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The Geometry of a Complex Institution

Unpacking the Meaning Structure of Results-Based Management
inside the French Development Agency

Supervisors and examiners

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of Jean-Paul Benzécri, who passed away on November 24, 2019, at the age of 87. He was a bright mind, mathematician and linguist, and the father of geometric data analysis, a statistical methodology that lets "the data speak for themselves" (Benzécri, 1973) and "thinks in terms of relations" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

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Abstract

Organizations incorporate the institutional demands from their environment in order to be deemed legitimate and survive. Yet, complexifying societies promulgate multiple and sometimes inconsistent institutional prescriptions. When these prescriptions collide, organizations are said to face "institutional complexity". How does an organization then incorporate incompatible demands? What are the consequences of institutional complexity for an organization? The literature provides contradictory conceptual and empirical insights on the matter. A central assumption, however, remains that internal incompatibilities generate tensions that, under certain conditions, can escalate into intractable conflicts, resulting in dysfunctionality and loss of legitimacy. The present research is an inquiry into what happens inside an organization when it incorporates complex institutional demands.

To answer this question, I focus on how individuals inside an organization interpret a complex institutional prescription. I examine how members of the French Development Agency interpret 'results-based management', a central but complex concept of organizing in the field of development aid. I use an inductive mixed methods design to systematically explore how different interpretations of results-based management relate to one another and to the organizational context in which they are embedded.

The results reveal that results-based management is a contested concept in the French Development Agency. I find multiple interpretations of the concept, which are attached to partly incompatible rationales about "who we are" and "what we do as an organization". These rationales nevertheless coexist as balanced forces, without escalating into open conflict. The analysis points to four reasons for this peaceful coexistence of diverging rationales inside one and the same organization: 1) individuals' capacity to manipulate different interpretations of a complex institutional demand, 2) the nature of interpretations, which makes them more or less prone to conflict, 3) the balanced distribution of rationales across the organizational sub-contexts and 4) the shared rules of interpretation provided by the larger socio-cultural context.

This research shows that an organization that incorporates institutional complexity comes to represent different, partly incompatible things to its members without being at war with itself. In doing so, it contributes to our knowledge of institutional complexity and organizational hybridity. It also advances our understanding of internal organizational legitimacy and of the translation of managerial concepts in organizations.

German Summary – Zusammenfassung

Sozialverantwortliche Firmen, kosteneffektive Krankenhäuser, leistungsfähige Administrationen, wettbewerbsfähige Schulen. Moderne Organisationen spiegeln institutionelle, teilweise widersprüchliche Anforderungen an sie wider. Diese Dissertation untersucht, was aus der Integration kollidierender Erwartungen resultiert.

Theoretischer Hintergrund und Fragestellung. Organisationen integrieren die institutionellen Anforderungen aus ihrem Umfeld, um Legitimität zu gewinnen oder aufrechtzuerhalten, denn Legitimität bedingt ihr Überleben. Allerdings werden die Anforderungen unserer immer komplexer werdender Gesellschaft zunehmend inkonsistent. Wenn Anforderungen kollidieren sind Organisationen mit „Institutioneller Komplexität" konfrontiert. Wie integriert eine Organisation konfligierende institutionelle Anforderungen? Was sind die Konsequenzen der institutionellen Komplexität für das innere Leben einer Organisation?

Die Literatur liefert widersprüchliche Einsichten zu diesem Phänomen. Dennoch bleibt eine zentrale Annahme, dass die intra-organisationale Repräsentation konfligierender Anforderungen in unlösbare Konflikte ausartet, und somit die Funktionalität einer Organisation, und letztendlich ihre Legitimität, beeinträchtigt. Diese Dissertation untersucht, was passiert, wenn eine Organisation eine komplexe Institution aus ihrem Umfeld integriert.

Theoretischer Ansatz. Um diese Frage zu beantworten analysiert die vorliegende Arbeit, Mitglieder einer Organisation eine komplexe institutionelle Anforderung interpretieren. Diese Arbeit verfolgt einen induktiven, interpretativ-relationalen Ansatz auf der Mikro-Ebene: es gilt, die Bedeutungsstruktur von komplexen Institutionen in Organisationen zu rekonstruieren, die den sichtbaren Strukturen und Praktiken unterliegt.

Fall und Methoden. Anhand qualitativer und quantitativer Methoden wird systematisch erforscht, wie Mitglieder der Französischen Entwicklungsagentur (*Agence Française de Développement* – AFD) das Konzept des Wirkungsorientierten Managements interpretieren. Wirkungsorientiertes Management ist ein zentrales, jedoch komplexes Organisationskonzept im Feld der Entwicklungshilfe. Dieses Konzept steht nicht nur im Widerspruch zu weiteren institutionellen Anforderungen in diesem Bereich, sondern auch zu sich selbst.

Um die Bedeutungsstruktur von Wirkungsorientiertem Management in der AFD zu explorieren, werden im ersten Schritt die interpretativen Konstrukte – sogenannte *Frames* – aus 41 Interviews mit Mitgliedern der AFD inkrementell rekonstruiert. *Frames* beinhalten sowohl

eine Definition von Wirkungsorientiertem Management sowie eine Auffassung darüber, wie die AFD auf die Anforderung reagieren sollte, wirkungsorientiertes Management umzusetzen. Diese erste Analyse beantwortet die Frage: welche unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen hat Wirkungsorientiertes Management in der AFD? Die *Frames* werden, im zweiten Schritt, anhand einer multiplen Korrespondenzanalyse mit weiteren diskursiven Aspekten und miteinander in Relation gesetzt. Die weiteren diskursiven Variablen sind Identitätskonstruktion, Emotionalität und (De)-Legitimierung. Diese Analyse beantwortet die Frage: in welcher Relation stehen die unterschiedlichen Interpretationen von wirkungsorientiertem Management zueinander und wie hoch ist das Konfliktpotential zwischen ihnen? Im dritten Schritt werden nochmals anhand einer multiplen Korrespondenzanalyse die unterliegenden Faktoren der rekonstruierten Bedeutungsstruktur untersucht. Hierzu werden Clusters von Individuen mit ähnlichen Interpretationsmustern gebildet und deren bezeichnende Merkmale herausgearbeitet. Diese Analyse beantwortet die Frage: wer denkt wie über Wirkungsorientiertes Management und wo in der AFD? Das Ziel der Rekonstruktion der Bedeutungsstruktur und derer Einbettung in die Organisation ist, herauszufinden, ob inkompatible Interpretationen in der Organisation vorhanden sind und, wenn ja, warum diese nicht in einen Konflikt eskalieren.

Ergebnisse. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf, dass wirkungsorientiertes Management ein umstrittenes Konzept innerhalb der AFD ist. Multiple und teilweise konfligierende Interpretationen dieses zentralen Konzepts koexistieren in der Organisation, welche zu widersprüchlichen Auffassungen der organisationalen Identität und der präferierten Vorgehensweise bezüglich Wirkungsorientierten Managements führen. Dennoch koexistieren diese Interpretationen friedlich und die AFD bleibt die zentrale, legitime und funktionale Organisation der Französischen Entwicklungshilfepolitik.

Die Analyse deutet auf vier Erklärungen für die friedliche Koexistenz entgegengesetzter Interpretationen in der AFD. Erstens, Individuen sind in der Lage, unterschiedliche Interpretation von komplexen institutionellen Anforderungen zu nutzen, je nach argumentativer Situation. Zweitens, die Natur der interpretativen Konstrukte macht diese unterschiedlich anfällig für Konflikte: während manche neutralisierend wirken sind andere eher polarisierend. Drittens, die differenzierte Distribution von Interpretationen in unterschiedlichen organisationalen Subkontexten separiert und gleicht aus potenziell kollidierende Interpretationen. Viertens, die divergierenden Interpretationen sind nichtsdestotrotz in einem gemeinsamen, weiteren soziokulturellen Kontext (hier die Französische politische Kultur) eingebettet, welcher gemeinsame Interpretationsregeln bietet und somit konfliktreiche Fauxpas verhindert.

Schlussfolgerungen und Beitrag. Insgesamt zeigt diese Forschung, dass eine Organisation, die institutionelle Komplexität integriert, sehr unterschiedliche und teilweise inkompatible Gebilde für ihre Mitglieder repräsentieren kann. Entgegengesetzte Auffassungen einer und der selben Institution können in einer Organisation koexistieren und balancieren einander aus, ohne zu eskalieren. Diese Dissertation weist hierfür auf vier Erklärungen hin.

Zusätzlich zur Forschung über Institutionelle Komplexität sind die hier gewonnenen Erkenntnisse von Bedeutung für weitere Themen der Organisationsforschung wie organisationale Hybridität, interne Legitimität oder die Translation von Managementkonzepten in Organisationen. Die Dissertation leistet zudem einen wichtigen methodologischen Beitrag durch die Veranschaulichung der besonderen Eignung von multipler Korrespondenzanalyse für die Untersuchung von Bedeutungssystemen.

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List of Abbreviations

ADD	*Avis Développement Durable* – Sustainable Development Opinion
AES	*Appui Environmental et Social* – Environnemental and Social Risk Management
AHC	Ascending Hierarchical Clustering
AFD	*Agence Française de Développement* – French Development Agency
ANT	Actor Network Theory
DfID	British Department for International Development
GARD	Gestion Axée sur les Résultats de Développement – Management Based on Development Results
GDA	Geometric Data Analysis
MCA	Multiple Correspondence Analysis
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RBM	Results-Based Management
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNDG	United Nations Development Group

Chapter 1: Introduction to a study on the manifestation of institutional complexity inside an organization

Socially responsible firms, performant administrations, cost-effective hospitals, competitive schools. A modern organization needs to be "so many things to so many people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war with itself" (Kerr, 2001, p. 7). The present work is an inquiry into what happens inside an organization that incorporates incompatible expectations about who it ought to be and what it ought to do.

This study explores the implications of institutional complexity inside an organization. It is aimed at furthering our understanding of how an organization can incorporate conflicting institutional prescriptions from its environment. I use an inductive approach to examine how the members of a development aid organization interpret the pervasive but complex concept of "results-based management". I systematically analyse the interpretive constructs individuals use to make sense of this concept, as well as the relations between these constructs. The analysis yields explanations for the coexistence of multiple and partly incompatible rationales inside one and the same organization.

1.1. Topic and context: the implications of institutional complexity for organizations

Neo-institutionalist theory is based on the premise that organizations gain legitimacy by conforming to institutional prescriptions, or "rationalized myths", from their environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional prescriptions are taken-for-granted rules that determine the appropriate behaviour of organizations. For example, firms are traditionally expected to make a profit, while hospitals are expected to heal patients. Yet, it is also acknowledged that organizations' environments have become increasingly heterogeneous over the past decades, putting multiple, sometimes incompatible institutional demands on them (D'Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Firms are not only expected to make a profit, but also to be socially and environmentally responsible. Hospitals are not only expected to heal patients, but also to be cost-effective. Organizations confronted with conflicting prescriptions from their environment face "institutional complexity" (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Vermeulen, Zietsma, Greenwood, & Langley, 2016). Institutional complexity increases as the boundaries

between the domains of our modern society fade away, e.g. between private and public life or between the social and commercial domains (Vermeulen et al., 2016).

By confronting organizations with incompatible demands, institutional complexity generates internal tensions and affects their decisions (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015). Since the early 2010s, a vibrant line of research has attempted to conceptualize the consequences of institutional complexity for organizations, to inquire how they manage tensions between incompatible prescriptions and to predict their response to complex institutional pressure (e.g. Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Besharov & Smith, 2014; Binder, 2007; Fiol, Pratt, & O'Connor, 2009; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010; Smith & Besharov, 2019; Vermeulen et al., 2016).

Many empirical studies on the conflicting institutional demands on organizations, however, have focused on two presumably incompatible prescriptions (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinnek, 2017; Greenwood et al., 2011). Especially studies on the incorporation of New Public Management principles in public organizations have typically emphasized the dichotomy between professionalism and managerialism. This dichotomy, however useful for immediately apprehending social conflicts, does not enable one to account for the nuanced effects of institutional complexity in organizations (Bezes et al., 2012). In order to fully comprehend the implications of institutional complexity for organizations, there is a need for empirical insights into the multiplicity of rationales at work inside organizations, and into the degree to which these are incompatible (Greenwood et al., 2011).

The present research attempts to overcome this limitation by inductively exploring the manifestation of institutional complexity in a public organization. In doing so, I seek to further our understanding of what happens in an organization confronted with institutional complexity.

1.2. Questions and objectives for exploring how institutional complexity manifests inside an organization

It is assumed, on the one hand, that organizations incorporate institutional demands in order to be considered legitimate. It can be observed, on the other hand, that institutional demands on organizations become increasingly complex. It thus logically ensues that organizations themselves must display internal incompatibilities. Is this so? The first aim of this research is to

substantiate the proposition that **an organization confronted with institutional complexity displays internal incompatibilities**.

If this is the case, however, the question arises as to how an organization subsists despite internal incompatibilities. Complex prescriptions give rise to incompatible rationales for action in organizations. For example, in hospitals, the need to heal patients effectively and the need to heal patients cost-effectively may lead to different decisions concerning the appropriate moment to discharge them. What are the consequences of such internal incompatibilities for organizations?

The literature provides contradictory insights regarding the consequences of internal incompatibilities. Research on hybrid organizations, that is, organizations that combine forms, rationales or identities that do not conventionally go together, tends to assume that hybridity leads to tensions in organizations (Battilana et al., 2017). In particular, it is assumed that the presence of equally central but conflicting rationales eventually jeopardizes the functionality of organizations by escalating into intractable conflicts or by paralyzing the organization (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010). Driven by this assumption, scholars of hybrid organizations have examined how organizations can manage the tensions resulting from conflicting rationales or identities (Fiol et al., 2009; Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015; Smith & Besharov, 2019). On the opposite side, several case studies suggest that organizations and their members are capable of a bricolage integrating different presumably incompatible rationales; that is, they can use and mix rationales according to their immediate needs (Binder, 2007; McPherson & Sauder, 2013).

Although not explicitly concerned with institutional complexity in organizations, research on organizational discourse provides interesting insights into the relation between adversary discourses inside organizations. In particular, scholars assume a hegemonic order to result from contestations because the dominant discourse becomes reified to the detriment of its adversaries (Grant & Hardy, 2004; Iedema & Wodak, 1999).

Contrary to this, studies of translation rooted in the actor-network theory suggest that multiple meanings necessarily result from the negotiations of actors. This body of research is also not explicitly concerned with institutional complexity. Yet, many studies have analysed how managerial concepts are translated into specific socio-cultural contexts, including inside organizations. The theory of translation assumes that concepts or ideas have no absolute meaning.

Rather, they are interpreted in the local contexts to which they travel (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). From the perspective of actor-network theory, multiple, possibly incompatible meanings result from translation processes. These meanings coexist in a given context (Callon, 2012). However, they are not subject to open conflict because they have become "black-boxed" over time (Latour & Callon, 1981). Contradictions between meanings resurface when incidents happen: black boxes open and actors renegotiate meanings (Callon, 1984). Accordingly, studies of translation rooted in actor-network theory observe diverging translations of one and the same managerial concept inside organizations (Doorewaard & van Bijsterveld, 2001; Jensen, Sandström, & Helin, 2009; Kelemen, 2000).

To sum up, the literature provides contradictory answers to the question of what happens when organizations incorporate complex institutional demands from their environment. Therefore, by looking into the black box, the present research aims at substantiating the proposition that **an organization displays incompatibilities in the incorporation of complex institutional demands**. It further aims at answering the question: **how do incompatible rationales coexist inside an organization without escalating into conflicts?**

1.3. An intra-organizational, micro-level and interpretive approach to institutional complexity in an organization

To explore how institutional complexity manifests in an organization, I adopt an intra-organizational, micro-level and interpretive approach. More schematically:

I explore how individuals inside an organization interpret a complex institutional demand.

There are three main reasons for choosing an intra-organizational, micro-level and interpretive approach to institutional complexity in the organization.

First, organizations have become so institutionalized (Zucker, 1983) that researchers need to be careful not to reify them, i.e. to attribute to them thing- or human-like characteristics (Baum & Rowley, 2005; Suddaby, Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer, & Zilber, 2010). It is not the firm or the hospital as a whole that responds to institutional demands from its environment.

Organizations remain socially constructed systems of meaning (Barley & Kunda, 1992). They are "physical, social and mental spaces" (Hernes, 2014, p. 59) that enable and constrain human activity (Aldrich, 1999). In this research, I adopt an intra-organizational perspective and conceive the organization as the social context that shapes the way its members interpret complex institutions. That is:

I explore how individuals inside an organization interpret a complex institutional demand.

Second, people are the "guts of organizations" and, as such, the link between the organization and macro-level scripts (Stinchcombe, 1997). People in organizations are those who act and think in response to macro-level prescriptions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Zilber, 2002). They are also those who concretise these prescriptions into practices and whose practices may become institutionalized (Powell & Colyvas, 2017, p. 312). Because organizational members connect the organization with institutions, I focus on them as key for understanding how institutional complexity manifests in an organization. In this study, I therefore adopt a micro-level perspective to capture how organizational members cope with complex institutional demands:

I explore how individuals inside an organization interpret a complex institutional demand.

Thirdly, institutional prescriptions do not come to organizations "ready-to-wear" (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002). Actors embedded in their specific socio-cultural context – here, in their organization – ascribe meaning to these prescriptions and derive appropriate practices (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). Attributing meaning to abstract scripts is thus not trivial because "social actors act on the basis of meaning, and not, for example, from coercion" (Hernes 2014, p. 99). Interpretations determine the concrete decisions, the course of action in organizations (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012). Interpretation is thus a form of individual agency and a political struggle over the organizational order (Czarniawska, 1997; Hallett, 2003; Zilber, 2002). In order to understand how institutional complexity manifests inside an organization, it is therefore crucial to capture the different ways people frame institutional demand with regard to their organization. Thus, in this research:

I explore how individuals inside an organization interpret a complex institutional demand.

Neo-institutionalist research on meaning has remained close to the cognitive aspects of meaning-making (Zilber, 2017). Meanings, however, are intimately linked with further discursive aspects, such as emotionality, identity and legitimization (Gamson, 1992; Goodwin, Jasper, &

Polletta, 2004; Jasper, 1997). These three aspects are highly relevant for understanding the escalation potential between interpretations, as they make them more or less able to "put fire in the belly and iron in the soul" of people (Gamson, 1992, p. 32). In exploring how individuals interpret a complex institutional demand, I therefore consider the discursive aspects of emotionality, identity and legitimization.

Furthermore, different interpretations of an issue do not stand alone inside an organization. Rather, they arise and evolve in relation to one another to constitute the organization (Hernes, 2014). Beyond adopting an interpretive perspective, I therefore focus on the relations between interpretations inside the organization, that is, on the *meaning structure* of complex institutions (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). In this research, I define the meaning structure as the arrangement of and relations between meanings anchored in the organization as a socio-cultural space. As such, the meaning structure has the potential to connect semantic and organizational aspects and to reveal how incompatible interpretations interact inside an organization.

This research is an inductive inquiry into how institutional complexity manifests in an organization. I propose a micro-level, intra-organizational and interpretive approach to this phenomenon. More concretely, I explore the meaning structure of a complex institution inside an organization. Figure 1 provides an overview of the research approach and design.

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Figure 1: Overview of the research approach and design

Concepts and premises	Institutional complexity has more nuanced effects than extant literature accounts for	Individuals are the link between organizations and macro-level scripts	Organizations are the context of interpretation in which individuals evolve	People negotiate the meaning of institutional demand. Meanings exist in relation to one another.
Approach	Inductive	Micro-level	Intra-organizational	Interpretive
	I explore how	*individuals*	*inside an organization*	*interpret a complex institutional demand.*
Object		Organizational members' attribution of meaning to complex institutional demand	Organizational members' position and trajectory in the organization	The **meaning structure** of complex institutional demand as meanings in relation and embedded in the organization
Mixed method design	Frame analysis to **reconstruct** the **meanings** of complex Institutional demand	Multiple correspondence analysis to explore the **relations between meanings**	Multiple correspondence analysis and clustering to explore **how meanings are embedded in the organization**

1.4. A mixed methods design for exploring the meaning structure of results-based management in the French Development Agency

To substantiate the proposition guiding this study and answer the research question, I examine the meaning structure of the concept of results-based management in the French Development Agency (AFD). In the following, I briefly expose why results-based management in the AFD constitutes an instrumental case. I then provide an overview of the mixed methods design used to reconstruct and explore the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD. I briefly explain how each of the three analytical steps is expected to contribute to the overall objective of this research.

1.4.1. The case: a complex and institutionalized concept of organizing within a complexified organization

Results-based management is a concept that implies the focus of organizational activity and actors on results (UNDG, 2011). It has become a central and taken-for-granted principle of organizing in the field of development aid. It reflects the New Public Management trend towards more effectiveness and efficiency in the public sector. However, it conflicts with further historical and contemporary institutions in this field, as well as with itself (Earl, Carden, Patton, & Smutylo, 2001; Eyben, Guijt, Roche, & Shutt, 2015; Sjöstedt, 2013; Vähämäki, Schmidt, & Molander, 2011). This makes results-based management a case of both inter- and intra-institutional complexity. Results-based management thus confronts aid organizations with contradictory scripts in their quest for legitimacy.

As a central institutional prescription, results-based management has been incorporated by most development aid organizations, including the AFD. The AFD is a public agency created in 1941 and the main operator of French development assistance. It is located at the periphery of the French state, where the government has tended to induce rationalizing reforms, following the New Public Management doctrine (Rouban, 2008). Indeed, over the past 15 years, the AFD has set up structures and instruments of results-based management and hired specialized staff. Yet, due to its Napoleonic tradition (Peters, 2008), French bureaucracy is generally considered to be resistant to New Public Management (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). This makes the case of the AFD particularly instrumental for observing struggles over the interpretation of results-based management.

1.4.2. An inductive mixed methods design

I proceed with a three-step design to explore the interpretations of results-based management in the AFD. I am interested in the way people inside the AFD define results-based management and how they position themselves with respect to this concept. Do multiple interpretations exist and potentially conflict with one another inside the AFD? Then, if this is the case, why do these conflicting interpretations not escalate into conflicts? Based on 41 interviews conducted during a research stay at the AFD between April and July 2017, I reconstruct the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD.

For the first step, I conduct a "frame analysis", that is, I reconstruct the different interpretations available to individuals within the AFD to make sense of results-based management. In struggles over meaning, frames are interpretive constructs that provide individuals with a definition, a solution and a motivation to act about the issue at stake (Snow & Benford, 2000). Concretely, they constitute different versions of what results-based management is and what the AFD should do about it, i.e. varying rationales for action that are anchored in different broader cultural beliefs and rules (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). By investigating the repertoire of available frames, this analysis aims to substantiate the proposition that organizations display internal incompatibilities in the incorporation of institutional complexity.

In the second step, I use multivariate statistics to explore how these frames systematically relate to the three discursive variables that affect their conflict potential: emotionality, identity and legitimation. To do so, I use multiple correspondence analysis, an explorative statistical method particularly adapted to measuring and visualizing meaning structures (Mohr, 1998). Broadly speaking, multiple correspondence analysis places the categories in a dataset in a multi-dimensional space according to the following principle: frequently co-occurring categories are plotted close together, while rarely co-occurring categories are plotted farther apart (Le Roux, 2014; Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). This method is thus suited for analysing how differently the frames are interwoven with emotionality, identity and legitimation. The results of this analysis provide insights into the different conflict potentials between opposing frames. This contributes to answering the research question regarding how incompatible rationales can coexist within an organization.

In the third and final step, I relate the frames of results-based management to the characteristics of interviewees using them. By means of another multiple correspondence analysis, followed by a cluster analysis, I build groups of like-minded people based on their use of frames. I then explore variables related to their career and position within the organization. Schematically, this analysis yields a picture of who thinks what and where in the organization. This third analytical step is expected to provide insights as to whether and how meanings are hierarchized and compartmentalized throughout the organization, explaining why conflicting meanings coexist without escalating.

This design, summarized in Figure 2, enables me to systematically connect meanings with further discursive variables and with the features of the organization. In other words, it enables me to inductively reconstruct the meaning structure of a complex institution. As such, it constitutes an innovative way of exploring the implications of institutional complexity inside organizations and, more generally, of apprehending meaning in neo-institutionalist research.

Figure 2: Overview of the sequential mixed methods design used to reconstruct the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD

1.5.   Structure of this study

The following chapter lays out the theoretical dimensions of this research. I describe the concept of institutional complexity and the resulting complexification of organizations, leading to the proposition and research question driving this thesis. I then review the

literature related to the implications of institutional complexity inside organizations. In view of the contradictory insights, I propose an intra-organizational, micro-level and interpretive framework for studying the meaning structure of a complex institution within an organization.

Chapter 3 presents the selected case and the methods used to reconstruct the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD. I first describe the centrality and complexity of this concept of organization in the field of development aid. I then present the AFD as a complexified organization that has progressively introduced reforms towards results-based management over the past 15 years. The remaining part of the chapter is dedicated to describing the methods selected to reconstruct the meaning structure of results-based management, as well as the operationalization of the variables used in the multiple correspondence analyses.

In Chapter 4, I present the results of the three analyses, each followed by a preliminary discussion of the elements of the meaning structure that substantiate and explain the coexistence of incompatible frames of results-based management in the AFD. The conclusion of this chapter summarizes the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD.

The concluding chapter is divided into two sections. I begin with a structured discussion of the implications of the main findings for our understanding of how institutional complexity can manifest inside an organization, and beyond this, for research on organizational hybridity, translation and internal legitimacy. Based on these implications and the limitations of the present research, I outline directions for future theoretical and empirical research in these domains. Whenever possible, practical implications are derived from the findings. Finally, I conclude by summarizing the entire thesis and emphasizing its theoretical, methodological and practical contributions.

Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical framework

The basic assumption of neo-institutionalism is that "organizations structurally reflect socially constructed reality", a reality which has become increasingly complex in modern societies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977 referring to Berger & Luckmann 1967). Organizations form or expand to conform to the institutionalized rules from their environment because conformity confers the legitimacy necessary to their survival. While there is overall agreement on this proposition among scholars of neo-institutionalism, the effects of complex institutional pressure on organizations are theorized quite differently, from systematic isomorphism to total variation in the formal structures, practices and meanings ascribed to institutions.

This chapter begins by briefly recalling the basic theoretical insights of neo-institutionalism on organizations, before turning to the mutually reinforcing complexification of institutions and organizations. After describing this dialectical complexification, this chapter develops the proposition that complex organizations incorporating complex institutionalized myths display internal multiplicity and even incompatibility. The literature reviewed does not consistently support this proposition. One central assumption is that durable contestation jeopardizes the functionality of organizations and, eventually, their survival. The second part of this chapter provides a framework for conceptualizing and capturing the effects of institutional complexity on a modern organization.

2.1. Fundamental insight of neo-institutionalism: the search for legitimacy

Modern organizations respond to institutional demands from their environment by establishing and maintaining formal structures, providing them with the legitimacy necessary for their survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Legitimacy is thereby understood as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). This foundational premise of neo-institutionalist theory is a significant departure from efficiency and rationality oriented approaches towards a constructionist perspective on the life and evolution of organizations in modernized societies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Organizational behaviour is explained by the conformity to institutions. Institutions are taken-for-granted macro-level scripts or "rationalized myths" (DiMaggio & Powell,

1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizations conform to institutional rules "because other types of behavior are inconceivable; routines are followed because they are taken for granted as 'the way we do these things'" (Scott, 2014, p. 57). As a result of the incorporation of institutionalized rules, organizations become isomorphic with their institutional environment and with one another (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

The proposition that organizational isomorphism with the environment is rewarded with legitimacy and survival has remained central and consensual in institutional theory. Beyond this central claim, Meyer and Rowan also assumed more rationalized myths to be found in modernized societies, due to the complexification of social networks.Thus, modern organizations face ever-growing and inconsistent institutional demands (1977). The following section discusses the dialectical construction of institutional and organizational complexity.

2.2. The dialectics of institutional and organizational complexity

"Institutional environments are often pluralistic and societies promulgate sharply inconsistent myths" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 356). The idea that organizations face different institutional prescriptions from their environment has accompanied neo-institutionalist research since its early days. The environment of organizations is not only considered to be complex, but also to complexify, as modernization progresses and social domains become increasingly permeable.

The modernization of society implies the diversification and multiplication of institutionalized rules, meaning that organizations are confronted with ever more and at times conflicting institutional pressure. Over the past decades, research on organization has consistently documented the pluralization and complexification of ongoingly constructed institutions. From a dialectical point of view, this complexity both causes and results from intra-organizational complexification. In this section and based on the dialectical complexification of organizations and their environment, I formulate the proposition driving this research.

2.2.1. Institutional pluralism and complexity

In the past decades, the "pervasive spread of rationalizing trends in society" has multiplied institutional influences on organizations, notably involving the rise of the transparency and

accountability myths (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 483). This evolution of society, driven by the spread of market principles onto the public and non-profit domains, encompasses the explosion of audit and the ubiquity of commensuration (Espeland & Stevens, 1998; Power, 1997; Supiot, 2015).

Moreover, "as boundaries between firms, industries, public and private lives are fading", it does not suffice for organizations to conform to the institutional scripts associated with one domain, sector or industry (Vermeulen et al., 2016, p. 278). Rather, they make strategic decisions under the simultaneous influence of multiple institutional prescriptions. Kraatz and Block have prominently labelled this phenomenon "institutional pluralism" and defined it as

> "the situation faced by an organization that operates within multiple institutional spheres. If institutions are broadly understood as 'the rules of the game' that direct and circumscribe organizational behaviour, then the organization confronting institutional pluralism plays in two or more games at the same time. Such an organization is subject to multiple regulatory regimes, embedded within multiple normative orders, and/or constituted by more than one cultural logic. It is a participant in multiple discourses and/or a member of more than one institutional category. It thus possesses multiple, institutionally derived identities which are conferred upon it by different segments of its pluralistic environment." (Kraatz & Block, 2008, p. 243)

Institutional pluralism may remain unproblematic or even advantageous as long as the multiple institutions do not imply contradictory structures and practices for organizations (Meyer & Höllerer, 2016). However, when institutional prescriptions collide, organizations are confronted with "institutional complexity" (Greenwood et al., 2011). Collisions between prescriptions may occur both between and within institutions, as the remaining part of this section outlines.

Inter-institutional complexity

Scholars have not only paid attention to the multiplicity of institutional demands on organizations, but also to their incompatibility (D'Aunno et al., 1991; Hoffman, 1999; Reay & Hinings, 2009). In their 1985 book on the Power of Theory, Friedland and Alford already outlined the inherent contradictions between the logics underlying the core institutional orders of modern western societies: capitalism, bureaucracy and democracy (Alford & Friedland, 1985; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 101). Each institutional order has a specific logic, defined as "the set of material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes [the] organizing principles [of the institutional order] and which is available to organizations

and individuals to elaborate" (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). Contradictory logics not only manifest across, but also within social domains or organizational fields, resulting in contradictory prescriptions for organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991). This situation has been coined "institutional complexity" (Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011).

Field fragmentation, that is, the penetration of a field by uncoordinated organizations or social actors, leads to conflicting institutional demands and, ultimately, to the expansion of administrative structures (Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1987; Pache & Santos, 2010). Complexity in fields may arise between and within institutions. Inter-institutional complexity emerges and grows in organizational fields over time as institutionalized rules permeate them. New organizations bring in new ideas which may temporarily or durably coexist with older ones (Hoffman, 1999; Reay & Hinings, 2009). When new logics supersede older ones, this does not necessarily imply the full disappearance of former institutions (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Rather, established institutions are littered with elements of abandoned and alternative institutions (Schneiberg 2007). Thus, with time and within mature fields, "institutional complexity unfolds, unravels and re-forms, creating different circumstances to which organizations must respond" (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 319).

Intra-institutional complexity

In addition to the fact that contradictory institutions can be relevant in one specific context, several authors have argued that complexity also evolves intra-institutionally (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Meyer & Höllerer, 2014). Intra-institutional complexity describes a situation in which "conflicting institutional demands […] arise *within the same* institutional order" (Meyer & Höllerer, 2016, p. 380). In their study of medical education, Dunn and Jones find the longtime coexistence of two logics within the same profession, against the assumption that professions are guided by one logic (2010). Similarly, Meyer and Höllerer find that the variation in the meaning attached to the concept of Shareholder Value in the Austrian context depends on competing institutional logics (2010). Schneiberg analyses the US economy and finds that institutional paths entail the possibility of change because they are littered with remnants of alternative or failed institutional paths, which carry the potential of endogenous change (2007).

Moreover, intra-institutional confusion may arise over time as the practices and labels attached to them change, rendering the core of the institution increasingly difficult to grasp (Erlingsdóttir & Lindberg, 2005). As Meyer and Höllerer put it:

"How long can we think of a concept as "transformed" or "translated," and when is it to be regarded as "different" altogether? What characteristics constitute "family resemblance," what is the "genotype" of an institution that is held constant during all the transformations?" (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010, p. 1259)

This specific, intra-institutional type of complexity has been neglected in neo-institutionalist research, although it is as frequent as inter-institutional complexity (Meyer & Höllerer, 2016, p. 381).

2.2.2. Organizational complexity

Scholars have become interested in how organizations maintain their legitimacy by responding to multiple and conflicting prescriptions from their environment. Overall, the research points to a complexification of organizations, both within and between them. This section reviews the literature concerned with the structures and strategies of organizations responding to complex institutional demands.

Expanding and decoupling formal structures

In their seminal article of 1977, Meyer and Rowan already acknowledged the conflicting demands on organizations. They posited that, to respond to inconsistent demands, organizations expand their domain of activities and decouple inconsistent structures not only from practices, but also from each other (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This latter form of decoupling – between structures – has been less picked up on by the subsequent literature than decoupling between the structures and practices.

"Policy-practice decoupling" refers to the fact that, in order to overcome the structural inconsistencies between institutionalized rules and technical needs, organizations decouple their formal structures from their practices as a way to signalize their conformity to external demands, while ensuring the effective achievement of their actual goals (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Formal structures in the form of instruments, units or procedures feature as celebration of the rationalized myth. Furthermore, rationalized professions with specific training and certification emerge and are integrated into organizations to signalize the delegation of practices to professionals. Organizational participants act in a logic of confidence and good faith to maintain this façade, minimizing inspection and evaluation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As mentioned above,

Meyer and Rowan not only suggest that formal structures are decoupled from practices, but also that formal structures are decoupled from each other to overcome inconsistences between rationalized myths. Decoupling formal structures from each other has the advantage of enabling organizations to mobilize external support from a larger number of potentially opposing constituencies. Yet, it also leads to the expansion of specialized formal structures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357).

To Bromley and Powell, the emphasis on transparency and accountability in modern societies has increased the pressure on organizations to actually align their practices with their formal structures (2012). This has led to practices that correspond to the formal structures, but that are decoupled from the actual goals of organizations. They coined this phenomenon "means-ends decoupling". As a consequence, organizations dedicate resources to practices that do not lead to the achievement of their core goals. According to the authors, the fact that formal structures actually lead to activities contributes to resource-intensive organizational complexity, heterogeneity and a permanent state of reform.

Beyond expansion, decoupling, professionalization and heterogeneity, organizational reactions to institutional complexity may take the form of compartmentalization, that is, the disconnection of specific units from the rest of the organization (Greenwood et al., 2011). In her study of departments in a social care organization, Binder shows how an organizational sub-unit is buffered from the rationalizing and bureaucratizing prescriptions of the state by getting funding from other sources (2007). Cooper et al. further advance a geological metaphor to describe how organizational structures are layered upon each other in response to shifts in the institutional context (1996). As a result, "what is exposed at the surface of the organization is the result of a complex and historical process of faults and disruptions" (Cooper et al., 1996, p. 624). Over time, the formalization of changing institutional demands does not lead to the replacement, but to the sedimentation of formal structures. Thus, complexity grows horizontally through compartmentalization and vertically through sedimentation.

Overall, these approaches on the formalization of institutional demands into organizational structures emphasize the continuous complexification of organizations in response to conflicting institutional demands.

A panoply of strategic responses

These approaches assume a rather passive role of organizations as receptors of institutional prescriptions. Yet, increasing institutional complexity makes it impossible for organizations to comply with all demands from their environment (Pache & Santos, 2010). This implies that there is a certain room for variety and strategic agency in the way organizations manage conflicting demands. Some scholars have focused on predicting how organizations respond to institutional pressure.

Indeed, further theoretical developments have taken distance from the rather passive and isomorphic view of organizations to emphasize their diverse strategic engagement with the legitimate rules (Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017). These authors contend that organizations are more than the formal instantiations of their institutionalized environment. Oliver has differentiated five types and fifteen tactics of strategic organizational responses to institutional pressure, reaching from passive acquiescence to active resistance (1991). This typology leaves more space for inter-organizational diversity in the incorporation of rationalized myths than the systematic establishment of formal structures reflecting institutionalized rules. Pache and Santos have elaborated on this typology by emphasizing the fragmentation of institutional demands on organizations (2010). Looking at the nature of the demand, as well as the intra-organizational power structures as determinants of organizations' strategic response, they predict that institutional demands heterogeneously represented inside the organization and related to organizational goals are likely to lead to strong resistance. Similarly, Greenwood et al. contend that organizations experience and respond to institutional complexity differently since the repertoire of responses available to them depends on their position on the organizational field, as well as their organizational attributes in terms of structure, ownership and governance and identity (2011). Finally, Bertels and Lawrence extend the existing typologies of responses and find that organizations' response to complex institutional pressure depends on the institutional biographies of individuals making sense of them (2016).

As many responses as organizations responding

Besides the agentic and the isomorphic perspectives on organizations, the theory of translation contends that the response of organizations to institutional pressure is necessarily unique, as translation implies the continuous and simultaneous movement and transformation of abstract templates across settings (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Sahlin

& Wedlin, 2008). Because actors are embedded in a specific socio-cultural context, which provides the "editing rules" for interpreting these ideas, the incorporation of "circulated ideas that have become rational myths" necessarily differs from one place to the other (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008, p. 219). Imitation necessarily involves modification and uniqueness.

Likewise, Ocasio and Radoynovska argue that organizations interpret the complexity of their environment in different ways, which leads to different strategies of response (2016). In their view, institutional complexity leads organizations to respond with different prioritizations and combinations of logics, resulting in a high heterogeneity – rather than isomorphism – in the way organizations incorporate multiple demands.

To sum up, institutional complexity leads to complexity, both within and between organizations. On the one hand, organizations confronted with conflicting institutional demands become increasingly complex through processes of expansion, compartmentalization, sedimentation and professionalization of their formal structure. On the other hand, the degree to which organizations incorporate contradictory rationalizing myths depends on their specific situation, context and attributes, opening up a multitude of possible responses, reaching from the rejection to the conformity to institutional prescriptions. The responses of organizations are not only varied but potentially unique as the formalization or strategic response of organizations require their context-bound interpretation.

2.2.3. Feedback effect

Institutional and organizational complexification is not a unidirectional effect. Although less literature has tackled the question, some scholars have suggested that organizational reactions to complexity feed back on institutional pluralism. In other words, bottom-up effects also unfold on the organization-field or local-global path (Drori, Höllerer, & Walgenbach, 2014).

Studies inquiring processes of "tight coupling" or "recoupling" suggest that different myths are not only ceremonially incorporated but actually become incarnate inside organizations (Hallett, 2010; Sandholtz, 2012). Professionals hired to populate formal structures bring the logics attached to their profession into the organization. Structures and staff inherited from the sedimented adaptation to changing or inconsistent institutional demands may mix to create very

specific institutional paths (Schneiberg, 2007). These forms of embedded local solutions, specific to each organization, can rebound onto the organizational field by being disembedded from their local context and circulated among further organizations (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 26). As Greenwood et al. write, "field creation and change must not be understood as an exogenous event, but as something that is socially constructed by organizations via their decision-making and their ongoing and cumulative responses to institutional complexity" (2011, p. 357).

Seo and Creed (2002) have theorized the dialectical relationship between institutional contradictions and the praxis of humans at the organizational level. Institutional change arises from praxis. Praxis is "political action embedded in a historical system of interconnected, yet incompatible institutional arrangements" (Seo & Creed, 2002, p. 223). Incompatible arrangements are the source of permanent tensions and conflicts. These conflicts induce actors embedded in their socio-historical context to modify social interactions. These interactions are produced, reproduced and institutionalized at multiple levels, generating even more contradictions, and so on.

There is thus a dialectical complexification of between organizations and their institutionalized environment.

2.2.4. Theoretical proposition

This section has established that there is a dialectical evolution of institutional and organizational complexity. After decades of this self-reinforcing complexity, organizations and their environment have become complex. This implies that the conditions for the incorporation of rationalized myths by organizations have changed dramatically. Already in the sixties, Clark Kerr observed the complexity of universities reflecting the multiple expectations on them, stating that such an organization must represent "so many different things to so many different people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war with itself" (2001, p. 7). The literature reviewed so far focuses on organizations as the entities that react to institutional pressure. I propose adopting an intra-organizational perspective to investigate the reality underlying the externally observable behaviour of an organization. How is complex institutional demand received in a complex organization? What are the implications of institutional complexity for a

modern, complexified organization? In this research, I therefore aim at exploring what happens inside a complexified organization confronted with institutional complexity.

Having set the mutually reinforcing institutional dynamics between the inconsistent demands from the environment and the complexified organization, it seems reasonable to assume that institutional pressure would result in intra-organizational multiplicity. If the complexification of organizations due to institutional complexity involves the compartmentalization of units, their isolation from the rest of the organization or the integration of specific professions representing different logics, it is plausible to assume that different, potentially conflicting rationales would arise inside a modern organization confronted with complex institutional demand. I therefore propose that:

An organization confronted with institutional complexity displays internal multiplicity and even incompatibilities.

If it is the case, however, the question arises how an organization function despite internal incompatibilities. What are the consequences of internal incompatibilities for an organization?

The next section reviews the literature that has adopted an intra-organizational perspective on the effects of the incorporation of rationalized myths in general and of conflicting prescriptions in particular. I screened the extant literature for descriptions of the outcome of this process inside the organization in order to find out whether it supports the above proposition and how it explains it.

2.3. The intra-organizational effects of the incorporation of (complex) institutions

While the dialectical complexification of institutions and organizations points to intra-organizational incompatibilities, as proposed above, the literature does not consistently support this proposition. Different lines of research – including translation studies in organizations, research on hybrid organizations and organizational discourse – predict completely different outcomes, from homogeneity through heterogeneity to hegemony between the rationales issued from institutional demand. In the following, I review these predictions, as well as their assumed consequences for organizations.

2.3.1. Unitary or heterogeneous translation

The literature on translation is not explicitly concerned with institutional complexity. Yet, it offers important insights on what happens when institutional scripts are materialized inside organizations. These insights can be applied to complex institutional scripts.

Depending on whether their underlying assumptions are rooted in Scandinavian institutionalism or in actor-network theory (ANT), studies of the translation of managerial concepts in organizations draw a different picture of the outcome of translation processes (for an extensive review of Translation studies, see Waeraas & Nielsen, 2016). While translation studies rooted in Scandinavian institutionalism tend to focus on the inter-contextual variation, studies based on the actor-network theory (ANT) emphasize the intra-contextual diversity of meanings ascribed to the concept being translated. ANT-based studies stress the power relations underlying the contextualization of rationalized myths.

In studies on the translation of managerial ideas in organizations influenced by the Scandinavian institutionalism, the translation process is described as resulting in one consistent materialization of the idea at a time. Studies describe the observed interpretation, structures and practices as unitary outcome of the translation process (e.g. Bergström, 2007; Bergström & Diedrich, 2011). This outcome might vary over time but it remains unitary (e.g. Vähämäki, 2017). The result of the translation process is, however, often not central to these studies, which rather show a pronounced interest in the mechanisms and the actors' strategies of contextualization (see for example Bartel & Garud, 2009; Gond & Boxenbaum, 2013; Van Grinsven, Heusinkveld, & Cornelissen, 2016; Van Grinsven, Sturdy, & Heusinkveld, 2020).

Contrary to this, ANT is a theory of heterogeneity assuming that the diffusion of scientific facts or technical artefacts is a progressive succession of translations in a socio-technical network between human and non-human entities (Callon, Rip, & Law, 1986). The notion of translation was developed by Michel Serre "to explain the incremental constitution of heterogenous assemblages" (Callon, 2012, p. 272). This process necessarily involves power relations (Callon, 1984). It results in hybrid networks of artefacts and meanings which are generally "blackboxed". This means that they are no longer subject to active negotiations because their content has become a matter of indifference (Latour & Callon, 1981, p. 285). Yet, translation is a "never completed accomplishment" (Callon, 1984, p. 196). Black boxes might suddenly open

in case of incident or when failures become visible. In this case, actors renegotiate the meanings of facts.

Based on these premises of an ever-evolving and heterogeneous translation of diffused artefacts, ANT-oriented studies of the translation of managerial concepts inside organizations emphasize the heterogeneity of meanings ascribed to the circulated concepts. In their study of the application of the 'Integrated Approach' to management in a bank, Doorewaard and van Bijsterveld find that the introduction of the managerial concept led to conflicting interests and to the formation of loosely structured networks built around these interests (2001). Concealed hegemonic power processes play out in the interpretations and implementations of new managerial concepts, which are always "temporary fixations", since translation is an ongoing process (2001, p. 73). Jensen et al. describe Corporate Code of Ethics as traveling artefacts resulting from a variety of translations (2009). In the organization studied, the code "draws together and re-presents numerous different moral possibilities" (Jensen et al., 2009, p. 538). Similarly, in her analysis of the language used by top managers to speak about 'Total Quality Management' in a UK service organization, Kelemen finds that this managerial concept has come to mean different things to different people (2000). Employees' discursive responses to the ambiguous managerial talk range from resistance through compliance to internalization.

In sum, studies on the translation of rationalizing concepts in organizations both corroborate and disprove the proposition formulated above, depending on their theoretical foothold in Scandinavian institutionalism or in ANT. Translation processes are both found to result in a state of permanent but subjacent heterogeneity of meaning and in a unitary interpretation.

2.3.2. Managed multiplicity: hybridization and bricolage

I now turn to the body of research explicitly concerned with the effects of multiple and complex institutional demands on organizations. This body of research on is based on the assumption that these multiple demands generate different identities and rationales inside organizations. That is, organizations incorporate different versions of "who we are" and "what we do as an organization". This situation is referred to as "organizational hybridity" (Battilana et al., 2017).

Research is divided as regards the consequences of the presence of different identities and rationales inside organizations. Some scholars argue that it represents an opportune room for manoeuvre for organizational actors to strategically mediate their environment. Along this line,

Kraatz and Block outline four ways pluralistic expectations on the organization's identity are managed in organizations: first organization's leaders may try to shed or marginalize some of the identities imposed on the organization; second, identities may be compartmentalized, for example by creating distinct units or sequentially attending to contradictory institutional demands; third, organizations may strategically balance pluralistic demands by influencing the constituencies they emanate from; and fourth, organizations may reconcile disparate demands by transcending individual identities and creating an autonomous "organization as self" (2017). Binder finds that people in organizational units creatively use combinations and re-combinations of different logics to achieve their ends (2007). McPherson and Sauder demonstrate that actors of a drug court use the multiple logics as tools to negotiate decisions and get the work done (2013). Similarly, Voronov et al. find that actors of the Ontario fine wine industry choose between the aesthetic and the market logic depending on the particular situation and audience they face (2013).

These examples emphasize the room for manoeuvre available to organizational members through institutional pluralism. Kraatz and Block's chose term "pluralism" to convey the image of organizations and people as "capable of accommodating, encompassing, and governing its various distinct parts" (2017, p. 538). Because the environment offers different scripts, organizational members may cobble together the structures, practices and identities that best serve their interests (Binder, 2007; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Voronov et al., 2013).

On the other hand, some scholars assume that the presence of multiple identities and rationales that do not conventionally belong together generates tensions inside organizations (e.g. Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014; Pestoff, 2014). These tensions manifest in conflicts, not only between organizational members or units, but also within individuals (McGivern, Currie, Ferlie, Fitzgerald, & Waring, 2015). For example, Croft et al. relate the identity conflict experienced by hybrid nurses teared between their nursing role and their managerial role (2015).

Scholars of hybrid organizations largely assume, however, that these inherent tensions can be managed. A myriad of empirical studies have investigated the different strategies of hybridity management. For example Reay and Hinings find that individuals solve tensions through collaboration. They identify four mechanisms of collaboration between physicians, members of the government and of Regional Health Authorities for managing the conflicting logics of medical professionalism and business-like health care management (2009). Battilana and Dorado's

study of two microfinance organizations teared between the banking and the development logic reveals that such organizations avoid internal contestation if they create a common identity that blends the two logics (2010). Ebrahim et al. suggest that social enterprises manage the tension between the charity and the business rationales by structurally integrating or differentiating their social and commercial activities (2014). Between these ideal types, Fiol et al. propose that organizations may manage intractable identity conflicts by sequentially integrating and differentiating the organizational sub-groups representing conflicting identities (2009). This approach has the advantage of securing and strengthening the conflicting identities and eventually leads to "intergroup harmony" (Fiol et al., 2009).

The body of literature summarized here tends to support my proposition: it suggests that multiple and conflicting rationales or identities exist inside organizations. Some scholars argue that this situation provides organizations and their members with strategic leeway in adapting to their environment. Others suggest that it generates tensions that need to be, and can be managed. The following section turns to the literature that emphasizes the presence of presumably incompatible logics inside organizations.

2.3.3. Contestation and hegemony

Other scholars expect the contestation between incompatible logics to result in the hegemony of one within an organization. This is based on the assumption that the sustained presence of incompatible logics in an organization leads to conflicts, dysfunctionalities and organizational paralysis.

The literature on organizational discourse is not directly concerned with the contestation between conflicting prescriptions within an organizations. It nevertheless offers insights into the outcomes of discursive confrontations in organizations. In the event of conflicting discourses, scholars of organizational discourse predict that, by being constantly reproduced (Hardy, 2001), one discourse comes to dominate others in an organization (Grant & Hardy, 2004). Hegemonic discourses are "recontextualized", that is, their meaning is fixed through writing as they move from "talk to print". This move depersonalizes and objectifies their meaning, thereby entrenching their domination (Iedema & Wodak, 1999). To Iedema and Wodak, recontextualized meaning becomes black-boxed in the sense of the ANT. Yet, dominant discourses are always related to the other, currently dominated discourses (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). The

existence of dominated discourses always implies the possibility of resistance and change (Grant & Hardy, 2004, p. 8).

Zilber's investigation of the logics underlying the structures and practices of an Israeli rape crisis centre confirms this premise (2002). Zilber investigated the transition between two competing logics – the feminist and the therapeutic – in this rape crisis centre. She found that the very same practices came to be substantiated by different rationales, as the therapeutic logic was infused into the originally feminist organization. While the feminist logic was still reflected in the formal structures, the therapeutic one had superseded it in the internal discourse and practices. In this case, one of the competing logics emerged as the dominant one in the actors' interpretation of their practices.

Taking into account both the possibility of institutional pluralism and complexity, Besharov and Smith identified different possible consequences for organizations (2014). They propose that the degree of compatibility between logics and their degree of centrality determines how they manifest inside an organization. Compatibility between logics is defined as "the extent to which the instantiations of logics imply consistent and reinforcing organizational actions" in terms of goals and means (Besharov & Smith, 2014, p. 365). Centrality means "the degree to which multiple logics are each treated as equally valid and relevant to organizational functioning" (Besharov & Smith, 2014, p. 369). Both dimensions are seen as continuous. Based on these two dimensions, the authors build a typology of the possible manifestations of logics multiplicity within organizations and outline the implications of each type in terms of internal conflict and organizational functionality.

Quite intuitively, the higher the compatibility between logics and their hierarchization inside an organization, the more coherent and functional the organization is. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the higher the incompatibility and the higher the centrality of the logics represented inside an organization, the more likely the organization's goals, values and identity are to be disputed. In such "contested" organizations, conflict is expected to be "extensive and intractable" (Besharov & Smith, 2014, p. 371). Persistent clashes damage the organization's legitimacy, jeopardize its functionality and eventually threaten its survival. One case in the study by Battilana and Dorado confirms this assumption: one of the microfinance bank's internal contestation between sub-groups representing two different logics escalated into intractable conflicts and led the CEO to resign (2010, p. 1427). Similarly, Pache and Santos contend that contestations between logics need to see a clear winner emerge (2010). Otherwise, and in case

of balanced power structure, the organization will fail to respond to institutional pressure. This can have tremendous consequences on its functionality by leading to organizational paralysis or breakup." (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 468)

To sum up, the authors mentioned in this last section expect that one hegemonic discourse, translation or interpretation emerges from intra-organizational struggles over the meaning of complex institutions. A permanent state of multiplicity of equally central and incompatible discourses is assumed to lead to organizational dysfunctionality, paralysis or breakup. This contradicts my proposition that an organization confronted with complex institutional pressure displays internal multiplicity and even incompatibilities.

On the other hand, cases of hybridization and bricolage suggest that the heterogeneity of rationales does not necessarily damage the functionality of organization. It may provide strategic leeway, instead, as individuals manipulate different rationales depending on their immediate needs. Scholars of organizational hybridity suggest that institutional complexity does generate tensions between conflicting rationales or organizational identities. However, organizations can manage these tensions by blending or separating these conflicting aspects. Finally, ANT-based translation studies assume that heterogeneity is the natural but subjacent outcome of an ever-ongoing process of meaning negotiation. Black-boxed meanings resurface and incompatibilities become visible only in case of incidents.

In sum, the reviewed literature provides contradictory insights regarding what happens inside organizations confronted with complex institutional pressure. The present research therefore not only aims at substantiating the proposition that organizations display incompatibilities in the incorporation of complex institutional demands, but also at finding explanations as to **how incompatible rationales can coexist inside an organization without escalating into a conflict**.

The following section provides a framework for apprehending how institutional complexity manifests inside organizations. I propose to observe this phenomenon through an intra-organizational, micro-level and interpretive lens. That is, I intend to focus on how people inside an organization interpret complex institutional demands.

2.4. Framework for conceptualizing the manifestation of institutional complexity in an organization

This research attends to the micro-politics behind the incorporation of complex rationalized myths into organizations. After emphasizing the need to focus on the micro-foundations of organizational reactions to institutional complexity, the following sub-chapter clarifies the concepts relevant to assessing what happens inside a complex organization confronted with institutional complexity: organization, actor and meaning.

2.4.1. "Inhabited" organizations: people and meanings

The assumption that reality is socially constructed constitutes the main root of neo-institutionalism. People as inhabitants of the rationalized formal structures are both the carriers and makers of institutions that confer legitimacy to their organization (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Stinchcombe, 1997). Based on this premise, some scholars have advocated a micro-perspective on institutionalization, bringing individuals, along with their practices and interpretations, back into the centre of the picture (e.g. Suddaby, 2010; Suddaby et al., 2010; Zilber, 2012).

Hallett and Ventresca have prominently argued that institutions such as bureaucracies are populated with people "whose interactions suffuse institutions with local force and significance" (2006, p. 213). Institutions do not enter organizations "ready-to-wear" (Creed et al., 2002). Rather, as institutions arise through social interactions, they are "inhabited" by people who act and think on them. As Stinchcombe argued, "institutions are staffed", that is, organizations pay people to serve values in which they believe (1997). As such, staff constitute the "guts of institutions", which means "that somebody somewhere really cares to hold an organization to the standards and is often paid to do that" (Stinchcombe, 1997, p. 17).

Processes of institutionalization are the interplay between actors, actions – in terms of practices and structures –, and meanings (Zilber, 2002). Beyond formal structures and practices, "meanings are what attracts actors to actions" and actors, on the other hand, infuse actions with meanings by interpreting their actions in what Zilber calls the "politics of institutionalization" (2002, p. 235). Acts of interpretation by individuals inside organizations are therefore considered a form of institutional agency. More than a cognitive process, interpretation is a micro-political struggle by which powerful actors attempt to impose their understanding, because the dominant

version of truth will eventually determine the course of actions (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012, p. 1479).

An important aspect of the call of scholars for considering the micro-foundations of institutions is the urge to pay attention to unimportant people in everyday situations (Powell & Colyvas, 2017). People mindfully reflect on their daily practices. They also theorize about their solutions to the limits of these practices (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). They ascribe meaning to their activities by drawing on the stock of knowledge available to them. In that sense, their agency is embedded (Creed et al., 2002). This perspective on agency enables dialectically connecting the micro and the macro levels in neo-institutionalist accounts of inertia and change since "[p]eople frequently 'pull down' larger, societally approved justifications for their actions, just as on-the-ground practices can 'build up' into broader institutional patterns" (Powell & Colyvas, 2017, p. 312).

I follow this line of research, conceptualizing people inside an organization as the embedded actors of institutions who not only perform them, but also negotiate their meaning by interpreting the concepts and structures issued from these institutions.

However, while recognizing the mindfulness of people in action, micro-level approaches to institutionalization tend to view human agency from a praxeological perspective. That is, they see human agency as embedded in everyday practices, and therefore not necessarily intentional. On the extreme opposite of micro-level accounts of institutionalization, scholars have argued that people are capable of active work on institutions. Institutional work is defined as "the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions" (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). This approach, although based on practice theory, requires attributing to people the capacity to stand back from institutions and to manipulate them. With this concept, the authors bring in the political character of institutions by drawing attention to actors as "writers and stage-hands that produce them" (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 249). Fligstein contends that such actors must be specifically skilled and culturally competent in order to reflexively navigate institutions (2001). This reduces agency in institutionalization to a specific category of skilled actors, as opposed to the focus on all people by the praxeological approach.

In between these two conceptualizations of agency, I contend that potentially all organizational members confronted with the practical implications of the incorporation of a rationalized myth into their organization are capable of both: attributing meaning to their every day practices and

reflecting on the abstract institutional template these practices are derived from. Following Gamson (1992), I contend that individuals have the capacity to stand back from immediate reflections on the limits of their everyday practices and, as politically conscious people, to reflect on the institutions underlying them.

2.4.2. Organizations as (issue) fields

Organizations are inhabited by people interpreting formal structures, their actions and abstract concepts. These people do so in the particular context of the organization. How can the organization as context be conceptualized?

Organizations are highly institutionalized (Meyer & Höllerer, 2014; Zucker, 1983). As such, they have become thing-like. Scholars have often treated them, in analogy with humans, as unitary entities capable of agency, i.e. as "entities in and of themselves" (Baum & Rowley, 2005, p. 3). From a social-constructivist perspective, however, organizations remain "socially constructed systems of meaning" (Barley & Kunda, 1992). They are the "structures in process" (Cooper et al., 1996, p. 643) or the "cultural reflections of [their] environment" that underlie the actions of their human members (Suddaby et al., 2010, p. 1234). Hernes uses the term "organizational meaning structures" to emphasize that organization is the product of human thoughts, interpretations and talk (Hernes, 2014).[1] He conceives of organization as space – physical, social and mental – which can be mapped (Hernes, 2004).

Similarly, Emirbayer and Johnson have called for analysing organizations in analogy with fields (2008). This conceptualization implies a spatial and relational perspective on the people and meanings inhabiting organizations. From this perspective, the position-taking of individuals is related to their early socialization, their position within the organization and the capital at stake in the organizations-as-field. These attributes determine the power of actors to impose their meaning on others. Bourdieu used the analogy of a game to convey the notions of field and capital:

> „We can indeed, with caution, compare a field to a game *(jeu)* although, unlike the latter, a field is
> not the product of a deliberate act of creation, and it follows rules or, better, regularities, that are not

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[1] Note that Hernes insists on using the term "organization" in its singular and indeterminate form – as opposed to "organizations" or "the organization" – to capture its "emergent, unfinished, multiple and amorphous character" Hernes, 2004, XVIII.

explicit and codified. Thus we have *stakes (enjeux)* which are for the most part the product of the competition between players. […] a species of capital is what is efficacious in a given field, both as a weapon and as a stake of struggle, that which allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to *exist,* in the field under consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quantity." (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98)

The position-taking of actors depends on their capital, social trajectory and habitus, that is, the dispositions of a person, conditioned by her social origins and trajectory. Together these make certain position-takings possible, appropriate or desirable in an organization-as-field (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008, p. 27).

Relationality in a field is not restricted to social relations between actors. From a discursive perspective, semantic relations exist between meanings (Oberg & Korff, 2019). These relations constitute what Hoffman has coined issue field (1999). With this concept, Hoffman conveys the notion that an organizational field forms around a central issue. Accordingly, "fields become centers of debates in which competing interests negotiate over issue interpretation" (Hoffman, 1999, p. 351). The different logics represented in a field stand in relation to one another, building up the *meaning structure* of an issue field (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010).

Studies of issue fields have been conducted at the level of organizational fields, highlighting the different logics represented by different actor groups (see for example Bertels, Hoffman, & DeJordy, 2014; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Hoffman, 1999; Litrico & David, 2017; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). The analytic power of Bourdieu's notion of field is useful both when deployed horizontally, that is, across different organizational fields such as religion or education, but also vertically, across levels (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008, p. 22). Therefore, the concept of field – whether it is understood as field of actors or field of meanings – can be used as analytic framework to study the structure of organization as social space (Hernes, 2014).

In this research, the organization is understood as a discursive terrain on which actors negotiate the meaning(s) of circulated ideas. Individuals involved with the issue at stake are actors of translation through their act of interpretation (Zilber, 2002). Organizations with their specific history, culture and structure provide actors with the "editing rules" for interpreting ideas (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). The position-takings of individuals depend on the repertoire of meanings available to them. This repertoire, in turn, depends on their position within the organization and their trajectory. Put differently and borrowing Meyer and Höllerer's metaphor: for actors evolving in a field, and, in analogy, for members of an organization, the existence of a "menu" of position-takings does not necessarily imply "dining à la carte" (2010, p. 1259).

This section has set the stage and introduced the actors in it. In the following part, borrowing from social movement theory, I will delineate the object of my research: the *meaning structure* as the product of the micro-political struggles between actors involved in the interpretation of circulated concepts of organization.

2.4.3. The meaning structure of concepts of organization

Concepts of organization materialize in the specific socio-cultural context where local actors negotiate them (Drori et al., 2014; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). The translation of ideas is not only a process but, as Callon and Latour define it,

> "the sum of negotiations, intrigues, persuasion acts, calculations, violence by means of which an actor or a force affords or is given the authority to speak or to act in the name of another actor or another force" (Callon & Latour, 2012, pp. 12–13).

Thus, a translation is at the same time a political process of meaning negotiation and the sum of this process. What happens during this process and what results from it?

Actors substantiate abstract ideas through interpretive struggles within a given socio-cultural opportunity structure (Creed et al., 2002; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Zilber, 2002). They do so by framing the issue at stake, that is, by enacting interpretive packages or frames (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Benford, 2000). Frames enable actors to make sense of the issue by fulfilling three core framing tasks: first, a diagnosis proposing a definition of a perceived problem, second a prognosis offering a remedy and, third, a motivation to act (Snow & Benford, 1988). The sum of available frames constitutes the political culture of an issue (Gamson, 1992; Gamson & Lasch, 1983). When constructing their position in a specific symbolic environment, individuals may tap into this catalogue of interpretive packages or engage in meaning work, building on or challenging existing interpretive frames to advance their preferred solution (Snow & Benford, 2000).

In this struggle, "power is the power to define" the organizational order (Czarniawska, 1997, p. 24; Hallett, 2003). Actors compete to impose their version of truth to eventually influence the course of political action (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012, p. 1479). This requires mobilizing supporters and delegitimizing opponents for what they consider to be the appropriate response of their organization to institutional pressure. If frames are logical cause-effects reasonings, they

are not merely cognitive devices in the negotiation of meaning (Gamson, 1992; Goodwin et al., 2004). As Jasper pointed out, "an important aspect of this construction of meaning is the creation of moral valuations, which then give us emotional energy for striving to transform our lives and society. We need to allocate praise and, more importantly, blame" (1997, p. 10). Because politics is about creating friends and foes to order the world (Jasper, 1997, p. 10), identification is a necessary feature of the interactions between social actors (Snow, 2013, p. 264). To Gamson, frames entail three components, which reflect the categories invoked by Jasper: the injustice component loads frames with emotions by suggesting moral indignation; the agency component implies a sense of collectiveness in action, and therefore the invocation of a "we"; finally, the identity component is the process of defining this "we" by opposing it to some "they" whose values are rejected (1992). The importance of identification has been documented in numerous contributions. For example, in their study of the rise of nouvelle cuisine in France, Rao et al. find that identity movements drive institutional change (2003). Van Grinsven et al. argue that the translation of "Lean Management" in Dutch hospitals involves identity work (2020). The authors suggest that both the concept being translated and the actor of this translation are co-constructed. When meaning is contested, disidentification with enemies also features prominently in the discursive contestation (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012, p. 1485).

Beyond coherent frames entailing visions of organizational action, meaning construction thus involves the construction of identity and boundaries, i.e. the representation of self and the categorization of others allies, heroes, villains or victims for the assignment of moral value. (Dis)identification, vilification and moral evaluation trigger emotions (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012; Vanderford, 1989). This is particularly true when identification takes place in the organizational context where it is related to work, loyalty and commitment towards the organization as employer (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008). Yet, actors also "strategize about what kind of emotions to display" in order to mobilize supporters (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 423, emphasis added; Hunt & Benford, 2004). For instance, Van Grinsven et al. find that managers infuse the identification strategy related to their translation of a new managerial concept with more or less emotionality (2020).

This section has established that the contestation over meaning involves the dimensions of (dis)identification, emotionality and moral valuation. Beyond moral evaluation, by which legitimacy is conveyed by reference to a specific value system, Van Leeuwen and Wodak distinguish three further legitimation strategies in discursive struggles: authorization, that is, the

legitimation by reference to the authority of a person, custom or law; rationalization, i.e. legitimacy by reference to utility; and mythopoesis, i.e. legitimation by telling exemplary narratives of rewards for appropriate behaviour, or the reverse (1999). In the struggle over meaning "de-legitimizing the claims of opponents is often more effective than arguing one's own position" (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012, p. 1485). Therefore, several scholars have used Van Leeuwen and Wodak's strategies to capture actors' efforts to delegitimize counter-frames (Vaara, 2014; Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006).

In micropolitical struggles over the translation of concepts of organization, actors frame the issue at stake by combining frames, representations of identity and rivals, emotionality and (de)legitimization strategies. These discursive elements stand in a specific relation to one another and, together, constitute the framings actors use to make sense of an issue. The relation between these framings constitute the meaning structure of the issue being translated. Thus, I define the meaning structure of a circulated concept within an organization as *the structure of the relations between framings, which are actors' combinations of frames, identity, emotionality and (de)legitimization strategies in the struggle over the meaning of institutional demands.* Figure 3 visualizes the elements of this definition.

Figure 3: The meaning structure of institutional demand in organizations

2.5.Summary and transition

In view of the dialectical complexification of institutions and organizations, this chapter introduced the question of what happens inside a complexified organization confronted with complex institutional pressure. Based on the literature review on the complexity of organizations on the one hand, implying sedimentation, compartmentalization, professionalization and expansion, and, on the other hand, institutional complexity not only between, but also within rationalized rules, I proposed that **an organization confronted with institutional complexity displays internal multiplicity and even incompatibilities**.

The literature on the incorporation of different logics in organizations does not consistently support this proposition. It tends to suggest a homogeneous, or at least hegemonic outcome, because prolonged conflicts over meanings are expected to jeopardize the functionality of an organization, and eventually its legitimacy and survival. If the above proposition can be substantiated, this raises the question: **how do incompatible frames coexist inside an organization without escalating into conflicts?**

To substantiate the proposition and answer the ensuing question, I intend to observe the different meanings of a complex institution and how these meanings relate to each other. I adopt an intra-organizational, micro-level and interpretive approach to the incorporation of complex institutional demand in an organization. Individual members act as political players embedded in an organization, which is understood as a discursive terrain: depending on their position and trajectory in the organization, organizational members frame the meaning of rationalizing concepts of organization. Framing the concepts at stake involves the construction of collective identity, emotionality and (de)legitimization. Together and in relation to one another inside the organization, framings constitute the *meaning structure* of the concept at stake.

In this research, I explore the meaning structure of a managerial concept inside an organization. I draw on the case of an established development bank which has been confronted with the pressure to implement results-based management for more than 15 years. I intend to shed light on the intra-organizational, micro-level framing(s) of results-based management within the concerned organization. Through this instrumental case study, the analysis is expected to reveal the structure of the discourse – heterogeneous, hegemonic or homogeneous – underlying the formal structures of this organization and the practices of its members, and to offer explanations as to how incompatible framings coexist inside an organization.

Chapter 3: Case, data and analysis methods

To explore the meaning structure of management concepts in an organization, I selected the case of 'results-based management' in the French Development Agency (*Agence Française de Développement*, or AFD). This chapter begins by describing the centrality and complexity of results-based management in the international field of development aid. I then briefly describe the AFD and outline its most significant structural reforms towards results-based management over the past 15 years. These descriptions are based on the internal documentation, observations, as well as 41 interviews with AFD staff that took place during a three-month research stay in the agency. Finally, the mixed methods design is presented. The first step consists of an in-depth frame analysis based on the interview transcripts. This is followed by multivariate statistics as means to reconstruct the framings and explore the relations between them in a systematic way. In a third step, I use multivariate statistics and a clustering method to analyse the distribution of frames in the organization. Together, these three analyses yield a precise map of the meaning(s) of results-based management in the AFD.

3.1.   Setting the scene: results-based management in development aid and in the French Development Agency

Results-based management has become the central concept of organization pushed forward in the global field of development aid. In order to comply with this standard, most aid organizations have undergone reforms towards results-based management, including the creation of dedicated units, the employment of specialized staff or the implementation of specific tools and instruments.

After briefly introducing the concept of results-based management and outlining the institutional complexity in the field of development aid, I turn to the organization examined here: the French Development Agency (AFD). I briefly outline the AFD's growing mandate in the French development policy and the aspects of its history relevant to this study. I then describe how results-based management was incorporated in this large development bank, showing that the AFD constitutes a case of a complexified organization confronted with institutional complexity. This makes the AFD an instrumental case for answering the research question.

3.1.1. Results-based management as central rationalizing myth of development aid

In 2005, the Paris Declaration established results-based management as a core governing principle of development aid. Donors and developing countries committed to „managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision-making" (OECD, 2005). Results-based management is, thus, the focus of organizational activity and actors on results. One of the most used definitions is found in the Results-Based Management Handbook of the UN Development Group:

> „Results-based management is a management strategy by which all actors, contributing directly or indirectly to achieving a set of results, ensure that their processes, products and services contribute to the achievement of desired results (outputs, outcomes and higher level goals or impact). The actors in turn use information and evidence on actual results to inform decision making on the design, resourcing and delivery of programmes and activities as well as for accountability and reporting." (UNDG, 2011, p. 2)

The concept of results-based management is currently gaining momentum in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In July 2019, the OECD enacted guiding principles on Managing for Sustainable Development Results in order to "set a renewed practice in results-based management" and "guide development organizations in setting up or refining results-based management approaches that are fit for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (OECD, 2019b, p. 1).

This so-called "Results Agenda" has led most development aid organizations to incorporate results-based management. In fact, results-orientation in planning and accountability has become self-evident for all actors involved in development aid. For example, the peer reviews of OECD countries' development policy dedicate an entire section to verifying that "a results-based management system is being applied" (OECD, 2019a). In 2016, I attended a meeting of the OECD Results Community[2] and observed that results-based management is taken-for-granted. In plenary sessions, participants neither expressed doubts about the rightfulness or usefulness of results-based management, nor did they mention any alternatives to it. Rather, participants debated on how to best implement it. Results-based management can be qualified as an institutionalized rationalizing myth in the field of development aid.

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[2] The Results Community" is a community of staff involved with results-based management from donor governments, bilateral and multilateral development organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations. The OECD results team coordinates this community and organizes regular meetings on the practical issues related with the implementation of results-based management.

Results-based management has taken many forms in aid organizations. For example, the 'logical framework' is a project management tool that delineates the theory of change behind development interventions, that is, how planned activities are assumed to lead to the desired results. This logical framework has become an ubiquitous condition for organizations to access funds. Beyond project management tools such as the logical framework, organizations have adopted extensive information systems to collect results that are aggregable at the corporate level. 'Aggregated indicators' reflect, for instance, the number of children enrolled in school or the number of kilometres of road generated through an organization's activities. Results-based management also reflects a specific type of project design, called 'output-based aid'. In these output-based interventions, organizations reimburses the project implementor upon proof of achieved results. The World Bank has championed this results-based approach under the label 'Program for Results'.[3]

Results-based management is a central institution in development aid. Yet, this rationalizing concept competes with other institutions. The following section briefly sketches the history of development aid to expose the inter-institutional complexity in this field.

3.1.1.1.The inter-institutional complexity in development aid

Over the past century, development aid was infused with different and partly antithetic logics. The concept of development and the practice of development aid are legacies of the European colonialism (Hodge, Hödl, & Kopf, 2015). In the beginning of the 20th century, the rationale behind development was to foster self-sufficiency in order to avoid the transfer of resources to the colonies. Yet, instability forced western countries to allocate funds to their colonies already in the early 1940s, as means to ensure security and stability. The post-war history of development aid began with the Marshall Plan, which was based on the premise that poverty was a "handicap and threat both to [people living in poverty] and more prosperous areas" (Truman, 2013). At that time, aid aimed at ensuring world peace and economic prosperity. Until the end of the Cold War, development aid was largely conditioned upon political change and underpinned by the fight between two antagonistic ideologies, represented by the United States and the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, development aid entered a crisis of purpose and ethics, due to accusations of ineffectiveness on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of

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[3] https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/program-for-results-financing#1 [accessed on 15.12.2019].

interference in the domestic matters of sovereign nations in the developing world (Hofmeier, 1991; Selbervik, 1999).

Caught by the international New Public Management (NPM) wave in the public sector, development aid notably faced controversies about its effectiveness and efficiency (for a summary of the debate, see Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2010)[4]. NPM arose in the 1980's as promise of apolitical and diffusible remedy to "management-ill" public services (Hood, 1991, p. 8). One of the elements of NPM is performance management, or "requiring staff to work according to performance targets, indicators and output objectives" (Pollitt, 1995, p. 134). The underlying, market-based assumption is that results-orientation would increase the productivity (Peters, 2017). The international Results Agenda at the core of today's development aid reflects the NPM promises of apolitical and well managed development aid. As a result, the field of development has become dominantly guided by an econometric logic.

The crisis of development aid led to a restructuration of its architecture (Holzapfel, 2014, p. 1; White, 2010). In the first decade of the new century, development aid was restructured around principles emphasizing the sovereignty of developing countries, reinforcing the coordination among donors and fostering the efficiency and transparency on the effects of aid. The respective principles of 'ownership', 'harmonization' and 'results-based management' appear together in the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005). Yet, some of these principles are per se incompatible, as Sjöstedt demonstrates in his study on the mismatch between ownership, harmonization and results-based management (2013).

> "[A]lthough all donors are supposed to promote partner country ownership, harmonize their efforts with other donors, and align themselves with partner country priorities, results-based management simultaneously implies not only a focus on continuously measuring and reporting results but also stricter prioritizations on behalf of donor governments." (Sjöstedt, 2013, p. 144)

The desire of donors to ensure the achievement of results clashes with the commitment to follow the priorities of developing countries.

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[4] The debate on the effectiveness of aid divided researchers into three groups advancing economic arguments on the usefulness of aid. Aid optimists aim at demonstrating the positive effects of aid on the economic development (Hansen & Tarp, 2000; Sachs, 2005; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Miniou & Reddy, 2009; Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Aid pessimists diagnose, beyond the ineffectiveness of aid, detrimental effects on developing countries, which has seriously impaired the legitimacy of development aid (Moyo, 2011; Easterly, 2006). Finally, challengers acknowledge the complexity of the aid-development link, yet advocate differentiated improvements in the aid sector (Riddell, 2008; Ramalingam, 2015; Ramalingam, Laric, & Primrose, 2014).

Over the past hundred years, development aid was underpinned by different logics including stability and security, ideological imperialism, NPM and equality among sovereign nations. These paradigms underlie the different rationales that currently drive the development policies of donor countries. Voituriez et al. find five narratives underpinning the aid policies of four donor countries and one organization (2017). The legitimacy of the British policy is based on instability and insecurity, while the German policy emphasizes the obligation of Germany as former beneficiary of aid vis-à-vis other countries. France's focus is on steering the negative externalities of globalization and, the authors argue, on "offering an alternative to liberal liberalisation" (Voituriez et al., 2017, p. 13). Furthermore, relatively new players in the field of development bring in new rationales. For example, China emphasizes non-interference and the role of aid in the emancipation of nations. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation – which has become an influential philanthropic actor in this field – relies on innovation and scientific research in the fight against poverty.

Results-based management is one of multiple institutions which development aid organizations incorporate to maintain their legitimacy. By sketching the history of development aid, this section has shown that organizations in this field face inter-institutional complexity, which is reflected in different national and organizational rationales for justifying aid. The following section focuses on the intra-institutional complexity of results-based management.

3.1.1.2.The intra-institutional complexity of results-based management

The restructuration of development aid around results-based management involved a shift from the focus on inputs and activities to the focus on the outcomes and impact of development aid.

Results-based management, as defined by UNDG, implies the focus on planed results in implementation, the use of information on achieved results in strategic-decision making and for accountability. While these three core aspects of results-based management seem complementary at first sight, some scholars and practitioners have identified inherent contradictions in the rationales derived from them.

Accountability involves a certain systematization in the collection of information on results. This systematization fosters bureaucratization and the focus on measurable results. Some scholars argue that results-based management induces a bias towards easily measurable intervention for the purpose of reporting on results (Eyben et al., 2015). This excludes complex

interventions that address poverty as a multi-factorial phenomenon and potentially lead to more effective results. To Natsios, this drift towards measurable results ignores the central principle of development theory, which is that "those development programs that are most precisely and easily measured are the least transformational, and those programs that are most transformational are the least measurable" (2010, p. 5). Moreover, instead of fostering innovation in planning and implementation towards the achievement of better results, accountability requirements incentivize risk-averse behaviour (Earl et al., 2001). The production of information meant for reporting purposes contrasts with the adaptive and analytic learning needed for strategic decision-making and innovation in the pursuit of more effective solutions (Eyben et al., 2015; Vähämäki et al., 2011).

The very institution of results-based management induces contradictory principles in development aid. The expectation to improve the impact of development aid through analytical learning contrasts with the focalization on planned results and the systematization necessary to count, aggregate and demonstrate these results.

This section has shown that results-based management has become a taken-for-granted concept of organizing in the development aid sector, yet that it conflicts with further institutions and with itself. This confronts aid organizations with contradictory scripts in their quest of legitimacy. The following section introduces the organization examined in this research: the French Development Agency (AFD). It highlights the progressive complexification of this organization which partly resulted from the incorporation of results-based management.

3.1.2.   The French Development Agency as complexified organization

This section presents the selected case of the AFD, which is the main operator of the French development policy. As such, the AFD is an object of public scrutiny as regards its focus on results in planning and accountability. As a complexified organization confronted with multiple expectations, the AFD constitutes an instrumental case for addressing the question of what happens inside a modern organization confronted with institutional complexity.

3.1.2.1.Context, history and mandate of the AFD

The French context: Napoleonic tradition vs managerial change

In the case of the AFD, there is a contradiction between the local administrative logic and the NPM logic underlying results-based management. This makes this case all the more instrumental for studying incompatibilities in the incorporation of complex institutional demands.

The French government has tended to induce management reforms at the periphery of the state, particularly in autonomous agencies such as the AFD (Rouban, 2008). Indeed, the AFD has undertaken different reforms towards results-based management over the past 15 years, as the next section describes. However, France is a country where public service reforms are constrained by the Napoleonic administrative tradition, as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon or Nordic administrative traditions (Ongaro, 2008). Napoleonic states, in particular France, are characterized by the superiority of traditional bureaucratic values of impartiality and uniformity (Peters, 2008), the centrality of the state as "major actor of social change" (Rouban, 2008, p. 143) and general scepticism towards managerialism in the public sector (Peters, 2008). This opposes the market-based ideas of efficiency, decentralization and the involvement of local or non-state actors inherent to the NPM doctrine (Bezes & Jeannot, 2013; Peters, 2008). Although an incremental and "silent managerial revolution" has taken place in the French public administration since the 1980' (Rouban, 2008, p. 139), France is still is considered resistant, if not "allergic" to NPM (Peters, 2008; Schedler & Proeller, 2002; Rouban, 2008, p. 143). Despite this resistant context, several elements of results-based management have been integrated in the AFD over the past 15 years. These are outlined after a brief presentation of the different and historically given rationales at work in this organization.

Brief history of the AFD

The AFD was created in 1941 as commercial and industrial public agency with the status of specialized financial institution. It was mandated with the tasks to contribute to the implementation of the French foreign development policy and to contribute to the development of oversea departments and territories. The AFD does so by financing development operations and delivering technical expertise to its beneficiaries (Article R515-6, Gouvernement Français).

The AFD group is composed of the AFD and Proparco, which finances the private sector.[5] In 2017, the AFD Group committed 10.4 Billion Euro to development projects in various economic sectors. The largest share of AFD's commitments is delivered in the form of loans with a strong, legally anchored focus on the poor countries of the African continent (Journal Officiel de la République francaise, 2014).

This status as commercial institution in the development sector positions the AFD in a contradiction between logics similar to the micro-finance organizations analysed by Battilana and Dorado (2010). The AFD is influenced, on the one hand, by the development logic guiding its „mission to help the poor", and, on the other hand, by the banking logic, requiring a focus on „profits sufficient to support ongoing operations and fulfill fiduciary obligations" (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, p. 1419).

Expanding budget and mandate

Both the budget and mandate of the AFD have steadily grown in the last years with the progressive delegation of mandates from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the AFD. From 2015 to 2018, the budget increased by three billion Euros, or 37 percent. According to many interviewees, this puts pressure on staff to disburse a larger amount of money, while maintaining the quality of planning and implementation.

Originally focused on large infrastructures, the AFD activity now encompasses interventions in social sectors such as education and health since the mid-2000, and, since 2016, in governance. The transfer of competencies in these soft sectors from the Ministry of Cooperation to the AFD implied the integration of staff specialized in non-commercial and non-technical domains, as opposed to the historical focus of the AFD on infrastructures and the commercial sectors (Cour des Comptes, 2010, III).

This section has highlighted the specific, NPM-resistant context of the AFD, as well as elements of its history involving the multiplicity of potentially conflicting logics within the organization: banking vs development, disbursing vs quality, technical vs non-technical, commercial vs non-commercial. This is the complex context in which results-based management has been incorporated for the past 15 years.

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[5] This research focuses on the AFD's activity in foreign countries. It excludes the AFD's activity in French oversea territories and départements, as well as Proparco which would constitute a separate case.

3.1.2.2.Formal structures and practices of results-based management in the AFD

This section describes the most significant formal structures of results-based management at the AFD since the early 2000, as well as the practices they lead to. I selected the structures explicitly identified by interviewed staff or in internal documents as elements of results-based management. I provide anecdotal evidence on the practices connected with these structures as related in interviews or in informal conversations during the field research. Overall, this section illustrates how results-based management has led to a complexification of the AFD.

The Aggregable Indicators

The beginning of the formal integration of results-based management at the AFD can be traced back to the first Strategic Orientation Project of 2002, which committed the AFD to the implementation of tools for measuring its results and performance (AFD, 2002, p. 10). In January 2004, a set of 58 aggregable indicators of results, divided in 11 sectors of activity, was introduced at the AFD. These included, for example, the number of girls enrolled in primary education or the number of kilometres of road rehabilitated or constructed. These indicators constitute the basis for reporting on results to the AFD's line ministries and to the public via annual activity reports. Ideally, for each intervention, the project staff determines the target values ex ante and collects the effective values during the project implementation in the information management system. However, until 2012, aggregable indicators were collected only ex ante, that is, based on the planned results of approved projects (AFD SPC-PIL, 2016). In 2013, following the conclusions of the national conference on development and international solidarity, notably on the transparency and efficacy of development cooperation, the AFD presented a matrix of indicators to the inter-ministerial committee on international cooperation and development. This list, comprising at least one indicator for each sector of activity, was annexed to the Orientation and Planning Law for International Solidarity and Development Policy, enacted in 2014. It constitutes the basis for the biennial reports of the agency to its line ministries (Journal Officiel de la République francaise, 2014).

At the time of my visit in 2017, the one person responsible for transparency and accountability within the strategic department, gently nicknamed "Madame Résultats", was in charge of aggregating the indicators to feed the accountability and annual activity reports. More broadly, the strategic department fulfils the function of bridge between outside institutional influence and the actual work of the operational departments within the AFD. It enacts the guidelines

and strategic documents supposed to guide the actions of operational staff and it reports results to external audiences. In 2017 this department was working on the adaptation of the Aggregable Indicators to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015.

Interviewees reported practices in the collection and use of aggregated indicators which point both to coupled and decoupled structures. On the one hand, staff in the operational departments in charge of collecting the information on results would often start inputting data into the information system only upon the yearly request by Madame Résultats. This was reportedly due to the incapacity of indicators at such an aggregated level to reflect the results really achieved on the field. One interviewee commented:

> "did she tell you how it works with the aggregated indicators? Once a year, she meets with the operationals[6] and, because the system was not filled properly, in ends up on a table corner, estimating the numbers by the rule of thumbs". (Interviewee from the Evaluation and Research Department)

On the other hand, interviewees often referred to the Water and Sanitation Department as the operational department championing the results-based approach, because of their accurate reporting on the aggregated indicators, both to the strategic department and to external constituencies. In addition, staff uses these indicators for piloting the department's activity. In the case of the Water and Sanitation department, the practices are tightly coupled with the formal structures of results-based management.

The Logical Framework

A further formal element of results-based management at the AFD is the logical framework. It is a table attached to each project identification form presented for approval to the Identification Committee. According to the methodological guidance provided to project staff in the operational manual, the logical framework (see display below) is the product of the use of the logical framework approach, a formalized results-based approach to project planning which serves as basis for piloting and evaluating interventions. The logical framework delineates the strategy, or theory of change of an intervention: the goals at different levels (output, outcome, impact), the activities expected to lead to these goals, the indicators chosen to monitor the attainment of goals, the means of verification, as well as risks that could influence the attainment of goals.

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[6] The so-called "operationals" are the AFD staff members working in the Operational Department

Figure 4: The Logical Framework in the AFD Operational Manual

Objectifs	Indicateurs	Moyens de vérification	Hypothèses critiques
Finalités / Objectif général			
Objectif spécifique			
Réalisations (Résultats / Produits et services)			
Activités			

Source: (AFD, unknown). Top row from left to right: Objectives, Indicators, Means of verification, Critical hypotheses. Left column, from top to bottom: Goal / general objective, Specific objective, Achievements (Results / products and services), Activities.

Similarly to the aggregable indicators, evidence exists for both coupled and decoupled practices regarding the use of the logical framework in project planning. Some interviewees asserted that project leaders fill the logical framework on the day before the presentation of their project to the Identification Committee, without sharing it with the counterpart in the developing country, i.e. the ones taking out the loan for the project. It means that project staff does not use the logical framework as planning approach, but fills it out as fixed part of the project description form, that is, as an imposed procedure. On the other hand, some interviewees reported projects being planned by means of the logical framework approach in a participatory manner, that is, using the framework as a basis for discussions on the desired results with the counterpart. These experiences, requiring the accompaniment on the field by a person specialized in results-based planning, were reported to increase the capacity of all participants in designing realistic and evaluable projects.

Avis Développement Durable (ADD): Sustainable Development Opinion

In 2013, the delegated development minister, Pascal Canfin, asked the AFD for information on the impacts of its activity. To satisfy this demand, a specific unit was created in the strategic department. This unit evaluates planned projects according to their potential impacts along six dimensions of sustainable development, such as climate, gender equality or sustainable

economic growth. For each project and, among others, based on the logical framework appended to the project identification form, this unit issues a 'sustainable development opinion' (ADD) in the form of a multiple notation. The notation follows the methodology developed by its twin unit located in the operational department.[7] The ADD is thus an ex ante evaluation of the projects' impact on sustainable development.

The creation of the ADD unit can be framed as a case of expansion, sedimentation and compartmentalization due to the political pressure to demonstrate results. The ADD unit remains independent from the rest of the agency. While the notations are expected to contribute to the improvement of projects, they do not have the formal power to sanction projects judged to have too little or even negative impacts on sustainable development. According to some interviewees, the activities of this unit and its twin unit in the operational department display some overlap with the mandate of the Social and Environmental Support unit (AES), which is in charge of advising operational teams on the social and environmental impacts of their projects. In theory, while the AES' rationale is to avoid the negative impacts of interventions, the ADD units is also meant to optimize their positive impacts. Yet, in practice,

> "people don't understand why there is an Environmental and Social team and a Sustainable Development team" (interviewee in the operational department).

Climate Co-benefit

Since 2012, the AFD accounts for the estimated impacts of its operations on climate change. To do so, the unit in charge of climate issues in the Operational Department systematically reviews projects at their appraisal stage for their potential positive impact on climate change mitigation and adaptation. The 2012 Climate Strategy set a target of 50 percent of the funds allocated by the AFD with a so-called 'climate co-benefit'. This target was met in 2014 for the first time after already reaching 47 percent in 2013[8], and starting from a baseline of 48 percent in 2012 (AFD, 2017, p. 134). This means that, in 2012, the AFD committed itself to raising its share of projects with a climate co-benefit by only 2 percent, though these 2 percent increase does not appear explicitly in public documents. Some interviewees emphasized the ceremonial

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[7] Since the 2017 reform, these twin units are gathered as one unit within the strategic department.
[8] According to the French Senate's finance law project for 2019: https://www.senat.fr/rap/a18-149-4/a18-149-44.html [accessed on 13.12.2019]

character of publicly issuing an almost reached target, while others attributed a certain evolution of staff to the instrument, suggesting that this instrument led to changes in their practices:

> "I see an evolution at the level of project leaders and technical units. It sensitizes on these questions
> a bit and changes practices, even if having a percentage cast in stone like this puts a certain pressure."
> (Interviewee in the Operational Department)

At the time of my visit, debates were ongoing regarding the introduction of an inequality co-benefit, that is, setting a target in terms of the percentage of projects addressing the poorest 40 percent of the population in developing countries. According to an interviewee, an internal study revealed that the baseline for the inequality co-benefit was very low. The Strategic Orientation Plan for 2018-2022 postpones this issue by stating that:

> „The AFD Group plans to develop "*inequality diagnoses*" and an "*inequality co-benefit*" marker to
> identify the disadvantaged populations who benefit from projects." (AFD, 2018, p. 24 translated by
> the author)

One interviewee emphasized the dominant purpose of communication behind co-benefits at the AFD, suggesting that, on the short term, the need to maintain face superseded the intention to improve results:

> "Well so in 2012, we say the AFD has a climate co-benefit target of 50 percent and, already in 2013,
> it is surpassed. That looks better than saying that the AFD has an inequality co-benefit target of 25
> percent and we hope to reach it in 4 years from now. Then you have to explain that we start from so
> low that 25 percent is already very good. And that we are a bank and if we wanted to do social stuff
> we should give grants and not loans. It's going to mess up our entire communication and that's
> annoying [ironic tone]" (Interviewee from the strategic department)

Summing up, the incorporation of results-based management complexified the AFD. Several dedicated structures with specialized staff arose in response to the institutional pressure to adopt results-based management. These structures are more or less isolated from the rest of the agency and from each other. Interviewees provided anecdotal evidence of both decoupled and tightly coupled practices, as in the case of the aggregated indicators and the logical framework, as well as for ceremonial communication, as in the case of the climate co-benefit. Units following different rationales overlap in practice, creating some confusion over their mandate. In 2017, a reform of the organization was expected to clarify the means-ends relationships of these structures, which corroborates Bromley and Powell's assumption that organizations displaying

means-ends decoupling "persist in a state of perpetual reform" (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 484).

The purpose of this research is to investigate the structure of the meaning(s) attributed to results-based management in this complexified context. To this end, I collected data on staff's definition and opinion of results-based management. The following section briefly presents the data collection methods I used before turning to the operationalization of variables and the analysis methods.

3.2. Data collection and structuration

Translation is an ever ongoing process with no definite beginning and end. Therefore, this study is a "window study", meaning that "the researcher opens an arbitrary time window and describes all that can be seen through it" (Czarniawska, 1997, p. 65). In the case studied here, I observe the meaning structure of results-based management at the time of my visit. It is based on in-depth interviews conducted with 41 AFD agents and managers from the Strategy, Research and Operations Departments during a research stay at the AFD headquarter in Paris from April to July 2017. I joined the AFD officially as an intern. This status granted me an AFD email address, access to the electronic addresses of staff, as well as to the intranet, which contains internal documents not accessible to the public. I further enjoyed the explicit support of the directors of all relevant units for my interview requests.

Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 1,5 hours. All interviewees authorized me to record the interview. In only four cases, the conditions of the interview did not allow for recording. The analysis is based on the interview transcripts, as well as on extensive notes taken during the interviews.

3.2.1. Interview method: narrating the organization

Preliminary discussions with AFD staff revealed a great heterogeneity in the definitions, labels and positions towards results-based management. This fragmented perception complicated the study by blurring the boundaries of the concept of results-based management. The same interview partner could advocate both in favour and against results-based management, depending

on the different definitions and labels s/he would attribute to results-based management at a particular moment of the interview. This difficulty of delineating the kinship of a concept is inherent to the concept and study of translation, as mentioned in the previous chapter (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005, p. 10; Erlingsdóttir & Lindberg, 2005). Therefore, the study of the translation of results-based management required adapting both the data collection method and the analysis design.

In structuring the interviews, I followed Czarniawska's "Organizing as Narration" approach, acknowledging that rich narratives produced by interviewees beyond the planned interview structure yield relevant information (Czarniawska, 1997, p. 28). Therefore, I structured interviews around two purposefully broadly formulated questions on the interviewees' definition of and opinion on the management of aid based on results:

- "How do you define the management of aid based on results?"

  I did not use the term "results-based management", or its French translation "GARD"[9] to avoid narrow definitions determined by formal structures at the AFD.[10]

- And "What is your opinion about it?"

These questions were outlined both in the request email for an interview, and at the beginning of the interview itself. This enabled me to open a large stage for interviewees to produce rich accounts on their definitions and opinions of results-based management, including anecdotes and stories. Due to this open data collection method, doubt often arose as to whether interviewees were still speaking about results-based management. In case of doubt, I asked interviewees at later stages during the interview whether they felt that we had been talking about "results-based management".

3.2.2. Structuring the data: retrieving argumentative statements as units of analysis

Because single interviewees produced heterogeneous accounts, and therefore non-aggregable individual positions about results-based management, I chose to focus on argumentative statements, rather than individuals, as unit of analysis. From each interview transcript, I isolated

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[9] All interviews were conducted in French. All the quotes from interviews in this research are translated by the author.

[10] In the AFD, GARD or Gestion Axée sur les Résultats de Développement refers to the aggregated indicators collected by Madame Résultats in the Strategic Steering and Accountability unit of the Strategic Department.

and paraphrased up to 11 discrete statements on results-based management, leading to a data set comprising of 224 paraphrased statements. Paraphrases start with "results-based management is good / bad / good and bad / neither good nor bad, because" to express the general direction of interviewees' accounts, following the method of Meyer and Höllerer (2010). Whenever possible, I accompanied the paraphrases with a representative quote from the interview.

For each paraphrasis, I collected the elements necessary for reconstructing the underlying frames in the first step, and for relating them to emotionality, efforts of (dis)identification and (de)legitimization strategies in the second step. The operationalisation of these concepts is detailed in the next section.

3.3. Mixed methods design

I use a mixed methods design to reconstruct and analyse the meaning structure of results-based management from the retrieved statements. The first step consists of an inductive frame analysis. In the second step, I use multivariate statistics to set these frames in relation to emotionality, identity work and strategies of (de)legitimization. In the third step, I isolate explanatory elements underlying the reconstructed meaning structure. The following sections describe each of these steps in detail.

3.3.1. Step 1: Reconstructing the frames of results-based management

This section explains how I reconstructed the frames of results-based management in the AFD, following the method developed by Meyer and Höllerer in their study of the meaning structure of Shareholder Value in the Austrian context (2010).

Frames are the schemata of interpretation underlying individuals' efforts to assign meaning to a specific issue (Goffman, 1974; Snow & Benford, 2000). Interviewees rarely evoke the entire frame underlying their position in argumentative statements. Rather, they invoke "idea elements" which are part of it (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). They do so either explicitly or implicitly, by using symbolic devices suggesting the underlying frame, such as metaphors, catchphrases or depictions (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). Therefore, the frames need to be reconstructed

incrementally from these snippets (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). I combined these elements into coherent accounts, forming the frames of results-based management in the AFD and structured along their three core framing tasks: the diagnosis, the prognosis and the motivation to act.

For each argumentative statement, and following Meyer and Höllerer's method (2010), I first collected the definition and valuation of results-based management (diagnosis) by paraphrasing each statement to complete the sentence "results-based-management is…". Second, I collected the perceived risks or potentials of results-based management (prognosis) by completing the sentence "results-based management leads to…". Because this research takes place in the organizational context, I also included as part of the prognosis the organizational response prescribed by interviewees to the pressure to implement response-based management, that is, the answer to the question: "what should the AFD do about results-based management?". And third, I evaluated the urgency for action (motivation) conveyed in the statement (Snow & Benford, 1988). The set of frames was then systematically applied to the 224 paraphrased statements. Whenever a new frame arose, the entire set of statements was recoded with the new set of frames. Table 1 provides an overview of the frame elements, as well as illustrative quotes for each core framing task. Only one statement was isolated because it did not fit into any of the reconstructed frames. The final database contained 223 statements.

The analysis yielded six distinct frames, which are quite evenly distributed in the data set. The frames are described in detail in the next chapter.

Table 1: Overview of the operationalization of frames with illustrative quotes

1. Frames		Illustrative quotes
Diagnosis	Definition and valuation of results-based management	"We remain in the understanding of the world by economists, for economists [...] an approach which creates a space where everything can be validated and which validates itself in circles and evicts all others." "And unfortunately, when we talk about results and indicators, we systematically talk about numbers." "So results-based management is a matter of communication. This is not a criticism. I think it is legitimate." "And then we comply with the injunctions of the line ministries saying we want so many percent of grants in Africa, so many projects with a climate co-benefit, so many projects with an explicit gender component etc. etc. etc. So in the end it is an equation with unknown and known variables." "I see results-based management as a tool box. It is the use made of it that is bad."
Prognosis	Perceived risks or potentials of results-based management	"Numbers can always be criticized. But they enable having a target and then verifying whether it is reached or not. And that is why they have such a mobilizing effect." "It is often the limit of all these results-based management models. It is a negation of this complexity. Not sure we do better development aid with this kind of tools." "Eventually, the results approach could force concentrating aid where it already works." "It is going to change. In the beginning it will be a paragraph project leaders will be asked to write at the end [of the project identification form] but eventually it modifies their way of thinking."
	Prescribed organizational response	"If we want to increase our quality margin we have to accept to take the time necessary to reflect, to better structure our interventions and to use tools for that." "If the AFD wants to be a powerful actor on the international scene, it needs its own matrix." "So results-based management is of course necessary but we should not tell too many stories about it. We should not expect too much." "The learning dimension should be more important: knowing what we wanted to do, whether we succeeded or not and why. [...] today, this exercise exists but does not influence future allocations."
Motivational framing	High, moderate or low degree of urgency and severity of the situation:	"We are in a competitive logic. Think of the World Bank, the Islamic Bank, the Asian Development Bank etc. who work with way higher amounts than we do. The agency needs to differentiate itself and find its value-added." "Justifying our action is logical in a context of restricted budget." "Let's go much further, let's dig into innovation and research, let's create tomorrow's projects, let's have an innovative unit for development, let's do some experiments, let's try, let's give project leaders and agencies this spark to go further and believe" "It is always in construction and one shall not wait to have the perfect tool to begin"

The frames constitute one of the variables used for reconstructing and analysing the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD. Beyond the frames, identity work, emotionality and the (de)legitimization serve as variables in this analysis. To explore the relations between these variables, I use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), a method of the geometric data analysis (GDA) paradigm. MCA is an adequate tool to study the spatial arrangement of meaning because it expresses the relations between categories in geometric distances.

In this research, I perform two MCAs which are labelled MCA-1 and MCA-2 in the following. MCA-1 aims at revealing the dimensions that structure the meaning of results-based management in the AFD. With MCA-2, followed by an ascending hierarchical clustering analysis, I intend to bring the analysis back to the level of individuals to explore the trajectories and position in the agency that underlie their way of framing of results-based management. This will enable me to explore the distribution of meaning in the organization as well as the structure of the discourse coalitions on results-based management. The following section describes the procedure, variables and expected results of the first MCA.

3.3.2. Step 2: reconstructing the meaning structure of results-based management in the French Development Agency – MCA-1

GDA is an inductive paradigm in multivariate statistics particularly adapted to relational thinking and to exploring the structure of discursive spaces (Oberg & Korff, 2019). After sketching the principles underlying GDA and the MCA procedure, this section describes the operationalization of emotionality, identity work and (de-)legitimization strategy.

3.3.2.1. What is multiple correspondence analysis in geometric data analysis ?

Developed by Benzécri from the 1960s on and extensively applied by Bourdieu, *l'analyse des données* – translated „geometric data analysis" (GDA) – is a paradigm in multivariate statistics that "represents multivariate data sets as clouds of points and bases the interpretation of data on these clouds" (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2004, p. 1).

Principles of GDA and affinity with the analysis of meaning structure

GDA seeks to make patterns emerge from data in an exploratory attitude. GDA, as opposed to the main stream of multivariate statistics, is description-oriented. This means that the descriptive analysis of data comes before probability, obeying Benzécri's principle: „the model should follow the data, not the reverse" (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010).

GDA is not merely a method for visualizing data, but primarily for modelling data sets into geometric spaces (Rouanet, Ackermann, & Le Roux, 2000). The distribution of points in a geometric space expresses their relation in the dataset (Oberg & Korff, 2019). As such, GDA is a paradigm that "thinks in relations" (Bourdieu 1991 quoted in Lebaron, 2009, p. 13) and in space, making it tailored to the spatial modelling of fields. Despite its potential for studying meaning structures (Mohr, 1998), GDA has not been extensively exploited in the study of issue fields, except from the notable exception of Meyer and Höllerer' study of the meaning structure of 'Shareholder Value' in the Austrian context (2010). Their analysis showcases the capacity of GDA to reveal the profound structuring principles of meaning systems, conceived as "spatial arrangement of meanings" (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010, p. 1247).

Beyond the primarily descriptive exploration of social spaces, GDA enables isolating possible sociological explanations (Lebaron, 2010, p. 107), because it "brings to light […] the structure of the distribution of powers and specific interests determining, and explaining, agents' strategies" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 128, translated by the author). Clouds are constructed based on active categories. Supplementary categories, that is, elements that have not contributed to constructing the cloud, can be projected on it to explain its structure (Lebaron & Le Roux, 2013). For example, in *'L'Anatomie du Goût'* Bourdieu used status variables as supplementary categories to unveil the elements of the social position of people that determine their taste (Lebaron, 2009). The choice of active and supplementary categories is theoretically driven.

In this research I use multiple correspondence analysis, i.e. the method of GDA suited for the analysis of two-way tables with individuals × categorical variables.

Constructing and interpreting clouds with multiple correspondence analysis

Multiple correspondence analysis transforms the values of a two-way table with individuals × categorical variables into coordinates in a multidimensional space, based on their relation in the data set. The analysis yields two multi-dimensional clouds of points: the cloud of statistical individuals and the cloud of categories. Basically and in the spirit of GDA, MCA plots variables

with similar profiles close together and variables with dissimilar profiles remote. In other words, in the cloud of individuals, the more different the pattern of categories of individuals i and i', the more distant the points i and i' will be in the constructed space. The more similar their pattern of categories, the closer they will be. In the cloud of categories, the more often categories k and k' are both attributed to individuals, the closer the points k and k' will be in the cloud. The more often individuals feature either k or k' but not both, the more distant they will be in the cloud.

The results are displayed as two-dimensional projections, or 'planes', of the clouds on a few, well-selected axes in decreasing order of importance, for example using the plane of axes 1 and 2, 1 and 3 or 2 and 3, etc. The second axis is always orthogonally added onto the first one to explain the residual variance of the cloud. Thus, there is a priori no relation between axes. Axes cross at their mean point, which constitutes the barycentre, or the point of equilibrium, of the cloud. Individuals featuring infrequent categories will be located at the periphery of the cloud of individuals, i.e. far from the mean point. The same is true for infrequent categories in the cloud of categories.

Axes are the product of the analysis and the structuring elements of the created space. Thus, to analyse the results, the researcher interprets the axes that structure the space; in my case, the axes that structure the meaning of results-based management in the AFD. To do so, one looks for general principles describing the similarities between categories or individuals on the same side, and the differences between categories or individuals on opposite sides of one axes. The main aid to interpretation is the contribution of points to axes. The contribution of a point to an axis is "the proportion of variance of the axis due to point" (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010, p. 40). The contribution of a point to an axis depends on the weight p and distance of the point to the mean point y on the axis of variance λ:

$$(p\ y^2)/\lambda.$$

The contribution of a category point k is thus a function of both its distance from the mean point and its weight. If y is the coordinate of point k on the axis of variance λ and Q is the number of categorical variables, the contribution of k to the axis is:

$$\text{Ctr}_k = \left(\frac{f_k}{Q}\ (y^k)^2 \right) / \lambda$$

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In the cloud of individuals, and because individuals have a priori the same weight, the contribution of point i is a function of its distance to the mean point:

$$\text{Ctr}_i = \left(\frac{1}{n} \, (y_i)^2 \right) / \lambda$$

Only categories that contribute to the axis over the mean contribution are retained for the interpretation (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). It is important to note that the results should not be interpreted based on the sole graphical representation of the cloud, because two points close on a plane might be remote in the multi-dimensional space. In other words, on a plane of two axes, a category might contribute over the mean contribution to one axis but not to the other. In the results chapter, I will therefore systematically provide the results of MCAs both in graphical and in tabular forms.

Illustrative example: MCA on people's taste

Because MCA is not a well-known method in the Social Sciences outside of France, this subsection provides a simple example to illustrate the procedure and the interpretation of results. I present the example used by Le Roux and Rouanet in their textbook on MCA, which is inspired by Bourdieu's work on the anatomy of taste (2010).

1215 individuals responded to a survey on their taste. This simplified example of MCA is based on their responses to only four multiple-choice questions related to their preferences regarding the following items:

- TV-programs: news, comedy, police, nature, sport, films, drama, soap opera
- movie genre: action, comedy, costume drama, documentary, horror, musical, romance, SciFi
- type of art: performance, landscape, renaissance, still life, portrait, modern, impressionism
- place to eat out: fish & chips, pub, Indian restaurant, Italian restaurant, French restaurant, steakhouse

Each individual has a pattern of responses made of four categories, for example Individual 1 in the table below has the pattern: News / Comedy / Renaissance / Italian restaurant.

Table 2: Two-way table underlying the MCA – taste example

	TV-programs	movie genre	type of art	place to eat out
Individual 1	News	Comedy	Renaissance	Italian restaurant
Individual 2	Soap	Action	Landscape	Steakhouse
…				
Individual 1215				

Based on this two-way tables of Individuals × Questions, the MCA produces a cloud of categories and a cloud of individuals along the principal axes – here the first two:

Figure 5: Cloud of categories and cloud of individuals for the taste example

Source: Le Roux and Rouanet (2010, pp. 7–8)

The interpretation of axes is based on the active categories that contribute to the one or the other axis over the mean. On the first axis we observe an opposition between matter-of-fact/traditional tastes on the left-hand side, and fiction world/modern tastes on the right-hand side. On the second axis, we observe an opposition between popular and sophisticated tastes.

Figure 6: Correspondence map for the plane of axes 1 and 2 – the taste example

From the questionnaire, we know the age, sex and income of the respondents. The categories resulting from these questions can be projected on the cloud of categories as supplementary variables to identify elements that explain the structure of the cloud. The interpretation is based on the deviation between supplementary categories on the axes. This analysis suggests that the first axis is related to the age of the respondents: younger respondents are attracted to the fiction world, while elder respondents have matter-of-facts tastes. On the second axis, the opposition between popular and sophisticated taste is related to the income of respondents.

Figure 7: Interpretation of supplementary categories on the plane of axis 1 and 2 – the taste example

This example illustrates the potential of MCA for structuring social spaces and inquiring about the factors underlying their structure. I now turn to the selection and operationalization of the active variables for the first MCA.

3.3.2.2. Operationalization of the variables for MCA-1

The first MCA aims at reconstructing the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD, based on the framework developed in the theoretical chapter. The groups of variables on the same sides of the axis will enable me to reconstruct the framings of results-based management. The analysis of the distribution of framings along the axes (similarities/closeness and opposition/distance) will reveal the principles that structure the meaning of results-based management in the AFD.

This section describes how I operationalized the different elements of the meaning structure: identity work, emotionality and strategies of (de)legitimization. I added the variable of 'positioning' towards results-based management entailed in the statements to reflect their overall direction. Figure 8 provides a visual summary of the variables used for conducting the first MCA.

Figure 8: Summary of the variables and groups of variables used for reconstructing the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD

The operationalization of the frames (1) results from the frame analysis described in the previous section. I now turn to the operationalization of the other aspects of the meaning structure. I provide illustrative quotes and indicate the representation of each category in the data set.

(2) Positioning

This variable was not developed in the theoretical framework. However, in order to give the general direction of interviewees' accounts on results-based management, I indicated whether their statements expressed a positive, a negative, ambivalent and neutral positioning towards results-based management as a concept. This should be distinguished from the evaluation of results-based management as a practice. I am interested in the positioning of the interviewee towards the concept in general, rather than whether the person judged a particular practice as good or bad results-based management.

48 percent of the statements express a positive positioning towards results-based management, while 33 percent express a negative positioning. Respectively 15 and 4 percent of the statements express an ambivalent or neutral positioning.

Figure 9: Representation of the categories of the variable 'positioning' in the dataset

(3) Identity Work

Following the theoretical framework, I recorded whether statement included identity and boundary work, that is, whether they included the representation of the AFD as collective self, the identification of allies, including perceived victims, and the identification of rivals. I further

recorded whether allies and enemies were identified inside or outside the AFD in order to analyse where lines of coalition and oppositions are constructed in relation with frames.

Table 3: Overview of the operationalization of identity work with illustrative quotes

Identity work		Illustrative quotes
Representation of self as organization	Representation of the AFD via description of the vision, mission, statute, culture etc. of the AFD or its staff.	"We remain the financer of someone else's project, […] who remains the pilot.[…] so a large part of the wish and reality of impact remains with the client who borrowed from you and will reimburse you". „The [World] Bank remains profoundly affected by the culture of numbers. If you are not able to give a number, it means your thing is worth nothing. And here at the AFD we are in the opposite culture: the culture of words. Discourse is way more important than reality."
Identification of allies (or victims)	Naming allies: no/yes, who? If yes: inside or outside the organization	"I think EAA [AFD's Water and Sanitation Department] has the most mature vision. They put the needed resources on these topics and they have a good positioning on the issue of indicators." "We risk prejudicing countries that already are aid orphans in which for institutional, political, economic or other reasons, we can't reach such immediate results."
Identification of rivals (boundary work)	Naming rivals: yes/no, who? If yes: inside or outside the organization	"It's a dogma, they [the DfID] made it a dogma and they gave themselves the means to impose a standard." "That's kind of the fantasy of the [World Bank]… That we are going to assess an objective reality and deduce from it the allocation of scarce resource. But it is always way more complicated than that, otherwise you could replace development banks with ATMs."

The representation of self is crucial in framing work in general (Van Grinsven et al., 2020) and in resolving institutional contradiction in particular (Creed, De Jordy, & Lok, 2010). Therefore, I went further than the binary coding in the analysis of the representation of self. From the statements, I developed a typology of AFD identities based on the different views on the primary mission, role or characteristics of the AFD. From the 76 statement involving a representation of the AFD, I could differentiate five typical identities of the AFD:

- The AFD is a 'bank' offering tailor-made financial solutions to respond to the needs of its clients;
- The primary mission of the AFD is 'development in the partner countries';
- The AFD is an agency of 'experts' in development, of knowers, of field-experienced people;
- The AFD is a 'public entity' in a democratic system, and as such, it needs to justify the use of resources;

- The AFD represents France and/or the Western world abroad and acts as a 'political actor' with its own values and interests;
- Other or representation of self as group within the AFD.

34 percent of the statements involve the construction of identity. 33 percent involve boundary work, that is, the mention of discursive rivals, and 38 percent of the statements include the mention of perceived allies or victims to sympathize with. Table 4 and Figure 10 below provides a detailed overview of the representation of each sub-category of identity work in the dataset.

Table 4: Representation of identity work in the dataset

Variables of identity work	Categories	Representation in the data set (N=223) in percentage and share
Representation of self, collective identity as AFD	No representation of self as AFD	66 % - N=147
	Representation of self as AFD	34 % - N= 76
	... of which	
	The AFD is a *bank*	29 % - N=22
	The AFD is a *development partner*	20 % - N=15
	The AFD is a *political actor*	16% - N=12
	The AFD is an agency of *experts* in development	13 % - N=10
	The AFD is a *public entity*	11% - N=8
	Reference to a specific group within the AFD	7 % - N=5
	Other	5% - N=4
Identification of allies	No allies mentioned	61% - N=137
	Allies mentioned	39% - N=86
	... of which	
	Allies, friends, victims identified *within* the AFD	45% - N=39
	Allies, friends, victims identified *outside* the AFD	55% - N=47
Identification of rivals	No rivals mentioned	67% - N=149
	Rivals mentioned	33% - N=74
	... of which	
	Enemies, rivals, challengers identified *within* the AFD	36% - N=27
	Enemies, rivals, challengers identified *outside* the AFD	64% - N=47

Figure 10: Representation of categories of the variable 'identity work' in the dataset

REPRESENTATION OF SELF

Bank 10%

Development partner 7%

Experts 5%

Pol actor 5%

Public entity 4%

No identity 69%

IDENTIFICATION OF RIVALS

Bound. outward 21%

No boundary 67%

Bound. inward 12%

INDENTIFICATION OF ALLIES

Allies outward 21%

Allies inward 18%

No allies 61%

(4) Emotionality

I differentiated between emotional and non-emotional statements, depending on the tone and language used by interviewees to frame results-based management. I performed this step listening to the recorded interviews and reading the transcripts. This variable is closely connected – though not systematically – with some categories of identity work and legitimization strategies. Appeal to moral values or story-telling tend to convey strong feelings, such as indignation or compassion with victims. Legitimation via reference to authority or customs rather keep emotions low: "we do so because it is demanded from us" or "because that's what everyone does" (Vaara et al., 2006). When coding the use of emotionality, I therefore paid attention to

the legitimation strategies entailed in the statements, as well as to the use of language and the tone directly conveying emotions.

The analysis of emotionality is limited to this binary coding. I discuss this limitation in the concluding chapter. 75 statements were coded as emotional, representing 34 percent of the dataset.

Table 5: Overview of the operationalization of emotionality with illustrative quotes

Emotionality	Illustrative quotes
Emotional statements	"We use mechanisms from ancient times with a way of managing project cycles that shocked me when I arrived and still shock me." "Otherwise to get the best results, we take only the easy countries. […] What does it mean to perform well when the country is fragile, in great difficulty, vulnerable, when there are political tensions?"
Non-emotional statements	"We have to be pragmatic about that, it is a good option."

(5) Legitimation and delegitimization strategies

I used Van Leeuwen and Wodak's typology of legitimation strategies to code the statements for the discursive strategy used by interviewees to legitimize their position towards results-based management. This typology includes legitimation by authority, by rationality, by moral evaluation or by mythopoesis, also called narrativization (Vaara & Monin, 2010). To capture efforts to delegitimize counter-frames, I constructed the reverse definitions to the legitimation strategies of Van Leeuwen and Wodak.

Table 6 provides the definitions of the legitimation and delegitimization strategies along with illustrative quotes. Table 7 and Figure 11 below provide an overview of their representation in the dataset.

Table 6: Overview of the operationalization of legitimization and delegitimization strategies with illustrative quotes

(De)legitimization Strategies	Illustrative quotes for the use of legitimation and delegitimization strategy
Authorization - Legitimization by authorization (because someone said) or by custom/normality - Critic of Authorization, i.e. critic of the authorization (e.g. by undermining the authority of the source of legitimacy)	"We provide results because we are obliged to do so, somehow." "Does the average French, from whom we take tax-money, does he really want tables with figures, results and indicators?"
Rationalization - Legitimization by utility - Critic of rationality, i.e. delegitimization of the utility of results-based management (e.g. by demonstrating irrationality)	"It helps structuring the discussion with more objective data." "To say: I want more people who gain access to water for less money" makes no sense. It negates the complexity of interventions."
Moral evaluation Legitimization or delegitimization of results-based management by appeal to moral values	"It is too easy to criticize the tool without questioning oneself" "This approach would risk disadvantaging even more orphan countries."
Mythopoesis Legitimization or delegitimization via story-telling involving reward or loss for (not) using results-based management	"And she delayed the execution of the project. Having worked for the World Bank, you know the tensions you can create when you delay projects. But because she wanted this to be well done, that the contract corresponds to the needs and she wanted to test the contract before scaling up. [...] Once you have put in place a good system, you can scale up." "But when we asked the statistical department to do a scientific evaluation, they were not able, for diverse reasons. Apparently it was difficult to have random samples of the population, to compare where it worked and where not etc. [...] So incredible result of this story: it worked very well during several years […] and there was an evaluation demonstrating that nothing could be demonstrated and it was abandoned."

Table 7: Representation of Legitimation and delegitimization strategies in the dataset

Legitimization strategies		Delegitimization strategies	
Categories	% and N	Categories	% and N
No legitimization	35% - N=77	No delegitimization	51% - N=114
Legitimization	65% - N=146	Delegitimization	49% - N=109
... *of which*		... *of which*	
Rationalization	66% - N=96	Critic of rationality	50% - N=54
Authorization	18% - N=26	Critic of Authorization	9% - N=10
Moral Evaluation	10% - N=14	Moral Evaluation	29% - N=32
Mythopoesis	7% - N=10	Mythopoesis	12% - N=13

Figure 11: Representation of the strategies of legitimation and delegitimization in the dataset

LEGITIMATION

Mythopoesis 4%
Moral eval 6%
No Legit 35%
Rationality 43%
Authority 12%

DELEGITIMIZATION

Mythopoesis 6%
Moral eval 14%
No Delegit 51%
Rationality 24%
Authority 5%

3.3.2.3. Procedure for MCA-1 and interpretation of results

The operationalization of the different aspects of the meaning structures yielded eight variables. Table 8 below provides an overview of these variables and the number of active categories they entail. In the two-way table for the MCA, the statistical individuals (or rows) are the 223 statements retrieved from the interviews and the eight variables (columns) are the frames, positioning, three variables on identity work, emotionality and two variables on (de)legitimization strategies. All variables were set as active, i.e. all variables contributed to constructing the cloud. Categories with very low frequencies (≤ 5 percent) are usually excluded from the MCA because of the risk that a few outliers distort the cloud through large distances from the origin despite low weight (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2004). These categories are usually set as passive, that is, they are projected onto the cloud, but they do not contribute to its construction. The categories 'group within the AFD' and 'other' in the variable 'representation of self' were set as passive categories, because of their very low frequency in the data set of two percent, and because they constitute "junk" categories, i.e. they are made of heterogenous entities. However, I decided to keep the identity work category 'public entity' despite its frequency of 4 percent because the other four identity categories range between 5 and 10 percent, apart from the category 'No identity' (see Figure 10). A strict application of the ≤5 percent rule would be inappropriate in this case.

Table 8: Structure of the data set for MCA-1 and number of active categories for each variable (in brackets)

	Frame (6)	Positioning (3)	Identity work			Emotionality (2)	(De)legitimization strategy	
			Representation of AFD (6)	Boundary work (3)	Allies (3)		Legitimation (5)	Delegitimization (5)
Statements N=223								

The interpretation of the first MCA will be based on the cloud of categories. I will identify how frames relate to other discursive variables to reconstruct the framings of results-based management in the AFD. Second, I will interpret the axes. That is, I will analyse how the framings relate to one another along the principal axes to uncover the principles that structure the meaning of results-based management in the AFD.

In the third step of my research design, I use GDA to place the meaning structure in the organization conceived as a discursive terrain. I aim to isolate the aspects of interviewees' position in the AFD and of their trajectory that determine their position-taking on results-based management. This requires the use of supplementary variables, i.e. variables that are projected on the cloud after it is constructed, to characterize it. The following section describes the active variables used to perform the second MCA and details how the active and the supplementary variables are operationalized. I further describe how I use ascending hierarchical clustering on the cloud of individuals to create groups of like-minded individuals and analyse their characteristic attributes. Schematically, this enables me to map who thinks what about results-based management, and where in the AFD.

The structure of the meaning of results-based management and the way it is anchored in the AFD as discursive terrain are expected to reveal how potentially incompatible framings coexist inside one and the same organization.

3.3.3. Step 3: Exploring individuals' position-taking to explain the meaning structure of results-based management – MCA-2 and Clustering

This first MCA explores the framings and their relations as structuring elements of the meaning of results-based management in the AFD. With the second MCA, followed by a clustering analysis, I aim at isolating sociological determinants of the position-takings of individuals on a specific issue within an organization. This exercise thus brings the analysis back to the level of people as carriers of meaning and inhabitants of institutions and organizations (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Zilber, 2002). I assume, in the tradition of Bourdieu, that actor's position on a specific issue like results-based management is linked with their trajectories and their social position in the environment or field of interest – here the organization in which they work. Therefore, I explore the relation between interviewees' position-taking on results-based management and their professional position and trajectory.

To isolate the possible determinants underlying the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD, I construct groups of like-minded people and explore the attributes that characterize individuals of one group and distinguishes them from the individuals of other groups. This is done in five steps. First, I restructure the data to obtain interviewees' pattern of frame use through binary coding of their use of each frame. The binary codes will serve as active categories, i.e. to construct the cloud. Second, I retrieve data on their educational and professional career, which will serve as supplementary variables, i.e. to characterize the cloud. Third, I perform a MCA on the frame use as active variables and the interviewees as statistical individuals. Fourth, I interpret the cloud by means of the supplementary variables. Fifth, I perform an ascending hierarchical clustering on the cloud of individuals and analyse the significant properties of the interviewees in each cluster.

3.3.3.1. Operationalization of the variables of MCA-2

As mentioned in the section on data structuration, interviewees manipulated different argumentations during interviews. Yet, the fact that different frames exist does not mean that individuals use them freely. Rather,

> "it is knowledge of the field itself in which they evolve that allows us best to grasp the roots of their singularity, their point of view or position (in a field) from which their particular vision of the world (and of the field itself) is constructed." (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 107)

In order to analyse interviewees' position-taking in the meaning structure, I move back to the level of individuals by restructuring the data to reflect the patterns of frame use of the 41 interviewees (see Table 9 below). In this analysis I take the variable of frames as proxy for the framings, since each framing is structured around one frame. For each interviewee, I code whether s/he had used or not each the six frame during the interview (see Table 9 below). I then perform an MCA on these six binary variables. The constructed cloud offers a consistency test as it is expected to reflect the meaning structure obtained through MCA-1.

Table 9: Active categories for MCA-2 on interviewees' patterns of frame use

	Frame 1	Frame 2	Frame 3	Frame 4	Frame 5	Frame 6
Interviewee N=41	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO

In the second step, to capture the position and trajectories of interviewees, I retrieved biographical data on their educational and professional background, as well as on their position inside the AFD. This data was collected in the introductory part of the interview and through complementary internet research. Table 10 provides an overview of the variables and categories retained for the analysis. The selection of supplementary variables was partly driven by my own or interviewees' assumptions about their possible link to the way people interpret results-based management. Other variables reflect standard sociological variables such as the level of education or the position in the AFD. Some variables were collected opportunistically, depending on the data available online or provided during the interview.

In the analysis of the educational background, I focused on the obtained diploma and the domain of studies. To record the position of interviewees inside the AFD, I focused on four aspects. First, I recorded their position in the hierarchy as agent or manager – knowing that the evolution of the professional track in the agency implies a hierarchical progression from agent to manager positions. Second, I located them inside their department or unit. I split the operational department into the soft, technical and regional departments to reflect their different metiers and history, as outlined in the previous section on the AFD. Third, I recorded whether the interviewee had experience working in the network of AFD agencies abroad, that is, in close contact with their counterparts in the developing countries. And finally I recorded the

ratio of time spent inside and outside the AFD to differentiate interviewees who had spent their entire or the major part of their career working for the AFD from those who have more work experience outside the AFD. The latter experience is recorded in the last set of variables on the career of interviewees before joining the AFD. This set consists of binary variables on the experience of interviewees in different sectors, working in developing countries or in the UK/US context, including international organizations. All these variables are expected to reflect the position and trajectory of interviewees. With the second MCA and the clustering exercise, I aim at finding out which of these aspects of the trajectory and position inside the AFD underlie the different position-takings on results-based management.

Table 10: Operationalization of supplementary variables for MCA-2 and Clustering

	Variables	Categories
Educational Background	Level of Studies	Master level
		PhD level
	First domain of studies	Management, Economic and political Sciences (incl. development studies)
		Humanities and Social Sciences
		Engineering (incl. agricultural and environment studies)
		Other
	Second domain of studies (leading to second diploma)	Management, Economic and political Sciences (incl. development studies)
		Humanities and Social Sciences
		Engineering (incl. agricultural and environment studies)
		No second discipline
Career at the AFD	Current position on the AFD	Agent
		Manager
		Other
	Current Department[11]	Strategy Department
		Research and Knowledge Department
		Soft operational department: Human Development divisions, concerned with soft and more recent AFD sectors (Governance, Capacity Building, Education and Health, Climate change, Social and Environmental Risk Assessment)
		Technical operational department: Sustainable Development divisions, concerned with technical and historic AFD sectors (Agriculture and Biodiversity, Transport and Energy, Water and Sanitation)
		Regional operational department: Regional Departments at the headquarter or AFD Agencies located in developing countries
		Other (e.g. CEO office)
	Experience in AFD Agency (abroad)	Yes
		No
	Ratio Time at the AFD/time elsewhere	More working experience outside than inside the AFD
		Approx. as much experience working for the AFD and elsewhere
		More experience working for the AFD than elsewhere
		Entire career at AFD
Career outside the AFD	Experience working in developing country	Yes
		No
	Experience in the private sector	Yes
		No
	Experience in an NGO	Yes
		No
	Experience in Public Administration	Yes
		No
	Experience in UK/US Context	The person has studied or worked in an Anglo-Saxon country or an international organization
		The person has no experience studying or working in an Anglo-Saxon context

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[11] An organigramme of the AFD's structure before the 2017 reform is provided in the annex.

3.3.3.2.Procedure for MCA-2 and interpretation of the results

In MCA-2, I use the binary variables on the use of frames as active categories and the interviewees as statistical individuals (see Table 11 below). In the case of binary variables, the interpretation of the cloud of categories is based on the contribution of the variables – not the individual categories – to explaining the variance of the axes. I then use the supplementary variables to find explanatory factors underlying the structure of meaning of results-based management in the AFD. On each side of the axis, I search for supplementary categories that are overrepresented in relation to active variables contributing to the axis over the mean. This enables me to tell, for example, that staff working in a particular department, or having experience working for NGOs, tends to frame results-based management in a specific way.

Table 11: Active and supplementary categories for MCA-2

	Active (binary) variables on the use of frames Used to construct the cloud						Supplementary Variables Used to characterize the cloud		
	Frame 1 Yes/No	Frame 2 Yes/No	Frame 3 Yes/No	Frame 4 Yes/No	Frame 5 Yes/No	Frame 6 Yes/No	Educational Background (3 variables)	Career at the AFD (4 variables)	Career outside the AFD (5 variables)
Interviewees (n=41)									

3.3.3.3. Procedure for the Clustering Analysis

I perform an ascending or agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis (AHC) on the clouds of individuals resulting from MCA-2. This analysis groups people with similar patterns of frame use. This enhances my interpretation of the cloud of categories described above by revealing what biographical attributes characterize the different groups of like-minded individuals.

A cluster analysis is best suited to search for the principles of homogeneity within (compactness criterion) and differentiation between groups (separability criterion), and therefore to describe sub-contexts in the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD. The AHC method proceeds from one-element-clusters to successive aggregations until all objects are grouped in a single class. In GDA, the clustering is based on the Euclidean distance between the points in the cloud. The results are represented in the form of a dendrogram and as groups

of points in the cloud. The researcher determines the optimal partition such that the between-variance of the clusters remains high enough and the within-variance of the clusters remains small enough to ensure both the compactness and the separability of clusters.

The AHC enables assessing what characterizes the organizational sub-contexts in which specific frames or combinations of frames are over-represented. The results will show what elements of their position and trajectory underlie individuals' position-taking on results-based management.

3.4. Summary and transition

This chapter has highlighted the centrality of results-based management as rationalizing myth in development aid, as well as the institutional complexity in this field and the intra-institutional complexity of results-based management itself. I have outlined how the AFD has incorporated this complex institution, leading to compartmentalization, professionalization, and more or less decoupled practices. The AFD constitutes an instrumental case for analysing what happens in a complex organization confronted with institutional complexity.

I use a three-steps design to answer the research question. It consists of the in-depth content analysis of 41 interviews, followed by multivariate statistics based on the statements and on the argumentative patterns of interviewees. The results of the frame analysis, two multiple correspondence analyses and a clustering analysis will yield the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD, as well as isolate explanatory elements underlying the interpretation(s) of this managerial concept in a development aid organization. The following chapter presents the results of these analyses, showing that conflicting meanings peacefully coexist inside the AFD. It shows how oppositions are embedded in different sub-contexts of interpretation.

Chapter 4: The meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD – a complex equilibrium

This chapter presents the results of the analyses, following the structure of the previous chapter. Overall, the analysis draws the picture of a complex equilibrium between highly heterogeneous meanings of results-based management, that, nevertheless, coexist in a functional and legitimate organization. Following each analysis, I make preliminary suggestions as to why the complexity of interpretations of results-based management does not escalate inside the AFD, as the reviewed literature tends to suggest.

I begin by describing in detail the six incrementally reconstructed frames of results-based management. In the second part of this chapter, I reconstruct the framings of results-based management and find three principles that structure the relations between these framings, i.e. the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD. In the third sub-section, I isolate two organizational sub-contexts of meaning, as well as two experience-related factors connected with the interpretation of results-based management in the AFD. Finally, I zoom in on one discourse coalition around efforts to recouple the practices and structures of results-based management in the AFD.

4.1.The heterogeneous repertoire of frames of results-based management in the AFD

Six frames arouse from the in-depth content analysis, constituting the repertoire of interpretive packages available to assign meaning to the concept of results-based management in the AFD. After providing an overview and a detailed description of the frames, I examine them along the functionality they attribute to results-based management. I divide the frames into three categories: technical-managerial frames, political frames and frames of decoupling.

4.1.1. Overview and representation of the frames in the dataset

Results-based management has different meanings in the AFD. Based on the 224 statements, I found six discrete frames of results-based management. Each provides a different diagnosis, i.e. definition, or a different prognosis of results-based management, i.e. the perceived potential or risks and the solution either to avoid the risks or to fulfil the potentials of results-based management. Because this research takes place in the organizational context, I also reconstructed the prescribed organizational response to the pressure to implement response-based management. Table 12 summarizes the reconstructed frames.

The six frames or results-based management are quite evenly distributed in the data set, apart from 'money for results' which is used in only in 15 statements.

Figure 12: Representation of the frames in the data set, in absolute and relative frequency

Frames are also quite evenly used by interviewees. The frames used by most interviewees are 'playing the accountability game' and 'structured reflection', used respectively by 23 and 20 interviewees. 11 to 16 interviewees used the frames 'critic of economism', 'bureaucracy vs our metier' and 'effective corporate steering'. Only 8 interviewees referred to the frame 'money for results'.

Table 12: Overview of the core tasks of the six frames of results-based management in the AFD

|	'Structured reflection'	'Effective corporate steering'	'Money for results'	'Playing the accountability game'	'Bureaucracy vs. our metier'	'Critic of economism'
Diagnosis Definition Results-based management is…	A set of tools for structuring the reflection on and analysis of results	An effective way of steering the agency towards the focus on results by means of transparent targets and methods	A pragmatic and comfortable way of delegating financial risks, while reaching results (output-based aid)	A necessary evil, a normal (even though irrational) thing to do in a modern democracy: communicating questionable numbers in order to be considered transparent	A systematization of rituals not fitting the metier of the AFD	The manifestation of economism, scientism and liberalism: an oversimplification of complexity and a negation of the political character of aid
Prognosis Potentials or risks of results-based management → solution	Improved reflection leads to more results → use results-based management tools to improve reflection and plan, monitor and deliver realistic results	Transparency of measurable targets induces compliance, change in practices, and, over time, an evolution of mentality → use smart targets and methodologies to steer the agency towards agreed goals	Meaningfulness only under certain conditions which are not fulfilled at the AFD → consider using it when appropriate, that is, in very specific, few cases at the AFD	Political survival → Do what is demanded: provide numbers as symbolic currency of accountability	Burden for project staff and incentive of dishonesty on results ("Christmas tree projects") → business-as-usual, do what the AFD is best at doing: establishing long-term trust relationships with clients	Perverse effects of pretention of political neutrality and scientific objectivity → rehabilitate the complexity and the political in development aid (qualitative studies)
Prescribed organizational response	ADOPT managerial tools as tailor-made approaches with more preparation time/resources to support project staff	CONTROL managerial tools as means to realize political priorities	DISSASSOCIATE the theoretical from the practical meaningfulness for the AFD. Implement it whenever possible.	COMPROMISE between transparency and symbolism	AVOID through symbolic compliance	CHALLENGE the established order by attacking latent assumptions
Motivation	High – bottom-up crusade	Medium – Top-down, transparent approach by specialists	Low – remains theoretical, little knowledge and experience	Low – do what is necessary for satisfying demand	Low – contain results-based management	Medium – remains at the discursive level

Figure 13: Number of interviewees using each frame (N=41 interviewees)

4.1.2. Detailed description of the frames

This section provides a detailed description of each frame of results-based management, from the most frequently to the least frequently used one. Descriptions are structured along the three core framing tasks of frames. The frame's title is systematically followed by a representative quote to illustrate its overall point. Furthermore, I construct the frame descriptions around original quotes, in italics, in order to directly reflect the voices of the interviewees (Gamson, 1992; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010) in a manner as unbiased as possible (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012). All interviewees were conducted in French. All translations are by the author.

'Structured reflection': *„If we want to increase our quality margin we have to accept to take the time necessary to reflect, to better structure our interventions, and to use tools for that.“*

In this frame, results-based management is an attitude, almost an imperative, in development aid. It offers a set of tools to structure the reflection about the expected results, and about the adequacy of the intervention design to ensure, verify and capitalize the achievement of these results. *"Results-based management, to me, doesn't mean accountability, it means achieving our planned objectives. And to do so, we need to ensure that we are going in the direction we had planned upfront."* Central to this frame is the assertion that the usefulness of results-based management depends on the mind of its user. If used properly, results-based management

fosters logically designed interventions by providing methods for questioning the consistency of paths between the planed activities and the expected results, as well as for effectively monitoring the progress towards the expected results. If imposed as a standardized procedure or with accountability as main purpose, it becomes a burden. *„Here, the Logical Framework[12] is perceived as a straight-jacket rather than a support to the reflection and to the structuration of the monitoring and evaluation system."* Results-based management is expected to shift the deplored focus on financial results towards development results, defined as the expected changes in the life of end beneficiaries. In doing so, results-based management increases the chances for results to materialize more effectively. The motivational framing is strong. 'structured reflection' conveys the urge to change the positioning of the AFD and of its staff towards doing development aid. It calls for a cultural shift within the agency starting from the level of interventions, by showcasing the value of results-based management for strengthening the focus on results. *"Incentive yes, constraint no. We need more structuring stuff."*

'Playing the accountability game': *"They want numbers, give them numbers. No one's going to verify."*

Results-based management is a response to the external, political demand for transparency and accountability. In a democratic country, a public agency receiving public funds is expected to legitimate its existence by showing how it uses public resources. An enhanced visibility towards taxpayers and politicians secures its survival. "Simplistic" numbers are the best suited way to fulfil this purpose. Results indicators serve as proxies for the immediate results (outputs) financed by the AFD. The figures provided are not suited for revealing any truth about the results attributable to the AFD. However, they are more "understandable", "striking", "sexy" to laypeople, which is their primary purpose. "*Besides the numbers are not exhaustive. I am not even sure it gives an order of magnitude. But I understand that we want to present figures. Indeed when the AFD publishes its development results at the beginning of each year, that's what we find back in the media afterwards: the number of children given access to education, the number of pregnant women vaccinated, etc.*" Results-based management is "better than doing nothing". Rather, in a logic of communication and "pedagogy" towards politicians and taxpayers as non-experts, they are considered as powerful symbolic devices in the discourse on the transparency of public services since *"you need to sell public policies too"*. Results-based

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[12] In the AFD, the Logical Framework is an analytical table attached to each project identification form. It delineates the strategy of projects, that is, the logical link between means and goals, potential risks mitigating this logic, and the indicators for monitoring goal attainment (see methods chapter).

management shall not be expected to perform more than this symbolic accountability. *„Every public policy needs a justification. That's not absurd. Still, it is a bit of a heresy to people who know development, because they know that the kilometres of road you build will not necessarily lead to development".* The AFD could become better at communicating its results and shall adapt to new external demands such as reporting on the SDGs. It should not, however, invest more resources than necessary to produce figures meant for communication and accountability only. This frame is a rather fatalistic one displaying a low motivation to resolve the perceived "*heresy*" inherent to the modern accountability discourse. *„What makes up the strength of all that, why it works and why everyone promotes that is because it is very simplistic, it is sexy and very useful to hurried people who are not interested in the topic. Interested people go way beyond indicators. […] Typically, a minister is on mission in this or that country and he needs a one-pager with indicators, results, figures. So his communication manager will pick three figures and put them on the minister's speech*"

'Bureaucracy vs. our metier': *"So we promise to change people's life"*

'Bureaucracy vs our metier' diagnoses results-based management as a ritualized and bureaucratic management system, which is judged inappropriate to the core metier of the AFD. The systematic "one-size fits all" character of results-based management fails to account for the diversity and complexity of the contexts in which the AFD intervenes as bank. The primary focus of a bank is naturally on financial results in terms of committed, allocated and disbursed funds. The main result of the AFD activity is the sustainability of financial products, which in turn enables a long-term trust relation to clients. Staff is, by vocation as technical experts in the sector of development aid, dedicated to the success of projects, and therefore to results. *„The diverse and multiple opinions already add up to the militant will of project leaders who really want to change for good. And after 4 to 5 opinions on different topics, where through a small project like that we transform a society, all at once, you intervene in Niger, an arid country with the highest fertility in the world, so opinions ask you to make sure that women blablabla, that climate blablabla, that biodiversity blablabla, and as a project leader you take note and say yes, we'll do our best.*" Yet, the results of development interventions ought to remain the preoccupation of the client taking out a credit, not the lender's. *"We remain the financer of someone else's project, […] who remains the pilot. So even if we can be exigent in certain contexts and on certain issues […] a huge share of the wish for impact remains with the client who borrows from you and reimburses you."* By adding standardized quality management items in the project preparation cycle, results-based management not only slows down planning

processes, but it also incentivizes dishonesty in planning operations that overpromise on the expected results of development interventions *„because at the AFD there is always a beauty contest on who has the biggest science, who is most rigorous, who'll give the most anxious opinions, etc*.". Rather than leading to better designed projects more likely to reach expected objectives, it results in so-called "Christmas tree projects": *„To get a project through here, you are forced to be extremely affirmative and peremptory and promise a bright future to everybody."* What is mostly needed to reach results is a long-term relationship of trust and mutual understanding to develop adapted products to the client's situation: . "*Our projects are lace. We do tailor-made stuff.* […] *That's in opposition with the industry, which is the World Bank with all its assets, but which is very dogmatic*". The focus on the client's needs and the economic model of the AFD as bank have priority over the focus on results. It is experienced operational staff with deep knowledge of the field who increase the chances of results, and not results-based management. 'Bureaucracy vs our metier' has a strong motivational framing in favour of the status quo. Results-based management shall not be (further) institutionalized at the AFD. Where institutions of results-based management are identified as such, they should not be further expanded at the expenses of already overworked project staff.

'Critic of economism': *"We remain in the understanding of the world by economists, for economists […] an approach which creates a space where everything can be validated and which validates itself in circles, and evicts all others."*

In its most elaborate version, the 'critic of economism' frame characterizes results-based management as a manifestation of the dominant rationalistic, economistic and scientistic discourse in development aid, that is, the belief in the reducibility of social facts to economic dimensions that can be scientifically elucidated. Advocates of this frame contend that economism and scientism structure the debate on aid effectiveness, based on the assumed causal relationship between development aid and development results. *„To the best of my knowledge, the money that was put into the Horn of Africa… Is Somalia or Afghanistan better off now? Well Afghanistan, in terms of Value-for-Money, we should check where we are now, but I am not sure… But then again, it is not linked to development aid. If you don't have any political consensus, if you don't find any consensus in society, if there are so many tensions, we can put all the money we want, it won't make development. It doesn't mean that aid is not effective, it simply means that it is not only about development aid and we have to accept this".* This frame taps into the historical roots of the logic of business and the military, following which inputs can and shall be logically derived from the expected outputs by means of evidence-based assumptions. *„It is the legacy*

of Mc Namara who calculated ratios of tons of bombs to be dropped on the Vietcong and the logic was to say: we'll make it if we drop so much. So it also stinks quite a lot on the side of the metrics trying to solve any kind of problems by applying some sort of ratios". Applied to the sector of development, the idea that development aid can be managed by expected results conveys a wrong and dangerous pretention of political neutrality via pretendedly scientific truth. The 'critic of economism' frame posits development as a highly complex, social and human process which cannot be predicted, modelled or measured as result of development interventions. *"That's kind of the fantasy of the [World Bank]. That is, we are going to assess an objective reality and deduce the allocation of scarce resources. But it is always much more complicated than that. Otherwise you could replace development banks with ATMs".* Any development intervention in a complex system is an expression of political choices and visions, which results-based management contributes to negate. "*We did not give Somalia a lot of money because they performed well [...] These are political choices.*" The 'critic of economism' frame fears the "*perverse effects*" caused by the idea of piloting aid based on measurable, expected results. Results-based management oversimplifies the complex reality of development, because it directs the allocation of aid towards measurable results and performing sectors, interventions or recipients. By introducing a bias towards measurable results and performing recipients, results-based management contradicts the raison d'être of development aid, which is to intervene on complex issues in difficult contexts. *"If I want results, I vaccinate children and that's it. I don't do capacity building in the health sector, because you can't see it".* At the more macro-economic and ideological level, 'critic of economism' questions the imposition of a Western-centred conception of development onto the rest of the world under cover of scientific neutrality. At its extreme, this frame fears that, following a productivism-focused neoliberal logic, development aid would lead to further widening the gap between poor and rich countries by encouraging unsustainable choices. This frame does not point at concrete persons or measures to be taken. Beyond suggesting intense qualitative studies on the socio-cultural contexts in which the AFD works, the motivational framing of 'critic of economism' remains weak because of the conveyed pointlessness of struggling against a discourse so overwhelming "*because who is going to say they don't want their work to produce results on development? No one! So we create a false consensus based on an instrument, a tool, and we go on*". "*It's a breaking wave*".

'Effective corporate steering': *"Because that's what people remember in the end: what did they put on my objectives sheet?"*

Results-based management constitutes an effective way of steering a development agency with an focus on results, and according to the state's and the agency's strategic priorities. It enables transparently prioritizing results targets and setting up procedures of verification. Even without negative incentives, transparency fosters compliance because individuals tend to act on verifiable targets: *"what gets measured gets done"*. Steering and accountability go hand in hand. Similarly to the 'structured reflection' frame, 'effective corporate steering' aims for a shift from the focus on financial production to the focus on results. *"The fact that we can quantify the financial and not the non-financial [results] can induce the impression that it is less important."* Yet, the method is different as it relies on the superiority of top-down, systematized and verifiable (mainly quantitative) instruments for influencing staff's behaviour. *"Numbers can always be criticized. But they enable having a target and then verifying whether it is reached or not. And that is why they have such a mobilizing effect."* Over time, the compliance with these instruments creates a habit, which in turn enables the internalization of desired results by staff. *„In the beginning it is difficult, but then, by rambling over and over and with this sensibilization work, they finally become integrated in the practices."* The motivation to act is low, due to the perceived risks of too rigid and meaningless compliance (voluntarism), and to the difficulty to come up with sensible targets and verification methods. *„That being said, one certainly needs good indicators, the right results, which is not easy. […] What makes up a developed country is not that it has roads. […] It is that it has the capacity to maintain them. And that is more difficult to measure than the quantity of road we built. So there is this difficulty in the proposition of results-based management, which applies in theory."*

'Money for results': *„We are always a bit schizophrenic because we want to control the use of our money and sit back at the same time, but for that we need a very capable client."*

'Money for results' is the least used frame. It is contingent upon the specific definition of results-based management as output-based aid, i.e. a contractual form of management in which payment is conditional upon the achievement of contractually stipulated results. It is perceived as a comfortable project design approach, which enhances the chances that results materialize, while delegating the financial risk to the implementor. Results-based management is "interesting", "convenient", "pragmatic", yet only appropriate *"with certain partners and on certain issues, especially with people who have a treasury to do it, since you are supposed to pay only*

after the work has been done", „so that works for the rich. But you know a banker often lends to the rich [smiles]. So I think it is a convenient way for the donor to ensure that there will be results because we pay after the service." Results-based management should be considered as one option for designing interventions at the AFD: *„it is a good option. If we can then we should do it".* The motivational framing of 'money for results' is nevertheless low because of its inappropriateness to the AFD core business, in particular regarding, first, the typically weak capacities of implementers in developing countries: *"in the places we electrify, clients generally don't have the capacities. Otherwise it would have been done already"* and, second, the specific type of projects potentially concerned by such an approach:*"There is no match between the fact that results-based management is done on simple and replicable processes, and the fact that processes we are asked to intervene on are precisely big and extraordinary."*

4.1.3. Structured description of the frames

The frames of results-based management in the AFD mainly differ according to the functionality attributed to results-based management in the diagnostic framings: results-based management is valuated either by its technical, by its political or by its symbolic functionality.

The technical-managerial frames 'structured reflection', 'effective corporate steering' and 'money for results' focus on the technical functionality of results-based management, either top-down, using results to drive and control the organization along political priorities, or bottom-up, as set of tools to reinforce the quality of interventions in order to reach results. The political frame 'critic of economism' views results-based management as the manifestation of the rationalism zeitgeist, perpetuating a specific world order under cover of scientific neutrality. These two types of frames echo the findings of Meyer and Höllerer on the managerial vs. socio-political translation of management concepts (2010, p. 1251). However, a further level of meaning arouse in the analysis, which I label frames of decoupling. The decoupling perspective is at the core of the frames 'playing the accountability game' and 'bureaucracy vs. our metier'. Under this perspective, formal structures of results-based management serve as symbolic devices for displaying rationality. These formal structures are seen as decoupled from the organizational goals or from the practical needs of employees for performing their work. The function of the structures and practices related to results-based management is to maintain the legitimacy of the AFD.

Diagnoses not only separate frames into technical-managerial, decoupling and political perspectives on results-based management. The six frames also differ in their basic definition of results-based management according to the perceived nature of the concept. 'bureaucracy vs. our metier' and 'critic of economism' frame results-based management as an imported dogma, i.e. as established tenet with definite practices. On the opposite, 'effective steering' and 'structured reflection' frame it as an approach, that is, as broad attitudinal statement towards the primacy of results in all organizational activity, leaving the concrete arrangement of instruments in the hands of the user. 'Money for results' and 'playing the accountability game' entail elements of both definitions. In 'Playing the accountability game, in theory, results-based management is a set of tools to approach accountability from a results perspective. Yet, in reality, what constitutes a legitimate implementation of the approach is dominated by the model of the British Department for International Development (DfID). In 'money for results', results-based management is a specific type of project design invented by the World Bank that can be selectively applied, depending on the type of project at stake.

This basic differentiation between results-based management as approach and as dogma induces opposing prognostic framings. It structures the repertoire of frames along a continuum of organizational responses from appropriating the approach to rejecting the dogma.

The categorization of frames along the functionality and nature of results-based management is summarized in Table 13 below. This overview table is not meant to be an exhaustive typology. Yet, this representation is interesting as it reveals the possible frames not encountered in the AFD, but which might exist in different contexts. It shows that the translation of results-based management in the AFD is very specific. In other contexts or organizations, alternative frames might populate the empty cells, e.g. frames advocating the appropriation of results-based management by virtue of its political or symbolic functionality, or rejecting results-based management as ineffective set of definite tools.

Table 13: Overview of the types of frames of results-based management in the AFD

Nature of results-based management and prescribed organizational responses

		Results-based management as approach → Appropriation	← →	Results-based management as dogma → Rejection
Functionality of results-based management	Technical-managerial frames	'Structured reflection' →ADOPT 'Effective steering' →CONTROL	'Money for results' →DISSASSOCIATE	
	Frames of decoupling		'Playing the accountability game' →COMPROMISE	'Bureaucracy vs our metier' →AVOID
	Political frame			'Critic of economism' →CHALLENGE

4.1.4. Summary and preliminary discussion of the frames of results-based management in the AFD

The frame analysis yielded six evenly distributed frames, that involve partly incompatible definitions and solutions to results-based management. The frames are based on antithetic definitions of results-based management, which leads to opposing prescribed organizational responses, from the appropriation to the rejection of results-based management.

First of all, this result points to the existence of multiple and contradictory rationales within the AFD, after 15 years of implementing results-based management. This disproves the assumption that, in discursive contestations, one meaning becomes dominant to guarantee the functionality of the organization. While anecdotal evidence points to frictions in the daily implementation or in the negotiation of formal structures of results-based management, as described in the previous chapter, contestation does not escalate into conflicts, nor is the AFD threatened by organizational paralysis or breakdown or by loss of legitimacy. The recent transfer of mandates in soft sectors from the line ministry to the AFD and the budget increase over the past few years rather point to the contrary. This temporarily confirms my proposition that a modern organization displays internal multiplicity and even incompatibility in the incorporation of complex institutionalized myths. The coexistence of contradictory rationales does not jeopardize their functionality, as the case of the AFD reveals. The next sections explore the meaning

structure of results-based management to provide elements of response as to why this complexity does not escalate into a conflict.

The frame analysis has further revealed a specific type of frames – the frames of decoupling. These frames show a certain awareness of staff about the ceremonial character of results-based management. In this type of translation, the managerial concept at stake is consciously framed as symbolic device for maintaining the legitimacy of the organization: *"Yes we produce numbers but they are not meant to tell all the truth about the agency"* (Interviewee from the Research and Evaluation Department). Frames of decoupling involve the conscious perception of a misfit between the policy and actual practices, as well as between the means and ends of managerial concepts. Some scholars have discussed the role of intentionality as cause of decoupling in organizations (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Hironaka & Schofer, 2002). The findings of this study suggest that intentionality might rather be an effect of decoupling. Decoupling of meaning offers staff a way of coping with the disturbing dissonance between the means and end of the managerial practices they are required to perform. This involves coupling practices with the primary goal of any organization: survival through legitimacy. The following quote of a manager in the Operational Department highlights this goal displacement:

> „So we end up with numbers that do not have anything to do with one another because there are differences in the way [AFD] agencies monitor them (because agencies are in charge of monitoring them). It takes one project leader who forgets to fill in information on his project for us to lose thousands of… I mean for us to end up with a value that does not correspond at all to the reality. Anyway, it is not exhaustive and I am not even sure that it gives an order of magnitude. But I understand the wish to flaunt numbers. And, by the way, that's what the media remember when we give press conferences at the AFD. When the AFD presents its development results in press conferences at the beginning of the year, that's what we find in the press afterwards: so many children enrolled in school, so many pregnant women vaccinated, etc." (Interviewee in the Operational Department)

The scope of this study does not enable verifying the proposition of retrospective intentionality behind decoupling, as it would require retracing the evolution of these frames since the introduction of results-based management in the AFD. However, internal documents[13] and narratives on the early implementation of results-based management – under the label of GARD[14] – relate good faith in the original tools set up at the AFD. This suggests that decoupled meaning

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[13] This assertion is based on the first Strategic orientation Plan of 2002, three internal notes of the Strategic Steering and Accountability unit to the Executive Committee (COMEX) around 2010 and one report on the experience of the AFD with aggregated indicators of 2012.

[14] Labelled "Gestion Axée sur les Résultats de Développement" or "GARD" at the AFD.

evolved retrospectively, due to the disillusions produced by the practice of results-based management. The third section of this chapter offers insights into the relation between meaning decoupling and time, that tend to confirm this idea: there is a positive relation between the use of frames of decoupling and the length of careers at the AFD.

Frames, as defined and analysed so far in this research, are largely limited to the cognitive aspects of meaning contestation. In reconstructing them, I have focused on the logic of argumentation underlying the diagnosis and prognosis constituting them. In the following section, they are set in relation with variables that entail categories more or less prone to dispute, such as moral evaluation, emotionality or the identification of rivals inside the agency. When connected with these emotionally charged aspects, frames might become "hot cognition", that is, framings that "put fire in the belly and iron in the soul" (Gamson, 1992, p. 32). Such hot frames increase the risk of escalation.

In the following sub-chapter, I use the first MCA to reconstruct the framings of results-based management in the AFD. I then analyse the relations between the reconstructed framings. The results will shed light on the lines of potential conflicts underlying the peaceful coexistence of incompatible meanings in the AFD.

4.2. The meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD: characteristics of and relations between interpretive framings

Although the debate on results-based management is not an open conflict at the AFD, it does not imply that a consensual translation resulted from the negotiation of its meaning, as the incompatible frames described in the previous section show. Rather, this case shows that multiple meanings of a managerial concept can coexist and compete without escalating within one organization. The first MCA examines the dimensions that structure the relations between meanings of results-based management in the AFD.

MCA-1 places the variables in a discursive space according to their relations in the data set. The frames described in the previous section constitute the central variable in reconstructing the meaning structure of results-based management from the 223 statements. MCA-1 enables exploring how these frames are related to the variables of identity work, emotionality and (de)legitimization, and, together, constitute the framings of results-based management.

Beyond the simplistic dichotomy between pro and contra, the analysis reveals that frames are embedded in different discursive strategies, and at different argumentation levels.

4.2.1. Guide for reading the results of the first multiple correspondence analysis

This section presents the results of the first MCA. After providing some guidance for reading the results, I analyse and discuss the three axes coming out as structuring principles of the meaning of results-based management in the AFD. Table 14 provides the labels used for each category in the graphical and tabular representations of the results. The results are first displayed in the form of a table, presenting the contributions of categories to axes that are over the mean contribution. This table serves as the basis for interpreting the graphs.

In the graphs, for matters of clarity, only the categories that contribute to one axis over the mean contribution are displayed, because they are the categories retained for the interpretation. The graphical and tabular results for all categories are provided in the annex. Categories contributing over the mean contribution to the horizontal axis are systematically written in bold characters, while categories contributing over the mean to the vertical axis are in italic. Categories in bold and italic contribute over the mean to both axes. The size of points is scaled according to the weight of the categories.

Before interpreting the results of MCA-1, I provide basic statistical results for judging the overall quality of the model. These include the cumulated importance of the axes according to Benzécri's modified rates[15], as well as the percentage of variance of the cloud explained by the selected axes. I interpret the axes following Benzécri's method, which is recalled here:

> "Interpreting an axis amounts to finding out what is similar, on the one hand, between all the elements on the right of the origin and, on the other hand, between all that is written on the left; and expressing with conciseness and precision the contrast (or opposition) between the two extremes."
> (Benzécri, 1992 quoted by Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010, p. 10)

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[15] Modified rates give a fairer evaluation of the relative importance of principal axes than their eigenvalue (Le Roux, 2014). These rates are understood as "an index of the departure of the cloud from sphericity", i.e. when all eigenvalues are equal (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010).

Table 14: Labels of the categories used in MCA-1

Variable	Categories (33 active categories)	Labels in MCA
Frames	Structured reflection (managerial frame)	Reflection
	Effective corporate steering (frame of decoupling)	Steering
	Money for results (managerial frame)	Money for Results
	Playing the accountability game (frame of Decoupling)	Account
	Bureaucracy vs our metier (frame of Decoupling)	Our Metier
	Critic of economism (political frame)	Economism
Positioning	Positive	Positive
	Negative	Negative
	Ambivalent or Neutral	
	Note: Ambivalent and neutral have been grouped after a preliminary analysis because Neutral constituted a very small group and ended up very close to Ambivalent in the cloud	Ambiv/Neut
Emotionality	Emotionality in statement	Emo
	No emotionality in the statement	No Emo
Representation of self	No representation of self as AFD	No ID
	The AFD is a *bank* offering offering tailor-made financial solutions to respond to the needs of its clients	Bank/Tech. Assistant
	The AFD's primary mission of the AFD is *development in the partner countries*.	Development Partner
	The AFD is an agency of *experts* in development, of knowers, of field-experienced people.	Experts
	The AFD is a *public entity* in a democratic system and as such, it needs to justify the use of resources.	Public Entity
	The AFD represents *France* and/or the Western world abroad and acts as a *political actor* with its own values and interests	France/pol. Actor
	Reference to a specific group within the AFD (passive category, i.e. not used to construct the cloud)	Group within AFD
	Other (passive category)	Other
Mention of allies	No allies mentioned	No allies
	Allies, friends, victims identified within the AFD	Allies inward
	Allies, friends, victims identified outside the AFD	Allies outward
Mention of rivals	No rivals mentioned	No boundary
	Enemies, rivals, challengers identified within the AFD	Boundary inward
	Enemies, rivals, challengers identified outside the AFD	Boundary outward
Legitimization strategies	Rationalization	Leg_Ratio
	Authorization	Leg_Auth
	Moral Evaluation	Leg_Moral Eval
	Mythopoesis	Leg_Mythop
	No legitimization	Leg_NA
Delegitimization Strategies	Critic of rationality	Deleg_Ratio
	Critic of Authorization	Deleg_Auth
	Moral Evaluation	Deleg_Moral Eval
	Mythopoesis	Deleg_Mythop
	No delegitimization	Deleg_NA

4.2.2. Dimensions of oppositions between framings of results-based management

The first three axes have be retained for the interpretation of the results. They explain 36 percent of the total variance of the cloud, amounting to a cumulated importance of 93.4 percent, according to Benzécri's modified rates. After the third axis, the rates of importance decrease rapidly. The eigenvalues of the axes are provided directly in the graphs.

All categories of the first two variables 'frame' and 'positioning' are explained by the model, apart from the 'money for results' frame because of its low weight: this frame was used in only 7 percent of the statements. Categories of all variables contribute to the variance of the cloud (see Table 15). The model can therefore be seen as well balanced, and the dimensions can be considered as general axes, accurately capturing the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD.

I first present the plane of axes 1 and 3 because the cloud of individuals on this plane is split along both axes, suggesting a relation between them (see Figure 23 in the Annex). I then turn to the interpretation of axis 2.

Positive vs negative framings at field and organizational levels

The 11 categories contributing to the first axis over the mean (of 3.03 percent) contribute 83.2 percent of the variance of the axis. They summarize the opposition on the first axis between the left and the right-hand side of the graph in Figure 14. This horizontal axis opposes framings of results-based management clearly representing the contra and the pro sides in the meaning structure. Three framings oppose one another along this dimension. On the left-hand side, the two framings around 'critic of economism' and 'bureaucracy vs our metier' rely on traditional values, evoking moral concerns and rejecting the intrusion of a concept from the outside. These two framings confront a framing of neutralization based on the utility of managerial tools around the 'structured reflection' frame.

The pro and con sides are split along the third axis, revealing that the positive and the negative framings play at different levels: the organizational and the field level (see the vertical axis on Figure 14). The categories retained for interpretation contribute 84.9 percent of the variance of this axis.

Table 15: Tabular results of the first multiple correspondence analysis

	Variable	Category	Contribution to axis 1	Contribution to axis 2	Contribution to axis 3
Negative coordinates	Frame	Economism	8,9	-	8,9
		Account	-	8,4	-
		Our Metier	3,6	-	-
		Steering	-	-	6,5
	Position	Negative	13,3	-	-
		Ambiv/Neut	-	14,5	-
	Emotionality	Emo	3,2	-	-
		No emo	-	3,2	-
	Identity work	France / Pol. Actor	-	-	6,5
	Allies	-	-	-	-
	Boundary	boundary outward	8,1	-	-
	Legitimation Strategy	Leg_NA	13,2	-	-
		Leg _Auth	-	8,0	-
	Delegitimization strategy	Deleg_Moral Eval	7,6	-	6,9
		Deleg_Ratio	-	7,8	-
CENTRAL ZONE					
Positive coordinates	Frame	Reflection	4,1	9,1	-
		Our Metier	-	-	11,7
	Position	Positive	7,7	3,7	-
	Emotionality	Emo	-	6,4	-
	Identity work	Development Partner	-	7,8	-
		Experts	-	-	9,3
	Allies	Allies inward	-	3,4	10,6
	Boundary	Boundary inward	-	7,2	6,6
	Legitimation Strategy	Leg_Ratio	5,5	-	-
		Leg_Moral Eval	-	5,4	-
	Delegitimization strategy	Deleg_NA	8,0	-	-
		Deleg_Ratio	-	-	3,3
		Deleg_Mythop	-	-	6,3
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE VARIANCE OF AXIS			83,2	84,9	76,7

Note: For matters of clarity, only active categories with contribution to one axis over the mean are displayed in the table (mean contribution = 3.03 percent). The results for all categories are provided in the annex.

Figure 14: Multiple correspondence map for the plane of axes 1 and 3 – pro vs con at the organizational and field level

Note: Categories contributing over the mean to axis 1 and 3 are respectively in bold or italic. Categories contributing to both axes are represented in bold and italic. Points are weighted. For the purpose of clarity in visualization, categories with contribution < mean contribution are not displayed. The results for all categories are provided in the annex.

Statements involving the 'economism' and the 'our metier' frames tend to suggest emotionality by evoking negative moral considerations of results-based management. These framings further involve drawing a boundary towards rivals located outside the AFD. A look into the data shows that the boundary is often drawn towards mainstream economists or institutions located

in the Anglo-Saxon context, mainly the British Department for International Development, the World Bank, as well as development economist Jeffrey Sachs or further development economists involved in the aid effectiveness debate. In some cases, interviewees explicitly locate the origins of results-based management in the "Anglo-Saxon world". The consistent link between emotionality, negative moral evaluation and strong boundary creation outside the AFD makes 'economism' and 'our metier' hot frames, that is, frames of injustice building on moral indignation and charged with emotion (Gamson 1992, p.7). These ways of framing results-based management can therefore be considered to heat up the debate.

> "Our limit is that we are in a policy conceived as an economic and financial discipline, not at all in a relational diplomacy and relational intelligence. And doing so, we are authoritarian, imperious and imperialistic." (Interviewee in the Strategic Department)

> "Most people are not naïve: they know it's not with [indicators] that we do our job" (Interviewee in the Research Department)

This framing strategy opposes the positive positioning involving the 'reflection' frame and the legitimization of results-based management by its utility. It is a neutralizing framing because it defuses discursive tensions: on this side of the axis, questions of collective identity and morality are avoided, favouring a morally neutral legitimization strategy: rationalization. The other managerial frame 'effective steering' does not contribute to the first axis over the mean contribution, because of its low weight in the data set. Yet, it is positioned at the far right, on the side of 'structured reflection'. This suggests that it is also a neutralizing framing. In 'effective steering', results-based management is framed as tool that "helps structuring the discussion with more objective data" (Interviewee in the Operational Department).

The third axis of the cloud, i.e. the vertical axis on Figure 14, divides these framings into organizational and field-level framings. On the top part of the cloud, 'our metier' is connected with an inward-oriented representation of self as experts of development, as well as the identification of enemies and allies inside the agency. Delegitimization involves story-telling (mythopoesis) and critic of rationality. A closer look at the data shows that the delegitimization related to the 'our metier' frame is connected with the inward-looking construction of identity as experts: delegitimization at the organizational level is often performed by telling stories of project leaders whose experience and expertise are superior to results-based management for planning successful development intervention. The following quote illustrates this use of mythopoesis in connection with the 'our metier' frame:

> "Some colleagues remain in their divisions for 10 to 15 years and follow one country for a very long time. I am thinking of this colleague [name], from the education department. He has been working on Togo for 20 years. So on the education sector in Togo, what has been done, the actors, the history etc, he is a gold mine. I was lucky to work with him […]. He knows all the seven or eight last ministers of the Togolese Education Ministry, he knows them by heart. And THAT is important." (Interviewee in the Operational Department)

Although the 'structured reflection' frame does not contribute to the third axis, the analysis of the second axis of the cloud will show that it is connected with the identification of allies and boundaries inside the AFD, which enables me to consider it the counter-frame of 'our metier' at the organizational level.

The bottom part of the plane is also split along the horizontal axis. On the bottom left side, the 'economism' frame is related to the identity of the AFD as political actor representing France, that is, an outward-oriented identity construction. Furthermore, we know that the 'economism' frame is related to the identification of discursive rivals outside the AFD on the first axis. On the bottom-right part of the plane, the 'effective steering' frame is not significantly related to other categories, due to its low weight (13 percent of the statements). A closer look at the data indicates, however, that, in the few cases when allies are identified in connection with the 'steering' frame, they are systematically identified outside the AFD.

To summarize, the first dimension of the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD opposes a positive framings pragmatically, emphasizing the utility of managerial tools, to negative framings based on traditional values, which tend to moralize and emotionalize the debate. These different framings manifest at the organizational and at the field level. Table 16 provides a visual summary of these two dimensions of opposition.

Table 16: Summary of the positive and negative framings and their levels of manifestation

	Negative - traditional values framings (Hot framings) Emotionality, moral concerns	Positive - neutral managerialism framings (Cold framings) Rationality/Utility
Organizational level (Allies and boundaries inward)	**Our Metier** Delegitimization by irrationality and mythopoesis, AFD as experts	**Structured reflection**
Field Level (Allies and boundaries outward)	**Economism** Boundaries outward in the Anglo-Saxon context), identification of the AFD as France/political actor	**Steering**

Ambivalence and decoupling vs recoupling

The second dimension of the meaning structure of results-based management opposes a framing of decoupling around the 'accountability' frame to a framing of recoupling around the 'reflection' frame. The 10 categories retained for interpretation of the second axis contribute 84,9 percent of the variance of the second axis. On the bottom side of the graph, the 'accountability' frame – which is a frame of decoupling – is combined with the delegitimization of the pretended rationality of results-based management, and with its legitimization by authorization, offering an ambivalent positioning. This ambivalent positioning opens the space for decoupling results-based management practices from their original purpose (means-ends decoupling, as per Bromley and Powell 2012). Results-based management is posited as necessary symbolization of a focus on results towards outsiders who ask the AFD to implement it, while the very rationality behind this demand is ridiculed. This strategy involves avoiding emotionality.

Figure 15: Multiple correspondence map for the plane of axes 1 and 2 – decoupling vs recoupling

Note: categories contributing over the mean to axis 1 and 2 are respectively in bold or italic. Categories contributing to both axes are represented in bold and italic. Points are weighted. For the purpose of clarity in visualization, categories with contribution < mean contribution are not displayed. The results for all categories are provided in the annex.

The decoupling strategy is countered, on the top side of the graph, by the 'structured reflection' frame, generating emotionality by coherently mobilizing all aspects of identity work – a representation of the AFD as 'development partner', as well as by identifying challengers and allies

within the agency – and the legitimization of results-based management by positive moral evaluation. In this framing, if taken seriously, results-based management is a way of ensuring the right identity of the AFD as development partner on an equal footing with developing countries. This strategy enables to suggest a moral commitment to taking results-based management seriously, that is, to make practice and structures or means and ends tightly coupled. Allies and rivals are identified within the agency, often as supporters of the 'accountability' frame.

4.2.3.   Summary and preliminary discussion of dimensions of opposition in the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD

The first multiple correspondence analysis enabled describing the structure of the meaning of results-based management at the AFD, setting apart the different available framings.

The first dimension opposes negative framings, based on moral considerations, to a positive framing, based on the neutral character of managerial tools for reaching results. This opposition reflects Rouban's description of the traditional French scepticism towards New Public Management, despite the silent managerial revolution which has taken place since the 1980s (Rouban, 2008). Indeed, I observe the rejection of the market-based values of NPM and rivalry with Anglo-Saxon actors in the negative framing of results-based management. Yet, in this specific development organization, these considerations are not linked with traditional values of the French administration such as uniformity, impartiality and the centrality of the state. Rather, they connect to broader ethics and the very raison d'être of development aid, especially at the field level. The results of the second MCA presented in section 4.3 indicate that the negative, field-level framing around the 'economism' frame is confined to one specific sub-context of the AFD.

This first dimension further reflect the findings of Meyer and Höllerer on the confrontation between the polarizing socio-political and the neutralizing managerial translations of imported concepts at the field level (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). Yet, while they find that liberal, Anglo-American notions of management have started pervading the Austrian context, the AFD remains dominantly hermetic to these, at least at the discursive level. The positive framing of results-based management does not significantly involve the identification of Anglo-Saxon role models, rather the contrary, as this quote from an interview illustrates:

> „Tools have been introduced here by Sévérino[16] together with the [strong budget increase and the focus on loans instead of grants] in the American management style. So it was a turning point in the corporate culture […]. Quite destabilizing for some here. […] It was not done bottom up. They said "the World Bank is using it and it's great, so now it becomes obligatory and I want all of you to attach a logical framework to the FIP [Project identification Form]". Well, when you've said that…"
> (Interviewee in the Operational Department)

Within the AFD, the success of a positive translation of results-based management seems to require a detachment from Anglo-Saxon templates, that is, the neutralization of ideological debates around the concept, by emphasizing the instrumental character of results-based management.

The second dimension confronts two visions of what to do about results-based management. It opposes proponents of results-based management, willing to actually practice it, to the ambivalent positioning, opening the way for a justification of decoupling. On this dimension, it is the positive framing which is charged with emotionality and a representation of the desirable identity: as development partner realizing the priorities of beneficiaries in developing countries, the AFD has the duty to focus on results. Walking the talk of results-based management becomes a moral imperative. Although it is built around a managerial frame emphasizing the neutral character of tools, the positive framing mobilizes emotional commitment through the collective identity question. This goes against the expectation that managerial frames "build on the emotional neutrality of instruments and techniques as opposed to ideologies" (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010, p. 1256). This recoupling vision opposes an unemotional and double-edged framing, both justifying and delegitimizing results-based management. This ambivalent positioning paves the way for a decoupled view of the structures and practices of results-based management. Results-based management shall be done to convey transparency on results, while paradoxically not reflecting, even obscuring, the real results the agency achieves on the field. Despite this inherent irrationality, it is what every organization is expected to do, and does.

It is noteworthy that the managerial frame 'structured reflection' is involved in both a neutralizing and a polarizing framing, making it well-equipped to influence the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD. It is a flexible frame which can be combined into a rationalizing, non-emotional framing strategy, but also into a polarizing strategy by mobilizing a combination of identity, emotionality and morality to advocate tight coupling in the

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[16] Jean-Michel Sévérino was the director of the AFD between 2001 and 2010

implementation of results-based management. The following section provides a description of the strongly cohesive discursive front behind the 'reflection' frame.

MCA-1 has revealed the dimensions of opposition in the contestation between incompatible framings of results-based management in the AFD. Yet, the fact that they are related to opposing positionings does not necessarily imply a high conflict potential between the positive and the negative framings.

Before escalating into conflict, I assume that "hot" framings need to be directed at each other within the organization. Therefore, I contend that the opposition with the most virulent potential for escalation is between supporters of the positive recoupling framing around 'structured reflection' and the negative framing around the 'our metier' frame. Both frames are related to emotionality, contradictory representations of the identity of the AFD – respectively as partner and as experts – and the identification of allies and rivals within the agency (see Figure 16). Any organizational move away from or towards more results-based management is likely to provoke conflicts between staff representing these two antithetic definitions of results-based management. This suggests that contestation between framings inside an organization does not systematically lead to conflict or paralysis, against the hypotheses of Besharov and Smith (2014) and Pache and Santos (2010). Rather, potential clashes depend on the existence of lines of confrontation between framings involving emotionally charged questions of identity, morality and boundaries and arguing at the organizational level. Put differently, people are less likely to start a revolution against aggregated indicators than to defend their representation of a metier or an organization they feel committed to.

Figure 16: Conflict potential between two *hot* framings in the plane of axes 2 and 3

Note: categories contributing over the mean to axis 2 and 3 are respectively in bold or italic. Categories contributing to both axes are represented in bold and italic. Points are weighted. For the purpose of clarity in visualization, categories with contribution < mean contribution are not displayed.

To sum up, the meaning of results-based management at the AFD is structured around oppositions between positive and negative translations, advocating recoupled or symbolic practices and playing at the organizational or at the field level. Yet, I argued that conflict is unlikely to escalate in oppositions between hot and cold framings or at different levels of argumentation. Meaning incompatibility in an organization does not necessarily mean confrontation. The case of the AFD rather shows that opposing translations might not meet and fight because they play

on different levels or because some involve neutralization strategies. This confirms my proposition that a complexified organization can display meaning incompatibility in the translation of managerial concepts without becoming dysfunctional.

I find that a potential for escalation exists between two contradictory framings that both play at the organizational level, i.e. that entail inwardly-directed claims of morality and identity. However, in a complexified organization with decoupled and compartmentalized formal structures – i.e. structural differentiation –, the existence of separate sub-contexts might dampen this conflict potential (Battilana et al., 2017). Sub-contexts enable framings and counter-framings to peacefully coexist on the longer run. The second MCA explores the sub-contexts of the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD.

4.3. Back to the people as carriers of meaning: sociological elements underlying the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD

This first MCA has revealed the dimensions of opposition between the framings of results-based management in the AFD. By adopting an intra-organizational perspective, I captured multiple and conflicting interpretations that result from the incorporation of complex institutions in an organization. I identified and discussed elements of the meaning structure that explain why conflicting frames of results-based management do not escalate into conflicts or jeopardize the functionality or legitimacy of the AFD.

With the second MCA, I explore elements of the trajectory of interviewees and of the organization that underlie this meaning structure. I aim at isolating organizational sub-contexts in which the multiple translations are located. This provides insights into the factors of individual position-taking within an organization and into the framings' position in the organization as a discursive terrain: who thinks what about results-based management, and from where in the organization? And what insights can be gained from the answer to this question regarding why conflicting rationales do not escalate in this organization?

To this end, I move back to the level of individuals. I perform a MCA and cluster interviewees based on their pattern of frame use. Based on the interviewees' biographical attributes, as well as their position in the organization at the time of the interview, I identify three different sub-contexts of translation in the AFD.

4.3.1. Identifying and characterizing the sub-contexts of framing in the organization

Most of the interviewees used several frames during the interviews. Along with Meyer and Höllerer (2010), I argue that interviewees' use of frames depends on their position in the meaning structure. I therefore analyse the patterns of frame use of the 41 interviewees. Since I argued that actor's position is linked with their trajectories and their social position in the environment or field of interest, I aim at finding out what characterizes groups of individuals with similar patterns of translation in the AFD. These constitute the sub-contexts of the translation of results-based management in the AFD.

To this end, I perform a second MCA on the patterns of frame use of the 41 interviewees. The use or not of the six frames by an interviewee constitute the active binary variables. Basically, the second MCA projects interviewees in the middle of the frames they used. Then, I use biographical data as supplementary variables to characterize the obtained cloud and to obtain a preliminary overview of possible sub-contexts of translation. Table 17 gives an overview of the active and supplementary variables of this multiple correspondence analysis. In a second step, and based on the cloud of individuals resulting from the analysis, I group like-minded people into clusters by means of an ascending hierarchical clustering analysis. I analyse the biographic attributes that characterize the interviewees of each group. AHC enables me to characterize the sub-contexts of the meaning structure and to identify discourse coalitions related to these particular sub-contexts.

Table 17: Structure of the dataset for the second multiple correspondence analysis

	Binary variables on the use of frames						Supplementary Variables		
	Account	Economism	Our Me-tier	Reflection	Compliance	Money for Results	Educa-tional Back-ground	Career at the AFD	Career outside the AFD
Interviewees (n=41)									

For matters of clarity and visibility, only the supplementary variables used in the interpretation are displayed on the chart and in the results table. Supplementary categories are retained for interpretation if their probability value is ≤ 0.025.

The first two axes are retained for the interpretation of the results. The cloud is constructed based on six binary variables. Thus, its dimensionality is quite low. I therefore limit the interpretation to the first two axes.

Table 18: Tabular results of the second multiple correspondence analysis

Label of the variable	Contribution to axis 1 (%)	Contribution to axis 2 (%)
Account	24,2	20,0
Economism	29,7	11,3
Our Metier	7,4	25,7
Reflection	34,3	2,8
Steering	0,0	25,0
Money for Results	4,3	15,2

Notes: The mean contribution is 100/6 = 16,67. Because the active variables are binary, in the interpretation of the results, I consider the contribution of variables to axes, rather than the contribution of categories. If one category of the variable is over-represented on one side, its opposite is necessarily overrepresented on the other side of the axis.

The cumulated importance of the first two axes amount to 98,2 percent. They explain 50.8 percent of the variance of the cloud. All variables, apart from 'money for results' are explained by the cloud, meaning that the model is well balanced.

The first dimension of the cloud resembles the meaning structure reconstructed in the first MCA and, thus, confirms its consistency. It opposes the positive managerialist framing to both the negative framings based on moral values and the ambivalent decoupling framing. Besides, it reveals the compatibility and incompatibility between the frames. For instance, interviewees use either the 'economism' and the 'accountability' frame or the 'reflection' frame. It means that 'economism' is compatible with 'accountability', while 'reflection' is incompatible with these two frames. The second dimension opposes those using the frames of decoupling 'accountability' and 'our metier', as well as the 'steering' frame, to those systematically not using them. In the following section, I use the supplementary variables related to the interviewees'

career to characterize these oppositions. Only six categories appear to be significantly related with the position of individuals in the cloud (see Table 19).

Table 19: Supplementary categories retained for the interpretation of the second multiple correspondence analysis

		On Axis 1		On Axis 2		
	Variable	Category and *label*	p	Variable	Category and *label*	p
Negative coordinates	Current Department	Strategic Department *Dpt_Strat*	0.003	Ratio Time at AFD/Time elsewhere	More working experience outside than inside the AFD Number of years at the AFD/number of years elsewhere *<0.600*	0.022
			CENTRAL ZONE			
Positive coordinates	Current Department	Soft operational department *Dpt_OP Soft*	0.001	Current Department	Regional Departments at the headquarter or AFD Agencies located in developing countries *Dpt_Region/Agency*	0.017
				Ratio Time at AFD/Time elsewhere	Entire career at AFD Number of years at the AFD/number of years elsewhere *>=3.400*	0.020
				Experience in Public Administration	No experience working in Public Administration *Public Admin NO*	0.025

Sub-context: Strategic vs Soft Department

The first axis opposes interviewees using the 'economism' and 'accountability' frames and not using the 'reflection' frame to those doing the contrary (see categories in bold in Figure 17). This indicates a certain discursive compatibility between political and decoupling framings on the one hand, and an incompatibility between these two frames and the managerialist framing on the other hand. The analysis of the supplementary elements significant for the interpretation of this axis reveals that this opposition is significantly explained by the institutional location of interviewees. Against assumptions expressed by several interviewees, the discourse on results-based management within the AFD does not simply oppose the Operational to the Strategic Department. It opposes staff from the Strategic Department, who combines political and decoupling framings, to staff from soft sectors of the operational departments (governance, capacity building, health and education), significantly resorting to the 'reflection' frame. It

reflects the opposition on the plane axes 1 and 2 of the first MCA, where the 'reflection' frame opposes both the negative and the ambivalent positioning respectively related to the 'economism' and the 'accountability' frames. These opposing frames are confined respectively to the Strategic and the Soft Operational departments.

Figure 17: Multiple correspondence map for the plane of axes 1 and 2 – sub-contexts of translation

Note: Categories contributing over the mean to axis 1 and 2 are respectively in bold or italic. Categories contributing to both axes are represented in bold and italic. Points are weighted. For the purpose of clarity in visualization only the supplementary categories retained for interpretation are displayed (with p ≤ 0.025).

Sub-context: Experience in the AFD

The second dimension opposes interviewees using the 'accountability', 'our metier' and 'effective steering' frames to those not using these frames. We know from the first MCA that these three frames are all related to different positionings. These three frames, however, have in common the perception of results-based management as "straight-jacket", i.e. pre-determined, systematized and number-driven procedures. This is diametrically opposed to the

definition of results-based management as a set of flexible tools (structured reflection) or as the emblem of an ideology (economism). The analysis of significant supplementary categories reveals that the use of these three "straight-jacket" frames is influenced by three aspects: the current position of the person in a Regional Department or in an agency of the AFD abroad, the amount of time spent in the AFD compared to the time outside the AFD, and whether the person has experience working in Public Administration.

Some interviewees expressed the assumption that so-called "AFD babies"[17] – that is, people who have spent their entire career at the AFD – are more hermetic to results-based management than others. Indeed, I find that the time spent at the AFD is related to the use of the 'our metier' and 'accountability' frames, which are connected to negative and ambivalent positionings towards results-based management. However, this attribute is also shared by people using the 'effective steering' frame, which is related to a positive assessment of results-based management. The cloud of categories reveals that the longer the time spent within the AFD, as compared to time spent in a position outside the AFD, the more likely it is that frames of decoupling or 'effective steering' become part of the repertoire of staff. The use of these frames is further related to their current position in AFD regional departments or agencies abroad, suggesting that closeness to the specific constraints and realities of field work is a factor influencing the use of frames of decoupling and 'steering' by staff. Furthermore, interviewees using these frames tend not to have experience working in public administration, yet this variable is related to the overrepresentation of persons on this side of the axis who have spent (almost) their entire career at the AFD. Because experience working in Public Administration is a binary variable, it is sensible to interpret this variable as significant attribute of people not using these frame, even if its p-value is higher than 0.025 on the bottom side of the cloud.

On the opposite side of the axis, those interviewees who have spent more time in positions outside the AFD than within the AFD, and especially with experience working in Public Administration do not use frames of decoupling or the 'effective steering' frame in their argumentation. This generally implies that they do not use frames involving a straight-jacket perception of results-based management. More narrowly, they do not use frames of decoupling. Whether they are supportive of results-based management or reject it, they do so using frames that assess the validity of the concept in its coupled form, that is, not dissociating the means from the ends or the policy from the practices.

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[17] The term was used by an interviewee in the Operational Department

Thus, "AFD babies" and country-close staff are more likely to perceive results-based management as a straight-jacket which can be used to steer the agency ('effective steering'), as symbol of transparency ('accountability') or as façade ('our metier').

In sum, the cloud of categories resulting from the second multiple correspondence analysis points to two types of sub-contexts related to departments, as well as to individual resources in terms of time spent at the AFD and field experience.

4.3.2.   Discursive clusters and their attributes

To further differentiate the sub-contexts of framing, I perform a clustering analysis on the cloud of individuals. I look at the characteristic attributes of sub-groups of interviewees with similar translation patterns. The clusters represent discourse coalitions, which are defined as "group[s] of actors who share […] an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena" (Hajer, 1993, p. 45). Beyond precising the sub-contexts of translation, the clustering analysis provides insights into the structure and position of discourse coalitions in the AFD.

Figure 18 displays the four clusters in the cloud of individuals. Points represent the interviewees. Bigger points represent a group of interviewees with exactly identical patterns of frame use. Table 20 summarizes the significant properties of each cluster.

Figure 18: Clusters in the cloud of individuals – discursive coalitions

Table 20: Characterization of the clusters of interviewees

	C1 (n=10)	C2 (n=13)	C3 (n=10)	C4 (n=8)
Economism	YES	NO	-	-
Reflection	NO	-	-	-
Account	-	YES	NO	-
Money for Results	-	NO	-	YES
Our Metier	-	-	NO	-
Compliance	-	-	-	-
Supplementary categories character-izing the class (p<0.025)	**Strategic Department**	**Entire career at the AFD**	**No experience in AFD agency abroad**	**-**

The first cluster C1 is clearly the politicizing cluster largely confined to the strategic depart-ment. It is distinctly separated from the rest in the discourse on results-based management by

its consistent use of the 'economism' frame by non-use of the 'structured reflection' frame. 7 out of the 10 members of this cluster are located in the Strategy Department. Further two individuals are located in the Research Department. This department has developed a specific, politicizing discourse at the issue field level, quite separated from the rest of the agency, but with ties to the Research Department, as its remote position from the rest of the group demonstrates.

C2 is characterized by the use of the 'accountability' frame and the non-use of 'money for results'. It is located in the middle of the 'straight jacket' frames. In this class, individuals who did their entire career at the AFD are overrepresented (5/13 in the class of 6 in the whole sample). The position of this cluster in the cloud of individuals confirms the centrality of the 'accountability' frame in the AFD, a frame used by more than half of the interviewees. This cluster is not only central, but also quite dispersed and overlapping with other clusters, which shows the compatibility of this argumentation with other frames.

C3 is a highly homogeneous group in terms of the patterns of frame use: five interviewees within this cluster had exactly the same pattern of frame use (see the large point in C3 on Figure 18). This cluster constitutes a highly cohesive group around the 'structured reflection' frame. The characteristic of this cluster is that individuals consistently do not use frames of decoupling. These individuals further tend to have no experience working in an AFD Agency, that is, they have only worked at the AFD headquarter. Field experience with the AFD is, thus, related to the use of frames of decoupling.

The characterization of these C2 and C3 enables precising the relation between experience and the use of frames of decoupling revealed by axis 2 of the second MCA. While a long time spent at the AFD is related to the acceptance of the symbolic purpose of accountability procedures, the lack of experience in an AFD Agency is related to the non-use of both frames of decoupling. This means, inversely, that the rejection of results-based management as counterproductive ritual ('our metier') is connected with field experience.

C2 and C3 have different structures. While C2 is rather disperse, C3 is a strongly cohesive group around a consistent translation of results-based management. In this class of new entrants, 5 out of 10 members display exactly similar patterns of frame use. The five remaining members remain close to one another and to the bigger knot. My observations, as well as anecdotal evidence collected during interviews, point at the centrality of one person driving this discourse coalition. Four interviewees spontaneously referred to this person during the

interview (see the dotted arrows Figure 19). Two of these interviewees belong to the rival clusters C1 and C2.

Figure 19: Brokers and catalyst in the cloud of individuals

This person has a strategic position enabling outreach and cooperation beyond her unit. She is involved in training on project planning, on-the-job support of teams in project design, as well as collective reflection on common definitions and practices related to results. For example, she facilitated an email-based discussion across departments on the standardization of core terms around the concept of results in the AFD. She also accompanied project teams in their appraisal mission on the field to enable the use of the Logical Framework Approach. In her own words:

> „I am not a specialist of RBM [results-based management], I do maieutic: I help giving birth to the project in a way that enables results-based management. My specialty is this co-construction."

During the interview, this person further evoked her bottom-up and demand-oriented approach to mobilizing supporters in favour of her translation of results-based management. The strategy

of her unit consists of using trainings as platforms to trigger the demand by providing visibility to their offer.

> "So we try to fully turn around the marketing positioning […] by offering support and thereby proving our value added so that people then come and ask. […] We try to create appetite for such approaches, rather than imposing them by force, because when it is imposed by force… […] It has been ten years since the results approach doesn't fly at the AFD because they introduced it through a procedure, rather than through a process of change."

This evidence, though anecdotal, suggests that this discursively skilled individual has succeeded in generating a strongly cohesive coalition around the idea that the concept and practices of results-based management need to be recoupled within the AFD. This coalition of "new entrants" builds on a low-key meaning spreading strategy, through progressive outreach to the more established cluster around frames of decoupling.

Finally, C4 is dispersed in the discursive space with the frame 'money for results', constituting the only attribute that characterizes this cluster. The use of the 'money for results' frame is thus randomly dispersed across the agency, i.e. not attached to any particular sub-context. Two extreme outliers pertain to this group, that deserve more attention (see the grey-filled circles on Figure 19). These two individuals, located in the Strategic Department, are the only interviewees who used five frames during the interview. A review of the CVs of these individuals reveals the diversity of experience over the course of their career, both inside and outside the AFD. Both studied two different disciplines, worked in AFD agencies abroad, and both have worked in other organizations before joining the AFD. One has experience of the NGO sector, while the other has experience working in an international organization and in a consultancy. At the AFD headquarter level, one worked in different sectors of the operational department and the other in the Research Department. These two interviewees, characterized by a many-facetted professional trajectory, were able to manipulate most of the available frames at the AFD for interpreting results-based management, including the more infrequent frame 'money for results'.

4.3.3. Summary and preliminary discussion of the sub-contexts of translation

The sub-contexts of translation of results-based management within the AFD are related either to the department staff work in or to their position in the organization-as-field (Emirsbayr and

Jonsson 2008). The Strategic Department constitutes a relatively isolated sub-context of politicization of results-based management at the issue field level. Almost only staff from this department manipulates the 'economism' frame, which is almost completely absent in the operational departments. The mission and tasks of this department might explain this field-level orientation. The strategic department constitutes the "hyphen" between the governmental and international spheres and the AFD operations by transforming the political demand into operational guidance. That is, it relates the field level to the organizational level. The negative and politicizing translation of results-based management is thus confined to the Strategic Department. Ironically, at the AFD, the very creature of rationalized myths – i.e. the department responsible for rationalizing the organization, for keeping the myth alive – is most critical of the meaningfulness of results-based management. This goes against the assumption of Meyer and Rowan that dedicated staff acts "in good faith" to maintain the formal structures celebrating institutionalized myths (1977, p. 358).

The soft sector units of the Operational Department (governance and capacity building, education, health and climate) constitutes a further specific sub-context in the AFD, which is diametrically opposed to the politicizing discourse emanating from the Strategic Department. In this sub-context, the perception of results-based management as a toolbox, rather than a dogma, and the desire to recouple practices and structures, are over-represented. Yet, it is important to note that the use of the 'structured reflection' frame in neutralizing and recoupling framings is driven by but not restricted to the Soft Operational Departments. A strongly cohesive discursive front seems to have developed around the 'structured reflection' frame, enabling it to resist both politicizing and decoupling translations.

Sub-contexts of translation are not only attached to the location in departments within the agency. They are also related to the experience of staff. Staff in the Regional Departments in Paris and in AFD agencies abroad is more prone to using frames of decoupling than staff located in other departments. Staff with no experience working in AFD agencies is less likely to use frames of decoupling. The ratio of time spent in the agency vs time spent in positions outside the AFD further creates a cleavage in the translation of results-based management. It opposes old hands to new entrants. Interviewees who spent (almost) their entire career at the AFD are more likely to use frames of decoupling than others. Staff who spent more time in positions outside the AFD, especially in Public Administration, is less likely to resort to these frames.

These two experience-related dimensions are connected to the location in departments. We know from the AFD's history that soft divisions, as opposed to regional and technical divisions in the Operational Department, are products of the more recent history of the AFD. The transfer of competencies in soft sectors from the Ministry of Cooperation to the AFD (e.g. Education and Health in the mid-2000 or Governance in 2016) implied the integration of staff specialized in non-commercial domains, as opposed to the historical focus of the AFD on infrastructure and commercial sectors (Cour des Comptes, 2010 p. III). Considering the organization in analogy to a field, this opposition can be regarded as conflict over meaning between "incumbents" and "challengers" within the organization, that is, between those representing the dominant logic attached to the traditional mandates of the agency, and those challenging this logic, yet disposing of less resources – here in terms of the experience traditionally valued in the AFD – to engage in open defiance (Fligstein and Mc Adam 2011 and Gamson 1975). In spatial terms, the sub-contexts identified here would correspond to the periphery and the centre of the organization as field (Glückler, Suddaby, & Lenz, 2018).

The challengers have succeeded in building a cohesive coalition around a positive, managerialist translation of results-based management, against both the negative-politicizing and the decoupling framings. My observations point at the centrality of one person, who is driving this discourse coalition and showing many attributes of what Furnari has coined "catalysts" in the emergence of new practices (Furnari, 2014). Catalysts are "actors who sustain others' interactions over time and assist the construction of shared meanings by coordinating and energizing common activities" at the interstice between institutional fields (Furnari, 2014, p. 452). They possess specific skills to "induce cooperation in others" (Fligstein, 2001, p. 105), among which "multivocality", i.e. the capacity to manipulate symbols that appeal to culturally different audiences and build bridges between them. Especially in contexts of meaning ambiguity, catalysts, or meaning "brokers", actively engage in "nexus work", synthesizing disparate ideas into coherent meaning (Korff, Oberg, & Powell, 2017). The strong cohesion of this discourse coalition – which is located at the periphery of the AFD and emerging from the younger soft sectors divisions of the Operational Department – benefits from the commitment of such an individual within the AFD. This suggests that catalysts mediate between different, potentially conflicting framings not only at the field level, but also inside complex organizations. The soft sectors in the Operational Department serve as incubator of recoupling, where this skilled catalyst creates the micro-level conditions for the constitution and institutionalization of new practices of results-based management.

On the opposite, the cluster of incumbents, which advocates means-ends and policy-practice decoupling, appears to be more disperse and less concise than the challengers' coalition. Incumbents, according to Fligstein and McAdam (2011) are privileged because the social order and the underlying shared meanings tend to reflect their dominant interest. However, the fact that central meanings become institutionalized, that is, taken-for-granted, decreases the scrutiny on their content (Hsu & Grodal, 2015). The fact that dominant meanings become black-boxed represents a strategic opportunity for challengers to advance their alternative. Because it is not yet institutionalized, I contend that the challengers' discourse is more conscious, and therefore more coherent and strategic, than the incumbent discourse, to which attention necessarily loosens as it becomes taken-for-granted. The insecurity of some interviewees about the topic of the interview reflects this loosened meaning consistency in the incumbent accounts of results-based management. When I asked interviewees about their definition of management based on results, some would ask back: "what do YOU mean by results-based management?". Members of the challengers' cluster did not ask. They had a clear definition in mind.

Finally, a few individuals transcend these sub-contexts. They are able to manipulate almost all frames available in the AFD to make sense of results-based management, even contradictory ones. These individuals, characterized by multi-facetted professional trajectories, constitute bridges between different rationales and their underlying sub-contexts. One of these individual's "profile corresponded to the job, because they were seeking someone who had been on the operational side to foster respect and a constructive and realistic dialogue with the operationals" (Interviewee in the Strategic Department, broker). By mastering multiple perspectives on results-based management, these multi-facetted professionals can act as "brokers" (Mosse & Lewis, 2006). Brokers mediate between different, even conflicting views of the organization that are attached to different sub-contexts.

The following section summarizes the findings developed in this chapter before proceeding with the concluding chapter.

4.4.Summary of findings: the complexity of results-based management in the AFD

This chapter set out to analyse what happens inside a complexified organization like the AFD when it is confronted with institutional pressure to incorporate a complex rationalizing concept of management. The purpose was to explore the meaning structure of results-based

management in the AFD and how it is embedded in the organization. First, this involved working out the central elements of this meaning structure: the frames of results-based management. Second, I set these frames in relation with discursive variables of positioning, identity work, emotionality and strategies of (de)legitimization used by individual in their accounts of results-based management. And third, I grouped interviewees into clusters based on their pattern of frame use to explore the sub-contexts of meanings within the organization. Overall the analyses yielded the picture of a complex equilibrium between partly incompatible and unevenly distributed translations of results-based management in the AFD.

I uncovered six distinct frames, providing individuals in the AFD with different, partly antithetic definitions of results-based management. These definitions lead to antithetic prescriptions as to whether to adopt or reject results-based management. I distinguished one political frame from three managerial frames and two frames of decoupling. The later involves the definition of results-based management as device to symbolize transparency or rationality, rather than to be effectively transparent or act rationally. Despite the existence of such antithetic frames, the AFD does not seem to suffer from open conflicts, paralysis or a loss of legitimacy.

This apparent truce opposes different framings. At the field level, a political, anti-neoliberal framing opposes a neutralizing managerial framing. The managerial framing, however, becomes polarizing when opposed to an ambivalent decoupling framing. At the organizational level, the question of results-based management opposes antithetic visions of the role and raison d'être of the AFD. However, not all frames are connected with polarizing elements such as negative moral evaluation, the identification of discursive rivals, emotionality or questions of identity. Furthermore, those that are connected to such polarizing elements do not necessarily confront at the same level. In the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD, I identified one potential line of conflict, which opposes two groups. People in the one group argue that the practices of results-based management shall be recoupled with the concept to realize the desired identity of the agency as partner primarily interested in development. People in the other group argue that standardized practices of results-based management stand in the way of the valuable expertise of committed staff, which makes the bank run.

The different frames of results-based management are attached to distinct sub-contexts in the AFD. The polarizing political frame is largely confined to the Strategic Department, with ties to the Research Department. On the opposite, the Soft Sector Divisions of the Operational Departments serve as incubator for the managerial translation of results-based management, as

well as for concrete efforts to recouple practices and talk at the organizational level. A strongly cohesive discourse coalition has formed around this translation, catalysed by the efforts of a skilled broker who prefers a silent, bottom up revolution over open fire. This group of people constitutes the challengers, located at the periphery of the organization and opposed to the dispersed incumbents at the centre, to whom results-based management is a straight-jacket, rather than a useful tool.

Overall, I have drawn the picture of a highly heterogeneous meaning structure involving partly incompatible framings of results-based management. Rather than a singular or hegemonic translation, we observe a heterogeneous discursive space on results-based management, in which more or less compatible translations coexist. The meaning structure of results-based management resembles a slowly moving truce between opposing meanings, rather than an on-going struggle. The specific features of this meaning structure summarized above constitute the micro-level explanations of the organizational complexity resulting from the incorporation of a complex rationalized myth. Incompatible translations coexist because only some are embedded in polarizing framings, because organizational sub-contexts dampen their conflict potential, and because of the efforts of skilled challengers acting strategically to avoid open confrontation. These elements, presented in the preliminary discussions of each results section, are discussed in depth in the following, concluding chapter.

Chapter 5: Discussion of findings and conclusion

5.1. Discussion of findings

A central objective of this research was to understand what happens when an organization incorporates institutional complexity. The results suggest that a modern organization can function despite – or maybe through – internal incompatibilities. In the following, I discuss the findings of this research and how they contribute to our understanding of how an organization can incorporate institutional complexity. Whenever relevant, I draw practical implications for organizations and propose directions for future research.

The first overarching conclusion of this research is that **the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD is strongly heterogeneous and entails incompatibilities**. This supports my proposition that a modern organization displays interpretive multiplicity and even incompatibility in the incorporation of a complex institutionalized myth. Incompatible framings of results-based management coexist within the organization studied here, against the expectations that one hegemonic discourse comes to dominate (Grant & Hardy, 2004; Iedema & Wodak, 1999) or that incompatible logics jeopardize the organization's functionality (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010). Rather, the case of the AFD illustrates that an organization may exist, expand and further complexify by remaining both functional and legitimate. As depicted in this research, hybridity thus does not appear to be a special feature of some organizations. Rather, it seems to be the logical consequence of incorporating multiple and conflicting institutional demands, as already predicted by Meyer and Rowan (1977). The contrary situation of a strictly consistent organization now becomes the puzzle. If hybridity is the new normal, research might gain more insight from focusing on non-hybrid organizations and inquiring how these maintain their legitimacy despite increasingly complex institutional demands, especially in mature fields. In the same vein, studies of escalations in highly hybrid organizations – that is, organizations featuring multiple and conflicting rationales – would provide valuable knowledge on the conditions under which hybridity degenerates into crises.

This argument is to be taken with caution, however. In this research, I have focused on one relatively old and well-established organization. There is probably a strong link between the

taken-for-grantedness, age and size of an organization and its degree of hybridity. The more and longer an organization is confronted with institutional complexity, the more it complexifies and grows to conform to its environment (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and the more capable it becomes of incorporating institutional complexity into its multiple structures and professions. As organizations last over time integrating institutional demands, they become increasingly taken-for-granted (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Zucker, 1983). As a consequence, they are less scrutinized. A large, compartmentalized and old organization thus features multiple sub-contexts for incorporating potentially incompatible rationales. It also has a strong incumbent basis ensuring a certain stability and greater discretion over its internal coherence, as opposed to scrutinized newcomers in a field. The conclusions of this research might therefore not apply to smaller newcomer organizations in complex fields. Future research might inquire how incompatible rationales coexist within such organizations.

The overarching conclusion of this study has further implications for our understanding of organizational legitimacy. I grounded this research on the core premise of neo-institutionalism regarding the primacy of legitimacy for organizational survival. To date, legitimacy has been dominantly perceived as a characteristic attributed to organizations by external audiences: the media, the public opinion, the state or even individuals (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, & Suchman, 2017). Research has under-explored and under-conceptualized the role of internal legitimacy in organizational survival (Drori & Honig, 2013; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). In an effort to remedy to this shortcoming, researchers have adopted a consensus-based definition of internal legitimacy:

> "We define internal legitimacy as the acceptance or normative validation of an organizational strategy through the consensus of its participants, which acts as a tool that reinforces organizational practices and mobilizes organizational members around a common ethical, strategic or ideological vision." (Drori & Honig, 2013, p. 347; based on Kostova & Zaheer, 1999)

By revealing the multiple identities and rationales available inside an organization to make sense of a managerial concept, the present research rather suggests that, in the same way an organization represents multiple things to different external audiences, it represents multiple things to its various *internal* audiences. In a complex organization like the AFD, this points to a pluralism-based, rather than consensus-based internal legitimacy. In view of the dialectical relation between institutional and organizational complexity that I described in the beginning of this research, it seems plausible to assume that, in hybrid organizations, the expectations of

internal audiences might be as diverse as the expectations of the external audiences to which they are meant to respond.

There is a need to continue the conversation begun by Kostova and Zaheer "on aspects of organizational legitimacy that are brought to the surface when we examine complexity in the environment, in the organization, and in the process of legitimation" (1999, p. 77). More work is needed to conceptualize the challenges faced by organizations in maintaining legitimacy both exogenously and endogenously. To begin with, Deephouse et al.'s catalogue of five questions may orient conceptual work on internal legitimacy by assessing whether our extensive knowledge about external legitimacy applies within the organization: "What is *internal* organizational legitimacy? Why does *internal* legitimacy matter? Who confers *internal* legitimacy, and how? What criteria are used (for making *internal* legitimacy evaluations)? and How does *internal* legitimacy change over time?" (Deephouse et al., 2017, p. 27, "internal" added). And more importantly, how does internal legitimacy relate to external legitimacy? (Drori & Honig, 2013; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).

Finally, the observation of the large heterogeneity of interpretations of one concept of organization transcends the dichotomy between managerialism and professionalism usually observed both in studies of organizational hybridity and in research on the spread of NPM in public organizations (Battilana et al., 2017; Bezes et al., 2012). The premise underlying many case studies, especially in the public sector, has remained the dichotomous opposition between the logic of autonomous professionals and the logic of controlling managers (e.g. Ashforth & Reingen, 2014; Croft et al., 2015; Ebrahim et al., 2014; McGivern et al., 2015; Voronov et al., 2013). This dichotomous model might prove useful in making observed conflicts immediately intelligible. The present study, however, makes visible the multiple shades that exist between the defence of professional autonomy and the adoption of managerial control when organizational members interpret a managerial concept of the NPM paradigm. In reality, organizational members' translation(s) of New Public Management concepts are placed on a continuum between these two ideal-typical discourses, as suggested by Evetts in Bezes et al. (2012). I agree with Bezes that, in research on the implications of NPM:

> "[w]hat is at stake is understanding and demonstrating how introducing managerial rationality and tools can lead to differentiating between professional trajectories, recomposing their activity, and separating their worlds." (Bezes et al., 2012, 8).

The question nevertheless remains how these "separated worlds" coexist inside one and the same organization. I have demonstrated that a modern organization displays internal incompatibilities in the translation of a complex institutional demand. I now come back to the question that ensued from the proposition of internal complexity: **Why do incompatibilities between different translations not escalate into conflict? What features of the meaning structures enable incompatible framings to coexist in an organization?**

By adopting a micro-level perspective framed with concepts borrowed from the sociology of social movement, I have offered explanations as to why an organization featuring incompatible rationales and identities is not necessarily "at war with itself" (Kerr, 2001). I now discuss these explanations. In the following, I outline how several aspects of the meaning structure feature as conflict-dampeners between different interpretive frames. These findings contribute to the extant research on institutional complexity in organizations, organizational hybridity and translation.

Individuals are capable of using multiple rationales and identities in translating complex institutional demands.

Already during data collection, I found that individuals used different definitions and opinions of the managerial concept at stake, generating different rationales for organizational response to a complex demand. The analysis of the patterns of argumentation revealed that the large majority of interviewees used more than one frame. The reconstruction of the meaning structure further revealed that the frames are attached to different representations of organizational identity, reflecting Rao et al.'s idea that logics bring with them identity cues (2003). This implies that organizational members are capable of manipulating different rationales and representations of organizational identity in making sense of a complex institution.

This conclusion suggests that individuals can take advantage of the plurality of meanings, against the assumption that the blending of different identities or rationales generates conflicts within and between individuals regarding the appropriate response to institutional demands (Croft et al., 2015; McGivern et al., 2015). Rationales and identities constitute tools for drawing multiple senses from a complex institutional demand (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Voronov et al., 2013). Depending on their position in the meaning structure, a different set of tools is available to organizational members.

The analysis further showed that individuals who utilized the most framings occupied different positions in distinct departments in the past. In doing so, they became socialized to different, even supposedly contradictory rationales over the course of their career in the organization (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The assimilation of multiple rationales and identities rendered these individuals pivotal brokers capable of mediation at the intersection of potentially conflicting rationales. Such multi-faceted professionals have the potential to defuse conflicts over organizational reform by relating to the different aspects of the complex organization.

On a practical note, these results imply that organizations may recruit such experienced brokers internally to manage complex organizational reforms. Due to their unusual insight into multiple translations, they can better foresee cleavages, understand resistance and prevent conflicts between concerned sub-groups. While their conflict-dampening potential is high in implementing controversial reforms, the reverse possibility exists that these individuals end up straddling the fence, leading to consensual but minimal change. A variegated organizational career alone might not be a sufficient attribute. An anecdotal close-up view of the leader of a cohesive discourse coalition has further illustrated that specific discursive skills such as multivocality enable brokers to "induce cooperation in others" (Fligstein, 2001, p. 105). They do so by encouraging interactions between organizational sub-groups and building bridges between divergent translations (Fligstein, 2001, p. 105; Furnari, 2014; Korff et al., 2017). In a complex organization, both the variegated experience and multivocality of change managers contribute to dampening the conflict potential between opposing rationales.

The conclusion that individuals are able to use framings like tools needs to be treated with caution, as it arises from data collected in a very particular format: the interview. This is very different from the day-to-day performance of tasks related to one's mission in the organization, in which decisions and actions have direct practical consequences, in contrast to the stories told during an interview to an external researcher. In the concrete work situation, role conflicts might very well put strain on individuals obliged to decide which rationale applies (Croft et al., 2015; Reay & Hinings, 2009). But, there also, the multiplicity of rationales might constitute an opportunity for creativity or discretion (Battilana et al., 2017). Further research might explore the conditions under which, in concrete work situations, organizational members experience the availability of multiple rationales and identities as a strategic advantage versus a disturbing inconsistency.

Contradictory rationales are combined differently with emotionality, polarizing or neutralizing (de)legitimization strategies and argumentation levels

A second important finding of this study is that, in the translation of managerial concepts, opposing frames present clear combination patterns with different levels of emotionality, strategies of (de)legitimization and representations of self, allies and rivals. Together, these elements constitute the framings available to make sense of the concept at stake. Although these framings entail antithetic positionings, they are not necessarily at war with one another. The meaning structure studied here revealed that this is due to the presence of neutralizing framings and to the different level of argumentation of the framings.

First of all, rationales are interwoven with different levels of emotionality, which are connected with more or less polarizing strategies of (de)legitimization. A strongly polarizing and negative discourse around a management concept might coexist with a positive or ambivalent framing built on a neutralizing argumentation strategy. The meaning structure reveals a balance between hot and cold framings. Hot framings tend to polarize the debate by featuring a strong representation of the organizational identity and (de)legitimization strategies involving a moral evaluation of the concept at stake. They are countered by cold framings that keep emotionality low by downplaying questions of identity and by appealing to normalization, authorization or rationalization strategies. Schematically, to the polarizing claim "this is what is right to do because of who we are", the neutralizing answer is "these are the instructions" or "this is only a tool". I assume that, for a conflict to arise, two opposing rationales must be combined with contradictory representations of the organizational identity and (de)legitimization based on morality or mythopoesis, both emotionalizing features.

The presence of two hot and contradictory framings still might not escalate in an organization. This study has shown that direct opposition also depends on the level of argumentation. While some framings involve positionings towards field-level discourses, others are directed at each other within the organization. Field-level framings entail distancing from rivals or identification with allies outside the organization. Organization-level framings target rivals within the organization, which is obviously more problematic for the intra-organizational quietude. Field-level framings and organization-level framings are consequently not directed at each other. Based on this finding, I propose that the opposition between hot framings might escalate if these framings are directed at each other *within* the organization (see Figure 20).

For organizations, this implies that the simple presence of contradictory rationales among staff is not necessarily problematic. It can even be a positive aspect, as pluralism is a source of creativity and innovation (Battilana et al., 2017; Kraatz & Block, 2017). Even in the event of contradictory and hot translations at the organizational level, as is the case in the AFD, I have provided evidence, though anecdotal, that a skilled broker was able to reach out to discursive rivals through practice-based collaboration. Beyond re-emphasizing the importance of skilled brokers for preventing escalation, this indicates the effectiveness of low-key, bottom-up efforts in the creation of shared meaning by individuals otherwise divided by their translations of a management concept.

Figure 20: Finding – The opposition between hot framings might escalate if they are directed at each other within the organization

Studies have been published on the micro-level dynamics of institutional change in organizations (e.g. Creed et al., 2010; Hallett, 2010; Zilber, 2002). Others have discussed the role of catalysts making new practices emerge from the interaction between people (Furnari, 2014; Korff et al., 2017). Yet, research on the effects of institutional complexity on organizations emphasizes the incompatibilities between and within institutions (Greenwood et al., 2011). This raises the question of how such catalysts manage contradictions between meanings in interactions. Further research might explore in more depth the specific skills, strategies and concrete activities of these catalysts when they manage conflict-laden interstices in organizations.

Framings are unevenly distributed across organizational sub-contexts

Another major finding of this research concerns the structural and spatial distribution of framings in the organization. First, I have found that framings are not evenly distributed across departments. Some framings are over-represented in some departments. Second, the analysis reveals that sub-contexts are not only determined by formal structures, but also spatially. By applying an organization-as-field perspective, the analysis has revealed that the centre and the periphery constitute important symbolic sub-contexts in which framings are also unevenly distributed. In the following, I discuss how these sub-contexts may contribute to sustaining the truce between incompatible framings in an organization.

I found that multiple framings are unevenly distributed across departments. This finding reflects scholarly work on structural separation as a way organizations manage multiple rationales and respond to conflicting demands by their external constituents (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015; e.g. Binder, 2007). The assumption is that separation enables organizational members to focus on the rationale most appropriate to the external demand on their unit (Battilana et al., 2017). Structural separation may exacerbate conflict lines between individuals, however, as specialization undermines understanding of alternative rationales (Dunn & Jones, 2010). In the organization studied here, I found that rationales are not strictly separated by formal structures. Rather, some framings may be over-represented in some departments, yet coexist with other framings. Other framings may be less prominent but they are nevertheless present. In an organization displaying a multiplicity of rationales, it might therefore be more accurate to speak about a structural *distribution* of rationales to acknowledge the fact that the configuration of the meaning structure, i.e. the structure of the relations between the framings, may differ from one department, unit or team to another. Even in units with a dominant rationale, it is reasonable to assume that the immediate presence of others ensures insight into alternative rationales, which reduces the risk of escalation between individuals.

Beyond differentiated structural distribution, I found evidence of differentiated spatial distribution, i.e. a difference in the distribution of framings at the periphery and at the centre of the organization. This differentiation between periphery and centre has been widely used by scholars to inquire about change in institutional fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991). Several scholars have recommended conceptualizing the organization in analogy to a field (Dobbin, 2008; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Vaughan, 2008). Doing so enabled me to grasp a further aspect of the

complexity of an organization confronted with complex institutional pressure. By paying attention to the unequal distribution of symbolic resources between central and peripheral individuals, I identified a balanced opposition between two sub-contexts in the organization at hand.

Not surprisingly, the analysis revealed that the old centre of the organization examined here sticks to framings emphasizing the status quo, while new entrants at the periphery challenge this status quo (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). My research further shows that the challengers' discourse is strongly cohesive, as opposed to the incumbents', which enables its existence despite its inferiority in terms of symbolic resources. Yet, the peripheral position makes it difficult for the challengers to engage in open contestation, as they do not dispose of the legitimating resources traditionally valued in the organization (in the case studied here: field or technical experience and a long career in the organization). These inequalities in cohesion and symbolic resources create a balance between central and peripheral forces in the organization, which contributes to preventing escalation between their incompatible rationales.

In sum, the differentiated structural and spatial distributions of rationales contribute to dampening conflicts in the complex organization examined here. The different distributions of translations across the agency enables individuals to prioritize the rationale most appropriate to their mission and the external demand on their department (Binder, 2007), while knowing and acknowledging the existence of other rationales (Voronov et al., 2013). Incumbents and challengers, i.e. the centre and the periphery of the organization, respectively, confront in a balance of forces, which also contributes to the peaceful coexistence of their conflicting translations.

Figure 21: Finding – The differentiated distribution of framings across organizational sub-contexts prevents escalation

For organizations, this conclusion implies a need to strike a balance between the structural separation and integration of rationales (Battilana et al., 2017). In the event of two hot framings directed at each other within the organization and attached to separate structures, the concerned structures may be merged in order to foster the development of common practices. Battilana et al. suggest creating spaces of interactions for the negotiation of trade-offs, as these enable productive tensions to be maintained between different rationales (2015). Fiol et al. propose an ordered multiphase process of integration and differentiation to transform an intractable identity conflict into "enduring intergroup harmony" (2009). This approach has the advantage of securing, strengthening and eventually integrating the conflicting identities, which prevents strongly conflictual disidentification processes (Fiol et al., 2009). In the concrete case of the AFD, I have shown that the challengers' discourse is confined to the soft sector units of the operational department and strongly emanates from its capacity building unit. The integration of the mandate of the capacity building unit into all operational units, including the technical ones, could contribute to the creation of a common rationale. A balance between separation and integration could be realized through stronger ties between the capacity building unit and other operational units, for instance via the presence of a focal person from this unit in each operational division. Such a person might be part of the project teams or at least participate in the design of interventions.

Scholars have extensively examined incumbent-challenger dynamics at the field-level (Fligstein, 2013; van Wijk, Stam, Elfring, Zietsma, & Den Hond, 2013). Organization research could further exploit the field analogy to explore the benefits and pitfalls of infusing a challenging rationale into structures dominated by incumbent discourses. Under which conditions would this strategy lead to the fusion of two conflicting rationales, to their balanced coexistence, to the subordination of one to the other or to the full disappearance of one or the other?

The broader sociocultural context provides a common script

A less prominent finding of this research, yet deserving our attention, is the relatively consistent rejection of the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of the managerial concept at stake. I have looked for heterogeneity inside the organization and found it in the multiple framings available to members for translating results-based management. Yet, one unitary element of these otherwise heterogeneous framings has become visible: the disidentification or non-identification

with the Anglo-Saxon model of results-based management. While opponents of results-based management explicitly draw boundaries to the Anglo-Saxon context, proponents justify their claims without referring to role models from this context. This is true of all framings apart from one, which is the least used.

This finding corroborates comparative research on the adoption of the NPM paradigm, which has consistently found that "NPM rhetoric is hardly encountered in French modernization programmes" (Schedler & Proeller, 2002, p. 170). In France, 'Anglo-Saxon' ideas have been largely "remodelled and relabelled" (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 274) to foster their acceptance by professionals. Bezes et al., however, have documented the strong protestation movements of different professions against reform efforts based on the NPM doctrine in the first decade of the millennium (2012). This scepticism towards managerialism *à l'anglaise* (Bezes et al., 2012) constitutes a script shared by actors interpreting managerial concepts in an organization, i.e. a uniting element between the otherwise incompatible rationales. This implies that an organization, however internally complex it may be, remains embedded in a socio-cultural context that provides some consistency, or "editing rules" for the translation of institutional demands (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). While multiple translations can coexist within an organization, I contend that, by delineating the 'utterable' within a given society or profession, common socio-cultural scripts reduce the potentials of escalation between multiple rationales in an organization.

This raises questions about the conceptualization of inter- and intra-contextual heterogeneity in the theory of translation. The Scandinavian stream of this theory teaches us that each context provides specific editing rules and that the interpretation of an abstract idea will differ inter-contextually. The definition of the context, however, always depends on the perspective adopted by the researcher, i.e. the choice of the translating unit and the context in which s/he places this unit. The place where heterogeneity is found thus depends more on the researcher's design, rather than on the empirical reality. By observing translation from the perspective of institutional and organizational complexity, however, this research shows that translation resembles Russian dolls. Heterogeneity is found at multiple levels. First, one organization may evolve in different socio-cultural contexts that provide different editing rules, such as the national administrative tradition or the transnational community of development aid actors in the case of the AFD. Organizations are therefore expected to come up with unique translations of an abstract idea. Second, the organization itself constitutes a discursive arena with multiple

sub-contexts, providing distinct editing rules for organizational members to make sense of the abstract template. An organization should therefore be expected to feature multiple interpretations of the template, differing from one sub-context to the other. Third, the dominance of a specific translation in one sub-context does not exclude the coexistence of less prominent translations. Finally, within these sub-contexts, I have shown that individuals are capable of manipulating different translations in making sense of the abstract template. Thus, translation implies multi-level heterogeneity.

Furthermore, due to the isomorphic way organizations incorporate demands from their environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), there might be more resemblance between the translations of similar sub-contexts *across* organizations pertaining to one field than within one and the same organization. This is only speculative, however, and beyond the reach of this single case study. Future research on translation may concentrate on a better conceptualization of the context, more specifically on formulating and testing assumptions on inter-contextual and intra-contextual homogeneity and heterogeneity. This could be done, for example, by comparing the multiple intra-organizational translations of one managerial concept across similar organizations embedded in the same field.

5.2.Conclusion

In this research, I have shed light on how an organization can represent multiple things to multiple external and internal audiences without being at war with itself (Kerr, 2001).

In order to maintain their legitimacy, organizations incorporate the rationalized myths, or institutions, from their environment. These myths have become increasingly complex (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Vermeulen et al., 2016). Not only might they contradict each other, but some are intrinsically inconsistent (Meyer & Höllerer, 2016). Organizations become more complex as they expand to reflect the rationalizing scripts from their environment, i.e. as they attempt to represent different, sometimes incompatible things to different audiences (Bromley & Powell, 2012). The enactment of rationalizing myths at the organizational level generates practices and micro-level theorizations that rebound onto the environment, thereby adding to the complexity (Seo & Creed, 2002). Briefly, institutional and organizational complexity reinforce each other in a dialectical process. Scholars of neo-

institutionalism have observed and theorized how organizations mirror the multiple institutional demands of their environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), strategically respond to them (Oliver, 1991) or translate circulated scripts in their specific context, developing unique features in the adoption of rationalized myths (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). Yet, this outside perspective does not offer insight into how institutional complexity manifests inside organizations. To understand how complexified organizations absorb institutional contradictions, it is crucial to adopt an intra-organizational perspective. This research attempted to further our understanding of what happens inside a complexified organization confronted with institutional complexity.

Because organizations incorporate institutionalized scripts, and as these scripts become increasingly inconsistent, both with each other and intrinsically, I proposed that a **modern organization displays internal incompatibilities in the incorporation of complex institutions.**

The literature on the internalization of conflicting logics in organizations provides mixed or incomplete insights regarding the consequences of institutional complexity for organizations. Some scholars have assumed that the simultaneous presence of conflicting logics inside an organization leads to intractable conflict, paralysis or breakdown (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010). According to scholars of organizational discourse, conflicting discourses persist in organizations, yet one dominant discourse becomes reified (Grant & Hardy, 2004; Iedema & Wodak, 1999). In the reverse, some authors have assumed that organizational members are able to solve tensions between conflicting logics through hybridization or bricolage (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). This perspective assumes the capacity of people to manipulate logics like tools to serve their individual purposes (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Finally, the theory of translation predicts inter-contextual heterogeneity in the interpretation and enactment of ideas (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005). Zooming in on the organization as a complexified system with multiple sub-contexts, it is reasonable to expect heterogeneity in the translation of complex institutions. Yet, translation studies have not explicitly explored the intra-organizational consequences of institutional complexity and there is no explanation as to how incompatible translations coexist inside the organization. If the above proposition is substantiated, **why do multiple translations within one and the same organization not escalate into a conflict?**

Framework

I borrowed from research on social movements, translation and discourse to conceptualize how institutions are incorporated in organizations. I went down to the micro-level of people as carriers and negotiators of meaning. I conceptualized the organization, in analogy to a field, as a discursive terrain on which actors construct the meaning(s) of circulated ideas (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008). People embedded in this specific organizational context ascribe meaning to practices, to formal structures and to the concepts underlying them. Micro-level struggles over the meaning of concepts of organization involve discursive frames, representations of identity and boundaries, emotionality and strategies of legitimization and delegitimization. Together, these discursive elements constitute the framings available to organizational members to apprehend the complex institutions at stake. The relations between these framings constitute the meaning structure of the ideas being translated (Hernes, 2014; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). Grasping this meaning structure is crucial, as it underlies the formal structures of organizations and the practices of their members. By revealing how framings are distributed across the organization, the meaning structure provides clues for understanding how incompatible rationales can coexist within one and the same organization.

Methods

The central objective of this research was to substantiate the proposition and identify elements to explain the coexistence of multiple and incompatible rationales inside an organization. To do this, I took the case of the incorporation of a complex managerial concept in a complexified organization. I analysed the translation of the concept of results-based management in the French Development Agency (AFD). Results-based management is a central but complex concept of organization in the international field of development aid. It competes with other institutions and provides contradictory rationales for its implementation (Natsios, 2010; Sjöstedt, 2013). As an organization that expanded its mandates, budget and formal structures over the past decades, partly in reaction to the pressure to implement results-based management, the AFD constituted an instrumental case of a complexified organization confronted with institutional complexity. I combined an in-depth content analysis with multiple correspondence analysis – a method of the geometric data analysis paradigm – to systematically explore the meaning structure of results-based management within the AFD. An inductive frame analysis enabled me to reconstruct the discursive frames of results-based management in the AFD from the argumentative statements of 41 interviewees. As multiple correspondence analysis is

particularly suited to analyse meaning structures (Mohr, 1998), I used it to reconstruct the meaning structure of results-based management in the AFD. It enabled me, on the one hand, to reconstruct the framings available to AFD members to make sense of results-based management by systematically relating the frames of results-based management to emotionality, (dis)identification and (de)legitimization strategies. On the other hand, it made possible a systematic exploration of the relations between these framings. Exploring the nature and relations of the framings offered the first elements to explain the proposition of this research. In the final step, I used a multiple correspondence analysis, followed by a cluster analysis, to build clusters of like-minded people in the AFD and analyse their biographical attributes as well as their position in the AFD. This last analysis offered further elements to explain the central proposition of this research by showing how framings are distributed across the organization.

Results

The frame analysis yielded quite heterogeneous and partly incompatible frames. In the AFD, six frames of results-based management are spread along a continuum between the rejection of the concept as politically questionable or professionally unsuitable dogma and its adoption motivated by the usefulness of tools for systematic control or for improving the quality of interventions. In-between, results-based management is framed as an irrational but vital element of the organization or as a potentially interesting type of project design, which is nevertheless ill-adapted to the core business of the AFD. This panoply of available interpretations substantiated my proposition that **organizations display internal incompatibilities in the incorporation of complex institutions.** Despite this heterogeneity, the AFD remains both legitimate and functional as a key provider of French development aid. The reconstruction of the meaning structure of results-based management provided explanations at different levels as to why these heterogeneous rationales do not escalate into conflicts or jeopardize the organization's functionality.

First individuals are capable of manipulating different translations of results-based management, involving different conceptions of the identity of their organization. This corroborates the idea that individuals use translations like tools to make sense of the concept at stake (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Anecdotal evidence revealed the presence of skilled brokers who assimilate multiple translations. Such individuals constitute an asset for organizations, as they are capable of mediation at the intersection of multiple meanings (Furnari, 2014; Korff et al., 2017).

Two further elements dampening the potential of escalation between conflicting translations are their nature and their level of argumentation. The reconstruction of the framings has revealed the existence of polarizing and neutralizing framings, or hot and cold framings. While hot framings tend to emotionalize the debate by moralizing and emotionalizing the issue of results-based management, cold framings emphasize the utility of results-based management or the fact that it responds to a demand. Furthermore, the meaning structure reveals that framings involve argumentations at different levels. While some framings are outwardly oriented, i.e. towards the broader field of development aid or the French public administration, other framings are inwardly oriented, that is, they involve the identification of rivals within the agency. Based on these observations, I proposed that escalation depends on the existence of lines of confrontation between contradictory framings involving emotionally charged questions of identity, boundaries and morality, and arguing at the organizational level. For a conflict to arise, hot frames need to be directed at one another within the organization.

The third analysis brought people back into the picture by examining their positioning within the meaning structure. The analysis yielded four discursive clusters populated by organizational members with different trajectories and positions in the organization. This enabled me to identify two sorts of sub-contexts that make possible the coexistence of multiple framings: structural and spatial sub-contexts. First, the distribution of framings is structurally differentiated. Framings are unevenly distributed across the departments of the agency, enabling each department to follow the most appropriate rationale, yet acknowledging the existence of others. Second, framings are spatially differentiated between the peripheral discourse of the challengers, keen on fostering a change of interpretation and practices, and the incumbents' centre largely in favour of the status quo. The former build a strongly cohesive and conscious coalition, while the latter possess the symbolic resources valued in the organization. This creates a balance of forces between these two sub-contexts, impeding the escalation between their contradictory framings.

Finally, I found a homogenizing principle of translation that ensures some agreement between otherwise heterogeneous framings: the rejection of the Anglo-Saxon model of results-based management in development aid. The French context provides a common editing rule for organizational members to make sense of a NPM-derived concept. I proposed that such common socio-cultural scripts reduce the risk of escalation by preventing interpretive faux-pas.

Contributions

The above findings mainly contribute to the debate around the consequences of institutional complexity on organizations and on organizational hybridity. First, approaching the organization through the lens of institutional complexity enabled me to exhaustively capture the different rationales at work in an organization responding to institutional pressure, beyond the usual dichotomy between rationalization and professionalism (Bezes et al., 2012). Second, I offered multi-level explanations as to why an organization featuring incompatible rationales and identities is not necessarily "at war with itself" (Kerr, 2001). Third, in view of the dialectical complexification of organizations and institutions, I proposed conceptualizing hybridity as a pervasive phenomenon, rather than as a remarkable feature of some organizations. Recalling that the present study has shed light on one large, complexified and established organization, I argued that future research on hybridity should examine cases of escalation in similar organizations and, second, explore how highly consistent organizations survive in the face of institutional complexity.

The present study also contributes to research on translation, more specifically to the conceptualization of inter- and intra-contextual heterogeneity and homogeneity. By looking into the organization as a discursive terrain, I demonstrated that the translation of an abstract concept involves heterogeneity and homogeneity principles both vertically and horizontally within one organization. In view of these results, considering organizations as a source of one consistent and unique translation appears problematic. Rather, I speculated that heterogeneity might be higher within than across organizations. Although the Scandinavian branch of the translation theory took an opposite stance to organizational isomorphism, I suggest that we might find homogeneity in translation across organizations. This requires acknowledging the multiplicity of contexts in which organizational members are involved. As single case study, the present research does not enable me to substantiate this assumption. I therefore encourage comparative translation adopting an intra-organizational perspective to investigate the sameness of variation (Drori et al., 2014) across similar organizations.

Finally, this research triggered reflections on the under-explored concept of internal legitimacy. By revealing the multiple identities and rationales available inside an organization to make sense of a managerial concept, this research contradicts existing definitions of internal legitimacy as a consensus-based vision of the appropriate organizational behaviour (Drori & Honig, 2013; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). The results rather suggest that, in the same way that

organizations represent multiple things to different external audiences (Deephouse et al., 2017), they represent multiple things to their different internal audiences. In view of institutional complexity, I think that conceptual research is needed to re-define internal legitimacy, and explore the way it relates to external legitimacy and affects organizational survival.

Beyond theoretical contributions, this research has proposed an innovative mixed method approach to the study of organizations as systems of meanings (Suddaby et al., 2010). By borrowing from social movement theory, translation and different notions of field, I proposed a useful and exhaustive framework for exploring how institutional complexity manifests in an organization. Considering differently emotionalizing aspects of meaning negotiation, such as organizational identity and (de)legitimization strategies, enabled me to grasp the conflict potential of interpretive frames. Although different types of positive and negative emotions featured in the accounts of interviewees, the analysis of emotionality remained limited to binary coding in this study. Since Goodwin et al.'s seminal book *Passionate Politics* (2001), social movement research has taught us that emotions are not only "fundamental to human orientation and the embodiment of social realities", but also "constitutive of our rational evaluations and interpretations of political reality" (Reed, 2015, p. 936). Future research on the negotiation of rationalizing concepts should build on the advances of social movement theory to better account for the role of emotions in organization.

This study has further revealed the usefulness of multiple correspondence analysis not only for reconstructing meanings and mapping the relations between them, but also for isolating sociological explanations underlying these relations and the position of individuals within the meaning structure (Bourdieu, 2000; Lebaron & Le Roux, 2013). GDA remains a largely under-used statistical paradigm outside the Bourdieu school and despite the importance of the relational notion of field in organizational research. I hope to have demonstrated the potential of this inductive and relationality-affine paradigm for interpretive organization research, and more particularly for paying "*systematic* attention […] to how individual organizations experience and respond to the complexity that arises" (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 357, emphasis added).

This research has not explicitly explored strategies aimed at managing conflicts between opposing rationales in organizations. However, I have identified conflict-dampening elements and made suggestions as to how these elements may be steered in order to take advantage of meaning pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008). First, I emphasized the key role that experienced and skilled brokers may play in managing complex organizational reforms by fostering

interactions between organizational sub-groups and building bridges between divergent rationales. Secondly, I suggested that the differentiated distribution of multiple rationales and identities enables organizational sub-contexts to respond to their specific external audience. This implies a need to carefully balance the structural separation and integration of rationales in order to preserve or even take advantage of meaning pluralism (Fiol et al., 2009). In-between these radical options, I have suggested that the introduction of a focal person, i.e. a representative of one department in another, may foster the integration of divergent rationales, while structurally preserving their existence. The development of common practices might lead new social interactions to become institutionalized and to rebound onto the field-level, influencing the nature of institutional demands (Seo & Creed, 2002). This leads to my third point, in which I would like to reiterate Bromley and Powell's suggestion of a pro-active and practice-based organizational response to institutional pressure (2012). Especially in NPM-resistant contexts, instead of passively complying with external demands, bootstrapping practices could enable organizations to appropriate and eventually mediate the rationalizing pressure. An interviewee summarized the challenge as follows: "the AFD has not yet succeeded in constructing a positive discourse based on the refusal of the Anglo-Saxon results logic but without neglecting the interest for results". In this research, I have shown the effectiveness of a coalition of challengers in conducting a bottom-up reform to align external demands with the concrete needs of professionals. Such efforts and their success may be actively supported inside organizations, as well as advertised to peers and influential actors in the field.

Concluding remarks

This inquiry has explored the spatial arrangement of meanings that resulted from the incorporation of a complex institution in an organization. It has revealed the large intra-organizational heterogeneity of meanings attributed to an institutionalized concept of management by the members of an organization. Opposing meanings are embedded in conflicting rationales about "who we are" and "what we do as an organization". These rationales coexist inside an organization without escalating into open confrontations or affecting its functionality. This is due to the nature of conflicting rationales, which makes them more or less prone to conflicts, to their differentiated distribution across the organization, to the capacity of individuals to manipulate different interpretations of complex institutional demands and to the common rules of interpretation provided by the larger socio-cultural context. An organization represents many things to

many different people, not only outside, but also internally. Yet, it is not necessarily at war with itself.

Annex A: Complete results of the multiple correspondence analyses

MCA-1

Figure 22: Multiple correspondence map for the plane of axes 1 and 3 – discursive variables, all categories displayed

Note: categories contributing over the mean to axis 1 and 3 are respectively in bold or italic. Categories contributing to both axes are represented in bold and italic. Points are weighted.

Figure 23: Multiple correspondence map for the plane of axes 1 and 3 – cloud of individuals (statements)

Figure 24: Multiple correspondence map for the plane of axes 1 and 2 – discursive variables, all categories displayed

Note: categories contributing over the mean to axis 1 and 2 are respectively in bold or italic. Categories contributing to both axes are represented in bold and italic. Points are weighted. All active categories are displayed.

Table 21: Results of MCA-1 – weight and contributions of active variables and categories

| **Contributions of the active variables**				
Variables	**Relative Weight (%)**	**Axis 1**	**Axis 2**	**Axis 3**
Frame	12,4	19,6	19,0	29,0
Position	12,5	21,2	18,5	4,2
Emotionality	12,5	4,8	9,6	1,4
Identity Work	12,0	4,0	13,3	20,1
Boundary	12,5	10,3	8,8	8,4
Allies	12,5	0,8	4,2	12,8
Legitimation Strategy	12,5	20,3	14,8	5,0
Delegitimization strategy	12,5	19,0	11,9	19,1

Contributions of the active categories

Frame

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Account	2,5	3,209	0,3	8,4	1,2
Compliance	1,7	3,458	2,3	0,2	6,5
Economism	2,1	3,333	8,9	0,4	8,9
Money for results	0,8	3,725	0,3	0,8	0,2
Our Metier	2,2	3,298	3,6	0,1	11,7
Reflection	3,2	2,959	4,1	9,1	0,5

Position

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Ambiv/Neut	2,4	3,226	0,1	14,5	2,9
Negative	4,1	2,692	13,3	0,4	0,0
Positive	6,0	2,068	7,7	3,7	1,3

Emotionality

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Emo	4,2	2,656	3,2	6,4	0,9
No Emo	8,3	1,337	1,6	3,2	0,5

Identity Work

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Bank/Tech Assist.	1,2	3,601	0,4	0,6	1,1
Development partner	0,8	3,725	0,4	7,8	2,0
Experts	0,6	3,815	0,3	0,3	9,3

France/pol. Actor	0,7	3,779	2,2	1,6	6,5
No ID	8,3	1,355	0,1	1,2	1,0
Public Entity	0,4	3,850	0,5	1,8	0,1

Boundary

Label of the cate-gory	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
boundary inward	1,5	3,512	0,2	7,2	6,6
boundary no	8,4	1,319	2,0	1,6	0,2
boundary outward	2,6	3,155	8,1	0,0	1,6

Allies

Label of the cate-gory	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
allies inward	2,2	3,298	0,7	3,4	10,6
allies no	7,7	1,533	0,1	0,8	1,6
allies outward	2,6	3,155	0,0	0,0	0,6

Legitimation Strategy

Label of the cate-gory	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Leg_Auth	1,5	3,529	0,4	8,0	1,9
Leg_Moral Eval	0,8	3,743	0,9	5,4	0,8
Leg_Mythop	0,6	3,815	0,4	1,2	0,1
Leg_NA	4,3	2,620	13,2	0,1	0,1
Leg_Ratio	5,4	2,264	5,5	0,0	2,1

Delegitimization strategy

Label of the cate-gory	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution to the total variance (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
Deleg_Auth	0,6	3,815	0,4	0,7	1,5
Deleg_Moral Eval	1,8	3,422	7,6	0,9	6,9
Deleg_Mythop	0,7	3,761	1,9	0,5	6,3
Deleg_NA	6,4	1,943	8,0	2,1	1,1
Deleg_Ratio	3,0	3,030	1,1	7,8	3,3

MCA-2

Table 22: Results of MCA-2 – weight and contribution of active variables and categories

Contributions of the active variables				
Variables	**Relative Weight (%)**	**Axis 1**	**Axis 2**	**Axis 3**
Account	16,7	24,2	20,0	1,8
Economism	16,7	29,7	11,3	1,7
Our Metier	16,7	7,4	25,7	21,0
Reflection	16,7	34,3	2,8	0,1
Compliance	16,7	0,0	25,0	46,7
Money for Results	16,7	4,3	15,2	28,8

Contributions of the active categories

Account

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution à la variance totale (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
NO Account	7,3	9,350	13,6	11,2	1,0
YES Account	9,3	7,317	10,6	8,8	0,8

Economism

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution à la variance totale (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
NO Economism	12,2	4,472	8,0	3,0	0,5
YES Economism	4,5	12,195	21,7	8,3	1,2

Our metier

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution à la variance totale (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
NO Our metier	10,2	6,504	2,9	10,0	8,2
YES Our metier	6,5	10,163	4,5	15,7	12,8

Reflection

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution à la variance totale (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
NO Reflection	8,5	8,130	16,7	1,4	0,0
YES Reflection	8,1	8,537	17,6	1,4	0,0

Compliance

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution à la variance totale (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
NO Compliance	10,2	6,504	0,0	9,7	18,2
YES Compliance	6,5	10,163	0,0	15,2	28,5

Money for Results

Label of the category	Relative Weight (%)	Contribution à la variance totale (%)	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3
NO Money for Results	13,4	3,252	0,8	3,0	5,6
YES Money for Results	3,3	13,415	3,5	12,3	23,2

Table 23: Results of MCA-2 – Description of axis 1 by supplementary categories with deviation ≥ 0,4

By supplementary categories

Label of the variable	Label of the category	Weight	Coordinate	Calibrated deviation	Test-value	Probability
Current department/unit	Dpt_Strat	13,000	-0,644	-0,644	-2,777	0,003
Context of studies	*Missing value*	7,000	-0,640	-0,640	-1,836	0,033
Context of studies	*Missing value*	7,000	-0,640	-0,640	-1,836	0,033
Ratio Time AFD/elsewhere	[1.300;3.400[	9,000	-0,438	-0,438	-1,470	0,071
Experience in private sector	Priv Sect YES	8,000	-0,414	-0,414	-1,290	0,098
CENTRAL ZONE						
Experience in NGO	NGO YES	6,000	0,412	0,412	1,079	0,140
Ratio Time AFD/elsewhere	[0.600;1.300[	11,000	0,482	0,482	1,846	0,032
Current department/unit	Dpt_OP Soft	9,000	0,957	0,957	3,209	0,001

Note: A deviation greater than 0,4 is considered notable and a deviation larger than 1 is large. The probability value expresses the possibility that the observed deviation is due to chance. The lower it is, the more probable it is that the result is not due to chance. In the analysis, I retained supplementary variable with P ≤ 0.25 (see grey cells)

Table 24: Results of MCA-2 – Description of axis 2 by supplementary categories with deviation ≥ 0,4

By supplementary categories

Label of the variable	Label of the category	Weight	Coordinate	Calibrated deviation	Test-value	Probability
Ratio Time AFD/elsewhere	< 0.600	14,000	-0,440	-0,440	-2,006	0,022
CENTRAL ZONE						
Experience in Public administration	Pub Admin NO	15,000	0,406	0,406	1,952	0,025
Current department/unit	Dpt_OP Infra	6,000	0,414	0,414	1,084	0,139
Time elsewhere	< 5	13,000	0,425	0,425	1,829	0,034
Experience in NGO	NGO YES	6,000	0,548	0,548	1,435	0,076
Ratio Time AFD/elsewhere	>= 3.400	6,000	0,788	0,788	2,062	0,020
Current department/unit	Dpt_Region/Agency	6,000	0,806	0,806	2,110	0,017

Note: A deviation greater than 0,4 is considered notable and a deviation larger than 1 is large. The probability value expresses the possibility that the observed deviation is due to chance. The lower it is, the more probable it is that the result is not due to chance. In the analysis, I retained supplementary variable with P ≤ 0.25 (see grey cells)

Annex B: Lists of interviews

Table 25: List of interviews in the AFD

Nr	Department in the AFD	Position	Date of interview
1.	Strategy	Agent	24.01.2017
2.	Research and Development	Manager	26.01.2017
3.	Strategy	Agent	07.04.2017
4.	Strategy	Agent	13.04.2017
5.	Research and Development	Manager	25.05.2017
6.	Strategy	Manager	25.05.2017
7.	Strategy	Agent	29.05.2017
8.	Strategy	Agent	29.05.2017
9.	Operational Tech	Manager	30.05.2017
10.	Strategy	Agent	30.05.2017
11.	Operational Region	Agent	30.05.2017
12.	Operational Soft	Agent	31.05.2017 (continued on 09.06.2017)
13.	Operational Soft	Agent	01.06.2017
14.	Operational Soft	Manager	01.06.2017
15.	Operational Tech	Manager	01.06.2017
16.	Strategy	Agent	06.06.2017
17.	Operational Region	Manager	07.06.2017
18.	Operational Tech	Manager	07.06.2017
19.	Research and Development	Agent	08.06.2017
20.	Operational Tech	Agent	08.06.2017
21.	Operational Tech	Agent	08.06.2017
22.	Operational Region	Manager	09.06.2017
23.	Operational Soft	Agent	09.06.2017
24.	Strategy	Agent	12.06.2017
25.	Agency	Agent	15.06.2017
26.	Agency	Agent	16.06.2017
27.	Operational Soft	Agent	16.06.2017
28.	Research and Development	Agent	16.06.2017
29.	Strategy	Agent	19.06.2017
30.	Research and Development	Manager	19.06.2017
31.	Operational Soft	Agent	19.06.2017
32.	Operational Soft	Agent	19.06.2017
33.	Strategy	Agent	19.06.2017
34.	Operational Tech	Agent	20.06.2017
35.	Other	Agent	20.06.2017
36.	Operational Soft	Agent	22.06.2017
37.	Strategy	Manager	26.06.2017
38.	Operational Region	Manager	26.06.2017

Nr	Department in the AFD	Position	Date of interview
39.	Operational Soft	Agent	03.07.2017
40.	Other	Agent	05.07.2017
41.	Strategy	Manager	06.07.2017

Table 26: Complementary interviews outside the AFD

Nr	Organization / Department	Position	Date of interview
1.	OECD – Results Team of the Development Assistance Committee	Manager	24.01.2017
2.	AFD Research and Development	Agent	26.01.2017
3.	OECD – Results Team of the Development Assistance Committee	Agent	13.04.2017
4.	AFD – Centre for Financial, Economic and Banking Studies	Agent	14.06.2017 (phone interview)
5.	Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs – Directorate General of Global Affairs	Manager	16.06.2017 (phone interview)
6.	Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs – Directorate General of Global Affairs	Agent	20.06.2017
7.	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau – Development, Governance and Peace Unit	Agent	04.07.2017 (phone interview)

Annex C: Organigramme of the French Development Agency before the 2017 reform

Departments and Units considered in this research

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