



Philosophische Fakultät

Bastian Matteo Scianna

## A predisposition to brutality?

German practices against civilians and *francs-tireurs* during the Franco-Prussian war 1870–1871 and their relevance for the German ‘military *Sonderweg*’ debate

Suggested citation referring to the original publication:  
Small Wars & Insurgencies 30 (2019) 4–5, pp. 968–993  
DOI <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2019.1638551>  
ISSN (print) 0959-2318  
ISSN (online) 1743-9558

Postprint archived at the Institutional Repository of the Potsdam University in:  
Postprints der Universität Potsdam  
Philosophische Reihe ; 165  
ISSN 1866-8380  
<http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-434218>  
DOI <https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-43421>





OPEN ACCESS



## A predisposition to brutality? German practices against civilians and *francs-tireurs* during the Franco-Prussian war 1870–1871 and their relevance for the German ‘military *Sonderweg*’ debate

Bastian Matteo Scianna

Department of History, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany


### ABSTRACT

The German *Sonderweg* thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the military, things differ: all conflicts before the Second World War are interpreted as prelude to the war of extermination between 1939–1945. This article specifically looks at the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71 and German behaviour vis-à-vis regular combatants, civilians and irregular guerrilla fighters, the so-called *francs-tireurs*. The author argues that the counter-measures were not exceptional for nineteenth century warfare and also shows how selective reading of the existing secondary literature has distorted our view on the war.

**ARTICLE HISTORY** Received 28 August 2017; Accepted 30 January 2018

**KEYWORDS** *Francs-tireurs*; *levee en masse*; myth of *Franktireurkrieg*; Franco-Prussian War; Geneva convention of 1864; *Landwehr*; siege of Paris 1870

On 1 September 1870, the battle of Sedan decided the first phase of the Franco-Prussian War. The French Army was beaten and Emperor Napoleon III marched into captivity with over 100,000 of his soldiers. Under Prussian guidance, troops from several German states had won a series of victories since the start of the campaign in early August. In Bazeilles, a small town near Sedan, French Marines and National Guards put up a fierce resistance. After being repelled, the Bavarian troops shelled the village with artillery before infantry units resumed the attack. In the heat of battle, some surrendering soldiers were shot out of hand and over 400 houses burned down. Convinced that civilians had illegally taken part in the battle, the Bavarians subsequently captured around one hundred suspects, but released them unharmed the next day.<sup>1</sup> International media reports and public outrage in Paris and Berlin led to mutual accusations of atrocities – fact and fiction were mixed. However, investigations after the war established that ‘only’ 39 civilians were either killed or wounded during the fighting in Bazeilles, in contrast to 2,600 dead soldiers on each side.<sup>2</sup>

**CONTACT** Bastian Matteo Scianna  [scianna@uni-potsdam.de](mailto:scianna@uni-potsdam.de)

© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

The incident hinted at the many problems that the Germans encountered until the end of the war in May 1871: the continued French resistance impeded any clear separation between civilians and combatants, as calls for a *levée en masse* led to the recruitment of *francs-tireurs* (literally free shooters)<sup>3</sup> to supplement the new armies. Bazeilles also demonstrated the influence of the press and the precarious nature of slaughter narratives about German 'barbarism'. They cast a long shadow and would be evoked in the opening stages of the First World War in order to describe 'German atrocities'.<sup>4</sup>

The history of the German military and the 'totalisation' of war have sparked numerous debates over time. Not least due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, references to historical 'lessons learned' from insurgencies and occupations have flourished over the last decade. But flawed examples and unsustainable *longue durée* arguments can dangerously twist historical facts and denude them of their context.<sup>5</sup> Especially in the German case a toxic mix of an uncritical Anglo-American fascination with Teutonic 'super soldiers' that often overlooked war crimes, the long-overdue debate that debunked the myth of a chivalrous 'clean Wehrmacht',<sup>6</sup> and crimes in the colonies were conflated since the early 2000s.<sup>7</sup> Some of these debates have showed a tendency, however, to analyse German military history through the lenses of the Second World War and have distorted our view on the events of 1870–1871.

In particular, the German atrocities in Belgium in 1914 have been interpreted as an almost inescapable escalatory step after the Franco-Prussian War. John Horne and Alan Kramer's influential study on 1914 also devoted special attention to German actions against *francs-tireurs* and civilians in 1870–1871. They argued that the institutionalised memory of the *Franktireurkrieg* influenced the harsh German reprisals against alleged partisans during the advance through Belgium and northern France in 1914, during which German forces killed approximately 6,500 civilians.<sup>8</sup> The initial debate following Horne and Kramer's book led to clarifications in their argument that are often overlooked.<sup>9</sup> Yet, other scholars who built on their research even described the German operations in 1914 as a deliberate terror campaign,<sup>10</sup> without offering context or comparisons.<sup>11</sup> Along similar lines, Isabel Hull saw 1870–1871 as a precedent that changed the German Army's behaviour towards civilians and irregulars.<sup>12</sup> She argued it was the origin of ruthless military culture centred on 'military necessity', which led to the subsequent atrocities in German colonies and during the First World War. Other authors followed this nexus between Imperial Germany, colonial war, and genocide in the Second World War and drew continuities from 'Windhoek to Auschwitz'.<sup>13</sup> However, several scholars have shown that the German military did not learn any operational lessons or import cultures of violence from colonial campaigns.<sup>14</sup>

In contrast to prior associations of German occupational regimes during the First World War as precursors to Nazi practices,<sup>15</sup> recent scholarship has painted a more balanced picture.<sup>16</sup> It is often overlooked that the atrocities

in 1914 occurred during the chaotic days of an invasion and not during an occupation. The last years have seen an upsurge of new studies on German atrocities in Belgium in 1914, which were accompanied by intense debates,<sup>17</sup> but also comparisons to other theatres, which have repulsed ideas of a new German military *Sonderweg* in terms of mass crimes.<sup>18</sup> Alexander Watson upheld the notion that reminiscences of 1870–1871 played a role in 1914, but argued that German actions were neither ‘unusual nor was their conduct out of place compared to other contemporary armies’ norms of violence; if anything, they were milder, and therefore ‘attempts by historians to present the atrocities as a prelude or pointer to Nazi genocide and annihilation warfare in eastern Europe three decades later lack credibility.’<sup>19</sup> Also Peter Lieb repulsed the idea of a German military *Sonderweg* in the East between 1914–1919.<sup>20</sup>

The next logical question would be if 1870–1871 could credibly be described as ‘prelude or pointer’ to 1914, and to what extent it can be classified as the foundation for a ‘German way of COIN’.<sup>21</sup> The Franco-Prussian War – and in particular the ‘people’s war’ after September 1870 – has been framed as a conflict ‘on the road to total war’.<sup>22</sup> Most scholars agree that elements of restrained *ancien régime* warfare existed alongside more total aspects, such as new technology, a full mobilisation of national economic and human resources, and excesses of violence.<sup>23</sup> Yet, also Hull agreed with Howard that the German Army by and large behaved in a disciplined manner in 1870–1871, without wreaking ‘absolute destruction’.<sup>24</sup> Despite the fact that the *francs-tireurs* have received very little serious study, most reference works on the Franco-Prussian War still imply German ruthlessness and the alleged headaches the *francs-tireurs* had caused them.

The doctoral dissertations of Sanford Kanter and Paul Hatley specifically studied the guerrilla warfare in 1870–1871, but are frequently overlooked. Hatley described the *francs-tireurs*’ highly diverse character and their low effectiveness in combat, which merely ‘prolonged the inevitable’ defeat for two or three months.<sup>25</sup> Kanter’s work stressed that the resistance movement is largely a myth.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, he claimed that there was neither a people’s war, nor widespread destruction by German forces. His findings were backed by similar assessments by Michael Howard and German historians who based their research on primary sources. Frank Kühlich, Frank Becker, and Heidi Mehrkens all remained sceptical as to the actual level of the insurgency and arguments hinting at an escalation of violence.

Still, several authors continue to claim that there was a fierce counter-insurgency, which left a lasting ‘influence on the German military until 1914, and to some extent even during the Second World War’.<sup>27</sup> Mark Stoneman did not consider 1870–1871 as all-out slaughter, but indirectly implied that there was *something different* that set a precedent for later.<sup>28</sup> The short essay by Marcus Jones also followed Stoneman’s argument, and cited Bazeilles (!) as an example

that the *francs-tireurs* prolonged the Franco-Prussian War.<sup>29</sup> David Stone claimed to provide a view from ‘inside the German army’, but without using German primary sources, rather he perpetuated myths about the influence and significance of the *francs-tireurs*.<sup>30</sup> Henri Ortholan offered detailed descriptions of the armies at the Loire and in Eastern France, without, however, consulting primary sources.<sup>31</sup> The same holds true for the account by Alain Goultmann, which focused little on the *francs-tireurs*.<sup>32</sup> Also Colonel Arnel Dirou relied largely on French post-war memoirs – with all the inherent problems and biases – to depict the *francs-tireurs*’ operations and a German trend towards ‘total war’ based on a flawed reading of Clausewitz’s search for decisive victory.<sup>33</sup> Still, Dirou regarded these irregular units as unorganised and in constant quarrels with regulars and civilians. Thus, he acknowledged that the government had to tame them in order to avert a prolonged civil war.

Indeed, the main lesson the French Army drew from 1870–1871 was to avoid placing their bets on the National Guard, a *levée en masse*, or still less the *francs-tireurs*, let alone praise their efforts.<sup>34</sup> The latter were too closely related to the Commune and could function neither as a role model for the French military (who had made a first step at regaining prestige by defeating the Commune), nor for society at large, given the Third Republic’s political infighting, anti-militarism, and civilian-military tensions.<sup>35</sup> Calls for a Republican Army expressed the desire for an organised professional army as a school of the nation<sup>36</sup> – not marauding and hapless *francs-tireurs*.<sup>37</sup> These two concepts must not be confused when analysing 1870–1871, or the German debates afterwards. Yet the neglect of French scholarship (and nineteenth-century context) exemplifies the often-narrow focus of scholars who work on the German Army,<sup>38</sup> and it is astonishing how little serious study the Franco-Prussian War has attracted despite its importance.<sup>39</sup>

Therefore, this article will examine the nature of German reactions to the French war effort under the Gambetta government after September 1870. First, it will give additional context on nineteenth-century counter-insurgency, before second, assessing the actual scale of the *francs-tireurs*, and, third, the German counter-measures. This will include a brief look at the treatment of regular soldiers and civilians in 1870–1871. This article will argue that the scale and intensity of *francs-tireurs* was very limited and no serious threat to overall operations in 1870–1871. Far from celebrated heroes, the majority of Frenchmen – who had no interest in irregular resistance – shunned the *francs-tireurs* whose little-fruitful actions were quickly forgotten after the war. The German counter-measures were in line with nineteenth-century practices and should not, therefore, be seen as starting point of a German military *Sonderweg*.

## Counter-insurgency in the nineteenth century

During the Napoleonic Wars, the revolutionary rhetoric of a people’s war forged a rather positive image of the partisan in Germany, while many

insurgencies across Europe were suppressed with varying degrees of brutality.<sup>40</sup> However, irregular combat threatened the established monarchical order and the norms of *ancien régime* warfare.<sup>41</sup> When the anti-Napoleon coalition advanced into France in 1813, they reached out to local notables to establish good relations.<sup>42</sup> Yet tensions escalated in eastern France when half-starving allied soldiers and the population contested for scarce food during winter; but these episodes did not spiral out of control and never had any influence on the campaign.<sup>43</sup> The irregular resistance of the *corps-francs* was negligible and French peasants created a new daily routine under occupation,<sup>44</sup> leading to a 'passive resistance' against their own government.<sup>45</sup> Unsurprisingly, the memory of the occupations in 1814 and 1815–1818 had been 'largely erased from the national cultural memory in favour of more glorious events, except during subsequent conflicts, when they were reconstructed as, first, justification for revenge against France's "hereditary enemy" Germany and, second, evidence of France's capacity for regeneration through defeat'.<sup>46</sup> Thus, it is important to note the longevity of the intrinsically linked political myths of 'brutal occupation' and 'heroic irregular resistance', and their selective use.

In Prussia, the so-called *Befreiungskriege* and their propagandised memory played an essential role in stirring up anti-French sentiments and forming a collective identity, despite the persistent regional differences.<sup>47</sup> Even though the soldiers in 1870–1871 often linked current events to the Napoleonic Wars, this did not mean that they could derive any practical lessons from it<sup>48</sup> – especially as the men were trained to fight a (regular) dynastic war.<sup>49</sup> As conflicts between the great powers were largely evaded after the Congress of Vienna, the monarchs successfully managed to retain the monopoly on violence by taming the partisan and keeping war separated from society. Conscription served as an instrument for improving social cohesion and as a disciplining process for nation-building.<sup>50</sup> Soldiers were intended as tools for upholding the dynastic order and not to waging war *among* the people. Consequently, the Prussian Army was employed – much like other European armies – to suppress internal unrest, and proved itself as backbone of the monarchical order in 1848.<sup>51</sup>

Besides domestic duties, small war operations remained a minor issue in the war against Denmark in 1864 or during the 1866 campaign against Austria-Hungary.<sup>52</sup> However, some senior German officers had gained experience through liaison duties or service under foreign flags before holding important command positions in 1870–1871. August von Werder (1808–1887), the XIV Corps' Commander, lost an arm during his service with the Russians in the Caucasus, and Ludwig von der Tann (1815–1881), commander of the I Bavarian Corps, observed French operations in Algeria in 1843 and headed a free corps in the First Danish War. August Karl von

Goeben (1816–1880), commander of the VIII Corps and later the First Army, even published on his deeds in the First Carlist War and in Morocco. Yet such experiences were not widespread among NCOs or the rank-and-file in 1870. Furthermore, the handful of writers on small wars had very little influence – what mattered was great-power war.<sup>53</sup>

One must not forget that even in countries whose armies were stronger involved in small wars, such as the British, Americans, French, Polish, Spanish, Russians, Austrians, and Italians, there were no concise counter-insurgency doctrines, and the importance attached to irregular warfare was secondary at best.<sup>54</sup> Insurgencies were brutally suppressed: looting, pillaging, and requisitioning were commonplace in the nineteenth century, as were reprisals against civilians or alleged irregulars.<sup>55</sup> In conclusion, the involvement in counter-insurgency operations constitutes a minor paradigm in Prussian military history and theoretical writings prior to 1870, and reminiscences of the Napoleonic Wars could not substitute practical or theoretical schooling in anti-partisan warfare – when the German armies advanced into France, they were not expecting irregular resistance, and nor were they trained to counter it.<sup>56</sup>

### **German atrocities 1870–1871?**

In 1866, Prussia had won a decisive victory over Austria that changed the balance of power on the continent.<sup>57</sup> Merely four years later, a quarrel over the Spanish throne officially started the Franco-Prussian War. Despite Bismarck's manipulations, the war was initially perceived as a legitimate German response against French aggression.<sup>58</sup> The German armies prevailed in the bloody battles of August 1870, and advanced into France, where the campaign culminated on 1 September with the victory at Sedan.<sup>59</sup> After merely four weeks, the German forces had defeated most of the highly experienced French soldiers and taken close to 300,000 prisoners. The Prussian General Staff had proven more capable at managing the fog of war, manoeuvring and controlling the troops,<sup>60</sup> and the superior German artillery outweighed the strength of the French Chassepot rifle.<sup>61</sup> Given the norm of European war, the powers would now resort to the negotiation table. But in Paris, Léon Gambetta (1838–1882) and General Louis-Jules Trochu (1815–1896) established a new Government of National Defence on 4 September 1870.<sup>62</sup> Gambetta refused to surrender and used inflammatory revolutionary rhetoric to stir up a nationwide *levée en masse*. The Germans were forced to mobilise over one million men in order to control the vast territory, repel possible attempts to relieve a Paris under siege, and fight on the different fronts.<sup>63</sup> In fact, French resistance was centred on the capital, the Loire, and the so-called Army of the East (around Belfort, Besançon, and in the Vosges). The following will first analyse German



behaviour *vis-à-vis* French regular soldiers and civilians, second, attempt to assess the scale of the new French forces; and finally, investigate the countermeasures employed to fight irregular resistance where it emerged.

### **No brutalisation: the treatment of regulars and civilians**

The sudden collapse and chaotic retreat of the French Army made a great impression on the populace. Seeing their protector demoralised and beaten, they expected the cruel-natured enemy to turn against them.<sup>64</sup> Many 'slaughter narratives' and false rumours led to collective fears bordering panic.<sup>65</sup> Yet, in many cases the German forces functioned rather as policemen and not in a way the myth of the 'ruthless occupiers' would have us believe. For example, *francs-tireurs* patrolling the villages outside Paris told atrocity stories about *les Prussiens* in order to make the inhabitants abandon their houses, which they then looted.<sup>66</sup> When the civilians encountered Prussians, they returned to their destroyed and plundered houses, trusting them more than the *francs-tireurs*,<sup>67</sup> and peasants even turned in their compatriots to the Germans out of indifference to the struggle or fear of reprisals.<sup>68</sup>

The interactions were largely marked by peaceful passivity of the population and proper behaviour of German troops.<sup>69</sup> However, tensions with civilians did erupt, particularly when combat operations were conducted in urban centres, which the German soldiers particularly detested.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, when they were unable to track down *francs-tireurs* after ambushes, their anger was at times directed against civilians – especially if they suspected them of being informants or disguised rebels.<sup>71</sup> Sometimes, hostages were taken in order to assure the payment of contributions or to increase the safety of German troops.<sup>72</sup> This was, however, a custom of war<sup>73</sup> and there is no proof that any hostages were harmed during the conflict.<sup>74</sup> Many misunderstandings and merciless actions did occur, but this was still far from outright mutual hatred and deliberate slaughter.<sup>75</sup> By the way of comparison, the much-publicised three-week German bombardment of Paris had resulted in 97 casualties, whereas up to 20,000 Frenchmen fell victim to the outright civil war during the crushing of the Commune.<sup>76</sup> After the armistice in January 1871, almost no incidents occurred across France, which left François Roth concluding that 'the occupation after the Franco-Prussian War was neither a terror regime, nor an arbitrary regime'.<sup>77</sup>

Indeed, it is more than questionable that a 'personal hatred of the French'<sup>78</sup> influenced German behaviour, as the relations with civilians and professional French soldiers were rather "normal".<sup>79</sup> The French (metropolitan) regulars' bravery was respected and they were perceived as equals.<sup>80</sup> There prevailed a soldierly ideal of war as honourable duel,

diametrically opposed to any personal hatred. The good treatment of French POWs<sup>81</sup> is another indicator that contradicts the claim of boundless brutalisation. Despite the lacking preparation for such large prisoner numbers and the beginning of harsh winter climate the mortality rate remained low: in Bavarian camps 1,508 out of 39,339 POWs had died by mid-February 1871 (3.8 per cent) and in the North German Confederation 7,230 out of 285,124 (2.5 per cent); low percentages that led to a positive review by a French delegation, which had been allowed to inspect the camp conditions.<sup>82</sup>

Again, only by comparisons we can better understand the German conduct: when the French Army of the East fled with 85,000 men to neutral Switzerland and was interned there, around 1,700 men perished in captivity (2.0 per cent),<sup>83</sup> and the mortality rate in both Confederate and Union camps during the American Civil War was much higher – out of 195,000 imprisoned Union soldiers approximately 30,000 died in captivity (15.4 per cent), and around 26,000 of the 215,000 Confederate prisoners did not survive (12.9 per cent).<sup>84</sup> Thus, when analysed in context, the treatment of French prisoners can hardly account for German brutalisation. *Francs-tireurs* did not always enjoy prisoner of war status,<sup>85</sup> but were often taken captive.<sup>86</sup> After the capitulation of Strasbourg, for example, many *francs-tireurs* were released on their promise not to take up arms again and no one was executed.<sup>87</sup> Most interestingly, the few existing documents indicate that German POWs in the hands of *francs-tireurs* also fared relatively well, which precipitated German comportment *vis-à-vis* captured *francs-tireurs*.<sup>88</sup> This would support the findings on relations between regular soldiers, which were marked by informal agreements that often kept violence as low as possible in a sort of ‘live-and-let-live’ system.<sup>89</sup>

In conclusion, the German forces did not deliberately or systematically target civilians, who largely remained unharmed passive bystanders; nor did their treatment of French regular soldiers hint at any radicalisation processes. Thus, it is vital to differentiate between the treatment of regular uniformed soldiers, civilians, and *francs-tireurs*, while it is also useful to take a closer look at the German reactions and counter-measures against irregular resistance.

### Every Frenchman to the front?

Any analysis has to differentiate between the new regular units, the (mostly uniformed) National Guards and the less structured, less disciplined men in the *Garde Mobile* and the *francs-tireurs*.<sup>90</sup> The lines between these units remained blurry, however, as manpower fluctuated and both sides had an interest in over-stating their numbers: it provided the Germans with an excuse for setbacks and the French government could celebrate an alleged

volunteer spirit. Further *franc-tireur* forces were rallied in and around Paris,<sup>91</sup> accompanied by calls for a *guerre à outrance*.<sup>92</sup> In the (less enthusiastic) provinces,<sup>93</sup> the Republican Government of National Defence conscripted around 5,000 new troops per day for their regular formations, which increased the National Guard to 320,000 men, and overall force levels reached 830,000 by February 1871.<sup>94</sup> Yet, this does not mean that they were all combat-ready frontline troops or that they could be employed *en bloc* against the German occupiers.

It is virtually impossible to give precise estimates of the various *francs-tireurs* formations, let alone document their losses. Michael Howard estimated 57,300 *francs-tireurs* under arms (based on French official sources published after 1900) and one thousand German fatalities due to their actions.<sup>95</sup> French reports on killed *Prussiens* vary, but many are too high, for example in the Vosges.<sup>96</sup> Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau stated that it is impossible to provide exact numbers, and listed sources offering a range between 17,000 and 141,000 *francs-tireurs*.<sup>97</sup> Forrest acknowledged the same problems, and cited over 20,000 volunteers for Paris and an additional 11,502 in the main recruiting areas – for both the *Garde Mobile* and the *francs-tireurs*.<sup>98</sup> Dirou listed 393 battalions with 72,000 *francs-tireurs* (including 3,000 officers and NCOs) that he deemed operative between September 1870 and February 1871 – without acknowledging the highly fluid character of these formations.<sup>99</sup> In fact, only by disregarding traditional patterns of French history could we believe the myth of a rural population eager to enrol for a distant government.<sup>100</sup> Many men joined the irregular forces to dodge conscription, and desertion posed a severe problem – especially after setbacks and the sharp decline of morale in January 1871.<sup>101</sup> Most *francs-tireurs* formations never gained any reasonable combat efficiency or military discipline; they wore no proper uniforms and suffered from poor supply, which led to many quarrels with civilians.<sup>102</sup> The French government recognised these problems: the *francs-tireurs* needed official combatant status and stricter discipline. Severe measures in regards to the latter were taken in October and November 1870, including court-martialing.<sup>103</sup>

Other scholars' estimates on insurgent levels rely mainly on Howard, whereas Sanford Kanter calculated the number of insurgents killed. Based on an unpublished official French inquiry after the war, he placed the total of *francs-tireurs* killed in action at 53.<sup>104</sup> Furthermore, he stated that the overall damage in the whole country was constantly exaggerated, while in reality the occupied regions had barely experienced any disruption.<sup>105</sup> Kühlich also rejected the idea that there had been a full-scale people's war and dismissed as absurd the claims about 1870–1871 representing a new kind of warfare.<sup>106</sup> Wolfgang Etschmann also held that the *francs-tireurs* did not hamper any operations, setting the death toll at several hundred

fatalities on both sides.<sup>107</sup> The exact numbers will remain unknown, but they were marginal in comparison to overall French casualties. In total, the French army lost 24,031 soldiers in action (plus an additional 28,896 men who died from combat-inflicted wounds and diseases such as typhus and dysentery), 89,228 wounded and 14,138 missing; while most civilian losses occurred during the sieges of Paris (275), Belfort (262), Mézières (53), and Strasbourg (400).<sup>108</sup> In comparison, the German states had on average around 800,000 men in the field, of whom 28,208 died in combat or from battle-inflicted wounds, almost 15,000 died from illnesses, and 88,488 were wounded. A great majority of casualties (on both sides) occurred in the initial encounters in August and September until the battle of Sedan, i.e. the first phase of the war that preceded the 'guerrilla campaign'.<sup>109</sup> In fact, German fatalities dropped from 12,299 in August (1.6 per cent of combat strength), to 6,788 in September, 4,999 in October, 3,392 in November, and saw a quick rise to 4,476 in December (0.3 per cent of combat strength) and 4,141 in January (as German troop levels also rose to almost one million), before ultimately falling to 3,277 between February and June.<sup>110</sup> Even if one accepts Howard's account of roughly one thousand German fatalities due to *francs-tireurs* activities during the entire war, it can still be hardly seen as a serious threat. In general, the military results of Gambetta's call to arms were a disaster – the troops were poorly equipped and officered, and never stood a chance against professionally trained and combat hardened German soldiers.<sup>111</sup> But how did the Germans react when they encountered irregular resistance?

### Sticks and carrots: German counter-measures

The German high command was upset about the continued French war effort, which they perceived as a futile and unnecessary prolongation of hostilities.<sup>112</sup> The soldiers had anticipated (another) brief campaign and believed in fighting a just war against French aggression.<sup>113</sup> Likewise, international opinion found it dishonourable to continue a war with a *levée en masse* that Paris had started and already lost.<sup>114</sup> Given the nature of insurgencies, Röhkramer argued 'it is understandable why the German soldiers were primarily concerned with their own safety. Without playing down individual cases of excessive cruelty, one has to conclude that a national war necessarily includes violence of this kind. The soldiers are less responsible than the circumstances of war'.<sup>115</sup> Thus the soldiers in the field gradually came to accept the harsh measures taken (or claimed to be taken) by some of their comrades,<sup>116</sup> but were wholly inadequately prepared for such a kind of warfare. As Stoneman noted, the Germans had expected a fair and open fight, and not 'an enemy who would not shoot and then run, hide or pretend to be an innocent civilian'.<sup>117</sup>

The Prussian King had equalled irregular resistance to banditry – to be punished with ten years' imprisonment, or execution if individuals had harmed German troops.<sup>118</sup> This official proclamation left room for commanders on the ground and we should not take gruesome political rhetoric, for example also by Bismarck, for the same thing as actual procedures in the field.<sup>119</sup> The Germans struggled to differentiate between the diverse units, but were willing to ascribe the *francs-tireurs* combatant status if they were wearing uniforms, carried their weapons openly, and operated under military command – according to the customs of war.<sup>120</sup> Indeed, the legal situation in 1870 was far from clear. The Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868 had only regulated the treatment of the wounded and banned certain projectiles, and harsh reactions to irregulars were commonplace in the nineteenth century.<sup>121</sup> We should also bear in mind that 'what in 1870–1871 were arguably legal reprisals would by the twentieth century be regarded as war crimes'.<sup>122</sup> Still, the German Army distinguished between the war-mongering of the Government of National Defence, the regular soldiers, the mostly-peaceful inhabitants, and the *francs-tireurs*.

The German forces were spread all over France: from Paris to the Vosges. Their main aim was to uphold the siege of Paris and suppress the newly recruited armies that operated mainly in the Loire region and near the Vosges. The Germans did not change their operational procedure considerably and the counter-measures entailed limited active elements, besides more active patrolling of railways and roads. In order to protect their lines of communication and to counter-raid the enemy, they established small 'flying columns', which chiefly resulted in unsuccessful and frustrating endeavours.<sup>123</sup> The patrolling duties put further strain on the infantry, as they often had to shield the precious (and scarce) cavalry units<sup>124</sup> or march along the railway lines.<sup>125</sup> In short, the lack of any coherent counter-insurgency strategy during the war was apparent. But had there been any need to develop one?

We repeatedly come across the number of around 100,000 Germans deployed (of over one million mobilised) in order to protect their lines of communication and rear areas for the 500,000 front line troops.<sup>126</sup> However, it was almost exclusively the *Landwehr* (i.e. second- or third-rate battalions) who secured these areas.<sup>127</sup> Any army needs to safeguard the lines of communication to secure operational freedom and supply. Accordingly, the safeguarding of railways should not *prima facie* be interpreted as a countermeasure forced upon the Germans by guerrilla activity. Further, the actual raids against railways and bridges posed no serious threat to the outcome of the war. The most successful such raid – against a bridge in Fontenoy-sur-Moselle on 22 January 1871 – destroyed its target, but it occurred very late in the war, and the bridge was fully repaired within two

weeks.<sup>128</sup> At the same time, the defence of Dijon, often depicted as a large-scale encounter, 'merely' resulted in 25 Prussian fatalities and had no strategic consequences.<sup>129</sup> Thus, it is questionable whether the actions of the *francs-tireurs* (which are difficult to separate from those of the Army of the East in general) were really 'frequent occurrences' that 'imposed crippling shortages on the Prussians'.<sup>130</sup>

Nevertheless, the German general staff did have difficulties supplying their men on foreign soil. Lothar Sukstorf even went so far as to speak of a 'German crisis' in early December, when due to a lack of supply and reserve forces, marching duties and sickness, German troops' combat-readiness was critically low, with repercussions for discipline and morale.<sup>131</sup> In some cases, German authorities allowed 'wild' food requisitioning, but the situation never spiralled out of control, not even during the harsh winter. Furthermore, Sukstorf did not attribute these difficulties to the *francs-tireurs*.

However, safeguarding supplies and controlling the territory were not the only concerns. All surviving evidence on active engagements by *francs-tireurs* mention either ambushes or fierce resistance in urban centres. At the Loire, the favourable terrain helped the newly levied troops harass the occupying forces.<sup>132</sup> Many reports speak vaguely of ambushes or single shots fired at enemy columns, which were difficult to attribute. In response such incidents, the Germans often marched to the nearest village. On 18 October 1870, German troops reached Châteaudun, a town of 6,000 inhabitants, where approximately 4,000 National Guards and *francs-tireurs*<sup>133</sup> refused to surrender and fortified houses for the defence. They repelled the first wave of attackers, after which German artillery 'prepared' the town for a second advance.<sup>134</sup> The French rallied civilians to join the battle, and the evolving fight 'made Bazeilles pale by comparison'.<sup>135</sup> While many houses burned, the fierce fighting continued throughout the night, with innocent residents also perishing.<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, there were no reprisals, and after the battle the Germans took 44 *francs-tireurs* prisoner.<sup>137</sup> Other than the number of burned houses and captured French, we have no reliable data on the number of fatally wounded.<sup>138</sup> Châteaudun was immediately used as a symbol for resistance and German brutality.<sup>139</sup> But this case also demonstrates, that even in fierce urban encounters, there were limitations to operational procedures. *Francs-tireurs* were rarely shot outright, despite the high command's gruesome rhetoric. Wartime propaganda and the post-war desirability of painting the picture of a brutal invader should not distort our view of the facts. Examples such as Bazeilles and Châteaudun were the exception: in countless towns, the mayor and other notables managed to preclude a defence.<sup>140</sup> The Bavarians, for example, behaved terribly in Orléans, but nothing comparable happened in Rouen, Nancy, Reims, Dijon or Tours. Roth has argued that the taking of tributary payments was the most common form of reprisals against

civilians,<sup>141</sup> while Mehrkens concluded that ‘a consistent procedure [*vis-à-vis* the *francs-tireurs*] cannot be demonstrated by the source material. The individual commanders decide[d] themselves on the spot, how to react to attacks and how to deal with captured national guards and *francs-tireurs*’.<sup>142</sup> Even in the rare cases where towns were burned down, the civilians had left already.<sup>143</sup> Thus, even the sporadic acts of irregular resistance did not necessarily lead to bloodshed – situational factors were the main driver for the few excessive applications of force.<sup>144</sup>

## Conclusion

The German soldiers did not adopt a ‘kill anything that moves’ policy in 1870–1871. As argued above, the Germans were placing their bets on deterrence, and resorted to demanding monetary payments. Reprisals against alleged insurgents were ‘in comparison to other wars, particularly in the twentieth century, rather mild’.<sup>145</sup> The views of the Germans in 1870–1871 were comparable to other historical examples – not least the US Civil War: the soldiers lacked counter-insurgency experience, and detested the specific nature and methods of guerrilla warfare, rather than the overall French resistance or the French people in general.<sup>146</sup> Their treatment of regular soldiers, POWs and civilians fell within the norms of war. On the other hand, the Germans held little sympathy for the irregular *francs-tireurs*. Sometimes they shot them on the spot, in other cases they were trialled and even after that often unharmed. The German forces clearly committed acts of excessive violence that would today be seen as war crimes, i.e. the killing of innocent civilians. However, based on the almost unanimous scholarly verdict, these reactions were far from exceptional or excessive, and declarations that demanded a ruthless dealing with *francs-tireurs* and enemy resistance in general should always be compared to actual deeds. There was neither a *carte blanche* nor a ‘Commissar Order’, and German soldiers could be held responsible for illegitimate acts of violence. Situational factors, such as combat stress, fears of subversion, and threats to supply, were the main reasons for excessive violence and sometimes-harsh symbolic punishments.<sup>147</sup> In this regard, the German occupation was not very different from 1813–1815, where relations had been rather cordial, and deteriorated only where a combined set of situational factors emerged.

The *Franktireurkrieg* should finally be recognised as what it was: an exaggerated myth. As Alan Forrest stated in accordance with Kanter: it ‘was an invention, a convenient alibi for failure, since in many parts of the country the call for a partisan insurrection was met with embarrassing indifference, especially among the peasantry, while agriculture was largely left undisturbed by the Prussian invasion, even in many departments that

lay directly in the invader's path'.<sup>148</sup> Rather, the idea of a spontaneous rush to the colours fitted the French revolutionary narrative and the goal of creating an image of German ruthlessness, which could be used as rallying calls in 1914 or after 1940. Yet politicised wartime propaganda – which various scholars have debunked – continues to serve as a point of reference for *longue durée* arguments about the German military.

Pieper maintained that the Germans had 'a predisposition towards unusually brutal counterinsurgency'.<sup>149</sup> However, he also cited Hull's assessment of German East Africa (1905–1907), which is backed up by Bühner's findings, and Lieb's research on Ukraine 1918, as counterexamples to German brutalisation. If we add to this the almost unanimous scholarly verdict that the Germans did not exercise extreme measures in 1870–1871, as well as the more differentiated analysis of German atrocities of 1914, the picture of an exceptional 'German Way of War' before the Second World War must be questioned. Further research has to investigate whether an alleged 'guerrillaphobia'<sup>150</sup> and 'dread of irregular warfare' was inherent or even 'endemic'<sup>151</sup> in the German Army after 1870–1871. After all, which armies do like guerrilla-wars? And why should the German military have been daunted by *cauchemars* of a phenomenon that even the French acknowledged to be a failure? Only transnational and contextualised comparisons – based on archival research, or, at least full use of available secondary literature – can provide anything resembling satisfactory answers and enhance our understanding of the German armies between 1870 and 1945.

## Notes

1. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 114.
2. Initial French reports had set the civilian death toll at 2,000 civilians: Showalter, *Wars of German Unification*, 279.
3. The term *franc-tireur* dates back to Napoleonic times and described an early form of light infantry separate from the regular army. In 1870–1871 these were mainly local volunteer units, often not fighting directly under government command. There existed a great variation and confusion in the usage of terms such as guerrilla, partisan, insurgent etc. Even today there are many hybrid forms, with the irregular character of the person in question representing the common denominator, in contrast to a regular uniformed soldier that visibly operates under a state authority and chain of command. Thus here the terms insurgent, guerrilla, partisan, and *franc-tireur* will be used interchangeably.
4. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 113, 127.
5. Gumz, "Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency," 555–9; Scheipers, "Counterinsurgency"; and Porch, *Counterinsurgency*.
6. On the 'Wehrmacht debate' see Hartmann et al, *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht*.
7. An example for such selective argumentation is Melson, "German Counterinsurgency Revisited"; now extended in Melson, *Kleinkrieg*.
8. Horne and Kramer, *German Atrocities*, 89–174.



9. Anderson, "A German Way of War?"; Horne and Kramer, "German Atrocities in the First World War: A Response"; and Anderson, "How German is it."
10. Lipkes, *Rehearsals*; Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium*; and Nelson, "Ordinary Men."
11. Kramer later embedded the German case in a wider European context: see Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction*; also Alan Kramer, "German War Crimes 1914 and 1941."
12. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 117–30. See also Hull, *A Scrap of Paper*; Messerschmidt, "Völkerrecht und 'Kriegsnotwendigkeit'."
13. Zimmerer, *Windhuk nach Auschwitz*; Madley, "From Africa to Auschwitz"; and Baranowski, *Nazi Empire*.
14. Kuß, *Deutsches Militär*; Bühner, *Die kaiserliche Schutztruppe*; and Gerwarth and Malinowski, "Der Holocaust als 'kolonialer Genozid'."
15. Liulevicius, *War Land*.
16. Lieb, "Suppressing insurgencies"; Kauffmann, *Elusive Alliance*; Becker, *Les cicatrices rouges*; and De Schaepdrijver, *Military Occupations*.
17. Münch, *Bürger in Uniform*, 182ff; and Bönker, "A German Way of War." Spraul, *Der Franktireurkrieg* has to be treated with caution; more useful is Keller, *Schuldfragen*. Yet, his findings have been met with fierce criticism; see Kramer and Horne, "Wer schießt hier aus dem Hinterhalt." A good overview on this debate is provided by Pöhlmann, "Habent sua fata libelli."
18. On the Russian invasion in Galicia, see Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland*; on East Prussia; Watson, "Unheard-of Brutality"; and on Serbia, Gumz, *Resurrection and Collapse*, 44ff.
19. Watson, *Ring of Steel*, 132.
20. Lieb, "Der deutsche Krieg im Osten."
21. The literature on the lessons the German Army drew from 1870–1871 is vast. Yet, most authors focused on the regular people's war and not on how the Germans intended to counter guerrillas; an often-overlooked exception is Potempa, "Der kleine Krieg." Potempa argued that the Germans were preoccupied by threats to their lines of communication in future conflicts, not least from irregular forces. For general debates in German military journals, see Pöhlmann, "Das unentdeckte Land," and the classic accounts, Showalter, "From Deterrence"; Förster, "Facing 'People's War'"; Foley, *German Strategy*, 14–37; and Echevarria, *After Clausewitz*.
22. Förster and Nagler, *On the Road to Total War*; for general reference, see Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*; Audoin-Rouzeau, *1870*; Roth, *La guerre*; and Gersdorff and Groote, *Entscheidung 1870*.
23. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 256; Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*; Becker, *Bilder*; and Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*.
24. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 119.
25. Hatley, "Prolonging the Inevitable."
26. Kanter, "Defeat 1871," 31ff; condensed in Kanter, "Exposing the Myth."
27. Pieper, "German Approach," 2; He upholds the same argument in Pieper, "From Fighting." See also Dirou, *La guérilla*, 121ff.
28. Stoneman, "The Bavarian Army."
29. Jones, "Fighting," 189.
30. Stone, *First Reich*, 183ff.
31. Ortholan, *L'Armée de l'Est*; and Ortholan, *L'Armée de la Loire*.
32. Goultman, *La grande défaite*.

33. Dirou, *La guérilla*, 225ff.
34. Instead, the army attempted to regain lost ground by augmenting the professionalism, discipline, and civic education of the regular forces; see Porch, *The March*, 35–7; Chanut, *Vers l'armée nouvelle*. After all, even the French 'army leaders had no faith in the conscript soldier' and the 'French people were unwilling to accept the rigors of compulsory military service', see Challenger, *The French Theory*, 5, 31–2.
35. Varley, *Under the Shadow*, 203, 205.
36. Crépin, *Défendre la France*, 331ff.
37. Forrest, *The Legacy*, 147, 157ff, 171ff.
38. Excellent in depicting the reciprocal relationship is Nolan, *The Inverted Mirror*; see also Schivelbusch, *Culture of Defeat*; and Tison, *Comment sortir*.
39. This was not the case in the late nineteenth century: in 1898, a bibliography on the war listed over 7,000 titles, see Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*, vii.
40. Heuser, "Small Wars"; Rink, "The Partisan's Metamorphosis," 27, 33. The internal suppression of the revolt in the Vendée was arguably the most brutal, see also Esdaile, *Popular Resistance*.
41. Bell, *First Total War*, 8–12, 265, 275–81.
42. Hantraye, *Les Cosaques*, 18–9.
43. Leggiere, *The Fall*, 77.
44. Hantraye, *Les Cosaques*, 27, 55, 274–5.
45. Leggiere, *The Fall*, 72–3, 76–8, cited on 77.
46. Haynes, "Remembering," 540.
47. Jeismann, *Das Vaterland*, 76ff.
48. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 145ff.
49. Clark, "The Wars," 560–5.
50. Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks*, 2, 70.
51. After the Franco-Prussian War, the French and German approach to internal policing greatly varied and the Prussian Army was far less involved: see Johansen, *Soldiers as Police*. It would be interesting to compare the Prussian case – in 1848, but also later – to other armies. The Italian Army, for example, was deployed to a far greater extent against domestic uprisings in the late nineteenth century, see Gooch, *Italian Army*, 12–3.
52. Hahlweg, *Guerilla*, 66–7.
53. *Ibid.*, 62ff. See also Daase and Davis, *Clausewitz on Small War*. Yet, one has to remember that Clausewitz's star only began to rise during the German Wars of Unification and his writings on small wars were not at the forefront of attraction.
54. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies*, 31, 35; Heuser, *The Evolution*, 398, 405; Rid, "The Nineteenth Century"; Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey"; and Beccaro, "Carlo Bianco and *Guerra per bande*."
55. Nabulsi, *Traditions of War*, 21–2.
56. Dirou overlooks these differences, see Dirou, *La guerrilla*, 155–88.
57. On 1866 and the pre-history to 1870 see, Wetzler, *Duel of Nations*; Showalter, *Wars of German Unification*, 123–200; and Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 20–40.
58. Showalter, *Wars of German Unification*, 216ff.
59. For a detailed operational account, see Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 85–229.
60. Sukstorf, *Problematik der Logistik*, 2.
61. On the French high command's problems, see Porch, *The March*, 45ff.

62. Gambetta's motifs and the Government of National Defence are described vividly in Mayeur, *Léon Gambetta*.
63. For an in depth description, see Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 257–98.
64. Roth, *La guerre*, 67–8.
65. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 97.
66. Hatley, "Prolonging the Inevitable," 152–6. Many such atrocity stories were quickly corrected.
67. Forbes, *My Experiences*, vol. II, 63–4, 262.
68. Porch, *The March*, 34.
69. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 300, 302; and Stoneman, *Bavarian Army*, 283. For example, the cases of sexual violence were very low, as the German armies maintained a strong civilian behavioural code, see Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 173.
70. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 353.
71. Rindfleisch, *Feldbriefe*, 28, 109–12. Indeed the French at times used civilians for intelligence, Foudras, *Les Francs-Tireurs*, 67–8.
72. Lassberg, *Mein Kriegstagebuch*, 155. After the Germans were shot at in Châteauneuf, they took the mayor prisoner and threatened to burn the village if more attacks took place, which ended hostilities, Foudras, *Les Francs-Tireurs*, 44.
73. Nabulsi, *Traditions*, 34–6. More problematic was the placing of hostages on trains or using them as shields during reconnaissance missions, where they were exposed to greater dangers: see Cardinal, *Deutsch-Französischer Krieg*, vol. II, 170.
74. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 188, 195–6.
75. Rohkrämer, "Daily life," 504.
76. Over this timespan the Germans lost several hundreds to counter-battery fire and French mortality from diseases was around 4,000. Also in this case, 'most of the population remained as spectators' during the battle for Paris – before the massacres – the *Versillais* lost 'merely' 1,500 men, see Tombs, *The War*, 162.
77. Roth, "Occupation et liberation," 316–7.
78. Stoneman, *Bavarian Army*, 291. It would be interesting to investigate the Bavarian example further, as the French had been their traditional ally.
79. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 138.
80. Michael Howard described such phenomena as a 'professionalization restraint' between regular soldiers, in contrast to the treatment of rebels: see Howard, "Constraints on War."
81. There were rumours about the alleged 'brutal nature' of French colonial soldiers, which led to often-brutal behaviour towards them, Becker, *Bilder*, 153–7.
82. Botzenhart, "French Prisoners," 590. Those who died in captivity included soldiers that had been wounded on the battlefield.
83. Ortholan, *L'Armée de l'Est*, 199–00.
84. On both sides the mortality rate hit double digits, while many myths about deliberate neglect have been debunked: see Gillispie, *Andersonvilles of the North*. There are apparent differences between the conflicts, however, which must not be overlooked, see Degler, "The American Civil War."
85. Botzenhart, "French prisoners," 588.
86. Hatley, "Prolonging the Inevitable," 136.
87. *Ibid.*, 124.
88. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 428; and Bizzoni, *Impressioni*, 144.
89. Rohkrämer, "Daily life," 500. Here I am also referring to the findings of Tony Ashworth on similar behaviour in the First World War.

90. Detailed in Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 129–35.
91. Some groups existed already before the campaign, drawing from members of shooting clubs, Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*, 249–50.
92. Forrest, *The Legacy*, 127. In general, the urban population seemed more anti-German than that in the countryside – Roth, *La guerre*, 152 – and war enthusiasm varied greatly between urban and rural centres, Audoin-Rouzeau, *1870*, 216, 239.
93. Mainly in the North, East, and along the northern parts of the Loire.
94. Tombs, *The War against Paris*, 2; Audoin Rouzeau, *1870*, 187.
95. Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*, 252.
96. Wolowski, *Campagne*, 70–1; in comparison to the official statistics provided in Löhlein, *Feldzug*, 319.
97. Audoin-Rouzeau, *1870*, 198.
98. With an additional ‘1,132 in the Ardennes, for instance, 1,165 in the Gironde, 1,250 in the Indre-et-Loire, 1,823 in the Bouches-du-Rhône, 2,807 in the Seine-inférieure, 3,325 in the Nord’, Forrest, *The Legacy*, 126.
99. Dirou, *La guérilla*, 20.
100. See the classic argument on the distance between government and rural population in Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*. Yet, Weber’s arguments have also been qualified in recent years, see Ford, “Peasants into Frenchmen.”
101. Roth, *La guerre*, 344; and Audoin-Rouzeau, *1870*, 253–5.
102. Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*, 252–3.
103. The anti-republican General Charles-Denis Bourbaki (1816–1897) struggled immensely to uphold combat morale, see Meier-Welcker, “Der Kampf mit der Republik,” 117. See also Bizzoni, *Impressioni*, 210–13; and Foudras, *Les Francs-Tireurs*, 19, 35–8.
104. Kanter, “Defeat 1871,” 184–5.
105. Kanter, “Exposing the Myth,” 15.
106. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 312, 314.
107. Etschmann, “Guerillas und Franc-tireurs,” 40.
108. Roth, *La guerre*, 507–8. Roth did not provide any sources for his numbers, but his account is the most detailed. He also added that the sieges were particularly bloody for the regular armies as well, particularly due to diseases, see *ibid.*, 509.
109. Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*, 453; Roth, *La guerre*, 508. In 1866, the rapid-firing Prussians had ‘consistently killed, wounded, or captured five Austrian soldiers for every casualty of their own’, Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 51, 307; thus these numbers hint at the possibility of the French regular army to inflict severe casualties.
110. Engel, *Die Verluste der deutschen Armeen*, 282.
111. The battle of Beaune-la-Rolande on 28 November 1870 is just one example: 9,000 Germans successfully repulsed repeated attacks by 60,000 Frenchmen, at the cost of – both dead and wounded – 850 casualties to 8,000, see Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 271–4; and Porch, *The March*, 10.
112. Förster, *Moltke*, 227, 230.
113. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 130–2.
114. Roth, *La guerre*, 61, 136–7.
115. Rohkrämer, “Daily life,” 509.
116. Loch and Vette, *Friedrich Clauson von Kaas*, 176. The Prussian officer Kaas received reports of several hundred executed Frenchmen, but was never able to verify the

stories of the boastful Bavarian cavalry: see *Ibid.*, 136. However, it would sustain Stoneman's argument of a special predisposition of the Bavarian cavalry. Yet it is questionable if this was a cultural phenomenon or the situational aspect of cavalry reconnaissance and a peculiar unit culture. Christoph Hertner (University of Bern) is currently researching this field.

117. Stoneman, *Bavarian Army*, 276.
118. Cardinal, *Deutsch-Französischer Krieg*, vol. V, 72–3.
119. As done, e.g. in Dirou, *La guérilla*, 236ff.
120. Howard, *Franco-Prussian War*, 208, 378–1.
121. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 25–39; Toppe, *Militär und Kriegsvölkerrecht*, 86; and Best, *Humanity in Warfare*.
122. Tombs, "The Wars against Paris," 562.
123. It seems that the Germans seldom attempted night attacks at the *francs-tireurs* in their strongholds, see Bizzoni, *Impressioni*, 266.
124. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 316.
125. The cavalry's dealings with *francs-tireurs* and their own unit culture would deserve an independent study.
126. Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 288–9. The exact displacement of forces and orders for rear duties would also represent a desirable subject of future research.
127. Roth, *La guerre*, 384.
128. Cardinal, *Deutsch-Französischer Krieg*, vol. IV, part 2, 247–99, for the most detailed account. According to Wawro – who cited Horne and Kramer – the Prussians went on a 'killing spree' in the village, 'spearing the inhabitants with their bayonets and heaving them into the flames', see Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 279. Horne and Kramer's source is a French study from 1902; see Horne and Kramer, *German Atrocities*, 142, 489. Other reports spoke of monetary contributions only: see Roth, *La guerre*, 409.
129. Molis, *Les Francs-Tireurs*, 175–9. Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882) had rallied volunteers to fight for the French cause, but relations with General Bourbaki and civilians were not always harmonious, see Ortholan, *L'Armée de l'Est*, 39ff.
130. Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 289; and Ortholan, *L'Armée de l'Est*, 215.
131. Sukstorf, *Problematik der Logistik*, 383, 391, 398–9; and Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 286–7.
132. Showalter, *Wars of German Unification*, 295.
133. The exceptionally capable and well-armed formation under the leadership of Ernest de Lipowski, see Tanera, *An der Loire*, 40.
134. Berlit, *Vor Paris*, 38.
135. Showalter, *Wars of German Unification*, 297. Contemporaries also compared it to Bazeilles, see Tanera, *An der Loire*, 49.
136. In the heat of battle, the irregular units also shot at French marines who lost 38 men in friendly fire incidents, as they were mistaken for Germans due to their blue uniforms: see Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 264–5.
137. Schneider, "Der Krieg in französischer Sicht," 195.
138. Large parts of the town burned down, yet German accounts claiming that wind was the driving factor may have some element of truth, as only the eastern parts of the town burned down; see Hatley, "Prolonging the Inevitable," 173.
139. Even a street in Paris was named after it, see Favre, *The Government*, 216ff.

140. Audoin-Rouzeau, *1870*, 214–5; Hoenig, *Der Volkskrieg*, vol. I, 182ff. Especially the mayors were vital in protecting the needs of the population and assuring a system of collaboration with the German occupiers, see Parisot, “De la négociation.”
141. Roth, *La guerre*, 373, 376.
142. Mehrkens, *Statuswechsel*, 141.
143. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 319. When a Saxon officer was killed near Beauvais the town had to pay 400,000 francs (around \$40,000 today) as compensation, whereas Héricourt was burned down after an ambush, see Wawro, *Franco-Prussian War*, 238.
144. Rohkrämer, “Daily life,” 511–3. He also argued that it was far from developing into a ‘total war’.
145. Kühlich, *Die Deutschen Soldaten*, 317.
146. Becker, *Bilder*, 225.
147. Hantraye, *Les Cosaques*, 26, 31, 273.
148. Forrest, *The Legacy*, 127.
149. Pieper, “German Approach,” 2.
150. *Ibid.*, 9.
151. Chickering, *Imperial Germany*, 84.

## Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

## Notes on contributor

*Bastian Matteo Scianna* is Assistant Professor at the Department of History at the University of Potsdam. In 2018-2019 he is the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Fellow of Modern European History at the London School of Economics (LSE). His PhD, entitled ‘The Italian War on the Eastern Front (1941-1943) and Its Legacy. Myths and Memories’ will be published with Palgrave Macmillan this year.

## Bibliography

- Anderson, Margaret L. “A German Way of War?” *German History* 22, no. 2 (2004): 254–258. doi:10.1191/0266355404gh302xx.
- Anderson, Margaret Lavinia. “How German Is It?” *German History* 24, no. 1 (2006): 122–126. doi:10.1191/0266355406gh369xx.
- Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane. *1870: La France Dans La Guerre*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1989.
- Baranowski, Shelley. *Nazi Empire. German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Beccaro, Andrea. “Carlo Bianco and *Guerra per Bande: An Italian Approach to Irregular Warfare*.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 1 (2016): 154–178. doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1122924.
- Becker, Annette. *Les Cicatrices Rouges, 14–18: France Et Belgique Occupées*. Paris: Fayard, 2010.

- Becker, Frank. *Bilder Von Krieg Und Nation: Die Einigungskriege in Der Bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit Deutschlands, 1864–1913*. Munich: De Gruyter, 2001.
- Beckett, Ian. *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerillas and Their Opponents since 1750*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Bell, David. *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare as We Know It*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.
- Berlit, Bruno, ed. *Vor Paris Und an Der Loire 1870 Und 1871. Feldpostbriefe*. Kassel: Fischer, 1872.
- Best, Geoffrey. *Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of International Law of Armed Conflicts*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1980.
- Bizzoni, Achille Antonio. *Impressioni Di Un Volontario All'esercito Dei Vosgi*. Milan: Sonzogno, 1874.
- Bönker, Dirk. "A German Way of War? Narratives of German Militarism and Maritime Warfare in World War I." In *Imperial Germany Revisited. Continuing Debates and New Perspectives*, edited by Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp, 227–238. Oxford: Berghahn, 2011.
- Botzenhart, Manfred. "French Prisoners of War in Germany, 1870–71." In *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871*, edited by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, 587–595. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Bührer, Tanja. *Die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe Für Ostafrika. Koloniale Sicherheitspolitik Und Transkulturelle Kriegführung 1885–1918*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011.
- Cardinal von Widdern, Georg. *Deutsch-Französischer Krieg 1870–71. Der Krieg an Den Rückwärtigen Verbindungen Der Deutschen Heere*. Vol. 6. Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1893–1899.
- Challener, Richard D. *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms 1866–1939*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1955.
- Chanet, Jean-François. *Vers L'armée Nouvelle. République Conservatrice Et Réforme Militaire, 1871–1879*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2006.
- Chickering, Roger. *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Clark, Christopher. "The Wars of Liberation in Prussian Memory: Reflections on the Memorialization of War in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany." *The Journal of Modern History* 68, no. 3 (1996): 550–576. doi:[10.1086/245342](https://doi.org/10.1086/245342).
- Crépin, Annie. *Défendre La France. Les Français, La Guerre E Le Service Militaire, De La Guerre De Sept Ans À Verdun*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2005.
- Daase, Christopher, and James W. Davis, eds. *Clausewitz on Small War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- De Schaepdrijver, Sophie, ed. *Military Occupations in First World War Europe*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2015.
- Degler, Carl N. "The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification: The Problem of Comparison." In *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871*, edited by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, 53–71. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Dietrich von, Lassberg. *Mein Kriegstagebuch Aus Dem Deutsch-französischen Kriege 1870/71*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1906.
- Dirou, Armel. *La Guérilla En 1870. Résistance Et Terreur*. Paris: Bernard Giovanangeli, 2014.
- Echevarria, Antulio J. *After Clausewitz. German Military Thinkers before the Great War*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

- Engel, Ernst. *Die Verluste Der Deutschen Armeen an Offizieren Und Mannschaften Im Kriege Gegen Frankreich 1870 Und 1871*. Berlin: Verlag des Königlichen Statistischen Bureaus, 1872.
- Esdaille, Charles, ed. *Popular Resistance in the French Wars: Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Etschmann, Wolfgang. "Guerillas Und Franc-tireurs, 1866 Und 1870." In *Freund Oder Feind?: Kombattanten, Nichtkombattanten Und Zivilisten in Krieg Und Bürgerkrieg Seit Dem 18. Jahrhundert*, edited by Erwin Schmidl, 31–44. Frankfurt: Lang, 1995.
- Favre, Jules. *The Government of the National Defence: From the 30th of June to the 31st of October 1870*. London: King, 1873.
- Foley, Robert. *German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich Von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Forbes, Archibald. *My Experiences of the War between France and Germany*. Vol. 2. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1871.
- Ford, Caroline. "Peasants Into Frenchmen Thirty Years After." *French Politics, Culture & Society* 27, no. 2 (2009): 84–93. doi:[10.3167/fpcs.2009.270205](https://doi.org/10.3167/fpcs.2009.270205).
- Forrest, Alan. *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars. The Nation-In-Arms in French Republican Memory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Förster, Stig. "Facing 'people's War': Moltke the Elder and Germany's Military Options after 1871." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10, no. 2 (1987): 209–230. doi:[10.1080/01402398708437297](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398708437297).
- Förster, Stig, ed. *Moltke: Von Kabinettskrieg Zum Volkskrieg: Eine Werkauswahl*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1992.
- Foudras, Théodorit. *Les Francs-Tireurs De La Sarthe, Journal D'un Commandant*. Chalon-sur-Saone: Mulcey, 1872.
- Frevort, Ute. *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*. Oxford: Berg, 2004.
- Gerwarth, Robert, and Stephan Malinowski. "Der Holocaust Als 'kolonialer Genozid'? Europäische Kolonialgewalt Und Nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungskrieg." *Geschichte Und Gesellschaft* 33 (2007): 439–466. doi:[10.13109/gege.2007.33.3.439](https://doi.org/10.13109/gege.2007.33.3.439).
- Gillispie, James M. *Andersonvilles of the North. The Myths and Realities of Northern Treatment of Civil War Confederate Prisoners*. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2008.
- Gooch, John. *The Italian Army and the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Goultman, Alain. *La Grande Défaite 1870–1871*. Paris: Perrin, 2015.
- Gumz, Jonathan. "Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency: How the Professional Military Literature Created a New History and Missed the Past." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 4 (2009): 553–588. doi:[10.1080/01402390902986972](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390902986972).
- Gumz, Jonathan. *The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Hahlweg, Werner. *Guerilla. Krieg Ohne Fronten*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968.
- Hantraye, Jacques. *Les Cosaques Aux Champs-Elysées: L'occupation De La France Après La Chute De Napoléon*. Paris: Belin, 2005.
- Hartmann, Christian, Johannes Hürter, and Ulrike Jureit, eds. *Verbrechen Der Wehrmacht. Bilanz Einer Debatte*. Munich: Beck, 2005.
- Hatley, Paul. "Prolonging the Inevitable: The Franc-Tireur and the German Army in the Franco-German War of 1870–1871." PhD diss., Kansas State University, 1997.



- Haynes, Christine. "Remembering and Forgetting the First Modern Occupations of France." *Journal of Modern History* 88, no. 3 (2016): 535–571. doi:10.1086/687527.
- Heuser, Beatrice. "Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed between Partisan War and People's War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 1 (2010): 139–162. doi:10.1080/01402391003603623.
- Heuser, Beatrice. *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Hoenig, Fritz. *Der Volkskrieg an Der Loire Im Herbst 1870*. Vol. 6. Berlin: Mittler, 1893–1897.
- Horne, John, and Alan Kramer. *German Atrocities 1914. A History of Denial*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Horne, John, and Alan Kramer. "German Atrocities in the First World War: A Response." *German History* 24, no. 1 (2006): 118–121. doi:10.1191/0266355406gh367xx.
- Howard, Michael. *The Franco-Prussian War*. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Howard, Michael. "Constraints on War." In *Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, edited by Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, 1–11. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Hull, Isabel. *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Hull, Isabel. *A Scrap of Paper. Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
- Jeismann, Michael. *Das Vaterland Der Feinde: Studien Zum Nationalen Feindbegriff Und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland Und Frankreich 1792–1918*. Stuttgart: DVA, 1992.
- Johansen, Anja. *Soldiers as Police. The French and Prussian Armies and the Policing of Popular Protest, 1889–1914*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
- Jones, Marcus. "Fighting 'this Nation of Liars to the Very End': The German Army in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870–1871." In *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*, edited by Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, 171–198. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Kanter, Sanford. "Defeat 1871: A Study in 'after-war.'" PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1972.
- Kanter, Sanford. "Exposing the Myth of the Franco-Prussian War." *War & Society* 4, no. 1 (1986): 13–30. doi:10.1179/106980486790303871.
- Kauffmann, Jesse. *Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War I*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2015.
- Keller, Ulrich. *Schuldfragen. Belgischer Untergrundkrieg Und Deutsche Vergeltung Im August 1914*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2017.
- Kramer, Alan. *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Kramer, Alan. "German War Crimes 1914 and 1941. The Question of Continuity." In *Imperial Germany Revisited. Continuing Debates and New Perspectives*, edited by Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp, 239–250. Oxford: Berghahn, 2011.
- Kramer, Alan, and John Horne. 2012. "Wer Schiesst Hier Aus Dem Hinterhalt?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 1, 2018. <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/massaker-in-belgien-im-ersten-weltkrieg-15472194.html>
- Kühlich, Frank. *Die Deutschen Soldaten Im Krieg Von 1870/71: Eine Darstellung Der Situation Und Der Erfahrungen Der Deutschen Soldaten Im Deutsch- Französischen Krieg*. Frankfurt: Lang, 1995.

- Kuß, Susanne. *Deutsches Militär Auf Kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen. Eskalation Von Gewalt Zu Beginn Des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Berlin: Links, 2010.
- Leggiere, Michael V. *The Fall of Napoleon. Volume I. The Allied Invasion of France, 1813–1814*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Lieb, Peter. "Suppressing Insurgencies in Comparison: The Germans in the Ukraine, 1918, and the British in Mesopotamia, 1920." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 4–5 (2012): 627–647. doi:[10.1080/09592318.2012.709765](https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2012.709765).
- Lieb, Peter. "Der Deutsche Krieg Im Osten Von 1914–1919. Ein Vorläufer Des Vernichtungskriegs?" *Vierteljahreshefte Für Zeitgeschichte* 65, no. 4 (2017): 465–506. doi:[10.1515/vfzg-2017-0029](https://doi.org/10.1515/vfzg-2017-0029).
- Lipkes, Jeff. *Rehearsals. The German Army in Belgium, August 1914*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007.
- Liulevicius, Vejas. *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Loch, Thorsten, and Markus Vette, eds. *Friedrich Clauson Von Kaas. "potsdam Ist Geschlagen". Briefe Aus Dem Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 1870/71*. Freiburg: Rombach, 2016.
- Löhlein, Ludwig. *Feldzug 1870–71. Die Operationen Des Korps Des Generals Von Werder*. Berlin: Mittler, 1874.
- Madley, Benjamin. "From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Included Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe." *European History Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (2005): 429–464. doi:[10.1177/0265691405054218](https://doi.org/10.1177/0265691405054218).
- Mayeur, Jean-Marie. *Léon Gambetta. La Patrie E La République*. Paris: Fayard, 2008.
- Mehrkens, Heidi. *Statuswechsel: Kriegserfahrung Und Nationale Wahrnehmung Im Deutsch-Französischen Krieg 1870/71*. Essen: Klartext, 2008.
- Meier-Welcker, Hans. "Der Kampf Mit Der Republik." In *Entscheidung 1870. Der Deutsch-Französische Krieg*, edited by Ursula von Gersdorff and Wolfgang von Groote, 105–164. Stuttgart: DVA, 1970.
- Melson, Charles D. "German Counterinsurgency Revisited." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14, no. 1 (2011): 1–33.
- Melson, Charles D. *Kleinkrieg: The German Experience with Guerrilla Warfare, from Clausewitz to Hitler*. Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2016.
- Messerschmidt, Manfred. "Völkerrecht Und "kriegsnotwendigkeit" in Der Deutschen Militärischen Tradition Seit Den Einigungskriegen." *German Studies Review* 6, no. 2 (1983): 237–269. doi:[10.2307/1428529](https://doi.org/10.2307/1428529).
- Molis, Robert. *Les Francs-Tireurs Et Les Garibaldi. Soldats De La République 1870– 1871 En Bourgogne*. Paris: Tirésias, 1995.
- Münch, Philipp. *Bürger in Uniform. Kriegserfahrungen Von Hamburger Turnern 1914 Bis 1918*. Freiburg: Rombach, 2009.
- Nabulsi, Karma. *Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Nelson, Robert L. "Ordinary Men' in the First World War? German Soldiers as Victims and Participants." *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, no. 3 (2004): 425–435. doi:[10.1177/0022009404044448](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009404044448).
- Nolan, Michael E. *The Inverted Mirror: Mythologizing the Enemy in France and Germany, 1898–1914*. New York, NY: Berghahn, 2005.
- Ortholan, Henri. *L'Armée De La Loire, 1870–1871*. Paris: Bernard Giovanangeli, 2005.
- Ortholan, Henri. *L'Armée De l'Est 1870–1871*. Paris: Bernard Giovanangeli, 2009.

- Parisot, Guillaume. "De La Négociation Comme Instrument D'occupation Pacifiée Et D'exploitation Économique Efficace Pendant La Guerre De 1870–1871." In *Le Temps Des Hommes Doubles: Les Arrangements Face À L'occupation, De La Révolution Française À La Guerre De 1870*, edited by Jean-François Chanet, Annie Crépin, and Christian Windler, 279–302. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013.
- Pieper, Henning. "The German Approach to Counterinsurgency in the Second World War." *The International History Review* 37, no. 3 (2014): 1–12.
- Pieper, Henning. "From Fighting 'francs-tireurs' to Genocide: German Counterinsurgency in the Second World War." In *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies. National Styles and Strategic Cultures*, edited by Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir, 149–167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Pöhlmann, Markus. "Das Unentdeckte Land. Kriegsbild Und Zukunftskrieg in Deutschen Militärzeitschriften." In *Vor Dem Sprung Ins Dunkle. Die Militärische Debatte Über Den Krieg Der Zukunft 1880–1914*, edited by Stig Förster, 21–131. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016.
- Pöhlmann, Markus. "Habent Sua Fata Libelli. Zur Auseinandersetzung Um Das Buch 'german Atrocities 1914.'" Portal Arbeitskreis Militärgeschichte. Accessed November 20, 2018. [http://portal-militaergeschichte.de/http%3A//portal-militaergeschichte.de/poehlmann\\_habent](http://portal-militaergeschichte.de/http%3A//portal-militaergeschichte.de/poehlmann_habent)
- Porch, Douglas. *The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Porch, Douglas. "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, 376–407. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Porch, Douglas. *Counterinsurgency. Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Potempa, Harald. "Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2010. Die Grenzen Des Militärischen." In *Der Kleine Krieg in Der Deutschen Militäropublizistik: Das Militär- Wochenblatt 1871–1900*, edited by R. Hammerich Helmut, Uwe Hartmann, and Claus von Rosen, 134–151. Berlin: Mises, 2010.
- Prusin, Alexander V. *Nationalizing a Borderland: War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2005.
- Rid, Thomas. "The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counter-insurgency Doctrine." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 5 (2010): 727–758. doi:10.1080/01402390.2010.498259.
- Rindfleisch, Georg Heinrich. *Feldbriefe 1870–71*. Göttingen: V&R, 1891.
- Rink, Martin. "The Partisan's Metamorphosis: From Freelance Military Entrepreneur to German Freedom Fighter, 1740 to 1815." *War in History* 17, no. 1 (2010): 6–36. doi:10.1177/0968344509348291.
- Rohkrämer, Thomas. "Daily Life at the Front and the Concept of Total War." In *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871*, edited by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, 497–518. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Roth, François. "Occupation Et Libération Des Départments Lorrains." In *La Guerre De 1870/71 Et Ses Conséquences: Actes Du XX<sup>e</sup> Colloque Historique Franco- Allemand Organisé À Paris 1984–1985*, edited by Philippe Levillain and Rainer Riemenschneider, 313–317. Bonn: Bouvier, 1990.
- Roth, François. *La Guerre De 1870*. Paris: Fayard, 1990.

- Scheipers, Sibylle. "Counterinsurgency or Irregular Warfare? Historiography and the Study of 'small Wars'." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 5–6 (2014): 879–899. doi:10.1080/09592318.2014.945281.
- Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. *The Culture of Defeat. On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery*. London: Granta, 2003.
- Schneider, Fernand Thiébaud. "Der Krieg in Französischer Sicht." In *Entscheidung 1870. Der Deutsch-Französische Krieg*, edited by Ursula von Gersdorff and Wolfgang von Groote, 165–203. Stuttgart: DVA, 1970.
- Showalter, Dennis. "From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890–1914." *Journal of Military History* 64, no. 3 (2000): 679–710. doi:10.2307/120865.
- Showalter, Dennis. *The Wars of German Unification*. London: Bloomsbury, 2004.
- Spraul, Gunter. *Der Franktireurkrieg 1914*. Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2016.
- Stone, David. J. A. 'First Reich'. *Inside the German Army during the War with France 1870–71*. London: Brassey's, 2002.
- Stoneman, Mark. "The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in the War of 1870– 1871: A Cultural Interpretation." *War in History* 8, no. 3 (2001): 271–293. doi:10.1177/096834450100800302.
- Sukstorf, Lothar. *Die Problematik Der Logistik Im Deutschen Heer Während Des Deutsch-Französischen Krieges, 1870/71*. Frankfurt: Lang, 1994.
- Tanera, Carl. *An Der Loire Und Sarthe*. Munich: Beck, 1906.
- Tison, Stéphane. *Comment Sortir De La Guerre? Deuil, Mémoire Et Traumatisme (1870–1940)*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011.
- Tombs, Robert. *The War against Paris 1871*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Tombs, Robert. "The Wars against Paris." In *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871*, edited by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, 541–564. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Toppe, Andreas. *Militär Und Kriegsvölkerrecht: Rechtsnorm, Fachdiskurs Und Kriegspraxis in Deutschland 1899–1940*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008.
- Varley, Karine. *Under the Shadow of Defeat. The War of 1870–71 in French Memory*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Watson, Alexander. "'Unheard-of Brutality' Russian Atrocities against Civilians in East Prussia, 1914–1915." *Journal of Modern History* 86, no. 4 (2014): 780–825. doi:10.1086/678919.
- Wawro, Geoffrey. *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Wetzel, David. *A Duel of Nations. Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870–1871*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
- Wolowski, Ladislav. *Campagne De 1870–71. Corps Franc Des Vosges (armée De L'est). Souvenirs*. Paris: Chamuel, 1871.
- Zimmerer, Jürgen. *Von Windhuk Nach Auschwitz. Beiträge Zum Verhältnis Von Kolonialismus Und Holocaust*. Münster: LIT, 2007.
- Zuckerman, Larry. *The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I*. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2004.