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Europe's Architecture in 2020

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EU Council Meeting, Skopje Summit, March 23rd, 2020*: Barely hiding his excitement, B.Z., the newly appointed Union's Foreign Minister, enters the venue of the press conference and begins to address the people of Europe. Via the Brussels-run TV-channel "EBC"¹ he declares:

"Dear citizens of Europe. On this historical day I am proud to announce that all 31 member states agreed on the Communitisation of the Foreign and Security Policy and signed the *acquis politique*. With this document, we have set another milestone in the political integration of Europe and strengthened the Union's role as a global actor. We are prepared for the challenges of the next decades!"

Is this scenario merely a utopian and naive musing of Euro-enthusiasts, or does it anticipate the future reality of the European Union (EU)?

Ever since the Dutch and French voters deferred the entry into force of the Constitution, maybe indefinitely, negative media coverage has dominated the daily debate. Allegedly, the EU is in a "crisis", the project is stuck in a "dead end", and nationalism in the member states is on the rise, at least according to the consistent outcries of journalists.

In this essay, we – a German-French-Polish group of students – refuse to join in the requiem pitched by the media and to participate in the analysis of the clinical history of a man predicated to die soon. Just on the contrary, we develop a scenario of the EU as a powerful actor in 2020 and reflect on the discussions it might have incurred on the way.

After all, the EU has not lost its attractiveness, as evidenced by the long queue of countries applying for membership. Precisely therefore, the Union's

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¹ The Brussels-based European Broadcasting Channel was established in 2017 and is the first common, europewide TV-station of the Union member states.

future has to be seen in the light of potential enlargements and the chances such steps will bring for the transformation of European borders, European institutions, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and – last but not least – European identity. Accordingly, this essay will address these questions and suggest a mechanism of how to create a political Union.

Where does Europe End?

Thesis: The Union's centre of gravity will shift eastwards.

In 2020, the EU will have new borders and new neighbours. Bulgaria and Romania will enter the Union in 2007; accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia have recently been opened; the South Eastern neighbours Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro are knocking on the Union's doors; and Ukraine has repeatedly emphasised that it sees its future in the European Union, rather than with Russia. The sex appeal of the Union even exceeds the geographical borders of the continent: Morocco and Tunisia have officially applied for accession, and political leaders in Georgia relentlessly stress their interest in being part of the perceived "Area of Prosperity and Peace". However, the perspective of seemingly endless further expansion to countries so remote and alien to Western and Central Europeans increasingly scare the citizens. According to a Eurobarometer poll, 75 percent of its people wish to define the EU's outer borders before further enlargements takes place.² Admittedly, this is no easy task. Never in the history of European integration has a "grand design" for the construction of the common house been sketched out. Talking openly about the *finalité européenne* is a taboo among politicians as defining who belongs to the EU implicitly defines who will stay outside the club. The Treaty on European Union stipulates that any European state has the opportunity to join the Community.³ However vague that definition is, discussing the geographical finality is more important than ever. It raises crucial questions such as: "How much homogeneity does the EU need to avoid erosion?"

² Flash Eurobarometer 140, Par. 4.2.2., 11 April 2003, conducted by Gallup Europe.

³ The Treaty of Maastricht adopted the accession clauses of the EEC, ECSC, Euratom Treaties word by word. Title VII, Article O reads: "Any European State may apply to become a member of the Union". Five years later, Art. 49 of the Treaty of Amsterdam defines more clearly: "Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union." Article I-2 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe reads: "The Union shall be open to all European States which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together".

And how much diversity can it stand?" (Biermann 2005, p. 53) The answer is likely to be twofold: On the one hand, full membership of Asian or African countries seems unlikely; on the other hand, the extension of certain Community policies towards North Africa or the Caucasus, for example, looks like an attractive option. Although Europeans expect their governments to finalize the question of future EU borders, we suggest keeping it unanswered for the moment as no one can predict the Union's geographical future right now. If it sticks to its accession promises already made to applicant countries, we will face an "EU-30+" in 2020 that will have a completely different face than today.

In order to secure inner cohesion of an enlarged EU, we suggest the creation of a political Union based on common values and a common heritage; all combined in one document. An *acquis politique* would define clear political rules within the Community from which member states could not deviate, and at the same time allow the EU to speak with one voice in external affairs.

Thesis: Overlapping functional boundaries will replace clear-cut geographical borders.

The Union has long realized that its growing weight on the international scene entails responsibility towards those countries that will never join it. With future enlargements, the Union will move closer to instable areas – crisis regions will be right at our doorsteps, such as the Caucasus, Syria or Iraq. This makes it more important for member states to clarify what the alternatives for neighbouring countries without membership perspective are. First steps in that direction have already been taken. In 1995, the "Barcelona process", creating closer links with the Mediterranean countries, was launched; and in 2005, the European Commission presented a blueprint for the future European "neighbourhood policy". Both initiatives aim at stabilizing the Union's immediate surrounding through a three-fold formula, consisting of trade liberalisation, political relations in the form of regular, institutionalized dialogues and cooperation programmes that involve civil society actors. Once the final shape of the EU will be reached, Europe's neighbourhood policy will further gain in salience and blur the clear-cut geographical borders through overlapping functional boundaries. The Schengen Treaty illustrates this complexity. It abolished border controls but does not include all member states. While Britain and Ireland as actual members decided to opt out of the Treaty, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland joined Schengen as non-members. Another recent example for overlapping functional borders is the South-East Europe Energy Community Treaty, which extends the *acquis communautaire* in the field of energy to the whole of

South-East Europe.⁴ Thus, the EU is likely to retain the property of overlapping functional borders, blurring its geographical boundaries, and making the difference between members and non-members less clear-cut than some neighbouring countries might fear.

Is there a European Identity or Will it Ever Emerge?

Thesis: The emergence of a European identity requires a bottom-up approach centred around a new notion of participatory democracy and effective problem-solving.

Although the founding rationale for European integration, namely to make another devastating war between European peoples impossible, was the important driving force guiding early European visionaries. It was never bound to capture the imagination of large sections of the European population. Recent resentment, expressed powerfully by the French and Dutch dismissal of the Constitution, made it plain that the EU cannot continue to base political integration merely on elite consensus. European values cannot be imposed from above. But this does not change the fact that identities are constructed – and can thus be changed or even created anew. A European Constitution – named *acquis politique* –, embraced by the people, is one necessary ingredient in such a process of European identity formation. Arguably, a genuine European demos needs what Habermas has termed “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1989).

Yet today, a European identity exists only in rudimentary form. We are convinced that European values will not constitute a threat to national identities. In fact, a common identity can only emerge and survive alongside existing identities. Discussions on this topic will have to take into account that every person disposes of multiple individual and community identities such as nationality, ethnicity, religion, social class and sexuality. The formation of a shared identity will require explicit and relentless efforts by European elites – and the will of the people to adopt it.

We believe that cultural heterogeneity in the EU does not per se impair upon the creation of a common identity, just as it did not hinder this process within nation states. Regular Eurobarometer surveys show that feelings of “Europeanness” are slowly taking hold among people in Europe. However, this process displays great differences across member countries, as national histories impact in important ways on the development of a European identity. Such a process needs time. While it is true that political integration requires

⁴ This treaty was signed on 25 October 2005 in Athens. For the text, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/south_east/treaty_en.htm.

some feeling of common belonging – even more so within a Union stretching all the way from the Atlantic to the Russian border – this ostensible lack of identity should not be used as an argument to prevent further enlargement. Rather, European political integration and identity formation need to go hand in hand. These two processes have to be pursued actively and require more of a bottom-up approach. Even though it is not clear yet what precise form of European identity is likely to emerge and what form would be desirable, it is crucial that in both processes – identity formation and further enlargement rounds – the European people become active participants.

We are convinced that the EU should eventually evolve around a new notion of participatory democracy and effective problem-solving. The continued popularity of the notion of sovereign nation states has lately been exposed again by certain politicians and intellectuals. The resentment of political leaders and engaged citizens in a number of EU Member States to reforming agricultural markets and further market liberalisation under WTO rules shows that despite all heterogeneity one concern exists across “old” and “new” Europe alike: the fear of emerging as losers in the process of globalisation. Meeting such fears with a strong and unified political response will contribute to the formation of a European identity. However, as long as the EU remains incomprehensible to its citizens, growing fears of an EU “super-state” will persist. The process will need to be complemented by new and more transparent notions of European democracy. This requires several additional features such as the emergence of a genuine European public space allowing for a coherent debate on European issues in a truly European media as well as the formation of a European civil society. Hence, the construction of a common identity must entail the constant interplay between people- and elite-driven processes. A feeling of “Europeanness” will only emerge if European citizens can claim to be proud of having constructed a unique project, enabling them to reap the fruits of globalisation while mitigating its negative consequences.

Thesis: Europe’s External Action Service must be open to civil society involvement and personnel.

The Treaty for establishing a European Constitution foresaw the creation of a European minister of Foreign affairs. This has sparked a heated political and academic debate on what kind of a service and tasks this future minister would have. The debate has lost much of its effervescence after the French and Dutch rejection of the constitutional treaty, but the question remains: Should Europe re-organize its “External Action Service” (EEAS), as the future diplomatic service is called in the Brussel jargon. Our answer is clearly: yes! The discussion so far has been driven mainly by power struggles between

the Commission, the Council and national capitals. We call on to consider pragmatic solutions: If the political project of the EU is to become a success story, the EEAS has to be the new centre of European foreign policy decision-making. Only the co-operation of national diplomats alongside Commission and Council officials can ensure the establishment of a highly professional body, which is needed to cope with future challenges. A rotation principle for diplomats between the national capitals and Brussels would guarantee professionalism, secure a merit-based selection and anchor the new service firmly alongside national diplomatic bodies.

Once the EEAS is fully established – in 2020 –, let us think the unthinkable. Let us conceive an EEAS which in the long run employs people from civil society alongside career diplomats from the national capitals and European civil servants. In the age of civil society and patchwork biographies, this could allow persons working in civil society to work on certain projects for the European administration, and European civil servants to work for civil society. Increasing the permeability of a public administration raises many questions on locality, impartiality, and independence, but there are no a priori reasons why increasing permeability would be incompatible with principles of good governance. Allowing for a different brain mix may also stir up the intellectual life of Brussels, permitting it to become the veritable European capital, attracting, and be it only temporarily, the heavyweights from all over the continent. It would, however, seem necessary to keep an administration, so that the outside world has a phone number to call – but the person on the end of the line does not necessarily need to be a life-time civil servant. When a new service is set up from scratch, chances might be better to adopt new approaches – it seems at least worth a try.

Europe – Towards a Truly Common Foreign and Defence Policy?

Thesis: Without communitising the CFSP, the political integration of the Union cannot succeed.

The EU has often been referred to as “an economic giant but a political dwarf”. Indeed, the EU was particularly slow in adapting to the new security challenges of the post Cold War era but a European “strategic culture” seems to be gradually emerging. The 2001 Gothenburg Programme drawn up under the Swedish Presidency recognised that conflict prevention can only be achieved through addressing roots of conflicts rather than curing symptoms. However, conflict prevention cannot be reached if the relevant competences

⁵ “A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy”, approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003, available online at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

in this area remain scattered across different directorates of the Commission and, more importantly, between the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Recognising the new realities of the post Cold-War world, the 2003 European Security Strategy⁵ (ESS) identifies some of these new security threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises, failed states and organized crime. Addressing these challenges requires the unequivocal political will to assume international responsibility. It will, beyond this, also necessitate the communitisation of the CFSP as questions of security and development can no longer be treated separately. As Christoph Heusgen (the former head of Solana's Policy Unit) pointed out, "no crisis today can be solved by military means alone. To succeed, it is essential to employ a broader range of instruments."⁶

It is true – since 2003, the EU is engaged in its first military missions under the European and Security and Defence Policy.⁷ European military forces were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), police troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and military observers to Sudan/ Darfur in 2004, while EU Special Representatives have been dispatched to various regions. Even the EU-Battlegroups will be deployable soon. However, institutional turf wars over competences in the field of foreign policy between the Council Secretariat and the Commission persist.

With the establishment of the EEAS, EC-delegations will turn into EU-embassies and, gradually, they will assume more responsibility and hence authority. By 2020, EU-embassies should have become more important than those of individual member states. In 2020, a mechanism will have been found that will allow the EU-Foreign minister to make full use of the currently ill-coordinated foreign policy instruments including, above all, autonomous military action. While the EU may not measure up to the US in terms of military capabilities, it certainly has significant peace-stabilisation forces at its disposal. As Braithwaite pointed out, the EU has the potential for very significant leverage in crisis management as it disposes of the largest development budget and has more votes than any other entity in the UN Security Council and the IMF. Hence, there is scope for the EU to develop its own foreign policy identity and act globally. In the future this "might just be the

⁶ "A Strategic Culture for Europe: EU Security Policy after Iraq", *Oxford Journal of Good Governance* 2 (1) 2005, available online at: <http://www.oxfordgovernance.org/index.php/413/0>.

⁷ In March 2003, the military operation Concordia started in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A further military operation (Artemis) was launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June 2003.

basis for a new trans-Atlantic partnership: one in which the US consults the EU in managing crises, because of the EU's comparative advantage in building states" (Chalmers et al. 2005, p. 39).

Closer United in More Diversity!

Looking into the future can never generate reliable predictions on a complex issue. The picture developed here is just one possible scenario for the European Union in two decades.

This being said, however, it is quite foreseeable that the EU in 2020 will have new members, new borders, new partner countries, new policy mechanisms – and face new challenges. Moreover, the Union – sometimes perceived as an exclusive club of Christian states – will be more multicultural than ever before. The membership promises to the Balkans show this clearly. The countries that will join the Union will make the Community more multi-religious and multi-ethnic. In particular, the accession of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Turkey will further strengthen the already existing Muslim voice of the Union.

Heterogeneity will not make effective policy-making easier, but we need to start regarding diversity and pluralism also as assets, not only liabilities. In essence, the EU-30+ sketched out above will be the best example of a microcosm of the world's diversity and may serve as a laboratory for showing how we can tackle global problems in a "civilized" way and to the benefit of all. "United in diversity" – that has been the Union's motto until now. "Closer united in more diversity" – this should become the *Leitmotiv* of the EU in 2020.

Again, we believe that the EU is not in a crisis and certainly not because the Constitution failed. In fact, it is likely that we will see crucial reforms in foreign policy (such as the EEAS) being implemented anyway. Hence, it might be worthwhile contemplating a future *acquis politique*, which could serve as a political counterweight to the image of a purely economic EU. Politically, this would be a bold step to take. But it would also be a pragmatic yet symbolically very important way of ensuring further political integration, of creating a genuine European identity and defining instruments for a CFSP, lest the Eurosceptics' gloomy interpretation of the French and Dutch referenda might become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

We, young students from "old" and "new" Europe alike, thoroughly believe that in the near future the EU will have successfully tackled many of the challenges delineated above. By 2020, we will have moved on to new ones and we look forward to making our contributions to resolving them in the years to come.

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Großmächtiges Deutschland

Wider die machtpolitische Resozialisierung der deutschen Außenpolitik. Ein Plädoyer von Gunther Hellmann für einen offensiven Idealismus.

Über zwanzig namhafte Wissenschaftler und Politiker aus Legislative und Exekutive diskutieren pointiert, scharf formuliert und umfassend in der Darstellung die neue Rolle Deutschlands in den internationalen Beziehungen. WeltTrends wurde damit erneut zur Plattform der außenpolitischen Debatte in diesem Lande.

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