, notes that the City "lacks capacity and experience in this type of research."

aspects that have been mentioned in this section. Their installation should also not be seen as being merely a technical problem. As has been indicated, they are part of a holistic upgrading approach and their 'successful' implementation, operation and maintenance depend to a great extent on the participation of the beneficiary community, as do other aspects of the upgrading:

> *"Community co-operation is particularly important to resolve questions of tenure, mutual help, relocation, compensation, type or quality of services, charges, tax or fee collection and enforcement of requirements." (*Werlin *1999, 1529)*[94]

To allow for effective community participation it is important to consider its limitations and also to recognise (and include) different levels of decision-making and the different stakeholder levels that might be affected by the decision-making process. Abbott, for instance, defines four different levels of decision-making:

> *"The first level of scale is that of the internal/external interface itself, which deals with the issue of integration of the settlement into the surrounding areas. The second level of scale deals with the needs of the settlement as a whole, covering those needs that are common to the large majority of residents. The third level of scale deals with small, clearly defined areas within the settlement, where families can be defined in decision-making terms as more homogeneous groups. And the fourth level of scale is the individual family unit [...]." (2002b, 331)*

Participation is also an important aspect when it comes to effectiveness and long-term success (i. e. sustainability) of *in situ* upgrading. Important categories of thought are thereby cost recovery, replicability and scaling-up of upgrading measures.

Long-term success depends on the ability to operate and maintain infrastructure, which is dependent on the costs as well as on the commitment of the beneficiary community and the respective public authority. In the CIUP in Dar es Salaam, for example, commitment of the community was encouraged by upfront and one-off payments of property owners which led to the creation of a sense of community ownership. Moreover, perceivable benefits of new infrastructure led to the commitment of residents to participate in maintenance by cleaning and protecting infrastructure from vandalism. If the municipality will be able to finance operation and maintenance in the long-run remains to be seen, though. The same is true for the goal of cost recovery. In the self-help sanitation projects of the OPP

94 Smit (2006a, 120), moreover, states that: "Participation is especially important in informal settlement upgrading, where there are already existing communities and where there are significant numbers of vulnerable households whose livelihood strategies may potentially be at risk as a result of interventions."

in Karachi, for example, upfront payments by the users were necessary to acquire construction materials in order to be able to actually initiate the projects.

The problem of financing informal settlement interventions and securing cost recovery is also sometimes addressed by applying lower construction standards – which, however, can implicate lower quality. Some authors propose medium-term public deficit spending as a solution. Others call for cross-subsidisation, e. g. through the establishment of special tax rate zones.[95] It also seems important to resolve the question of how to secure user payments. Often beneficiaries are not able to pay for the infrastructure and services. Thus, providing economic opportunities can contribute to the beneficiaries' ability to pay as can effective tenure arrangements (cf. Arnott 2008; Marx 2003; Soeker/Bhana 2011; Werlin 1999, 1528–1529).

Besides the questions of financing and cost recovery, it is also necessary to allow for the replicability and the scaling-up of *in situ* upgrading if this approach is meant to effectively work on a broader (e. g. city-wide) level. Of course, scaling-up severely depends on the availability of funds. However, other factors include political support, appropriate regulatory frameworks and the inclusion of the private and civil society sectors. Scaling-up thus also depends on the principles of decentralised governance to allow for greater efficacy (through power sharing, transparency, accountability) and again on participation to include the poor into the upgrading process (cf. Das/Takahashi 2009, 213–214; Payne/Majale 2004).[96]

Furthermore, the formalisation of informal settlements always implicates land registration and tenure formalisation. For the above mentioned reasons, it appears the need to consider if individual ownership is the most appropriate tenure form and to evaluate other forms of tenure (e. g. land lease, community ownership). Moreover, existing informal tenure arrangements need to be taken into account when tenure formalisation takes place, as different interest groups may claim an (informal) right to the land. It also has to be considered that tenure generally is a controversial issue: on the one hand it is a prerequisite for reducing social vulnerability (e. g. prevention of evictions), securing cost recovery (e. g. through fees and taxes) and the beneficiary community's commitment to the project. On the other hand the promise of development can lead to land invasions and/or land speculation and downward-raiding. And what is more, the registration of land can result in a complex and lengthy bureaucratic process and is sometimes subject to corruption (cf. Payne/Majale 2004; Werlin 1999, 1527–1528).

95 With regard to this Soeker/Bhana state that: "Internationally it has been demonstrated that wealthy citizens would gladly subsidise low-income housing, through taxes, if they are assured that their taxes will deliver decent housing to the poor" (2011, 9).

96 This also meets the fact that in general "[…] slum upgrading has evolved into a collaborative urban service provision and development approach that seeks participation by local government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and citizens" (Das/Takahashi 2009, 213).

Failed land registration and other failures that prevent 'successful' implementation of informal settlement upgrading often derive from administrative and capacity constraints and a lack of political will.[97] *In situ* upgrading is a complex undertaking and it takes a lot of skills and patience and "[...] requires a very powerful as well as humanistic bureaucracy to carry it out successfully [...]" (Werlin 1999). These preconditions are often unmet, which prevents the initiation of such projects in the first place or lead to project failure, as has been the case in Hangberg.

Regarding the South African context, Misselhorn (2008, 38f.) list a number of aspects that need consideration to overcome these constraints. Inter alia, he stresses the need for putting greater emphasis on skills, experiences and competencies in staff recruitment, ensuring continuity in decision-making and management systems, and enforcing constant monitoring and evaluation to hold public administrations accountable. He further stresses the need for fast-tracking approval processes, such as of environmental assessments and planning, and the need for creating single funding mechanisms to overcome bureaucratic constraints that result from the current need to acquire funding from different sources. Other aspects include the fast-tracking of land acquisition, long-term planning with regard to future population growth to reduce the need for informal settlements, and the cooperation of relevant government departments (e. g. those responsible for health, social and economic development). Interdepartmental cooperation in project management is important as it can secure "co-ordination of state planning, budgeting and accountability processes to create the possibility of more integrated support to informal settlements" (Marx 2003, 315).

Generating political will to engage with informal settlements in alternative ways is a further key aspect. It requires a change of mindsets to follow the paradigm and policy change that has occurred on the international as well as national level (in terms of the BNG plan and the UISP). It also requires the promotion of *in situ* upgrading as an alternative and in many cases more sustainable approach to informal settlements. This promotion could not only reduce NIMBYism but also political and/or administrative resistance to this type of informal settlement intervention and to generate broader support (cf. Huchzermeyer 2006; Pithouse 2009).

In situ upgrading might be most effective if it becomes part of a holistic and integrated development approach, which aims at combining physical with socio-economic development. Integrated development means the strengthening of social capital (e. g. networks, saving groups), human capital (e. g. education), financial capital (e. g. access to credit) and physical capital to address infrastructure and shelter (Smit 2006a, 118–120).

97 For a detailed analysis of the South African context see for example Misselhorn (2008).

> *"[Moreover] [...] while the primary objective of upgrading should be to reduce vulnerability, this should take place within a wider planning framework that seeks, ultimately, to achieve social integration and create a sustainable settlement [...]. For a settlement to meet both of these goals it has to satisfy two distinct needs. Firstly, it has to achieve internal cohesion. And secondly it has to be integrated into the surrounding areas [...]." (Abbott 2002b, 323)*

Finally, as *in situ* upgrading is a dynamic long-term process, it requires continuous support and a departure from the tendency to consider upgrading measures as being implementable within a classic project cycle. Marx suggests that:

> *"[...] the key action may not necessarily be one of 'improving' informal settlements but one of 'support' [...]. The emphasis on support [...] suggests that changing the quality of life of people in informal settlements is a creative process, rather than an event that can be completed in an 'upgrading project' and then considered dealt with [...]." (2003, 300)*

6 CONCLUSIONS

International housing policy and practice and with it the perception of informal settlements (and 'slums') underwent an evolutionary process in the past decades. While at first it was common to 'eradicate' these forms of housing and to replace them with modern public housing, over the decades the approach has changed.[98] Informal settlements were increasingly seen as 'part of the solution' to the housing crisis in many parts of the world. A paradigm change and a shift from the 'provider paradigm' to the 'support paradigm' took place and site and service as well as *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements became the new state-of-the-art concepts. Both concepts and their underlying principle of aided self help, however, have faced several constraints, which limited the success of related projects – although some projects achieved considerable success and gained international recognition, such as the *Orangi Pilot Project* in Pakistan. Nonetheless, despite a further international policy shift towards embracing reforms of housing finance and housing policy, both concepts are frequently applied. The 'support paradigm' is reflected by several international development principles, concepts (e. g. good governance) and agendas (e. g. MDGs, Habitat Agenda) and also has found its way into international housing practice. *In situ* upgrading, which is a main element of the 'support paradigm' and is promoted in many housing policies and academic papers, thus constitutes an important practical approach to the housing crisis in the 'Global South'.

In the post-apartheid era the South African housing discourse has also adopted the 'support paradigm'. However, the national housing programme followed a site and service approach including elements of the 'provider paradigm' (mass-delivery of single housing units), while the concept of *in situ* upgrading entered the debate only recently with the policy shift of 2004. It has to be stated, though, that currently it seems to remain a policy only, while its practical implementation faces several constraints. However, as it is increasingly acknowledged that the current practice of housing delivery will not reduce the national housing backlog, alternatives are being investigated and *in situ* upgrading might hence become more significant in the future. Due to its inherent principles *in situ* upgrading might, the matching circumstances provided, not only lead to improved housing and living conditions where it is applied, but might also contribute to the transformation of South Africa's socio-economically divided society and indeed to the creation of integrated and sustainable human settlements as envisioned in a number of policy documents.

It has been shown, though, that the concept of *in situ* upgrading can have severe limitations and produce its own constraints and conflicts or can reproduce existing ones. Success seems only likely if a number of preconditions are met, which are not only of physical but also of social and organisational nature. One

98 Nonetheless, evictions have remained a common practice in many countries as for example studies by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (2006) indicate.

of the most important – and often paradoxical – aspects seems to be the democratic participation and the cooperation of all project stakeholders. Continuous support beyond the project-cycle to allow for sustainable settlement development is another important prerequisite.

With the initiation of the PMF in Hangberg it appears that in this case 'steps towards the right direction' have been taken. Extensive cooperation between the community, government agencies and departments as well as other external supporters now provides a basis for the initiation or continuing of community development efforts, not only with regard to housing in the narrower sense. It remains to be proven whether the effects of this form of cooperative governance can lead to alleviating the housing problems in the area and whether the various social and economic developments that have been initiated can be 'successful' in the long-run. Furthermore, the questions arise how future population growth in Hout Bay can be dealt with – not only in Hangberg but also in the low-income settlement of Imizamo Yetu – and what impact this will have on the relationship between the different communities in the area. The 'microcosm' of Hout Bay therefore remains an interesting 'social laboratory', not only for the recent experiments with the concept of aided self-help but also for other strategies to achieve social transformation in South Africa, including economic development, social development, education and other aspects. Further research might engage with this.

In any case, for the local authorities – in Cape Town and beyond – the implementation of *in situ* upgrading persists to be a difficult task. Although many officials may have recognised the value of this support approach and are committed to its implementation, it tends to be limited by several practical, regulatory and institutional constraints (e. g. resulting from inappropriate planning standards, the prevalence of the current capital subsidy system and a lack of skills and resources). The future success of *in situ* upgrading, if possible and appropriate to implement, will thus significantly depend on the political will and on the ability to overcome these constraints – on the national/provincial level where policy formulation takes place as well as on the city/local level where municipalities are supposed to implement it.

Moreover, it must be stated that the concept of *in situ* upgrading – after all no uniform approach – is not a panacea for the housing problems in South Africa or the 'Global South' in general. It can be an important element of a support approach towards informal settlement intervention, though, that needs to be holistic, needs to adapt to the local context and needs to be accompanied by other complementary housing solutions when applied. Especially to cater for the future growth of urban populations, which implicates further informal settlement growth, upgrading alone will not be a sufficient measure. A 'twin-track approach' of upgrading and the provision of serviced sites (if and where appropriate) to accommodate additional population might be an opportunity (cf. Payne 2005).

The strengthening of rental housing programmes, such as provided for in current South African housing policy, might be another alternative.

Finally, as has been indicated, globalisation trends and urbanisation trends (in terms of population growth) as well as urban poverty, inequality and other social problems will continue to be a challenge for urban areas in the 'Global South'. They are likely to continue to restrict their respective administrations' capacity to address the housing problems of the poor. For the poor themselves living in urban areas will thus remain a struggle for land, housing and livelihoods, while informal settlements will, at least in the foreseeable future, persist to be a prevailing feature of most cities in the 'Global South'. They "are likely to stay where they are" (JOHNSON 2011, INTERVIEW) and they offer what neither the state nor the (formal) market could yet provide. This implicates a need to accept informal settlements and informality in general as an undeniable component of urban areas in the 'Global South' and eventually as 'part of the solution' to the global housing crisis. Support-driven informal settlement interventions would be a suitable response to this.

7 APPENDIX – INTERVIEW PARTNERS

Name*	Date of Interview	Postion/Description	Organisation
Byrne	3.6.2011	Manager	Local NGO
Donovan	4.5.2011	Engineer and Project Manager	Housing Directorate, City of Cape Town
du Plessis	29.4.2011	Resident of Hangberg	Hout Bay Civic Association, Peace and Mediation Forum
Flanagan	19.5.2011	Programme Leader	Local NGO
Fourie	1.5.2011	Resident of Hangberg	Hangberg *in situ* Development Association, Peace and Mediation Forum
Johnson	17.5.2011	Housing Consultant	Housing Directorate, City of Cape Town
Naidoo	17.6.2011	Attorney	Peace and Mediation Forum
Olivier	13.6.2011	Project Manager	Housing Directorate, City of Cape Town
Reynolds	[a] 27.5.2011 [b] 9.6.2011	Resident of Hangberg	Peace and Mediation Forum
Richards	10.5.2011	Resident of Hangberg	Hangberg *in situ* Development Association, Peace and Mediation Forum
Roberts	15.6.2011	Resident of Hangberg	Peace and Mediation Forum
Salim	2.6.2011	Resident of Hangberg	
Smith	14.6.2011	Engineer and Project Manager	Housing Directorate, City of Cape Town
van der Merwe	[a] 17.4.2011 [b] 12.5.2011 [c] 16.5.2011	Resident of Hangberg	Hangberg *in situ* Development Association, Peace and Mediation Forum
van Dyk	26.5.2011	Resident of Hangberg	Hout Bay Civic Association, Peace and Mediation Forum

* pseudonyms

ANNEX

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Despite its many challenges and limitations the concept of *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements has become one of the most favoured approaches to the housing crisis in the 'Global South'. Due to its inherent principles of incremental *in situ* development, prevention of relocations, protection of local livelihoods and democratic participation and cooperation, this approach is often perceived to be more sustainable than other housing approaches that often rely on quantitative housing delivery and top down planning methodologies. While this study does not question the benefits of the *in situ* upgrading approach, it seeks to identify problems of its practical implementation within a specific national and local context. The study discusses the origin and importance of this approach on the basis of a review of international housing policy development and analyses the broader political and social context of the incorporation of this approach into South African housing policy. It further uses insights from a recent case study in Cape Town to determine complications and conflicts that can arise when applying *in situ* upgrading of informal settlements in a complex local context. On that basis benefits and limitations of the *in situ* upgrading approach are specified and prerequisites for its successful implementation formulated.

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