

Makreeta Lahti  
PhD dissertation  
University of Potsdam  
Department of Economics  
and Social Science  
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Security Cooperation as a Way to Stop the  
Spread of Nuclear Weapons? Nuclear  
Nonproliferation Policies of the United  
States towards the Federal Republic of  
Germany and Israel, 1945-1968

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*To my parents, Marja Hirvisalo-Lahti and Tapio Lahti*

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## 1 Introduction

Civilian nuclear development, when it includes (even relatively small) facilities for uranium enrichment or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, can give any state a capability to produce the material required for nuclear weapons. Some states have intentionally acquired such capabilities to get the option to produce nuclear weapons within a relatively short time; for others, such *latent* weapon production capabilities have been a more or less welcome by-product of civilian nuclear development. For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has acquired such latent capabilities but not used the option to produce nuclear weapons, whereas Israel has both intentionally acquired and used the option but not clearly admitted that in public. As many states have latent capabilities, the risk exists of a wide spread of nuclear weapons in case their security situation worsens.

The overlaps in civilian and military nuclear development have posed a dilemma to the United States (US) regarding whether to give other states assistance – reactor technology and data and nuclear materials – in the civilian nuclear field. On the one hand, in case it refused to do so, others were likely to pursue nuclear development fully independently, implying no outside control on their efforts, or with other major powers, implying losses from US perspective regarding other states' foreign policy orientation. On the other hand, US help to others could lead to a spread of capabilities for weapon production, though the US tried to limit this effect by demanding safeguards and rights to buy back spent nuclear fuel and by promoting such nuclear reactor types that give no good basis for weapon material production. US nonproliferation policies have varied over time and from case to case: for instance, the US has given help for the British nuclear weapon program, whereas in 2002-03 President G. Bush justified the war against Iraq with alleged Iraqi aims and efforts to produce nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

This is a study of the policies of the United States government (USG; I use this term for the sake of convenience to refer to the executive branch of the US government, i.e., the president and his administration) in the field of nonproliferation during the terms of Presidents H. S. Truman, D. D. Eisenhower, J. F. Kennedy, and L. B. Johnson, with focus on two cases: the FRG and Israel. Both states posed a risk of nuclear proliferation in the 1950s and 1960s but with differing results. On the one hand, the US undertook far-going security cooperation with the FRG in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the FRG has not developed nuclear weapons of its own, which makes it an anomaly as a major power ultimately dependent on others for security. On the other hand, despite other kinds of US support for Israel, no formal US-Israel alliance exists, and Israel has acquired nuclear weapons. Since the general impression is that the US did not prevent it from or

punish it for doing so, Israel's case is an important reason why the US is often blamed of double standards on nonproliferation<sup>1</sup>.

These two cases give rise to several important questions. Why and how did the US nonproliferation policies differ? How can security cooperation affect proliferation prospects and be used as a nonproliferation policy? Does the case of the FRG demonstrate successful US nonproliferation policies? Does Israel's case demonstrate US incapability or lack of will to prevent proliferation?

Though numerous factors affect different foreign (in this case nonproliferation) policy situations, I expect some factors to affect all such situations and thus help explain policy choices in general. Little theoretical understanding exists about the determinants of nonproliferation policies. I analyze considerations of national security as possible explanations for the policies and focus on the role of different kinds of security assistance as nonproliferation policies. In doing so, I use insights of both the Structural Realist (SR) and the Rational Institutionalist (RI) theories of International Relations (IR). Though the two theories are often portrayed as competing, I argue that it is useful to use a combination of them to explain, respectively, important foreign policy *goals* and the basic *orientation* of policies, on the one hand, and the practical *workings* of security cooperation and its effects on states' behavior, on the other hand. Doing so allows moving beyond the dispute over whether some cases of international (non-)cooperation are in line with either theory into considering *when* states are prepared to cooperate and institutions can help them do so. Moreover, I consider US-Israel and US-FRG relations in the light of bargaining theory to explain the level of USG ability press other states to its preferred courses of action.

My study is thus a combination of theory proposing and testing and of historic description and explanation<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, it has a policy-relevant dimension as I aim at general lessons regarding the use of security cooperation as a nonproliferation policy.<sup>3</sup>

This study provides evidence that to avoid conflict in the central Cold War arena of Europe and to be able to protect own security through NATO both in terms of military power and by keeping Western European states in its sphere of influence, the USG wanted to keep the FRG from acquiring nuclear weapons: its doing so could have led to a crisis with Moscow and disrupted NATO. At the same time, to keep the FRG on its side of the Cold War divide, the USG had to ensure the security of that state. Through various institutionalized mechanisms, it succeeded to make the protection it offered seem trustworthy enough to keep the FRG as a relatively satisfied client with no own nuclear weapons – though the FRG did maintain the *option* to produce nuclear weapons.

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<sup>1</sup> For instance a simple Google-search provides a very long list of articles where such claims are made, recently especially related to the dispute over Iranian nuclear activities. Even the *Wikipedia* article on the concept of double standard mentions the US stance in the Israeli nuclear issue as an example.

<sup>2</sup> In doing so, I combine the approaches of historians and political scientists, as for instance George 1979 (p. 44) and Van Evera 1997 (p. 75) encourage political scientists to do.

<sup>3</sup> On different "missions" for PhD dissertations, see Van Evera 1997 pp. 89-95.

The USG likewise opposed Israel's nuclear weapon ambitions, because of Arabs', especially Egypt's, expected reactions of either following suit or siding with Moscow. The result would have been greater tension in the volatile area, a worse balance-of-power from US perspective, and, increased risk of escalation into a US-Soviet confrontation in regional crises. But also a US-Israel alliance would have pushed Arabs closer to Moscow, and thus the US was not prepared to tie one. Moreover, the USG wanted to remain able to interfere in any Arab-Israel hostilities on either side's behalf. As it refused to guarantee Israel's security in a formal, credible way with its nuclear deterrent, it was unable to persuade Israel to forgo producing nuclear weapons. But gradually, an opaque nuclear status for Israel, plus US arms sales (albeit, during the time studied, each time on a one-off basis) that helped Israel maintain its conventional military advantage over the Arabs, emerged as a compromise between the USG and Israel. Important regarding the feasibility of this solution was 1) that the USG both strongly pressed Israel for restraint in the nuclear field and came to show through arms supply that it would ensure Israel's ability to respond to most key threats with conventional weapons and 2) that Arabs and the world in general did not react strongly to Israel's nuclear weapon ambitions as long as these were ambiguous; including that Moscow did not react by giving nuclear weapons to Arabs.

Because Israel and the FRG had also other options than cooperation with the US, and because the USG had limited chances to punish them if they did not act as it wanted, these much weaker states were able to offer resistance when the superpower pressed its nonproliferation stance on them. The FRG had a very vulnerable position between the West and the East blocks and was both dependent on its allies' military support and restricted from unilateral moves by their troops on its soil; but at the same time, the USG felt a need to treat West Germans well to prevent revanchism and neutralistic tendencies among them. Israel depended on American economic and political support, but for domestic political reasons the USG could not credibly threaten it with a major cut-down of these. Israel had a feasible unilateral military option in the form of a national nuclear force, but the FRG did not, as other powerful states were very wary of Bonn's moves and very likely to react strongly if the FRG pursued nuclear weapons.

Several reasons existed for this kind of a study. Scholarly research does not satisfactorily cover all aspects of nuclear proliferation: especially linkages among nuclear proliferation, security, and alliances and security guarantees have been identified as issues where further study is needed<sup>4</sup>. The determinants of US nonproliferation policy choices have received little theoretical attention. Many historical studies consider particular situations or shorter time periods, which tends to be good for finding out historical facts but less suited for putting US policies into a perspective across time and different countries. Moreover, studies on states' choices about nuclear weapons and on US nonproliferation policies tend to be either 1) at a generic level, which implies risks of somewhat superficial or inaccurate

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<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Feaver & Niou 1996 pp. 230-1; Paul 2000 pp. 6, 153-5.

treatment of individual cases, or 2) focused on one country at the time, which tends to lead to parochial thinking, failure to evaluate its general implications, and/or exaggeration of the importance of that case<sup>5</sup>. With a comparative analysis of two important cases, I seek a fruitful middle ground between those two approaches and insights regarding linkages between US security and nonproliferation policies.

My study is also more comprehensive than some earlier key studies in that in addition to building on them, I have benefited from access to archival materials that were earlier inaccessible. This is the case for instance with McArdle Kelleher's 1975 study that was largely based on speeches, newspapers, and interviews and Hersh's 1991 study that relied quite heavily on interviews. Individual USG documents are moreover being constantly declassified, which means that some such documents were available to me that were not available even for other quite recent studies<sup>6</sup>.

Moreover, considering the development of the field of IR, it seems useful to try to constructively bring together insights of two major theoretical families, both of which have produced important ideas, explanatory models, and research results, but often seem to exist in separate worlds and argue past each other<sup>7</sup>.

One widespread fear today is that terrorists would acquire nuclear or other WMD<sup>8</sup>. This study concerns only proliferation by *states*. Much of what is said about states' motives and ways to pursue nuclear weapons, nonproliferation policies, and deterrence does not apply to terrorists, at least ones not tightly affiliated with a state.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> For instance, Trachtenberg's otherwise very perceptive 1999 study suffers a little from his tendency to stress the importance of Germany's nuclear status to the utmost.

To mention just a few, noteworthy studies with a more narrow focus include, e.g., Ahonen 1995 on F. Strauss's policies and stances; Eckert 1989, Müller, W. D. 1990, and Fischer, P. 1994 on Bonn's early policies in the nuclear field, Schwarz 1989 on Adenauer's views on nuclear weapons; Haftendorn 1994 on NATO's strategic dilemmas in the 1960s; Mahncke 1972 and McArdle Kelleher 1975 on West Germany's nuclear policies and role in NATO; Trachtenberg 1999 on US security policy in Europe in 1945-63; Hersh 1991, Cohen, A. 1998, and Karpin 2006 on Israel's nuclear weapon program; Cohen, A. & Burr 2006 on Nixon's nonproliferation policy towards Israel; and Gavin 2004 and Brands 2006 on Johnson's nonproliferation policy. Some overviews of nuclear proliferation covering many states include Kollert 1994; Jones & McDonough 1998; Reiss 1988; Paul 2000; Campbell et al 2004; Reiss 2004; Cirincione et al 2005. But typically, little real comparison between different countries is made in such studies, and the focus is not on US policies but on each individual country's choices.

<sup>6</sup> However, owing to the process of re-classification, I have not had access to some USG documents that used to be accessible.

<sup>7</sup> For instance Gelpi 1999 calls for integration of Institutional perspectives on security into Realist theory (p. 109).

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., the US *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*, Sep 06 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf>; 14 June 07).

<sup>9</sup> Terrorists are hard to deter because of a lack of targets for retaliation (see also Bueno de Mesquita & Riker 1982 p. 304). So far, all states with nuclear weapons have *developed* them themselves, some with foreign help. Such a large, complex undertaking requires significant financial and technical resources and a long-term secure territorial base. The more viable way for terrorists to get a nuclear weapon would be to try to *buy or steal* one. But nuclear powers are very unlikely to sell the weapons (though individuals may sell related technology) since other states may severely punish them if such a weapon was used. They are also likely to try develop secure systems to prevent thefts. Stealing one or some nuclear weapons would anyway give only an uncertain weapon; the reliability of a stolen system would probably be imperfect.

In the next chapter, I describe methodological questions, my choice of cases, and materials used. In Chapter 3, I place my study in the context of IR theory, focusing on SR arguments about states' goals and balance-of-power behavior, IR theses about ways to overcome problems of international cooperation, and insights regarding international bargaining. In Chapter 4, I make hypotheses regarding the determinants of 1) US nonproliferation and security policies; 2) whether security cooperation with the US could prevent nuclear proliferation; and 3) bargaining power of the USG when it tried to press its preferences on the FRG and Israel. In Chapter 5, I discuss nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation from a general perspective. The empiric part of the study is divided into four chapters according to US presidents in office<sup>10</sup>, followed by a some observations about the Nixon era and the time thereafter. In those chapters, some sections concern US nonproliferation policies in general, some particular issues related to the FRG or Israel. In the concluding chapter, I summarize and discuss my theoretical findings.

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It is possible that terrorists would acquire nuclear weapons but it is probably much less hard for them to get access to other weapons that can cause great destruction such as advanced conventional, biological, or chemical weapons, or even commercial aircraft. On the effects and proliferation requirements of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, see US Congress Office of Technology Assessment OTA 1993 pp. 6-11, 52-5.

<sup>10</sup> No nuclear nonproliferation policy towards Israel existed during the Truman era; the chapter on that time only provides some background for Israel's case.



## 2 Methodology and materials

My research method is a comparative case study. I define a case study, following Gerring, as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units<sup>1</sup>” and a comparative case study as a combination of two or more case studies, with cases selected so that they are together well suited for theory development and generalizations<sup>2</sup>.

I chose the case method since it can be used for both testing and creating theories and explaining as such important cases<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, it is suited for creating both understanding and explanation of what happened. Such understanding is needed in studies like this: exploratory research on causal mechanisms with the goal of policy lessons. A statistical approach could be better suited for proving the *general* validity of propositions and establishing the scope and probability of effects, and would more easily allow to control for potential third variables. But even a single, carefully chosen case can offer chances for generalization; the chances can be further improved by making a *comparative* study.<sup>4</sup>

Following the method of controlled comparison and Mill’s method of difference<sup>5</sup>, the cases I chose are two situations that differ regarding the study variable – US nonproliferation policies – but otherwise have many similarities. In the 1950s and 1960s, both Israel and the FRG were relatively open, democratic states and had incentives (clear security threats that could be countered with nuclear weapons). At the time when the US became concerned that the FRG or Israel might acquire nuclear weapons, each had close relations with and was quite dependent on the US. The fact that they posed the challenge mostly simultaneously facilitates comparisons and putting the cases into a perspective regarding US nonproliferation policy in general. Also the importance of the cases as such played a role in my choice.

Various considerations made me limit the time studied to the Truman to Johnson terms. The 1950s and 1960s were the formative era in the nuclear policies of the FRG and Israel and by the end of this period, Israel acquired its first nuclear weapons and the question of the nuclear status of the FRG was by and large settled. Moreover, the international non-

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<sup>1</sup> Gerring 2004 p. 342. See also George 1979 p. 46. On different meanings of the concept of case study, in particular in IR, see Stake 2000 pp. 435-6; Gerring 2004 p. 341.

<sup>2</sup> The term comparative case study has different definitions and meanings; see George 1979 p. 52; Collier 1993 p. 105; Ragin et al 1996 pp. 750-1; Stake 2000 p. 437. On case study types (classifications based on goals pursued and definitions of a case study), see George 1979 pp. 49, 51-4, 66; Collier 1993 pp. 106, 115; Van Evera 1997 p. 55; Stake 2000 pp. 437-8; Gerring 2004 p. 343.

<sup>3</sup> See Van Evera 1997 p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> On strengths and problems of case studies in testing and developing theories, and ways to overcome the problems, see George 1979 pp. 47-50, 59-60; Van Evera 1997 pp. 50-5; Gerring 2004 pp. 346-53. Flyvbjerg 2004 stresses the importance of case studies, and the context-specific knowledge they produce, in social sciences and academic education (pp. 420-3).

<sup>5</sup> On different case study methods and their pros and cons, see George 1979 p. 66; Ragin et al 1996 pp. 754-5; Van Evera 1997 pp. 56-75. On case selection criteria, see *ibid.* pp. 31-4, 59-60, 76-88; Stake 2000 p. 437; Flyvbjerg 2004 pp. 425-8.

proliferation regime (also referred to as the NPT regime, after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) was formed and key international treaties in the field were negotiated during this time. Besides, less archival material is accessible from more recent times.

As material, I use archival documents and literature on US policies toward Israel and the FRG, and literature on nuclear weapon politics in these two states; regarding archival materials, I concentrate on USG policies because they are in the focus of this study. A large part of my archival material consist of documents, most of them originating in the Department of State (DOS) and the White House, that I was able to access in summer 2006 at the J. F. Kennedy Library (Boston, MA), L. B. Johnson Library (Austin, TX), the National Archives (College Park, MD), and the Library of Congress Manuscript Collection (Washington, DC). I have also used extensively USG documents from electronic databases accessible over the Internet and USG and German documents published in edited volumes. I give more detailed information about the sources at the end of the study.

Whereas I have searched through and studied literally thousands of archived documents, I chose not to collect material for this study through interviews or a broader review of newspaper articles. This was because 1) alone the amount of archival material on the topic is overwhelming; 2) key persons have been interviewed and the newspaper track taken by other authors – I seek to build on their studies, not repeat them; 3) fairly few key persons involved in the making of USG policies in the time I study would be available for interviews.

I have sought a balance between providing adequate guidance to my sources and making the footnotes manageable and use abbreviations extensively regarding source information; they are listed in Appendix A. Books and journal articles are referred to in footnotes only with author names and years of publication. Complete references are given in the list of sources at the end of the study. All information regarding newspaper articles – name of article, newspaper, and date – is given in footnotes. Also all information regarding document material is given in footnotes; I make general comments on them in the list of sources. I always give the minimum of information that makes it easy to find a source. When a document is referred to for the first time, full information is given; later a reference is made to the footnote where the document was first mentioned. Information on where to find texts of relevant laws and treaties is given in Appendix B. A list of key persons can be found in Appendix C. References in footnotes are arranged so that primary sources precede secondary ones; both are in a chronological order (except when a special reason makes another order more practical).



### 3 Theoretical framework: using insights of Structural Realism and Rational Institutionalism

In this chapter, I first discuss Realist theories, with a focus on Waltz's Structural Realism. These offer insights regarding the basic setting of international politics and states' goals. Since SR makes propositions about states' typical actions, I argue that it is feasible to make hypotheses about key foreign policy decisions based on it. In section 3.2, I consider both lessons from RI regarding how to promote international cooperation and different types of security cooperation. In section 3.3, I discuss international bargaining and determinants of bargaining power.

#### 3.1 Security-seeking under anarchy

Realism focuses on the importance of security in international relations. It holds that the international system is *anarchic* as no international sovereign exists and within it the key actors, *sovereign states*, pursue their *national interests* in *goal-oriented* ways, as their *resources* allow. A state, considering its own interests, arms to protect itself against other states it considers threatening. But other states can see even defensive arming as threatening and increase their own armaments. This *security dilemma*, resulting from the facts that offensive and defensive means are often inseparable, motives for military strength are not observable, and states *may* have aggressive aims, leads to distrust and arms races. Under anarchy, even those who want no expansion need to arm themselves to prevent war and protect themselves.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The earliest surviving example of such explanations to war is Thucydides ~400 BC, esp. Book 1. Realism projects into the international sphere what Hobbes 1660 wrote about relations among men; the classic case of this view of international relations was presented by Rousseau 1917 (esp. pp. 46-9; orig. mid-1750s). The basis for the theory in modern times was laid out in Carr 1939 and Morgenthau 2006 (orig. 1948). Prominent later Realists include, among others, Waltz and Mearsheimer (see, e.g., Waltz 1954 pp. 159-60, 188; Waltz 1979 pp. 102-3, 186-7; Mearsheimer 2001 pp. 30-5). See also Herz 1950 (who coined the term security dilemma) and Jervis 1978 p. 167. For a classic discussion of international anarchy, see Dickinson 1916, esp. Chapters 1, 17. On Rousseau's contribution to Realism, see Waltz 1954 pp. 165-88; Fidler 1996. For a more detailed discussion of the security dilemma, see Glaser 1997.

Were offensive and defensive forces distinguishable, the security dilemma would alleviate as states would be better able to interpret others' current aims (but they would still not know how those would develop in the future). But it is questionable whether any armaments are fully offensive or defensive, for instance because the character of a weapon system often depends on the situation where it is used. See Jervis 1978 pp. 199-206. Moreover, even states that just seek to protect the status quo need offensive arms (pp. 201-2).

As a part of the Constructivist wave, which stresses that the nature of society and science is constructed in human interaction, Wendt 1992 questioned whether the security dilemma and concern about others' aims *need* to characterize international affairs. Constructivism and Realism are often seen as competing, but Barkin 2003 argues a "Realist Constructivist" approach could be useful in IR.

Classical Realism stresses the importance of security issues for states, but some disagreement exists on whether *power* or *security* is states' highest goal in it. Waltz 1990b argues that Classical Realism sees *power* as an end but Davis 1993 that it sees *survival* as the end and power as a means (pp. 80-1). Also Mearsheimer argues Morgenthau saw *relative, not absolute, power* as states' key concern (p. 416 fn 21). Morgenthau 2006 himself argues that since states cannot be certain that they assess the distribution of power correctly, they have to seek *maximum power* (pp. 218-9).

Several, partially competing types of Realism exist: a common division is into Offensive and Defensive (or quite similarly, Pessimistic and Optimistic) Realism. A key difference is whether, beyond expansion, mere maintenance of status quo is accepted as the ultimate goal of some great powers. Offensive Realism argues that states try to maximize their relative power and that this means that great powers always have 1) hegemony as a final goal and, 2) as long as they do not reach that, aggressive aims since offense is the best way to ensure security under anarchy. Thus states compete fiercely and with offensive strategies over scarce security. In Defensive Realism, states often (but not necessarily always) just try maintain the status quo and efficient moves to balance other states' power, instead of aggression, can provide them with security.<sup>2</sup>

In Waltz's Structural Realist theory of international politics<sup>3</sup>, states' ultimate goal is survival<sup>4</sup>. Power, in SR usually defined through resources controlled rather than influence over outcomes, is a means to ensure survival<sup>5</sup>. Waltz argues that though states also have other goals, their primary goal is to ensure survival: that is a precondition to pursuing anything else. States "at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination".<sup>6</sup> He argues that a distinction between Offensive and Defensive Realism is not helpful as states protect their security the best they can and whether that implies offensive or defensive strategies depends on the situation.<sup>7</sup> Thus all states may have both security and non-security goals and are likely to pursue expansive policies when the cost-benefit ratio and the likelihood of success speak for it<sup>8</sup>.

Even if all states at one point in time had no expansionist aims, *lack of information*, different and mistaken *perceptions* of the situation and others' aims, and concern about the *future* can still make them prepare for the case that others embarked on an expansionist path. Others' aims at the time can be perceived more or less correctly but not known for sure,

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<sup>2</sup> For instance Mearsheimer is considered an Offensive and Jack Snyder and Glaser Defensive Realists. See Walt 1987 pp. 932-3; Mearsheimer 1990 pp. 45-6; Rose 1998 pp. 149-50; Taliaferro 2000 (see him for a thorough discussion of the differences); Mearsheimer 2001 pp. 29, 34-5, 414 fn 8.

<sup>3</sup> Waltz 1979 p. 73; Waltz 1990b. He and many others call his theory Neorealism, but since also other theories have been thus called, for the sake of clarity I do not use that term

<sup>4</sup> Waltz seems not to define survival explicitly. Mearsheimer 2001 defines it as "territorial integrity and the autonomy of ... domestic political order" (p. 31).

<sup>5</sup> Waltz 1979 p. 91; Waltz 1990b. On material and relational definitions of power and their pros and cons, see Waltz 1979 pp. 191-2; Wohlforth 1993 pp. 3-8; Rose 1998 p. 151. Glaser 1994 suggests Waltz uses power in a relational way since he focuses on the *distribution* of resources (p. 61).

<sup>6</sup> He leaves open what makes a state to have either goal. Waltz 1979 pp. 91, 118; Waltz 1990b.

Mearsheimer 2001 argues that states are free to pursue non-security goals as long as their actions are not contradictory with balance-of-power considerations (p. 46).

Schweller 1996 maintains that if states sought survival only, no need to feel threatened and thus no security dilemma would exist, and no security *dilemma* (but a security problem) exists if they do seek expansion (pp. 91-117). But he ignores the point that though states' foremost goal is survival, they also have other goals, pursuing of which can threaten others. States take into account that others may aim at something beyond survival; it is *uncertainty* that creates security dilemmas. Others' future aims are also unknown. Taliaferro 2000 pp. 144-5; Mearsheimer 2001 p. 414 fn 8. On basic assumptions of Realism and how mere concern about survival causes offensive policies, see also Mearsheimer 1994 pp. 9-12.

<sup>7</sup> Waltz 2004 p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> See also Jervis 1978 p. 168; Morrow 2000 pp. 74-5.

and future goals are anyway unknown. Others' capabilities and true interests may be evaluated more or less accurately. Perceptions of threat tend to be exaggerated and states can on purpose feed mistaken perceptions by others.<sup>9</sup>

What Waltz calls first- and second-image theories, i.e., explanations that concern the nature of the man and of states, assume that international politics can be explained by analyzing the *units* in the international system. But international affairs have been remarkably similar over time despite large changes in state-level factors. Thus Waltz argues that if the fact how units are *organized* in a system affects their actions and interactions, such reductionist theories are not enough to explain international outcomes; also third-level theories are needed that consider the effects of *the structure of the international system* and variations in it over time.<sup>10</sup> In SR, the structure restricts the array of potential outcomes in international politics by limiting and guiding units through competition and socialization. These mechanisms encourage states to become alike and act similarly and reward and punish action based on what kind of behavior makes success in the system likely. Waltz argues that knowledge of *both* the structure *and* the units is needed to explain international outcomes: systemic theories explain changes *across* systems, unit-level theories explain developments *within* them. But he deliberately focuses just on the structure as an explanatory variable.<sup>11</sup>

Waltz argues that the structure of a system is defined on three dimensions that he illustrates by comparing domestic and international political systems. First, domestic systems are hierarchic but in international politics, anarchy reigns. Second, within a state, subunits have specified, functionally differentiated roles and depend on others' taking care of other tasks. Internationally, all states perform all tasks themselves and co-exist in competitive functional similarity. On the third dimension, international and domestic systems are alike: units differ in capabilities. Internationally, the unequal division of capabilities indeed is the primary way in which states differ. States' unequal capabilities mean that an international system is characterized by the existence of some great power "poles". Which states are such at a given time depends on their strength on several dimensions; decisive are

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<sup>9</sup> See Jervis 1978; Snyder, G. H. 1984 p. 486; Glaser 1997 pp. 179-83, 200; Mearsheimer 2001 pp. 31, 38.

<sup>10</sup> Waltz 1954; Waltz 1979 pp. 19, 37-9; Waltz 1990b. Other authors further simplify or disaggregate this three-level classification. See, e.g., Jervis 1976, who distinguishes between four levels of explanation: decision-making, bureaucracy, nature of state and domestic politics, and international environment (pp. 15-6).

<sup>11</sup> Waltz 1954 pp. 232, 238; Waltz 1979, esp. pp. 68-71, 74-7, 92, 128; Waltz 1990b. See also Gourevitch 1978 p. 900. Waltz 1990b argues that Classical Realism concentrates on unit-level factors and sees their effect on international politics as a one-way street, but Davis 1993 points out that also it considers systemic effects on state behavior, especially the security dilemma (pp. 80-1).

Waltz's use of the concepts of structure, system, and systems-theory can at times be a little confusing. For him, a *system* "is composed of a structure and of interacting units" (1979 p. 79); a *structure* concerns how units "stand in relation to one another" (p. 80) and depends on whether the units are anarchically or hierarchically ordered, existence of functional differentiation, and relative capabilities (pp. 100-1); and a *systemic* or *systems-theory* concerns the effects of how units are organized (pp. 39-40) (i.e., of structure) on international outcomes.

“size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”.<sup>12</sup>

In principle, a change in any dimension (anarchy, functional similarity, capabilities) could mean a change from one international system to another. But typically, it has been changes in states’ capabilities and the number of poles that has led to changes across systems.<sup>13</sup>

Waltz discusses the basic types of international system of bipolarity (the Cold War) and multipolarity (Europe from the 18<sup>th</sup> century to 1945). Multipolarity can be further divided into systems of three, four, five, or more poles.<sup>14</sup> In Huntington’s words, under bipolarity the relations between two superpowers “are central to international politics. Each superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with the other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries”. Multipolarity is characterized by “several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues.”<sup>15</sup> The types are seen to differ regarding how states are likely to act and how *stable* the systems are, meaning both *absence of* (major) *war* and *durability* of an era of polarity<sup>16</sup>. Waltz argues that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity in both ways. Tripolarity is particularly unstable: under it, two poles can ally against the third and make the system bipolar. But how exactly the types of polarities and their effects differ is a matter of considerable debate.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Waltz 1979 pp. 81-101, 131.

<sup>13</sup> Waltz 1979 pp. 97, 100-1.

<sup>14</sup> Waltz 1979 pp. 118, 162-3.

<sup>15</sup> Huntington 1999. Instead of a definition of bi- or multipolarity, Waltz 1979 (p. 131) provides the just mentioned criteria for establishing the number of poles.

After the Cold War, also *unipolar* systems have attracted attention. Wohlforth 1999 defines unipolarity as “a structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced” but “not so concentrated as to produce a global empire” (p. 9). It resembles hegemony, and he suggests that though hegemonic and balance-of-power theories are often seen as competing, they can be complementary (p. 23). Waltz 2004 notes that “unipolarity weakens structural constraints, enlarges the field of action of the remaining great power, and heightens the importance of its internal qualities.”

<sup>16</sup> This dual meaning of stability creates at times much confusion in IR. I use it in both meanings but use the more exact terms when confusion is possible.

<sup>17</sup> See Deutsch & Singer 1964; Waltz 1979 pp. 97, 134-51, 163-76, 197-9; Mearsheimer 1990 pp. 12-7; Van Evera 1990 pp. 34-40; Hoffmann 1990; Wohlforth 1999; Waltz 2000.

Another prominent structural theory is the offense-defense balance, on which the classic work is Jervis’s 1978 article. The theory makes same basic assumptions as SR and is seen to either partially challenge or further refine it. Here, variation in the offense-defense balance, instead of or in addition to polarities, explains the likelihood of war. The balance depends on, e.g., whether available offense or defense technology has an advantage; whether the technology equalizes and makes it easy to estimate states’ power; geography; dominant strategic beliefs; and defense pacts. Whether states pursue expansive or status-quo strategies depends on what is the best way to ensure security under the existing offense-defense balance. Offense-dominance i.e. the relative feasibility of conquest or even a perception of it makes war more likely. These explanations stress that the deterrence-dominance of nuclear weapons, which has similar effects as defense-dominance, was central in promoting great power peace during the Cold War, even though the situation was only slowly understood and translated into state behavior. But Kemp points out that “no general theory of the relationship between arms and conflict” exists: the impact of particular military technology depends also on the prevailing, specific political-military situation. See Jervis 1978 pp. 186-7, 194-8; Mearsheimer 1990 pp. 12-3

Despite states' general functional similarity, pole powers tend to assume the task of managing the international system – not for the sake of order as such but to promote their interests. Waltz and other Realists suggest that their chances of success in this task depend on the prevailing polarity: they argue that Cold War bipolarity and the superpowers' great power advantage over other states led even to some functional differentiation as a superpower could perform the task of dampening the effects of anarchy in a subsystem and even make it hierarchic. US preponderance in NATO gave Europeans protection also against each other and thus enabled them to overcome fears of each other and concerns over relative gains and thus a great level of cooperation among them.<sup>18</sup>

The balance-of-power theory incorporates SR expectations about the outcomes of states' behavior. Though states pursue their own ends, ranging from just trying to ensure survival to expansion and dominance, it is expected that as a net result of states' seeking of survival under anarchy, balances-of-power form. But this happens neither automatically nor always successfully: whether states balance efficiently against expanding power depends on decisions of governments who in Waltz's words are "free to disregard the imperatives of power, but they must expect to pay a price for doing so."<sup>19</sup> Von Gentz defined a balance-of-power in 1806 as "that constitution which exists among neighboring states more or less connected with each other, by virtue of which none of them can violate the independence or the essential rights of another without effective resistance from some quarter and consequent danger to itself"<sup>20</sup>. But the concept is used in various ways to mean, among others, both any or a balanced, stable distribution of power and the process of balancing or pursuing hegemony<sup>21</sup>. A notable modification of the theory is Walt's balance-of-threat theory. Here states balance in regional contexts less against power as such but rather against concrete threats, which depend on both the distribution of power and geography, offensive capacity, and perceived aims.<sup>22</sup>

States try to build up their power in two complementary or substituting ways: internal and external efforts. Internal efforts mean that states develop national military, economic, and strategy capabilities and resources; external efforts imply security cooperation with other

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(who speaks of the nature of weaponry available to states instead of offense-defense balance); Hopf 1991; Lynn-Jones 1995; Kemp 1996 p. 129; Glaser 1997 p. 188-9; Van Evera 1998 pp. 5-6, 33-4, 42. On deterrence- and defense-dominance, see Adams 2003 pp. 48-50. Waltz himself cherishes and adopts Jervis's point about offense- or defense-dominance. See Waltz 1981.

<sup>18</sup> Waltz 1979 pp. 70, 135-6, 197-9, 205; Mearsheimer 1990 pp. 46-7; Frankel 1993 pp. 37, 45-6, 54-9; Waltz 2000 p. 25; Mearsheimer 2001 p. 49. The latter argues, however, that great power interests often do not speak for promotion of stable orders, though these states do seek to "deter wars in which they would be the likely victim." But it is likely that beyond wars that would weaken their relative positions, great powers try to avoid *unnecessary* wars that would not improve their position, and this implies that great power promotion of stable orders is probably more likely than Mearsheimer suggests.

<sup>19</sup> Waltz 1954 p. 210; Waltz 1979 pp. 118-21, 128; Waltz 2000 p. 37.

<sup>20</sup> Gentz 2002 (orig. 1806) p. 307.

<sup>21</sup> See Wohlforth 1993 p. 3; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1996 p. 37. For instance, Burchill 1996 defines a balance-of-power as "the absence of a preponderant military power in the international system" (p. 40).

<sup>22</sup> Walt 1987.

states or trying to harm such efforts by an opposing side.<sup>23</sup> Waltz argues that internal efforts are generally more reliable and precise, and Mearsheimer that they are more efficient, than external efforts<sup>24</sup>.

Waltz rejects the idea of using SR as a theory of foreign policy, arguing both that the causes of foreign policy are too complex for a theory and that such a theory has to include national-level factors, indeed maintaining that “a theory about foreign policy is a theory at the national level”.<sup>25</sup> But other authors question this stance: Elman and Feaver argue that no grounds exist to reject SR as a theory of foreign policy and point out that SR anyway leads to expectations about states’ *typical* actions<sup>26</sup>. I find this view justified: especially if security is crucial for states, systemic factors should tend to much affect states’ foreign policies; otherwise SR would also fail to describe reality<sup>27</sup>. As Waltz himself stresses, theories require simplification<sup>28</sup>. Though many internal and external factors can influence foreign policy decisions, it is likely that some of them matter more than others and that they can be bundled together into a manageable number of factors.

Such attempts seem justified and worthwhile. As Feaver argues, “if a sparse and elegant theory manages to get some things mostly right, or often right, about some important dimensions of states’ foreign policies, this is a major achievement in social science”. As such a theory could at least help lay a basis for further studies, also on the effects of domestic factors on foreign policy, he calls for further development of a systemic theory of foreign policy.<sup>29</sup> Some efforts in this direction have been made: the so-called Neoclassical Realist theories policy stress the effects of structural pressures on foreign policies and

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<sup>23</sup> See Waltz 1979 p. 118. A contrary type of behavior to balancing is *bandwagoning* where actors join an expansionist side in hope of benefiting from its gains (pp. 125-7). Waltz and Walt argue that internationally, balancing is more likely, but Schweller 1994 suggests that small revisionist states often bandwagon large ones. Christensen & Snyder 1990 consider two further phenomena possible under multipolarity: chain-ganging with reckless states and buck-passing in hope of free-riding on others’ balancing efforts.

On when national arming complements or substitutes allying, see Sorokin 1994. Glaser 1994 points out a third way to promote security: arms control. He uses the term to mean any formal or informal “reciprocated restraint in the deployment, operation, and monitoring of forces” (p. 57), a line I follow.

Waltz 1979 argues that under bipolarity, superpowers rely on internal efforts: other states’ capabilities have little effect on the bipolar balance. Superpowers welcome others’ contributions to balancing, but since these are not indispensable, defection by allies is no great concern and superpowers can formulate strategies and policies based on their own interests and views (pp. 163, 168-9). But Waltz is a little contradictory in also arguing that under bipolarity, one superpower’s advances anywhere in both internal and external efforts appear as the other’s losses and noting that “Japan, Western Europe, and the Middle East are prizes that if won by the Soviet Union would alter the balance of GNPs and the distribution of resources enough to be a danger” (pp. 171-2).

<sup>24</sup> Waltz 1979 p. 168; Mearsheimer 1990 p. 19.

<sup>25</sup> Waltz 1954 pp. 232, 238; Waltz 1979 pp. 68, 71-2, 121; Waltz 1996 pp. 54-7; Waltz 1990b.

<sup>26</sup> See Elman 1996; Fearon 1998b; and also Rittberger 2004.

<sup>27</sup> On this point, see also Fearon 1998b p. 296.

<sup>28</sup> See, for instance, Waltz 2004 p. 2.

<sup>29</sup> Fearon 1998b pp. 298, 305-6. See pp. 302-7 for a review of structural and domestic-political explanations for foreign policies. See also Parasiliti 2001 on the importance of structural factors as explanations of foreign policy (pp. 166-7).

connect these to unit-level factors<sup>30</sup>. For instance, a significant body of literature instrumentalizes the concept of balance-of-power to explain foreign policies by analyzing the effect of relative power and changes in it, also as translated through leaders' perceptions (in turn often seen to be affected by domestic political and organizational factors).<sup>31</sup>

### **3.2 Prospects of international cooperation and how to improve them**

Lacking information about the future makes cooperation problematic under anarchy. Realism argues that even if all sides are equally interested in a shared goal, they cannot fully trust one another: even if cooperation starts with good intentions, one side may later *defect* if it gains so more than by cooperating.<sup>32</sup> Another obstacle to cooperation is that the security dilemma makes *relative gains* important: as today's partner can be tomorrow's opponent and benefits to others from cooperation can be turned against oneself, a state does not care only about its *absolute gains* but has incentives to avoid cooperation that benefits others more than itself.<sup>33</sup>

The risk of defection is very relevant regarding US-FRG and US-Israel relations and any nonproliferation understandings, but the relative gains issue is less central in this study: the US anyway had a great power advantage over the other two states and these could not realistically expect to overcome it. Accordingly, I focus on the defection issue.

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<sup>30</sup> Though the term soon became used in this broader meaning (see Taliaferro 2000 pp. 132-4, 141), Rose 1998 launched it to mean theories that try to explain how domestic- and individual-level factors intervene when structural pressures are translated into foreign policy decisions. The theories he particularly meant consider especially how leaders' *perceptions* of power realities and their ability to *mobilize* nations' power affect foreign policies. For instance, Christensen 1996 and Zakaria 1998 stress the latter factor, presenting domestic public opinion and the strength of government, respectively, as the key variable intervening between external pressures and strategies states' leaders design in reaction.

<sup>31</sup> See, e.g., Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Mandelbaum 1988; Friedberg 1988 on British policy; Leffler 1992 on Truman administration's policy; Wohlforth 1993 on Soviet policy. On this literature, see also Rose 1998. The so-called *Innenpolitik* theories are another common type of explanations for foreign policies. They stress the role of such factors as domestic political groups with parochial interests, prevailing ideology, or socioeconomic structure. See Rose 1998 p. 148 on such theories and Snyder, J. 1991 for an example.

<sup>32</sup> Waltz 1954 pp. 167-8; Jervis 1978 pp. 167-8; Grieco 1988a; Grieco 1988b; Mearsheimer 2001 p. 52. A further problem is that gains from cooperation may be reaped at different times. States may be concerned that if they would benefit later than others, these will stop cooperating after ensuring their early benefits.

<sup>33</sup> Waltz 1979 pp. 105-7; Grieco 1988a; Grieco 1988b; Mearsheimer 1990 p. 45; Mearsheimer 2001 p. 52. This issue has caused debate between Realists, who stress states' concern with relative gains, and Institutionalists, who tend to see states as more concerned with absolute gains. See Powell 1991; Keck 1993b. Powell suggests a model where 1) states seek absolute gains but 2) when the use of force is a prospect to reckon with, unequal gains pose a problem for cooperation. Keck argues that the relative gains issue does not prevent cooperation if at least one potential outcome exist that is pareto-optimal from the perspective of both absolute and relative gains; if gain from cooperation is divisible; or if linkages to other issues or welfare transfers are possible. On how institutions can alleviate the relative gains problem, see, e.g., Grieco 1988b pp. 615-20. Glaser 1994 points out that arguments about relative gains often confuse ends and means: states seek security rather than some capabilities as such (pp. 74-5).

### 3.2.1 Institutions as ways to promote cooperation among states

Whether a state continues to cooperate or defects at some specific moment depends on the current, discounted net value of all future costs and benefits of the two courses of action; the length of horizon and the discount rate affect how much early versus long-term benefits and costs matter<sup>34</sup>. From within Realism, Jervis notes that chances of cooperation grow if 1) incentives to cooperate are strengthened “by increasing the gains of mutual cooperation ... and/or decreasing the costs the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not”; 2) incentives to defect are weakened “by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the other ... and/or increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation”; 3) expectations of cooperation by another side are strengthened. In the latter, also reliable inspection systems that give early warning about any defection can help. Jervis notes that large size, defensible borders, and protection against sudden attacks facilitate cooperation as states enjoying such benefits can better carry the potential costs of defection by another state.<sup>35</sup>

RI further proposes that through suitable *institutional schemes*, problems of cooperation can be alleviated or solved. RI largely shares Realist assumptions about international affairs, explicitly assumes actor rationality, and stresses that *in some situations*, international cooperation and participation in institutions is *rational* for self-interested states (without necessarily assuming any specific interests), even though it implies costs.<sup>36</sup> Despite anarchy, conflict need not always be the result.

Wallander and others define *international institutions* as “persistent and connected sets of rules, often affiliated with organizations, that operate across international boundaries”. Institutions range from mere conventions to regimes and formal organizations that facilitate institutions’ operations.<sup>37</sup> Krasner in turn defines *regimes* as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area”<sup>38</sup>.

RI stresses that institutions affect participating states’ interactions. Institutions can promote cooperation and allow overcoming problems of collective action by helping states cope with uncertainty and changing incentives for cooperation so that continuous coopera-

<sup>34</sup> See Lipson 1991 pp. 511-2.

<sup>35</sup> Jervis 1978 pp. 171-81.

<sup>36</sup> See Stein 1982; Haftendorn et al 1999 pp. 5, 334; Keck 1993b p. 36; Keck 1999 pp. 215, 218-9, 229. Often these that I for the sake of clarity always refer to as RI are called just Institutional or “new” or neoliberal Institutional. The term Institutionalism has become vague as several types of it now exist. On them, see, e.g., Mearsheimer 1994 pp. 14-47; on the concept of RI, Keck 1993b pp. 36, 42; and on neoliberal Institutionalism, also Grieco 1988a.

<sup>37</sup> Wallander et al 1999 pp. 1-2. Mearsheimer 1994 notes that terms institutions and regimes are often used interchangeably and that multilateralism is largely synonymous with institutions (p. 8).

<sup>38</sup> Krasner 1983 p. 1. On international regimes, see that volume and Hasenclever et al 1997. On their definitions, see also Keck 1991, who defines them as institutional schemes for collective management of problems that involve several states’ interests and can be properly solved only through agreement or cooperation among them (pp. 637, 648). See also Martin & Simmons 1998 p. 737. Davis 1993 notes that whereas policy-makers often use the term *nonproliferation regime* to mean the sum of all nonproliferation efforts, the origi-



tion becomes rational and concerns about relative gains and defection are alleviated. Institutions are a response to uncertainty and information needs and are created to provide for collective resolution of cooperation problems especially when states need to deal with *durable* and *dense* (interdependent and important) issues within one policy space.<sup>39</sup> Specific ways how institutions promote cooperation in security issues include that they can 1) enable states to get and give credible information about interests, goals, aims, strategies, and potential for relative gains and thus help them to move away from policies based on worst-case fears; 2) establish shared rules and norms that reduce uncertainty about others' future action; 3) provide a forum for communication, issue linkage, and organizing side-payments; 4) enable effective retaliation against cheating; 5) reduce transaction costs; 6) help to make some form of cooperation dominant when several forms are possible; 7) help to limit potential for relative gains; 8) in case of, e.g., alliances alter balances-of-power; and 9) provide stability when the distribution of power changes. Powerful states can benefit from institutions also in that by shaping institutions, they can influence other states' actions; institutions can make the others less likely to challenge their actions; and institutions enable them to use "soft power" to influence others' perceptions.<sup>40</sup>

RI considers four types of cooperation problems<sup>41</sup> where uncoordinated action can lead to suboptimal results and security problems and that can be solved through specific institutional approaches. First, in a *collaboration problem* states have clear incentives to defect and cheat because of a risk that others do so. The dilemma is especially hard when considered in a short-term perspective but can be alleviated if "the shadow of the future" is long and long-term gains from repeated cooperation are high compared to gains from defection. The institutional solution is to create structures that sanction cheating and make promises of cooperation self-enforcing and more credible. In complex situations, what is defection may moreover not be self-evident, and a way to promote cooperation also be to establish explicit rules about that and verification, and thus to make of a complex collaboration problem a simple one. If cooperation is established, changes that reduce either transparency or the relative value for states of long- and short-term gains from cooperation or de-

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nal scholarly meaning was "institutions leading to norm-driven behavior whose motivations are said to transcend parochial interests" (p. 84).

<sup>39</sup> Haftendorn 1997 p. 16; Keck 1997a p. 35; Wallander & Keohane 1999 pp. 30-1; Keck 1999 p. 229.

<sup>40</sup> Keohane 1990; Martin 1992 pp. 783-6; Keohane & Martin 1995 pp. 42-6, 49; Wallander et al 1999 pp. 1-4, 9-10; Wallander & Keohane 1999 p. 30; Keohane et al 1999 p. 330. But as Keck 1999 notes, institutions meant to promote cooperation can be inefficient (p. 230).

For instance Haftendorn 1994 has shown in an empirical study on NATO how the use of existing and creation of new institutional cooperation schemes helps in consensus-seeking and thus promotes alliance cohesion by facilitating information exchange and confidence-building.

<sup>41</sup> In terms of game theory, the different problem types are games with specific strategic structures. Game theory is a tool to show how outcomes in various situations depend on interdependent action by several actors. RI theorists and Realists often use it to demonstrate the problems of or chances of cooperation and strategies for overcoming the problems. For classic works on 1) the effects of security dilemma and problems of international cooperation in Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games, see Jervis 1978, and 2) cooperation prospects under iterated PD games, see Axelrod 1984. On game theory in general and especially PD games (often used to analyze, e.g., arms racing), strategies to overcome that collaboration problem, and their real-world applicability, see Keck 1997a pp. 36-40, 50-3; Keck 1999 pp. 223-31.

fection can lead to a crisis of the cooperative solution. Second, *coordination problems* result from the existence of multiple stable cooperation equilibria with varying distributive effects. Though all participants want cooperation, that does not occur if they cannot agree on one cooperation model. But once cooperation is launched, participants lack incentives to defect as long as their preferences and power distribution among them remain unaltered, though they may try to force a switch to another cooperation model. Establishment of one form of cooperation as prevailing can occur through pressure by a strong state, historical development, or just agreement. Here institutional structures to facilitate the bargaining process can help. Third, *a suasion problem* exists when one, often powerful, side has incentives to always cooperate irrespective of what others do. This makes it a potential victim of exploitation. It might solve the problem by dominating an institution and using it to link the issue to others and to monitor other participants to ensure that they do not free-ride at its expense. Fourth, *assurance problems* can appear when mutual cooperation is the best outcome for each side and mutual non-cooperation is a better outcome than cooperating while others defect. Uncertainty about other side's preferences, possibly owing to domestic discord on the other side, or even about its rationality, then gives incentives to defect. Here institutions can help by providing transparency.<sup>42</sup>

One institution can be a response to several problem types. As an institution solves one problem, others can emerge, and it may develop mechanisms to solve them, too. For instance, as an institution (or repetition) solves or alleviates a collaboration problem, a coordination problem can emerge. Thus the two problem types often need to be treated together.<sup>43</sup>

Realism and RI agree that cooperation takes place (only) when and as long as it is in all states' interest: states have to have cooperative goals before institutions can help them cooperate. If a state does plan aggression, security institutions as such do not prevent that (though they may enable early detection of aggressive aims or coordination of other states' reactions). Where the schools of thought differ is how large a difference they think institutions can make in international affairs by facilitating cooperation. Waltz and Mearsheimer see international institutions mostly as tools set up by powerful states to help them to effectively pursue their interests; the capabilities and aims of powerful states largely determine the effects of institutions. As discussed above, for Waltz the prospects that institutions effectively promote cooperation depend on prevailing polarities. RI in turn argues that the existence of a hegemon can help in but is no precondition for setting up of an institution. It admits that powerful states shape institutions based on their interests and insti-

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<sup>42</sup> On different problem types, see Martin 1992 pp. 768-83, 789; Martin & Simmons 1998 pp. 744-7; Wallander et al 1999 pp. 6-8; for the point about need to define defection in complex situations see Keck 1997a p. 39. Though certain problem types are often said to characterize specific issue areas, Fearon 1998a argues that states often first face coordination and then enforcement (collaboration) problems. For an early discussion of the two problem types, see Stein 1982. See also Cupitt & Long 1993 for applications on the nonproliferation regime.

<sup>43</sup> See, for instance, Riecke 1997 p. 231; Martin & Simmons 1998 p. 745.

tutions change following changes in the distribution of power but stresses that this occurs in path-dependent, often originally unexpected ways and that institutions themselves affect the process. From a RI perspective, Realism gives inadequate attention to the role of institutions and information in international affairs and thus underestimates chances of cooperation. RI maintains that international institutions matter and the principles, rules, and procedures they consist of affect international bargaining, though institutions mostly help states to pursue their existing goals and change their *strategies* rather than *preferences*. Institutions promote cooperation and affect expectations about international politics and thus state behavior. States signal preparedness to continue cooperation by adhering to institutions, which strengthens the prospects of peace. Sometimes, institutions even have power over states.<sup>44</sup>

Keck suggests in particular that Realism sees NATO just as a balance-of-power or -threat measure and ignores institutions within it. But Waltz does agree that powerful states use alliance institutions to manage relations among participants; he writes that the US has done so with NATO.<sup>45</sup>

Part of the debate and competition between Realism and RI results from the ambiguous relation between them: RI has been considered both an alternative to and a further development of Realism. Mearsheimer and Waltz argue that RI cannot offer a clear alternative to Realism but is integrated in it: also RI sees institutions as a result of the distribution of power, “starts with structural theory, applies it to the origins and operations of institutions, and unsurprisingly ends with realist conclusions”.<sup>46</sup> But in fact, RI also assumes a more modest task than offering a complete alternative theory of international politics. It sug-

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<sup>44</sup> For Realist arguments, see Waltz 2000 pp. 18-26. See also Mearsheimer 1994; Mearsheimer 1995 pp. 82, 86-7. He argues against Institutionalism and theses about institutions’ value even more strongly than Waltz and even notes that “Realists maintain that institutions ... have no independent effect on state behavior”, “are not an important cause of peace”, and “matter only on the margins” (1994 p. 7). See him (1995) for thorough criticism of the idea that institutions would clearly affect the prospects of international stability. Realism stresses problems of cooperation especially in collaboration games, and Fearon 1998a notes that it sees cooperation as more likely in the typically less crucial coordination games (p. 269). Glaser 1994 argues that when common misunderstandings about the implications of Realist assumptions are corrected, these lead to expect cooperation in many situations.

For the RI arguments, see Keohane 1990; Keohane & Martin 1995 pp. 39, 41-2, 46-7; Haftendorn 1997 p. 17; Keck 1997a p. 50; Wallander et al 1999 pp. 9-13; Keohane et al 1999 pp. 326-7, 334. Keohane & Martin point out that it is in practice hard to distinguish between the effects of power distribution and institutions. But since institutions’ effects are conditioned by structural factors, RI claims are somewhat vague. Keohane & Martin admit that institutions cannot “prevent war regardless of the structure in which they operate” and that their impact varies “depending on the nature of power and interests” but argue that “controlling for the effects of power and interests, it matters whether they exist”; “institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace” (pp. 42, 50). The point is thus that institutions can promote peace in *suitable* circumstances.

On institutional change and adaptability and why institutions differ in this respect, see, e.g., Haftendorn et al 1999.

<sup>45</sup> Keck 1997b p. 257; Waltz 2000 pp. 25-6. For Waltz, bipolarity explains NATO’s high level of institutionalization.

<sup>46</sup> Mearsheimer 1995 p. 85; citation of Waltz 2000 (p. 25) who refers to Keohane & Martin 1995 p. 46. Mearsheimer 1994 suggests Institutionalism is influential among academics and US policymakers because of value-based *dislike* of Realism and its theses about international politics (pp. 47-79).

gests (just) that institutions can in *some* circumstances promote cooperation. Keohane and others argue that it “incorporates much of realism but supersedes it by offering a richer specification of the institutional and informational environments within which strategic interaction takes place”. RI tries to show in what kinds of situations institutions can matter and cooperation take place and thus under what conditions Realist expectations hold. It complements rather than challenges Realism.<sup>47</sup> In practice, another key difference between Realism and IR is the focus of research agenda: RI concentrates on the institutional aspects of international relations, Realism considers those relations in general.

Though SR and RI theories tend to be seen as competing, I find it useful to try to build on insights of both. In practice, much of RI research has primarily concerned *how* institutions can promote cooperation, what conditions contribute to their *long-term success*, and how some institutions have *evolved*<sup>48</sup>. I suggest to use SR to determine the circumstances in which powerful states are willing to establish close security cooperation in the first place. In this matter, no major disagreement exists between the two theoretical families as RI accepts the point that powerful states shape institutions according to their interests. I propose that RI in turn offers insights especially for analysis of the exact operations of institutions; in this respect, SR has less to offer than RI, which is focused especially on this question. I discuss my hypotheses in Chapter 4. Next, I consider the forms that security cooperation between states can take and their characteristics and implications.

### 3.2.2 International security cooperation in practice

Many types of security cooperation between states exist. Alone promises of military support in case of an attack range from informal alignments and private, even just oral assurances between leaders of states to formal alliance treaties that may even stipulate automatic action in some situations. Such promises may be supported by military measures, such as arms supply (ranging from one-off arms sales to long-term guaranteed supply), military consultations for information exchange, joint planning, and force integration. Such measures both make joint defense efforts more efficient and increase the strength and credibility of the promises in partners’ and opponents’ eyes.

For instance Walt uses the terms *alliances* and *alignments* interchangeably to mean “any formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states”<sup>49</sup>. But in this study, distinguishing between formal alliances and other commitments seems useful since I study whether and how *different* types of security cooperation, formal and informal, little or highly institutionalized, help in nonproliferation efforts. Thus

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<sup>47</sup> Keck 1991 pp. 635-6, 641-2; Keck 1993b pp. 37, 42; Keohane & Martin 1995 p. 42; Keohane et al 1999 p. 335. Keck argues that RI enables a synthesis of the basic premises of Realism (anarchy, self-interested states acting rationally) and the expectations of Institutionalism and thus arrives at different conclusions than Realism.

<sup>48</sup> See, e.g., Martin 1992; Haftendorn & Keck 1997; and Haftendorn et al 1999.

<sup>49</sup> Walt 1987 p. 12.

an *alliance* means here a formal agreement among two or more states to intervene militarily on each other's behalf under more or less clearly specified conditions<sup>50</sup>. If such promises are (de facto) one-sided, as may be in case of states of clearly unequal strength, and in practice even in alliances, I refer to them also as *security guarantees*<sup>51</sup>. *Alignments* differ from alliances in that they are not written down in a formal treaty and have a lower level of *institutionalization*<sup>52</sup> (a matter I turn to in section 3.2.2.2).

Security cooperation requires shared security interests<sup>53</sup> and can be managed through two types of *security institutions*. First, alliances and alignments seek to deal with *external* threats by effectively combining members' military efforts. Second, security management institutions try to prevent security dilemmas from creating problems *among* member states by promoting cooperation.<sup>54</sup> Though alliances tend to be set up to counter external threats<sup>55</sup>, they can in practice become used for the latter purpose, too.

In a hypothetical situation where two states had fully identical interests, an alliance could seem unnecessary since they would anyway pursue the same goals. But still, an alliance could help to *coordinating* policies and forces: one end can be pursued in different ways. As (perceived) interests in practice always differ, an alliance *demonstrates* that despite differences, states see it as useful to cooperate on some issues. Alliances thus signal aims and interests<sup>56</sup>.

*Allies* are states in a formal alliance with each other, irrespective of their relative capabilities. Regarding security cooperation and alliances between states of unequal power, of which the stronger one provides security support to the weaker one, I also refer to the two sides as *patrons* and *clients*, irrespective of the exact form and depth of the relationship.

A common form of patron-client security cooperation is arms supply. Unlike alliances, this is a form of support for a client's internal build-up efforts, not of external efforts. Another state's internal efforts can be aided also in non-military ways, for instance through economic aid or preferential trade schemes, which can in turn enable patrons to try to

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<sup>50</sup> Hereby I follow Gelpi 1999, who writes that "an alliance represents a promise to intervene with military force on behalf of an alliance partner under specified conditions." P. 114. Citing Kegley & Raymond 1990 p. 52 (who in fact cite Bueno de Mesquita and Singer), Sorokin 1994 similarly defines alliances as "formal agreements between sovereign states for the putative purpose of coordinating their behavior in the event of specified contingencies of a military nature" (p. 423).

<sup>51</sup> Since the term alliance is in general often used when in practice unilateral security guarantees are meant, also by officials of the countries studied here, I find it impractical to define alliances as always concerning *mutual* promises of support.

<sup>52</sup> Varying criteria are used to distinguish between alliances and alignments. Morrow 2000 argues that alliances require formality since the interest the members share is not obvious to everybody, whereas alignments do not *need* to be written down and last (only) as long as the common interest does (p. 64). Haftendorn 1997 distinguishes between the two based on levels of institutionalization and durability (p. 18). But durability is a problematic criterion as it can be observed only ex-post. Wallander & Keohane 1999 use only the criterion of institutionalization and note that even NATO was first an alignment (p. 28). Thus formality does not necessarily mean institutionalization.

<sup>53</sup> Waltz 1979 p. 166.

<sup>54</sup> Wallander & Keohane 1999 pp. 26, 33-4.

<sup>55</sup> Waltz 1979 p. 166.

shape the domestic institutions of the client. Economic and military assistance both signal a commitment to a client and make it better able to defend itself<sup>57</sup>.

Next, I consider different *forms* of security commitments and international agreements in general. Focusing on security commitments, I then go on to discuss the issue of their level of institutionalization and, thereafter, risks and costs involved in making them. The risks and costs affect both whether a state is prepared to make commitments at all and how much formality and institutionalization it accepts.

### 3.2.2.1 Forms of international agreements

Security commitments and international agreements on cooperation in general have differing levels of *formality*, reflecting the goals of states making them. International law treats all formal and informal, oral and written international commitments made at any level of government as binding. But Lipson points out that it is misleading to consider *any* international agreements similarly binding as agreements made within national jurisdictions among private persons or companies since international agreements are self-enforced only.<sup>58</sup>

International agreements vary in formality based on 1) the level of government where they are made and 2) their form: written agreement, exchange of letters, joint communiqué, or oral or just tacit bargain. Content-wise formal, written agreements tend to differ from informal bargains in their greater level of detail and explicitness and clearer delimitation, though they, as Lipson notes, also allow for “deliberate ambiguity and omissions on controversial matters”.<sup>59</sup>

Otherwise informal agreements differ from formal treaties in that they tend to be quicker to conclude and more flexible. Government bureaucracies have greater control over them, including that parliaments have fewer chances to amend them, but at the same time the breadth of support for them among the public or political elites is less clear and “authority to make and execute them may be in doubt”. When desired, it is easier to keep them secret and their “sensitive and embarrassing implications” from becoming evident. Informal agreements are also less constraining as diplomatic precedents.<sup>60</sup>

In part these differences result from the fact that in, e.g., the US, formal treaties require ratification by the Congress and informal agreements do not<sup>61</sup>. Thus a formal alliance by the US indicates strong commitment to another state and a perception of largely similar in-

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<sup>56</sup> See, e.g., Morrow 1994; Morrow 2000 p. 63.

<sup>57</sup> Kohler 1972 p. 25.

<sup>58</sup> Lipson 1991 pp. 498, 502-8.

<sup>59</sup> Lipson 1991 p. 498.

<sup>60</sup> Lipson 1991 pp. 499-501.

<sup>61</sup> Lipson 1991 pp. 500, 514.

terests regarding what is covered by the treaty: these are likely conditions for congressional approval.

Lipson argues that formal treaties have higher “reputational costs of noncompliance” than informal agreements. Thus states use them especially to “signal their intentions with special intensity and gravity” and to benefit from a strong commitment by the other side.<sup>62</sup>

Paul argues that especially treaties on *automatic* action on behalf of attacked allies make security commitments credible. But Kohler points out that security guarantees tend to be conditioned so that they allow patrons to avoid entrapment and that ultimate decisions about honoring promises and choices of retaliatory measures are generally left to them. Efforts by clients to make such action automatic or gain influence regarding the decisions they have in general been unsuccessful and even led patrons to take distance from commitments.<sup>63</sup>

*Explicitness* of security commitments in turn affects their perceived reliability in two ways: it tends to increase confidence in them in situations explicitly covered, whereas in case of a less clear commitment, a state may feel greater pressure to assist its partner in *all* situations<sup>64</sup>.

States are likely to honor commitments, when tested, only if that is in their interest at that moment and to decide about this based on the expected overall effect on their security. Reneging on promises can enable avoiding costs of warfare but maybe allow a rival to get control over the state it threatens and erode the credibility of one’s other existing and future commitments. Jervis argues that this is a problem especially for the greatest powers, who thus tend to be gradually pulled into disputes over various issues that have little to do with their key interests. It is in guarantors’ interest to try to altogether prevent situations where commitments are unnecessarily tested. Nonetheless, clients sometimes successfully press them for repeated assurances on some issues that thus become tests of commitment, though they as such are not crucial for patrons (Kohler cites US commitments to the freedom of West Berlin as an example). But Morrow points out that since situations of test greatly vary, a reputation effect is in reality unlikely. In a statistical analysis, Huth & Russett found that when commitments are tested, a patron is more likely to defend a client that is relatively strong and if a formal alliance exists, whereas the patron’s historic record has no predictive power.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Lipson 1991 p. 508. Sorokin 1994 argues similarly (p. 423).

<sup>63</sup> Paul 2000 p. 23; Kohler 1972 pp. 6-7. On historic forms of security guarantees, their determinants, and functions, see pp. 8-26.

<sup>64</sup> Snyder, G. H. 1984 p. 473.

<sup>65</sup> See Kohler 1972 pp. 25-6; Jervis 1978 p. 169; Freedman 1989 p. 223; Morrow 1994 pp. 270-1; Morrow 2000 pp. 63, 71-2. Huth & Russett 1984 pp. 520-2. On alliances and alliance reliability in general, see Kegley & Raymond 1990 Chapter 3. Beaton 1966 argued that though in reality, the US would probably have been just as likely to retaliate a nuclear attack against, e.g., the Swiss, as against NATO allies, formal guarantees clearly helped people to trust that (pp. 117-8).

*Secret* agreements are used especially in case of sensitive, somehow humiliating, or politically problematic understandings that are sought quickly. Their other features include that breadth of support for them may remain unclear, they bind successors less, third parties remain unaware of intentions expressed in them, and they might not be understood even everywhere within the governments themselves.<sup>66</sup>

A *tacit understanding* can in turn emerge even without explicit cooperation or agreement of any kind, based only on each side's independent choices. A tacit understanding can be gradually established through, e.g., tit-for-tat (equivalent retaliation) strategy, where an actor first acts cooperatively and thereafter does so (only) if the other side cooperated in the preceding round.<sup>67</sup>

The form of a security commitment alone is not always very revealing. Walt points out that *de facto* changes in commitments tend not to lead to changes to formal treaties and that irrespective of their form, the real meaning of alliances varies from case to case. Morrow moreover points out that as effective alliances can be formed even at a time of crisis, the deterrent effect of an alliance can be achieved also short of formal guarantees during peacetime.<sup>68</sup>

### 3.2.2.2 Institutionalization of security cooperation

For instance Lefever and Paul argue that beyond a formal treaty, the credibility of alliance commitments depends on, e.g., stationing of foreign troops and nuclear forces on allied territory, integration of forces, closeness of military cooperation, and general ties<sup>69</sup>. Such measures indicate *institutionalization* of security cooperation, which is another important dimension of variation in security cooperation, stressed by RI.

Institutionalization signals states' aim to cooperate over a longer time, helps in the coordination of military efforts, and so enhances the credibility of commitments. It has three dimensions: 1) commonality, i.e., shared "expectations about appropriate behaviour"; 2) specificity, i.e., "specific and enduring rules" about members' responsibilities and how to change the rules or establish their validity; and 3) organized, legitimized functional differentiation among members. Thus in institutionalized security institutions, members share expectations about responses to various contingencies, have specific rules, procedures, and norms for the identification of threats and effective responses, and assume differentiated roles.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Lipson 1991 pp. 523-6.

<sup>67</sup> See Lipson 1991 pp. 499-502, 529.

<sup>68</sup> Walt 1987 p. 12; Morrow 2000 p. 64.

<sup>69</sup> Lefever 1979 pp. 125-6; Paul 2000 p. 23.

<sup>70</sup> Wallander & Keohane 1999 pp. 24, 28. This can apply to both mutual and one-directional security assistance.



The historic record indeed suggests that *tangible*, rather than formal, ties help patrons to effectively communicate resolve to protect clients to third states. Huth & Russett found in a statistical analysis of situations of immediate extended deterrence (where an opponent is seriously thinking to attack and a deterrer preparing to threaten with retaliation) that successful extended deterrence was predicted by 1) trade between patron and client; 2) military aid from patron to client; and 3) their combined relative local military strength. Unless formal alliances were supported by some tangible ties, which may enable patrons to limit adventurism by clients, they increased the risk for patrons to become involved in warfare.<sup>71</sup>

### 3.2.2.3 Costs, benefits, and risks of security cooperation

Since allied states only partially share interests and hold different views on how to best deal with the common threat they face, an alliance is often a compromise<sup>72</sup>. It is a bargain where states both give and gain something: a state is willing to tie an alliance when its benefits exceed its costs. Following relevant literature, I present this section as concerning alliances, but the arguments apply also in more general to security guarantees and such relatively binding security cooperation where a state significantly relies on another for its security and/or is tied to a partner's defence.

Allying entails two kinds of risks that play into choices about whether and how strong commitments to make and create the *alliance security dilemma*: risks of *abandonment*, i.e., that an ally fails to honor commitments if they are tested and of *entrapment*, i.e., that an ally pulls a state into a crisis against its interests. Unless very thorough integration in practice prevents this, the risk also exists that an ally de-aligns or even re-aligns towards a rival (Glenn Snyder's concept of risk of abandonment covers this risk; for the sake of clarity, I refer to this risk explicitly as that of de- or re-alignment). Alleviating concerns about these risks is problematic since they tend to vary inversely.<sup>73</sup>

Concern about entrapment, abandonment, and de-alignment result from differences in allies' (perceived) interests; the larger the differences, the more reason for concern. Glenn Snyder argues that the level of concern is also affected by 1) the ally's past behavior (but as discussed, this is no very good indicator of future behavior) and levels of 2) dependency on the ally, 3) need to prevent a rival from getting the ally on its side, and 4) explic-

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<sup>71</sup> Patron's historic record, overall military capability, or states' known possession of nuclear weapons had no significant effect on the likelihood of successful deterrence. Formal alliance as such made effective deterrence *less* likely. The authors suggest this is because in such cases, an opponent makes immediate threats only if it is very determined to pursue its interests even at the risk of war, which makes deterrence unlikely to succeed; thus without formal alliances, immediate threats could emerge more often. Huth & Russett 1984 pp. 496, 516-9, 522. Based on a formal model of alliances as signals of intention, Morrow 1994 argues that "tight" alliances with a high level of coordination in most cases tend to strengthen deterrence (pp. 293-4).

<sup>72</sup> Waltz 1979 p. 166.

<sup>73</sup> See Snyder, G. H. 1984 pp. 466-7; Sorokin 1994 p. 424.

itness of commitments (in contradicting ways, as discussed above).<sup>74</sup> For instance, state A is less likely to fear abandonment by state B if B has a record of trustworthiness, is dependent on A, and has to prevent a rival from getting control over A and if the alliance explicitly covers the threat scenario at work. Moreover, similarity of interests not only as such reduces risks of abandonment but is also likely to make states prepared to more thoroughly coordinate military forces<sup>75</sup>, which further alleviates the risk.

Especially force integration and joint planning can in practice to some respect limit states' independent options; less deep cooperation allows states greater freedom to pursue policies their partners dislike. Contradictory arguments have been made about how alliances affect chances of adventurism that increases risks of entrapment. For instance Gelpi provides evidence that "alliance ties can be used to restrain alliance partners in international crises"<sup>76</sup>. But Schwarz suggests that an alliance can enable or encourage reckless behavior by a client if it can be sure that its patron will protect it even if it causes a crisis<sup>77</sup>.

An alliance may involve mutual expectations of additional security. In security cooperation between non-equals, a *patron* typically promises a client greater security and expects to benefit in some other way. For instance Sorokin argues that it can hope to get political leverage over a client, and this would indeed appear as a likely price of security assistance. But based on a study on patron-client bargaining in the Middle East from 1955 to 1979, Walt provides evidence that even large amounts of aid seldom give patrons effective leverage over clients. These tend to follow patrons' wishes only when that promotes their own causes: aid can boost existing ties based on shared interests but not create alliances. He argues that giving security aid instead has the benefits of 1) strengthening states with similar interests as one's own; 2) signaling interest in a client's welfare to all sides; and 3) weakening an opponent's effort to control a client.<sup>78</sup> Other potential gains for a patron may include, e.g., privileged access to markets. A client's resources can also somewhat help in a joint defense effort. If a client pays for arms, arms supply can financially benefit a patron.

Sorokin argues that *weaker* states in turn choose between internal and/or external power build-up based on the relative price of arms to that of alliance tightness. Arms and allying can be complements or substitutes; how easily allying can be substituted for arming depends on, e.g., geography, urgency of threats, and offense-defense balance (see fn 17). Allying allows saving money and time but entails a risk of abandonment, which, however, alliance tightness can reduce. Internal efforts have the benefit that a state does not need to pay the price of allying, can decide about the use of its weapons alone and has in general more freedom of action, and does not need to fear abandonment. Sorokin notes that states

<sup>74</sup> Snyder, G. H. 1984 pp. 467, 471-4.

<sup>75</sup> Morrow 1994 p. 291.

<sup>76</sup> Gelpi 1999.

<sup>77</sup> Schwarz 1966 p. 145.

<sup>78</sup> See Walt 1987 pp. 225, 241-2; Sorokin 1994 p. 425.

in regional rivalries generally tend “to prefer the acquisition of cheap arms to promises of intervention that might not be honoured”.<sup>79</sup> But also acquiring arms from abroad can have a political price. Important further considerations for a client state are likely to be that strength achieved through internal efforts does not disappear as alliances dissolve and whether the patron would come to its help in a crisis even if no alliance existed, so that it does not pay the price of allying in vain.

Various arguments have been made about how the Cold War bipolarity affected risks of abandonment and entrapment. Goldstein argues that other states in general had relatively low military value for the superpowers and, therefore, reason to worry about abandonment in situations where the patron’s vital interests were not at stake and a risk of a general war existed<sup>80</sup>. Glenn Snyder argues that a severe *nuclear* alliance dilemma existed for clients as risks of the US extended nuclear deterrent being withdrawn or becoming seen as incredible by Moscow (abandonment) or of superpowers’ use of nuclear weapons in Europe (entrapment). But he also suggests that for both the US and its allies, risks of *general* abandonment (failing to honor commitments or de- or re-aligning) were in Europe in reality minimal: the US was so committed to its allies that it was both very unlikely to abandon them and likely to make much effort to prevent them from abandoning it, and it was not in Western Europeans’ interest to realign towards Moscow. Partial but illusionary surrogates for abandonment could exist: the superpowers could closely cooperate in system management at the cost of their allies’ interests, or a client could move towards neutralism. But neither case as such implied that a patron would not have defended its (former) clients if need be. Since fears of both US-Soviet collaboration and conflict tended to push US allies towards neutralism, the US needed to pursue a middle-ground policy towards Moscow.<sup>81</sup>

Waltz and Snyder argue that NATO, as a product of bipolarity and resulting joint interests, was stable as long as bipolarity lasted. Thus the dominance of the threat posed by the USSR meant that NATO states could pursue differing policies, even towards the East: the shared security interest was nonetheless strong enough to keep the alliance together. NATO would have only been at risk had the US come to see keeping Western Europe on its side as not crucial.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Sorokin 1994 pp. 422-4, 427, 431, 434. See also Goldstein 1993 pp. 216-7.

<sup>80</sup> Goldstein 1993 p. 215.

<sup>81</sup> Snyder, G. H. 1984 pp. 483-92. He argues that as the general risk of abandonment was low, a key question for states was how to deal with the risk of entrapment: by disassociating from the ally’s policy or restraining it through, e.g., economic pressure or refusal to support its actions.

However, such separate treatment of the nuclear and general issues is not very helpful since they were in practice intertwined in states’ consideration of alliance security dilemmas.

Kohler 1972 argued that lesser states’ options were also limited by superpowers’ tendency to give security guarantees only for states with political systems alike theirs (p. 166).

<sup>82</sup> Waltz 1979 pp. 184-5; Snyder, G. H. 1984 pp. 485, 495. See also Kissinger 1965 pp. 15-8.

### 3.3 Bargaining between states

In this section, I discuss factors that explain states' relative success in bargaining with each other. I will then apply these insights to explain the level of US ability to press its nonproliferation preferences on its clients.

States bargain to promote and protect their interests, sometimes with the result of agreement on cooperation of some kind. In bargaining situations, actors' interests overlap *partially*, their gains depend significantly on other side's moves, and agreement requires mutual expectation that it has a greater net value to oneself than non-agreement. But often cooperation can take many different forms that benefit the actors to varying degrees and *unevenly*. And power over resources does not equal power over outcomes: small states sometimes bargain successfully with states with large resources.<sup>83</sup>

In this overview, I consider only distributional bargaining (i.e., how a cake of gains from cooperation is divided), not efficiency bargaining (i.e., ensuring that the cake is as big as possible and neither side's gains could be increased without reducing those of the other)<sup>84</sup>. I base the overview of states' relative bargaining power in general especially on Schelling, Hopmann, and Muthoo, then bring up linkages between domestic issues and international bargaining in light of Putnam's theory of two-level bargaining, and finally discuss Walt's insights regarding patron-client bargaining in the Middle East<sup>85</sup>.

Actors' relative, real or successfully faked, situations on a number of dimensions have been identified as explanations for bargaining power. Generally, the side with smaller *costs of non-agreement*<sup>86</sup> and more *patience* regarding reaching agreement tends to have a stronger bargaining position. This means also that the side benefits that is better able to take the risk that negotiations fail owing to uncontrollable factors such as an external intervention that eliminates potential gains from cooperation or either side's becoming so frustrated with negotiations that it ends them at some random moment.<sup>87</sup>

The side with better options *outside* the negotiation table also benefits. But to play a role, an outside option has to have in sum at least equal value as cooperation would have; an actor can ignore such options by the other that this has no incentive to carry out.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Schelling 1960 p. 5; Hopmann 1978 p. 144; Keohane & Nye 1989 pp. 18, 53.

<sup>84</sup> On these concepts, see Schelling 1960 p. 21.

<sup>85</sup> The overview of asymmetrical bargaining presented here is basically limited to relatively simple two-party cases. See Hopmann 1978 on differences between two- and multi-party bargaining. Many insights about two-party situations can be applied to multi-party cases, especially when the multiple parties in practice act as two groups. One general point is that in negotiations between such coalitions, "the actor with the most stringent minimum acceptable position in effect sets the minimum for the coalition as a whole." Pp. 155-6.

<sup>86</sup> This is the factor Hopmann 1978 especially stresses (esp. p. 149) and indeed, many factors discussed here can be presented in terms of relative preparedness to accept non-agreement.

<sup>87</sup> Muthoo 2000 pp. 150-4, 157.

<sup>88</sup> Muthoo 2000 pp. 154-7.

Ability to *communicate credibly* is crucial in bargaining<sup>89</sup>. International negotiations take place under lacking information especially about the other side's true position. Information deficits generally cause disagreement and/or delays and thus make bargaining less efficient. Information advantage generally helps one's bargaining position. Bargainers have incentive to communicate their interests to each other enough to make agreement possible, but actor A may also benefit from ability to *deceive* actor B (more than B deceives A) about how A values different outcomes and especially what A's true minimum requirements for an acceptable deal are. Lipson notes that when information is lacking, clever bargainers can moreover promise to take "concession" action that they would have in reality taken even had they reached no quid pro quo from their negotiation partner.<sup>90</sup>

Governments may have or try to make irrevocable *commitments* to some minimum demands, which limits their freedom of action in international negotiations, for instance through public statements that put their reputation at stake and most strongly by "burning bridges" and making compromising impossible. The side with stronger existing commitments, better ability to credibly make new ones, and less capability for and/or greater costs of revoking such commitments benefits in terms of bargaining position. Such commitments can be used either just to disseminate true information about the range of possible agreements or to deceive the other side about own minimum needs. The commitments are often domestic; I return to linkages between domestic and international negotiations in a few moments. But also A's other topical or future negotiation situations with B or other states can improve A's ability to make commitments if A can credibly argue that concessions in one case would set a precedent and harm some general policy or force A to make concessions also in other cases. Use of commitments as a bargaining tactic requires willingness to take the risk of weaker chances of agreement: the outcome may be a situation with no potential solution compatible with both sides' commitments. If both then believe the other's commitments to reflect a true minimum, negotiations can end in a stalemate; if they suspect deception, talks can continue in hope of concessions by the other. A can benefit if it can somehow help relieve B fully or partially of its commitments through, e.g., reinterpretations or pointing out excuses. Ability to relieve oneself can help in face-saving if concessions are unavoidable, but prior awareness of such ability makes the other side likely to bargain harder. Hopmann points out that "the first concession is hard to make since the side making it reveals that its commitments were not really valid", thus weakening "the credibility of further commitments, leading to a chain reaction of concessions". As a result of misjudging B's situation, A can make too far-going commitments, which then force A to either forgo even a profitable deal or to start "a chain of concessions", with a risk of ending up with a worse result than what it could have reached had it made no such commitments.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> See Schelling 1960.

<sup>90</sup> Lipson 1991 p. 525; Muthoo 2000 pp. 162-5.

<sup>91</sup> Schelling 1960 pp. 19, 22-35, 40; Hopmann 1978 pp. 157-9; Muthoo 2000 pp. 160-2.

Agreement as such in turn requires that the two sides can 1) credibly promise to do what they agree upon, especially when incentives to cheat remain, and 2) make fulfillment of promises somehow observable<sup>92</sup>.

Beyond trying to manipulate how B *sees* the payoffs of potential agreements, A can try to affect B's *objective* payoffs and so change the range of possible cooperative outcomes. Ability of an actor to credibly offer negative or positive side-payments and to threaten with punishment in case of non-agreement or promise additional rewards after agreement enhances its bargaining position. Such ability depends on an actor's resources, reputation, and generally recognizable incentives to carry out threats and promises.<sup>93</sup>

Schelling points out that A can increase the credibility of commitments or threats it lacks incentives to carry out by, e.g., turning the ultimate choice over to B<sup>94</sup>. B can in turn try to protect its position by, e.g., acting quickly before A makes such commitments or committing itself irrevocably to the act A tries to prevent. Either side might also be able to use a piecemeal approach. A may divide the threat to smaller parts and demonstrate resolve by executing, if needed, one part, and B may divide the action A tries to deter into several steps and show resolve by taking one step.<sup>95</sup>

Though sets of potential agreements can be large, Schelling observes that the outcome is often some "simple" solution that stands out and appears superficially fair or reasonable, such as "splitting the difference", equal sharing, or some previously used (possibly fully unrelated) scheme for division of benefits.<sup>96</sup>

Somewhat conflicting points have been made regarding initiative-taking in negotiations. Muthoo argues that an initiative-taking, proposal-making side benefits in terms of bargaining power. But Hopmann sees a strong desire of agreement as an explanation for a state's initiative to present proposals at negotiations; if the desire is *relatively* stronger, it should weaken one's bargaining position.<sup>97</sup>

Putnam's argument about two-level games in international negotiations offers insights regarding linkages between international bargaining and *domestic factors* and the effect of asymmetries in this respect. He argues that in many international bargaining situations, actors have to simultaneously consider their domestic political audiences, especially those who in some way have to "ratify" the potential international agreement and generally those whom they try to please. Bargaining at the two levels can in practice take place si-

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<sup>92</sup> Schelling 1960 pp. 43-6.

<sup>93</sup> Hopmann 1978 pp. 149, 156, 161.

<sup>94</sup> If A's threat fails to prevent B's action, somehow undoing the threat can be in both sides' interest.

<sup>95</sup> Schelling 1960 pp. 35-43.

<sup>96</sup> Based on, e.g., practical experiments, he finds likewise that if bargainers cannot communicate directly, mutual expectations about each side's likely actions tend to converge towards focal points for outcomes. Schelling 1960 Chapter 3.

<sup>97</sup> Hopmann 1978 p. 176; Muthoo 2000 p. 165.

multaneously and iteratively and expectations regarding the requirements of one game influence bargaining in the other.<sup>98</sup>

The sizes of and overlap in international negotiators' *win-sets*, i.e., sets of outcomes that would reach national acceptance, affect the chances of an agreement, and the relative sizes of win-sets affect relative bargaining positions. Negotiator A's large win-set invites negotiator B to push A towards B's preferred outcomes; thus A can gain from a relatively small win-set (resulting, in terms used above, from domestic commitments of some kind) or from ability to present his win-set as small, in which B's natural information-deficit regarding A's domestic situation helps. A negotiator with a relatively weak or circumscribed domestic position can benefit at the international table from chances to stress the constraints on his ability to make concessions.<sup>99</sup> From A's perspective, limitedness of own win-set reduces the chances of agreement but improves relative bargaining position with B, whereas widening B's win-set (in terms used above by, e.g., helping to relieve B of its domestic commitments) is clearly in A's interest.<sup>100</sup>

Negotiators may use different arguments at home and at the international table. But large differences are unfeasible since few end results of negotiations allow for clearly varying interpretations.<sup>101</sup>

Lipson suggests that the person of the negotiator also matters. An individual with high status at home tends to be better able to offer side-payments and carry the domestic audience with him if he reaches an international agreement. Thus it is in A's interest not to have a higher-status negotiator than B has and A's chances of a better outcome in relative terms can improve if it can use a relatively lower-level negotiator.<sup>102</sup>

Putnam notes that the requirement of ratification by the Congress generally strengthens the USG bargaining position with other states but also "makes potential partners warier about dealings with the Americans"<sup>103</sup>. Though the USG has the general lead in US foreign policy, the Congress has some notable powers in the field, especially to approve and ratify international commitments and treaties, declare war, and appropriate funds. But it is not clear-cut and depends on power relations between the President and the Congress which treaties have to be submitted to congressional review. The constitution gives the President the right to make treaties and the Senate the role of advising him or her and approving them. But the President can make *executive agreements* with other states that require no Senate ratification and according to the Supreme Court have equal legal force.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Putnam 1988 pp. 434, 436.

<sup>99</sup> Putnam 1988 pp. 440, 452. Schelling 1960 similarly points out that the use of a bargaining agent with strict, inflexible, and visible instructions can be for benefit (p. 29). See also pp. 22-8.

<sup>100</sup> Putnam 1988 p. 450.

<sup>101</sup> Putnam 1988 p. 434.

<sup>102</sup> Putnam 1988 p. 452.

<sup>103</sup> See Putnam 1988 pp. 440, 448.

<sup>104</sup> See Lipson 1991 pp. 516-7; Hastedt 2005 p. 161. On war powers, see pp. 170-1.

At the same time, the President's need for congressional support for other policies also gives the Congress some de facto influence over foreign policy.

In the FRG, the Bundestag can in principle similarly influence the cabinet's foreign policy in various ways. For instance, it has to approve international agreements that affect the territorial integrity or independence of the FRG or its international position or influence or imply a transfer of sovereignty, typically excluding situations where the Bundestag has accepted a similar agreement before (for instance, since the Bundestag has approved the NATO treaty, its approval has not been required for new NATO strategies). The Bundestag can also use its power to appropriate funds, votes of no confidence, and constitutional legal challenges to force changes to the policy, and in case of national emergency, it has the power to determine and terminate a state of defense and decide about concluding peace. But Anderson points out (primarily based on evidence from the recent decades) that the Bundestag tends not to use these powers.<sup>105</sup>

In Israel, the Knesset's general power to choose the cabinet, dismiss it by withdrawing confidence, and introduce bills and launch debates in principle opens opportunities to influence foreign policy. But the Knesset's power is overall de facto restrained because of the subordination of Knesset members to their parties in the electoral system. The executive has a fairly strong position and the Knesset seldom takes stances in opposition to those of the cabinet.<sup>106</sup>

One further domestic factor relevant in my study is the fact that Israel has many influential friends in the US, who have been able to raise and benefit from sympathies towards the Jewish people in the US electorate. Israel's friends – a unified, wealthy, well-organized group that has skillfully used accepted interest group tactics to promote easily justifiable causes – have often successfully pressed their demands especially in the Congress regarding the level of US aid to Middle East states. Their role in financing election campaigns has given them some leverage even with presidents. Nevertheless, for instance Spiegel argues that during the presidencies considered here, the "Israel lobby" was not decisive regarding key foreign policy decisions, though it sometimes affected the *timing* of decisions or their announcement as presidents sought maximal benefits in electoral terms. In the Eisenhower era, the Israel lobby was overall unusually weak, whereas pro-Arab forces in the US generally offered little competition to it during the time studied here.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Anderson 2002.

<sup>106</sup> *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, <http://www.answers.com/topic/knesset> (25 Oct 07).

<sup>107</sup> Quandt 1977 argues that pro-Israel groups often have to do nothing to influence US policies: their *expected* reactions are taken into account in policy formulation (pp. 20-1). As Walt 1987 points out, when overt pressure is unnecessary, influence of interest groups is easily underestimated. Estimates of influence are also affected by the observer's views on the best foreign policy (p. 252). See Spiegel 1985 and Schoenbaum 1993 on the history of US-Israeli relations in general, including on the influence of Israel's friends in the US; Quandt 1977 pp. 21-2 on support for Israel in the Congress; Mearsheimer & Walt 2006 and Mearsheimer & Walt 2007 for much-debated article and book on the influence of the Israel lobby on US foreign policy (see also Walt 1987 pp. 253-9).



Turning to empiric findings about patron-client bargaining, as already mentioned, Walt found in his study on the Middle East that even large amounts of aid seldom give patrons effective leverage over clients. He concluded that a patron has more leverage when 1) a client lacks attractive alternatives to the relationship and 2) a patron's key interests are clearly involved in matters where it supports the client. Factors that explain clients' resistance to pressure include 1) their evident value for patrons; 2) their tendency to bargain harder – they have more at stake in regional issues than especially superpower patrons; 3) the fact that aid makes them stronger and thus less dependent on patrons; 4) the fact that aid commits a patron's prestige to and implies an investment in a client, which makes aid cut-down unlikely (thus generous aid may be a sign of a client having successfully coerced a patron into ever greater help); and 5) domestic constraints on a patron's ability to change the level of aid. To get more support, clients also tried to make especially the USG exasperatingly concerned about the risk of their re-alignment, even though switching to the Soviet side was seldom in their interest.<sup>108</sup>

Based on insights of SR, RI, and bargaining theory, I now present my research hypotheses.

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<sup>108</sup> Walt 1987 pp. 44, 225, 236-41, 282. For similar arguments, see also Snyder, G. H. 1984 pp. 467, 473; Keohane & Nye 1989 pp. 30-1. Mack 1975 similarly explains stronger states' failures to win some wars against smaller states by their weaker interests at stake, as a result of which the domestic public or domestic political competition forces the stronger state to back down from warfare. In Walt's study, the US had greater leverage with Israel than either superpower had with other Middle East states, which had good chances of re-alignment and were thus little dependent on their patrons. Walt argues that US threats to restrict aid caused Israeli restraint regarding Jordan waters, its post-Suez withdrawal from the Sinai, and possibly restraint in nuclear efforts in the early 1960s. Pp. 233-7.



## 4 Research hypotheses

In this study, I use insights of SR and RI to explain, respectively, the basic *orientation* of foreign and security policies and the practical *workings* of security cooperation among states. I propose that balance-of-power considerations and national security interests explain both the stance of the USG towards possibility of proliferation and the extent of security cooperation it was prepared to undertake with other states. Whether such cooperation came about and how far it was institutionalized, and thus how reliable and credible the protection the USG offered to them was, is in turn an explanation I suggest for whether the USG was able to persuade its client states to forgo acquiring nuclear weapons. Based on insights of bargaining theory, I further propose explanations for the level of bargaining power of the USG when it pressed its nonproliferation preferences on Israel and the FRG.

This study seeks to explain the differences in US security and nonproliferation policies towards Israel and the FRG. Also further important questions emerge from this basis. How can security cooperation affect proliferation prospects and be used as a nonproliferation policy? Does the case of the FRG demonstrate successful US use of security cooperation as a nonproliferation policy? If so, what did this cooperation have to include to have this effect? Does Israel's case demonstrate US incapability or lack of will to prevent proliferation? Could greater security cooperation with the US have kept Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons? Alone the facts that the US has given security guarantees for the FRG but not for Israel and that Israel but not the FRG has acquired nuclear weapons do not prove any causal relationship or that security cooperation is a sensible nonproliferation policy in other cases, too.

My first hypothesis (H 1) is that concern about own security explains USG policy choices. Thus USG stances towards prospects of nuclear weapons proliferation by, or security cooperation with, a particular state depended on how it expected proliferation, or security cooperation, to affect the balance-of-power vis-à-vis Moscow (long-term security) and risks of the US becoming entrapped in warfare (immediate security). The key indication I use for the reasons of specific policies is justifications put forward within the USG. This translates into the following sub-hypotheses.

1.1 The USG stance towards the possibility of acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel or the FRG depended on how it expected that to affect the balance-of-power vis-à-vis Moscow and/or the risk for the US of entrapment in warfare.

1.2 Whether the USG was willing to guarantee the security of Israel or the FRG depended on whether it expected doing so overall to have a negative or a positive effect on the security of the US in terms of the balance-of-power vis-à-vis Moscow and/or risks of entrapment in warfare.

My second hypothesis (H 2) is that the level of institutionalization of security cooperation explains whether security cooperation with the US was enough to keep client states from

pursuing own nuclear weapons: institutionalization alleviated cooperation problems and was suited to reduce Israeli and West German concerns about defection by the US. My consideration of this question is somewhat limited by the fact that regarding primary sources, I focus on US policies, use West German documents to a lesser extent, and have not benefited from access to Israeli documents. This is because I primarily study *US* policies and owing to practical considerations regarding access to materials. I assess my material nonetheless to enable me to consider this question since 1) it includes literature on West German and Israeli policies, some of it based also on Israeli primary sources<sup>1</sup>, and 2) as indications of what the client states saw as requirements for forgoing nuclear weapons, I can study the arguments they used with the USG (taking into account the chance that the clients would have sought to deceive the USG on this).

My third hypothesis (H 3) is that the following factors and resulting bargaining tactics affected the bargaining power of the USG and its client states and thus help explain how far and strongly the USG was able to press its nonproliferation preferences on them: ability to credibly 1) threaten to forgo agreement and cooperation, resulting from impressions of significant outside options; 2) refer to existing or make new commitments that tie one's hands and limit ability to make concessions; 3) promise rewards and/or threaten with punishments.

I assume US decision-making to be characterized by rationality in the sense that based on the information available to them, decision-makers *seek to realize their most preferred outcomes*. This implies that they have consistent preferences about the effects of alternative courses of action they perceive and make decisions based on that order and the perceived likelihood of different developments. This concept of rationality is limited compared to an ideal rationality model, where decisions would be made after comparing *all potential*, possibly nearly endlessly many, alternatives. I assume that as a result of involvement of several intelligent individuals in policy-making, a number of alternatives will be put forward that are likely to include the most relevant ones. I also allow for the possibility that decision-makers make mistakes in assessing the likelihood and effects of different courses of action.<sup>2</sup>

In line with game theory, this concept includes that states consider others' likely reactions in their cost-benefit analyses for different policies. When choosing policies, the USG considered 1) how best to affect the cost-benefit ratios of the FRG and Israel about nuclear weapons and 2) the expected reactions to various courses of action by third states – (po-

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<sup>1</sup> Most importantly, Cohen, A. 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Consistence of preferences means that an actor cannot prefer both situation A over situation B and B over A. Rationality is often defined additionally as reflexivity and completeness of preferences but Keck argues that the former requirement is rather a matter of mathematical finesse and the latter not necessary in social sciences since knowing the full preference order is not always needed. On the rationality assumption, see Huth & Russett 1984 p. 499; Keck 1993b p. 41; Keck 1999 pp. 215-7.

tential) rivals of the two states, the USSR, and other states whose proliferation decisions could be affected by those of the FRG and Israel and by US policies towards them.

I am especially interested in the policies of the US since due to its great power, it was more than any other state, save possibly for the USSR, in a position to affect other states' choices about nuclear weapons. I focus on the actions of the President and his administration, which have the general lead in foreign policy, but expect my hypotheses to apply to US policies in general, irrespective of whether just the executive branch or also the Congress influenced their formulation.

My explanatory framework has its limitations. I may be criticized for giving little attention to domestic political and organizational battles and influences, cultural factors, the technical and practical sides of US cooperation with Israel and the FRG at lower levels, or personal, psychological, and cognitive factors related to policy-makers. But in developing theoretical explanations, explanatory models need to be simplified by leaving the study of some factors out: as Waltz argues, "theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually" and the justifiability of the isolation depends on whether it is useful in terms of explanatory and predictive power, rather than on whether it is realistic<sup>3</sup>. Would the factors I put forward alone not appear as sufficiently powerful explanations, further complementary studies could be made with other factors as explanations for states' choices about security and nonproliferation policies and their effectiveness.

One point still to note is my use of language regarding "states' actions". Behind the actions there are of course human beings who alone or collectively act, think, intend, or say something and are influenced by various constraints on their position. Leaders, primarily motivated by personal well-being and political survival, choose policies<sup>4</sup> and this may motivate policies not be in the best (security) interest of the country. But leaders are likely to also be interested in the security and survival of their state to ensure that they continue to have something to lead. Especially in a country like the US where leaders are accountable to the public, a wish to remain in office, win a second term, and avoid public criticism and discord with the Congress, which can limit one's general freedom of action, imply that the

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<sup>3</sup> Waltz 1979 pp. 8-10. See also Frankel 1993 p. 38.

<sup>4</sup> Thus Byman & Pollack 2001(a and b) and Bueno de Mesquita 2002 argue that IR research today gives too little attention to the role of individuals, their personality, and views (and to domestic issues), though these can much affect states' actions.

Hastedt 2005 suggests that "situational factors, role variables, and the common socioeconomic backgrounds of policy makers place severe constraint on the impact of personality on policy" and that in most situations, personalities and individuals matter little (pp. 184, 187). But in public discussion and presentations of policy, leaders' persons and personality are much emphasized: they are praised or blamed for policies, with the implication that different persons would pursue different policies. Different leaders are seen to perceive international situations and various strategies in different ways and have differing personalities, belief systems, and mental ways to process information and make decisions. Levy 1998 p. 157. The effects of such factors on decisions have received quite much attention, special areas of study including leader personalities (Barber 1992), their (mis-)perceptions (Jervis 1976), the question of "learning" from history (Levy 1994), and common biases in weighting different options for action (Levy 1997). On such research, see also Levy 1998 pp. 157-8.

President has to make choices that at least can credibly be presented as not violating the state's fundamental security interests. The implementation of leaders' decisions depends on other individuals, but a system of accountability reduces the chances of them disregarding given orders. As certain individuals have, based on positions they occupy (in case of democracies, as a result of elections or nominations according to procedures given by constitutions or the like i.e. agreements that define a state), authority to decide about a state's policies, I for convenience's sake refer to the decisions of such individuals as states' actions. Still, when appropriate, I refer to the persons making the decisions.

Before I move on to the empiric part of this study, I next discuss nuclear weapons, their spread, and policies to stop that from a theoretical and general point of view.

## 5 Nuclear weapons and international relations

This chapter provides theoretical background regarding states' decisions about acquiring nuclear weapons and a discussion of practical aspects of proliferation and nonproliferation. After some definitions and comments on the technology-side of proliferation, in section 5.1 I discuss the deterrent function of nuclear weapons and states' path to achieving it. Thereafter I outline the debate on the effects of proliferation, a question that affects USG stances towards the possibility of proliferation and its preparedness to act to prevent it. In section 5.3, I discuss different explanations for why some states pursue nuclear weapons. I conclude the chapter with an overview of nonproliferation policy options.

First, some definitions. Two types of nuclear weapon proliferation exist: *horizontal*, i.e., the spread of nuclear weapons to further states, and *vertical*, i.e., acquisition of more or better nuclear weapons by an existing nuclear power. I consider only horizontal proliferation and refer with the term "proliferation" to horizontal nuclear weapon proliferation. A *proliferant* is a state that pursues or is strongly suspected to pursue nuclear weapons. Almost any state with some level of technological capability and economic resources can be a *potential proliferant*. A *nuclear weapon state* (NWS), i.e., a *nuclear power* is a state that controls usable nuclear explosive devices, whether or not it has publicly tested them or declared itself as one. If it has not, it can be called an *opaque* nuclear power. All other states are *non-nuclear (weapon) states* (NNWS), irrespective of what they otherwise do in the field of nuclear energy.<sup>1</sup>

Technical data and knowledge needed to develop nuclear weapons is wide-spread and the key hurdle to doing so, i.e. to "going nuclear", is to acquire enough fissile material for the core of a weapon. This can be either plutonium (PU) or highly enriched uranium (HEU) containing at least 90 % of uranium isotope 235 (U-235). Plutonium does not appear in nature but can be separated from spent uranium fuel; thus the amount of it potentially available for weapons has grown together with the spread of PU-producing reactors. In a nuclear explosion, huge amounts of energy are released in a process of fission where an atom is split. The destructive power of a nuclear weapon greatly grows if the fission is used to trigger a fusion among atoms. Developing such thermonuclear explosives requires great industrial and economic resources and a prior development of a fission explosive.<sup>2</sup>

Irrespective of whether a HEU- or PU-path to weapons is chosen, civilian uses can be used to justify reactors and fuel plants needed in fissile material production. Slightly and low-enriched uranium is used in civilian research and power reactors, but the same enrichment plants can be used for HEU-production. HEU as such can also be used in scien-

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<sup>1</sup> Following Waltz 1981, some authors avoid the term nuclear proliferation: it implies a rapid spread, and nuclear weapons have spread rapidly only vertically, not horizontally. But as the term is widely used, for the sake of convenience I use it to mean the spread of nuclear weapons. My definition of a NWS differs from that of the NPT (1 July 68), according to which a NWS "has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967".

<sup>2</sup> For a primer on nuclear weapons, see Meyer 1984 pp. 173-93; Zimmermann 1993; Gardner 1994.

tific research. Civilian research and power reactors produce plutonium, and after reprocessing also plutonium can in principle be used to fuel reactors. Considerations of fuel availability and a need to avoid alerting other states affect national choices of reactor technology and, simultaneously, possible weapon route.<sup>3</sup>

The HEU-route requires either foreign HEU supply or a national enrichment facility. But HEU suppliers have tended to demand safeguards on their exports. Early on, the US was the only potential supplier in the non-communist world and demanded them. During the first decades of the nuclear era, the key process used for enrichment was gaseous diffusion, which uses much electricity and is very costly. Thus such activity was hard to hide or credibly present as motivated by civilian needs and was not feasible for most states. Later, several states developed gas centrifuge technology, which is more efficient and consumes much less electricity. A further development was laser technology, which is highly efficient, requires relatively little electricity, but is technically very challenging.

PU-production is in turn possible in both natural and enriched-uranium reactors. From early on, more suppliers existed for natural uranium and thus chances of unsafeguarded supply were greater. But some natural uranium reactors are moderated with heavy water, the production of which in sufficient amounts is not feasible for all states. With a PU-reactor, a weapon production capability is achieved more slowly but with less special effort and less overtly than through the HEU, gaseous diffusion route (but this does not apply to the later developments of centrifuge and laser technology).

### **5.1 Nuclear deterrence and the path to achieving it**

A state can use nuclear weapons both as military weapons in nuclear attacks or as political weapons in promotion or protection of its interests. Since nuclear weapons can cause great destruction, making a nuclear attack makes sense in very rare situations, especially when nuclear retaliation is possible. In 1945, it was shown that in some situations, nuclear attacks can be made. But such attacks were then more feasible than they have been since the late 1940s because the US did not need to fear retaliation in kind. That risk, even when small, is a strong incentive against nuclear attacks. The key function of nuclear weapons thus came to be to *deter* nuclear attacks and any large-scale aggression by other states.<sup>4</sup>

Technically, nuclear deterrence is based on a secured ability to make a nuclear *second strike*, i.e., to cause unacceptable damage on an enemy even after absorbing an attack; it is

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<sup>3</sup> On the nuclear fuel cycle, reactor types, and associated proliferation risks, see Gardner 1994 pp. 11-35. See also Radkau 1983 p. 58; Keck 1993a p. 177, and on requirements of a nuclear weapon program, Meyer 1984 pp. 20-43, 173-203.

<sup>4</sup> Classic works on nuclear deterrence include Brodie 1946; Snyder 1973 (orig. 1961). To some respect, deterrence contradicts defense: building up defenses can indicate that a state does not trust its ability to deter others. Deterrence aims at preventing aggression, defense its success, and both at convincing others that aggression is not worthwhile. See also, e.g., Richardson 1966 pp. 140-2, 159-98; Waltz 1981.



a destructive capability that an enemy cannot eliminate<sup>5</sup>. To achieve it, a state needs enough secure, survivable, operational nuclear weapons and suitable means of delivery compared to opposing forces. Moreover, nuclear deterrence depends on perceived resolve to strike if deterrence fails<sup>6</sup> and on the opponent's perceived resolve: success of deterrence depends on both sides' cost-benefit calculations regarding the outcomes of various courses of action and their likelihood<sup>7</sup>.

As already noted in the section on bargaining theory, a factor that can reduce the credibility, and thus success of, deterrence is that if it fails, the best policy may be not to execute the threat as doing so can lead to renewed action against oneself. Signaling resolve to execute a nuclear threat is especially challenging in case of *extended deterrence*, where action on behalf of other states can lead to a nuclear attack on the guarantor itself.<sup>8</sup> But a fact that helps make even extended deterrence credible is that deterrence is based on *potential* force, a *chance*, rather than certainty, that aggression leads to retaliation: few, if any, states are likely to willingly accept any clear risk of nuclear retaliation. The risk is significant when vital interests of the deterrer are at stake. But nuclear deterrence does not work regarding less crucial issues or prevent all inter-state conflict: a deterrent has to be relative to what is at stake. Waltz argues that the credibility of a deterrent depends also on who has *more* at stake and that when this is unclear, as in case of blurred territorial disputes, nuclear deterrence does not work. For instance, Israel's nuclear weapons do not deter attacks on areas occupied by Israel since Israel is not likely to accept a risk nuclear retaliation for those areas' sake.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, due to the risk of nuclear fall-out, making nuclear attacks close to homeland is problematic.

Deterrence requires no huge nuclear force but an ability to inflict *unacceptable*, instead of unlimited, damage. The opponent has to see that a part of a force would survive a first attack and be usable for retaliation. Whereas such complex nuclear war strategies as the US developed requires a large arsenal, the nuclear strategy of a small nuclear power is likely to be to threaten to make an all-out counter-value attack and thus existential deterrence.<sup>10</sup>

Though costs are often seen as a disincentive to nuclear weapon development<sup>11</sup>, nuclear weapons are not necessarily expensive compared to conventional arms. Jervis argues that

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<sup>5</sup> A *first-strike capability* in turn enables destroying enemy nuclear forces with *counter-force* strikes before they are used and thus removing the chance of retaliation. See Freedman 1989 p. 135. Nuclear deterrence is primarily based on capability for *counter-value* attacks on cities or other targets of great value to the enemy.

<sup>6</sup> Huth & Russett 1984 pp. 501-2; Freedman 1989 p. 193. Huth & Russett argue that resolve depends on a state's risk-proneness and its stakes in the situation.

<sup>7</sup> Huth & Russett 1984 point out that such calculations can change quickly: a wave of uprisings in Eastern Europe could have for instance at once turned those of Moscow to favor action against the West (p. 514).

<sup>8</sup> On nuclear deterrence, its credibility, and ways to enhance that, see Schelling 1960; Waltz 1981; Freedman 1989 (esp. pp. 219-22), and on the debate about the operation and vulnerability of extended deterrence, Huth & Russett 1984 p. 501 also fn 9.

<sup>9</sup> See Brodie 1946 p. 75; Schelling 1960 pp. 5, 9; Wohlstetter 1961 pp. 377-86; Rosen 1977 pp. 1377-8; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita & Riker 1982 p. 300; Visuri 1997 p. 369.

<sup>10</sup> See Waltz 1981; Freedman 1989 p. 306.

<sup>11</sup> See Gardner 1994 p. 82; Reiss 2004 p. 12.

they indeed are a relatively cheap way to provide security. The OTA estimated in 1993 that the “cheapest overt production route for one bomb per year, with no international controls, is about \$200 million [total]; larger scale clandestine program could cost 10 to 50 times more, and even then not be assured of success or of remaining hidden. Black-market purchase of ready-to-use fissile materials or of complete weapons could be many times cheaper”. In comparison: Israel’s yearly military spending valued \$9,45 billion in 2005, Germany’s military budget was \$36,5 billion in 2006.<sup>12</sup>

Each case of pursuing nuclear weapons is a long (possibly reversible) process with uncertain success. Though a state may aim at weapons from early on, the process can also start with a civilian nuclear program and no clear goal to develop weapons. A decision to do so can also be made only after securing required capabilities: governments tend to avoid clear, explicit decisions about pursuing nuclear weapons since early decisions are often both unnecessary and politically risky. As mentioned in the introduction, because civilian and military nuclear capabilities overlap, (officially) civilian programs have made of many states *latent nuclear powers* with capabilities – required facilities and know-how – to produce weapons relatively quickly. Similar concepts are *threshold* countries and what Levite labels *nuclear hedging*. Such strategies give a latent deterrent and leverage towards other states; Reiss argues especially that when proliferation became a concern to the US, the chance to improve own bargaining position became for its partners an extra incentive to acquire latent capabilities. Also the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) M. ElBaradei stresses that states “look at know-how as a deterrent ... If you have nuclear material, the weapon part is not far away” and points out especially that by acquiring enrichment capabilities, a state can get a de facto deterrent without violating the NPT. By shortening the time within which a crash program would realize an operational nuclear force, a latent or hedging strategy improves a state’s chances to react fast to new circumstances and reduces the risk of preventive action by others. Whether a state pursues nuclear weapons or only a capability to quickly develop, and deliver, them in practice makes no big difference in technology, at least until a state reaches the stage where it can manufacture and operationalize weapons, but it may make a difference regarding the political commitment to the effort.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Meyer similarly estimated the minimum costs of national production of nuclear weapons from a scratch as \$172 million in 1980 figures and the time requirement as six years. Existing nuclear infrastructure can much reduce the costs and the time-lag. See Meyer also on general defense costs compared to costs of nuclear weapons. Jervis 1978 p. 198; Meyer 1984 pp. 37-40, 194-203; OTA 1993 p. 11; “Chancellor Unleashes New Defense Spending Debate”, *Deutsche Welle*, 7 Sep 06 (<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2166295,00.html>; 15 Sep 07); DOS 2007. On the costs, see also Betts 1993 pp. 103-5.

<sup>13</sup> See Quester 1972; Lefever 1979 pp. 10-1; Meyer 1984 pp. 5-6; Reiss 1988 p. 259; Levite 2002 pp. 67, 69, 72-3; Reiss 2004 p. 4; “Peaceful Nuclear Technology Can Be Effective “Deterrent,” IAEA Chief ElBaradei Warns”, 10 Dec 04 (28 Nov 05) ref. to *Financial Times*, 9 Dec 04. The number of latent nuclear powers has been estimated as 36 by 1980 and over 40 since the 1990s. See Meyer 1984 p. 41 (pp. 31-43 on latent capabilities in general); Frankel 1993 pp. 45, 71; “More Than 40 Countries Could Have Nuclear Weapons Know-How, IAEA Chief ElBaradei Warns”, *GSN*, 22 Sep 04. Glaser 1998 suggests that in defining NWSs, it would make sense to consider how far a state is from acquiring the weapons and not just whether it has acquired them (p. 127).

Once a production capability is achieved, the question of what to do with it becomes more topical. A decision to produce weapons can still be postponed if the threat that motivates the capability is not acute (depending, however, whether a large, sophisticated force is seen as needed to deter the opponent). If a decision to produce weapons is made and executed, a further step is to make them fully operational by combining them with a suitable delivery system, deploying them, and integrating them into military strategy.<sup>14</sup> But even this step can be delayed. At the same time, even when acquiring capabilities to produce nuclear weapons turns out to be difficult, states are unlikely to give up their efforts unless the motivation for them disappears.

A state might opt for a latent strategy also if it pursues a policy of 1) *nuclear restraint* based on a national policy or external commitment not to go beyond some critical point in the nuclear effort, most commonly in the form of NPT membership or 2) *nuclear reversal* – de facto abandonment or slow-down of a weapon effort, a typically gradual, not clearly goal-oriented, and reversible process.<sup>15</sup>

Already in 1972, Quester argued that the time-lag to produce the weapons was for many states getting so short that others would maybe fail to detect a crash weapon effort in time to react, which would eliminate the deterrent effect of their doing so. He argued that a “mere desire for scientific tidiness” and “fears of some pre-emptive intervention” would push states with latent capabilities towards crash programs and their rivals towards pre-emption.<sup>16</sup> Such fears have not materialized, and Meyer on the contrary suggests that latent capabilities can *reduce* states’ need to acquire operational capabilities. Van Evera argues that the fact that several NNWSs have latent nuclear capabilities much reduces the risk of war in Europe.<sup>17</sup> But many observers stress the proliferation dangers involved in unrestricted civilian nuclear efforts that give latent capabilities<sup>18</sup>.

Acquisition of nuclear weapons or a capability to produce them is sometimes but not always demonstrated in a test explosion and/or declaration of a NWS status. Overt testing as such is not necessary for developing rudimentary nuclear weapons<sup>19</sup>. A state can choose an *opaque* proliferation route where its “nuclear capability has not been acknowledged, but is recognized in a way that influences other nations’ perceptions and actions<sup>20</sup>”. The likely ef-

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Kohler 1972 defines threshold states through economic and technological capabilities that would enable producing nuclear weapons within a few years (p. 104). On different concepts of a threshold state and usefulness of that status, see Quester 1991. Levite defines nuclear hedging as “maintaining, or at least appearing to maintain, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capacity” (p. 69).

<sup>14</sup> See Meyer 1984 p. 6; Levite 2002 p. 72.

<sup>15</sup> See Levite 2002 pp. 67-9, 74.

<sup>16</sup> Quester 1972.

<sup>17</sup> Meyer 1984 p. 89; Van Evera 1990 p. 13.

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., the report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, p. 44; Campbell & Einhorn 2004; Allison 2004; Levi & O’Hanlon 2005.

<sup>19</sup> See, e.g., Zimmermann 1993 p. 354; OTA 1993 p. 35.

<sup>20</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 2.

fects of an opaque nuclear strategy are that the weapons are neither openly deployed, included in official strategy, nor debated, and the nuclear effort is isolated from the basic security policy. An opaque strategy has the benefit of avoiding sanctions by other states while acquiring a deterrent (assuming the nuclear capability is not kept *fully* secret). Also one effect of the NPT regime has been to drive nuclear programs “underground”<sup>21</sup>: the norm of nonproliferation makes states to either try to keep efforts conflicting with it secret or to acquire just advanced latent capabilities.

## **5.2 Nuclear proliferation: security threat or stabilizer?**

Nuclear weapons have received much credit for having kept the Cold War cold and it is not exorbitant to argue that they made major great power war most unlikely<sup>22</sup>. The superpowers’ second-strike forces created a balance of terror that hindered the use of nuclear weapons and even of conventional force when their vital interests were at stake.

Another question is the effect of a spread of nuclear weapons on smaller states. Nuclear attacks could have disastrous effects, but the weapons also help to deter wars in the first place. A number of scholars, starting with Viner in fall 1945 and including prominently Gallois, Waltz, and Mearsheimer, have argued that the spread of nuclear weapons can indeed promote peace. Virtually anyone, so the argument, is deterred from using nuclear weapons if a *chance* of retaliation exists. Thus after acquiring them, opposing states become more careful in actions towards one another. As developing nuclear weapons takes time, proliferants also have time to learn moderation. Waltz expects the risk of escalation to prevent any conflicts on vital issues between NWSs and suggests that major conventional and nuclear arms races between new NWSs could be avoided as nuclear weapons remove the need to match an adversary’s capabilities in quantity and quality. In the right circumstances, even a small arsenal can give a second-strike capability. Only an opponent’s achievement of “near-miracles” of a first-strike capability or effective nuclear defense would make an arsenal obsolete. Secure second-strike forces can also promote equality of power among great powers and, through clarity about relative power, successful balancing.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> See Frankel 1991 who provides a thorough discussion of opaque proliferation; Feaver 1993 p. 175 (on different levels of opaque proliferation pp. 175-8); Paul 2000 p. 152.

<sup>22</sup> In a way nuclear weapons and missiles also made direct US-USSR war possible: in their absence, the distance between and great size of the two states would have made such war difficult. Freedman 1989 p. 49.

<sup>23</sup> Gallois 1961; Waltz 1981; Waltz 1990a; Mearsheimer 1990 p. 20; Waltz 1993; Waltz 1995 p. 804; Lavoy 1995 pp. 700-1. Also Brodie 1946 already proposed that if schemes were created to ensure that nuclear aggressors would face a risk of nuclear retaliation, nuclear weapons would strongly inhibit aggression (p. 75). Glaser 1998 even argues that nuclear weapons allow states to overcome the security dilemma by enabling them to deter each other without threatening others’ deterrents (p. 116).

Waltz 1981 explains Israel’s large spending on conventional arms by its need to defend the occupied territories by other means since nuclear deterrence does not work regarding them. He argues that US aid makes it unnecessary for Israel to withdraw to a territory that the nuclear deterrent would protect.

Bueno de Mesquita & Riker specify the argument so that proliferation is desirable to states whose rivals already have nuclear weapons: *symmetrical* nuclear capabilities keep conflicts from turning nuclear. Moreover, since developing countries tend to have no air defense capabilities and only a few very valuable targets for nuclear attacks, mutual nuclear deterrence among them requires just a few nuclear weapons and some kind of aircraft to deliver them. Thus proliferation can promote stability and is likely especially among them.<sup>24</sup> For instance Rosen argued in the 1970s that proliferation could in particular promote military stability in Israel-Arab relations and so improve chances of a diplomatic solution to the conflict<sup>25</sup>.

The historic record does not contradict the proliferation optimist view. The five acknowledged NWSs have not waged direct war against each other after acquiring nuclear weapons. The Kashmir conflict did continue after India and Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities and declared themselves as nuclear powers, but that conflict is a blurred border conflict where Waltz does not argue nuclear deterrence to work. This applies also to the Arab-Israel conflict as far as areas occupied by Israel in 1967 are concerned (moreover, in this conflict, no *mutual* nuclear deterrence exists).

But many observers doubt whether the assumptions proliferation optimism is based on – mutual acquisition of secure second-strike forces; no preventive attack before that; unauthorized or accidental use is no concern – hold and create stable deterrence in all situa-

Waltz seems not to derive his proliferation optimist view directly from SR and does not explicitly explain the relation between the two. Deudney 1993 criticizes this, arguing Waltz's proliferation optimism is unrelated to and partially inconsistent with SR, which moreover "largely lacks the ability to analyze the effects of new technology, unless it alters the distribution of power" (pp. 12-6). But in fact, Waltz's two theories seem complementary. He does see the introduction of nuclear weapons and new military technology in general as a *unit-level* change *within* a system but with "system-wide effects" (1979 p. 67 and 2004 p. 5). In 1981, he adopted Jervis's thesis about offense-/defense-dominance and portrayed bipolarity and nuclear weapons as *complementary* reasons for post-WWII peace (neither being subordinate to the other). Even under the more war-prone multipolarity, nuclear weapons significantly promote effective balancing (1993 p. 74); he even argues that "among states armed with nuclear weapons peace prevails whatever the structure of the system may be" (2004 p. 5).

Deudney's criticism seems to result from terminological confusion: whereas Waltz argues that nuclear weapons can promote stability as *absence of war*, Deudney considers his stability point in the sense of continuation of particular *eras of polarity*. Waltz indeed stresses that nuclear weapons do not alone make great powers (see section 5.3.2).

As Frankel 1993 points out, it is hard to *compare* the effects of bipolarity and nuclear weapons on the international system as the historic cases of both largely coincide (p. 40).

<sup>24</sup> Bueno de Mesquita & Riker 1982. But they also stress the limits of the pro-proliferation view: in regions where no proliferation has taken place yet, its start would not promote peace; achievement of nuclear symmetry between two states can lead to new asymmetrical state pairs; proliferation can increase terrorists' chances to get access to nuclear weapons; and preemptive strikes can occur before symmetry is established (pp. 303-5).

Karl 1996 points out that though resource constraints may make third world nuclear arsenals vulnerable, they also limit other similar states' capabilities for counter-force attacks (p. 104).

Offense-defense balance theory (see Chapter 3 fn 17) in turn stresses that nuclear weapons discourage offense. See Mearsheimer 1990 pp. 20-1; Van Evera 1990 pp. 12-3, and also Van Evera 1998 pp. 33-4.

<sup>25</sup> Rosen 1977. Lefever 1979 argued on the contrary that Egypt's acquisition of nuclear weapons would probably be destabilizing (pp. 80-1). As Krause 1994 notes, the nature of the conflict and both sides' vulnerability to nuclear attacks later made most analysts think that Israel's rivals' getting nuclear weapons would not create a stable balance of terror (p. 45).

tions. The proliferation pessimists argue that some proliferants may be unable to acquire secure second-strike forces and vulnerable forces push states towards early military action; large nuclear powers' air defense may prevent smaller states from achieving secure second-strike capabilities against them; a wider spread of nuclear weapons implies greater chances of accidental or unauthorized use; command and control (C&C) systems against such uses take time and money to develop (even the US had "near-accidents" with its weapons); military organizations may lack full rationality; many governments are politically less stable than those of the old nuclear powers, and internal turmoil can make the use of nuclear weapons more likely; and rational deterrence concepts developed in the West do not work in the third world.<sup>26</sup> Mao Zedong offers an example of a leader that was prepared to sacrifice a large part of the population of his country to achieve a military victory: he said that sacrificing half of the Chinese would not be too much<sup>27</sup>.

Moreover, in case of opaque proliferation, special problems are expected regarding the achievement of safe, secure arsenals: national leadership has fewer chances to debate nuclear options and operational tradeoffs and develop a carefully weighted use doctrine; armed forces get insufficient training on the handling and use of the weapons; lack of full-scale nuclear testing can make it harder to develop safety systems; and such systems may be insufficiently supervised.<sup>28</sup>

Proliferation optimism further defends itself against criticism. For instance, proliferants have strong incentives to handle their arsenals with great care and to protect them, old nuclear powers can help new ones in this, and securing small arsenals can be relatively easy. Force survivability can be ensured in resource un-intensive ways and even so difficult environments as the Middle East. Characteristics of third world nuclear forces and existential deterrence strategies can make them less accident-prone and less likely to be used than those of the superpowers. And the risk of retaliation is likely to deter preventive attacks unless their success is certain.<sup>29</sup>

Though in practice, the USG has seen cases of proliferation in varying light, the view that proliferation is *generally* undesirable is wide-spread among policy-makers and officially the US has long opposed it. Beyond the proliferation pessimist arguments and the psychological effect of pictures of Hiroshima and of fears of a nuclear world war, the US (and a similar Soviet) stance has been explained with various factors. In some cases, nuclear weapons pose a direct threat to the US, its allies, or forces. It has been feared that war in-

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<sup>26</sup> See Wohlstetter 1961; Nye 1992; Sagan 1994; Feaver & Niou 1996 pp. 210-4 esp. on problems of small states to develop survivable nuclear arsenals; Karl 1996 for a critical discussion of proliferation pessimism; Hagerty 1993 pp. 264-70 on both sides' points; and Feaver 1993 on nuclear operations and achievement of secure deterrents.

<sup>27</sup> On Mao, see Chang & Halliday 2005.

<sup>28</sup> See Feaver 1993 pp. 175-8; Sagan 1994 p. 98; Thayer 1995.

<sup>29</sup> See, e.g., Rosen 1977 pp. 1374-7, 1382-3; Waltz 1981; Karl 1996; Glaser 1998 p. 118. For an overview of the proliferation debate, see Sagan & Waltz 1995; Lavoy 1995. Even recently, the US has been assisting also Russia in making its nuclear arsenal safe. See "Securing Russian Nuclear Missiles? U.S. Is Set to Say 'Done'", *NYT*, 31 Oct 07.

volving a small NWS could catalyze superpower war. Nuclear weapons can make conventional US forces less capable for action and restrict US room for action, whereas nonproliferation helps maintain and stabilize US preponderance in the world. With nuclear weapons, even small states can cause much destruction and strengthen their bargaining positions. A widespread concern is that terrorists would get access to nuclear weapons as a result of a multiplication of nuclear arsenals or growth of markets for weapon technology. It is argued that nuclear weapons can be used to blackmail and intimidate other states. And one state's acquisition of nuclear weapons tends to increase others' interest in them.<sup>30</sup>

*What* exactly the USG should do to try prevent proliferation in cases where it is especially undesirable depends on the reasons for proliferation, and US leaders' implicit or explicit assumptions about the reasons affect their views on how useful different nonproliferation policies can be. The motives of proliferation is the topic I now turn to.

### **5.3 Why do (only) some states pursue nuclear weapons?**

Currently eight to nine states (the US, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan; the situation with North Korea is unclear) are known to possess nuclear weapons. Over the years, many others have been suspected of trying to acquire some. South Africa is so far the only state that has given up nuclear weapons it had developed<sup>31</sup>. Some others like Argentina, Brazil, and Libya were earlier suspected of pursuing them but seem to have given up the efforts. Many states have demonstrated no actual intention to produce nuclear weapons, but a number of states used to have small or preliminary nuclear weapon programs<sup>32</sup> and, as already discussed, many industrially advanced states have become latent nuclear powers.

What explains the differences in national choices regarding nuclear weapons? Beyond the already discussed cost issue, the explanations offered range from security issues to availability of technology, status ambitions, international norms, type of domestic system, and the impact of domestic politics and powerful individuals.

#### **5.3.1 National security explanations**

The basic Realist explanation for proliferation (seen also by most other observers as *one* key reason for it) is national security: states seek nuclear weapons to counter security threats. Proliferation is a direct result of the security dilemma and has mostly been a chain

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<sup>30</sup> For anti-proliferation arguments, see, e.g., D/2 CIA "Estimate of the World Situation", 17 Jan 61, FRUS 61-3:8; OTA 1993 pp. 2-4; US *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Dec 02, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf> (14 June 07); and on the arguments, Freedman 1989 pp. 303, 462; Müller 1989 p. 279; Waltz 1997 p. 160.

<sup>31</sup> Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited and gave up nuclear weapons the USSR had stationed on their soil but no independent weapon production was behind these arsenals.

<sup>32</sup> See, e.g., Kollert 1994.

reaction, as a state that acquires nuclear weapons to balance a nuclear threat posed by a rival can push a third state to seek them. To deter a NWS, a state needs either to become one itself or to get a nuclear guarantee from a superpower. But a guarantee can seem unreliable and not be enough for or desired by all states. Also a rival's conventional capabilities can push a state towards nuclear weapons, and these can appear as a way to avoid costly conventional arms races. Since developing nuclear weapons from a scratch takes years, beyond a rival's existing military capabilities also expected future threats affect decisions about pursuing them.<sup>33</sup>

In principle, offensive aims can motivate a nuclear weapon effort. But this is usually unlikely since a state threatening others with nuclear weapons can become punished by another nuclear power (though punishment might not deter such exceptionally cold-blooded leaders as Mao).<sup>34</sup>

A rival's *latent* nuclear status can be both an incentive for and a disincentive to proliferation: it calls for a response, but nuclear weapon efforts can push the rival to upgrade its the latent capability into an actual one<sup>35</sup>.

But though many states face security threats, nuclear weapons have spread quite slowly. This is because nuclear weapons are not the only way to protect one's security; Goldstein points out that a state's reaction to security threats depends on the relative feasibility and costs of non-nuclear, nuclear, and alliance-based security strategies<sup>36</sup>.

Paul's "prudent Realism" moreover stresses (in line with game theory) that other states' expected *reactions*, including arms build-up and harm to bi- or multilateral relations, can eliminate the security gain from acquiring nuclear weapons and are likely to play a key role in non-great power states'<sup>37</sup> choices about nuclear weapons. This amended security threats model suggests that a state may forgo nuclear weapons because it recognizes the security dilemma that the weapons can provoke reactions that reduce its security. If a state pursues nuclear weapons, its rivals are likely to react *and* it may lose allies, support, and markets.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> For the Realist arguments, see Waltz 1981; Frankel 1993 pp. 45-6, 51-2; on them, see Sagan 1996 pp. 56-8. Frankel argues that only states with "large and invulnerable nuclear force and developed counterforce capabilities" can give credible nuclear guarantees to others: a guarantor has to be able to defend its allies without the nuclear exchange leading to its entrapment in full-scale nuclear war (pp. 61-2).

<sup>34</sup> Similarly, risks of retaliation limit the chances of nuclear blackmail. Waltz 1981. On offensive aims and blackmailing, see also Goldstein 1993 pp. 217-8. Reiss 2004 on the contrary argues that "the desire to intimidate and coerce rivals" can motivate proliferation (p. 12).

<sup>35</sup> Meyer 1984 p. 70.

<sup>36</sup> Goldstein 1993.

<sup>37</sup> He argues that proliferation by great powers, who have a "capacity to intervene in the affairs of a minor power without receiving physical threat to its home territory" and include the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China, is determined by "balance-of-power considerations, especially vis-à-vis other major powers", though they may acquire nuclear weapons also to insure against losses and quick changes in relative power. Paul 2000 pp. 4, 17-9.

<sup>38</sup> Paul proposes a model where technologically capable states' pursuit of nuclear weapons depends on 1) the level of conflict and 2) the nature of inter-state relations in the region. The model is less insightful than Paul's stressing of the role of others' expected reactions as such. Regarding the factor 2, he namely argues



Paul maintains that “hard” Realism can explain nuclear choices, especially forgoing of acquiring nuclear weapons, only in some situations because in it, states seek to maximize power and normally forgo nuclear weapons only due to structural factors, such as the distribution of power or alliances, or if a hegemon presses them to do so.<sup>39</sup> But taking others’ reactions into account is as such not contrary to *SR* where security, not maximal power, is states’ primary goal; states are likely to seek nuclear weapons only if doing so in sum improves their security<sup>40</sup>.

The security explanation has been criticized because some states with clear security threats have not acquired nuclear weapons and others have sought them for non-security reasons<sup>41</sup>. But when states’ expectations about others’ reaction and the *net* impact to security are considered, this model can explain cases where threatened states do not pursue nuclear weapons. Also statistical evidence supports the security explanation<sup>42</sup>. Moreover, it only maintains that security is the *most* important determinant of states’ nuclear choices; it does not exclude that other factors can play a role.

### 5.3.2 Competing and complementary explanations

Some authors argue that *demand* for nuclear weapons always exists, either because all states face security threats or since mere technological momentum pushes states to produce them, and thus *supply*-side factors, i.e., **access to technologies and materials**, de-

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that “security interdependence” i.e. “mutual vulnerability and the resultant anticipated sensitivity” increases states’ awareness of the effects of unilateral action on all sides and makes them more likely to forgo nuclear weapons. He does not explain why this situation would characterize (only) some areas, Western Europe and North America in particular, but his point builds on Keohane’s & Nye’s complex interdependence. Paul 2000 pp. 4-5, 15-6, 21-3, 143. That theory has basic premises *contrary* to Realism and suggests that as a result of multiple ties between societies, national and international systems are not clearly distinguishable, states have lost in sovereignty and are not always unitary or the only key international actors; and that military force is not a viable or cost-effective way to promote all kinds of goals. Keohane & Nye 1989 (orig. 1977). But as discussed in Chapter 3, from a Realist perspective close ties among Western European and North American nations result from post-WWII bipolarity and US hegemony in the West. Thus distribution of power affects both the level of conflict, nature of relations among states, and proliferation prospects in a region. Though Paul suggests that especially states in low-conflict regions are likely to be aware of security interdependence and consider others’ likely reactions (p. 23), *all* states’ security depends on their environment and their leaders see that a security dilemma exists. If a state in a protracted conflict acquires nuclear weapons, this obviously creates strong negative security externalities for its rival especially *because* of the conflict. Why would national leadership then ignore the rival’s likely reactions? Moreover, Keohane & Nye do not suggest that their thesis applies to crucial security matters.

Also, e.g., Frankel 1993 (p. 81) and Reiss 2004 (pp. 12-3) refer to the importance of others’ expected reactions on proliferation choices.

<sup>39</sup> Paul 2000 pp. 7-8, 149-50.

<sup>40</sup> For similar points about Realism, see Evron 1991 p. 288; Davis 1993 pp. 80-1. Similarly, Betts 1993 argues that the key reasons to forgo nuclear weapons include risks of provocation and becoming a target of nuclear weapons (p. 111) and Glaser 2004 notes that the goal of avoiding making rivals feel insecure can cause restraint in arms build-up (pp. 51-2).

<sup>41</sup> See Ogilvie-White 1996 pp. 44-8.

<sup>42</sup> In a quantitative test of the association of various factors with different levels of interest in nuclear weapons, Singh & Way 2004 found that external threats (as involvement in enduring rivalries and the frequency of militarized disputes) were statistically significantly correlated with both seriously exploring a nuclear option, launching a major weapon effort, and constructing or deploying nuclear weapons (pp. 872-6).

termines whether and when states do so.<sup>43</sup> But as the existence of many latent nuclear powers shows, technologies (especially enrichment or plutonium production plus reprocessing) and materials are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a nuclear weapon acquisition.<sup>44</sup>

Another common explanation for proliferation, used typically in the French and Indian cases, is that states see nuclear weapons as a way to enhance their **regional and/or global status**, or that nuclear weapons are a precondition for status. For instance, a prominent former US diplomat J. McCloy thought in 1965 that many states were “simply trying to keep up with the Joneses. They want these [nuclear] weapons not only for defense, but as much for prestige.” Nuclear weapons are supposed to symbolize greatness and demonstrate a nation’s technical and economic ability. It is often argued that their possession is a *de facto* condition for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Sagan suggests that similarly as, e.g., national airlines, certain weapon systems can be seen as a part of modern statehood. In 1961, Wohlstetter saw that for NATO states, one possible motive to acquire nuclear weapons was hope of a special status in NATO, but he also stressed that setbacks in nuclear programs had harmed states’ prestige.<sup>45</sup>

Waltz sees a wish to boost status as alone unlikely to be enough to make states pursue nuclear weapons<sup>46</sup>, which moreover do not as such make great powers but complement other power resources<sup>47</sup>. He does see nuclear weapons as *necessary* for great powers but for military, not symbolic, reasons: “the possession of most but not all of the capabilities of a great power leaves a state dependent on others and vulnerable to those who have the instruments that the lesser state lacks<sup>48</sup>”. Great powers tend to acquire nuclear weapons, but

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<sup>43</sup> For such arguments, see Reiss 1994 p. 336, and on them, Meyer 1984 pp. 9-12; Ogilvie-White 1996 p. 44.

<sup>44</sup> See also Meyer 1984 regarding empirical evidence against “the technological imperative” -thesis (pp. 75-90).

<sup>45</sup> Wohlstetter 1961 pp. 368-9; “Nuclear Proliferation: Status & Security”, *Time*, 23 July 65; Meyer 1984 pp. 50-5; Frankel 1993 p. 57; Sagan 1996 pp. 74-80; Reiss 2004 p. 12. Betts 1993 (orig. 1977) argues that a status motivation for proliferation exists for all states but is strongest for emerging regionally dominant states with great power potential but no front-line role in East-West competition (p. 107). Campbell 2004 in turn argues that declining states that used to seek prominence might see nuclear weapons as a both strategic and psychological lever, and Meyer suggests that “pariah” states are interested in them as a demonstration of their viability as states and a way to attract international attention (p. 27).

<sup>46</sup> Waltz 1981.

<sup>47</sup> He argues “great powers are strong not simply because they have nuclear weapons but also because their immense resources enable them to generate and maintain power of all types”. He points out that bipolarity existed already in the late 1940s before the USSR acquired nuclear weapons and that other states’ nuclear weapons do not as such cause multipolarity. Nuclear weapons “do not change the economic bases of a nation’s power” but reinforce an existing situation. Even in their absence, the US and the USSR would have acquired great military power: where they differed from others was in their “ability to exploit military technology on a large scale and at the scientific frontiers.” Waltz 1979 pp. 131, 180-3; Waltz 1993 pp. 50-2. But he is contradictory in (1979 p. 203) approvingly citing Foster 1965 on the goals of a NPT: “widespread nuclear proliferation would mean a substantial erosion in the margin of power which our [US] great power and industrial base have long given us relative to much of the rest of the world” (p. 591).

In fact, de Gaulle hoped to regain national *autonomy* with nuclear weapons (see Gordon 1999 p. 227), which is as such a security-related motive.

<sup>48</sup> Waltz 1993 p. 64. See also Waltz 2000 pp. 28-9.

nuclear weapons do not make great powers (also, when the permanent UNSC member states were chosen, not all of them had yet acquired nuclear weapons)<sup>49</sup>.

A related proposed explanation for nuclear choices is the development of international norms and the NPT regime (which consists of 1) multilateral treaties, especially the NPT and the statute of the IAEA; 2) negotiation for a, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); 3) rules and regulations regarding, e.g., safeguards and export controls; and 4) formal organizations, especially the IAEA).<sup>50</sup> The argument is that acquiring nuclear weapons was earlier maybe seen as a way to great power status, but later joining the regime became a sign of state “maturity”<sup>51</sup>.

But the recent cases of nuclear weapon efforts show that 1) no universally accepted non-proliferation norm exists and 2) norms and the regime cannot keep states with strong security motivations from pursuing nuclear weapons. Following of norms of restraint is likely to indicate that a state anyway lacks incentives to seek nuclear weapons<sup>52</sup>.

Paul argues that the NPT regime has not been decisive regarding original nuclear choices but becomes more important *after* a state joins it (i.e., in RI terms, the institution has made promises of nuclear restraint self-enforcing): it creates transparency and expectations of mutual restraint and costs of leaving it are high. He argues that the role of the regime is likely to be stronger in regions of low and moderate conflict but limited in high-conflict regions.<sup>53</sup> Also this view implies a limited role for the regime regarding nuclear choices: states facing no great threats anyway tend not to pursue nuclear weapons.

But though the regime has been unable to make states with strong reason to pursue nuclear weapons from doing so, it has helped to make the pursuit costlier and harder so that only states with strong motivations are likely to pursue them. In the absence of the regime, more states might have gone nuclear as the cost-benefit calculus would have been more favorable to that.<sup>54</sup> But also other factors can explain nuclear restraint to a large degree; most states fully cooperating under the NPT face no great security threats.

Solingen in turn suggests that certain **characteristics of states**, economic liberalism and democracy in particular, promote nonproliferation and that opening up economically

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<sup>49</sup> Pariah states are in turn more likely to seek nuclear weapons because pariah status tends to imply security threats than because of a mere status issue as such.

<sup>50</sup> On the regime, see Gardner 1994 pp. 53-65 and, in light of regime theory, Müller 1989.

<sup>51</sup> Sagan 1996 p. 76. He argues that this thesis can help explain, e.g., Ukraine’s decision to give up the nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR (pp. 80-2). Basically, the argument that states pursue nuclear weapons if these are *considered* status symbols but not if norms are developed against them is of Constructivist (see Chapter 3 fn 1) nature.

<sup>52</sup> See Meyer 1984 p. 70; Frankel 1993 p. 63. Paul 2000 argues that in India’s case, the NPT regime indeed was counterproductive: “it reinforced India’s pro-nuclear policy and solidified public opinion in support of maintaining the nuclear option” (p. 152).

<sup>53</sup> Paul 2000 p. 28.

<sup>54</sup> See also Davis 1993 p. 92; Thayer 1995. The effect of the NPT regime is no very relevant issue in this study since I only cover the time until the establishment of the regime.

makes states more likely to cooperate fully in the NPT regime<sup>55</sup>. The idea is that free citizens would be unlikely to support a nuclear weapon program. Ogilvie-White argues that the persuasiveness of this view has led the US to tie nonproliferation efforts to promotion of democracy and economic liberalism<sup>56</sup>.

But no clear link between regime type and nuclear choices has been established, and several liberal democracies *do* have nuclear weapons<sup>57</sup>. As recently as in 1998, Indians widely celebrated the country's nuclear tests and declaration as a nuclear power. Democracy does also not automatically imply public debate on nuclear choices. Moreover, during periods of democratization, politicians often try to appeal to the public with nationalist issues, and these may include nuclear weapons.<sup>58</sup>

This leads us to explanations that stress the role of **domestic politics and key individuals**: some individuals and domestic groups benefit from and may successfully promote nuclear weapon efforts, whereas others oppose such. A weapon program can bring money and prestige to national scientific community, serve the interests of some elements of the military (but maybe harm those of others, depending, e.g., on what delivery systems for nuclear weapons are chosen), and benefit some political forces (whereas others can benefit from opposing nuclear weapons). Especially within such benefiting groups, nuclear weapons can improve the positions of individuals who receive credit for or control the weapons. Key individuals' personal views about nuclear weapons may also play a role in decisions about pursuing them.<sup>59</sup>

These factors are likely to influence the *timing* and *speed* of proliferation and need to be considered in any detailed account of a specific national case. But in most cases, a motivation justifiable relatively broadly to domestic audiences, such as security threat, probably needs to exist for a nuclear weapon effort. Moreover, Sagan points out that no solid theory

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<sup>55</sup> Solingen 1994. Paul 2000 makes a similar claim without elaborating on it (p. 23).

<sup>56</sup> See Ogilvie-White 1996 p. 49. Also Levi & O'Hanlon 2005 stress the value of democracy promotion for nonproliferation efforts.

<sup>57</sup> In their statistical analysis, Singh & Way 2004 found that correlations of different levels of interest in nuclear weapons with 1) democratization and 2) the degree of institutional constraints on executive power were statistically not significant but suggested that democracy makes proliferation *more* likely. The significance and direction of correlations of various indications of economic and trade liberalization varied across the different levels of interest. Pp. 872-6. See also Levite 2002 pp. 83-5.

<sup>58</sup> See Mansfield & Snyder 1995 on dangers during democratization; Campbell & Einhorn 2004 pp. 326-7; Singh & Way 2004 p. 864.

<sup>59</sup> On such explanations, see Lefever 1979 p. 21; Meyer 1984 pp. 63-4, 103; Sagan 1996 pp. 63-5; Campbell 2004 pp. 27-8. Lavoy 1993 stresses the role of individuals, Solingen 1994 that of domestic coalitions (pp. 6-9), and Reiss 2004 that of "domestic politics and bureaucratic self-aggrandizement" (p. 12) in nuclear choices. India and South Africa have been proposed to be cases where domestic politics and coalitions largely explain nuclear choices. See, e.g., Sagan 1996 pp. 65-71.

Also the shared views, knowledge, and interests of *cross-national* scientific communities have been argued to affect the politics of nuclear weapons. See Ogilvie-White 1996 pp. 52-3.

exists regarding circumstances where domestic coalitions that want to pursue nuclear weapons come about or become able to realize that goal.<sup>60</sup>

## 5.4 Nonproliferation policies

Reflecting views on factors that affect states' nuclear choices, a range of uni- and multilateral policies is available for the US and other states that try to prevent proliferation. Whereas this study focuses on the use of security cooperation as a nonproliferation policy, it is in place to provide also a brief overview of other policy options<sup>61</sup>.

### 5.4.1 Policy options

**Restricting access to technology and materials** has been a much used nonproliferation policy. It has taken especially the forms of secrecy, export controls, safeguards, and sanctions on suppliers. The effectualness of such measures depends both on whether all potential suppliers are willing to restrict the supply of technology and materials and on proliferants' ability to substitute imports (materials, technology, knowledge) with domestic resources.

Though the main principles of nuclear explosions are widely known<sup>62</sup>, certain details about nuclear weapon design remain tightly protected secrets. Secrecy can also be promoted by discouraging experts from distributing knowledge; individual expertise is seen as capable of clearly affecting the speed of a nuclear weapon program<sup>63</sup>.

Export controls are multilateral agreements between supplier states about materials or technologies to be exported only when confidence exists that they will be used solely for civilian purposes. Two instances were set up in the 1970s for coordinating and establishing export controls in the nuclear field: the Zangger Committee and the NSG. The Zangger, i.e., the NPT Exporters Committee, started meetings in 1971 to ensure harmonized fulfillment of the NPT clause that safeguards need to be applied to nuclear exports. It agreed on and later regularly updated a trigger list of items to be exported only when the

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<sup>60</sup> Sagan 1996 p. 64. If proliferation choices were fully explained with *specific* national factors, each case of proliferation would need to be explained on its own terms, with little point in generalization. See Meyer 1984 pp. 9, 17.

<sup>61</sup> I base this discussion of the options especially on Lefever 1979 pp. 121-35; OTA 1993; Dunn 1996 pp. 28-37. On the options, see also Gardner 1994 pp. 83-6.

<sup>62</sup> This was shown already in the 1960s in the "Nth country experiment" at the Univ. of California: a few newly graduated physicists, with no prior experience on nuclear weapons, using only publicly available information, successfully designed a nuclear explosive within 2,5 years, using 3 man-years of work and only basic technical and computational support. For an extract of the summary report, see <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20030701/nth-country.pdf> (12 Nov 04).

<sup>63</sup> OTA 1993 p. 35. For instance, after the Cold War Western states have helped Russia to offer "safe" employment opportunities to former Soviet nuclear experts. See, e.g., OTA 1993 pp. 91, 112; "United Kingdom, Russia Sign MOU to Improve Efforts to Redirect Former Soviet Nuclear Weapons Personnel", *GSN*, 17 Nov 04. Levite 2002 notes that for nonproliferation purposes, the USG has also clandestinely recruited foreign officials and scientists involved in nuclear efforts as its agents (pp. 80-1).

receiving plant was safeguarded (the list was not legally binding). The complementary, more formal NSG was set up after India's "peaceful" nuclear test of 1974 made clear the need to control also exports of dual-use items. The NSG agreed on and has later regularly updated voluntary guidelines for the export of nuclear and related dual-use technologies and materials. A further kind of "export control" is to block unwanted transfers by military action or sabotage.<sup>64</sup>

The dual-use issue poses significant problems to the export control regime and as the suppliers moreover are competitors, export controls have time and again proved insufficient, despite efforts to strengthen them. The USG has taken the lead with the controls and US legislation now also requires sanctions on supplier states, companies, or persons who do not adhere to export controls<sup>65</sup>. But proliferants have found supply channels in, e.g., Western Europe.

The goal of safeguards is to enable *detecting* diversions to weapon uses. The system can be seen as an institutional solution to a cooperation problem related to nuclear assistance, i.e., that a recipient would secretly divert foreign support for civilian nuclear efforts to weapon production. In practice, international safeguards also strengthen disincentives to proliferation by making it harder and costlier to pursue nuclear weapons, especially to do so in secret. Quester moreover points out that states subjected to safeguards are more likely to make moves towards nuclear weapons only after clear decisions to pursue them.<sup>66</sup>

Access-restricting policies make nuclear weapon production costlier and delay it, sometimes much. But if a strong motivation for nuclear weapons persists, a state is nonetheless likely to continue pursuing them. Technological constraints are thus not expected to halt proliferation altogether, especially in case of "hard core" proliferants, but rather to buy time for diplomatic efforts and changes in regional and domestic factors to reduce interest in nuclear weapons. But Meyer argues that the controls help states that have no strong reason to acquire nuclear weapons to afford to forgo them and help to prevent proliferation by states with indefinite cost-benefit calculations about the weapons.<sup>67</sup>

To further increase the costs of proliferation, the US and others can use **sanctions** against proliferants, such as restrictions on aid or trade and diplomatic isolation. Building alliances against a proliferant and giving aid to its rivals are indirect ways to create disincentives to proliferation.<sup>68</sup> But as, e.g., the cases of North Korea and Iran have recently

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<sup>64</sup> OTA 1993 pp. 88-92; DOS fact sheets on Zangger Committee and the NSG, both 30 Nov 00, [http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau\\_np/exportcontrols.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_np/exportcontrols.html) (17 Dec 07). On India's "peaceful" test, see Lefever 1979 p. 26; Vanaik 1987 p. 64; Tamminen & Zenger 1998 pp. 228-32, 240-1.

<sup>65</sup> OTA 1993 pp. 88-91.

<sup>66</sup> Quester 1972 grounds his argument with the point that inspections prevent scientists and the military from taking such steps towards weapons that are not fully officially sanctioned (p. 496). But an even stronger factor seems to be that with inspections, any moves towards weapons become known to other states, which makes a government likely to allow such only if it really has decided to pursue weapons. On the purpose of safeguards, see Seaborg 1987 p. 267; Gardner 1994 pp. 69-70.

<sup>67</sup> Meyer 1984 pp. 160-2; OTA 1993 p. 19; Dunn 1996 p. 28.

<sup>68</sup> On US sanctions in particular, see OTA 1993 p. 95.

shown, sanctions tend not to be very efficient in making a state stop its nuclear weapon effort if the basic motivation for it persists, especially as other foreign policy considerations often make broad sanctions infeasible.

Nuclear restraint can in turn be **rewarded** with economic or technological aid and cooperation. This notion has been included in US policies since 1953, and in the NPT, in form of promises of cooperation on civilian uses of nuclear energy on the condition that the recipient accepts safeguards. When weapon proliferation concerns have been considered eliminated, states have also been exempted from export controls for some dual-use items, and the US has accepted the development of proliferation-sensitive capabilities, such as fuel reprocessing and breeder reactors, by European states and Japan.<sup>69</sup> The danger here is the resulting latent weapon capabilities – decisions of nuclear restraint can be revised.

When domestic politics and individuals are seen as central for a state's nuclear choices, other states can try **influence domestic pro-nuclear groups and give support for anti-proliferation groups** for instance by directing aid and credits to the latter and promoting open debate on nuclear policy<sup>70</sup>. Similarly, a policy in line with the norm explanation to nuclear choices (and one function of the NPT regime) is to **promote anti-proliferation public opinion and norms**.

A complication here is that these tend to get linked to general anti-nuclear weapon opinions and turn attention from proliferation threats to NWSs' weapons. Nuclear disarmament is often suggested as a response and a way to reduce incentives for proliferation<sup>71</sup>. But US-Russian nuclear disarmament, which many in particular call for as a first step towards general nuclear disarmament, does not appear as a promising nonproliferation policy. It would probably not eliminate proliferation incentives for states threatened by the US or Russia since the latter are also conventionally stronger than other states and nuclear disarmament would only improve the chances for small states to achieve a nuclear force relevant vis-à-vis larger powers. Nuclear disarmament is also suggested as a way to weaken the prestige value of nuclear weapons, but status reasons alone do not explain nuclear ambitions and if they play a role, nuclear disarmament would only increase the possible status upside of acquiring them. Though it would prevent complaints that the US and Russia violate their commitments under the NPT to disarm, and in that sense strengthen the NPT regime, no clear evidence exists that nuclear disarmament would promote non-proliferation. Even dramatic reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals in the 1980s and 1990s led to no clear decrease in other states' interest in nuclear weapons (the reductions, however, in practice did not limit either states' nuclear options). For instance Frankel points out that the strength of US and Russian nuclear arsenals, plus preparedness

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<sup>69</sup> See Shultz 1984; OTA 1993 pp. 98, 102.

<sup>70</sup> Solingen 1994 pp. 10-8.

<sup>71</sup> See, e.g., 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Decision 2, 4(c), <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm>; report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 30 Jan 97, [www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html) (both 3 June 07); UN report 2004 (fn 18) pp. 40-1.

to threaten to use them for clients' sake, has *limited* proliferation.<sup>72</sup> *Total* nuclear disarmament is also practically impossible and maybe undesirable since nuclear weapons cannot be de-invented<sup>73</sup>.

The extreme way to try stop a state's nuclear efforts is **military action**. The USG considered preventive attacks in, e.g., China's case<sup>74</sup> and Israel destroyed the Osirak reactor in 1981 to stop Iraq's nuclear efforts. But the US itself forwent such moves until President Bush in 2002-3 justified the war against Iraq with alleged Iraqi aims to produce nuclear and other WMD; current debates about how to react to Iran's alleged nuclear weapon ambitions show that at least some in Washington and Jerusalem consider the option in its case, too.

States do have a strong interest in preventing their opponents from getting nuclear arms and Bueno de Mesquita & Riker argue that a state that can successfully preempt "is likely to do so if it anticipates that waiting will deprive it of any advantage it currently possesses". The fact that preventive military action has nonetheless been rare is explained by the many problems involved, demonstrated by, e.g., the Osirak case. Unless the attacked country is occupied and its whole security situation thus transformed, an attack only slows down a weapon effort, which is likely to continue, maybe under greater secrecy, as long as the motivation for it exists. An attack can even strengthen the proliferant's resolve to develop the weapons by demonstrating its vulnerability. The success of a preventive strike much depends on the quality of intelligence: to avoid both a risk of nuclear retaliation and unnecessary attacks, it is necessary to correctly identify all relevant nuclear plants and estimate how advanced the nuclear program is. The attacker risks even nuclear retaliation by the proliferant or other states; thus Waltz argues that attacks are unlikely when (as is often the case) the potential attacker is uncertain how far the weapon program has already progressed. Moreover, the legitimacy of forcible unilateral action is easily questioned. Israel tried to justify the 1981 attack as necessary self-defense in a situation where non-military means to solve the issue were exhausted, i.e., action allowed by international law. Still, a UNSC resolution "strongly" condemned this attack by a non-NPT state on a NPT member, made "in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct". But in practice, little sanctions on Israel followed.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> See Fischer 1988; Frankel 1993 pp. 61-3; Betts 1993 pp. 101-2. Fischer concludes based on a study on the interconnectedness of horizontal and vertical proliferation and disarmament (cuts in US-Soviet arsenals, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs), universal negative security guarantees, no-first-use-policies, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems) that no clear link exists. Also Campbell & Einhorn 2004 argue that recent USG moves to upgrade the US arsenal and lack of clear steps in nuclear disarmament have little effect on other states' nuclear choices: crucial is how likely the US seems to be to use its *conventional* forces against or for them (p. 323).

<sup>73</sup> For strong arguments against nuclear disarmament, see Glaser 1998.

<sup>74</sup> On US decision-making on China's nuclear weapon program, see Burr & Richelson 2000.

<sup>75</sup> See UNSC Res. 487, 19 June 81; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita & Riker 1982 p. 304; OTA 1993 pp. 20, 92, 98; Glaser 1998 p. 122. Waltz defines *preventive* attacks as attacks by a stronger state that expects its power advantage to decrease. *Pre-emption* is an attack against the offensive forces of a state expected to attack, irrespective of its relative power. Often the two terms appear used interchangeably. Bueno de Mesquita



An assumption behind this study is that sensible nonproliferation policy includes efforts to remove the reasons for a state to pursue nuclear weapons and that a key way to do this is to **improve a proliferant's security situation**. Especially the US, as the most powerful state, can help others to enhance their security by giving security assistance, possibly security guarantees; supporting diplomatic conflict-resolution and confidence-building efforts and possibly the establishment of NWFZs; giving assurances about not using nuclear weapons against others; and avoiding policies and postures that appear threatening<sup>76</sup>.

But security cooperation meant to reduce incentives for proliferation has also problems. For instance, conventional arms transfers can increase regional instability. Especially transfers of advanced, nuclear-capable aircraft can directly benefit a nuclear weapon program by providing a delivery system or technology useful in the development of, e.g., targeting systems. A regional perspective is needed regarding security assistance to ensure that it does not end up making other states less secure and possibly more interested in nuclear weapons.<sup>77</sup>

Security guarantees have been credited as a way to reduce states' desires for nuclear weapons<sup>78</sup>, and statistical analyses suggest that alliances with nuclear powers make states less likely to go nuclear<sup>79</sup>. An alliance can both weaken reasons for and add to disincentives to proliferation, assuming a state can be credibly threatened with an end to the alliance in case it pursues nuclear weapons. In that case, also increasing the value of the relationship for that state can be a way to promote nuclear restraint. But Buchan argues that the spread of nuclear weapons itself weakens major powers' willingness to make or maintain security commitments as such become more risky.<sup>80</sup>

Compared to denial or coercion policies, such as export controls or sanctions, giving security assistance has for the US the benefit of creating positive attitudes in the client state and maybe even chances to influence its decision-making. But unilateral nonproliferation pressure on own allies can also harm alliance cohesion.<sup>81</sup>

Frankel argues that some states' severe security problems, possibly exacerbated by their questioned legitimacy, political isolation, and historic traumas, make them want own nuclear weapons even if security guarantees are offered, though a superpower might be able

& Riker 1982 seem to mean by pre-emption what Waltz defines as prevention. On the likelihood of preventive attacks, see also Karl 1996 pp. 95-8.

<sup>76</sup> Topical cases where the US could try to do the latter obviously include Iran and the North Korea. Paul 2000 notes that NWSs "have been careful not to threaten *nuclear* attack on non-nuclear states, especially since the 1970s, a factor that helped lessen the need for countervailing nuclear capability by many medium and small states" (pp. 31-2; my emphasis).

<sup>77</sup> See, e.g., Yager 1980 pp. 410-2; OTA 1993 p. 30; Betts 1993 p. 117.

<sup>78</sup> See, e.g., Lefever 1979 pp. 122-7; Reiss 1994 p. 341; Dunn 1996 p. 29.

<sup>79</sup> Meyer 1984 found an alliance with a NWS to be the key factor that reduces that likelihood (p. 103) and Singh & Way 2004 that alliances with nuclear great powers correlated negatively with different levels of proliferation but under the level of statistical significance (pp. 873-6).

<sup>80</sup> See Buchan 1966 p. 7; Meyer 1984 p. 69; Campbell & Einhorn 2004 p. 321. The latter conclude that a desire to keep US support continuing has been a crucial for some states' nuclear restraint.

<sup>81</sup> See Lefever 1979 pp. 122-7; Müller 1989 p. 279.

to influence whether they pursue nuclear weapons openly or opaquely. Paul suggests that security alignments can even *enable* proliferation in some cases: he argues that “Israel’s and Pakistan’s tacit alliances with the United States and India’s with the USSR” were used by the clients as “camouflage” for secret nuclear weapon efforts and that these both made the patrons less likely to react strongly and tended to tune down foreign reactions in general (thus these cases would support Schwarz’s point, presented in section 3.2.2.3, that alliances can enable reckless behavior by client states).<sup>82</sup>

A sustainable, effective way to improve states’ security and so reduce proliferation pressures would be to solve the conflicts that cause insecurity. But of course, doing so is no easy nonproliferation policy. And not all insecurity results from acute conflicts: also insecurity about the future gives incentives to acquire nuclear capabilities.

Trying to weaken the reasons for a state’s interest in nuclear weapons continues to be a possible path even *after* a state acquires them. Beyond such efforts, other states can either accept the situation and maybe assist the proliferant to make its arsenal safe, try to persuade it to abandon the weapons through sanctions and promises of rewards, or take action to destroy a still fragile arsenal. Based on a study of US options after proliferation, Feaver and Niou argue that the latter option can be viable only towards a small enemy state before it deploys the weapons and that help to make an arsenal safe is justified after friendly states and large rivals have acquired nuclear weapons. Especially in early stages of proliferation, potential accidents are likely to occur on the proliferant’s soil, but at the latest after the weapons are deployed, accidental or unauthorized use becomes a clear concern for other states, too. But as giving help to prevent that can remove disincentives to proliferation, it is against the NPT regime.<sup>83</sup>

#### 5.4.2 Choice of policy

Different nonproliferation policies are used in various combinations. Enhancing states’ security is probably crucial in the long term, but also policies that just *delay* proliferation are useful in cases where it is expected that a weapon acquisition would lead to early security risks and/or that the reasons for proliferation can be eliminated over time. USG policy choice is never automatic: even US nonproliferation legislation (much of which was introduced only after the period studied here) leaves the executive with much freedom of action.<sup>84</sup> Possible factors that can affect USG choices include the type of proliferant (size, risk tolerance, foreign policy orientation); the expected effect of nuclear weapons on its actions; how much progress it has made towards them; uncertainties in intelligence; other states’ likely reactions to US policies; the feasibility of multilateral action; chances to in-

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<sup>82</sup> Frankel 1993 pp. 45-6, 51-4; Paul 2000 pp. 154, 158-9 fn 19.

<sup>83</sup> See OTA 1993 p. 110; Feaver & Niou 1996. The latter argue that the NPT regime is not very helpful regarding post-proliferation situations and makes new nuclear arsenals likely to be unsafe.

<sup>84</sup> See OTA 1993 pp. 94, 97.

fluence the state's choices with US security policies; and the general prevailing nonproliferation attitude in the USG. The policy choice is complicated by the fact that US action in each case can affect other potential proliferants' cost-benefit ratios for nuclear weapons.<sup>85</sup>

Nonproliferation policies can be pursued uni- and/or multilaterally. Both kinds of policies have advantages and drawbacks. Multilateral action has greater international legitimacy, and especially in case of sanctions and export controls, it can be much more effective than unilateral moves. But multilateral coalitions for action against proliferation have to be created case-by-case, which is often difficult, uncertain, and slow; the NPT regime lacks agreed-upon, automatic enforcement and punishment mechanisms beyond referral to the UNSC<sup>86</sup>. Unilateral action can be launched fast and especially action by a superpower can even alone have a large impact. Action to remove reasons for proliferation (or potentially make its security consequences very undesirable) is more feasible outside the NPT regime that itself cannot, e.g., give security guarantees. If the option of military action is chosen, unilateral action has the benefit of secrecy.

Since the US opposes proliferation for various reasons, most of which apply only to some states, a differentiating nonproliferation policy would seem reasonable. In practice, it does have differing stances towards different states' nuclear efforts: compare the uproar caused by those of Iran with the acceptance of broad nuclear development, including proliferation-sensitive technologies, in many industrial states<sup>87</sup>. The problem of differentiating policies, especially if no consensus exists about which states pose the gravest proliferation threats, is that such lead to complaints about double-standards, which are said to erode the NPT regime<sup>88</sup>. But as all policies involve tradeoffs and costs, it is sensible to set priorities and evaluate in which cases nonproliferation action is most needed<sup>89</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup> See Lefever 1979 pp. 120-1; Feaver & Niou 1996; Burr & Richelson 2000 p. 99.

<sup>86</sup> See Lefever 1979 pp. 4-5; OTA 1993 p. 94. See also Cupitt & Long 1993 on problems of international cooperation on nonproliferation.

<sup>87</sup> For defense of a differentiating policy, see, e.g., Shultz 1984.

<sup>88</sup> See Wohlstetter 1961 p. 356; Smith & Cobban 1989 pp. 53-4; OTA 1993 p. 101; and also Yager 1980 p. 407.

<sup>89</sup> For such arguments, see also Betts 1993 pp. 119-20.



## 6 President Truman – 1945-53

Soon after president Truman announced office in the US following F. Roosevelt's death in April 1945, the Second World War (WWII) came to an end in Europe. Germany was occupied by the US, the USSR, and the UK; a little later, also France got an occupation zone in Germany. In part because of concern that Germany would succeed to develop nuclear weapons, the US had developed such in a huge war-time effort (the Manhattan project) with British and Canadian help. In August, the US dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Soon thereafter, the WWII ended also in Asia. But now the US and the USSR were increasingly at odds with each other. The emerging Cold War, which led to the division of most of the world into capitalist and communist spheres of influence, soon became fierce in Europe and later central for US policies in the Middle East, too.

One side of Cold War competition was the US-Soviet nuclear arms race. During Truman's term, the key proliferation concern for the USG was the USSR and its basic attitude in the nuclear field secrecy. In August 1945, Truman declared that the US (together with the UK and Canada) aimed to keep its nuclear secrets for itself. It was thought in Washington that the US would be able to counter the future Soviet nuclear threat on its own; the US Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1946 prohibited the transfer of nuclear materials, technology, and information for industrial or military purposes to any state. Together with exclusive purchase agreements that gave the US and the UK until the mid-1950s almost full control over uranium supplies in the non-communist world, this much restricted other states' options in the nuclear field. To keep its secrets from ending up in Soviet ears, the USG was secretive even towards states close to it, a stance that came to persist for long especially towards France, where some key scientists were thought to have communist inclinations. The USG hoped that its secrecy would prevent others from developing nuclear weapons, tended to underestimate Soviet abilities, and expected the first Soviet nuclear test clearly later than in 1949 when it took place. The UK made its first nuclear test in 1952; the USG reaction was not very condemning.<sup>1</sup>

In 1946, the USG publicly proposed international cooperation on and control of practically all nuclear activities. The "Baruch plan" implied that an international authority would control all nuclear activities and stockpiles, including those of the US but only in the last phase of the plan. Before that, inspection schemes were to be set up and the authority was to get a right, under no national veto, to punish any state that acted against the plan. Unsurprisingly, Moscow was not interested in the idea. Especially as it somewhat contradicted the secrecy approach of the AEA, some observers have seen the plan as a propaganda move

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<sup>1</sup> See Truman's statements, 6 and 9 Aug 45, PPT 93 and 97; US Atomic Energy Act of 1946; Bader 1968 pp. 20-1, 28; Kohler 1972 p. 51; Quester 1973 pp. 14-5; Deubner 1977 pp. 3-4. Leffler 1992 provides an account of the development of strategic thinking in Washington and global policy of the USG under Truman.

only; others argue the Act was meant as a provisory arrangement until the Baruch plan could be realized.<sup>2</sup>

During Truman's term, worries about a spread of nuclear weapons concerned only the most developed, powerful nations. Only the very first steps towards a nuclear program were taken in Israel and no US policy towards the possibility of Israel acquiring nuclear weapons existed. I thus only very shortly discuss the Israeli case in the Truman era and then move on to consider the issue of West German rearmament and integration into the West. The Germans being a large, advanced nation that had early on been in the front line of nuclear development, the USG saw their nuclear activities as a concern to be controlled.

### **6.1 Israel's first steps in the nuclear field**

In May 1948, Israel declared its independence. Both the US and the USSR quickly recognized it<sup>3</sup>. A war erupted between Israel and Arabs, ending in Israeli victory in summer 1949. In support of the resulting armistice agreements, the US, the UK, and France jointly declared in May 1950 "unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area", promising immediate action (but without promising *military* action) if "any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines". To limit arms racing in the area, they also reaffirmed their opposition to that and said that they would require non-aggression assurances from any state in the Arab-Israel conflict that wanted to buy arms from them.<sup>4</sup>

Like many Israelis, Israel's founding father D. Ben-Gurion was very concerned about Israel's security. He saw technological superiority as a way to ensure it and by the late 1940s developed interest in nuclear energy. The interest was shared by his aides, scientist E. Bergmann and military official S. Peres. To create a scientific cadre for Israel, also in the nuclear field, the men launched efforts to recruit Jewish scientists from abroad – many nuclear scientists were of Jewish origin – and to educate young physicists; many established Israeli scientists doubted the viability and reasonability of nuclear development in Israel.<sup>5</sup>

Israel's Ministry of Defense (IMD) was from the beginning involved in the nuclear project. In 1948-51, it commissioned studies that led to the discovery of low-grade uranium deposits in the Negev desert. In 1952, Ben-Gurion founded the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and placed it under IMD control. Bergmann became the chairman of the IAEC. A year later, Peres became the Director-General of the IMD.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Bader 1968 pp. 18-9; Seaborg 1987 pp. 66-7; Gardner 1994 pp. 38-9; Lavoy 2003.

<sup>3</sup> On Truman's decision to do so, see [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/israel/large/docs.php](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/israel/large/docs.php) (10 Nov 07); Spiegel 1985 Chapter 2; Schoenbaum 1993 Chapter 2.

<sup>4</sup> Tripartite Declaration, 25 May 50, <http://www.mfa.gov.il> (links: foreign rel., hist. docs, 47-74, III 12; 3 Apr 07). On Truman's policy towards the Arabs and Israel in general, see Spiegel 1985 Chapter 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 9-12, 20, 26. On Bergmann's and Peres's roles, see pp. 14-20. On key individuals behind Israel's nuclear program, see also Karpin 2006 Chapters 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> Crosbie 1974 p. 162; Pry 1984 pp. 5-6; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 18, 26, 31; Cordesman 2003 p. 43.

Ben-Gurion wanted to establish contacts with foreign, especially Jewish, nuclear scientists, and ties to France in particular were created early. In 1952-53, Israeli scientists developed new methods for extracting uranium from the Negev deposits and for making heavy water. These promised to be valuable in nuclear development and Bergmann sold patents for them to the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). By 1953, the IAEC and the CEA concluded a secret research cooperation agreement and started technical exchanges. The cooperation was rumored to cover nuclear weapon development.<sup>7</sup>

## **6.2 The creation of the Western European security system**

By joining NATO and the Brussels Treaty – a process that started around 1950 but was concluded only in 1955 – the FRG became integrated into the Western security system, its sovereignty was largely restored, and rearmament agreed upon<sup>8</sup>. During the rearmament negotiations, Bonn also made its first non-nuclear promises.

In March 1948, France, the UK, and the Benelux states signed the Brussels Treaty, which aimed at promoting their common values, prosperity, and security. The five states promised “*all the military and other aid and assistance in their power*” if any of them was attacked militarily in Europe<sup>9</sup>; help by all means was thus to be given *automatically* after an attack. The potential security threat explicitly mentioned in the treaty was Germany: one goal of the treaty was to react as necessary “in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression”<sup>10</sup>. This fact tends to be overlooked today: even the organization that later developed on the basis of the treaty presents a *Soviet* threat as having been a key motivation behind the treaty. But the original treaty does not mention that threat at all. In fall 1948, the five states started military cooperation and joint military planning in the new Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO).<sup>11</sup>

Concern about Soviet expansionism was growing in the West. Western Europeans saw US support against the USSR as necessary, but the US public and the Congress were uneager about involvement in Europe and first the US only economically assisted reconstruction in Western Europe. But as relations with Moscow deteriorated, London strongly pressed for

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<sup>7</sup> It seems the Israeli methods were first expected to be valuable for France, but after 1953, the US allowed other states access to better sources of nuclear materials. “The French-Israeli Relationship” (san.), n/d, JFKL N/I Ben-Gurion visit May-June 61; Crosbie 1974 pp. 56, 114-7; Lefever 1979 pp. 68-70; Green 1984 pp. 148-9; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 19, 25, 32-4.

<sup>8</sup> In addition to sources mentioned specifically below, regarding NATO’s creation and first years and German rearmament I rely on NATO’s history in <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0101.htm> and <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/45-49/1949e.htm>; Secretary General Ismay’s *The First Five Years 1949-1954*, <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm> and <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/2.htm> (23 March 05); and LC 1995. On the creation of NATO and US debates on and goals with it, see also Osgood 1962 pp. 28-51; Department of DOS 1999. Also Richardson 1966 provides an insightful account on the FRG and NATO until the mid-1960s.

<sup>9</sup> My emphasis. The Brussels Treaty, 17 March 48. On the treaty and its relation to NATO and the question of German rearmament, see also Zeeman 1990.

<sup>10</sup> The Brussels Treaty, 17 March 48.

<sup>11</sup> See “History of WEU”, <http://www.weu.int> (17 Aug 07).

greater US involvement, and Western Europeans showed resolve to protect themselves with the Brussels Treaty, those who saw US involvement as needed to protect Western Europe, including Truman and Secretary of State (SOS) D. Acheson, gained the upper hand in policy debates in Washington against isolationists and the liberal left, which favored cooperation with Moscow.<sup>12</sup> When the Brussels Treaty was signed, Truman expressed to the Congress his conviction “that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves” and stressed a need to keep US forces in Germany “until the peace is secure in Europe”<sup>13</sup>.

Spurred by the complete Soviet blockage of Berlin that started in June 1948, the alliance-building process continued in July with talks between the US, Canada, and the BTO states and later also Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT), which was to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe, was signed in April 1949. Its key content lies in Art. 5: “the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and ... if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, *such actions as it deems necessary*, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”<sup>14</sup>. Thus unlike the Brussels Treaty, the NAT leaves each member to decide whether and how to help an attacked ally. A promise of automatic action was not in line with the US constitution that requires a 2/3 Senate majority to declare war. Moreover, in case of the US, a promise to use *all* means to protect an attacked ally would have included nuclear weapons, and it is understandable that the USG did not want to promise to retaliate any attack with nuclear war.

The case of NATO shows that the formal terms of security cooperation do not alone determine its thoroughness and de facto value: the text of the NAT is not very strong as each party promises just to help others as it considers appropriate<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, though the promise is formally mutual, Waltz points out that NATO was de facto based on unilateral US security guarantees to the Europeans and Canada<sup>16</sup>: the US did not depend on its allies for its defense, but these did depend on it. But it should not be overlooked that in the NAT, Western European states also promised to help and cooperate with *each other*.

To make the deterrence effect of Art. 5 credible, Art. 3 states that “in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means

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<sup>12</sup> See Morgan 1974 pp. 10-4.

<sup>13</sup> Truman to the Congress, 17 March 48, PPT 52.

<sup>14</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 Apr 49. My emphasis.

<sup>15</sup> Also Theiler 1997 stresses this fact (p. 104).

<sup>16</sup> Waltz 1979 p. 169. RI authors agree on this point; see Wallander & Keohane 1999 p. 41.



of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”<sup>17</sup>.

According to Osgood, in US discussions the deterrent value of NATO as such was stressed and the Congress approved the NAT with little understanding of its material and other implications, which soon proved very significant. Though it sought, and got, the Congress’s approval for a large military aid program for Europe, the USG argued in congressional hearings on the NAT that this as such did not imply greater aid or stationing of large US troops in Europe. Rather, the US was to help revitalize Europe so that a united Europe could become able to defend itself.<sup>18</sup>

### **6.3 Plans for West Germany’s rearmament and a European Defence Community**

In practice, building Western European defense proceeded slowly and Western forces remaining in Austria and Germany after post-WWII demobilization were weak relative to Soviet forces in Europe. The perception of a Soviet threat continued to strengthen, to which also the first Soviet nuclear test in summer 1949 contributed. Though many states worried about their finances, NATO states agreed on greater armament efforts. The US much increased its military spending and its allies took similar steps.<sup>19</sup>

The need to strengthen Western defense opened the hard question of West Germany’s rearmament: whether to allow it, and how to do it so that Germany could not one day one again become a threat. This problem – a prime example of a security dilemma resulting from the inseparability of defensive and offensive capabilities – was to be central in US policy towards Europe for a long time to come. For instance in 1963, a senior USG official wrote that US policy in post-WWII Europe had been largely centred on it and even “NATO was, in large part, a response to the problem of how Germany might safely be armed”<sup>20</sup>.

At the time, Germany was occupied, divided, and subjected to strict restrictions regarding scientific and industrial activities and armaments. Activities in the nuclear field were fully prohibited and the occupying powers planned long-term restrictions especially on the military nuclear field. In 1946, the US-Soviet-British-French Allied Control Council, a governing body for the occupied Germany, issued laws that prohibited, e.g., applied and fundamental scientific research “of a wholly or primarily military nature” or that required facilities useful in research of such kind and “the manufacture, import, export, transport and

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<sup>17</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 Apr 49.

<sup>18</sup> Osgood 1962 pp. 40-1.

<sup>19</sup> Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 95-100. On how the Truman administration mobilized the domestic opinion in favor of the costly undertaking of containing the communist threat, see Christensen 1996.

<sup>20</sup> Department of State Policy Planning Council (DOS/PPC) Chairman Rostow to Kennedy, 19 Feb 63, JFKL PR. On the “German problem”, see Kissinger 1965 pp. 65-6; Ball 1968 pp. 160-6, and on historical ways to deal with it, Calvocoressi 1990 pp. 668-70.

storage” of, e.g., “all weapons including atomic means of warfare”.<sup>21</sup> After Moscow stopped cooperation in the Council, the three Western states set up the Allied High Commission (AHC). In 1950, the AHC issued the law 22 regarding the nuclear field in particular. This allowed theoretical research but prohibited the construction of reactors and major isotope separation plants, various nuclear and related materials, and commercial uses of nuclear energy.<sup>22</sup>

### 6.3.1 Western agreement on a need for West Germany’s rearmament

The constitution of the FRG was promulgated in May 1949 and in the fall, the new state got limited powers of self-government. The Soviet threat caused great insecurity in the FRG<sup>23</sup> but many West Germans nonetheless opposed rearmament – because they either questioned Western determination to resist Soviet aggression and thus saw rearmament efforts as pointless, wanted to preclude any re-militarization of Germans, or resented the idea of a *foreign-controlled*, “un-German” army, which was maybe the only option available<sup>24</sup>. K. Adenauer, who in fall 1949 became the country’s first chancellor, asked the Three Powers to declare that they would defend the FRG. In May 1950, these replied that “an armed attack upon the occupation forces of the Western Allies in Germany will be considered as an armed attack against all the parties to the [North Atlantic] Treaty ... So long, therefore, as the Western occupation forces remain in Germany the Federal Republic enjoys, in effect, protection under the North Atlantic Treaty. The three Allied powers have no intention in the present European situation of withdrawing their occupation forces from Germany.”<sup>25</sup> In this indirect way, the Western powers thus for the first time gave security guarantees for the FRG.

US officials soon came to see it as unfeasible to make the Germans accept permanent restrictions and controls: Germany had simply violated the broad restrictions forced on it af-

<sup>21</sup> Control Council laws 25 and 43, 29 Apr and 20 Dec 46. Similarly, a “Control Council Plan for Reparations and the Level of Post-War German Economy” (28 March 48, repr. in Ruhm von Oppen 1955 pp. 113-4) prohibited all war material, aircraft, and major ship production and required the destruction of all capital equipment for radioactive material production. Also according to US draft “Twenty-Five-Year Treaty for the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany” (29 Apr, *ibid.* pp. 128-31), “the manufacture, production, or importation of military equipment in Germany [was to] be prevented”, incl. “all fissionable materials for any purpose” except when the Four Powers permitted. Prevented was to be also the creation or use for military aims of facilities or information useful in production of prohibited items.

<sup>22</sup> AHC law 22, 7 March 50; Weilemann 1983 pp. 50-1. The law was somewhat relaxed by laws 53 and 68 (26 Apr, 14 Dec 51), but applied nuclear research and the use of nuclear energy remained prohibited. Fischer 1994 p. 26. On the laws and their implementation, see Müller 1990 pp. 43-54.

<sup>23</sup> For an appraisal of the situation, see McCloy at US Ambassadors’ mtg, 22-4 March, FRUS 50:3 pp. 810-4.

<sup>24</sup> AHC memo, 13 Sep, *ibid.* pp. 1278-9; Richardson 1966 p. 22; Cioc 1988 p. 70; Schrafstetter 2004 pp. 121-2 ref. to Geyer, M. (2001) “Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons,” in Schissler, H. (ed.) *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968*, Princeton: Princeton UP, pp. 382-3.

<sup>25</sup> Foreign Ministers’ reply to Adenauer, 22 May, FRUS 50:3 p. 1085. No indication exists in that volume or PPT collections that the reply would have been made public. A 13 Sep AHC paper proposed a *renewal* of a declaration about protecting the FRG and Berlin but is not explicit on whether a *public* declaration had been made (see FRUS 50:3 p. 1279).

ter the WWI and these had even been counterproductive in that the Nazis had benefited from the resentment they had caused in Germany. Moreover, to limit the burden on other Western states, the USG wanted to make the FRG to contribute to its defense. But the Germans had to be prevented from becoming too strong and capable of doing without Western protection: the USG wanted to tie them and their productive potential to the West so that they could not drift to neutrality or the Soviet sphere of influence. The possibilities of the Germans maneuvering between the East and the West and of a Soviet-German alliance caused concern and their chances were expected to grow along with unemployment in the FRG. All this led to a belief in the USG that the West Germans had to be treated well, be defended, and get a fair position in Europe. Changes to Three Power-FRG relations were needed: continuing the occupation regime indeterminately was unlikely to make Germans pro-West, and their productive potential could be better used if controls on them were eased. The US policy became not just to *control* but to *tie* the FRG to the West. Another question was, whether the FRG was to contribute its share to the defense of the West as both industrial production *and* armed forces.<sup>26</sup>

One way to prevent the FRG from again becoming a threat to peace was to integrate it in a broad Western European security and political framework. US officials hoped to see the emergence of a strong, united Europe, where internal differences would be overcome through political integration, which would strongly contribute to Western defense, and where West Germans would develop a healthy Western European identity.<sup>27</sup>

Several key US and British policymakers favored West German rearmament by late 1947, as did the military of all Three Powers by 1948. But the USG as a whole, the US public, and their allies remained unenthusiastic. Especially in France, acceptance of German rearmament grew slowly and only along with trust that US forces would stay in Europe to protect Western European states against both the USSR and each other. But in June 1950, the Korean War heightened Western feelings of insecurity and increased support for German rearmament in the US. To strengthen Western defenses psychologically and materially, the USG decided to promptly build up its forces in Europe. Though in early July, both US allies and the DOS (owing to allies' and domestic views and since the FRG was not yet tied well enough to the West to be counted upon) still saw German rearmament as "premature",

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<sup>26</sup> Ambassadors' mtg, 22-4 March, pp. 815-6; Telegram (T)/57 DOS to USDel/Tripartite mtgs, 2 May, pp. 913-4; Acheson to DOS, 9 May, p. 1015; USDel/Tripartite ForMin mtg to DOS, 12 May, pp. 1046-7; Acheson on mtg with Truman, 31 July, pp. 167-8; T/22 Acheson to DOS on NAC mtg, 17 Sep, pp. 316-8; DOS-Department of Defense (DOD) draft for NAC, 6 Oct, pp. 362-3; McCloy to Deputy (Dep) US Representative to NATO Spofford, 20 Nov, p. 472; MC-30-1 on German defense contribution, 9 Dec, p. 532, all *ibid.*; Secretary of Defense (SOD) Johnson to NSC on policy towards Germany with JCS views, 8 June, USNA RG273 PP 68-72 B/9; Acheson to NSC on German rearmament, 3 July, FRUS 50:4; T/2649 McCloy to Acheson, 23 Sep, FRUS 51:3 p. 1523; Ball 1968 pp. 167, 174; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 101-5. During the WWII, de-industrialization and re-ruralization of post-WWII Germany was considered in the USG but the idea was abandoned since having a backward state in the middle of Europe was expected to harm European development.

<sup>27</sup> Ball 1968 p. 58; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 62-3, 75-7, 84-5. On US hopes of European integration as a way to tie the FRG to the West and make Europe an equal partner, see also Kissinger 1965; Ball 1968 pp. 51-78.

at the end of the month Truman and Acheson agreed on studying the idea of creating a European or Atlantic army, into which German forces and production would be integrated and where they could be controlled. Soon the USG started supporting the idea.<sup>28</sup>

Even in any integrated force, safeguards were seen as a necessary for preventing independent German moves. One safeguard included already in early US plans for German rearmament was to keep German forces dependent on foreign supplies of heavy armaments.<sup>29</sup>

The Korean War added in particular to West German worries: like Korea, Germany was divided, and the military forces in the Soviet zone were stronger than those in the FRG. Adenauer asked the Three Powers to strengthen their forces in the FRG, give an explicit security guarantee for it and Berlin, and normalize relations with it: though NATO guarantees applied to the occupied country, he said that stronger signs of determination to protect the West Germans were needed to prevent a feeling of hopelessness from seriously weakening their will to resist the Soviet threat. He argued that it was in Western interest to protect the FRG since control over it and its steel production could be decisive in a WWII.<sup>30</sup>

In August 1950, the former British Prime Minister W. Churchill suggested the creation of a European army with German participation. The USG supported the idea. So did Adenauer, who offered a German defense contribution in terms of both manpower and industrial production.<sup>31</sup> In reaction to Soviet steps to establish armed German forces in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and to improve West German receptiveness towards defense efforts, in September the Three Powers responded to Adenauer in a publicized declaration that they would strengthen their troops in the FRG and consider “any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves”.<sup>32</sup>

Thus the USG gave also explicit security guarantees for the FRG well before the FRG made any non-nuclear promises or joined NATO or negotiations really started on German rearmament and limitations to it. Originally, the guarantees were a result of the global and European security situation, not a part of a bargain to prevent the FRG from acquiring nu-

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<sup>28</sup> Still in June, also Truman opposed German rearmament and saw a contrary JCS stance as “decidedly militaristic”. Johnson (fn 26), 8 June, Truman to Acheson (2 memos), 16 June, Acheson to McCloy, 21 June, all FRUS 50:4 pp. 686-90; Acheson (fn 26), 3 an 31 July; DOS on EDF, 16 Aug, pp. 212-7, Acheson & Johnson to Truman, 8 Sep, pp. 273-6, T/22 (fn 26) pp. 316-9, all FRUS 50:3; Osgood 1962 pp. 48-9, 73-4; Ball 1968 p. 57; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 13; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 73-8, 102, 107-8. Still in spring 1950, hesitation regarding German rearmament existed even among American military men. See DOS - SACEUR Gruenther - General Lemnitzer mtg, 27 March, USNA SRD B/1.

<sup>29</sup> Ambassadors’ mtg, 22-4 March, pp. 815-6; DOS on EDF, 6 Aug, pp. 213-7; Acheson & Johnson to Truman, 8 Sep, pp. 274-6; T/22 (fn 26), pp. 317-9; DOS-DOD draft for NAC, 6 Oct, pp. 362-3; US memo to NATO Defense Committee (body of member states’ Defense Ministers or their representatives), 26 Oct, pp. 408-9; Spofford to Acheson, 13 Nov, p. 449, all FRUS 50:3.

<sup>30</sup> Adenauer to AHC Chairman, 29 Aug 50, APD 49-50 pp. 322-9; Adenauer’s interview, *NYT*, 17 Aug 50, repr. in *Europa-Archiv*, 20 Nov pp. 3515-6; Adenauer 1965 pp. 346-54. For a thorough study of West German security and foreign policy throughout the period studied here, see Haftendorn 1986.

<sup>31</sup> T/22 (fn 26) FRUS 50:3 p. 318; Adenauer 1965 pp. 354-5.

<sup>32</sup> The Three Powers also said that they aimed to review the industrial controls on the FRG. AHC memo, 13 Sep; ForMin decision on Germany, 19 Sep, FRUS 50:3 pp. 1279, 1296-9. See Adenauer 1965 pp. 366-75 for accepting comments on the declaration.

clear weapons. The AHC law 22 at the time settled the nuclear status of the FRG. It is noteworthy that the form of these USG guarantees was stronger than those of NATO guarantees in that they were not explicitly conditioned in any way. The difference is in part explained by the fact that the guarantee for the FRG was given in a unilateral declaration not to be ratified in the US Congress and was in that sense less binding.

In the fall, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the political decision-making organ of NATO states, agreed on forward defense, urgent military build-up, and *integrated* military forces under *joint* command<sup>33</sup>. Military integration indeed came to transform NATO from a mere coalition of states<sup>34</sup> into a highly institutionalized alliance where various mechanisms promote cooperation among member states by solving different cooperation problems and reducing risks involved in cooperation. This process strengthened as the FRG joined NATO, and I discuss those mechanisms in that connection in section 7.2.1.4.

In the NAC meeting, Acheson moreover stated that the USG was willing to provide a commander and troops for a joint force that would include West German troops – a clear departure from the policy of demilitarizing Germany so far officially followed. The German troops were to depend on their allies for the supply of key equipment and the FRG was to have no national general staff. Thus if the Europeans wanted US involvement, they had to agree to rearm the FRG.

The USG got other allies' support for this plan but Paris opposed it because of a fear of provoking Moscow, unwillingness to give Bonn a strong bargaining position, and domestic opposition to German rearmament. Paris accepted German rearmament after China entered the Korean War in October, but Prime Minister R. Pleven proposed a purely *European* (and thus not US-dominated) force with West German participation. According to Osgood, many US officials saw the idea as unrealistic. Still, as French acceptance of German rearmament was needed, the USG, and similarly London and Bonn, did not reject it, though they preferred bringing the FRG to NATO.<sup>35</sup>

In December 1950, the NAC adopted a stance in favor of West German participation in European defense. The idea of a European force was accepted but if nothing came of it, the FRG was to contribute to NATO forces. In any case, the NAC wanted to keep the production of "heavy military equipment, military aircraft or other than minor naval vessels" in the FRG prohibited.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, the NATO Military Committee saw that "the *manufacture*

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<sup>33</sup> T/22 (fn 26).

<sup>34</sup> See Theiler 1997 p. 110.

<sup>35</sup> Spofford to Acheson, 13 Nov, FRUS 50:3 p. 449; Pleven declaration, *Europa-Archiv*, 20 Nov 50 pp. 3518-20; Osgood 1962 p. 85; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 108-10; Tuschhoff 2002 p. 34. On Moscow's reactions to steps towards West German rearmament and joining Western security arrangements, see DOS Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) RSB-119, 21 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/2 P/3.

<sup>36</sup> DOD/International Security Affairs (ISA) to SOD Marshall with summary of NATO Standing Group memo, 5 Dec; MC-30-1 (fn 26) FRUS 50:3 pp. 518, 532. The Standing Group was a US-British-French executive group for NATO's Military Committee (MC), a body of member states' military representatives that provides the NAC and NATO's commanders with military advice.

of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, and long range missiles should not be permitted *in Germany*<sup>37</sup>.” The exact wording of this early Western proposal for a nuclear weapon prohibition on the FRG deserves more attention than it has received in literature because key formulations in it – manufacture, not existence, and in Germany, not under German control – survived as such throughout the rearmament negotiations into Adenauer’s non-nuclear pledge in 1954. In addition to such negative safeguards, NATO states had positive ones over the FRG that they aimed to maintain “as long as there is a risk of Germany being a threat to the peace of Europe”: their alliance against aggression by any side, forces in Germany, and capabilities for aerial attacks<sup>38</sup>.

The NAC now also appointed General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and gave him the task of creating forces capable of defending the alliance against armed attacks. In April 1951, the US Senate authorized the stationing of four army divisions to Europe.<sup>39</sup>

In early 1951, the Three Powers reviewed industrial controls on the FRG. Paris favored bargaining with the controls in rearmament negotiations with Bonn, but since German defense contribution was needed and it expected early action to be more helpful in dealings with Bonn, the USG wanted to quickly give up all limits on industrial production, except those on military and aircraft production and the nuclear field. It wanted to maintain (maybe somewhat relaxed) Three Power controls over the *whole* atomic field instead of prohibiting just atomic *weapons*: this was the only way to make a weapon prohibition effective. The review resulted in relaxed restrictions on industrial activity in the FRG, but “the manufacture, production, installation, import, export, transport, storage, possession, ownership or use” of, e.g., atomic armaments was prohibited without AHC authorization and “materials, products, facilities and equipment relating to atomic energy” continued to be a matter of AHC legislation.<sup>40</sup> A detail that deserves attention is that the prohibition regarding nuclear weapons left open the possibility of the AHC later specifically allowing some activities.

West German scientists, led by W. Heisenberg (who became Adenauer’s advisor and a negotiator with the Three Powers) sought from early on relaxation of restrictions in the nuclear field. But Heisenberg saw only *civilian* nuclear activities as politically possible for the FRG. For the same reason, West German military experts, whom Adenauer in fall 1950 asked to develop a rearmament plan, saw the question of nuclear armaments as not even worth consideration.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> My emphasis. MC report, 12 Dec, FRUS 50:3 p. 544.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 543.

<sup>39</sup> Department of DOS 1999. NATO’s operational structure was divided into two areas under SACEUR and the Atlantic commander SACLANT.

<sup>40</sup> USDel/Intergovernmental Study Group to Acheson, 1, 12, and 16 Feb, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1348, 1358, 1362; AHC agreement on industrial controls, 3 Apr, *ibid.* pp. 1395-7.

<sup>41</sup> Fischer 1994 pp. 26-36.

Negotiations on German rearmament started in early 1951 along the French proposal for a European Defence Force (EDF) under a European Defence Community (EDC). The EDC was to include France, the FRG, Italy, and the Benelux states. The negotiations covered the relations of the Three Powers to the FRG and the nature and details of its rearmament in general; from the perspective of this study, key issues were restrictions in the nuclear field and security guarantees for the FRG.

### 6.3.2 Control of West German armament production

At the start of the negotiations, the West Germans said that to show good intentions towards France, they would forgo *any* armament production. But they wanted the industry and scientific research to be restricted in no way. As the Three Powers insisted on controls, the Germans indicated acceptance of *limited* ones.<sup>42</sup> Thus even though Germany was under occupation, Bonn did not just passively accept what others decided but made its own demands. It had bargaining power because the USG wanted West German resources to be used for common defense; Adenauer tried to strengthen his bargaining position further by referring to the opposition to rearmament among West Germans and by the Social Democratic Party (SPD)<sup>43</sup>. The perceived need to treat the Germans well also limited the preparedness of the USG to simply *force* Bonn to accept Three Power preferences.

In fall 1951, the Three Powers told Adenauer that they planned to further relax but not fully eliminate military and industrial controls on the FRG. Adenauer complained that planned prohibitions on the production of heavy armaments and aircraft and on atomic research “implied discrimination and lack of trust” and were incompatible with the idea of a joint army.<sup>44</sup>

The USG specifically wanted to maintain restrictions on the FRG on 1) production of atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons, missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels; 2) capital equipment used in such production; and 3) application of science for the purpose of producing them. But it was prepared to just rely on intelligence and its forces in the FRG and forgo explicit verification systems.<sup>45</sup> In the nuclear field, it moreover wanted the FRG to “agree not to engage in or permit, (*except as may be agreed with the three Allied Powers acting in interest of NATO*), a) research specifically related to, development, production or possession of, atomic weapons ...; b) production of fissionable material in quantities (500 grams per year) significant for production of such weapons; c) research specifically related to, or development, construction or possession of, nuclear reactors or other instruments or installations capable of producing such weapons, or fissionable materials in quantities ...

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<sup>42</sup> D/21 mtg with AHC, 2 Feb, APD 51; AHC report on Allied-German relations, 9 Aug, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1504-8. On negotiations on restrictions on nuclear development, see also Eckert 1989 pp. 119-21.

<sup>43</sup> See Morgan 1974 p. 41.

<sup>44</sup> AHC Chairman to Adenauer, T/2718 McCloy to Acheson, 24-5 Sep, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1531, 1525; AHC-Adenauer mtg, 24 Sep, APD AHK 49-51 pp. 381-7; Adenauer 1965 p. 483.

<sup>45</sup> ForMin mtg, Acheson to Truman & DOS, 21 and 23 Nov, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1715-8, 1609-10.

significant for production of such weapons; d) production or acquisition of normal uranium or its compounds in quantities greater than ten metric ton of contained uranium oxide per year.<sup>46</sup> As the marked passage shows, the USG again wanted to protect the Three Powers' freedom to later allow some activities. Moreover, whereas the Control Council and AHC laws had prohibited also, e.g., import, transport, and storage of atomic weapons, the USG wanted to maintain *production* prohibitions only.

France wanted much broader restrictions on scientific research and especially heavy armaments in the FRG<sup>47</sup> and Adenauer opposed discriminating restrictions. Chances of agreement on rearmament based on existing proposals thus seemed uncertain. But US High Commissioner J. McCloy thought that Adenauer might accept the idea that no EDF state would "produce any specific war materials not allocated to it by NATO" and maybe special prohibitions regarding, e.g., "atomic energy, chemical and biological warfare, major naval units and strategic air"<sup>48</sup>.

Adenauer indeed took the stance that he would only accept restrictions the EDC decided upon within its armament program. Acheson had understanding for Adenauer's domestic political concerns and saw a promise to produce weapons only as authorized by the EDC as equally good as one not to produce some items. The Three Powers told Adenauer that they wanted guarantees that the FRG would produce only what the EDC allocated to it and no ABC weapons, missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels. Adenauer rejected special German guarantees as discriminatory but accepted the idea of guarantees from *all* EDC states to produce only allocated items, with exceptions for states with overseas military engagements. He stressed that though German production of nuclear arms was out of question, German nuclear research was not to be discriminated against. According to him, views had been expressed in EDC talks that German atomic scientists should work for the benefit of joint defense.<sup>49</sup>

The French government worried that the EDC would not protect against German ABC weapons. But Acheson saw that security would result from tying German resources into producing what the EDC required so that no resources would be left to produce ABC weapons.<sup>50</sup> The USG saw tying the FRG in *positive* ways to the West as the best safeguard, instead of restrictions that "give illusory protection for an interim period yet become unworkable at very moment they might be needed"<sup>51</sup>. It stressed that though Germany had to be controlled, the Soviet threat made German productive contribution necessary. Fur-

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<sup>46</sup> My emphasis. T/1844 DOS to Embassy (E)/London (L), 5 Oct, *ibid.* p. 1704.

<sup>47</sup> T/1810 USDel/Tripartite talks to Acheson, 12 Oct, *ibid.* p. 1706.

<sup>48</sup> T/301 McCloy to Acheson, 12 and 31 Oct, *ibid.* p. 1709.

<sup>49</sup> AHC on negotiations with the FRG; T/510 McCloy to DOS; ForMin mtg, 17 and 26-7 Nov, *ibid.* pp. 1590, 1719-20, 1724; D/90 also fn 5 Adenauer-Eden (British Foreign Secretary) disc., 22 Nov, APD 51; AHC-Adenauer mtg, 26 Nov, APD AHK 49-51 pp. 422-7.

<sup>50</sup> ForMin mtgs, 27-8 Nov, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1724-7.

<sup>51</sup> T/29 Acheson (Emb. Rome) to Truman, 30 Nov 51, USNA CDF 762A.56/11-3051 B/3904.



thermore, broad prohibitions on military production (and thus fewer resources used in it) could create economic benefits for the FRG.<sup>52</sup>

Since other EDC states were unlikely to easily accept production controls on them and to increase acceptance among Britons of giving up British controls over the FRG, London hoped that Adenauer would “be simulated to make a voluntary offer on Germany’s part to refrain from the production of certain important military items.” Acheson supported the idea.<sup>53</sup> Thus McCloy suggested Adenauer that since prohibiting the production in Germany of, e.g., atomic weapons, was very important to Americans and for instance France would not agree to produce only what the EDC allocated, Bonn would voluntarily promise to 1) prohibit the production of ABC weapons, aircraft, and certain missiles and naval vessels and 2) produce only what the EDC allocated to it. Adenauer was grudgingly receptive, assuming rights 1) to build civil aircraft and 2) for German scientists to be involved in nuclear research abroad (he argued that economic development demanded this). McCloy saw the conditions as sensible. The German Foreign Office (GFO) suggested that Bonn could justify a unilateral promise with the “strategic position” of the FRG.<sup>54</sup> This became the line to be pursued.

In February 1952, the Three Powers agreed that Bonn had to unilaterally promise not to produce ABC weapons, guided missiles, aircraft, and other than minor naval vessels. Despite Adenauer’s initial opposition, agreement in principle was reached with him on the production prohibitions. Because of Adenauer’s concern about discrimination, it was agreed regarding the *form* of prohibitions that production of the listed items would be prohibited in strategically exposed zones, to which the area east of Rhine belonged. Adenauer was to declare that because of geography, the FRG would not find restricted EDC production allocations to that area discriminatory. Only solely civilian research in the restricted fields was to be allowed in the FRG, *except if the EDC requested otherwise*. McCloy reassured Adenauer the FRG would be *supplied* equally with other EDC states with all kinds of needed armaments.<sup>55</sup> The import, possession, or existence of ABC weapons into, by, or in the FRG was not prohibited: again, Western freedom of action was to be protected.

The prohibition of nuclear weapons in the EDC treaty came to cover both weapons, plants used *primarily* for their production, and large amounts of weapon material. This implied restrictions also on the civilian nuclear field. But the definition did not restrict activities re-

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<sup>52</sup> T/3560 E/Paris (P) to Acheson, 14 Dec, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1738. Later, the US used the point that the FRG would benefit economically from not participating in defense also to justify its rearmament towards Moscow. Eisenhower-Mikoyan (Soviet Deputy Premier) mtg, 17 Jan 59, DNSA BC00640.

<sup>53</sup> ForMin mtg, 21 Nov; T/611 ActSOS to McCloy, 11 Dec, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1718, 1735-6.

<sup>54</sup> McCloy to Acheson, 19 Dec, *ibid.* pp. 1740-1; D/208 Adenauer-McCloy disc., 19 Dec, APD 51.

<sup>55</sup> USDel to DOS (2 memos), Three Power-FRG mtg, ForMin-Adenauer memo, 18-21 Feb 52, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 56-7, 75-6, 68-9, 104-5; ForMin Conf., 18-9 Feb; AHC-Adenauer mtgs, 27 March and 15-6 May, APD AHK 52 pp. 329-33, 31, 229; D/148 ForMin Conf., 24-5 May, APD 52; Baring 1984 pp. 197-8; Fischer 1994 pp. 41, 44. The border of the exposed zone run along the Dutch-German border to Rhine, along it to Cologne, met Rhine in Bonn, followed it to Mainz and Neckar from Heidelberg to Esslingen, and run through Ulm and to the Eastern corner of the Bodensee. Agreement regarding Art. 107 of the EDC Treaty, 27 May 52.

lated to natural uranium or prohibit facilities *capable* of weapon material production. The Three Powers wanted Bonn to make further commitments on these issues and it was agreed that Bonn, in a letter by Adenauer, undertook “to maintain controls in this [atomic energy] field beyond production of such weapons” and “by legislation, prohibit ... the development, production and possession of atomic weapons”, the import or production of over 0,5 kg of nuclear fuel and nine tons of uranium in any form per year, “the development, construction or possession of nuclear ... installations” capable of producing nuclear fuel beyond the limits, and the storage of processed uranium in large quantities. Bonn was moreover to protect nuclear information and control nuclear exports. These restrictions were to be reviewed after two years.<sup>56</sup>

Though little concrete activity in the nuclear field was yet allowed in the FRG, the chancellery, scientists, and (especially after a marketing campaign by Heisenberg) the export-oriented industry early on started detailed planning for the time when restrictions would be eased.<sup>57</sup> One key question was the choice of reactor and thus fuel (natural or enriched uranium) and moderator type(s). Here, desire for fuel autarky and freedom from foreign controls played a central role. After it was found out that domestic resources were limited, Brazil was seen as a potential supplier for natural uranium; it was preferred to the US since it was unlikely to demand safeguards. Using enriched uranium seemed first unfeasible since 1) acquiring an enrichment plant was economically, technically, and politically unfeasible (at the time, only the US had such plants and used them primarily for weapon material production; the EDC Treaty was to prohibit the FRG from producing large amounts of enriched uranium) and 2) the US had not offered to supply enriched uranium and was anyway likely to demand safeguards.<sup>58</sup>

In spring 1952, the Germans presented their ideas for atomic research in the FRG to the Three Powers, but these were prepared to allow the supply of only a smaller reactor and less plutonium than Bonn wanted. The Germans argued that the desired reactor was small relative to research reactors in other countries, stressed that they had no intention to produce bombs, and suggested that foreign scientists working in the FRG could exert continuous control over atomic research. The amount of plutonium they wanted was enough for producing a bomb in 2-3 years, but they argued that they could not do so secretly. Still, the US and the UK agreed only that the given limits could be revised later: it had been problematic to allow any atomic research in the FRG at all and the Western public opposed fur-

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<sup>56</sup> T/1682 McCloy to DOS also fn 1, 23 Feb 52, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 257-8; AHC-Adenauer mtg fn 9, 19 May, APD AHK 52 pp. 265-6; Three Power-FRG Conf., 24-5 May, *ibid.* p. 344; Fischer 1994 pp. 45-7.

<sup>57</sup> See Weilemann 1983 pp. 51-6; Eckert 1989 pp. 120-6; Fischer 1994 pp. 26-36, 54, 62-6, 73-90, 164. Küntzel 1987 argues that West Germans undertook also secret action contrary to AHC regulations in the nuclear field in the early 1950s (pp. 181-2).

<sup>58</sup> See EDC Treaty Art. 107 Annex II, 26 May 52; Eckert 1989 pp. 121, 125-8; Fischer 1994 pp. 79-81.

ther relaxations. The risk also existed that plutonium in the FRG would end up under Soviet control.<sup>59</sup>

The production restrictions are an example of the basic security dilemma at work. Owing to uncertainty about the future and the risk that the weapons that were to protect against a common enemy could be used against allies, the Three Powers wanted to restrict critical weapon production in the FRG, even though this implied some limits to their joint effort to create a strong alliance with the most powerful weapons against the Soviet threat<sup>60</sup>.

### 6.3.3 Security guarantees for West Germany

The question of US security guarantees for the FRG was crucial for Adenauer in EDC negotiations. He found the fall 1950 statement insufficient because it had not been ratified by the US Congress but only accepted by the Foreign Relations Committees, which considered it a mere statement of an existing situation. He argued the statement could be withdrawn unilaterally and the Germans would not see why to participate in Western defense if the Three Powers did not promise to defend them. He also wanted them to promise to maintain forces in the FRG. But for the US, a formal agreement about that was contrary to historical practices and would have required congressional approval, which might not have been granted especially as Americans generally opposed new commitments abroad. McCloy argued to Adenauer that the 1950 declaration was stronger than NATO guarantees, which included no obligation to automatic action, but suggested that these could be extended over the FRG. The Three Powers assured Adenauer that the 1950 declaration still held and they would go as far with security assurances as constitutionally possible and the USG indicated willingness to reaffirm the 1950 guarantee and maybe declare an aim to station significant forces in Germany. Adenauer started warming to this solution, which he preferred to a NATO guarantee.<sup>61</sup>

In November 1951, the Three Powers agreed on a declaration, to be issued when agreements on West German rearmament and Three Power-FRG relations would be completed, that they would “treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves” and “maintain armed forces within the territory of the German Federal Republic and Berlin for such time as they deem necessary, having regard to their

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<sup>59</sup> D/116 Committee for Industrial Restrictions disc., 25 Apr, APD 52; AHC-Adenauer mtgs, 28 Apr and 15-6 May, APD AHK 52 pp. 135-7, 222-7. On these negotiations, see also Fischer 1994 pp. 47-50.

<sup>60</sup> Cioc 1988 notes that “once the initial [Korean] war scare subsided ... the European governments let it be known that they feared a revival of German militarism almost as much as they feared the Soviet army” (pp. xviii-xix).

<sup>61</sup> T/2026 McCloy to DOS, 31 Aug, with Adenauer’s 30 Aug draft security treaty; AHC Chairman to Adenauer, 24 Sep, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1520, 1533; T/2718, T/215, T/3155 McCloy to Acheson, 25 Sep, 4 and 12 Oct, *ibid.* pp. 1525-7, 1545-6, 1549-50; AHC-Adenauer mtg, 24 Sep, APD AHK 49-51 pp. 383-7; Adenauer 1965 pp. 481-9.

See Brady 2004 for an overview of the Congress’s stances towards the FRG in the 1945-68 period. He concludes that though the USG could not ignore them, they never determined its policy.

special responsibilities in Germany and the world situation.” Though the first part of the promise was again not explicitly conditioned in any way, Acheson pointed out to Truman that the language was chosen so “that final determination on this matter rests with us”. Still, he thought “this solution will tie us over until such time as Germany can be formally linked to the North Atlantic Treaty.”<sup>62</sup>

Nevertheless, in fall 1951 it became clear that Adenauer also wanted the FRG to be accepted into NATO and EDC participation to imply its inclusion in NATO guarantees. In early 1952, Bonn started to demand admission into NATO.<sup>63</sup>

#### 6.3.4 Treaty on the European Defence Community

In reaction to Western steps towards German rearmament, Soviet leader J. Stalin proposed in March 1952 German reunification negotiations on the conditions of Germany’s neutrality and recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as its border. The proposal and its sincerity caused much debate in the West. Adenauer demanded free all-German elections before negotiations, but Moscow did not agree. The domestic opposition attacked Adenauer’s stance but not very successfully (he and his party, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian-Social Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU), won elections in 1953 with a clear margin)<sup>64</sup>.

Another step to tie West German resources to Western Europe was the creation of a supra-national supervisory body and common free market for steel and coal (especially steel was crucial in armament production). France, the FRG, Italy, and the Benelux states founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in April 1952.<sup>65</sup>

In May, the six countries then signed the EDC Treaty. This included an automatic obligation to help an attacked ally and subjected West German troops fully to EDC command. According to Art. 107 and Annex II, the EDC was not to give production licenses for ABC weapons and certain missiles, ships, and aircraft in strategically exposed zones, unless member states unanimously decided so. The treaty was accompanied by Adenauer’s declaratory letters, discussed above, and declarations that 1) the Three Powers would “treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves” and 2) the US and the UK would intervene if the EDC was in any way endangered – to secure their continuing involvement on the continent, especially Paris wanted such a promise from them. They US and the UK also promised to station such forces as were needed in

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<sup>62</sup> Tripartite ForMin mtg of 21 Nov, Acheson to Truman & DOS, both 23 Nov, FRUS 51:3 pp. 1603-4, 1610.

<sup>63</sup> T/215, T/3155 (fn 61); D/29 ForMin Conf., 26-7 Jan, APD 52; Baring 1984 p. 201.

<sup>64</sup> Richardson 1966 pp. 24-31.

<sup>65</sup> See Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 51 and, on the ECSC, the European Commission website [http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/ecsc\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/ecsc_en.htm) (17 Aug 07).

Continental Europe.<sup>66</sup> In a new protocol to the NAT, conditional of the coming into force of the EDC Treaty, NATO states declared that “an armed attack ... on the territory of any of the members of the European Defence Community in Europe ... shall be considered an attack against all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty”<sup>67</sup>. Thus the FRG and Italy were to be covered also by NATO guarantees, as Adenauer wanted.

A simultaneous convention on Three Power-FRG relations was to end occupation and give the FRG “full authority over its internal and external affairs” with such exceptions as Three Power “rights ... relating to (a) the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, (b) Berlin, and (c) Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement”. Also this convention was to enter into force after the EDC Treaty did.<sup>68</sup>

Three Power controls in the nuclear field were to be lifted only after Bonn introduced necessary national legislation, not automatically with the coming into force of the EDC Treaty. From fall 1952 onwards, Bonn kept on submitting legislation drafts, aligned with Adenauer’s declaratory letters, to the Three Powers to comment. These overall kept a tight reign on the process. Bonn proposed to include in the legislation a notion that the production and possession of nuclear weapons by the FRG could be allowed if the EDC so wished, but the Three Powers turned down the idea.<sup>69</sup>

The EDF generally created little enthusiasm. But the USG accepted this solution to West Germany’s rearmament as it was in line with the idea of making Western Europe a third major power, which was popular in the USG because the USG did not want to tie US troops to Europe permanently.<sup>70</sup> This idea continued to color also the next US administration’s policy towards Europe.

#### **6.4 Conclusions regarding the Truman era**

In conclusion, the goal of ensuring security and protecting the balance-of-power was clearly central in the Truman administration’s policies. It came to favor West German rearmament because the defense of the West seemed to require that, even though the idea as such created little enthusiasm because of past experiences. For the USG, protecting the balance-of-power and ensuring that the Germans could not maneuver between the East and the West and so disrupt stability in Europe required tying the FRG to the West. To make the ties long-term sustainable, the USG preferred positive ties rather than overtly discriminat-

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<sup>66</sup> See USDel/ForMin Conf. to DOS, 18 Feb 52, FRUS 52-4:5 p. 57; EDC Treaty, 26 May; Tripartite Declaration, 27 May, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 686-8; Osgood 1962 p. 92; Fischer 1994 p. 50; Kreft 1997 p. 173. See also Adenauer 1965 pp. 350-463 on developments leading to the EDC.

<sup>67</sup> Prot. on NATO states’ guarantees to EDC states, 27 May 52.

<sup>68</sup> Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the FRG, 26 May 52.

<sup>69</sup> Fischer 1994 pp. 53-60.

<sup>70</sup> Osgood 1962 p. 92; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 110-20.

ing restrictions. Because the USG anyway wanted to keep the FRG from ending up under Soviet control, and to make the West Germans see a Western orientation as serving their interests, it gave security guarantees to the FRG. But in line with its general policy of nuclear secrecy, the administration pursued a very restrictive policy towards the FRG in the nuclear field. Though Bonn was unable to persuade the Three Powers to give up all restrictions on military production and the nuclear field in the FRG, these did go quite far to formulate them so as to meet Bonn's concerns.

The solution to West German rearmament and relations to the West was from early on not planned to be based on formal treaties only but to be institutionalized through a joint organization, integrated military forces, and maintenance of Western forces in the FRG. The Three Powers wanted these mechanisms in order to reduce the risk of defection from cooperation by the FRG and to monitor its actions. Bonn in turn wanted Western troops to be stationed in the FRG to get assurance, beyond verbal declarations, that the Three Powers would react in case of a Soviet attack.

## 7 President Eisenhower – 1953-61

In early 1953, former SACEUR Eisenhower became the US President. He promised resolute opposition against communism but also saw that “the only way ... to win World War III is to prevent it.” He had campaigned on the issues of “Korea, Communism and corruption”, blaming the Truman administration of having disposed of the great victory in foreign policy it started with so that the US ended up stuck in war in Korea, communists had gained power over hundreds of millions of people, US defense spending was massive, but no real plan existed for victory or lasting peace.<sup>1</sup> Also his SOS, J. Dulles, was a proponent of an active, determined stance, beyond the old policy of containment, in the battle against communism<sup>2</sup>.

East-West tensions somewhat relaxed for a while after Stalin’s death in March and Khrushchev’s coming to power in the USSR. Also the Korean war ended in a truce in summer 1953. But the Cold War continued in Europe, where Moscow tightened its grip by, e.g., suppressing uprisings in the GDR (1953) and Hungary (1956), and increasingly led to battles over the orientation of third world states. Also the USG overthrew through CIA operations nationalist governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). Anti-communist sentiments were strong in the US. But the Eisenhower administration set to reduce US military spending, which had greatly grown in the last years of the Truman era, and gave a large role for nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.

The possibility of a wide spread of nuclear weapons was now attaching the attention of USG officials. In both military and civilian nuclear fields, the Eisenhower administration came to try control other states’ ambitions by involving them in cooperation. I start this chapter by discussing the administration’s policy on civilian nuclear cooperation. Thereafter I consider the entry of the FRG into NATO. Section 7.3 focuses of how the Eisenhower administration assessed the risks of nuclear proliferation and acted to prevent it. Thereafter I consider nuclear development in the FRG and Western European cooperation in the civilian nuclear field and cooperation plans for the military field. In part in reaction to the latter kind of ideas, the USG came to propose a joint nuclear force for NATO, discussed in section 7.5. The last part of this chapter in turn concerns Israel’s case.

### 7.1 Atoms for Peace

As a major change to earlier US policies of secrecy and proposing nuclear development only under an international authority, Eisenhower announced in a late 1953 speech the Atoms for Peace -program that meant offering civilian nuclear cooperation to other states. He proposed also the setting up of the IAEA under the UN to facilitate and safeguard such

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<sup>1</sup> “Man of Experience”, *Time*, 3 Nov 52.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Dulles 1950.

cooperation and to manage an international nuclear material stockpile. Little came out of the stockpile, but after the US AEA was in 1954-55 amended to enable this, the US started supplying other states with nuclear materials and equipment. Pending the setting up of an IAEA safeguards system, the transfers were subjected to bilateral safeguards. Starting in 1955, large international conferences were organized in Geneva for the exchange of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Many national nuclear programs were now being set up. Over time, the Atoms for Peace -program clearly contributed to an international spread of nuclear technologies, materials, and know-how, and thus also weapon production capabilities. The proliferation risk was clear to the USG, but it nonetheless saw an attempt to control other states' actions through cooperation, instead of secrecy, as the most sensible policy. When the program was launched, the USSR, the UK, France, and the Netherlands were becoming active in the growing international nuclear market. Indeed, in June 1954 the world's first nuclear power plant started operation in the USSR; Britain's aggressive moves in the field in turn led the US to broaden the program after early 1955. Moreover, civilian uses of nuclear energy were starting to create great hopes in the world, and Moscow's first hydrogen bomb test in summer 1953 again showed the limits of containing proliferation through secrecy. Continued secrecy seemed potentially counterproductive as it prevented the US from influencing other states' nuclear efforts. One key reason for the Atoms for Peace -program was to prevent the development of unsafeguarded foreign fissile material supplies: by selling slightly or low-enriched uranium cheaply, the US motivated other states to choose reactor types using them and made others dependent on its fuel supply. After its exclusive deals for natural uranium purchases expired in the 1950s, the US also made efforts to make the suppliers demand safeguards on their exports. Moreover, as hydrogen bomb development had been agitating the public and its general disarmament initiatives were going nowhere, with the Atoms for Peace -initiative the USG presented constructive ideas to the world and sought a new communication channel to Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

The Atoms for Peace -program was a manifestation of the civilian nuclear field becoming included in East-West competition. The USG goal was to maintain a leading position in

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<sup>3</sup> Eisenhower on "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", 8 Dec 53, PPE 256; Deputy Special Assistant to SOS for Atomic Energy and Outer Space (DOS/AE) to DOS with draft NSC policy statement on the same, 25 June 57, USNA ERA B/1 NSC policy; "Achievement of a weapons capability by additional nations" (san.), n/d, LBJL CNP B/3 P/4 I; "US International Program for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", n/d (probably early 1965), USNA PDA B/9; Hall 1965; Quester 1970 pp. 98-9, 143; Quester 1973 p. 20; Deubner 1977 p. 4; Seaborg 1987 pp. 71-3; Keck 1993a pp. 139, 141-2; Gardner 1994 p. 39; Fischer 1994 p. 219; Lavoy 2003. On the Atoms for Peace -program and its background, see also Eckert 1989 pp. 128-39, 143. For instance Osgood 1962 (p. 220) and Schwarz, U. 1966 (p. 150) criticize the program, and the IAEA, because of, e.g., the weapon proliferation consequences. But Hall argues that the US could anyway not have prevented other states from developing nuclear know-how and that most declassified data contributed little to any military effort. The program had "created a general atmosphere of openness which has made it less likely that nations avowedly committed to peaceful purposes might clandestinely pursue military purposes" (pp. 603-9, 614). Lavoy argues that though the program did create interest in nuclear efforts in many countries and helped weapon proliferation, it also laid a basis for a global nonproliferation regime through the IAEA, the idea of safeguards, and the norm of nonproliferation.



the field and use it to strengthen Free World cohesion and prevent Moscow from gaining followers among unaligned states; it expected Moscow to seek maximal military, industrial, political, and psychological gains from nuclear development.<sup>4</sup> According to a late 1957 policy statement approved by Eisenhower, “the maintenance of U.S. supremacy in peaceful uses of atomic energy overseas and in nuclear technology, both in fact and in the eyes of the world, is an important element of U.S. national security policy”, the loss of which would greatly harm US prestige. Especially power reactor technology was a key field of competition. Here competition by other Free World nations was acceptable as long as the US was seen as the leading power. Western Europe and Japan were expected to be able and have a need to benefit from nuclear power within a decade; nuclear cooperation with underdeveloped areas was (only) “a part of the U.S. cold war effort”.<sup>5</sup> Thus even internal USG memos portrayed the US clearly as the leading power in the field, though in fact also the USSR had a strong position in the field<sup>6</sup>.

Alone in 1956-59, the US agreed on nuclear cooperation with 40 states and by 1962, it supplied 26 states with research reactors and related training and materials. The USSR similarly supplied many states with research reactors.<sup>7</sup>

The safeguards the USG required included inspection rights, spent fuel processing in the US or under international control, and fissile material accounting. As other ways to create hurdles to national nuclear weapon development, it saw multilateral export controls among supplier nations and in some situations support for regional nuclear cooperation. Multilateral safeguards on nuclear cooperation seemed politically preferable to unilateral ones and the USG planned the IAEA to provide an international basis for such safeguards as were already incorporated in its bilateral cooperation agreements. In any case, it saw some controls, such as inspections and material accounting, as necessary in IAEA projects. But though it expected its strong position in the nuclear energy field to increase the acceptance of safeguards, it saw broad controls as hard to achieve. Within the USG, Dulles argued that if IAEA projects were made conditional of, e.g., forgoing nuclear weapon production, as some USG officials proposed, many states would not join the IAEA at all. A further problem was that indigenous nuclear efforts were under no outside control and even if IAEA projects were safeguarded, states benefiting from them would have more domestic resources available for military efforts. Also possibly unsafeguarded nuclear assistance by Moscow or other suppliers threatened to make it hard to persuade recipients of US and IAEA aid to accept safeguards. Moscow backed the idea of safeguarding IAEA projects, but the USG feared it to be more lax in offers of bilateral aid to Western and neu-

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<sup>4</sup> D/14 NSC report, 12 March 55, with policy statement on “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy”, FRUS 55-7:20; DepDOS/AE to DOS (fn 3), 25 June; Quester 1970 p. 99.

<sup>5</sup> D/315 NSC report, 13 Dec 57, with policy statement on “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy”, FRUS 55-7:20.

<sup>6</sup> To compare US and Soviet progress in the nuclear field, see, e.g., Australian Uranium Association 2005.

<sup>7</sup> Meyer 1984 pp. 1-2; Gardner 1994 p. 40.

tral states. The centrality of nuclear weapons in US defense strategy moreover made it problematic to demand inspections and deny these weapons from allies.<sup>8</sup>

The Atoms for Peace -program led to changes in West German nuclear plans. Together with other increases in international availability of nuclear fuels by mid-1950s (the USG, however, continued to press other states not to sell uranium to the FRG), it reduced the need for and financial rationality of fuel autarky – but did not fully eliminate support for it in the FRG. To be able to fully participate in the new possibilities for international nuclear cooperation, Bonn wanted EDC restrictions to be clearly relaxed.<sup>9</sup> Also in the USG, the May 1952 limits were not expected to satisfy the Germans for long. The Three Powers wanted to maintain the prohibition of atomic weapon production but by fall 1953, the USG was prepared to allow the FRG a clearly larger nuclear fuel production quota and larger reactors than what the UK and France preferred.<sup>10</sup>

Also Israel came to benefit from the Atoms for Peace -program. I will discuss that issue in section 7.6.1. But next, I will return to the issue of West Germany's rearmament and thereafter consider Eisenhower's strategy for NATO.

## ***7.2 West Germany's entry into NATO and its integrated structures and strategy***

Eisenhower saw Europe as the central field of Cold War competition and the political orientation and security of Western Europe as crucial for the security of the US; he argued that if the Soviets gained control over the area and its resources, the US “would indeed be reduced to the character of a garrison state if it was to survive at all<sup>11</sup>”. Dulles similarly thought that “Western Europe, with its vast industrial power, is a prize of first order for any who would seek world domination<sup>12</sup>”. And according to 1957-58 NSC reports on policy towards Germany, geography and resources made it “a key area in the struggle between the Communist and Free Worlds” and vitally important for the US<sup>13</sup>. The concern persisted that the FRG could de- or re-align: in March 1960, Eisenhower expressed con-

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<sup>8</sup> D/14 (fn 4), D/315 (fn 5); D/106 USG mtg, 3 Feb 56; D/107 Secretary of the Air Force Quarles to Dulles, 3 Feb, all FRUS 55-7:20; DepDOS/AE to DOS (fn 3), 25 June 57; Osgood 1962 p. 220.

<sup>9</sup> See Deubner 1977 pp. 56, 65; Radkau 1983 pp. 169-70, 174; Eckert 1989 pp. 128-9; Fischer 1994 pp. 108-9, 129, 226-7.

<sup>10</sup> USG memo on discussions on atomic energy, 21 Sep 53, USNA AG 1.

<sup>11</sup> D/23 NSC mtg, 1 May 58, FRUS 58-60:3.

<sup>12</sup> Dulles's speech (excerpts), 29 Nov 54, World Peace Foundation 1954 p. 18. For similar arguments by the two men, see., e.g., NSC mtg, 4 Oct 56, and DOS mtg, 6 Nov 57, DDRS. Also Wohlstetter 1961 argued that a Soviet takeover of the area would change global power relations enough to directly threaten the security of the US (p. 378). But Art 1991 argued that since nuclear weapons and geography made the US so secure, Soviet domination of even all of Eurasia would not have meant a threat to the US in the medium term, though it probably would have lowered the standard of living in the US (pp. 19-20).

<sup>13</sup> NSC report on policy toward Germany, 13 Dec 57 and 7 Feb 58, USNA RG273 NSC 5727 (5803) PP 5727-5805 B/46 pp. 19-21, 25 and D/243 FRUS 58-60:9.

cern “that if we let the Germans down they might shift their own position and even to neutralistic” and “about who would then hold the central bastion in Europe”<sup>14</sup>.

Eisenhower and Dulles strongly supported the idea of Western Europe as a third force, and thus also the EDC, as it offered hope of making a US troop withdrawal from Europe possible. Only reluctantly, the US accepted that it needed to play a role in European security for some time to come. Some US officials feared that a third force Europe could become neutralistic, but for Dulles the problem was rather that the allies wanted the US to handle their problems.<sup>15</sup> The EDC Treaty had, however, not come to force when Eisenhower came to power.

### 7.2.1 West Germany joins NATO and the Western European Union

The EDC and related treaties indeed never came to force since the French Assemblée Nationale rejected the EDC Treaty in August 1954. US pressure in favor of the treaty and a growing impression that the EDC was a tool of US policy played a role here: a new defense strategy that the Eisenhower administration presented to NATO reduced French interest in the EDC since the strategy seemed to imply less US troops in Europe, a development France did not want to encourage with the creation of an European army.<sup>16</sup>

Thus some other way to tie the FRG to the West and to organize its rearmament was urgently needed. London had already sketched alternative plans based on German memberships in NATO and the Brussels Treaty, to be modified to make it non-anti-German<sup>17</sup>. Also the USG wanted the FRG to join NATO. At the same time, it wanted to increase military integration in NATO: that both desirable as such and a way to make also German NATO troops less capable of independent action.<sup>18</sup> Thus the increased institutionalization of NATO that followed was closely linked to the entry of the FRG into the organization.

#### 7.2.1.1 Agreement on West Germany’s rearmament and Adenauer’s non-nuclear pledge

The Three Powers still wanted to maintain restrictions on military production in the FRG, and controls on the FRG were generally seen as needed for the French to accept it into NATO<sup>19</sup>. The USG still wanted the FRG somehow to promise not to produce items prohib-

<sup>14</sup> Eisenhower-Macmillan (British Prime Minister) mtg (san.), 28 March 60, DNSA BC01856, 28 March 60. The British had similar views. See Dulles-Macmillan mtg (san.), 14 Dec 57, DDRS.

<sup>15</sup> Also Eisenhower complained that the allies showed lack of responsibility regarding common defense. See NSC mtg, 4 Oct 56, DDRS; D/228 NSC mtg, 12 Nov 59, FRUS 58-60:7(1); Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 121-2.

<sup>16</sup> See Kreft 1997 p. 173; Skogman 1999 p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> Maier 1990 p. 463; Fischer 1994 pp. 129-31. On how it came to negotiations on German NATO membership in general, see Fischer 1994 pp. 128-38.

<sup>18</sup> DOS/European Regional Affairs (RA) “U.S. Position on Alternative to EDC”, 10 Sep 54, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 1164-5.

<sup>19</sup> T/1096 E/P to DOS, 15 Sep 54, FRUS 52-4:5 p. 1195.

ited under the EDC Treaty “except as agreed by NATO<sup>20</sup>”. But it and London saw simply taking over EDC restrictions as unfeasible<sup>21</sup>. In Dulles’s view, *imposing* restrictions on the FRG was unviable but “a voluntary and public declaration of self-imposed limitations” was an option<sup>22</sup>. The USG and London prepared a “voluntary” pledge and Adenauer accepted the idea in principle<sup>23</sup>.

Seeing verification of the promise as necessary and NATO (that aimed at maximizing allied forces) as unsuited for that, Paris and London agreed on giving the task to the to-be-modified BTO. This solution also gave the UK a part in controlling the FRG and enabled avoiding inequality in NATO. But whereas Paris insisted on complex controls on the FRG, implying benefits for France regarding military supplies to continental Europe, London argued that having both the FRG and the US in NATO provided the “only real control over German forces”.<sup>24</sup>

The USG now pressed NATO states for agreement on German rearmament. After most of them gave support for the idea to modify the Brussels Treaty and include the FRG (and Italy) in it, representatives of the US, the FRG, Italy, BTO states, and Canada met in London in fall 1954 to consider German rearmament. The Three Powers and the FRG were simultaneously to negotiate about normalizing relations.<sup>25</sup> On 2 October, dispute with the French on restrictions on the FRG threatened to disrupt the talks, but the situation was, as Dulles reported to the NSC, “resolved by a highly statesmanlike proposal from Chancellor Adenauer”<sup>26</sup> of a “unilateral German declaration to be accepted and enforced by Brussels treaty organization that Germany would not produce atomic, chemical or biological weapons” (and without NATO and BTO authorization, certain other armaments)<sup>27</sup>. A fact often ignored is that the day before, Dulles suggested to Adenauer that the FRG would forgo manufacturing weapons on the EDC prohibition list<sup>28</sup>. The fact that Dulles, even within the USG, gave such merit for Adenauer, who just did what he had been told to do, probably indicates not just the friendship between the two men but also Dulles’s concern about resentment in the FRG if restrictions appeared *imposed* on it.

The Nine-Power conference resulted in agreement about the entry of the FRG into NATO and of it and Italy into both an amended Brussels Treaty and a new Western European Union (WEU) with the BTO states. The key task of the WEU was to control its continental members’ armaments on the continent through control of records and inspections of production sites, stockpiles, and forces: “the German defence contribution ... [was to] con-

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<sup>20</sup> RA (fn 18), 10 Sep 54.

<sup>21</sup> NSC statement on policy toward Europe, 25 Sep 54, FRUS 52-4:5 p. 1269.

<sup>22</sup> Dulles to Eden, 14 Sep 54, FRUS 52-4:5 p. 1192.

<sup>23</sup> Churchill to Eisenhower with his message to Adenauer, 3 Sep 54, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 1144-5; RA (fn 18), 10 Sep; Eckert 1990 p. 317; Fischer 1994 pp. 135-6.

<sup>24</sup> T/248-9 E/P to Dulles and McCloy, 16 Sep 54; DOS mtg, 27 Sep, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 1198-201, 1281.

<sup>25</sup> Fischer 1994 pp. 136-9.

<sup>26</sup> NSC mtg of 6 Oct 54, 7 Oct, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 1380-1.

<sup>27</sup> Summary of 2 Oct plenary mtg, 3 Oct 54, *ibid.* p. 1325.

<sup>28</sup> See Summary of 1 Oct plenary mtg in London, 2 Oct 54, FRUS 52-4:5 p. 1323.

form to the contribution fixed for EDC”.<sup>29</sup> Tuschhoff notes that compared to controls imposed by some other *state(s)*, it was clearly easier for Bonn to accept controls to be administered by *international organizations* it considered legitimate and participated in<sup>30</sup>.

In London, Western states also agreed to give NATO command greater authority over their forces. NATO states in general agreed to make the operational use of forces assigned to NATO conditional of SACEUR agreement, but only West German troops became fully tied to NATO’s integrated structure; the others maintained a right to withdraw troops from NATO.<sup>31</sup>

In related agreements, the FRG promised not to seek reunification or changes to its borders with force and to resolve all disputes with other states peacefully. The Three Powers recognized the sovereignty of the FRG and ended occupation. They declared that Bonn was the only legitimate German government that represented the Germans internationally and that “the achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy”. They retained rights regarding Berlin, to negotiate about a permanent settlement with Moscow, and to keep forces in the FRG even against the host’s will.<sup>32</sup>

Adenauer’s pledge was included in the resulting Paris agreement on modifying the Brussels Treaty (and thus in a legal agreement between the FRG and other WEU states) and in the Final Act of the London Conference. The FRG undertook “not to *manufacture in its territory* any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons” or certain categories of missiles, ships, and aircraft.<sup>33</sup> This left open the options of producing weapons abroad, importing them, having them in the FRG, and research and development (R&D) activities useful for civilian *and* military purposes, as long as they fell short of weapon production. Thus it was no definitive “no” to nuclear weapons.

The limitations to the pledge later created concern also in the USG and various explanations have been given about how they came about. Referring to information given by German negotiators, Sommer suggests they resulted from “hasty drafting and diplomatic oversight<sup>34</sup>”. McArdle Kelleher points out that the pledge followed the EDC treaty but suggests that the *Germans* chose the formula in the hectic of the negotiations as greater priority was given to other issues and owing to “German love for legal formulas already agreed to<sup>35</sup>”. Citing another German negotiator and arguing that the pledge was carefully

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<sup>29</sup> Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference (28 Sep - 3 Oct 54) Art. 2; Prot. IV to the Brussels Treaty on WEU agency for armament control, FRUS 52-4:5 pp. 1452-3; Bald 1993 p. 100. Many restrictions on German production were later lifted, save those on ABC weapons.

<sup>30</sup> Tuschhoff 1999 p. 156.

<sup>31</sup> Final Act... (fn 29) Art. 4 & Annex 3; 6 Oct NSC mtg (fn 26); Theiler 1997 p. 118.

<sup>32</sup> Final Act... (fn 29); Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 125-6.

<sup>33</sup> My emphasis. Paris agreement on modifying the Brussels Treaty, 23 Oct 54, Prot. III on control of armaments; Final Act... (fn 29).

<sup>34</sup> Sommer 1966 p. 41.

<sup>35</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 21-9.

formulated to concern production, not possession, Küntzel seems to hint that *Bonn* on purpose *sought* loopholes.<sup>36</sup> But the documents I have referred to show that the pledge closely followed *Three Power demands since 1950*: the idea of prohibiting *manufacturing in Germany* was included in their earliest plans for allowing military production in the FRG, in the EDC accords, and in Dulles's proposal in London (even if this did not explicitly include the provision "in Germany"). The pledge resulted directly from a US request, little German initiative was involved, the pledge was not spontaneous, and the Three Powers demanded no complete non-nuclear promise. The promise took the form of a unilateral declaration (as London had proposed already in fall 1951) because the Three Powers saw restrictions formally imposed on the FRG as politically infeasible.

Why did the Three Powers demand only a prohibition of *production in the FRG*? For one thing, at the time the options of the FRG producing weapons abroad or importing them implied little risk. The only potential source of imports was in practice the US, where legislation prohibited nuclear weapon exports. Paris, whom the USG later feared to undertake bilateral nuclear weapon efforts with Bonn, had not yet started producing nuclear weapons, and French-German rapprochement was still in early stages. The British were generally strongly opposed to any German access to nuclear weapons. Especially production in the FRG was possibly indeed seen as undesirable for the reason used to justify the prohibition to the West German public: the exposed position of the FRG implied a risk that production there could fall under Soviet control. But important was certainly also that the US wanted to remain able to station nuclear weapons in the FRG<sup>37</sup>, especially since these had a central role in its European defense strategy. During occupation, it had been free to do so, and in spring 1955, the USG took up the question about a continuing deployment right with Adenauer. He agreed but wanted no formal agreement. The USG interpreted the Paris and London accords to allow it to deploy any kinds of weapons in the FRG.<sup>38</sup>

As documents cited above show, throughout the rearmament negotiations the USG wanted to retain its freedom to both export and station nuclear weapons in the FRG. In principle, it was possible that nuclear weapon imports into (and control of the weapons by) the FRG could be agreed upon somehow in NATO or the WEU. But views diverged among the Three Powers on how this could happen. In fall 1954, Eden publicly argued that an *unanimous NAC decision* could enable the use and possession of nuclear weapons by West German forces. In spring 1955, Paris took the stance that West German possession of ABC weapons could be allowed only through an *unanimous WEU decision*. The USG in turn did not want *NATO* to have any such control function. A DOS memo reveals that it intentionally "tried to keep the matter from the public spotlight pending ratification of the

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<sup>36</sup> Küntzel 1992 p. 21.

<sup>37</sup> On this point, see also Fischer 1994 pp. 148-9.

<sup>38</sup> D/16 DOS/Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) "Understanding with the Federal Republic Concerning the Introduction, Storage, and Use of Nuclear Weapons with Respect to West Germany", 6 May 55, NSA EBB HMW.

agreements”; DOS position in Senate hearings was simply that there would be controls on nuclear weapon imports to the FRG and that “present U.S. legislation and present level of production elsewhere really renders this question academic.”<sup>39</sup> It also told the French that the WEU states themselves were to interpret the WEU Treaty. A memo by the DOS Office of German Affairs (GER) shows that the USG stance was still in March 1956 somewhat unclear, though in the Office’s view, the aim was *not* that Bonn would indefinitely be able to get nuclear weapons only through an unanimous decision.<sup>40</sup>

The discussion below will show that West German politicians came to use the non-nuclear pledge and its limitations in various ways. Sometimes the limitations were mentioned<sup>41</sup>, which was also a way to remind the audience that the FRG had a nuclear weapon option. On other occasions, no limitations were mentioned<sup>42</sup> and the pledge thus broadened. Some politicians maybe saw a broad pledge as desirable, but sometimes the aim probably was to reassure the audience and make further non-nuclear commitments seem unnecessary. Though the options the pledge left open were recognized in Bonn, in Bundestag debates over the Paris agreements Adenauer presented his pledge as a general non-nuclear promise: his government had renounced the *use* of.<sup>43</sup>

At the time, the nuclear restriction attached no greater public attention than other production limitations on the FRG; after Adenauer’s pledge, the press indeed only reported on France’s refusal to accept controls on its nuclear activities. But the nuclear restriction has been presented as the key limitation since Paris saw it as indispensable and without nuclear weapons, the FRG was alone unable to counter the Soviet threat.<sup>44</sup> A promise alone need of course not matter much, but it became enforced through the control systems of the WEU and monitoring activity enabled by NATO. And even in the absence of such a promise, other states’ likely reactions would have made national nuclear weapon efforts very risky for the FRG. Several authors have argued that promising not to produce nuclear weapons was in 1954 indeed no big issue for Bonn: the FRG had neither real chances nor reasons to produce them and Adenauer was unwilling to accept a central role for them in NATO strategy and focused on securing domestic acceptance for rearmament in general.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> DOS for Senate hearings on Paris agreements “German Import of ABC Weapons”, n/d, USNA LEG B/2 Senate hearings.

<sup>40</sup> GER “Restrictions on German Atomic Energy Activities”, 7 March 56, USNA AG R&D.

<sup>41</sup> Examples include a 28 Oct 55 interview by Atomic Energy Minister Strauss in *Bayrischer Rundfunk* and a 25 Apr 57 speech by Foreign Minister von Brentano at Ernst-Reuter-Gesellschaft. Cited in “Erklärungen der Bundesregierung zur Frage des Besitzes von Atomwaffen (1955-60)” (n/d), PAA R/305/II A6B43 II8 48.

<sup>42</sup> See, e.g., section 9.6.1.

<sup>43</sup> *Bundestag Verhandlungen: Stenographische Berichte*, 7 Oct 54 (2<sup>nd</sup> term, 47<sup>th</sup> session) p. 2282; Fischer 1994 pp. 142-3, 285.

<sup>44</sup> See McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 21-7; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 127, 146. Also Bald 1993 argues that Bonn’s forgoing of ABC weapons was crucial for Three Powers’ allowing of greater freedom in foreign policies for Bonn (p. 98). On the role of the non-nuclear pledge in Three Power-FRG relations, see also Sommer 1966 pp. 41-2; Lauk 1979 pp. 29-30; Küntzel 1992 pp. 19-21.

<sup>45</sup> See Mahncke 1972 p. 7; Radkau 1983 p. 188; Schwartz 1983 p. 42.

Though the FRG still had to accept armament production restrictions, the situation had changed compared to the EDC Treaty in that, reflecting the general change in US policy towards civilian nuclear cooperation, the FRG now got full freedom in civilian and scientific nuclear activities: the nuclear prohibitions in the 1954 accords did not cover materials or equipment “used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research. As Adenauer insisted, the accords include no limitations on nuclear fuels. Moreover, as a change to the EDC Treaty, the prohibition of nuclear weapons included beyond “any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or *primarily* useful in” them only “factories earmarked *solely* [not *primarily* as in the EDC Treaty] for their production”.<sup>46</sup> Since especially London still opposed an immediate elimination of all controls on nuclear development in the FRG and to reassure the allies, Adenauer agreed to promise that the FRG would in the next few years not produce more nuclear fuel than needed for normal civilian uses and that within two years, only reactors of up to 10 MW -capacity would be built and nuclear material stockpiles kept limited in the FRG. But he got his stance pressed through that no verification of the promises was to follow and (unlike with his letters related to the EDC Treaty) they were not included into the treaty package. Moreover, in practice the limits did not restrain the FRG as exceeding them during the two years was anyway beyond its plans and capabilities.<sup>47</sup>

Though the Three Powers allowed West German rearmament, they *maintained* restrictions on German production of key armaments. Owing to the Atoms for Peace -proposal and East-West competition in the nuclear field, it had become less viable to maintain (as the Three Powers first wanted to do) strict restrictions on the nuclear activities of this major state. But the need to secure popular acceptance of German rearmament in the West helped the Three Powers to persuade Adenauer that inclusion of some production restrictions in the rearmament deal was necessary.

The FRG joined NATO in May 1955. Thereafter Bonn started establishing the Bundeswehr (however, the West German public remained uneager about rearmament<sup>48</sup>) and what would become a stormy search of consensus on defense strategy with the US.

Moscow had threatened with various moves if West German NATO membership and rearmament were realized. When that happened, it quickly set up the formal Warsaw Pact (WP) defense alliance with Eastern European states. But in practice, its stances towards the West thereafter became rather more flexible.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> My emphasis. Final Act... (fn 29); McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 14-5; Kötter & Müller 1990 p. 19; Fischer 1994 pp. 145-6, 149.

<sup>47</sup> DOS to USDel Nine-Power Conf., 19 Oct 54, FRUS 52-4:5 p. 1400; GER to DOS/AE, 5 Jan 56, USNA AG 1; Enclosure to E/B D/1952, 21 Feb, USNA AED; DOS/RA on Adenauer's letter, 6 March, USNA AG R&D; Fischer 1994 pp. 146-7, 150.

<sup>48</sup> The German SPD opposed the Paris treaties and argued that they did not guarantee security. But the CDU had a clear majority in the Bundestag and the treaties were ratified in Feb 1955. See Cioc 1988 pp. 28-9. On rearmament and initial domestic political problems related to it, see Haftendorn 1986 pp. 150-6.

<sup>49</sup> DOS RSB-119, 21 Dec 64, FOIA.



### 7.2.1.2 US and British security guarantees and promises to keep troops in continental Europe

The FRG was now included in NATO and Brussels Treaty security guarantees, the latter of which implied even an *automatic* obligation to action<sup>50</sup>. But in fall 1954, Adenauer demanded also renewed, special Three Power guarantees for the FRG and Berlin – the declarations related to the EDC Treaty had come not into force<sup>51</sup>.

At the start of the London conference, Dulles said that after the EDC had failed, Eisenhower was unable to renew promises to keep US forces in Europe: the US public was pessimistic about the situation in Europe and wanted to make no new long-term commitments. But he hoped the conference to change the situation. And at its end, he said that if the new plan bore fruit, a renewed USG assurance could be forthcoming “that the United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while a threat to the area exists”. For its part, the UK assured it would participate actively in the Brussels Treaty and “continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR”. The Three Powers also declared to “maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it” and to “treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves”.<sup>52</sup>

In March 1955, Eisenhower made the statement about US troops that Dulles had promised to WEU states’ leaders. The statement also illustrates the dual US role in Europe as a protector of and a manager of relations among Western Europeans: Eisenhower added that the US would “regard any action *from whatever quarter* which threatens the *integrity or unity* of the Western European Union as a threat to the security of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty calling for consultation in accordance with Article 4 of that Treaty”. He moreover stressed that the reached agreements would “by controlling armament levels through an appropriate agency of the Western European Union, assure against militarism”.<sup>53</sup> But DOS memos for Senate hearings stressed that the US still retained all rights to withdraw forces from Europe at any time and to authorize the use of US forces under SACEUR<sup>54</sup>. The 1954-5 security guarantees to the FRG basically *reaffirmed* earlier Three Power guarantees: already in 1950, these had said that they would consider “any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves”. Still, membership in the WEU and NATO and inclusion in multilateral security guarantees were suited

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<sup>50</sup> Adenauer saw this aspect as very valuable for his country. Adenauer 1966 pp. 314, 362.

<sup>51</sup> Adenauer 1966 p. 343.

<sup>52</sup> Final Act... (fn 29).

<sup>53</sup> My emphasis. Eisenhower to the leaders of WEU states, 10 March 55, PPE 54.

<sup>54</sup> DOS memos for Senate hearings on US security commitments under the Paris accords, 9 and 16 March 55, USNA LEG B/2 Senate hearings.

for strengthening West German confidence in the guarantees, especially as these got an increasingly tangible basis through institutionalization of military cooperation in NATO.

### 7.2.1.3 The legal status of Adenauer's non-nuclear promise

The non-ABC promise was binding on the FRG until those to whom it was made, i.e., in the first place WEU states (and indirectly other NATO states), explicitly relieved it of the promise. At the same time, the London and Paris accords re-committed the Three Powers to protecting the FRG. A risk existed that if the protection was withdrawn or weakened, or more generally, if they clearly backed from their promises in the 1954 deal, also Bonn would question its promises; some years later, this became a concern for the USG.<sup>55</sup>

Later, Bonn indeed stressed that any change to the 1954 bargain could mean changes to the whole understanding. Moreover, Adenauer came to maintain that when he made the non-ABC pledge, it was clear, as Dulles explicitly noted, that it was *rebus sic stantibus* – for as long as circumstances (e.g., US protection) did not change.<sup>56</sup> Some witnesses of the pledge have questioned whether such an explicit understanding existed. Later also the USG did not simply accept Adenauer's claim at its face value. A 1962 DOS study noted that Dulles's alleged remark was absent in the London proceedings, but note-taking had been stopped at one point (Dulles could not clarify the question then: he died in May 1959). As McArdle Kelleher suggests, seeing the restrictions as temporary would have been in line with the Eisenhower administration's hope that Europe would one day be able to defend itself.<sup>57</sup>

In 1962, the DOS Office of the Legal Adviser (L) anyway saw the *rebus sic stantibus* -principle as “highly controversial” and “not a generally recognized rule of international law” or established as USG policy<sup>58</sup>. But the Permanent Court of International Justice had in 1932 recognized it; so did later the International Court of Justice (1973) and most authors of modern international law<sup>59</sup>.

<sup>55</sup> See Mahncke 1972 p. 6; Lauk 1979 p. 31; Häckel 1989 pp. 15-7. Richardson 1966 argues regarding another key Three Power promise in 1954, support for reunification efforts, that giving that up would have violated the basic deal but not have given the FRG a right to abandon the non-ABC weapon pledge (see pp. 359-60).

<sup>56</sup> See, e.g., Kennedy-Adenauer mtg, 21 Nov 61, JFKL N/G Adenauer visit; Adenauer 1966 p. 347.

<sup>57</sup> DOS “German Nuclear Developments and *rebus sic stantibus*”, 6 July 62, JFKL NCG; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 31. On evidence that no explicit *rebus sic stantibus* -clause existed, see *ibid.* pp. 29-30; Schwarz, H.-P. 1989 p. 578; Küntzel 1992 p. 23. One possibility is that Dulles and Adenauer discussed the matter only after the conference. See Fischer 1994 p. 143.

<sup>58</sup> DOS “German...” (fn 57), 6 July 62.

<sup>59</sup> Brownlie 1998 pp. 624-5. According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 69) Art. 62, to international treaties applies in general that “a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties” can “be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty” if “(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.” See also Brownlie 1998 pp. 608-9. For Bonn, the circumstances of Western protection, reunification as goal, and its status as the one legitimate German government were central in the 1954 bargain.

Though the alleged *rebus sic stantibus* -clause thus had no unequivocal legal consequence, Bonn later used references to it as a bargaining card and the USG also tacitly accepted that Adenauer's pledge held *rebus sic stantibus* only. The USG may have seen the non-nuclear pledge as in any case temporary or not enough to keep Bonn from pursuing nuclear weapons if it really wanted to. With the *rebus sic stantibus* -comments, Adenauer in practice created a tie between West Germany's nuclear status and Western protection and so made of the US guarantees a nonproliferation policy.

The 1954 deal shows that important international bargains can remain ambiguous even when formalized through treaties. Though all elements of the 1954 deal were written out in formal treaties, what at least later became one central bargain in it – that the FRG would not independently acquire nuclear weapons and the US would protect it – was not explicitly stated. Nor was it clearly defined what US protection had to include to be credible and sufficient. This came to provide for useful flexibility when military technology and balance against the USSR changed but also for discord between the US and the FRG.

#### **7.2.1.4 NATO as an increasingly institutionalized alliance**

When the FRG joined NATO, the alliance assumed the task of controlling it, thus becoming, beyond an alliance coping with an external threat, a security management institution trying to keep security risks from emerging among its members<sup>60</sup>. NATO (and the WEU) became responsible for reducing the chances of especially the FRG developing into a potential threat to its allies. Riecke and Tuschhoff point out that NATO assumed also an internal nonproliferation function as the FRG forwent a national nuclear force in return for US maintenance of its extended nuclear deterrent<sup>61</sup>.

The new tasks contributed to the institutionalization of NATO that had started as the Soviet threat heightened after the start of the Korean War<sup>62</sup>. Various measures were introduced that promoted effective organization of NATO defense. These included an integrated military structure based on forces assigned to NATO and largely stationed in continental Europe and on multinational, integrated command; an integrated military planning system that implied sharing of much information among NATO states about national military, industrial, and economic resources, capabilities, and execution of plans; centralized air surveillance and defence in Central Europe; various kinds of military and political consultations and formal and informal working groups for information exchange and search of consensus on strategy.<sup>63</sup>

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But it is of course debatable what exactly constitutes a *fundamental, unforeseen* change of circumstances. A key criticism towards the *rebus sic stantibus* -principle is that it makes obligations less clear. Ibid. p. 624.

<sup>60</sup> Haftendorn 1997 p. 17; Wallander & Keohane 1999 p. 42.

<sup>61</sup> Riecke 1997 pp. 201, 204; Tuschhoff 1999 p. 153.

<sup>62</sup> Wallander & Keohane 1999 pp. 41-2.

<sup>63</sup> See Theiler 1997 pp. 112-22 on the measures in general, Tuschhoff 1999 pp. 146-7, 151-2 on the planning system.

At the same time, these measures institutionalized NATO states' promises of cooperation by tying them together and creating transparency about actions and plans among them<sup>64</sup>. Thus the measures were suited for reducing risks involved in security cooperation and resolution of various cooperation problems that created hindrances and disincentives to cooperation: 1) the risk (and collaboration problem) existed that some ally, most importantly the US, would not react if the USSR attacked a NATO state; 2) the security dilemma implied the risk that the FRG would abandon the cooperative course, de-align, and even become a military threat to its (former) allies through military capabilities it was now allowed to build up; 3) chances to defect from the nonproliferation bargain led to another collaboration problem, i.e., that the US would fail to offer sufficient protection to its allies or that these would acquire own nuclear forces<sup>65</sup>; 4) a risk existed that some ally would unilaterally take action that would entrap others in unwanted warfare; 5) a coordination problem existed as NATO states had to agree on one joint strategy against the Soviet threat; 6) incentives to cut down own defense expenditures if free-riding on others' (especially US) defense efforts was possible created a suasion problem; 7) an assurance problem existed about convincing allies about one's determination to stand firm against the USSR and cooperate on this.

The integrated military structure made abandonment (1) in practice harder: joint command and plans and stationing of foreign NATO forces especially on the Eastern border of the FRG in, moreover, layers of different nationalities, helped ensure all allies' participation in any warfare. Also especially the existence of US nuclear weapons in Europe was suited to increasing European confidence on the US deterrent. Also various formal and informal working groups and consultations where the allies exchanged information about capabilities and aims could help alleviate concern about abandonment.

The security dilemma (2) issue was already alleviated through the production restrictions on the FRG, monitored through the verification activities of the WEU. One way for the FRG to convince its allies about benign intentions was simply to conscientiously cooperate with them<sup>66</sup>. Also NATO's planning system alleviated the dilemma by creating transparency about its industrial and military capabilities and by giving the others chances to guide its military efforts to a safe direction. Moreover, others' troops stationed in the FRG and the subjection of the to-be-created Bundeswehr troops to NATO command were mechanisms to control the country.

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<sup>64</sup> As a basis for this discussion, I rely on 1) Theiler 1997 who considers mechanisms that promoted cooperation in NATO based on whether they reduced the risk of abandonment, entrapment, or free-riding, and 2) Tuschhoff 1999 who studies NATO structures for information exchange, monitoring, and enforcement from the perspective of how they affected alliance cohesion (pp. 151-9).

Wallander & Keohane 1999 note also that as maintenance of US (and British) troops in Europe was a central part of the 1954 package on German rearmament, NATO created structures to make these sustainable in face of evolving domestic pressures, and that faced with the task of controlling the FRG, it increasingly developed also measures to strengthen democracy in member states (p. 42).

<sup>65</sup> Riecke 1997 points out this problem (p. 204).

<sup>66</sup> See Keohane et al 1999 p. 331.

The same measures that helped to reduce the risk of abandonment by the US and allowed verification of Bonn's non-nuclear pledge helped also to solve the nonproliferation collaboration problem (3) by preventing defection by either side<sup>67</sup>. Some measures to reduce risks of entrapment (4) were in turn already written down in the NAT, including the restricted geographic coverage of the alliance commitment, the non-automatic procedure for action in case of an attack, a commitment to peaceful conflict resolution according to the UN Charter, and stressing of the defensive nature of NATO. Moreover, also this risk was alleviated through consultations and information exchange that gave indications about allies' long-term aims and a chance to try to guide them to a safe direction. By enabling early detection of defection, the planning system even constrained member states' actions. The subjection of Bundeswehr troops to NATO command and planning and allies' troops in the FRG made it hard for Bonn to secretly plan or realize also such military adventures that could entrap its allies into warfare on its side.

The planning system and consultations in NATO also provided fora for searching agreement on strategy, harmonizing assessments of the threat situation, and thus solving the coordination problem (5). The hegemony of the US in NATO further facilitated agreement as the US was in a position to more or less subtly press its preferred strategy on its allies.

The suasion problem (6) was alleviated through mechanisms that made free-riding both harder and less lucrative. Joint planning and continuous sharing of information about capabilities and execution of agreed-upon plans helped ensure all allies' fair contribution to defense efforts. A principle of consensual decision-making in NATO implied that states that felt abused could turn down requirements on them. An unwritten rule that important political and military positions and influence were distributed in relation to financial contributions provided incentives for contributions. Moreover, since NATO states cooperated also on non-military fields, they had incentives to contribute fairly to the defense effort if that promoted beneficial cooperation in other areas. NATO as such was in turn a solution to the assurance problem (7).

In case of security institutions, possibilities to promote cooperation by sanctioning defection afterwards tend to be limited (if allies do not help an attacked state, this can lose its political independence). Thus also in NATO, cooperation was promoted with institutional measures that made defection *harder* and *easily recognizable*.

### 7.2.2 Tactical nuclear weapons and the credibility of the extended US deterrent

The key threat scenario for the West in Europe was a conventional Soviet attack, though with time, an all-out attack started seeming unlikely and local attacks with limited but politically important goals became the primary fear. Especially during the early Cold War, but also still in the 1960s, NATO states saw their conventional strength as insufficient to

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<sup>67</sup> On solutions to this problem, see also Riecke 1997 p. 205.

deter or allow successful defense against a Soviet attack, and the backbone of NATO strategy was a threat of *nuclear* retaliation by the US. But especially in anticipation of achievement by the USSR of a secure second-strike capability against the US, many questioned the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrent. Ensuring its credibility thus became a key issue for the West, whereas the doubts and the risk of local attacks made also the creation of strong defense forces in Europe important.<sup>68</sup>

NATO's strategy was first based on strategic US nuclear forces aimed at goals valuable for the USSR and conventional defense. But conventional defense required large forces, and implied high costs, especially because of the high need for manpower, which was expensive as such and due to its opportunity costs (men in armed forces were absent from the labor force). In part because of economic concerns and as a part of Eisenhower's "New Look", a change of strategy appeared around 1953: the US started putting emphasis on "tactical", relatively small-range and/or -size nuclear weapons, which were being developed for use at war theaters<sup>69</sup>. These were expected to increase the military power of battle forces and thus reduce manpower needs. Strategic nuclear forces retained their role as a deterrent; in early 1954, Dulles introduced the term *massive retaliation* for the US strategy that aimed to deter *large-scale* Soviet aggression with a threat of all-out nuclear war. As a result of differences in national capabilities, the strategy implied a division of work and thus certain functional differentiation in NATO: The Europeans were to be primarily responsible for ground defense forces in Europe, the US to provide reserve forces and strategic retaliation – its troops in Europe were above all to *symbolize* its commitment.<sup>70</sup>

The strategy implied stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. As Theiler points out, the measure was from US allies' perspective also suited for reducing the risk of abandonment by the US, whereas it at the same time ensured that also they (not just the US) would be targets of any nuclear first strike by Moscow<sup>71</sup>.

But the 1946 AEA largely prevented allies' involvement in such stationing arrangements. Eisenhower wanted a radical change to the Act so that nuclear weapons would "be treated like other weapons<sup>72</sup>". In 1954, he asked the Congress to amend the Act both to enable the Atoms for Peace -program and to provide authority "to exchange with nations participating in defensive arrangements with the United States such tactical information as is essen-

<sup>68</sup> On NATO's defense dilemmas and the development of its strategy, see Osgood 1962; Freedman 1989.

<sup>69</sup> Freedman 1989 criticizes the terms "strategic" and "tactical" nuclear weapons: they do no justice to the concepts of strategy, "the overall relationship between military means and the ends of policy", and tactics, "the specific application of military means for direct military ends". All war is strategic and all weapons are tactical (pp. 117-8). Still, I use the widespread terms for the sake of convenience.

<sup>70</sup> See McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 16; Freedman 1989 pp. 77-81, 90; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 151-2, 158-65, 187. The strategy of massive retaliation applied only to Soviet aggression that indicated the coming of *general* war – not against any war as often mistakenly argued (see Freedman 1989 pp. 83, 86) – i.e., to situations where vital US interests were at stake and nuclear deterrence is expected to work. In a Nov 1954 speech, Dulles also stressed that local war did not automatically lead to general war but potential attackers had to be made see aggression as not worthwhile (World Peace Foundation 1954 p. 18).

<sup>71</sup> Theiler 1997 p. 113.

<sup>72</sup> Cutler to NSC Executive Secretary (NSCES), 21 Oct 53, DNSA NP00130.

tial to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel for atomic warfare”, with the goal of improving US “atomic effectiveness”<sup>73</sup>. Though it allowed the provision of nuclear technologies and materials in the Atoms for Peace -program, the Congress did not want to relax the Act radically regarding nuclear weapons. But owing to perceptions of a growing Soviet nuclear capability, it authorized limited sharing of weapon data (on, e.g., their external characteristics) to allies who significantly contributed to common security in order to enable joint planning and training activities.<sup>74</sup>

Turning the new strategy into operational capabilities happened slowly and only US and British forces were receiving the training and the tactical nuclear weapons it called for. The US started preparing deployment of such weapons to its forces in the FRG in 1953, and in 1955, also Matador missiles of a range of 1100 km (enough to reach, e.g., Minsk) became operational.<sup>75</sup> But deployments to *German* forces had to wait.

Being in the front line of Western defense, a likely battle-field in case of any attack from the East, and target of special Soviet hostility, the FRG had the most precarious position among NATO states. Moreover, the Western position in West Berlin was vulnerable. Understandably, the credibility of the NATO deterrent was a great concern to West Germans. NATO’s June 1955 Carte Blanche exercise that simulated nuclear warfare in turn caused fears of entrapment and doubts about whether the NATO strategy could protect German interests among them: its much publicized conclusion was that any nuclear war would lead to wide destruction of Germany. A year later, press reports that JCS Chairman A. Radford had suggested greater emphasis on strategic US forces, significant cuts in conventional US forces abroad, and replacing them with mobile reserve forces stationed in the US caused much concern in the FRG. This “Radford Plan” seemed to make a division of work between nuclear and non-nuclear allies clearer, which West German leaders tended to see as discrimination, and in practice to weaken ties between European defense and US forces and so remove obstacles to abandonment by the US. Radford and the USG denied any such move was actually planned, but the idea of troop withdrawals was popular among the US electorate (which explains that it was discussed in a congressional election year) and the USG was not opposed to the idea as such.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Eisenhower to the Congress on amending the Act, 17 Feb 54, PPE 38.

<sup>74</sup> US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 p. 76 fn 149; Loper (assistant to SOD on atomic energy) on nuclear sharing to NSC Planning Board (san.), 26 Apr 60, DDRS; Kohler 1972 p. 51.

<sup>75</sup> At Adenauer’s request, the USG started preparing the deployments only after German elections in Sep 1953. The first Matador missiles came to the FRG in March 1954 and became operational in 1955. See DOD report “History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons Appendix B) Deployments by Country 1951-77”, Feb 78, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/04-01.htm> (19 Aug 07); Fischer 1994 pp. 121-4; Norris et al 1999; NSA 2006; Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/theater/matador.htm> (19 Aug 07).

<sup>76</sup> See “Radford Seeking 800,000-man cut”, *NYT*, 13 July 56, and, on the crises and West German reactions, Richardson 1966 pp. 40-2; Morgan 1974 pp. 634; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 34-59; Haftendorn 1986 p. 160; Cioc 1988 pp. 29-36; Fischer 1994 pp. 193-7. On Adenauer’s worries about the “Radford plan” and US reassurances, see also Adenauer-DepUSOS mtg, 4 Oct 56, DNSA BC00023; Adenauer 1967 pp. 197-214.

In 1955, FRG-US relations cooled and Adenauer started pursuing more independent defense policies. He also expressed doubts about the reliability of the US regarding, e.g., its willingness to keep forces in Europe and respond promptly to any Soviet attack and the risk of the USG dealing with Moscow behind Bonn's back. Trachtenberg suggests that with such comments and talks about a *rebus sic stantibus* -clause, Adenauer sought a justification for a national nuclear force.<sup>77</sup>

From early on, Adenauer officially welcomed the stationing in the FRG of tactical nuclear weapons, but Bonn first generally stuck to stressing earlier NATO targets for *conventional* build-up. This was a way for Bonn to try to strengthen its position in NATO: unlike on nuclear weapons, the German role in NATO strategy was in this respect significant. Adenauer first gave an impression of ignorance about nuclear weapons and strategy; it is debated whether he really was that. Especially until the FRG formally joined NATO, Bonn anyway got very little information about US nuclear forces. But in fall 1956, as the US was after all making no troop withdrawals and emphasis on conventional forces threatened to reduce Bonn's influence in NATO, Adenauer started to accept the centrality of nuclear weapons for NATO and the New Look -strategy for the Bundeswehr. But Bonn continued to strongly oppose any reductions in US and British troops in Europe.<sup>78</sup>

After the Radford crisis, Bonn indeed started to *demand* most modern (i.e., tactical nuclear) weapons also for the Bundeswehr; Western Europeans saw these weapons as a way to link their defense to US nuclear forces. But no clarity emerged on how tactical nuclear weapons could actually be used in warfare as they would have caused large collateral damage. Adenauer argued that if such weapons became feasible, they needed to be made available to all NATO troops: the FRG had to be an equal partner and have access to same weapons as its allies. Otherwise its troops would be the weakest link in Western defense, most likely to be attacked, and cannon fodder for the enemy. Bonn stressed further that these weapons were simply in line with technological development, needed for making West German forces effective under NATO strategy, and a way to reduce manpower needs. It saw the deployments also as a way to gain access to US nuclear decision-making and promote equality with the UK and France. The loudest demands for the weapons were made by CSU politician F. Strauss, who was Minister of Atomic Affairs in 1955-6 and Defense Minister since fall 1956 and is often said to have had national nuclear weapon ambitions. Soon after becoming Defense Minister, he scaled down the Bundeswehr manpower target and in late 1956, he and four NATO colleagues demanded at the NAC tactical nuclear weapons for European NATO forces. This demand he came to often repeat. To domestic audiences, Adenauer argued that if NATO strategy required a West German role

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<sup>77</sup> Adenauer-DepUSOS mtg (fn 76); Schwarz, H.-P. 1991 pp. 178, 205-6, 218, 299, 306, 385; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 231-4.

<sup>78</sup> DOS Intelligence report 7533 "West German Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons", 2 July 57, USNA AG weapons; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 47; Schwartz 1983 pp. 42-4; Schwarz, H.-P. 1989 pp. 569, 573-4; Boutwell 1990 pp. 18-20; Fischer 1994 pp. 117, 121, 287.



on nuclear weapons and missiles, rejecting that would mean cutting oneself out of NATO, and that if a key NATO state did not *own* as strong weapons as those that threatened it, it would become meaningless<sup>79</sup> – indicating desire to get nuclear weapons under West German control.

Over time, many NATO states came to host US nuclear weapons, but others questioned especially *Bonn's* intentions. Despite control mechanisms provided by the WEU and NATO, the European public remained suspicious of the Germans, especially when faced with West Germany's strong post-war recovery. Broad public opposition emerged both in the East and the West (in the UK in particular) to stationing of nuclear weapons in the FRG, especially with Bundeswehr troops. But Bonn's demands did not contradict NATO strategy and were moreover centred on *delivery systems*, though it often made no clear distinction between these and nuclear warheads in its statements.<sup>80</sup>

Rearmament was still not very popular among West Germans, and especially opposition to stockpiling nuclear weapons in the FRG and nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr was loud and widespread: according to a spring 1957 survey, over 70 % of West Germans opposed such moves. Opposition to nuclear weapons was manifested especially in the SPD-led Kampf dem Atomtod -movement and the Göttingen appeal of 18 leading atomic scientists against nuclear weapon development.<sup>81</sup> But though the issue was bitterly debated, in March 1958 Adenauer's cabinet got Bundestag approval for acquiring the most modern, including nuclear-capable weapons; owing to anti-communist feelings, SPD inflexibility, and lack of alternative, realistic ways to ensure security, West Germans at least tacitly accepted Adenauer's security policies. By 1960, domestic opposition to these weakened.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Adenauer's interview, 18 Oct 56, PAA R/305/II A6B32 18 287-8; D/105 Adenauer-Dulles mtg, 4 May 57, FRUS 55-7:26; Report 7533 (fn 78); *Bundestag Verhandlungen: Stenographische Berichte* (3<sup>rd</sup> term, 18<sup>th</sup> session), 20 March 58 p. 843; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 17-8, 48-9, 93-4; Freedman 1989 p. 384; Küntzel 1992 p. 35; Ahonen 1995 pp. 30-1.

McArdle Kelleher argues that Bonn sought nuclear (delivery) capabilities also because it wanted to get spill-over effects to civilian industries, close the technology gap created by the post-war restrictions, and show that the FRG was a reliable ally that fully executed US strategy, with hope of increasing US commitment to it (pp. 89-91, 94, 100). See also Ahonen, and on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO strategy and for the security of the FRG, Lauk 1979 pp. 98-136.

<sup>80</sup> See FRG Emb. Washington to Foreign Office (GFO) on US-German relations, 14 March 56, PAA R/305/II A6B32 18 98-101; Osgood 1962 p. 129; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 91-2; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 185.

<sup>81</sup> See Göttinger Manifest, 12 Apr 57, [http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest\\_erklaerungGoettingerErklaerung/index.html](http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest_erklaerungGoettingerErklaerung/index.html) (17 Dec 07); Report 47 "West German Public Opinion Trends on Atomic Issues", 17 May, USNA AG 2; Report 7533 (fn 78); D/246 NSC Operations Coordination Board (OCB) report on the FRG, 3 Sep 58, FRUS 58-60:9; Osgood 1962 p. 129; Cioc 1988 pp. 43-4, 72-91, 117-43; Boutwell 1990 pp. 20-9. On the rearmament debates, see Richardson 1966; Cioc 1988 (and Cioc 1990); Schrafstetter 2004, and on West German attitudes towards defence policy and nuclear weapons, also Brown & Desai 2005.

The Göttingen group expressed refusal to contribute to nuclear *weapon* efforts but stressed the value of *civilian* nuclear development – similarly as the West German industry, they wanted to ensure freedom of action in the civilian field and thus sought to preclude domestic or foreign opposition to it. They succeeded in that the Atomtod-movement did not turn against civilian efforts. See Radkau 1983 pp. 96-100.

<sup>82</sup> Electoral success of the government and reforms in the SPD led this party to moderate its opposition to NATO and nuclear weapons. See D/246 (fn 81) FRUS 58-60:9; DOS/RA to EUR, 25 Nov 58, USNA CDF

Encouraged by the opposition among the West German public to nuclear weapons, the East Block tried to prevent NATO's nuclear stockpile scheme with initiatives for a general settlement on Germany and denuclearization of Central Europe, especially Germany. But both Bonn and the USG opposed denuclearization. The USG wanted to keep nuclear weapons in the FRG. Bonn was in turn concerned about equality in NATO and sought a strong bargaining position for reunification negotiations: only if reunification would seem possible, denuclearization of Germany could be offered.<sup>83</sup>

After the mid-1950s, further factors added to fears of abandonment and concern about lacking credibility of the extended deterrent and incalculability of US policies in Bonn (and elsewhere in Western Europe). These included continuing rumors about US troop withdrawals; the Soviet launch of the world's first satellite, Sputnik, in fall 1957, implying an intercontinental missile capability; French striving for independent policies, which was feared to weaken the US commitment to Europe; questioning in NATO of the risky strategy to protect West Berlin with a threat of nuclear retaliation; an increasing feeling of not being heard by the USG; and signs of *détente*, which caused concern that the US would promote relations with Moscow at its allies' expense. Indeed, within the USG also Dulles questioned the US commitment to go to war over Berlin: though Eisenhower argued the US would have to do so for the sake of its own security, Dulles doubted the next US president would do so.<sup>84</sup>

As deterrence is based on a *chance*, not certainty, of retaliation, and US retaliation on Europe's behalf was surely possible, concern about the credibility of the deterrent was exaggerated. Still, it was widespread in Western Europe and one reason for British and French interest in national nuclear forces. Beyond bipolarity as such, weakening fears of an acute Soviet threat in Western Europe and changes in the distribution of especially economic power in NATO for European benefit made such questioning of US policies feasible. National nuclear forces were supposed to both ensure a US response to a Soviet attack on Europe (though the critics of the forces denied this effect) and make states more capable of deciding about their destinies. Following the strategist Gallois, de Gaulle maintained that as a decision to use nuclear weapons could lead to a nuclear response, no state could be trusted to make it for another. The French argued that even a small nuclear force that France could afford could deter a larger state: an aggressor would not be willing to accept great risks just because of France. Because of such arguments, de Gaulle's rhetoric

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762A.5611 B/3569; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 111-6; Boutwell 1990 pp. 21-3, 29-36, 47; Küntzel 1992 pp. 25, 32; Schrafstetter 2004 p. 125. On changes in SPD stance in defense matters, see also Despatch (Desp.) 1122 Counselor Tyler (E/B) to DOS, 8 Feb 61, DNSA BC01991.

<sup>83</sup> Intelligence summary "Soviet Policy Toward West Germany", 5 June 58, CIA FOIA; Nerlich 1965 p. 648; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 110, 127-21. On denuclearization ideas and Bonn's opposition, see also Richardson 1966 pp. 55-67, 234-6; Schwarz, H.-P. 1989 pp. 583-5.

<sup>84</sup> See D/23 (fn 11) FRUS 58-60:3; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 52, 128-9, 135-6; Küntzel 1992 p. 38; Ahonen 1995 p. 34; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 pp. 186-7. On doubts about the credibility of US commitment to Europe and US reassurances, see Adenauer-Dulles mtg, 14 Dec 57, DDRS; Herter to Embassies, 10 July 59, DNSA BC01506.

of grandeur, and the fact that even the weakest of the WWII Allied Powers now pursued nuclear weapons, especially France's weapon program made access to nuclear weapons seem more important also to other allies, both as a requirement of credible defense and as a way to improve or protect international status. The USG was especially concerned that the French example would make the FRG to follow suit. The close US-British relationship also made nuclear weapons appear as a way to get a privileged position in NATO.<sup>85</sup>

The British and French national nuclear weapon efforts showed that some allies saw cooperation in NATO as an insufficient solution to their security problems. They also increased the risk that either state would end or reduce cooperation in NATO as independent action became a more feasible option for them and the nuclear programs used up resources available to defense efforts. The threat this implied to cooperation in NATO, together with US interest in having also its allies' nuclear forces subjected to some central control and coordination, helps explain why the USG started to search some kind of a cooperative solution for NATO's nuclear organization – *at least* with those allies who had nuclear weapons.

When even less vulnerable states pursued national nuclear forces, it is no wonder if some West Germans felt insecure without any. Many in the West thought also the status rationale for nuclear weapons to apply to the FRG. Other observers argue that London's or Paris's nuclear status was no very crucial issue for Bonn and that fears of it wanting to follow their examples were for several reasons not fully realistic. Both friends and foes would have strongly opposed a German nuclear weapon effort; Moscow might have even taken preventive military action. Dependency on allies restricted Bonn's freedom of action. Moreover, Bader and Mahncke argue that at least first, the FRG could have produced only a small nuclear force, maybe insufficient to deter Moscow; finding suitable testing

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<sup>85</sup> Gallois 1961; Dalma 1965 p. 5; Richardson 1966 p. 4; Bader 1966 p. 696; Ball 1968 pp. 214-5; Kohler 1972 pp. 112-3; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 129; Waltz 1981; Seaborg 1987 p. 75; Freedman 1989 pp. 314-7; Gordon 1999 pp. 225-7. Pry 1984 suggests Gallois's and his colleague Beaufre's writings in support of national nuclear forces maybe also aimed at justifying French-Israeli nuclear cooperation (p. 11). On reasons for national nuclear forces in Europe, see also Richardson 1966 pp. 201-4. Many observers argue that ensuring security under the Soviet threat was not the sole or even prime reason for France and the UK to start pursuing the weapons. Häckel & Kaiser 1994 suggest that rather, great power and prestige ambitions were behind their programs, which were facilitated by their access to uranium and overseas testing areas, strong industrial capabilities, and powerful and advanced scientific-technologic community. See also Gardner 1994 p. 80; Wohlstetter 1961 p. 375. The latter also points out that the proponents of national nuclear forces, who argued that even a small chance of successful retaliation could enable a small nuclear power to deter a great power, contradicted their own concern about the credibility of US guarantees (pp. 365-6). On the British and French motivations, see also Bundy 1988 Chapter 10.

European nuclear forces were suggested to be "triggers" for US nuclear forces, but it is unclear how. Glenn Snyder saw two possible, unconvincing ways: a Soviet attack against European nuclear forces would 1) upset the Americans enough to make them retaliate against the USSR or 2) deplete the Soviet arsenal and make it more inviting to a US attack. Freedman 1989 pp. 319-20 ref. to Snyder, G. (1961) *Deterrence and Defense*, Princeton: Princeton UP, pp. 162-4. Towards the USG, Paris discounted the idea of triggering as silly. D/144, D/254 US-France mtgs, 20 June and 31 May 62, FRUS 61-3:13. Also US officials discounted the idea. To Rusk, it demonstrated European lack of understanding about nuclear realities: Paris's use of nuclear weapons would mean destruction of France. D/173 NSC Executive Committee (NSCEC) mtg, 12 Feb 63, *ibid*. But to other audiences, US officials argued otherwise: NSCS member Komer noted to an Israeli diplomat that French use of nuclear weapons could commit the US to action. Komer on mtg with Gazit, 16 Jan 64, LBJL KI 1.

sites would have been hard for it; and until the early 1970s, technologic obstacles remained to an effective West German nuclear force.<sup>86</sup> A national nuclear weapon program would have probably weakened, rather than strengthened, West German security and position, which explains why none was launched.

But others' nuclear weapon efforts did increase Bonn's interest in *participating* in NATO's nuclear weapon affairs matters as a way to limit status differences in NATO. At the same time, such involvement could strengthen West German confidence in US security guarantees and give Bonn some influence regarding NATO's nuclear strategy and thus chances to ensure that Western defense strategy served West German interests. Bonn was not alone with such goals: as the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy grew, so did in general the non-nuclear allies' desire to participate in decisions about them. A desire for stronger US-European ties was widespread in NATO. McArdle Kelleher argues that the non-nuclear allies wanted at least assurance that nuclear weapons would be available in case of a need and a role in decision-making about them, and that Bonn's dependence on the US generally restricted its options to those that the USG accepted.<sup>87</sup>

I will consider the nuclear activities and ambitions of the FRG and US efforts to manage and control nuclear proliferation in NATO below. But first, I will discuss the emerging concern within the USG about nuclear proliferation and global arms control and disarmament initiatives during the Eisenhower era.

### **7.3 Proliferation estimates and arms control ideas**

During the Truman era, US worries about a spread of nuclear weapons had been focused on the USSR. By the mid-1950s, the possibility of their spread to many states, including Germany and Israel, was causing concern in Washington. Thus the question was what, if anything, to do to stop it. The issue was referred to as the "nth country problem": though each further nth proliferant wanted nuclear weapons for itself, it was likely to hope no n+1th country to follow suit after it<sup>88</sup>.

The US arms control and disarmament bureaucracy was not very developed: it suffered from a lack of continuity, especially compared to the Soviet side. To improve the situation, in 1955 Eisenhower made Governor H. Stassen his disarmament aide. Stassen strongly stressed the urgency of the proliferation problem but also Dulles came to favor nonproliferation efforts (but expected it to be hard to persuade other states to make lasting

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<sup>86</sup> See Buchan 1963 p. 628; Bader 1966 pp. 696-8; Mahncke 1972 pp. 32-4, 43-5; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 278.

<sup>87</sup> Kohler 1972 pp. 109-10; Mahncke 1972 p. 107; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 123-5, 132.

<sup>88</sup> See Wohlstetter 1961 pp. 357-8.

commitments not to acquire such weapons that the US, the USSR, and the UK were producing).<sup>89</sup>

Next, I will outline the Eisenhower administration's estimates about nuclear weapon proliferation. Thereafter I consider its attempts to prevent or delay that with, first, general political arms control and, second, by reducing NATO states' incentives for national nuclear forces through measures suited for enhancing their trust in the extended US deterrent and offers of some cooperation in nuclear weapon affairs.

### 7.3.1 Concern about nuclear weapon proliferation

In May 1955, Stassen argued to Eisenhower that if no arms control agreement was reached, within a decade several states were likely to "attain an important nuclear weapons capability, probably including the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, and Communist China, and possibly including Germany, India, and Argentina, notwithstanding some present policies or agreements to the contrary"<sup>90</sup>. He argued proliferation would threaten US security and increase risks of miscalculation, reckless or illogical action, and escalation of hostilities<sup>91</sup>. A year later, he wrote that "within a matter of months other nations will be deciding to build nuclear weapons of their own, and *once they have so decided it will be difficult to reverse their decisions*". Thus from early on, it was seen in the USG that if any nonproliferation action was to be taken, it had to happen *before* others clearly decided to go for nuclear weapons. Stassen argued that Paris was already considering to do so and any state's decision to do so made others more prone to follow suit. He expected the FRG to follow suit on France, using another state as a basis for its effort if it had to (owing to the promise not to produce ABC weapons in Germany). Several states were able to acquire capabilities needed in nuclear weapon production and, if they decided to do so, produce crude bombs within three years and thermonuclear weapons 2-3 years later. Under existing trends, a world of 15-20 nuclear powers was possible quite soon.<sup>92</sup> In May 1957, Stassen argued that in the absence of a nonproliferation effort, France would launch a weapon program within two months, the FRG would follow suit, and then Moscow would be pressed to give nuclear weapons for China, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR. Thereafter Israel was likely to develop them or get them from France, and then Egypt would get them from Moscow. In fall 1957, Stassen expected Paris and Bonn in about a year to start a proliferation chain reaction by producing bombs jointly or separately, refer-

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<sup>89</sup> D/77 NSC mtg, 13 Oct 55; D/106 (fn 8); D/183 USG mtg, 20 Apr 57, all FRUS 55-7:20; Seaborg 1981 pp. 92-4.

<sup>90</sup> D/33 Stassen to Eisenhower, 26 May 55, FRUS 55-7:20.

<sup>91</sup> D/89 NSC Planning Board mtg, 21 Dec 55, *ibid*.

<sup>92</sup> My emphasis. D/143 Stassen to Eisenhower, 29 June 56, *ibid*. Stassen later repeated such comments on France and Germany: see D/183, D/197 USG mtgs, 20 Apr and 17 May 57, and D/185 Eisenhower-Stassen mtg, 23 Apr, all *ibid*.

ring to an intelligence estimate that “France can test a prototype nuclear bomb the later part of 1958, and France and Germany can have a capability of 50 bombs in 1960”.<sup>93</sup>

In response to a DOS request, by summer 1957 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prepared the first coordinated National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the likelihood and effects of proliferation within a decade. Up to ten states were expected to become on their own capable of producing at least some nuclear weapons. If Western Europe launched a joint effort, development of a significant force was possible. The FRG was estimated to be able to produce nuclear weapons within a decade from a decision to do so, or within 5 years if it found a foreign source of HEU. Assuming no disarmament agreement was reached, Bonn was seen to favor the arming within NATO of all troops with nuclear weapons. Also intelligence officials expected a French nuclear weapon effort to make the FRG follow suit despite contrary promises, though Bonn’s first reaction was expected to be to pursue *regional* nuclear weapon arrangements. Israel needed much help to produce a bomb but was expected to “almost certainly attempt to achieve nuclear capabilities if it could obtain fissionable material and the necessary financing”. According to the NIE, proliferation was within a decade unlikely to much increase the chances of general war. Moscow did not seem very concerned about it and was expected to respond with threats but no military action to any West German nuclear weapon effort.<sup>94</sup> A year later, a more detailed, otherwise similar NIE suggested that proliferation would increase the risks of general war, though disagreement existed about this in the intelligence community<sup>95</sup>. In fall 1960, a further NIE saw the FRG as capable of alone achieving an operational nuclear capability by 1966-68 but likely to pursue one only if cooperation with the US, other Europeans, or in NATO would not help it to get “the benefits of a nuclear capability” in other ways<sup>96</sup>.

But the USG was not unanimous in seeing dangers in proliferation. In 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the DOD saw it as not worrying enough to be decisive in US disarmament policy: the JCS argued that it did not threaten US security since Moscow would not give its allies nuclear weapons and allied nuclear forces were for US benefit.

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<sup>93</sup> D/199 Stassen to SOD Wilson, 18 May 57; D/201 NSC mtg, 23 May; D/303 Stassen to Dulles, 7 Oct, all *ibid.* Fn 12 in the latter notes the estimate Stassen referred to has not been found.

<sup>94</sup> However, in its contribution to the NIE, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) for intelligence coordination expected a country’s nuclear weapon efforts to encourage it to pursue its interests more strongly and make it more likely “to become engaged in disputes which might eventually involve the interests of the USSR and the US”, thus increasing the risk of local conflicts escalating into general war. For this reason, it thought that also Moscow worried about proliferation, especially in case of the FRG. The JAEIC also argued that neither the FRG nor Israel was seriously considering a weapon effort but noted that Bonn tended “privately to favor the acquisition of weapons” in case no nuclear disarmament took place. D/1 DOS to CIA Director A. Dulles, 25 Apr 57; D/2 NIE 100-6-57 “Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries. Likelihood and Consequences”, 18 June, both NSA EBB NIEs; CIA draft “Likelihood and Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries”, 24 May, CIA FOIA.

<sup>95</sup> This NIE also considered the possibility of a French-Italian-German nuclear weapon effort (discussed in section 7.4.3), which it estimated to have potential for resulting in a significant nuclear force. D/3a NIE 100-2-58 “Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences”, 1 July 58, NSA EBB NIEs.

<sup>96</sup> D/5 NIE 100-4-60 “Likelihood and Consequences of the Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Additional Countries”, 20 Sep 60 (san.), *ibid.* It seems that all excised sections here concern Israel.

Also the DOD saw the net effect on US security of, e.g., a French weapon program as not necessarily negative. JCS stances on arms control were generally important since without JCS support, reaching congressional approval for any such measures was hard.<sup>97</sup>

Eisenhower's own stance is somewhat unclear, but it seems that the general prospect of proliferation worried him. In May 1954, he argued that "soon ... even little countries will have a stockpile of these [nuclear] bombs, and then we *will* be in a mess<sup>98</sup>". In fall 1956, he noted regarding nuclear arms control (especially a test ban) that though obstacles existed, the US had to do something – "set some date and work toward it" – as otherwise, other states were to "enter the atomic competition", which could cause great harm<sup>99</sup>. However, in spring 1957 he argued that Moscow had an even greater interest than the US in stopping proliferation, which was a potential bargaining chip. A July 1959 meeting memo of the National Security Council (NSC) reveals that Eisenhower was particularly concerned about the prospect of proliferation in the Middle East: he noted that he "could conceive of nothing worse than permitting Israel and Egypt to have a nuclear capability".<sup>100</sup> But as discussed below, his stance towards somehow controlled or multilateral proliferation in NATO was different.

### 7.3.2 Agreement on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation?

Within the USG, Stassen proposed political arms control and disarmament measures, beyond safeguards, as ways to prevent proliferation. According to Morgan, Eisenhower was in general interested in disarmament but Dulles turned down ideas that he expected West Germans especially to dislike<sup>101</sup>.

Already in 1955, Stassen favored making efforts to delay and prevent further states from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability central in US policies: whereas ensuring that the Soviets could not cause grave damage in the US with a surprise attack was the primary US goal, he argued that the secondary goal had to be to prevent others from getting a weapon capability, except if Soviet nuclear build-up made others' capabilities necessary. Both superpowers had also earlier made propagandistic proposals for general and complete disarmament, but by spring 1957 several factors made Stassen see the time as suited for an agreement on a test stop and fissile material limitations *and* NNWSs forgoing nuclear

<sup>97</sup> See D/20, D/300 DepSOD Quarles to Dulles, 24 May and 30 Sep 57, with JCS memos; D/204 USG mtg, 24 May, all FRUS 55-7:20; Seaborg 1987 p. 12.

<sup>98</sup> Original emphasis. NSC mtg of 27 May, 28 May 54, DNSA NP00158.

<sup>99</sup> Eisenhower's 11 Sep mtg, 14 Sep 56, DNSA NP00274.

<sup>100</sup> D/185 (fn 92), D/201 (fn 93) FRUS 55-7:20; D/69 NSC mtg (san.), 30 July 59, FRUS 58-60:3. The NSC "is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials", including the SOS, the SOD, and the National Security Assistant. JCS chairman and CIA director provide the NSC with military and intelligence advise.

[Http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/) (4 June 06). Hastedt 2005 notes that the NSC has been presidents' key foreign policy tool and that the foreign policy bureaucracy, with its long-term focus, tends to be less responsive to presidential leadership (p. 188).

<sup>101</sup> Morgan 1974 pp. 68-70.

weapon capabilities. One factor was the expectation of several early proliferation decisions. Strong UN General Assembly (UNGA) and public pressure to stop nuclear tests also existed. Moreover, Moscow had in 1956 proposed a test stop and now seemed concerned about risks of conflict escalation, German rearmament, and proliferation (especially to Germany, Japan, and China). Stassen believed that if Moscow, Paris, and Bonn accepted a deal, all other states would accept it, too. As a difference to earlier US nuclear limitation proposals, he did not propose *banning* these weapons: the three existing NWSs were to maintain significant nuclear forces. Possibilities for civilian uses of nuclear energy were moreover to be protected under any agreement.<sup>102</sup>

Eisenhower approved seeking a trial-period package agreement that included a promise by NNWSs not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, a promise by NWSs not to produce fissile material or put it in further weapons, verification thereof, and a one-year test stop. But though Stassen was told to wait for approvals by other USG agencies, he gave an informal memo on the idea to allies *and* the Soviets at the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. This infuriated, e.g., Adenauer. He objected that the idea went much beyond what he and Dulles had discussed and made an earlier Adenauer-Eisenhower declaration that linked disarmament to a settlement on Germany seem empty; the proposed scheme gave Moscow much of what it wanted and thus weakened the prospects of a general settlement. He warned that for continuation of NATO, greater coordination of stances towards Moscow was necessary. Washington told Stassen that he had exceeded his authority and had to inform the Soviets that the USG did not stand behind his memo.<sup>103</sup>

Washington now removed the NNWSs' non-nuclear promise was removed from the proposal because 1) for instance France was not expected to accept it and 2) restrictions on testing and fissile materials seemed to together suffice as nonproliferation provisions (though a test stop alone did not prevent development of unsophisticated bombs). But Adenauer still opposed the proposal, maintaining that envisaged ground inspections implied risks to NATO's forward strategy, were problematic because of Bonn's doctrine of non-recognition of the GDR, and could even lead to a neutralization of the FRG. Also in Washington, the proposal was disputed.<sup>104</sup>

As agreement on the verification of fissile material prohibitions seemed hard to achieve, Moscow wanted to agree on a test stop first, and to win time to deal with the risk of proliferation, Stassen favored accepting, as a first step, only a two-year test stop and verification

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<sup>102</sup> D/33 (fn 90); D/82 Stassen's report, 1 Nov 55; D/143 (fn 92); D/181 USDel/Disarmament(D) (E/L) to DOS, 13 Apr 57; D/183 (fn 89); D/195 Stassen's recommendations, 9 May; D/197 (fn 92); D/201 (fn 93) all FRUS 55-7:20; Quester 1970 p. 182. On Soviet views, see also D/187 USDel/D to DOS, 27 Apr 57, FRUS 55-7:20; on general disarmament proposals, Seaborg 1987 pp. 79-81; and on developments regarding a test ban under Eisenhower, Bunn 1992 pp. 18-26, 42-3.

<sup>103</sup> D/206 USG mtg, 25 May 57; D/212 USDel/D to DOS, 31 May; D/213 Editorial note (EN); D/221-3 on USG reaction and telegrams to Stassen, 4 June; D/229 E/Bonn (B) to Dulles with Adenauer to Dulles, 5 June, all FRUS 55-7:20.

<sup>104</sup> See D/183 (fn 89), D/300 (fn 97); D/242 Dulles to Eisenhower, 18 June 57; D/259 E/B to DOS with Adenauer's memo, 18 June; D/272 E/B to Dulles with Adenauer to Dulles, 1 Aug; D/303 (fn 93), all *ibid*.



thereof, on the condition that serious efforts be made for the broader agreement. But many leading US scientists and some key Senators opposed a test stop. Also the DOD and the JCS opposed a *separate* agreement on that since 1) only a fissile material agreement and inspection regime could help to prevent proliferation and reduce the danger of nuclear war and 2) concessions to Moscow weakened the US bargaining position. But Eisenhower doubted the desirability and need for further nuclear testing. While the broad arms control plan was being debated, he publicly proposed a verified two-year test stop.<sup>105</sup>

But soon, prospects of any early arms control agreement weakened. Moscow first proposed an agreement not to *deploy* nuclear weapons abroad (something it hardly could expect the USG to accept) or give other states control over them and then stopped participating in the Disarmament Subcommittee. Multilateral disarmament talks now halted for a few years. After Stassen resigned by late 1957, Dulles took over the responsibility for disarmament matters and focused USG nonproliferation efforts on promotion of safeguards and reduction of *reasons* for independent nuclear weapon efforts through cooperation in NATO, instead of political agreements. Nevertheless, both the USSR and the US refrained from nuclear testing from 1958 to fall 1961.<sup>106</sup>

The Eisenhower administration did not seek a nonproliferation agreement separately from the broad disarmament proposals since it wanted to protect NATO's existing and potential nuclear arrangements (discussed further in the next section) and feared that Moscow would evade any special agreement. Several authors argue that this USG had no clear nonproliferation policy: it opposed proliferation, demanded safeguards on its exports, but did not really expect other states to promise to forgo nuclear weapons. It dealt with the proliferation problem selectively based on strategic issues and other interests, e.g., NATO cohesion, protecting its freedom of action.<sup>107</sup> It remained passive and did not openly object when France started pursuing nuclear weapons and made its first nuclear test.<sup>108</sup>

But other states started efforts for a general nonproliferation regime. In fall 1958, Ireland introduced at the UN a resolution proposing a committee to study how to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. However, it withdrew the idea because of lacking support by, e.g., the US, which sought to protect NATO's freedom regarding nuclear arrangements. Only a paragraph that recognized the danger of proliferation was adopted (the US abstained from voting). A revised fall 1959 resolution called for considering a treaty to prohibit 1) handing over the control over nuclear weapons and 2) production of nuclear weapons by states

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<sup>105</sup> D/249 NSC staff (NSCS) to Eisenhower's national security aide Cutler, 26 June 57; D/253 Dulles to Stassen, 1 July; D/281 USG mtg, 9 Aug; D/300 (fn 97), all *ibid.*; Eisenhower's test stop proposal, 21 Aug, PPE 158.

<sup>106</sup> ACDA DepDirector Fisher to Under (U)SOS Ball, 18 Dec 64, with "Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", 16 Dec, USNA BP; Osgood 1962 pp. 219, 227; Quester 1970 p. 182; Seaborg 1981 p. 94.

<sup>107</sup> See ACDA/NPT; Richardson 1966 p. 50; Bader 1968 pp. 26-7; Quester 1970 p. 171; Green 1984 pp. 155-7; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 79.

<sup>108</sup> Rusk-Gilpatric Committee (GC) mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 80-1 ref. also to Scheinman, L. (1965) *Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, pp. 129-65. The Gilpatric Committee is discussed in section 9.4.2.

that not yet had them. This formula got support from the US. A late 1960 resolution in turn included a prohibition of transferring weapon data. The outgoing Eisenhower administration abstained from voting on it.<sup>109</sup>

### 7.3.3 Preventing independent nuclear weapon efforts through cooperation in NATO?

To increase NATO allies' feeling of involvement in NATO strategy and trust in the US deterrent, Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to increase their role in nuclear matters and strengthen consultations in NATO. As NATO strategy was becoming so much based on nuclear weapons and the USG wanted the Europeans to both feel secure and take responsibility for their defense, it seemed hard to deny them a *role* in nuclear matters.<sup>110</sup> But Dulles had publicly taken the stance that the US had to retain the freedom to alone make the final decisions about using nuclear weapons and that operational requirements of effective deterrence made shared control over and advance decisions about the use of nuclear weapons unfeasible<sup>111</sup>. The intense discussions on non-nuclear allies' role in NATO's nuclear weapon affairs, i.e., nuclear sharing, continued from the latter half of the 1950s throughout the Kennedy and Johnson eras.

Though the official USG policy was and remained to generally discourage further states from moving towards nuclear weapons, Eisenhower saw nuclear weapon cooperation in a clearly more positive light in the case of NATO states than otherwise. But his administration had no clear stance towards European nuclear weapon efforts and disagreed on whether to help allies get nuclear weapons by providing weapons, data, and materials. Eisenhower saw it as inevitable that nuclear information and capabilities would spread and several European states, including the FRG, would want nuclear weapons. He and Dulles considered it dangerous and wasteful if several states pursued nuclear weapons *on their own*. But Eisenhower's stance towards *controlled* or *multilateral* proliferation was not quite clear: he now opposed helping further states produce nuclear weapons by supplying data, now argued within the USG that though giving such data only to some allies was problematic, it could be given *secretly* to, e.g., France and the FRG. It was economically best to produce the weapons in the US, or maybe in a *joint* European program, but he saw it to be in US interest to make them available to close allies in some situations; this was

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<sup>109</sup> UNGA Res. 1380/XIV, 1576/XV, 20 Nov 59 and 20 Dec 60; ACDA/NPT; Department of DOS 1960 pp. 1185-6, 1520-1, 1547; Bader 1968 pp. 23-4, 36-8, 41-3; Seaborg 1987 pp. 78-9; Küntzel 1992 pp. 46-7; Bunn 1992 pp. 64-5; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 80. On changing US voting behavior regarding UN resolutions on nonproliferation, see also Kohler 1972 pp. 53-5.

<sup>110</sup> See D/30 NSC mtg 10 May, 11 May 56, FRUS 55-7:4; NSC mtg, 4 Oct; Macmillan-Dulles mtg, 22 Oct 57; US-UK mtg 24 Oct (san.), 31 Oct; DOS mtg, 6 Nov, all DDRS; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 154-5, 176-7. Eisenhower considered central control of US nuclear weapons in Europe crucial but was willing to delegate it in advance to military commanders, especially regarding the possibility that reaching him in case of a Soviet attack would be impossible. Ibid. pp. 166-71; NSA 2001.

<sup>111</sup> Dulles's press conf., 16 Dec 54, FRUS 52-4:5(1) pp. 543-7; Fischer 1994 pp. 157-8.

also in line with his hope of a strong, unified, third force Europe. Later, he said “he was not as concerned as some about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons to allies”. He much disapproved of the obstacles the AEA and the Congress posed for nuclear sharing and attempts to force allies into “second-rate” positions – that was counterproductive. He was not too worried about growing power of the FRG as the USSR was now the enemy and provided a strong balance against it. The JCS in turn argued that France would make nuclear weapons anyway and it thus giving it weapon data was a sensible way to save resources. But some DOS officials thought that controlling the FRG was crucial and to stop it from going nuclear, the US had to oppose national nuclear forces in general.<sup>112</sup>

Whatever ideas of nuclear sharing Eisenhower entertained, even the amended AEA restricted his options. Seeing selected nuclear sharing as a way to prevent independent national nuclear weapon efforts and unenthusiastic attitudes towards NATO in Europe, he and Dulles wanted the Act to be further amended to allow giving close allies more nuclear weapon data and so enable greater cooperation on the US nuclear weapon stockpiles in Europe.<sup>113</sup>

Various ideas of nuclear sharing were emerging in Washington. In June 1956, Stassen brought up the idea of “a small elite NATO force equipped with nuclear weapons” under direct NATO command, manned and financed by all NATO states, as a way to boost NATO cohesion and European integration<sup>114</sup>. Though the idea seems to have attracted little immediate attention in the USG and Stassen’s role as its father is generally ignored in literature, it became much more prominent a few years later. In 1957, Senator H. Jackson publicly proposed a *sea-based* mid-range missile force for NATO and cooperation on this with allies. For nonproliferation reasons, US diplomats in Europe in turn recommended in May 1957 prompt setting up of stockpiles of US nuclear weapons for allies troops, under US custody and final control but maximal NATO “flavor”. In the summer, the USG studied also the idea of giving NATO the custody of US nuclear stockpiles in Europe. But be-

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<sup>112</sup> See DOS-AEC mtg, 25 Jan 56, USNA ERA B/1; D/172 Dulles-Strauss mtg, 14 May, FRUS 55-7:4; NSC mtg, 4 Oct, DDRS; D/105 (fn 79) FRUS 55-7:26; Eisenhower’s news conf., 17 July 57, PPE 134; D/311 USG mtg (san.), 22 Oct, FRUS 55-7:27; DOS mtg, 6 Nov, DDRS; Dulles-Brentano mtg, 21 Nov, DNSA BC00039; Eisenhower-Mikoyan mtg, 17 Jan 59, DNSA BC00640; D/67, D/69 (san.) NSC mtgs, 16 and 30 July, FRUS 58-60:3; Eisenhower-Macmillan mtg (fn 14), 28 March 60; USG-SACEUR Norstad mtg, 2 Aug, DDRS; DOS to National Security aide Bundy, 5 Feb 64, with Eisenhower-Merchant (DOS) mtg, 15 Jan, LBJL S:MLF I 2; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 146-55, 178, 203-10, 217.

<sup>113</sup> NSC mtg, 4 Oct 56; US-UK mtg 24 Oct 57 (san.), 31 Oct; Loper (fn 74), all DDRS; Bader 1968 pp. 31-2 citing Dulles’s 1958 statement before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) on amending the Act; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 134; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 178.

Eisenhower argued the Congress’s interventions in nuclear policies were very harmful or even unconstitutional. See D/144 NSC mtg (san.), 29 Oct 59, FRUS 58-60:7(2); D/264, D/269 Eisenhower-Norstad-Bowie and -NATO Secr. Gen. Spaak mtgs (san.), 16 Aug and 4 Oct 60, FRUS 58-60:7(1); Seaborg 1987 p. 89.

<sup>114</sup> D/143 (fn 92) FRUS 55-7:20.

cause of congressional opposition to changing the AEA and Stassen's London debacle, it did not submit the idea to congressional or allied consideration.<sup>115</sup>

In NATO, it was planned that SACEUR should command forces capable of destroying all Soviet weapons aimed at Europe. By 1957, the USG thought that the USSR had superior long-range capabilities and thus wanted to station also mid-range missiles in Europe from where they could reach the USSR and so complement long-range US forces.<sup>116</sup> At the same time, the Sputnik launch once again showed that US secrecy did not prevent technological progress by others and increased the need to strengthen allies' confidence in US protection. At a late 1957 NAC meeting, Dulles presented a plan for sharing nuclear hardware and information. Based on it, the NAC agreed in principle on 1) creating an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM<sup>117</sup>) force in Europe under SACEUR; 2) bilateral discussions on stationing US missiles and nuclear warheads in allied countries (the warheads were to remain in US custody but be operated in case of war also by hosts; decisions about use were to be made jointly); 3) joint European advanced weapon (including IRBM) production; 4) US delivery of dual-capable, tactical delivery systems to any NATO ally; and 5) assuming the Congress agreed, sharing by the US of data needed in producing nuclear submarines and IRBMs. Nieburg argues the latter point was especially important since the submarines were a delivery system that enables a secure second-strike force. The USG moreover wanted to deepen consultations with allies to educate them about nuclear matters and NATO capabilities. Altogether, the plans were seen as significant steps in NATO. But the USG still did not aim to enable the allies to produce or give them control over nuclear *warheads*.<sup>118</sup>

The USG now also favored giving up the 1954 prohibitions on the FRG regarding *missile* production, as was possible after SACEUR recommendation and under a 2/3 WEU majority, to be able to fully benefit from its potential in weapon development and production. Bonn itself had not sought such changes yet.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> See T/2765 Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations (M/RO) to Dulles, 21 May 57, DNSA NH01056; CIA (fn 94), 24 May; PPE 134 (fn 112); Osgood 1962 p. 220; Wiegele 1968 pp. 466-7; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 127-8.

<sup>116</sup> Kissinger 1965 pp. 97-8.

<sup>117</sup> NATO discussions on mid-range missiles in Europe concerned two missile types: IRBMs and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). According to DOD Missile Defense Agency, the missiles have ranges of 3000-5500 km and 1000-3000 km, respectively. But the definitions and use of terminology by officials have varied. Often the terms appear to have been used interchangeably. In Dec 1957, NATO states discussed IRBM deployments and production, but reflecting also changing priorities in US missile production programs (see McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 135-7), soon thereafter MRBMs were under discussion. When possible, I follow terminology used in source materials, though this leads to some inconsistencies, or use the term mid-range missiles that covers both types.

<sup>118</sup> DOS/Policy Planning Staff (PPS) "Nuclear policy", 4 Dec 57; Norstad at NAC (san.), 30 Apr 59, both DDRS; "Chronology of MRBM Project", 19 July 60, USNA FRG; Loper (fn 74); Osgood 1962 pp. 221-2; Nieburg 1963 p. 608; Richardson 1966 p. 50; Adenauer 1967 pp. 343-6; Wiegele 1968 pp. 468-70; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 129-30; Seaborg 1987 p. 76; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 194.

<sup>119</sup> NSC report (fn 13), 13 Dec 57 and 7 Feb 58.

Dulles now told the Congress and the public that to strengthen allies' confidence in NATO strategy and so prevent independent nuclear weapon efforts, neutralistic tendencies, and non-participation in NATO, the USG wanted to set up nuclear weapon stockpiles for NATO and have the AEA amended to allow greater information sharing and a bigger role for allies in operating tactical nuclear weapons. He stressed that a potential disarmament agreement would take priority over such moves and these would not imply giving up US custody of warheads but also that it was illusory to expect secrecy to prevent proliferation.<sup>120</sup> Allies' involvement in nuclear weapon affairs had thus for the USG become explicitly the other side of a bargain to keep them from pursuing national nuclear forces, and thus to strengthen the basis of cooperation in NATO. But it argued that it proposed no move to increase their *independent* capabilities.

But soon after the NAC meeting, unwillingness to boost foreign nuclear weapon capabilities, hopes of a disarmament deal with Moscow, and Paris's pursuing of an independent nuclear force weakened support for information sharing in Washington. When the Congress in spring 1958 considered revising the Act, sharing IRBM and submarine data was off the agenda and greater information sharing was discussed only in reference to allies who had already progressed far in nuclear weapon efforts.<sup>121</sup> After repeated USG assurances that the allies would not get control over US nuclear weapons, it amended the Act to allow giving them somewhat more information needed in operating the weapons and in delivery system development. The president also got a right to authorize, when it was in the interest of the security of US alliances, cooperation with states that significantly contributed to that security, including transferring "nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons" and "nuclear material for research on, development of, or use in atomic weapons", provided that such nation has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons". In practice, this gave the UK a privileged position in US legislation. But an option was created to help *any* ally that had an advanced nuclear weapon program.<sup>122</sup>

In spring 1958, NATO adopted the military plan MC-70 based on the NAC agreements, and the US was launching arrangements to provide nuclear weapons and delivery systems for allies' troops. Unlike some other allies, the FRG had to pay for nuclear-capable missiles. This held back its procurement, but by late 1958 it had nevertheless bought some nuclear-capable, tactical-range missiles and aircraft convertible to carry nuclear weapons

<sup>120</sup> PPS (fn 118), 4 Dec 57; NSC report (fn 13), 13 Dec and 7 Feb 58; Dulles-Macmillan mtg (san.), 14 Dec, DDRS; Osgood 1962 pp. 224-5; Wiegele 1968 pp. 471-2; Bader 1968 pp. 31-2 citing Dulles's 1958 statement before the JCAE on amending the Act.

The USG considered greater nuclear sharing also with non-NATO states. Regarding the Middle East, the DOS concluded that because states in the area were not allied to it, the US was not to go beyond civilian nuclear cooperation. DOS/NE "Nuclear Sharing with Countries of the NEA Area", 16 Feb 60, USNA ND B/1 chron. inter-office M2; NE "Significance of Possibilities of Expanded Nuclear Sharing for Near East Countries", 11 Aug, *ibid* 1.

<sup>121</sup> MRBM chron. (fn 118); Bader 1968 pp. 29-34; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 133 ref. also to, e.g., Nieburg, H. (1964) *Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy*, Washington: Public Affairs Press, pp. 177-84.

<sup>122</sup> US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Chapters 9, 12 also fn 149; Loper (fn 74); Osgood 1962 pp. 225-6; Wiegele 1968 p. 473; Bader 1968 p. 30.

and was negotiating with the US on buying nuclear-capable, mid-range aircraft and a license to produce them.<sup>123</sup>

The idea was that allies' troops would get a capability to *use* US nuclear weapons through training and acquisition of delivery systems, the warheads remaining in US custody in peacetime. It became commonplace to talk about a dual-key system where both the US and the host country in practice could veto the use of the weapons (through control over warheads and delivery vehicles, respectively)<sup>124</sup>. Whether this corresponded to reality is another matter, discussed below.

Over time, the US came to deploy over 7000 tactical and mid-range nuclear weapons in Europe, of which about a half in the FRG and 35-40 % to allies' forces. The FRG acquired the second largest nuclear delivery capability in NATO and hosted on its soil the world's third largest nuclear stockpile.<sup>125</sup>

The DOS also continued to develop the idea of a multilateral NATO nuclear authority and capability as a further way to delay national nuclear weapon efforts<sup>126</sup>. Before discussing this issue further, I next consider nuclear development in the FRG and European cooperation in the nuclear field.

#### ***7.4 Nuclear development in West Germany and European nuclear cooperation***

While the USG made plans for NATO cooperation on nuclear weapons and missiles, some of its European allies were also interested in Western European cooperation on these issues. That I will focus on in the last part of this section. But Western Europeans came to launch also cooperation on the civilian uses of nuclear energy. After first outlining the launch of a full-scale nuclear program in the FRG, I will consider the setting up of the European atomic energy community, Euratom. Thereafter follows a discussion about how large a risk of weapon proliferation was, and was perceived to be, involved in West Germany's nuclear program.

After gaining sovereignty, the FRG launched extensive activities in the nuclear field, seeking to close the technology gap to other advanced states that had come about after the WWII. To coordinate the efforts, Adenauer set up a Ministry for Atomic Affairs in fall 1955 and appointed Strauss to head it. The FRG signed a basic nuclear research cooperation agreement with the US in early 1956 and in 1958 commissioned an experimental light-water (quite proliferation-resistant) power reactor from it; this first reactor went criti-

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<sup>123</sup> DOS/RA (fn 82), 25 Nov 58; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 95.

<sup>124</sup> Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 185.

<sup>125</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 89; Norris et al 1999.

<sup>126</sup> See DOS to Dulles on mtg with Strauss with Att. C) on FIG nuclear weapon cooperation, 4 March 58, USNA AG.

cal in 1960. US companies were eager to export nuclear technology to the FRG since the country was expected relatively soon to be able to cost-efficiently benefit from nuclear energy, and its nuclear sector was under much less state control than in France and the UK (as these states had nuclear weapon programs). But the West Germans also aimed to develop nuclear technology themselves, had interest in export markets, and thus were to become a competitor to the US. West German companies worked on the design of various reactor types, often in cooperation with US firms and supported by electric utilities, sometimes aided by much public funding. The government pushed unenthusiastic parts of the energy industry to nuclear development, the profitability of which some questioned. In early 1956, it was expected in the USG that the scientific and industrial resources of the FRG would enable it to fairly soon close the technology gap. From 1956 onwards, several nuclear research centers and university institutes, which came to acquire research reactors, were launched in the FRG. The state set up such in Karlsruhe and Jülich, where construction of the first German-designed reactor started in summer 1961 (the pebble-bed reactor went critical five years later). In 1956, a nuclear research center focused on naval applications was set up in Geesthacht.<sup>127</sup>

Though the WEU had under the London and Paris accords the task of verifying that Bonn honored pledge not to produce nuclear weapons in the FRG, Bonn had the right to decide whether a “part, device, assembly or material” was “*especially* designed for, or *primarily* useful in” nuclear weapons and thus covered by the prohibition. It was also free to change or eliminate the AHC law 22 (in Berlin, the Three Powers retained control rights). However, the DOS/AE saw that the remaining general Three Power rights over the FRG gave potential leverage also in the nuclear field.<sup>128</sup>

Bonn and the Three Powers agreed in May 1955 that the law 22 would remain in force until comparable German legislation was introduced. Despite drafting done in 1952-54 (though under quite strict Three Power control), the legislative process became lengthy, owing to unclarity and controversy in Bonn about responsibilities in the field. One disputed issue in Bonn was also whether the law would include a prohibition of nuclear weapon production (those who favored the idea referred in particular to the risk that subversive elements would use the weapons *in the FRG* with foreign help). Adenauer successfully opposed such a clause. The Atomic Energy Act of the FRG was finally promulgated in late 1959.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Enclosure (fn 47), 21 Feb 56; Deubner 1977 pp. 9-10; Weilemann 1983 pp. 51-2, 55-6; Häckel 1989 p. 19; Kötter & Müller 1990 p. 20; Keck 1993a pp. 172-87, 229; IAEA 2003. On West German nuclear development, see also Eckert 1989 and, especially on the roles of the industry and investors in it, Deubner 1977. On proliferation risks of light-water reactors, see Gardner 1994 pp. 31-2, and of pebble-bed reactors, Feiveson 2001.

<sup>128</sup> My emphasis. Final Act... (fn 29); DOS/AE office memo, 15 July 55, USNA AG 2; Enclosure (fn 47), 21 Feb 56; “Restrictions...” (fn 40), 7 March.

<sup>129</sup> See Deubner 1977 p. 67; Radkau 1983 p. 188; Weilemann 1983 p. 54; Fischer 1994 pp. 165-8, 189-90, 264-5, 288.

### 7.4.1 Western European integration in the nuclear field

Fuelled by both the atomic energy conference in Geneva and a proposal for a supranational European atomic energy community Euratom, debate started in the FRG in summer 1955 over the basic outside orientation of the nuclear program: bilateral cooperation with the US and/or the UK or multilateral European cooperation.

In June 1955, the ECSC states agreed to pursue further integration and the nuclear field was seen as suited area for that. Also others' desire to control the nuclear field in the FRG and desire to prevent national French and German nuclear weapon efforts were behind the idea. The Euratom idea was divisive in the FRG (and France). Industrialists and politicians close to them, including Strauss, preferred national efforts, bilateral cooperation with the US and the UK, only a little multilateral European cooperation, and no supranational authority. The failure of the EDC had weakened support for European integration in the FRG, and Strauss and others saw Euratom as allies' attempt to prevent nuclear development in the FRG and France's effort to gain a hegemonic position among the ECSC states. West Germans wanted that if they would cooperate on atomic energy with other states, these would make similar promises against nuclear weapons as Bonn had made. But to promote European integration and confidence-building among allies and to enable *non-discriminatory* controls in the nuclear field among them, Adenauer and Foreign Minister H. von Brentano supported Euratom.<sup>130</sup>

Though Euratom was officially to be for civilian purposes only, implications regarding military capabilities were naturally possible. Paris preferred its national weapon effort, wanted to protect the advantage it had achieved through it, and thus opposed any overt military role for Euratom. But especially as the US was unhelpful towards its nuclear efforts (which also prevented French-British cooperation), Paris hoped Euratom to help it secure fissile material supply through jointly financed enrichment or plutonium production activity or by opening access to US or British enrichment know-how. Euratom plans came to include PU-producing dual-use reactors and a uranium enrichment plant. On enrichment, Paris also proposed bilateral cooperation to Bonn. A broader Western European enrichment effort was discussed, too. But nothing came out of the ideas any time soon.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> AEC-DOS mtg with German industrialists & officials, 12 Oct 55, USNA AG 2; D/219 Adenauer to his cabinet, 19 Jan 56, BDFD; Enclosure (fn 47), 21 Feb; DOS/AE & EUR to Dulles, 11 May, USNA AG 1; OCB report on policy towards the FRG, 17 May, USNA RG273 PP B/23 NSC 160; DOS/AE & EUR to Dulles with "A New U.S. Approach to Euratom", 25 Sep, USNA ERA B/1 background (Bg) data; Strauss to Brentano, 1 Oct, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: hist. events, 1957-68, creation of EEC & Euratom, preparation of Rome Treaties, positions on Euratom; 13 March 06); Radkau 1983 pp. 170-1; Strauss 1989 p. 230. On the creation of Euratom and disputes in the USG and Bonn, see Weilemann 1983; Eckert 1989 pp. 139-42; Eckert 1990 pp. 318-32; Thoss 1990 pp. 492-8; Fischer 1994 pp. 20, 201-15, 220-3, 256-8, 270, 274-82; Skogman 1999 p. 15.

<sup>131</sup> D/133 DOS/RA memo, 6 Dec 55, FRUS 55-7:4; Osgood 1962 p. 219; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 147; Deubner 1977 p. 124; Weilemann 1983 pp. 40-2; Radkau 1983 pp. 62, 173; Eckert 1990 p. 319; Fischer 1994 pp. 206-7, 210; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 151.



During Euratom negotiations, some politicians from the six states (also France) favored a joint promise not to develop nuclear weapons. Prohibiting especially *national* manufacturing of *large* but not tactical nuclear weapons was also discussed. But other politicians opposed such ideas, and the stances of the Assemblée Nationale in particular made the prospects of any joint renouncement weak.<sup>132</sup>

At least some in Bonn welcomed the potential military implications of Euratom, though it was also seen as important to prevent the French weapon effort from benefiting from joint efforts in the civilian field. Probably both reflecting his true expectations and to increase support for Euratom in Bonn, Adenauer according to Schwarz indeed argued to his cabinet that he wanted Bonn to get as quickly as possible a chance to produce nuclear weapons itself and that Euratom would over time provide the FRG a way to get nuclear weapons. He noted the non-nuclear pledge had unfortunately been necessary for the achievement of sovereignty but referred to Dulles's rebus sic stantibus -comment. A GFO official in turn argued to a US official that maybe *Euratom* would one day acquire nuclear weapons. After the Euratom Treaty was signed, it was written in the Adenauer government's bulletin that Euratom states would get access to each others' military nuclear secrets, including those received from third states.<sup>133</sup> But this information was unsubstantiated: the treaty allowed France to continue its weapon program outside Euratom controls. Moscow's propaganda attacks portrayed Euratom as a way for Bonn to get nuclear weapons<sup>134</sup>.

Eisenhower and the DOS were still behind the idea of a third force Europe<sup>135</sup> and supported Euratom (and the Common Market, another integration measure of the ECSC states): the USG wanted to tie the FRG irrevocably to the West, see close Franco-German bonds develop, and have all European nuclear efforts safeguarded in some way. Euratom was also a way to enable nuclear development in the FRG without worrying other states. Moreover, the USG saw regional (instead of national) nuclear efforts as the only efficient way for Western Europe to benefit from nuclear energy, and wanted to create markets for its nuclear technology. Some USG officials thought that Euratom could prevent and maybe at least temporarily prohibit nuclear weapon development or allow monitoring Paris's weapon efforts and later expected West German weapon efforts.<sup>136</sup>

<sup>132</sup> DOS-AEC mtg (fn 112), 25 Jan 56; DOS/RA "Attached COLUX 4" (20 March), 23 March, USNA ERA B/1 8.8; Weilemann 1983 pp. 73-9.

<sup>133</sup> E/B to DOS/AE office, 29 March 57, USNA AG 2; Osgood 1962 p. 219; Nieburg 1963 pp. 602-3 ref. to citation of the Bulletin in *NATO Letter*, Apr 57, p. 22; Deubner 1977 p. 67; Radkau 1983 p. 62; Schwarz, H.-P. 1991 p. 299 ref. to cabinet mtg (extract), 5 Oct 56, Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) Etzel papers 254(84) and to von Merkat's memos, 19 Sep and 5 Oct, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (Sankt Augustin) Merkat papers 1-148-041/1; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 233. See also Segers 2006.

<sup>134</sup> See Nieburg 1963 p. 602.

<sup>135</sup> Eisenhower saw European integration as "the possible salvation of the world" and the key to security in the area. See D/133 (fn 131) FRUS 55-7:4; 22 Apr USG mtg, 27 Apr 60, DNSA NP00646; D/267 Eisenhower-Norstad-Bowie mtg (san.), 12 Sep, FRUS 58-60:7(1).

<sup>136</sup> D/133 (fn 131), D/147 Dulles to Eisenhower also fn 2, 9 Jan 56, FRUS 55-7:4; DOS-AEC mtg, 25 Jan, Dulles & AEC to Eisenhower (draft) on "Atomic Energy and European Integration", n/d (early 56), both USNA ERA B/1; RA to E/B, 21 March 58, with a letter to be sent to posts in Euratom countries, USNA ERA B/3 Germany; DOS/Euratom pp. 70-1; Skogman 1999 pp. 17-8, 31-2.

As discussed above, Eisenhower and some DOS officials saw *joint* European weapon efforts as less undesirable than national ones. USG memos reveal that to avoid *national* efforts by the two states and a nuclear arms race, some USG officials saw especially Franco-German nuclear cooperation as desirable and hoped them to establish a *joint* authority over all nuclear activities, also those related to weapon production and deployment<sup>137</sup>. Thus they did not see Franco-German nuclear weapon cooperation as a threat (as will be shown, views about this soon changed in the USG). A DOS/RA official moreover argued that in European integration, France and the FRG had to be *fully* equal: the unilateral WEU prohibitions were no long-term solution and Euratom states had to either all forgo nuclear weapons or agree to “produce and use them in common<sup>138</sup>”. Weilemann notes that some USG officials did favor nuclear weapon production by Euratom, and Trachtenberg suggests that also Dulles’s support for selling an enrichment plant to Euratom implied such a stance. However, a DOS/RA memo shows that support for a sale did not have to imply that: the Office favored a sale because of an expectation that it would help ensure a civilian direction for allies’ nuclear efforts.<sup>139</sup>

The US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was, however, first skeptical about Euratom and especially assistance for an enrichment plant. It argued that preventing chances for diversions was harder in multilateral than bilateral cooperation and any cooperation involving the French (with suspected communist sympathies) implied security problems.<sup>140</sup>

In Bonn, opponents of Euratom tried to use the disagreement in the USG for their benefit, whereas Euratom’s supporters in Europe in general sought support from the DOS. However, though Eisenhower and DOS favored Euratom, the need to avoid the impression that allies wanted Euratom because it was a way to control the FRG complicated the USG position. Moreover, USG pressure had proved counterproductive regarding French stances on the EDC. Thus though the DOS saw US pressure as needed if French-German cooperation was to come about and behind the scenes put pressure on the Germans in favor of Euratom, the USG saw it as unwise to *openly* press for Euratom during the negotiation and ratification process or, according to Skogman, for a renunciation of nuclear weapons within Euratom.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> DOS/RA to EUR, 16 Jan 56; DOS-AEC mtg, 25 Jan, both USNA ERA B/1.

<sup>138</sup> RA (fn 132), 23 March 56.

<sup>139</sup> D/133 (fn 131) FRUS 55-7:4; Weilemann 1983 p. 176; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 150-1. Also other ideas emerged in the USG for managing European nuclear development, such as a supranational Atlantic organization: the US would offer to station nuclear weapons in all NATO states under joint SACEUR and national custody, to be used under NATO authorization, if the allies promised to forgo nuclear weapon development for a decade and let a NATO agency control the nuclear field and receive all the plutonium they produced. RA to EUR on alternatives to Euratom, 24 Feb 56, USNA ERA B/1.

<sup>140</sup> DOS-AEC mtg (fn 112), 25 Jan 56; Skogman 1999 pp. 24-5.

<sup>141</sup> DOS/RA (fn 137), 16 Jan 56; DOS-AEC mtg (fn 112), 25 Jan; Enclosure (fn 47), 21 Feb; DOS/AE & EUR to Dulles (fn 130), 25 Sep; D/133 (fn 131), D/237 Dulles-Adenauer mtg, 26 May 57, FRUS 55-7:4; RA (fn 136), 21 March 58; Deubner 1977 pp. 54-6, 104-5; Eckert 1990; Fischer 1994 pp. 221-2, 276-81; Skogman 1999 pp. 12-3, 21-2, 37. On Euratom negotiations and US-FRG relations, see also Segers 2006.

Though the USG came to support the idea of Euratom, allies' becoming *fully* self-sufficient in the nuclear field was not in US interest as it would have eliminated US chances to exert control over allies' actions and limited markets for US technology and materials<sup>142</sup>. In February 1956, the USG – having itself built up a huge enrichment capacity – thus offered to sell under safeguards large amounts of enriched uranium for peaceful uses for its partners. The material prices, published in the fall, were low. The offer was a way to make others' nuclear efforts dependent on the US and undermined the Euratom plan for an enrichment plant (with the counterproductive result of weakening French nationalists' interest in Euratom). The USG also took the stance that though it officially did not oppose the Euratom plant, it would not supply classified technology for it. The offer left open whether the uranium would be supplied through Euratom, the IAEA, or bilateral channels, and Dulles's stance was that talks on bilateral cooperation could continue during Euratom negotiations. But Skogman argues that the message he de facto sent to Bonn and Paris was that cooperation was dependent on their commitment to integration. Otherwise, so the implicit threat, it was possible that the US would assist just one of them.<sup>143</sup>

In the end, Bonn unwillingly accepted continuing inequality regarding nuclear weapons and that France could pursue them outside Euratom safeguards. The Euratom Treaty, signed in March 1957, had as its goal to ensure “that nuclear materials are not diverted for purposes other than those for which they are intended”; *announced* military activities did not violate it. Moreover, safeguards were not extended “to materials intended for the purposes of defence which are in course of being specially prepared for such purposes or which, after being so prepared, are, in accordance with an operational plan, installed or stocked in a military establishment”. US officials suspected that Bonn gave France this freedom in hope of some day benefiting from its efforts. But because of the inequality regarding nuclear weapons, Adenauer did not agree on Euratom financing for an enrichment plant (though the option was left open in principle). Euratom states agreed also that Euratom would get the ownership of nuclear fuels and monopoly over fuel procurement in the six states because such provisions started seeming as potential conditions to supply of US nuclear technology and materials.<sup>144</sup>

Euratom controls came to reduce others' fears that the FRG would secretly pursue nuclear weapons and thus made industrial nuclear activities more viable for it. Also Moscow came

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<sup>142</sup> Especially with British participation, Western Europe could have achieved a strong competitive position in the field. Deubner 1977 argues that the USG therefore was not enthusiastic about such ideas for European nuclear cooperation that included the UK (pp. 56-8). However, Nieburg 1963 on the contrary argues that initiatives that London made for broader European nuclear cooperation were based on an understanding with the US, the two states sought control over continental nuclear efforts, and the USG from early on gave much clearer support to this plan than to Euratom.

<sup>143</sup> Eisenhower's public statement, 22 Feb 56, PPE 43; DOS/AE office to E/P (draft), 26 Apr, USNA ERA B/1; Deubner 1977 pp. 57, 65; Radkau 1983 p. 173; Skogman 1999 pp. 25-30, 36.

<sup>144</sup> Euratom Treaty Art. 2 & 84, 25 March 57; E/B (fn 133), 29 March; Deubner 1977 p. 135; Weilemann 1983 pp. 73-9; Küntzel 1992 p. 210; Skogman 1999 pp. 35-6. On Euratom controls and regulations concerning NWSs and NNWSs, see Preisinger 1993 pp. 114-7.

to recognize the value of Euratom controls (see section 9.7.2). But the growing chances for Franco-German nuclear weapon cooperation and independent German action came to much disturb it and the Britons<sup>145</sup> and later also the USG.

To gain influence in Euratom and guide Euratom states towards solely civilian nuclear efforts, the USG took a cooperative, trustful line with Euratom and decided to support it by, e.g., being prepared to cover its nuclear fuel needs for decades (this was of course also a way to increase Euratom countries' willingness to accept dependency on the US). USG plans included use of assistance, plutonium buybacks at good rates, and safeguards as ways to guide Euratom away from weapon material production or joint weapon efforts. But owing to the Congress's views, the US-Euratom agreement of summer 1958 came to include no general provision for buybacks and less aid than the USG hoped. And though this meant problems to the general US stance in favor of IAEA or supplier safeguards, Euratom states persuaded the USG to forgo thorough external safeguards on materials it supplied to them (the materials did come under Euratom safeguards). They argued that Euratom needed an equal status with the UK and Canada, towards which the USG was showing such trust, and that its supranational status had to be strengthened and nuclear efforts protected from industrial espionage. Küntzel argues that both Paris and Bonn wanted in this way also to protect chances for weapon production. But in the setting up of Euratom safeguards, the US requirement that the fuels it supplied had to be safeguarded in some way played a central role. Euratom safeguards first followed US proposals for IAEA ones but later evolved on their own. The AEC continued to consider them as effective as the IAEA scheme.<sup>146</sup>

Beyond WEU verification of armament restrictions on the FRG in general, civilian nuclear development in the country in particular thus became safeguarded through Euratom – and bilateral cooperation agreements with the US<sup>147</sup>. Bonn accepted safeguards because others, especially the US, tied lucrative cooperation to them. Besides, it in principle retained an option to later reject continuation of safeguards. In return, it also gained a right to participate in safeguarding other Euratom states' nuclear activities, which was of value for it especially for status and equality reasons. Moreover, by subjecting nuclear development to Euratom safeguards, the FRG could signal to allies that it had no suspicious aims and so increase their preparedness to cooperate with it.

Bonn took a leadership position regarding European integration in general and started actively participating in Euratom programs and plans, though many in the FRG still opposed Euratom. But though Euratom came to serve as a supply channel for nuclear fuel and be

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<sup>145</sup> See Osgood 1962 p. 219; Kötter & Müller 1990 pp. 19-20; Fischer 1994 p. 207.

<sup>146</sup> DOS/AE office to E/P (draft), 26 Apr 56, USNA ERA B/1; Rivkin to McCloy et al, 9 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/2 P/4; DOS/Euratom pp. 77, 80-1; Osgood 1962 p. 223; Seaborg 1987 pp. 274-5; Küntzel 1992 pp. 208, 211-3.

<sup>147</sup> In its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the US, Bonn also promised not to divert material supplied for peaceful uses to military efforts. See DOS/International Scientific Affairs (SCI) on supplying HEU to the FRG, 6 May 63, USNA CFPF AE-11-2 Ger W B/4161.

important in its safeguarding role, nuclear development took a largely national character in the FRG and other Euratom states. Bilateral nuclear cooperation with the US also became more important for the FRG than Euratom cooperation.<sup>148</sup>

#### 7.4.2 Concern about potential West German nuclear weapon ambitions

The breadth of nuclear development that followed in the FRG hinted that Bonn intentionally developed capabilities that allowed weapon production quickly. For instance, in early 1960 the Atomic Ministry agreed to buy from a domestic company a multi-purpose, heavy-water reactor that could be used both for electricity and plutonium production and for experiments. Commercial companies did not see this reactor design as competitive.<sup>149</sup>

Beyond increasing national capabilities for weapon production, West German progress in nuclear R&D soon promised to lead to export products, some of which worried the US from a proliferation point of view. Similarly as the Britons and the Dutch, the Germans were developing centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment. Though still requiring further development, the method promised to become cost-effective even on a fairly small scale, unlike the diffusion technology the US was using. The limited size of centrifuge facilities and of their electricity needs meant that quite many states could become able to even secretly enrich uranium. The technology had no central role in national plans in the FRG but was seen as a possible quid pro quo for supply of (unsafeguarded) Brazilian natural uranium. The Germans sold a research centrifuge to both Brazil and the US, but in July 1960, Eisenhower persuaded the allies to agree to introduce security restrictions on centrifuge programs. Nonetheless, the issue continued to cause concern for both Eisenhower's and Kennedy's incoming administration in late 1960. Reportedly, the possibility of the FRG selling this technology to Israel caused special concern. But also due to a hindering effect of the security controls, centrifuge development efforts soon slackened.<sup>150</sup>

<sup>148</sup> NSC report (fn 13), 13 Dec 57 and 7 Feb 58; Radkau 1983 pp. 170-1, 313-5; Haftendorn 1986 pp. 615-6; Häckel 1989 p. 19; Skogman 1999 p. 37.

<sup>149</sup> Radkau 1983 pp. 191-5; Keck 1993a pp. 175-7. Also Küntzel 1992 (pp. 26-7) and Müller 2000 (p. 6) suggest West Germans aimed at a nuclear weapon option. Kollert 2000 makes more outspoken claims about such ambitions. Though government-funded nuclear projects on weapons-related technology with lacking economic profitability hint at interest in military uses, governments also do have trouble in getting good advice on such questions: Keck 1981 has shown that commercial companies are better equipped to make realistic economic assessments than governmental R&D agencies and laboratories, which moreover lack incentives to provide full information to the government especially when that can feed skepticism regarding their projects (pp. 191-2, 235).

In general, Bonn did not press commercial companies to choose any specific reactor types and these also made choices contrary to government plans and programs. See Keck 1981 Chapter 2, esp. p. 47.

<sup>150</sup> Similar security controls were introduced in the US. By 1964, both US companies and the allies wanted the controls to be abandoned. But ACDA Director Foster and SOD McNamara favored maintaining them as a way to delay the spread of weapon capabilities. Memo to Kennedy with "Action teams: military and foreign policy", n/d (probably Oct-early Nov 60), with memo on key early issues, JFKL PR; D/177 NSC mtg, 8 Dec 60, FRUS 58-60:13; Buchan 1966 p. 14; Beaton 1966 pp. 29-31; Crosbie 1974 p. 163; Radkau 1983 pp. 166-7, 194, 291, 298, 335 ref. to his 1965 talks in West German ministries; Seaborg 1987 pp. 261-4. On enrichment technologies, see also Gardner 1994 pp. 21-2.

West German leaders' attitudes towards nuclear weapons are a matter of debate. Varying arguments have been made about Adenauer: that he would have wanted a national nuclear force; saw pursuing one as impossible; had no desire for one; saw the NATO deployments as a step towards one; or at least wanted to keep a nuclear option open and had reservations about a permanent non-nuclear status.<sup>151</sup> His comments about Euratom and tactical nuclear weapons indicate that he indeed would have wanted nuclear weapons for the FRG.

Also Strauss has been suspected of having wanted that and at least to keep the option open. But it has also been suggested that he especially sought a bargaining chip towards other states and his efforts were centred on ensuring the security of the FRG and the credibility of Western commitments, preferably through NATO.<sup>152</sup> In his memoirs, he noted that in the nuclear era, nuclear weapons were important for sovereignty, and though the FRG lacked them, this was compensated by 1) the US willingness to supply delivery systems and make nuclear warheads available if needed; 2) the *rebus sic stantibus*-clause in the 1954 pledge; 3) cooperation with, e.g., France and Italy<sup>153</sup> (a matter discussed in the next section).

Strauss came to stress that Bonn did not want to *control* nuclear weapons but its forces had to be able to *use* them if needed. For instance, in July 1958 he said before the Bundestag that Bonn would keep the promise not to produce them, and the promise could be extended to cover national *control* over them, but technological development and existence of nuclear-equipped Soviet forces in the GDR made permanent renouncements regarding *equipping* troops impossible.<sup>154</sup>

Bonn came to use the nuclear weapon option in bargaining over, e.g., nuclear sharing, non-nuclear commitments, and Franco-German cooperation. For instance, von Brentano argued to Dulles that NATO needed to control nuclear weapons and intra-NATO nuclear inequality would make the not-haves develop own nuclear forces. But as McArdle Kelleher points out, bargaining was where the value of the option was: Bonn had more to achieve with a *threat* of going nuclear than by really doing so.<sup>155</sup> Thus bargaining power may have also been Bonn's primary goal in any effort to acquire a nuclear weapon option.

The value of this bargaining card depended on the *perception* by many USG officials of a risk that Bonn would pursue nuclear weapons<sup>156</sup>. US officials in the FRG were uncertain about the country's nuclear aims, as they reported in March 1957 and February 1958. There were no signs of plans or popular or governmental drive for an independent nuclear weapon effort, except for what possibly existed among some men around Strauss. Rather,

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<sup>151</sup> See Schwarz, H.-P. 1989 pp. 577-8, 589; Boutwell 1990 p. 46; Küntzel 1992 p. 35; Fischer 1994 pp. 281-4; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 213, 232, 237; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 pp. 177-80.

<sup>152</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 73-4, 186; Radkau 1983 pp. 176, 188; Fischer 1994 pp. 281, 286; Ahonen 1995; see also Richardson 1966 p. 53.

<sup>153</sup> Strauss 1989 p. 310.

<sup>154</sup> "Erklärungen..." (fn 41).

<sup>155</sup> Dulles-Brentano mtg, 21 Nov 57, DNSA BC00039; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 31-2.

<sup>156</sup> See also Mahncke 1972 p. 35.

“strong political, economic, and financial considerations mitigate[d] against any such issue now being raised publicly”. But the future was maybe another matter: “at least a partnership arrangement” was seen as Bonn’s goal within the next years and it seemed possible that over time, the British and French nuclear programs and uncertainty about US commitment would make the FRG more interested in an own nuclear force.<sup>157</sup>

In the USG, the credibility of US guarantees was indeed seen as crucial regarding German nuclear weapon ambitions: by summer 1957, the DOS expected that if the extended deterrent became incredible, the FRG would want to develop nuclear arms together with other Europeans. And unless progress was made on disarmament, continuation of NATO required giving nuclear weapons to German forces.<sup>158</sup>

Indeed, Bonn was interested in joint nuclear weapon development with other Europeans. The topic of the next section is the French-Italian-German (FIG) plan for such efforts.

#### 7.4.3 Plans for European advanced armament production

In existing circumstances, domestic and foreign attitudes in practice precluded Bonn any national nuclear weapon program. But a joint weapon effort with some allies was a potential option; also the USG had indicated no categorical opposition to such developments. In 1957-58, Bonn followed this course with France and Italy. Though such a project was no happy prospect to other allies, it was harder for them to attack such cooperation than any national effort Bonn had promised to forgo. Paris appears to have been the primary driving force in the FIG plan for nuclear weapon production, but also this shows that Adenauer and Strauss were open to security and nuclear arrangements outside NATO and prepared to use the options the 1954 pledge left open.

Strauss in general favored domestic arms production (often of US-designed weapons under US licenses) and joint European production. This was not unusual: by the early 1960s, many NATO states were increasingly interested in producing weapons instead of boosting the US balance of payments by buying them. Another argument for advanced weapon programs was that they could lead to economic and scientific spin-offs.<sup>159</sup>

Discussions having started in fall 1956 – around the same time as Adenauer argued in Bonn that Euratom would provide a way to get access to nuclear weapons – in early 1957 Paris and Bonn agreed preliminarily on arms production cooperation. Bonn’s representative at NATO, Amb. H. Blankenhorn, who saw the cooperation as important in making the French feel secure and reducing their suspicions towards the Germans, wrote in his diary that Strauss and Defense (later Prime) Minister M. Bourgès-Maunoury had agreed on close cooperation in arms production, including missiles and nuclear armaments, on which

<sup>157</sup> E/B (fn 133), 29 March 57; Amb. Bruce (E/B) to Dulles, 28 Feb 58, DNSA BC00100.

<sup>158</sup> Report 7533 (fn 78).

<sup>159</sup> E/B (fn 133), 29 March 57; Buchan 1963 pp. 630-1; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 104-5.

German experts were to join the French effort in Sahara. When asked by the press in March about the possibility of future bilateral nuclear weapon production, Adenauer answered that this was a matter for NATO to consider. Bilateral talks on nuclear weapons took place, but little was happening in practice.<sup>160</sup>

Paris tried to use the Sputnik launch to both justify its nuclear weapon effort and increase Bonn's interest in joint arms production. The emerging FIG plan for modern weapon development implied Italian and German financial support for the French nuclear weapon program.<sup>161</sup> In mid-November 1957, the French State Secretary M. Faure and Defense Minister J. Chaban-Delmas proposed Adenauer and Strauss, in the name of their government, joint nuclear weapon production and cooperation on an enrichment plant. Italy had already agreed on cooperation. Adenauer told Faure that Bonn would join the trilateral effort but wanted no trouble with the White House. Also Strauss and von Brentano stressed a need to act secretly and without violating the 1954 treaties in order to avoid Soviet reactions and public concern abroad. According to Strauss, Adenauer told him to go ahead with the enrichment plant, whereas Adenauer aimed to pretend to know nothing about it. Strauss told Chaban-Delmas that in the absence of disarmament, Bonn saw that the FIG, like all strategically exposed countries, would have to *get* nuclear warheads, but it seems warhead *ownership* was not discussed. On 25 November, the FIG Defense Ministers agreed on defense and armament cooperation, conforming to WEU and NATO treaties, including research on aircraft, missiles, and military applications of nuclear energy. Other NATO states were to be informed and let join any resulting concrete cooperation agreements, though in the military nuclear field, any sharing of information was to be based on reciprocity and require FIG states' specific approval.<sup>162</sup>

The USG was promptly informed of the cooperation plans. Already on 21 November, von Brentano told Dulles that Paris had proposed joint "basic research" and that a European armament research center was planned, to be focused on, e.g., mid-range missiles. Beyond Italy, he expected the Benelux states to be interested in cooperation. But he argued that though the Europeans needed a joint research program, the US had to have a central role in any such effort. He said that Bonn wanted to participate in military nuclear research, too, and that also this was a possible field of cooperation. A DOS official replied that the USG was forthcoming regarding cooperation in basic, applied, and missile research, though the latter two categories were somewhat problematic. But he argued against a FIG effort because of economic reasons. Also Dulles stressed that it would be wasteful if one NATO state after another pursued nuclear weapons on its own.<sup>163</sup> Some weeks later (just

<sup>160</sup> D/217 extract from Blankenhorn's diary, 17 Jan 57, BDFD; E/B (fn 133), 29 March; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 149; Küntzel 1992 p. 28; Ahonen 1995 p. 46.

<sup>161</sup> See also McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 104, 149-50; Küntzel 1992 pp. 28-31; Ahonen 1995 pp. 32-3, 46.

<sup>162</sup> D/219 Adenauer-Faure mtg, 16 Nov 57; D/220 Chaban-Strauss mtg, 20 Nov; D/221 Protocol signed by Chaban, Strauss, and Italian Defense Minister Taviani, 25 Nov; all BDFD; Strauss 1989 p. 313; Schwarz, H.-P. 1991 pp. 394-9. On FIG plans, see also Eckert 1990 pp. 332-3.

<sup>163</sup> Dulles-Brentano mtg, 21 Nov 57, DNSA BC00039.



before the late 1957 NAC meeting), Adenauer told Dulles about the idea of FIG cooperation on nuclear weapon research and said that if such an effort was launched, he would welcome further allies to join it. Dulles requested more information and put forward a personal idea of a joint nuclear agency for the FIG states, the US, and the UK as a way to prevent “undue spreading of nuclear weapons”. But he did not directly condemn the FIG plan.<sup>164</sup>

McArdle Kelleher interprets that the plan apparently had “Dulles’ direct blessing”<sup>165</sup>, but Mackby & Slocombe argue the US and the UK opposed it since it conflicted with their nuclear arms limitation plans and threatened NATO cohesion<sup>166</sup>. The truth seems to lie in between. Dulles’s comments to Adenauer show that he did not openly condemn the FIG idea and left his stance towards an effort without US or British involvement open. As discussed above, the USG had no clear position towards multilateral nuclear weapon production in Europe. Other DOS officials were concerned about the FIG nuclear plan since it seemed to exclude other allies, especially the UK, and to imply support for the French national effort and possible emergence of three independent nuclear powers at the expense of multilateral NATO efforts<sup>167</sup>. Indeed, as the USG was at the same time planning advanced arms production and nuclear weapon cooperation on a broad basis in NATO, a *competing* FIG initiative was not in its interest. In general, exclusive military cooperation efforts, not integrated into NATO planning, among some NATO states were problematic in that they could weaken NATO and cooperation within it. Moreover, a risk existed that such states would reallocate resources away from NATO and so defect from and undermine NATO’s cooperative defense solution. A FIG effort modified to include more allies and integrated into NATO planning was another matter; as already Dulles’s first reaction shows, the USG made some efforts for such modifications<sup>168</sup>.

During the winter, negotiations continued between the FIG Defense Ministers. Also Adenauer was kept up-to-date. But US officials thought – erroneously – that he was maybe not aware of all aims of Strauss and did not share Strauss’s suspected interest in a national nuclear force. US Ambassador in the FRG, D. Bruce, argued that strong USG objections could make Adenauer reject any independent nuclear weapon efforts and that as US silence could be taken for consent, the US needed to take the issue up with him.<sup>169</sup>

Reportedly, both Paris and Bonn were somewhat hesitant about FIG nuclear weapon cooperation: they were wary of antagonizing Washington, Paris especially since it hoped to get US help for its national program. They probably did not want to risk NATO but saw FIG cooperation as a complement to it. Vis-à-vis the USG, each side charged *the other*

<sup>164</sup> Adenauer-Dulles mtg, 14 Dec 57, DDRS; Adenauer 1967 p. 339; Schwarz, H.-P. 1991 pp. 399-400.

<sup>165</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 149.

<sup>166</sup> Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 186.

<sup>167</sup> DOS with Att. C) (fn 126), 4 March 58.

<sup>168</sup> Also Schwarz, H.-P. 1991 argues Dulles thus aimed to somehow get control over the FIG effort (p. 400).

<sup>169</sup> Bruce to Dulles, 28 Feb 58, DNSA BC00100; DOS with Att. C) (fn 126), 4 March; Ahonen 1995 p. 33; Schwarz, H.-P. 1991 p. 401 ref. to Adenauer-Chaban-Taviani mtg, SBAH III 55.

with pressing for nuclear weapon cooperation. The French even maintained that they had not accepted the idea and expressed concern about a risk that the FRG would get a national nuclear capability through participation in the French program.<sup>170</sup>

In February 1958, Strauss told US officials in Bonn that the FIG states had in January agreed “on division of labor with common financing under which Germans will concentrate on research and development tanks and anti-tank missiles, Italians on anti-submarine devices and French on nuclear weapons” and on a joint mid-range missile effort. He said he had suggested inviting the UK to join the latter, but Italy was opposed.<sup>171</sup> The US officials reported to Washington that they were “troubled by secrecy and obscurity surrounding FIG agreement and German plans in this [nuclear weapon] field”<sup>172</sup>. Also a NSC paper recognized that Bonn seemed interested in nuclear weapon research, especially with France and Italy, who could *produce* weapons on its behalf<sup>173</sup>.

According to Nieburg, the FIG states were unhappy about an understanding the USG and London had already reached on establishing IRBM bases in the UK and transfer of US IRBMs to British ownership as soon as the hosts were trained to use them. The *NYT* reported in February that the FIG states left open whether they might later produce nuclear weapons within Euratom open as they waited to see how US-UK cooperation on IRBMs went on.<sup>174</sup> At the NAC, the FIG states made a statement that they planned joint military R&D, in which “scientific studies in the field of military utilization of nuclear energy [were] not excluded”<sup>175</sup>.

The USG tried to make Bonn see a FIG effort as economically insensible, without condemning it directly. A senior German official was invited to visit a production plant for tactical Jupiter missiles, with the result that he told a DOS official that having seen what an effort producing just these was, he was going to stress to Adenauer and Strauss that the continental Europeans would for years lack resources to produce nuclear missiles on their own.<sup>176</sup>

In March, Strauss came to the US. The DOS aim was to try to persuade him to restraint in and greater openness about the FIG effort and to stress that advanced weapon production had to be coordinated with NATO requirements – though the USG was not against coordinated bi- or multilateral production as such<sup>177</sup>. In Washington, Strauss tried to appear as having no suspicious aims. He maintained that FIG cooperation not yet covered nuclear

<sup>170</sup> DOS/EUR- Zimmermann (CSU politician) mtg, 17 Feb 58, DNSA NP00388; DOS with Att. C) (fn 126), 4 March; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 151.

<sup>171</sup> US officials-Strauss mtg, 8 Feb 58, DNSA NP00385.

<sup>172</sup> Bruce to Dulles, 28 Feb 58, DNSA BC00100.

<sup>173</sup> NSC report (fn 13), 7 Feb 58.

<sup>174</sup> Nieburg 1963 p. 610 ref. to “France Insists U. S. Aid on Atom Arms”, *NYT*, 8 Feb 58.

<sup>175</sup> DOS with Att. C) (fn 126), 4 March 58.

<sup>176</sup> But he thought his argument would maybe not convince those in Bonn who wanted Europeans over time to do so and argued in favor of somehow meeting their demands “for reassurance as to the control and use of nuclear missiles in Europe”. DOS/EUR-Rust mtg, 20 Feb 58, DNSA BC00098.

<sup>177</sup> DOS (fn 126) with Att. B) “Development and Production of Modern Weapons in Europe”, 4 March 58.

weapons. Though Paris wanted financial help, he expected it to consult the US and the UK before pursuing nuclear FIG cooperation. Belgium and the Netherlands were welcome to join any FIG project. He expressed worry that London's nuclear weapon effort would result in similar programs elsewhere and said that Bonn had tried to persuade Paris not to pursue one. He said, quite in line with the USG stance, that he opposed proliferation because of the great costs involved, which would take resources away from NATO. The FRG did not want to produce nuclear weapons and "would be quite satisfied if atomic warheads were available for use in case of emergency" as agreed at the NAC. But because of expected Soviet technological progress, it had much interest nuclear *propulsion*. He expected the FRG to be able to move in the field in the mid-1960s and then to want to accept the offer of information the USG had made at the NAC.<sup>178</sup>

In April, the FIG Defense Ministers formally agreed on joint arms R&D and production. The public part of the agreement covered conventional arms only. According to Strauss, all of them also favored cooperation on nuclear warheads and Chaban-Delmas pointed out that the 1954 treaties presented no obstacle to German efforts abroad, as France proposed. Strauss wanted the secret part of the agreement to refer to military applications of nuclear energy, not warheads, so that if it became public, he would be able to refer to plans to develop nuclear propulsion and mobile nuclear power reactors for wartime use; he was anyway interested in both. This argument he indeed came to use in public references to the secret part of the agreement.<sup>179</sup>

It is unclear what exactly the FRG was supposed to get from the FIG effort in the nuclear field: technological benefits only or direct access to weapons in case of a need<sup>180</sup>. It seems that the latter was the case: later, the French told NATO's former Secretary General D. Stikker that Strauss and Chaban-Delmas had agreed that France would in return for financial and technical help " earmark" some nuclear weapons for the FRG.<sup>181</sup>

The FIG plans were abruptly stopped when C. de Gaulle resumed power in Paris in July<sup>182</sup>. After abandoning the FIG approach, France came to decide to construct an enrichment plant alone<sup>183</sup>. According to Defense Minister P. Messmer's later account, in the

<sup>178</sup> D/244 Dulles-Strauss disc., 5 March 58, FRUS 58-60:9.

<sup>179</sup> D/222 Extract from Strauss's memoir, 7 Apr 58, BDFD; Strauss 1989 pp. 313-5; Ahonen 1995 pp. 32-3.

<sup>180</sup> Boutwell 1990 argues that Strauss supported the French weapon program because of expected "technological benefits" (p. 37) and according to McArdle Kelleher 1975, German and Italian financial aid for the French program could have bought technical insights, possibly also military ones (p. 104). Küntzel 1992 argues this was the original idea but after Nov 1957, Paris offered Bonn war-time access to nuclear warheads stationed in France (pp. 28-31). Also Schwartz 1983 argues the idea was "to secure German access to some of these weapons during a crisis" (p. 45)

<sup>181</sup> D/292 FRG Emb. London to Schröder, 21 Oct, APD 64.

<sup>182</sup> Adenauer thereafter told the USG that the FIG effort had been planned to include joint work "related to the production of fissionable material" and the FIG states had discussed the possibility of financial cooperation on nuclear weapons but France had decided to pursue them alone. Dulles-Adenauer mtg, 26 July 58, DNSA NP00445; Klein (NSCS) to Bundy, 30 March 62, with DOS "French Military Policy and Forces", 23 March, JFKL MM B/321 Klein.

<sup>183</sup> Krass et al 1983 p. 197.

next years Strauss in vain tried to persuade him and de Gaulle to act on the agreement<sup>184</sup>. Strauss writes that French industrialists told him in summer 1958 that de Gaulle wanted to first pursue German reunification with Moscow, but if that turned out to be impossible, he would accept Franco-German nuclear weapon cooperation. Strauss then in vain pressed Adenauer to take the issue up with de Gaulle. But Adenauer did not want to disrupt harmony with de Gaulle, whose historically-motivated desire for a nuclear weapon monopoly vis-à-vis the FRG he understood.<sup>185</sup> Strauss was also making statements that hinted that the French weapon effort could force the FRG to launch one of its own. De Gaulle in turn proposed Eisenhower and the British Prime Minister H. Macmillan a trilateral scheme for political decision-making on key security issues and planning especially for nuclear weapons. Eisenhower turned the idea down with the argument that other partners were not to be made feel excluded.<sup>186</sup>

Though the FIG plan failed, the possibility of Franco-German nuclear weapon cooperation continued to cause concern in the USG over years to come. In the non-nuclear field, the FIG plan had some effects, but the USG succeeded to have the effort at least partly integrated into NATO. A fall 1958 USG paper noted that statements by Strauss and “the willingness of the FIG countries to keep NATO informed and to cooperate in this field with the WEU and NATO” had eased other NATO states’ original concerns that the FIG plan would hinder weapon development in NATO. Belgium and the Netherlands had joined the effort, of which became a NATO working group that was considering missile development. Bonn and Paris had also agreed on joint military R&D in France.<sup>187</sup>

Blankenhorn continued to stress to US officials that Strauss had to be kept “properly oriented”, hinting that Strauss’s earlier visit to the US had reduced his interest in independent FIG moves<sup>188</sup>. Such comments indicate that the West German leadership at least wanted to appear divided over the idea of nuclear weapon efforts outside NATO. But though it is unclear, how broad the support in Bonn was, the discussion above shows that at least both Strauss and Adenauer supported the idea.

Strauss also tried to persuade the USG to agree on a greater German role in NATO. He continued to demand tactical nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr, information, joint production of mid-range missiles, and deployment of such in the FRG (DOS officials suspected that the GFO was not behind all the demands; as will be discussed below, no clear stance in favor of the latter existed in Bonn). Strauss warmly welcomed the idea of a NATO nuclear force, discussed further in the next section; it seemed to the USG that Bonn would wish to be involved in any further nuclear sharing schemes. Ahonen argues

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<sup>184</sup> D/292 (fn 181) APD 64.

<sup>185</sup> Strauss 1989 pp. 316-8.

<sup>186</sup> See Osgood 1962 p. 255; Bundy 1988 pp. 476-9. See Haftendorn et al 2006 for a collection of essays on political, military, and economic relations among the “strategic triangle” France, the FRG, and the US from 1958 onwards.

<sup>187</sup> D/246 (fn 81) FRUS 58-60:9.

<sup>188</sup> T/1653 E/P to DOS, 4 Nov 58, DNSA BC00230.

that though Strauss's demands worried it, the USG was responsive since it wanted to prevent resurgent nationalism in the FRG and Eisenhower hoped the allies to become strong enough to defend themselves.<sup>189</sup>

From spring 1959 to mid-1960, Strauss's Defense Ministry showed much interest in a national R&D effort on submarine reactors, and Bonn also indicated desire to cooperate with the US on military nuclear reactors for both land and marine forces. But on this, the USG was not very receptive, and Bonn abandoned the cooperation initiative.<sup>190</sup> But as discussed in section 9.3, the West Germans later did come to develop nuclear propulsion technology. In summer 1960, US officials heard from a knowledgeable French source that talks were going on about Bonn helping to finance France's civilian nuclear program in return for joint strategic missile production<sup>191</sup>.

Though the FRG had nuclear-capable aircraft and some missiles and was planned to acquire further delivery systems, including Matador missiles with a range of 1100 km, no arrangement existed on nuclear *warhead* stockpiles for the Bundeswehr. By late 1958, the DOS favored concluding an agreement on this – because of Soviet capabilities, SACEUR L. Norstad's requirements, and Strauss's demands. US-FRG agreements on stockpile arrangements and provision of information for training of troops in using tactical nuclear weapons were concluded in spring 1959.<sup>192</sup> In late 1959, the US deployed also Mace missiles with a range of about 2000 km (enough to reach Moscow) with US forces in the FRG<sup>193</sup>.

West Germany's weight and participation in NATO was increasing: at the start of the 1960s, it was taking over France's old position as the strongest conventional military power on the continent and becoming a key ally of the US. Freedman notes that its clear orientation in security issues to NATO made it a cohesive force in NATO. Still, it remained outside NATO's key decision-making bodies.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> E/B to DOS, 17 Nov 58, DNSA NP00495; T/1914 M/ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to DOS, 22 Nov, DNSA NP00497; T/2305 E/P to DOS, 20 Dec, DNSA BC00544; T/2425 M/SHAPE to Dulles, 3 Jan 59, DDRS; Bruce to E/P on 21 Jan Quarles-Strauss mtg, 24 Jan, DNSA BC00669; EUR to USOS/P on mtg with Strauss, 7 June 60, USNA AG agreements; Ahonen 1995 pp. 34-5, 39.

<sup>190</sup> DOS Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) to GER, 26 July 63, with "German Interest in Certain Military Atomic Energy Investigations", USNA ERA B/3 Germany. In reference to the Dec 1957 USG promise, in 1960 the Netherlands requested nuclear submarine data from the US. But JCAE objections prevented the USG from giving data even on the non-nuclear parts. Wiegele 1968 pp. 478-9.

<sup>191</sup> M/RO to DOS, 25 Aug 60, USNA CDF B/1905.

<sup>192</sup> DOS/RA (fn 82), 25 Nov 58; DepUSOS to Eisenhower, 24 Dec, DNSA NH01086; Herter to Eisenhower, 8 and 27 Apr 59, DNSA BC01116 and DDRS; Strauss 1989 p. 238. However, Tuschhoff 2002 notes that of 24 Matador launching systems the FRG ordered, the US delivered only 4, with a total of 24 dummy-missiles for training purposes (p. 113).

According to Strauss, German Finance Minister Etzel did first not want to sign the agreements in fear of ending up in the next war criminal trial.

<sup>193</sup> See DOD "History..." (fn 75); FAS website <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/theater/mace.htm> (19 Aug 07).

<sup>194</sup> It participated in SHAPE but owing to strong French and British views played little role in the Standing Group or command of forces in Europe. McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 61-2; Freedman 1989 p. 325.

## 7.5 A joint nuclear force for NATO?

Owing to expected Soviet progress on missiles, in the late 1950s NATO agreed on upgrading plans for MRBM deployments in Europe. Also missile production in Europe was envisaged, and the Europeans pressed for starting that. But hesitation was growing in Washington about adding to their capabilities to develop nuclear delivery systems and in spring 1960, the USG told them that it would prefer to *sell* MRBMs to them and support joint European production of launching systems. In any case, all systems had to come under SACEUR control.<sup>195</sup>

Especially the British disliked even the idea of MRBM *deployments* in the FRG. Moscow protested against such and threatened with “counter-measures”. The idea then came up in NATO that the MRBMs would be water-borne and operate in international waters.<sup>196</sup> Bonn also rejected a US offer of IRBMs: Adenauer portrayed tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as two different matters and Bonn only sought missiles with ranges of under 2000 km (the distinction was somewhat artificial: this range was enough to reach targets in the USSR). Bonn considered European-based IRBMs necessary for NATO but was not keen to host them. This was because it wanted to avoid 1) domestic and international controversy; 2) political pressure by Moscow: the IRBMs were first-strike capable and not in line with Adenauer’s claim that the Bundeswehr was only defensively armed; 3) their becoming targets of Soviet missiles; and 4) creating a fixed line for NATO defense possibly far from the eastern border of the FRG. But Bonn’s opposition to mobile (unlike stationary) IRBMs was not categorical.<sup>197</sup>

The US AEA required US custody of nuclear warhead stockpiles abroad, but the understanding between the USG and the Congress was that this (only) meant that the US had to control access to them “to the extent that it would take an act of force to obtain either weapons or information concerning the weapons without proper authorization.”<sup>198</sup> Because of the laxness of the custodial arrangements, by the late 1950s US stockpiles in Europe were de facto under only nominal US control. Trachtenberg argues this was a conscious USG policy, in line with Eisenhower’s support for nuclear weapon cooperation with allies. Quester notes that if the stockpiles thus reassured the hosts about the availability of nuclear weapons for use in case of emergency, the risk of seizure in peacetime was minimal.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> MRBM chron. (fn 118).

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.; E/L to Herter, 15 July 60; Desp. 54 E/Moscow (M) to DOS with Soviet Note, 20 July, both USNA CDF B/1905.

<sup>197</sup> See Adenauer’s interview, 18 Oct 56, PAA R/305/II A6B32 18 287-8; Dulles-Brentano mtg, 21 Nov 57, DNSA BC00039; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 97, 130-1; Boutwell 1990 p. 22. Also Osgood 1962 argues that some delivery systems deployed in the FRG, such as Mace missiles, can be considered strategic rather than tactical (p. 254). Kissinger 1965 similarly argues that some weapons stockpiled in Europe under Eisenhower were “tactical” only in being deployed there and under SACEUR command (pp. 97-8). On West German views regarding various stationing modes for mid-range missiles, see Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 117-30.

<sup>198</sup> See Loper (fn 74) p. 8.

<sup>199</sup> Quester 1970 pp. 141, 171; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 194-6.

Having during visits in Europe witnessed just how lax the custodial arrangements were, members of the Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) started in 1960 strongly pushing for greater US control. But still in 1962, USG documents noted that the arrangements consisted sometimes only of “a flood-lit barbed wire fence guarded by a single U.S. enlisted man in a gate house”; that it would not be hard for hosts to get control over the warheads; and that despite significant recent improvements, “only a very minimal degree of U.S. control and possession of U.S. nuclear weapons” existed.<sup>200</sup>

Eisenhower still favored greater cooperation on nuclear weapons with NATO allies, and thus further liberalization of the AEA (he noted at the NSC that “the stupidity of Congress in this regard never ceased to amaze him<sup>201</sup>”). But though the Congress seemed unwilling to make any relaxations regarding *bilateral* aid (especially aid to France was being considered), in February 1960 (shortly before France’s first nuclear test) Eisenhower told the press that though he wanted to withhold such nuclear weapon data that also Moscow did not have, he otherwise favored more liberal laws towards the closest allies: these had “to be treated as partners and allies, and not as junior members of a firm who are to be seen but not heard”.<sup>202</sup> Among the allies, the comment created enthusiasm, but Congressmen commented that US legislation would not change, and thereafter the White House issued a statement that US policy would remain as it was.<sup>203</sup>

Having repeatedly come up against congressional opposition to greater *bilateral*, *selective* nuclear sharing, which even Eisenhower soon came to admit to be dangerous<sup>204</sup>, and to sharing of information for the benefit of joint delivery system *development* and *production* by the allies, the USG attention increasingly turned to the idea of a *multilateral* nuclear authority and force in NATO as another form of nuclear sharing. The idea had emerged from various sources in 1956-58: as discussed above, Stassen, and the DOS presented such ideas, and so did NATO and US study groups<sup>205</sup>.

The DOS was studying the idea, and several top US officials saw congressional acceptance of multilateral cooperation as possible.<sup>206</sup> In late 1959, Norstad proposed making NATO the fourth nuclear power through creation of a jointly controlled, land-based, mid-range missile force; this was a way to respond to estimates of a growing Soviet missile

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<sup>200</sup> See DOS/L to Rusk “Nuclear Diffusion Provisions in the Berlin *Modus Vivendi*”, 8 March 62, USNA AG R&D; DOS/Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems (SFP) “Security Arrangements for United States Atomic Weapons With NATO Units (Apr 62)”, 8 June, DNSA NH01151; Attachments to DOD-AEC “On-Site Survey of Security Measures at Atomic Weapons Storage Facilities for the Support of Non-U.S. NATO Forces”, June 62, DNSA NH01149; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 140; Norris et al 1999.

<sup>201</sup> D/144 (fn 113) FRUS 58-60:7(2).

<sup>202</sup> D/144 (fn 113) FRUS 58-60:7(2); Eisenhower’s press conf., 3 Feb 60, PPE 24.

<sup>203</sup> D/144 (fn 113) FRUS 58-60:7(2); Osgood 1962 p. 230; Bundy 1988 pp. 483-4.

<sup>204</sup> D/263 Eisenhower-Norstad mtg (san.), 3 Aug 60, FRUS 58-60:7(1).

<sup>205</sup> See also Buchan “The Coming Crisis on the MLF”, 23 June 63, LBJL S:MLF II 1.

<sup>206</sup> See D/144 (fn 113) FRUS 58-60:7(2).

threat, increasing questioning of the credibility of extended deterrence, and ensuing fears of a French-inspired proliferation trend.<sup>207</sup>

It was Paris that had first and most strongly demanded a share in control over nuclear weapons in NATO, but also Bonn greeted Norstad's proposals, though calling enthusiastically in Paris's manner for nuclear equality was politically unfeasible for it. Bonn's goal was on the one hand a say in decisions about the use of nuclear weapons and to ensure that the US could not withdraw its nuclear protection and on the other hand to get Paris abandon its nuclear weapon program, which increased inequality in NATO. In fall 1960, Adenauer started together with Norstad and NATO Secretary General P.-H. Spaak to promote the idea of NATO as a nuclear power.<sup>208</sup>

The until then far quite weak interest in Washington in a joint force started growing in mid-1960 especially because of concerns about German reactions to Paris' independent policies. Many considered Norstad's idea of a land-based force dangerous because of a risk that the weapons could end up under host (or enemy) control, and Herter commissioned consultant R. Bowie to study alternatives to the idea.<sup>209</sup>

In his report on US foreign and security policy for the 1960s, Bowie proposed that the US would first commit Polaris submarines to NATO and thereafter, a multinational and – lateral, *veto-free* "NATO seaborne missile force" (MLF) would be created. The goals with the idea were "1) to involve and reassure the Allies; 2) to discourage national nuclear forces; 3) to meet the stated military need for MRBMs while avoiding the problems of land based missiles; 4) to encourage European integration".<sup>210</sup>

Bowie expected the FRG, Italy, and the Benelux countries to be interested in the idea and thought that the UK could be persuaded "to fold their national force into the MLF", as would "(after de Gaulle) perhaps even the French". Spaak expected Adenauer to welcome the idea as a solution to "the problem of Germany and nuclear weapons."<sup>211</sup> Eisenhower supported the proposal: such concrete reassurance about US commitment to defend Western Europe could improve the morale in NATO. Discussions quickly started in Washington and with Norstad and Spaak. (Only) solvable problems were expected with the Congress regarding giving the control over the force to NATO. Bowie proposed an *independ-*

<sup>207</sup> Wiegele 1968 p. 477; Mahncke 1972 pp. 74-8; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 136-8; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 211.

<sup>208</sup> T/1024 E/P to Herter on 9 Sep Norstad-Adenauer mtg, 10 Sep 60, DDRS; Desp. 1122 (fn 82); Osgood 1962 p. 233; Mendershausen 1972 pp. 419-20.

<sup>209</sup> Buchan (fn 205), 23 June 63; Klein to Bundy, 20 May 64, with Newhouse (SFRC Staff Consultant) "Balancing the Risks in the MLF", 20 March, LBJL S:MLF I; Schwartz 1983 p. 83.

<sup>210</sup> Bowie did see the US deterrent as strong and capable of deterring Moscow, with a possible exception of limited attacks, the prevention of which required strong shield forces (which also Norstad demanded).

Bowie "The North Atlantic Nations Tasks for the 1960s: A Report to the Secretary of State", orig. 21 Aug 60, with a 1991 foreword by him, DNSA NP00661 pp. 4-8, 20, 45-72. He opposed national nuclear forces because of their inefficiency, costs, divisive effect on NATO, and harm to NPT efforts with Moscow. He argued that the US could not help the French weapon program without the FRG and maybe Italy later demanding similar aid (pp. 20, 58-61, 102-4).

<sup>211</sup> Ibid. pp. 7-8; D/269 (fn 113) FRUS 58-60:7(1).



ent force *not* bound by a US veto, and also Eisenhower wanted it to be under full *NATO* control. He further supported the idea that it would be seaborne and not deployed on any national territory.<sup>212</sup>

Trachtenberg argues that because they wanted to prevent a German nuclear weapon effort, many DOS officials now saw it as necessary that also other allies' nuclear ambitions would be blocked and existing programs reversed, and that though preventing allies' nuclear ambitions as such was less important for Eisenhower, the DOS officials pushed their views through in the official US MLF proposal so that this came to imply a turn against national nuclear forces<sup>213</sup>. Eisenhower's comments to Norstad and Bowie, however, reveal that nonproliferation figured also in his support for the idea and that he saw a MLF as a way to organize allies' nuclear ambitions in a controlled framework. He was interested in the idea because he wanted to avoid both forcing the allies to remain in subordinated positions and "untoward developments and misuse". Though the French, British, Germans, and Italians wanted nuclear weapons, these had to be "handled as NATO weapons".<sup>214</sup>

When Herter presented the proposal in a late 1960 NAC meeting, it was portrayed as a way to prevent a multitude of nuclear weapon programs. No promise was made about giving up the US veto. A MLF was further to balance against Moscow's nuclear missiles aimed at Europe, increase NATO cohesion, decrease worries about the credibility of US guarantees, educate allies on nuclear affairs, promote European integration, and maybe allow some reduction in US nuclear forces. European reactions to the proposal were somewhat reserved because of an upcoming change in US government and contradictions between the proposal and Norstad's idea of a land-based force.<sup>215</sup>

As in any strategy that aims at controlling another state's moves through cooperation, a contradiction exists in principle between nonproliferation and nuclear sharing as a way to promote it<sup>216</sup>: nuclear sharing aims at involving NNWSs in planning for and possible use of nuclear weapons and maybe even in controlling them, whereas nonproliferation aims at keeping NNWSs from getting control over nuclear weapons. But when national production of nuclear weapons by several allies seemed as otherwise likely and nuclear sharing as a way to prevent or delay it, the USG sought a middle position by involving allies in nuclear affairs enough to prevent independent efforts but without giving them national control over weapons or increasing their ability to produce them independently<sup>217</sup>.

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<sup>212</sup> Bowie (fn 210); D/268 USG mtg, 3 Oct 60, D/264 and D/269 (fn 113) FRUS 58-60:7(1); DOS to Ball with MLF chronology, 29 Jan 65, USNA LBM 5; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 201, 213, 220.

<sup>213</sup> Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 215-6, 221, 240-1, 261.

<sup>214</sup> D/263-4 Eisenhower-Norstad and -Bowie mtgs (san.), 3 and 16 Aug 60, FRUS 58-60:7(1).

<sup>215</sup> Klein, 20 May 64, with Newhouse memo (fn 209); Ball 1968 pp. 216-7; Mahncke 1972 pp. 78-81; Schwartz 1983 pp. 83-6; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 240-1. For early critique of the idea of a jointly controlled nuclear force, see Wohlstetter 1961. He argued it would not reduce proliferation pressures but provide chances of proliferation and weaken NATO by making US guarantees *less* credible (pp. 372-7).

<sup>216</sup> See Küntzel 1992 p. 37 and Kissinger 1965 p. 151 for arguments about this regarding the Dec 1957 NAC decisions and the MLF, respectively.

<sup>217</sup> See also Mahncke 1972 p. 73.

Key characteristics of a MLF were its composition and control scheme. The basic NATO approach was to have separate national forces under joint planning and (in case of war) command. But NATO states had rights to withdraw forces committed to NATO (though those of the FRG were fully integrated in NATO) and decide about entering a war. Such a composition for a MLF was thus possibly inefficient and could enable participants to get national control over a part of the force. though a fully integrated force that precluded unilateral action in turn had the problem of how it would work in practice, this was what the USG proposed. Regarding control, even if all participants were to be somehow involved, another question was whether and how many national vetoes would exist.<sup>218</sup> Eisenhower in principle favored a force under full NATO control but saw the question about authority to use the force as “somewhat academic” as for him, any attack on Western Europe meant general war<sup>219</sup>. Though the control scheme was crucial regarding how much say the allies got in nuclear decision-making, the USG had incentives to avoid a clear stance on it. Whether or not Eisenhower would have liked to promise to give up the US veto, that would have required agreement with the Congress and his successor. Indeed, as the US constitution requires a Senate decision for declaring war, the allies could not be given power to decide to enter a war in a way that fully tied the US<sup>220</sup>. Being clear about retaining a veto in turn implied a risk of killing allies’ interest in a MLF at the outset.

It was up to Eisenhower’s successors to decide about the MLF. Now it is time to turn attention to Israel, where first steps on a nuclear weapon path were taken during the 1950s.

## **7.6 Israeli efforts to ensure security while the US keeps distance**

In the latter half of the 1950s, Israel started with French help to construct a nuclear plant that was to give it weapon capabilities<sup>221</sup>. It kept the effort secret even from the US, and after it was revealed at the end of Eisenhower’s term, Ben-Gurion pursued an ambiguous nuclear policy from the outset. But as discussed in section 7.3.1, USG officials expected Israel to come to pursue nuclear weapons, and when Israel’s construction activity became known, they right away suspected weapon aims.

### **7.6.1 Eisenhower’s Middle East policy and Ben-Gurion’s efforts in security and nuclear fields**

Clearly most American Jews voted against Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. His administration did not feel indebted to Jewish constituencies in particular and embarked on a path towards middle ground between the Arabs and Israel, refusing also Israel’s requests for an

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<sup>218</sup> See Kissinger 1965 p. 122; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 202-4.

<sup>219</sup> D/269 (fn 113) FRUS 58-60:7(1). See also D/264 (fn 113) *ibid*.

<sup>220</sup> Kissinger 1965 pp. 146-7.

<sup>221</sup> On Israel’s nuclear program, see especially Cohen, A. 1998; Karpin 2006.

early reaffirmation that US policy towards it would not change. Compared to other administrations considered here, few Jews now held top USG positions. Eisenhower generally stood firm against domestic pro-Israel pressures, in which his personal popularity and the comparative weakness of the “Israel lobby” in the 1950s helped.<sup>222</sup> Though Israel pressed for closer ties with the US, his administration, seeing also this situation much in light of competition with the USSR, considered a security pact with Israel or a pro-Israel policy disadvantageous. Such moves would have promoted closer Soviet-Arab relations, whereas Eisenhower and Dulles saw good US-Arab relations as desirable.<sup>223</sup> Beyond seeking a neutral role in the Arab-Israel conflict, the USG tried to avoid becoming a major supplier of heavy arms to the area.

In the mid-1950s, Arab hostility and the danger posed by pan-Arabic initiatives of Egypt’s President G. Nasser prompted Ben-Gurion to seek a strong deterrent for Israel in forms of both a formal Western security guarantee and a national deterrent – which was to include nuclear weapons. He thought Israel needed also a conventional capability to defeat any Arab alliance and launched modernization and upgrade of Israel’s conventional forces.<sup>224</sup>

Though Ben-Gurion wanted to pursue nuclear weapons, no general consensus existed among the Israelis on the nature or scope of Israel’s future nuclear program. Cooperation in the US Atoms for Peace -program interested them, but it was unclear how much cooperation really was on offer. Some Israeli officials also considered trying to cheat the US to enable Israel produce plutonium for weapons. The US signed a cooperation agreement under the Atoms for Peace -program with Israel in July 1955 and agreed to sell it a small research reactor. (Only) Turkey signed such an agreement before Israel; the Israelis hoped the Turkish agreement to prevent rumors about them seeking nuclear weapons. Israel soon expressed interest to the USG in buying instead a larger reactor that would offer a training ground for handling plutonium. It inquired whether it would have to return the plutonium produced to the US and informed the USG that it had small-scale production of heavy water and uranium. The USG replied that it would demand safeguards and not let Israel control any plutonium.<sup>225</sup> In early 1956, its intelligence community added Israel to the list of

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<sup>222</sup> Walt 1987 pp. 253-4; Schoenbaum 1993 pp. 92-5; Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapter 2-3, esp. pp. 54-7, 96.

<sup>223</sup> NSC report on US goals and policies for the Near East, 14 July 53, DNSA PD00344; NEA to Dulles “Possible Assurances to Israel”, 30 Aug 54, USNA MC B/1; Green 1984 pp. 115-6; Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapter 2. On Eisenhower’s policy towards the Arabs and Israel in general, see Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapter 2-3; Spiegel 1985 Chapter 3.

<sup>224</sup> Somewhat contradictorily, Cohen also argues that 1) though Ben-Gurion had earlier been interested in an alliance with the US, he now considered one *unviable*, fearing that a surprise attack could cause unacceptable damage before the US would have time to help Israel, and that 2) Ben-Gurion continued to seek a great power guarantee as long as he was in power, though by the late 1950s, he saw no great *chances* of getting one from the West. Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 12, 48, 65-6 ref. to, e.g., T/724 E/Tel Aviv (TA) to Rusk, 3 Apr 63, JFKL NSF B/119; and to Bialer, U. (1990) *Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation, 1948-1956*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, pp. 235-75.

<sup>225</sup> DOS/AE-Israel Emb. mtg, 9 Feb 55, USNA SAEM; Bergmann-DOS mtg 16 Aug, 18 Aug, USNA Lot 57D688 B/417; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 41-5, 50 ref. also to Bergmann on the Geneva conf. 8-20 Aug 55 and to de Shalit to Mardor, 28 Aug, both ISA FMRG 2407/2. On Israeli debate about the nuclear program, see Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 50-1, 63-4.

states whose nuclear activities were to be followed (to the lowest-priority category), probably as a result of the US-Israel cooperation agreement. But Israeli nuclear aims were overall getting quite little US attention.<sup>226</sup>

One prospect that nuclear energy seemed to offer was to use it to run sea-water desalting plants in fresh-water poor regions. In the USG, acquiring an ability to offer desalting cooperation to Middle East states was seen as politically important. Israel indicated interest in the idea early on.<sup>227</sup>

In Israel's military build-up, emerging cooperation with France helped. The background for this was that in fall 1955, an arms deal between Egypt and the East block demonstrated deepening of that relationship and much strengthened Egypt militarily. Cairo then also closed the Straits of Tiran from Israeli ships; Israel saw this as an act of war. Israel sought a Western security guarantee and a sale of US arms, but the USG was only willing to help it find other suppliers.<sup>228</sup> In March 1956, Eisenhower said in public that prospects of peace would not be helped "by rushing some arms to a nation [Israel] that, at the most, can absorb only that amount that 1,7 million people can absorb; whereas, on the other side, there are some 40 million people" – a suggestion, it seems, that Israel's only chance was to make peace with its neighbors.<sup>229</sup> Israel continued to press for US arms sales<sup>230</sup> but in June 1956 also concluded a comprehensive security agreement with France. Large French arms sales to Israel followed, and France was now Israel's key foreign friend.<sup>231</sup>

In spring and summer 1956, Israel informed the US that it aimed to acquire a larger, 10-MW research reactor, and inquired about possibilities to buy enriched uranium and heavy water from the US. The USG replied that proper safeguards were a condition for a sale. Bergmann abandoned the initiative.<sup>232</sup>

In July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. France, the UK, and Israel started to secretly plan a military operation in the area. At the same time, Paris agreed in principle to sell Israel a small nuclear reactor. The Israelis this as a way to "blackmail" the US for a security guarantee: Bergmann and Peres reportedly said in reactor negotiations that "the day the Americans see that we are going toward independence in the field of nuclear en-

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<sup>226</sup> D/1 CIA draft "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability", 31 Jan 61, NSA EBB IB:Dimona Revealed; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 81, 370-1 fn 10.

<sup>227</sup> DOS/AE-Israel Emb. mtg, 9 Feb 55, USNA SAEM; NE to Dulles, 5 June 56, USNA RNA.

<sup>228</sup> *Current Intelligence Weekly Summary*, 27 Oct 55, CIA FOIA.

<sup>229</sup> See Eisenhower's press conference, 7 March 56, PPE 53; Gazit 2000 pp. 413-4.

<sup>230</sup> Meir to Dulles, 4 July 56, USNA Lot 60D560 SFRI B/11 US-Israel relations.

<sup>231</sup> See Crosbie 1974 for a thorough account of the French-Israeli "tacit alliance" from the mid-1950s to 1967; Green 1984 pp. 149-50; Evron 1991 p. 279; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 48-9. See also Karpin 2006 Chapters 3-4 on the development of French-Israeli security and nuclear cooperation.

<sup>232</sup> AEC-IAEC and -Israel Emb. mtgs, 11 Apr and 4 Dec 56, USNA Lot 60D580 B/11; CIA "Post-Mortem..." (fn 226); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 50-2, 60-1 ref. to DOS/AE to ActSOS, 14 Aug 56, to "Presentation of Draft Israeli Power Bilateral", 14 Sep, and to AEC "Implementation of Atomic Energy Program with Israel", 25 Jan 57, all USNA Lot 57D688 B/417.

ergy, they will probably give us the guarantees of existence that they have never agreed to give us until now”.<sup>233</sup>

As secretly agreed, in the Suez campaign of fall 1956 Israel first attacked the Sinai and moved towards the Canal. France and the UK then offered to intervene by occupying the Sinai between the Israelis and Egyptians. Nasser turned the offer down and the UK and France invaded the area, with the goals of getting control over the Canal and hurting Nasser. Militarily, the operation went as planned. But after Moscow sent to the triangle capitals notes that included a threat to Israel’s existence, the USG pressed the three to accept ceasefire.<sup>234</sup>

Several authors argue that as this fiasco created in Paris a feeling of guilt and indebtedness towards Israel, in return for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai (for which also the USG pressed) Paris quietly agreed to help it develop a nuclear weapon capability. The experience also made Paris abandon its previously unclear stance towards its nuclear option. The disappointment with all foreign friends strengthened a belief among Israeli leaders that Israel could count only on itself and needed an own nuclear force.<sup>235</sup> In early 1957, the French and the Israelis agreed on upgrading the reactor deal: a PU-producing heavy-water reactor, large enough for weapon-material production, was to be built in Dimona, in the Negev. A formal, secret sale agreement was signed next fall. The biggest secret was a reprocessing plant, on which Israel made a deal directly with a contractor company, so that no trace was left in intergovernmental papers. The nuclear complex came to be partly financed with private donations from around the world. Peres said to the French that the plant would be dedicated for scientific research. France demanded no safeguards on it (but at the time, also no international standard on safeguards existed).<sup>236</sup>

Combined with a reprocessing plant, natural uranium/heavy-water reactors offer relatively good chances for weapon production. Frequent and secret fuel load changes are possible because such reactors require no shutdown for a change (efficient weapon-material pro-

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<sup>233</sup> Hersh 1991 pp. 39-40 and Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 54, 363 ref. to Péan, P. (1981) *Les deux bombes*, Paris: Fayard, p. 82, to Golan, M. (1982) *Peres* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv: Schocken, p. 54, to Peres, S. (1995) *Memoirs: Battling for Peace* (ed. by D. Landau), London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 130, and to Cohen’s interviews with French officials. Cohen and Karpin 2006 (pp. 84-5) disagree on the role of the reactor in Israel’s acceptance of the Suez campaign. Based on Peres’s interview (*Ha’aretz*, 11 Oct 91), Cohen argues it was only an incentive for the role Israel assumed mainly because of other factors. Karpin presents it (based on, it seems, memoirs of key Israeli actors) as Ben-Gurion’s key reason for accepting the role. On Paris’s reasons to cooperate on Israel’s nuclear effort, see Crosbie 1974 pp. 120-1, 166-7; Pry 1984 p. 10; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 49, 53. Also the UK got involved in some nuclear cooperation with the two countries: it was included in the rights to use the Israeli patents. AEC to Gilpatric with summaries of atomic energy programs abroad, Aug 64, LBJL CNP B/2 P/4 pp. 68-9; Crosbie p. 116.

<sup>234</sup> Here, London’s need for help for the at the time threatened sterling gave the USG leverage.

Moscow’s relations with Israel deteriorated in the 1950s as its ties with Arabs strengthened. Bulganin- and Eisenhower- Ben-Gurion letter exchanges, 5-8 Nov 56, <http://www.mfa.gov.il> (links: foreign rel., hist. docs, 47-74, IX 7 and 9; 20 Apr 07); Hersh 1991 pp. 40-1; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 55; Boughton 2001.

<sup>235</sup> See Herter (E/P) to DepUSOS Dillon, 16 Dec 60, USNA IAEP; “The French-Israeli Relationship” (san.), n/d, JFKL N/I Ben-Gurion visit 1961; Walt 1987 p. 254; Hersh 1991 pp. 40-3; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 55-7, 80.

<sup>236</sup> Pry 1984 pp. 13-5; Hersh 1991 pp. 37, 66-7; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 58-9, 67, 70, 187 ref. to Péan 1981 pp. 96, 113-21, 128, to Golan 1982 pp. 72-4, and to Peres 1995 pp. 136-7 (all fn 233).

duction requires frequent fuel load changes: when a load is used for long, the level of weapon-grade PU decreases). Such reactors also produce relatively much plutonium. Tritium, which can reduce the PU-amount needed for a bomb, can moreover be extracted from irradiated heavy water.<sup>237</sup>

Following the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, the general USG policy in the Middle East remained to oppose aggression by *any* side, and preventing Soviet advances in the area was now clearly a key priority. In early 1957, Eisenhower stated to the Congress that the USG supported “without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East” and proposed economic and military assistance to protect them from international communism. He portrayed the region as important as a gateway and because of especially Western European dependency on oil. If Moscow was allowed to dominate the area, this would have the gravest effect on allies in Europe and very serious economic and political effects on the US.<sup>238</sup> The Congress authorized both a large aid package to friendly Middle East states and the use of force in case a state in the area asked for help in resisting communist-controlled rivals. But the administration overall failed to persuade key Arab states, especially Egypt, to orientate towards the US.<sup>239</sup>

The USG was unaware of the Franco-Israel nuclear deal. Towards it, Israel again showed interest in the small research reactor that had first been discussed. A final agreement on it was signed in March 1957. The enriched-uranium reactor was built in Nachal Soreq and started operation in June 1960. By 1966, the US supplied it with 50 kg of 90 % U-235 (enough for a few nuclear bombs). But it required that spent fuel was returned to the US and the reactor placed under US safeguards. It is possible that the project came to somewhat help Israel’s weapon effort as it gave Israelis training in nuclear activities.<sup>240</sup> Israel opposed US efforts to switch from bilateral to IAEA safeguards on the grounds that Arabs could be included in IAEA inspection teams<sup>241</sup>.

Also West Germans were rumored to be involved in nuclear weapon cooperation with Israel. For instance, in 1957 claims emerged in the press that Israel was pursuing nuclear weapons and Germans were working with it on the technology side<sup>242</sup>. But at least no large-scale or state-level cooperation on this existed. From 1956 onwards, however, Strauss and Peres secretly arranged significant arms sales from the FRG to Israel. Trying

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<sup>237</sup> See Gardner 1994 pp. 29-33.

<sup>238</sup> Eisenhower to the Congress, 5 Jan 57, [http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/speeches/Eisenhower\\_speeches.html](http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/speeches/Eisenhower_speeches.html) (25 Sep 07). On the value of the region, see also DOS/NEA to EUR, 25 Feb 58, USNA ND B/7 summit. Ben-Zvi 1998 argues that around 1960, the USG came to see the assumption that Middle East oil was so crucial for the orientation of Western Europe as exaggerated (p. 89).

<sup>239</sup> See Spiegel 1985 Chapter 2; Walt 1987 p. 67.

<sup>240</sup> Pry 1984 pp. 6-9; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 65, 81. Pry stresses the importance of the training effect. But the US reactor was of a different type than the French one; thus the direct applicability of the gained know-how in the weapon effort was probably limited.

<sup>241</sup> AEC-Israel Emb. mtgs, 6 Nov 58 and 9 Feb 59, and AEC-Bergmann mtg, 2 Apr, USNA SAEM Israel agreements 1.

<sup>242</sup> Pry 1984 pp. 35, 38 ref. to “Adenauer to See Norstad Today in Preparation for Visit to U.S.,” *NYT*, 21 May 57.

to protect relations with the Arabs, Bonn officially denied their existence. It also managed to keep the sales secret until 1964.<sup>243</sup>

As discussed above, Israel was by now in the USG seen as a potential future proliferant. It was clearly the first state in the area capable of acquiring a weapon capability. A May 1957 intelligence estimate also referred to evidence on Franco-Israeli nuclear cooperation of unknown scope. This estimate saw it as conceivable that France would one day give Israel some weapons under its veto but did not expect France to enable Israel produce nuclear weapons.<sup>244</sup> The CIA-chaired Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), however, thought that France would one day maybe provide Israel with material for nuclear weapons<sup>245</sup>. In fall 1958, Israel was lifted to a middle category regarding intelligence needs on nuclear activities<sup>246</sup>.

Israeli leaders continued to seek closer security ties with the West. In 1957, they wanted Israel to join NATO or get security guarantees from it. France reportedly presented the wish at the NAC, but especially Turkey, Greece, and the Scandinavians were opposed<sup>247</sup>. In fall 1957, Israel's Foreign Minister G. Meir probed with the USG into the ideas of the US 1) telling Moscow publicly that it "would not tolerate any aggression against Israel" and 2) supplying Israel with enough arms to ensure its capability to resist aggression. Acting (Act)SOS C. Herter gave no support for the ideas.<sup>248</sup> According to Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion again asked for US support against Moscow and the Arabs in summer 1958, but Eisenhower replied only with a generic statement of support. However, around 1958, as nationalistic challenges to pro-Western regimes in the area strengthened and Israel allowed the US and the UK to use its airspace in an operation to protect the Jordanian regime, the USG started to see Israel as a potential strategic asset that could be counted to oppose communist-fuelled revolutions and instability in the area. In 1958 and again in early 1960, Israel requested both direct and indirect sales of US arms (indirectly through France and Italy). The request included a defensive Hawk missile system; Avner Cohen argues Ben-Gurion wanted an advanced defense system against aerial attacks especially to ensure the security of the Dimona reactor. Still unwilling to become a major arms supplier to the area and to fuel arms racing there, the USG turned the requests down (though the new SOS Herter did favor a sale and indicated that also to Ben-Gurion in March 1960). But while they gave no concrete promises, Eisenhower and Herter assured Ben-Gurion that Israel's future was important for the US and pointed out that the USG 1) was pleased that Israel was able to cover its needs for heavy armaments from other sources; 2) had provided it with some defensive equipment; and 3) supported Israel's military effort indi-

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<sup>243</sup> See Samra 2002 pp. 47-53.

<sup>244</sup> DOS/AE draft "Arms Limitation in the Middle East", n/d (after mid-Feb 58), USNA ND B/7 summit.

<sup>245</sup> CIA draft (fn 94), 24 May 57.

<sup>246</sup> That it was in the next years not moved to a higher category was later seen as a reason for why its nuclear aims got in hindsight insufficient USG attention. CIA "Post-Mortem..." (fn 226).

<sup>247</sup> DOS to Bundy, 26 Oct 64, with Peres-USOS Harriman mtg, 7 Oct, LBJL KI 2; Crosbie 1974 pp. 96-7.

<sup>248</sup> ActSOS Herter-Meir mtg, 12 Oct 57, USNA Lot 60D580 B/11.

rectly with its significant financial assistance.<sup>249</sup> NATO requirements and transportation issues moreover made tacit USG acceptance of France's sales of especially Mystère aircraft to Israel necessary. It seems acceptance was achieved with the help of Israel's friends in Washington.<sup>250</sup> Thus the Eisenhower administration, desiring to protect relations to Arabs and to prevent Soviet gains, wanted Israel to be able to defend itself but was not prepared to get into institutionalized security cooperation with it.

Regional arms limitation was one potential way to stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In 1957-58, Moscow repeatedly proposed talks on stabilizing the area to the USG. But insufficient support existed in the USG for such efforts. To stop Soviet advances in the region and reduce the risk of hostilities that could escalate into a superpower level, the DOS Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space (AE) did in 1958 favor proposing a "five year trial program of arms limitation and control" for Israel and its closest neighbors, administered by neutral states and including limits on conventional forces, a prohibition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and safeguards on all nuclear facilities<sup>251</sup>. But the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian and African Affairs (NEA) opposed US-Soviet talks on the topic: Moscow, trying to gain influence in the area, seemed interested in arms limitation only if it included US clients Turkey and Iran. It was moreover in US interest to be free to supply arms to friendly regimes in the region. Also later, the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (NE) saw regional arms control as unfeasible especially because the US could not accept the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in such measures.<sup>252</sup>

Paris, led since June 1958 by de Gaulle, started in May 1960 to press Israel to accept safeguards and tell publicly about the Dimona plant. Israel managed to prolong talks on the issue; in the meanwhile, construction of the plant went on. Towards late 1960, Paris and Jerusalem reached a compromise: Paris' direct involvement ended but not that of French companies, no safeguards were introduced, but Israel promised to use the reactor for civilian purposes only and to tell the public about it.<sup>253</sup> Before that happened, its existence was anyway revealed, as discussed in the next section.

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<sup>249</sup> DOS/NE "Israel's Security Problems and Disarmament", 5 March 60; Eisenhower-Ben-Gurion mtg, 10 March, both USNA ND B/3; Herter to Ben-Gurion, 4 Aug, DDRS; Green 1984 pp. 152-3; Hersh 1991 p. 55 ref. to Bar-Zohar, M. (1977) *Ben-Gurion*, New York: Adama Books; Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapter 3; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 269 (see also his ref.).

<sup>250</sup> Crosbie 1974 pp. 63-5; LC 1988.

<sup>251</sup> DOS/AE draft "Arms Limitation in the Middle East", n/d (after mid-Feb 58), USNA ND B/7 summit.

<sup>252</sup> NEA (fn 238), 25 Feb 58; NE (fn 249), 5 March 60.

<sup>253</sup> "French-Israeli..." (fn 235); Crosbie 1974 pp. 167-8; Hersh 1991 pp. 68-70 ref. to de Gaulle, C. (1971) *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*, New York: Simon and Schuster; Cohen, A. 1995; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 73-5 ref. also to, e.g., Péan 1981 pp. 126-8, Golan 1982 pp. 100-2, Peres 1995 p. 142 (all fn 233), and to Bar-Zohar, M. (1987) *Ben-Gurion* (in Hebrew) Vol. 3, Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, pp. 1373-89.

Still, some Israeli-French cooperation continued. When France made its first nuclear test in February 1960, Israeli observers were reportedly present at the test site and given test data. CIA "Post-Mortem..." (fn 226); Lefever 1979 p. 68; Pry 1984 pp. 16-7 ref. to Weissman, S. & Krosney, H. (1981) *The Islamic Bomb: the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East*, New York: Times Books, pp. 112-3; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 83. Also in 1964, Israeli observers reportedly followed French tests. Green 1984 p. 167 ref. to *NYT*, 8 Dec 64.



One complication with the reactor was its moderator: France was unable to provide the heavy water it required, the Israeli method for making it turned out impractical, and the US demanded safeguards. But Israel found a source of supply in Norway. An agreement on a large sale was signed in February 1959. Though no general export standards for heavy water existed yet, Norway's Foreign Ministry insisted on safeguards. Israel promised to use the material only for civilian purposes and gave Norway an inspection right, but only *outside* the reactor. In June, Norway informed the AEC about a "safeguarded" sale. A little later, the USG inquired Israel's nuclear aims of G. Randers, the organizer of the deal in Norway, but got an evasive reply. Norway came to use its inspection right once in the early 1960s when the material was still stored.<sup>254</sup>

Secrecy defined Israel's nuclear weapon program: fearing that any debate could compromise the effort, Ben-Gurion kept a tight reign on the nuclear field and shared information only when necessary. Also other Israelis avoided public discussion of the subject: as security issues were central for all Zionist parties, none of them was willing to publicly criticize the nuclear program. Still, disagreement on the weapon effort existed also within Ben-Gurion's Mapai party, where especially Meir since the late 1950s criticized his approach. Though she was not against a weapon option, to avoid serious US displeasure and its consequences when Washington would find out that Israel was deceiving it, she favored telling the USG about the Dimona reactor and that it was meant for civilian purposes.<sup>255</sup>

### 7.6.2 The Dimona revelation

After summer 1956, the USG had shown little interest in what had happened to Israel's plan to acquire a larger reactor. But in 1957, signs of large-scale construction activity and tight security arrangements at Dimona prompted it to make an inquiry with Israel. Israel gave false explanations for the construction activity. Another warning sign for the USG could have been Randers's question to a DOS official about how the US would see a 40-MW reactor in Israel. The official responded only that the supplier of such a plant could get Israel accept IAEA safeguards.<sup>256</sup>

In early 1958, reconnaissance flights provided the CIA with further information on construction activity in the Negev. The political explosiveness of the issue made CIA officials limit discussions to a small circle. The officials later said that Eisenhower saw early pictures of what was estimated a "probable" nuclear plant but indicated no interest, which

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<sup>254</sup> CIA "Post-Mortem..." (fn 226); Hersh 1991 pp. 77, 103-4; Forland 1997 pp. 10-1, 16 fn 71 ref. to, e.g., Tveit, O. (1996) *Alt for Israel: Oslo-Jerusalem, 1948-1978*, Oslo: J. W. Cappelens, pp. 256-75; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 61-2 ref. to the same, to Bergmann-Norwegians' letter exchange, to Norwegian official-AEC disc., 5 June 59 (USNA; both courtesy of Tveit), and to Randers-DOS disc., 6 Aug, USNA CF Norway B/2169.

<sup>255</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 3, 71-2.

<sup>256</sup> CIA "Post-Mortem..." (fn 226); Green 1984 p. 151; Forland 1997 p. 10 ref. to Tveit 1996 (fn 254) pp. 261-2; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 61, 81; Cordesman 2003 p. 43.

made them to feel he was maybe not opposed to Israel's getting nuclear bombs and/or had already been aware of the reactor. On its own initiative, the CIA continued to follow the matter. In June, it also requested information from Emb. Tel Aviv. Bergmann told the Americans that Israel had decided to build a nuclear plant of an undecided capacity; US officials thought he meant only a plan for the future. Bergmann also said that Israeli-French cooperation covered only information sharing regarding heavy water production and uranium chemistry. But some US reports suggested it was possibly extended to nuclear weapons. Hersh notes that according to a former GOI official, Eisenhower asked Ben-Gurion about Dimona, but this replied only by asking for US nuclear guarantees for Israel. In 1959, the USG also got information about the heavy water sale and indications that personnel changes in the IMD were possibly connected to differing views about nuclear weapons. In the fall, the Israelis told a US official who saw the Dimona site that it was a military plant and that the US was to inquire of the IMD about it. It seems the official did not. In early 1960, the USG got unconfirmed information that Israeli officials observed France's nuclear test. A DOS/NE memo noted that it would not be surprising if Israel one day acquired a nuclear weapon capability, though no signs of such activity existed yet. In all, the separate pieces of information about the Dimona site got lost within the large USG bureaucracy, and the intelligence community did not clearly identify it as a nuclear plant.<sup>257</sup>

Hersh argues that some CIA officials were by 1960 even aware that an underground reprocessing plant was being built at Dimona, and thus convinced that Israel was pursuing nuclear weapons, and that Eisenhower and his aides were clearly "determined to look the other way"<sup>258</sup>. Also other evidence, discussed below, does suggest that some in the CIA knew about the reprocessing plant early on. But in light of Eisenhower's 1959 comment that he "could conceive of nothing worse than permitting Israel and Egypt to have a nuclear capability"<sup>259</sup> (and I see no reason to think that he lied when he on own initiative said so to his men), his dislike of uncoordinated and non-NATO nuclear weapon efforts, and his quite tough stance towards Israel, the claim about him seems ungrounded. If he did get some unconfirmed intelligence about the Dimona site, it may well be that he did not believe it, thinking that Israel could not alone secure nuclear capabilities and that no Western state could help it without the USG finding out. Cohen in turn argues that the US in the late 1950s maybe missed its only chance to persuade Israel to abandon weapon aims in re-

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<sup>257</sup> AEC-Israeli Emb. mtg, 19 March 58, USNA SAEM; NE to DOS/Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs (NR) "Nuclear Sharing with Countries of the NEA Area", 16 Feb 60, USNA ND B/1 chron. inter-office M2; E/TA to NE "A Catalogue of Replies Regarding the Reactor", 16 Jan 61, USNA IR; "French-Israeli..." (fn 235); CIA "Post-Mortem..." (fn 226); Hersh 1991 pp. 52-7 ref. to his interviews with an anonymous former Israeli official and Brugioni and Lundahl (both formerly CIA); Cohen 1998 pp. 81-4, 371-2 fn 19-20, 24 ref. also to his 1996-7 interviews with Brugioni.

<sup>258</sup> Hersh 1991 pp. 56-8, 112 ref. to his interviews with Brugioni and Lundahl.

<sup>259</sup> D/69 NSC mtg (san.), 30 July 59, FRUS 58-60:3.

turn for a security guarantee<sup>260</sup>. But this point seems somewhat exaggerated because Israel continued requests for a guarantee also in the 1960s.

Later, the US Intelligence Board (USIB) requested a report from the JAEIC on why the US failed to discover the reactor early. The JAEIC concluded that already in April 1958, information existed in the intelligence community that “could have alerted ... to Israeli intentions”. Had adequate follow-up studies been made, the reactor could have been discovered at the latest in 1959. This did not happen owing to, e.g., Israeli deception and a belief that Israel would need Western help to get a reactor and the USG would find out about such aid. Moreover, Cohen suggests that Israel’s friends “in high places” especially in the CIA maybe kept information from being passed on within the USG.<sup>261</sup>

According to Green, the CIA informed Eisenhower in mid-1960 that the construction project at Dimona was for a nuclear reactor that could yearly produce material for one bomb<sup>262</sup>. In mid-June, Emb. Tel Aviv reported on rumors about a French-Israeli nuclear project. DOS and CIA officials made inquiries but the Israelis maintained that the site was not a nuclear plant and denied existence of any plans for nuclear cooperation with NWSs. Now the JAEIC saw a need to gather information on the matter, but still in September the CIA told the DOS that it had “no confirming information” about the Negev site.<sup>263</sup>

Pressure on the CIA to draw conclusions grew as London in late October informed the USG that a reactor seemed to be under construction in the Negev and on 8 November provided the CIA with photos of the site. The next day, the CIA made a preliminary assessment that this “was probably a reactor complex”.<sup>264</sup>

Emb. Paris reported a that a CEA official had said that the CEA and the IAEC (i.e., not the two governments) were cooperating only on the production of heavy water and uranium fuel and denied that the CEA or any French company was “collaborating with the Israeli Government in the construction of a nuclear power reactor”<sup>265</sup>—no outright lie since the Dimona reactor was a *research* reactor.

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<sup>260</sup> Cohen 1998 p. 85.

<sup>261</sup> CIA “Post-Mortem...” (fn 226); Cohen, A. 1998 p. 84.

<sup>262</sup> Green 1984 p. 153. Also a CIA memo notes secrecy about the existence of the plant “was successfully maintained, at least from the outside world, until mid-1960.” A. Dulles to Kennedy’s military aide Clifton, 8 Feb 61, with “PM Ben-Gurion’s resignation” (san.), 7 Feb, JFKL N/I.

<sup>263</sup> Desp. 140 E/TA to DOS, 26 Aug 60, DNSA NP00671 ref. to Desp. 75 E/TA to DOS; T/G-19 DOS to E/TA, 20 Sep, DNSA NP00678; E/TA “A Catalogue...”; CIA “Post-Mortem...” (fn 226); NEA to Rusk with “History of United States Interest in Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities” (san.) and memo to Kennedy “Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities” (san.), 30 Jan 61, USNA MWH B/4; Rusk to Kennedy “Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities” (san.), 30 Jan, DNSA NP00745; USOS to Kennedy “Dimona Reactor in Israel” with the same “History...” (san. differently than the USNA memo), 30 March, JFKL N/I; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 85 ref. also to “History...” (unsanitized, it seems), 30 March 63, USNA CFPF 250/03/27/04 B/1297; DOS to Bundy with “Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events”, 18 March 64, USNA RNA; Chronology on Dimona visits (n/a), n/d (probably March 64), LBJL KD 2.

<sup>264</sup> CIA “Post-Mortem...” (fn 226); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 85-6.

<sup>265</sup> T/766 Amb. Houghton (E/P) to DOS, 22 Nov 60, DNSA NP00702.

In late November, American scientist H. Gomberg informed the USG that Ben-Gurion had told him in Israel about a plan to soon announce the construction of a nuclear plant in the Negev. The French were assisting it “apparently without consideration [of] IAEA or Euratom implications” (i.e., safeguards or reporting rules). Because of several indications he had seen, Gomberg was certain that a reactor was being constructed. CIA officials were now getting information about the French involvement also from other sources.<sup>266</sup>

On 2 December, Israel admitted to the USG that it was constructing a reactor in Dimona: Bergmann told the US Ambassador, O. Reid, that Ben-Gurion would soon announce that a 10 to 20 -MW reactor for desert research would be completed in about 1,5 years’ time<sup>267</sup>. “Desert research” may sound innocent, but compared to power reactors, large research reactors are in fact suited for clandestine weapon efforts: experiments made in them require reactor shutdowns, which increase chances for undiscovered, frequent fuel load changes<sup>268</sup> (whereas, as noted above, for the Dimona reactor type, shutdown was not fully necessary for a change at all).

On 8 December, the CIA issued a special NIE (SNIE) that expected grave proliferation implications from the Dimona plant. The same day, the NSC discussed the issue. Recognizing the reactor’s PU-production capability, the CIA and the AEC excluded the chance that it was for peaceful uses only. Severe Arab reactions were expected.<sup>269</sup>

Herter now warned Israel’s Ambassador, A. Harman, that a potential nuclear weapon capability could destabilize the region, and inquired Israel’s aims in more detail. He got no immediate reply. The DOS brought the matter up also with the French; Herter expressed concern that the reactor suggested weapon aims.<sup>270</sup>

The USG wanted to keep the matter away from public discussion while it was seeking clarifications from Israel<sup>271</sup>. But in mid-December, the press reported that Israel was pursuing a nuclear weapon capability with French help. Though the DOS had suggested him to comment only that the USG found the reports interesting, AEC Chairman J. McCone then remarked in public that the USG had “informal and unofficial information” that Israel

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<sup>266</sup> T/2162 Houghton to DOS, 26 Nov 60, DNSA NP00704; Desp. 311 E/TA to DOS with disc. memo, 30 Nov, DNSA NP00705; DOS/NE to NEA, 1 Dec, USNA ND B/1 chron. inter-office M1; DOS disc. memo “Israeli Atomic Energy Program”, 1 Dec, DNSA NP00707; CIA “Post-Mortem...” (fn 226); Cohen, A. 1998 p. 86 ref. also to “History...” (fn 263).

<sup>267</sup> T/486 Reid to DOS, 3 Dec 60, DNSA NP00710; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 87 ref. to the same, DDEL IF B/8 Israel.

<sup>268</sup> See Gardner 1994 pp. 30-1.

<sup>269</sup> D/177 (fn 150) FRUS 58-60:13; Chron. on Dimona visits (fn 263); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 86-8; Cordesman 2003 p. 43.

<sup>270</sup> D/178 DOS to E/TA (san.), 9 Dec 60, FRUS 58-60:13; D/6 Herter’s phone log, 9 Dec, NSA EBB IB:Dimona Revealed; T/894 Herter to Embassies, 22 Dec, DNSA NP00726; ASOS to Ramey (JCAE) with “Summary of Additional Recent Information on the Israeli Atomic Energy Program”, 19 Jan 61, DNSA NP00744; USOS & NEA with “History...” (fn 263); Cohen, A. 1998 p. 86.

<sup>271</sup> NEA to USOS/P, 30 Dec 60, with NEA to Reid, 28 Dec, USNA IAEP; DOS to Bundy, 24 Feb 61, USNA ND B/4 chron. WH corresp.

was constructing a PU-producing reactor, and had asked it to explain its aims.<sup>272</sup> The press reported that the IAEC had said that Israel was not producing nuclear weapons and was at the time incapable of that (thus leaving the future open), whereas the IMD did not comment “whether it was developing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons”<sup>273</sup>.

Israel and France now confirmed that France was assisting Israel in the nuclear field but stressed the civilian nature of the efforts. The French said “all necessary provisions” were made to verify this, France would supply uranium for the reactor, and all plutonium would be returned to it.<sup>274</sup> A little later, Euratom officials informed the USG that France, fulfilling the minimum Euratom requirement, had informed Euratom “in very general terms” in early 1958 “that it had peaceful uses bilateral with Israel which contemplated aid in constructing reactor”. Under Euratom, nuclear *material* transfers out of the Euratom area had to be reported, but France had not yet made any such report concerning Israel.<sup>275</sup>

In a 19 December USG meeting on Israel’s “plutonium production plant”, Gates noted that this did not seem to be for peaceful purposes. McCone said that AEC officials believed the site also to include a chemical separation plant. The USG discussed what kind of a public statement to make: one was needed especially to make clear that the USG had nothing to do with the plant. Eisenhower wanted 1) the USG to tell Israel that it wanted the IAEA to inspect the plant and 2) the public USG stance to be that based on Israeli statements that the plant was for peaceful uses, the USG was confident that Israel would accept inspections.<sup>276</sup> The same day, the DOS issued a statement that it welcomed Israel’s statements on the peacefulness of its activities but waited for a reply to its information request<sup>277</sup>. Following Hersh’s line, discussed above, Cohen and Karpin interpret Eisenhower’s stance as evidence that he wanted “to look the other way” from Israel’s nuclear ambitions<sup>278</sup> and “had no intention of making Israel cancel its project, or even freeze it” and “was prepared to pretend to the world that the Israeli project’s purposes were peaceful.”<sup>279</sup> The claims seem ungrounded because – in addition to Eisenhower’s general stances already discussed – the meeting memo gives the impression that he indeed wanted the reactor under IAEA controls. And as Herter argued that if the USG pressed Israel strongly, it still had a chance to keep Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons, Eisenhower

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<sup>272</sup> DOS “Suggested Guidance for Chairman McCone”, 17 Dec 60, DNSA NP00717; Meet the Press with McCone, 18 Dec, DNSA NP00719; USOS & NEA with “History...” (fn 263); “U.S. Hears Israel Moves Toward A-Bomb Potential” and “U.S. Misled at First on Israeli Reactor”, *NYT*, 19-20 Dec; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 88-90 ref. also to *Time*, 13 Dec, and to “Israel May Be Making An A-Bomb”, *Daily Express*, 16 Dec.

<sup>273</sup> T/537 Reid to DOS on Israeli press reports, 18 Dec 60, DNSA NP00718; “Defense Ministry Silent” and “Peaceful Aims Affirmed”, *NYT*, 20 Dec; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 90.

<sup>274</sup> Herter (E/P) to Dillon, 16 Dec 60, USNA IAEP; T/2552 Houghton to DOS, 19 Dec, DNSA NP00720.

<sup>275</sup> T/127 M/EC to DOS, 10 Jan 61, DNSA NP00742.

<sup>276</sup> 19 Dec 60 USG mtg (san.), 12 Jan 61, DDRS and D/7 NSA EBB IB:Dimona Revealed.

<sup>277</sup> ASOS to Ramey (fn 270) with DOS/AE “Public Statements Concerning the Israeli Reactor”.

<sup>278</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 89-90.

<sup>279</sup> Karpin 2006 pp. 158-60.

supported using various means to make it accept inspections. He noted it was time to decide “what we do as further countries become atomic producers”.<sup>280</sup>

Moreover, the question in the meeting was how to deal with the reactor *in public*. This is a point worth additional stressing in general: USG tactics for dealing with the matter in public – trying to avoid attention and reactions to Israel’s moves by other states – came to clearly differ from how it acted behind the scenes – pressing Israel to accept safeguards and to promise not to produce nuclear weapons.

Something that added to Israeli deception of the USG was that Israel seemed to have used diverted funds from US sources, especially private charity funds, to finance the plant (also the French expressed such a belief; Israel was secretive about the finances). Tax breaks were allowed on charity donations in the US, which constituted a significant form of tacit US aid to Israel. Herter and Eisenhower saw a threat to stop the tax breaks as a way to press Israel for safeguards<sup>281</sup>. Also this indicates that they favored strong USG action in the matter.

On 20 December, Israel answered the questions Herter had presented to Harman. Harman said that the 24-MW reactor was planned to be ready in 3-4 years’ time. It was to be for civilian, scientific purposes only and open for foreign scientists and “have no relationship to a weapons capacity.” But he did not answer Herter’s question about what would happen to the plutonium to be produced.<sup>282</sup> Herter then instructed Reid to tell Ben-Gurion that the USG did not want to “prolong or exaggerate this issue” but needed a “full and frank account [of] Israeli atomic activities, including plans for disposing of plutonium”, referring to otherwise resulting “grave repercussions in the Near East area particularly but also outside it”. This indicates that Israel’s moves were feared to have proliferation implications in the world in general. The DOS thought that Israel needed to soon let a “qualified scientist, preferably an IAEA designee, to visit Israel’s nuclear sites”.<sup>283</sup>

As also Cohen argues, US officials thus seem to have been already quite certain that Israel aimed to produce weapon material at Dimona but hoped safeguards to offer a way to prevent that. Though the USG had been slow to react to the first signs of the reactor, it made its opposition to proliferation very clear to Israel after the existence of the reactor became publicly known.<sup>284</sup> Especially to tone down *world reactions* to the revelation, the USG also wanted Israel to give proper guarantees on the peacefulness of its aims.

Ben-Gurion now made a statement also to the Knesset about a reactor being built in the Negev. To a question on “the report that an atomic bomb is being produced in Israel”, he

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<sup>280</sup> 19 Dec 60 USG mtg (fn 276).

<sup>281</sup> See D/177 (fn 150) FRUS 58-60:13; Herter to Dillon (fn 274); 19 Dec 60 USG mtg (fn 276); UK Emb. to DOS “Questions for Israel”, 13 Jan 61, with memo on Israeli replies, 23 Jan, USNA IR 1.

<sup>282</sup> D/180 Herter-Harman mtg, 20 Dec 60, FRUS 58-60:13; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 90.

<sup>283</sup> Herter to E/TA on disc. with Harman, 21 Dec 60, DNSA NP00721.

<sup>284</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 97.

noted this was “either a deliberate or unconscious untruth”.<sup>285</sup> Of course, none indeed was being *produced* yet.

Trying to calm down world reactions to the revelation, the DOS issued a public statement that referred to Israeli comments about the peaceful aims of its nuclear program, which did “not represent cause for special concern”. At the same time, the DOS stressed that the USG would keep up efforts to ensure that foreign nuclear programs would not take a military direction.<sup>286</sup> A telegram to US embassies stressed that the US had nothing to do with Dimona. The DOS was very unhappy about leaks to the press on USG interest in Israel’s nuclear program, which had led to “more excitement than facts as revealed by Israelis warrant”, and asked posts to help “in stilling atmosphere”. In Washington, the NEA tried to calm down other USG agencies that were disturbed by Israel’s secrecy towards the US and wanted to cut down aid to it.<sup>287</sup>

Especially important was to calm down Arab reactions against both Israel and, even though it had nothing to do with the site, the US. Among Arabs, the Dimona revelation caused upheaval. United Arab Republic (UAR; during a 1958-61 union with Syria and until 1971, Egypt used this name) officials in Washington “manifested almost hysterical attitude concerning Israel’s atomic capabilities” and argued that Israel tried to ruin US-Arab relations and “drive the Arabs completely into the arms of the Russians”.<sup>288</sup> Nasser indicated to the USG and the public that if Cairo were certain that Israel pursued nuclear weapons, it would have to “take radical action”, make a preventive attack, and acquire nuclear weapons. But he also argued that Israel could not threaten the non-nuclear Arabs with such weapons and was just trying to bluff.<sup>289</sup> After the revelation, Cairo strengthened its efforts in the nuclear field: it increased the budget and recruited personnel for its nuclear program (that was still in quite early stages), sought nuclear assistance from abroad, and made studies on the possibilities for nuclear development in Egypt<sup>290</sup>.

Emb. Amman in turn reported that though Jordanian officials welcomed US statements about the Dimona site, they warned that “if Israel has intention making atomic bomb later on Arabs will not delay getting their own”.<sup>291</sup> In Lebanon, press articles and some politicians demanded an “Arab bomb”, and Emb. Beirut argued to the DOS that if Israel’s aims were peaceful, inviting IAEA inspectors to Dimona was the way to “allay hysterical Arab suspicions”.<sup>292</sup> Despite USG assurances that it had nothing to do with the site, in Iraq the

<sup>285</sup> T/559 Reid to DOS on Ben-Gurion before the Knesset, 21 Dec 60, DNSA NP00722. See also Cohen, A. 1998 p. 91.

<sup>286</sup> DOS “Proposed Oral Statement to Press”, 22 Dec 60, DNSA NP00727. See also Cohen, A. 1998 p. 92.

<sup>287</sup> T/894 (fn 270); NEA, 30 Dec 60, with memo to Reid (fn 271).

<sup>288</sup> NEA-UAR officials mtg, 22 Dec 60, USNA NWS.

<sup>289</sup> T/577 Reid to Herter (san.), 24 Dec 60, DDRS; USOS with “History...” (fn 263); “Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb”, *NYT*, 24 Dec; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 244-5 ref. also to Levite, A. & Landau, E. (1994) *Israel’s Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel’s Nuclear Posture* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv: Papyrus, p. 73.

<sup>290</sup> See Einhorn 2004 pp. 45-7.

<sup>291</sup> T/76 Emb. Amman to DOS, 24 Dec 60, DNSA NP00729.

<sup>292</sup> T/604, T/614 Emb. Beirut to DOS, 27-9 Dec 60, DNSA NP00731-2.

press stressed its nuclear assistance to Israel and a news agency reported that “the atomic reactor that will be employed in manufacturing the Israeli bomb is of US make”<sup>293</sup>.

Moscow first reacted to the revelation by charging the US and the West with helping Israel get nuclear weapons. But soon, it switched to blaming the US of trying to control proliferation as it wished and of hypocritically questioning Israel’s aims but accepting Bonn’s nuclear ambitions. The Soviets also argued to the USG that the nuclear activities of small states like Finland or Israel that needed foreign help in them were insignificant.<sup>294</sup>

Referring to Israeli statements about peaceful aims was, as said, the USG tactic for *public* dealings. Behind the scenes, it continued to seek more information about Israel’s plans and pressed for safeguards. On 24 December, Reid stressed to Ben-Gurion US opposition to proliferation and the desirability of Israel accepting safeguards. A few days later, Reid reported that a reliable source had privately explained the secrecy around the site with foreign contractors’ hope to avoid Arab boycotts. But the USG was not satisfied with the information received from Israeli leaders so far and presented them questions about their plans regarding a) disposal of plutonium, b) visits by foreign scientists to Dimona, c) safeguards, d) further nuclear installations, and e) whether Israel could “state categorically that it has no plans for developing nuclear weapons”.<sup>295</sup> In early January, Ben-Gurion answered that a) plutonium would probably have to be returned to uranium supplier; b) friendly nations could make “completely “free and open”” visits; c) Israel would accept IAEA safeguards only when all nations with comparable facilities did (it did not want the Soviets to inspect it); d) no further reactors were planned; e) “categoric assurance that no nuclear weapons planned”<sup>296</sup>.

Whether or not Ben-Gurion really meant to allow free foreign visits to Dimona, the USG eagerly seized upon the offer. Though it wanted to avoid publicity on the issue, it was still not reassured: mere Israeli and French statements did not guarantee the peaceful nature of the reactor. Herter requested stronger guarantees on this from Harman and just before Kennedy took office, the DOS instructed Emb. Tel Aviv to keep up efforts for an early foreign visit to Dimona.<sup>297</sup>

London informed the USG that the Israelis had told it that though they did not plan to produce nuclear arms, no government could tie its hands for all times: it was possible that

<sup>293</sup> Desp. 748 Emb. Baghdad to DOS, 30 Dec 60, DNSA NP00733.

<sup>294</sup> DOS/INR “Soviet Comment on Israeli Reactor and Nth Country Problem”, 23 Dec 60, USNA NWS; Desp. 707 Foster (Emb. Vienna) to DOS on mtg with Soviet representative at the IAEA, 12 Jan 61, USNA IAEP.

<sup>295</sup> T/577 (san.), T/581 Reid to Herter, 24 and 27 Dec 60, DDRS and DNSA NP00730; D/181 ActSOS to Reid (san.), 31 Dec, FRUS 58-60:13; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 92-4.

<sup>296</sup> According to Bar-Zohar, Meir was asked the questions in the form of an ultimatum. USOS & NEA with “History...” (fn 263); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 94-5 ref. also to Bar-Zohar 1987 (fn 253) pp. 1391-2.

<sup>297</sup> DOS/AE to Herter, 6 Jan 61, USNA IR; USOS & NEA with “History...” (fn 263); Cohen, A. 1998 p. 95 ref. to disc. memo “Israel Atomic Energy Program”, 11 Jan, USNA B/2057, to “Harman and Herter Discussed the Reactor For Four Hours”, *Ma’ariv*, and to “The Contact with the U.S. on Israel’s Nuclear Program Will Continue”, *Ha’aretz*, 12-3 Jan (both in Hebrew).



changing circumstances would make a weapon effort needed. No formal agreement existed yet on whether plutonium from the Dimona reactor would be returned to the uranium supplier, but that was likely to be the case. The Israelis refused to reveal to London any details about agreements with France on, e.g., safeguards.<sup>298</sup>

The Dimona revelation caused irritation also in the Congress. This time, the USG tried to try calm down reactions against (not in support of) Israel. Several key Congressmen were very annoyed that Israel had hidden its plans from the US while it had pressed for military and economic aid and the US assisted it in many ways. In meetings with DOS officials, they moreover questioned whether Israeli statements about their aims could be trusted after they had also so far deceived the US. ASOS/NEA L. Jones argued in a meeting with five senators that the fear of an Arab boycott on Israel's contractors was not ungrounded but Israel had maintained secrecy too long. Herter admitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) that the Dimona situation was a new "disturbing element" in the region that pushed the Arabs to Moscow's arms. Jones argued the Arabs would in general not react immediately – the reactor was only to produce plutonium in 3-4 years' time – but Nasser seemed to have asked Moscow for a similar reactor. DOS views, as expressed to Senators (who seem to have accepted them), indicate that little *public* pressure on Israel was to be expected: publicity on the Dimona site was undesirable; US action against Israel could encourage the Arabs to do the same; and "it would be unfair to publicly brand Israel as a villain" as "all reactors everywhere produce some plutonium". At least some Senators did not oppose pressure behind the scenes: though doubting whether Israel could be forced to frankness, they referred to "various means of pressure" the US had vis-à-vis Israel.<sup>299</sup> Hersh argues, however, that many senior Congressmen also *favoured* the idea of Israeli nuclear weapons<sup>300</sup>.

On 19 January 1961, the Eisenhower administration's last day in office, the DOS submitted a report to the JCAE on Israel's nuclear activities. It noted that Israel had formally assured the US that a friendly state could visit Dimona once public interest in the matter weakened. The DOS intended soon to follow up on that but did not expect to get much more information about Israel's plans any time soon. It saw further public speculation on the reactor as contrary to US interests and was trying to damp such to prevent further Arab suspicions and reactions. But "persistent but quiet diplomatic approaches" seemed "most likely to productive". The report said that France, which did "not want to be associated with any Israeli nuclear weapons program", had satisfactorily assured that 1) its nuclear assistance to Israel was limited to this reactor, 2) as the provider of uranium, it would get

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<sup>298</sup> UK Emb. to DOS "Questions for Israel", 13 Jan 61, with a memo on Israeli replies, 23 Jan, USNA IR 1.

<sup>299</sup> SFRC Exec. session, 6 Jan 61, DNSA NP00739; D/2 DOS-senators disc., 9 Jan, FRUS 61-3:17; DOS to Bundy, 24 Feb, USNA ND B/4 chron. WH corresp.

<sup>300</sup> Hersh 1991 p. 119 ref. to Golan, M. (1982) *Shimon Peres*, New York: St. Martin's.

all plutonium produced in it, and 3) mechanisms, including inspections, had been agreed upon to ascertain that the plant would be used for peaceful purposes only.<sup>301</sup>

### **7.7 Conclusions regarding the Eisenhower era**

In conclusion, the Eisenhower administration came to want guarantees that Israel's nuclear aims were solely civilian because it wanted to prevent a destabilizing proliferation trend and violent Arab reactions that could be directed also against the US. To prevent the regional balance-of-power from tilting for Soviet benefit, it refused Israeli requests for closer security cooperation. Thus the evidence in this chapter indicates that balance-of-power and stability considerations much affected the basic direction of US security and nonproliferation policies towards Israel.

Ben-Gurion made repeated, strong requests for closer security ties to the US – an alliance or at least arms sales – and would probably have forgone pursuing nuclear weapons had an alliance been tied. But Israeli skepticism about the reliability of foreign commitments means that an alliance probably would have had to include strong mechanisms to reduce chances of abandonment before Israel would have put all eggs in one basket and fully forgone the acquisition of capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. France's willingness to cooperate on security and nuclear fields moreover reduced the need for Israel to reach an understanding with the USG on US security support for Israel.

To strengthen Western defenses against the USSR, the Eisenhower administration wanted rearmament of the FRG, but to reduce the risks that de- or re-alignment by the FRG would one day damage the balance-of-power or that adventurism by it would cause war, the administration at the same time saw it as necessary to tie the FRG tightly to Western Europe and the US. This need, together with the goal of military efficiency, made it favor institutionalization of NATO. It was prepared to make an effort to protect and strengthen the NATO solution to European security and added mechanisms to promote cooperation among NATO states, including military integration and cooperation in nuclear weapon affairs. The USG (but not the Congress) was trustful that the allies would not misuse such cooperation and saw it both as sensible regarding the strength of defense and relations to allies and as a way to prevent a destabilizing trend of nuclear weapon proliferation

The security dilemma made the USG to require production restrictions on the FRG and to retain a right to control its status regarding nuclear weapons. But the Eisenhower administration did not see it as feasible to control a major nation over time through restrictions and thus chose a strategy of trying to control Bonn's actions in the security field through cooperation, including involvement in nuclear weapon affairs (through participation in the scheme for stockpiles of US nuclear weapons in Europe and in the proposed schemes for a joint nuclear force and joint delivery system development). Similarly, after launching the

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<sup>301</sup> ASOS to Ramey (fn 270); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 95-6.

Atoms for Peace -policy the USG sought to control the FRG in the nuclear field through safeguarded assistance and cooperation, instead of restrictions. Even in the case of the FIG effort, it did not react in a directly condemning way but rather sought to gently guide Bonn towards cooperation on broad basis in NATO. The strategy of cooperation implied risks by adding to West German nuclear capabilities but was based on confidence that the USG would continue to be able to keep the FRG under control.

The thus tangibly strengthened credibility of the US security commitment to the FRG, together with expected strong, negative foreign reactions, decreased incentives and increased disincentives for Bonn to pursue a national nuclear force. Nonetheless, owing to persisting fears of abandonment fuelled by, e.g., the Radford crisis and the Sputnik shock, Bonn was open to joint weapon efforts with other Europeans and launched the development, as an insurance policy, of capabilities to produce nuclear weapons independently.



## 8 President Kennedy – 1961-63

The Kennedy administration, which came to power in January 1961, had in part new priorities in foreign and security policy. NATO remained central and it aimed to keep troops in Europe. But it had also other central goals: rapprochement with Moscow in order to reduce the chances of major war, global nuclear stability, stabilization of status quo in Europe, nonproliferation, central control of US nuclear forces, conventional build-up in Europe, and flexibility in crisis situations.<sup>1</sup> In his inaugural speech, Kennedy both pledged the US to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty” and proposed joint efforts with Moscow to solve shared problems, especially to prevent nuclear war – though adding that a prerequisite for the US to such efforts was credible military strength<sup>2</sup>. Kennedy especially emphasized the need for progress in the space race<sup>3</sup>. Some changes in the global balance-of-power were taking place around the turn of the decade, some benefiting the US and some the USSR. Discord between Communist China and Moscow grew as the Chinese criticized Soviet policies designed to avoid nuclear war; Moscow also gave up assistance for China’s nuclear weapon program. At the same time, F. Castro staged in 1959 a successful revolution in the backyard of the US and oriented Cuba towards the USSR after the failed, US-backed Bay of Pigs -invasion by counter-revolutionaries in April 1961.

Nuclear data and technology were becoming cheaper and more easily available. The first commercial nuclear power reactors had started operation in the US, and several others followed during the 1960s both there and in the USSR<sup>4</sup>. As also many other states were commissioning reactors, nuclear weapon proliferation was increasingly becoming a general concern; the CIA saw it as a key danger for the decade. Israel was now at the center of proliferation concerns, as Herter informed Kennedy at the start of Kennedy’s term. For many people, proliferation seemed almost unavoidable, sooner or later also to the FRG.<sup>5</sup> Kennedy and many of his top officials saw proliferation in general as contrary to US interests and justified this stance with several arguments. 1) Existence of many NWSs in NATO implied risks of uncontrolled, unpredictable responses in crisis situations. 2) National forces by US allies were wasteful as US nuclear forces protected them. Allies’ resources were needed in conventional build-up. Moreover, developing nuclear weapons re-

<sup>1</sup> See National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 40 “Policy Directive Regarding NATO and the Atlantic Nations”, 24 Apr 61, DNSA BC02034; US-UK mtg, 5 Apr, DNSA BC02024; Kennedy’s news conf., 5 July 62, PPK 279; Mahneke 1972 pp. 91-2; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 156-8; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 283.

<sup>2</sup> Kennedy’s inaugural speech, 20 Jan 61, PPK 1.

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Kennedy’s statement on amendment to Aeronautics and Space Act, 25 Apr 61, PPK 147.

<sup>4</sup> See IAEA 2004a; IAEA 2004b.

<sup>5</sup> D/2 CIA NIE 1-61 on “World Situation”, 17 Jan 61, FRUS 61-3:8; Owen (DOS/PPS) to Bundy, 27 Nov 61, with Kennedy on Liddell Hart’s *Deterrent and Defense*, 3 Sep 60, JFKL MLF; McNamara to Kennedy, 12 Feb 63, DNSA NP00941; Kennedy’s news conf., 21 Feb, PPK 75; Dalma 1965 pp. 2, 6; Freedman 1989 pp. 303-6; Reeves 1994 pp. 32-3; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 99, 101. For estimates that wide proliferation was *not* inevitable, see, e.g., Beaton & Maddox 1962; Beaton 1966; Bader 1966 p. 699. On pessimistic proliferation estimates of the 1960s, see also Seaborg 1987 pp. 249-52.

quires large initial investments, and small nuclear powers do not benefit from later economies of scale. 3) It was feared that a small nuclear force could somehow be a trigger to US nuclear forces. 4) Arms control and disarmament negotiations would become still more complicated. 5) Small nuclear forces were vulnerable to surprise attacks and, if used, elimination by ABM systems, and small states had no ability to absorb a nuclear first strike. This threatened to invite pre-emptive attacks against them and lead to hair-trigger response systems that can result in premature use of weapons.<sup>6</sup>

But though the USG came to play down the value and emphasize the costs of national nuclear forces in order to discourage such, Kennedy and his aides themselves believed in existential deterrence i.e. that even a small nuclear force can deter a larger one. Kennedy came to argue that the small Soviet missile force in Cuba had been a deterrent against the US and that national nuclear forces made states fully independent. Moreover, despite ideas of limited nuclear war entertained in the spirit of the new US strategy for NATO (discussed in section 8.2.1), these men seem not to have believed in chances to control nuclear war: later accounts by Kennedy's aides stress his (and Johnson's) urge to prevent *any* use of nuclear weapons because of the risk of escalation.<sup>7</sup>

Kennedy expressed great concern that 10-20 states could have a nuclear weapon capability by the mid-1960s. For him, Communist China's nuclear ambitions were the greatest concern. The lack of progress in arms control had received increasing public attention in 1959-60 and both Kennedy and the Republican candidate R. Nixon had promised in their election campaigns greater efforts in the field. Kennedy spoke especially about nuclear nonproliferation and (similarly as the earlier Democratic candidate A. Stevenson) a test ban treaty; this he had made his key theme in the Senate in 1959. Though a test ban was to affect weapon development by the NWSs, it was for him also a nonproliferation measure: he argued to his aides that beyond testing as such and the US-Soviet arms race, at stake was proliferation to, e.g., Israel. He justified a ban also to Soviet leader N. Khrushchev with the nonproliferation aspect.<sup>8</sup> The efforts for a test ban are discussed in section 8.4.

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<sup>6</sup> Wohlstetter 1961; Mahncke 1972 pp. 147-8; Freedman 1989 pp. 306-7. See also Kohler 1972 pp. 35-47 and Kissinger 1965 pp. 118-9.

<sup>7</sup> See D/402 US-UK mtg, 19 Dec 62; D/169 NSCEC mtg, 25 Jan 63, both FRUS 61-3:13; D/125 NSC mtg, 22 Jan, FRUS 61-3:8; Kissinger 1965 p. 178; Bundy 1969; Rusk 1991 p. 221; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 315-20. On disparaging of small nuclear forces, see D/250 DOS to E/P with Kennedy to de Gaulle 31 Dec 61, 1 Jan 62, FRUS 61-3:14; Kennedy-Strauss mtg, 8 June 62, JFKL N/G; McNamara's speech, 16 June, DNSA NP00879; Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; Ball 1968 p. 216.

<sup>8</sup> 3<sup>rd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup> Presidential debates, 13 and 21 Oct 60 (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu>; 19 July 07); D/31 Kennedy-Khrushchev mtg, 4 June 61, FRUS 61-3:7; Quester 1970 p. 182; Seaborg 1981 pp. 32, 48, 67, 94; Reeves 1994 pp. 111-2, 137, 510. Both Hersh 1991 (p. 98) and Cohen, A. 1998 (pp. 99, 375 fn 1) argue based on discussions with Kennedy's aides that Kennedy really was strongly committed to nonproliferation.

An early strategy paper prepared for Kennedy suggested indicating early to Moscow willingness to negotiate on nonproliferation measures even beyond a test ban. To put pressure on Moscow, respond to pressures in NATO, and secure a *backup* option if talks with Moscow bore no fruit, Kennedy needed to secure green light from the Congress for revising the AEA to allow a NATO nuclear force. Memo to Kennedy with "Action teams: military and foreign policy", n/d (Oct/early Nov 60), with 1) memo on key early issues, 2) "A Strategy for the first 6 months", and 3) "A Reserve Plan for NATO", JFKL PR.

Israel posed an acute proliferation problem when Kennedy came to power, but the case of the FRG was also important. For the new administration, the FRG simply *had to* be prevented from getting nuclear weapons. Just an impression of it getting closer to controlling strategic nuclear weapons was expected to put NATO cohesion, stability in Europe, and US-Soviet relations seriously at risk and maybe lead to even military action by Moscow. For instance, the SOS D. Rusk wrote to a US diplomat in May 1961 that any “German effort [to] create or join in creating nuclear capability would shake NATO to its foundations” and noted in a USG meeting in April 1963 that “it was certainly clear that in relation to the Soviet Union, we didn’t want a situation in which the Germans own warheads themselves.”<sup>9</sup> The Kennedy administration generally disliked the idea of uncoordinated, destabilizing national nuclear weapon efforts and in NATO states’ case saw such as dangerous also because these used up resources needed for conventional build-up. European failure to provide sufficient conventional troops could have in turn led to US troop withdrawals from Europe, which would have much weakened NATO.<sup>10</sup>

The USG accepted Moscow’s often expressed worry about German nuclear aims as genuine though it knew that this was also a propaganda topic for Moscow. Though NATO’s nuclear sharing plans probably contributed to Moscow’s concern about Germany, both Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations showed understanding for the concern and assured Moscow that also the USG did not want the FRG to control nuclear weapons.<sup>11</sup>

According to the existential deterrence logic for instance Kennedy subscribed to, the FRG could have been able to produce a nuclear force capable of *detering* Moscow, especially because of the risk of escalation into general war<sup>12</sup>. Also the USG wanted to minimize that risk; moreover, a national German deterrent contradicted its goal of keeping the FRG tied to and dependent on the US. Kennedy argued to Finland’s President U. Kekkonen that as long as the FRG was tied to the West, it could present no threat to the USSR, but if the ties were damaged, the risk existed of it embarking on a nationalistic route that implied a risk

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Mendershausen 1972 suggests that USG statements about expected proliferation to the FRG were maybe in part just an attempt to raise international support for nonproliferation (p. 420).

<sup>9</sup> D/227 Rusk to Amb. Gavin (E/P), 5 May 61, D/191 USG mtg, 24 Apr 63, both FRUS 61-3:13; D/250 (fn 7) FRUS 61-3:14; Rusk-Stikker mtg, 7 Feb 62; “US-European Relations in NATO” (n/a), n/d, both JFKL MLF; Ahonen 1995 p. 37; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 283-5, 305. Richardson 1966 argues that Moscow recognized that the FRG could not challenge it militarily and no irrationally strong Soviet response to German nuclear arming was likely, but a *perception* that a German nuclear force would threaten peace made the prospect so dangerous politically that it could have led even to dissolution of NATO (pp. 205-8).

<sup>10</sup> NSAM 40 (fn 1); Richardson 1966 pp. 209, 221.

<sup>11</sup> See, e.g., Mikoyan-Dulles and -Eisenhower mtgs, 16-7 Jan 59, DNSA BC00636 and BC00640; D/32 Kennedy-Khrushchev mtg, 4 June 61, FRUS 61-3:14; Rostow to Kennedy, 18 July, with 17 July Rostow-Menshikov mtg, JFKL PR; Deputy National Security aide Kaysen “Thoughts on Berlin”, 22 Aug, JFKL GEB 2; Kennedy’s interview, 25 Nov, PPK 483; D/98 Khrushchev to Kennedy, late Apr, FRUS 61-3:6; D/208 Khrushchev-Rusk mtg, 9 Aug, FRUS 61-3:15; D/86 Soviet leader Kosygin-Harriman mtg, 21 July; D/102 Bundy to Johnson with 24 Nov Bundy-Dobrynin disc., 25 Nov; D/153 Rusk-Gromyko mtg, 24 Sep 66; D/239 US-USSR disc., 17 May 68, all FRUS 64-8:11; Ball 1965 p. 224; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 177.

<sup>12</sup> Views vary on whether the FRG could have directly threatened the USSR with a national nuclear force. Trachtenberg argues it could have (pp. 252-3); Küntzel 1992 is of a contrary view (p. 45). Beaton 1966 argued that only after decades, the FRG could have achieved an effective force against it (p. 56).

of war<sup>13</sup>. For instance Küntzel and Trachtenberg present Germany's case as the key reason why the superpowers started efforts for a general nonproliferation agreement<sup>14</sup>.

Kennedy won the elections by a thin margin and his position with the Congress was not very strong, a fact to which he remained sensitive. Still, his basic stance was according to Rusk that "domestic politics can only lose elections. Foreign policy can kill us all."<sup>15</sup> But success on such key issues on his agenda as a test ban depended on congressional support and thus he was in general hesitant to strain his relations to it with unpopular ideas.

Kennedy acted to strengthen USG capabilities in disarmament issues. He made J. McCloy his disarmament advisor with a task of studying how to best organize efforts in the field. McCloy proposed creating a special agency for this, and as a result, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was launched in fall 1961. The Committee of Principals (COP), an interagency group Eisenhower had set up to coordinate arms control policy, was strengthened under Kennedy (it came to include, among others, the SOS, the SOD, ACDA and CIA directors, AEC and JCS chairmen, and president's national security and science advisors). Owing to the failure to discover the Dimona reactor early, a need for more thorough and better coordinated intelligence on potential proliferants was now recognized. According to Hersh, Kennedy found a fellow opponent of proliferation in McCone, whom he nominated to head the CIA and who in vain then tried to ascertain through intelligence efforts whether a reprocessing plant was being built at Dimona.<sup>16</sup>

I will start the discussion of the Kennedy era by returning to the question of Israel's Dimona reactor and discuss how the administration dealt with the issue during its first years in office. Thereafter I will consider the new US strategy for NATO and Bonn's response to it. In 8.2.2-6 follows a discussion of the emergence of the issue of cooperation on nonproliferation on the US-Soviet negotiation agenda and the simultaneous development of the administration's policy regarding nuclear sharing and organization in NATO. Then I will return to the questions of US policy in the Middle East and Israel's nuclear ambitions and discuss USG efforts to deal with this issue by pursuing Israel-UAR arms limitation and inspections of the Dimona plant (sections 8.3 and 8.5). While that initiative was underway, nonproliferation and arms control talks with Moscow progressed towards one concrete success, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), discussed in section 8.4.

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<sup>13</sup> Schlesinger 1965 p. 379.

<sup>14</sup> Probably reflecting the focus of their research, Küntzel 1992 portrays the German case as especially important in US nonproliferation policy (pp. 42-3) and Trachtenberg 1999 argues that a need to keep Germany non-nuclear was largely behind the superpowers' global nonproliferation efforts and that the USG attitude towards other possible proliferants, France and Israel in particular, was much more relaxed (pp. 381-7). In addition to the FRG, Japan has often been cited as a special early proliferation concern that drove global nonproliferation efforts: the USG feared that if these states went nuclear, the chances of proliferation elsewhere would much grow. See, e.g., Art 1991 p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> See Schlesinger 1965 pp. 707-13; Rusk 1991 p. 450.

<sup>16</sup> D/2 Kennedy to McCloy, 27 Jan 61, FRUS 61-3:7; D/1 CIA draft "Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability", 31 Jan, NSA EBB IB:Dimona Revealed; Schlesinger 1965 pp. 472-3; Bader 1968 p. 50; Seaborg 1981 p. 95; Seaborg 1987 p. 8; Hersh 1991 pp. 105-7.



### **8.1 Kennedy and the Israeli nuclear issue – the first years**

The Dimona revelation provided an immediate trial for Kennedy's nonproliferation agenda. The intelligence community clearly questioned the peacefulness of Israel's aims: CIA global estimate argued that Israel had "almost certainly" launched a nuclear weapon program and a JAEIC report concluded that Israel's secrecy indicated that it aimed to use the Dimona site at least partly to produce weapon-grade material.<sup>17</sup> The DOS took a less alarmed stance even with Kennedy: it told him that Israeli and French assurances regarding the plant seemed "satisfactory although several minor questions still require clarification" and argued that the claim that secrecy around it resulted from a desire to protect contractors from boycotts was reasonable. It saw as the reasons for the US concern over the reactor that 1) the stance of both the legislative and the executive was in general to oppose proliferation and 2) proliferation by Israel in particular could have serious effects, such as stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons in Arab countries.<sup>18</sup> Reid, who was leaving his position in Tel Aviv, indicated sympathy for Israel by telling Kennedy that Israeli statements about the reactor's peacefulness could be accepted "at face value", though he added that very few even among Israeli leaders knew the true goals of the nuclear program<sup>19</sup>. Towards the new president, who had the power to authorize aid to France's nuclear weapon effort (by determining that France had made significant progress towards nuclear weapons), Paris in turn now at least wanted to appear opposed to Israeli production of nuclear weapons and expressed concern about this possibility to the USG<sup>20</sup>.

Kennedy was showing special interest in the reactor. But despite his nonproliferation agenda, his ability to press Israel was in general somewhat restricted by the fact that his narrow election victory had depended on the votes of the Jewish electorate that he had won by expressing strong support for Israel during campaigning.<sup>21</sup> To maintain Jewish support and so prevent problems with the Congress, Kennedy made the Jewish aide M. Feldman his special assistant for Israel and Middle East. Though Feldman did become Israel's lobbyist in the USG, he was also a channel for the USG to make its views clear to the "Israel lobby" and seems not to have greatly influenced the Kennedy (and Johnson) administration's moves in the Israeli nuclear issue. And Kennedy ensured that also the views of those not tilted towards Israel would be fed into decision-making regarding the Middle East by having R. Komer, who favored efforts to improve relations with Cairo and represented prevailing DOS and CIA stances, as a NSCS member much involved in policies towards Israel.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> D/2 NIE 1-61 "Estimate of the World Situation", 17 Jan 61, FRUS 61-3:8; CIA "Post-Mortem..." (fn 16).

<sup>18</sup> DOS/NEA to Rusk with memo to Kennedy "Israel's Atomic Energy Activities" (san.), 30 Jan 61, USNA MWH B/4. See also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 101-2.

<sup>19</sup> D/6 Reid-Kennedy disc., 31 Jan 61, FRUS 61-3:17.

<sup>20</sup> D/10 on US-UK talks, 13 Feb 61, *ibid*.

<sup>21</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 20 Apr 67, with draft memo "1968 – American Jewry and Israel", LBJL N/I VI M1; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 100.

<sup>22</sup> Feldman himself argued to Kennedy that he was maybe a bad choice for the position because of his pro-Israel bias. Kennedy replied that the bias was why he wanted to appoint Feldman. Komer and reportedly also Kennedy's national security aide M. Bundy did not trust Feldman and sought to prevent the dissemination of

Domestic pro-Israel pressures implied problems regarding any moves to improve relations with Egypt. But for Kennedy, better relations were in US interest especially because this key Arab state was to be kept from ending up in the Soviet camp. Slow improvement in US-UAR relations reportedly took place during the first 1,5 years of his term. He nominated pro-Arab J. Badeau as Ambassador to Egypt and indicated seeking of middle ground in the region through public statements and by launching direct correspondence with Nasser. Cairo seemed to share the wish of better relations and be prepared to orientate towards the West in return for economic aid.<sup>23</sup>

But the Dimona issue caused problems to US-UAR relations and Cairo continued to warn the USG of possible consequences. Amb. M. Kamel again complained that Israel's moves pushed the Arabs into Soviet arms despite their strong anti-communism and warned that if Israel produced nuclear bombs, the Arabs would have to get some, even if it meant joining the East bloc.<sup>24</sup>

Also the new USG avoided publicly questioning Israel's reassurances about its aims but, rather, supported them: in early February 1961, Kennedy saw an early US statement on "the peaceful uses of the Israeli project" as maybe needed to prevent Cairo from pressing Moscow to help it get nuclear weapons<sup>25</sup>. At the same time, behind the scenes the administration saw itself as the only party that could maybe make Israel forgo nuclear weapons. The intelligence community aimed to follow the matter and the DOS to press for an inspection of the Dimona plant: regular visits were the only way to know what was going on there.<sup>26</sup> The USG also assured the Arabs that it was not giving Israel free hands in the nuclear field, opposed proliferation also by Israel, and aimed to keep a close eye on Israel's nuclear efforts.<sup>27</sup>

The Israelis continued to make claims about peaceful aims to the USG. Harman said that if Cairo acquired a similar or even larger reactor than the one in Dimona, "to be dedicated to the same purposes intended for Israel's, his Government would not be concerned". The plant was to be used only for scientific experiments and preparing scientists for future large-scale civilian uses of nuclear energy.<sup>28</sup>

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sensitive information related to US-Arab policies to him, suspecting him to leak too much to the Israelis. See Feldman-Harman mtg and Komer to Feldman, 6-9 May 63, both with Komer's comments to Bundy, JFKL N/I; Spiegel 1985 pp. 99-100; Hersh 1991 pp. 98-9 and Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 101, 375 fn 11 ref. to their interviews with Feldman, Komer, Kaysen, and Bundy.

<sup>23</sup> Rostow to Kennedy with Rostow-Kamel mtg, 6 Dec 61, JFKL PR; D/159 Rusk to Kennedy, 10 Jan 62, FRUS 61-3:17; Walt 1987 p. 94; Hersh 1991 pp. 107-8. On Kennedy's Middle East and Israel policy in general, see, e.g., Spiegel 1985 Chapter 4; Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapter 4.

<sup>24</sup> D/9 DOS to E/Cairo (C), 8 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17; NE-Kamel mtg, 17 May, USNA ND B/4.

<sup>25</sup> D/7 FRUS 61-3:17 fn 2 ref. to USNA SOS staff mtgs Lot 66D147.

<sup>26</sup> NEA "Israel's Atomic..." (fn 18); Briefing book (Bb) for Ben-Gurion visit II A-3 Israel's nuclear program, May 61, JFKL POF Israel B/119a security; Reeves 1994 pp. 32-3; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 101.

<sup>27</sup> D/9 DOS to E/C, 8 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17; Rusk to Emb. Baghdad & Beirut, 3 March, DNSA NP00755.

<sup>28</sup> D/12 Bundy-Harman mtg, 16 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17.

### 8.1.1 Views and expectations of the Kennedy administration

As nonproliferation was on Kennedy's agenda, any proliferation challenge posed the problem of how to protect this *general* goal: states' proliferation choices were expected to depend on what others decided and on major powers' reactions. Another question was whether the USG saw nuclear weapon ambitions of a specific state as very harmful as such. Though officially, the USG came to oppose all proliferation, senior USG officials continued to disagree on whether it was in US interest to actively pursue this policy in each case.

For war-avoidance and balance-of-power reasons, Israel's case did cause particular concern to the administration as shown by, e.g., a fall 1961 NIE on Israel and summer 1961 JCS and March 1963 CIA papers on the impact of Israel acquiring a nuclear weapon capability (the CIA defined this as testing or declaring; it was possible that Israel would forgo testing and use a foreign weapon design). The memos argued that US interests called for preventing war and easing tensions in the area and that Israel's nuclear ambitions and Jordan water issues were the key potential sources of greater Arab-Israel tension. A nuclear weapon capability was expected to make Israel promote its interests more assertively, be tougher towards Arabs, and use the capability in a psychological battle against them. The capability was expected to much disturb Arabs, but they were probably unable to take coordinated action against Israel or develop nuclear weapons early. A preventive attack was possible if Nasser thought Israel was about to produce nuclear arms, but his expected loss in ensuing hostilities inhibited him. Biological or chemical weapon efforts by Arabs were possible and Cairo was likely to use the issue to strengthen Arab unity. US interests in the region and West-Arab relations were likely to suffer as Arabs would maybe blame also the US for Israel's capability: the regional conflict would increasingly become one of the Arabs and the East against Israel and the West. Several Arab leaders thought that only the US could stop Israel from going nuclear. If it acquired a nuclear weapon capability, Israel was expected to portray itself towards the US as the only valuable ally in the area, press the US to accept its capability, and demand a part in international disarmament talks. Though such a capability was no direct threat to the US or its allies, it was expected to clearly affect US policies towards the region and possibly complicate arms limitation talks. Moscow was thought to want to prevent Israel's going nuclear because it opposed proliferation and wanted to avoid Chinese and UAR pressure for help in producing nuclear weapons. It was not likely to give Cairo such help (it did not want to give it to WP states, either) or set up nuclear bases in area (Arabs did not want it to and doing so was risky and of little military benefit for it). But Moscow could also benefit from an Israeli capability if Cairo in reaction sought its political and military support. Possible Soviet reactions included trying to get the US put pressure on Israel and France; maybe blaming the US; renewed proposals for a NWFZ that would include Turkey; use of the issue to increase Western and non-aligned interest in its disarmament ideas; and either stronger efforts for a test ban and nuclear arms limitation or, on the contrary, discounting of such moves. Especially neutral powers and small NATO states were expected to react to Israel's *pursuing* of

nuclear arms by pressing for nonproliferation efforts. But if Israel *demonstrated* a weapon capability, it was possible that, e.g., Switzerland, Sweden, and maybe Japan would follow suit.<sup>29</sup> The DOS expected proliferation in the area to limit US intervention capability, have a destabilizing impact in the world, and thus push even larger states towards developing a nuclear capability. It was moreover seen in the USG that even unclarity about Israel's aims, if it just tried to *appear* to have a nuclear weapon program and bluff the Arabs, was almost as bad as its having one: the issue with the reactor was "not only one of not producing weapons but also of convincing the Arabs that weapons were not being produced", the latter being more challenging.<sup>30</sup>

Thus the US feared Israel's nuclear aims both to lead to much trouble in the Middle East and to contribute to a setting in motion of a proliferation chain reaction in the world, albeit the latter effect was expected especially if Israel went *overtly* nuclear. This explains the USG tactic for dealing with the issue: its primary goal was to keep *other states* from *thinking* that Israel aimed to produce nuclear weapons. Its arguments also towards Israel concerned especially Arab reactions: a DOS official noted to an Israeli Embassy official that especially worrying was the effect in the region of "an apparent Israeli commitment to work toward nuclear weapons"; *even if many Americans understood why Israel might want such weapons*, pursuing them was not in its interest because it was possible that Arabs would then also get them and any nuclear attack would destroy the small Israel.<sup>31</sup>

Israel's factual and perceived, existing and expected, security situation was important for the prospects of proliferation, but despite Arab hostility, *the USG* did not see Israel's situation as very grave. In fall 1961, the DOS/NEA argued that for the time being, Israel would remain fairly secure, even though its neighbors were becoming stronger. Since 1948, the Arabs had refrained from large-scale aggression against Israel, and though many Arabs hoped Israel's destruction, no signs existed of an early effort or ability to cause that. Israeli forces were clearly superior to Arab forces and though the Arabs in sum had greater resources, Israel had other advantages: "mobilization capability, massive financial and material support from abroad, a modern industrial base, scientific know how, skilled manpower, and a reasonably satisfied population". The chance of real joint military action by all Eastern Arabs was "too remote to discuss seriously", and the UAR alone could not win against Israel.<sup>32</sup> An early 1963 NIE similarly expected Israel to remain military stronger than the Arabs for several years to come and added that Arab action in nuclear and sur-

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<sup>29</sup> D/95 JCS on effects of an Israeli nuclear capability (san.), Aug 61, FRUS 61-3:17; NIE 35-61 "The Outlook for Israel", 5 Oct, LBJL I:I; D/179 CIA Board of National Estimates "Consequences of Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability", 6 March 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>30</sup> D/10 on US-UK talks, 13 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17; Bb for Ben-Gurion visit II A-3 Israel's nuclear program, May 61, JFKL POF Israel B/119a security; NEA-Ball disc., 16 May 63, JFKL BT B/5 Israel; Komer to Kennedy, 31 May, with memo to arms limitation emissary, 29 May, JFKL SAC.

<sup>31</sup> DOS/AE-Gazit mtg, 16 May 61, USNA IR 2.

<sup>32</sup> D/143 Talbot to Rusk, 22 Nov 61, FRUS 61-3:17.

face-to-surface missile (SSM) fields had little prospect of becoming militarily significant any time soon.<sup>33</sup>

The NEA saw that since Arabs admitted that large-scale aggression against Israel would lead to Western intervention, Israel was safe as long as the West had a capability and the will to promptly intervene in the area if needed. Other consequences of the regional military situation for US policy were that the US 1) had to support Israel enough economically and politically to prevent perceptions of political isolation and serious military threat, and thus a pre-emptive attack on Arabs; 2) needed to “assure ourselves and others” about Israel’s nuclear efforts to avoid desperate military moves by Arabs; and 3) was not to relax its arms supply restrictions as Israel had other sources for arms.<sup>34</sup> Because of the expected effects of Israel acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, the JCS moreover thought that the US was to do all it could to make Israel and France see it as undesirable. Also SOD R. McNamara came to argue that if Israel tried to get nuclear weapons, the USG was to try to stop it.<sup>35</sup>

### 8.1.2 The short-term solution: US visit to Dimona

Ben-Gurion had indicated that an early visit to Dimona could be possible, and Reid informed Kennedy that the US could secretly visit the site when it wanted and even public inspections, though harder to arrange, were possible. But despite constant DOS pressure, also in Kennedy’s name (but not in public), a visit was hard to achieve. The Israelis cited domestic political turbulence and the Passover as reasons for delay. But Ben-Gurion continued to make promises about a visit and the DOS expected him to honor them. The Israelis told the USG also of plans to invite a journalist to Dimona.<sup>36</sup>

In April 1961, Harman finally presented an invitation for a mid-May visit. To a US question whether visits by other states were planned, Harman noted that this invitation was a special case. Israel hoped the visit to be kept secret, but the wide-spread interest in the plant in Washington made the NEA doubt whether that was possible.<sup>37</sup>

In return for the visit, Feldman and A. Feinberg, an influential Jewish fund-raiser for the Democrats (who according to Karpin organized the private funding for the Dimona facil-

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<sup>33</sup> D/139 NIE 30-63 “The Arab-Israeli Problem” (san.), 23 Jan 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>34</sup> D/143 (fn 32) FRUS 61-3:17.

<sup>35</sup> D/95 (fn 29) FRUS 61-3:17; McNamara to Kennedy (san.), 16 June 62, JFKL 8Q.

<sup>36</sup> NEA “Israel’s Atomic...” (fn 18); D/6 Reid-Kennedy disc., 31 Jan 61; D/7 Harman-Jones disc. also fn 3, 3 Feb, both FRUS 61-3:17; DOS/AE to NEA, 1 Feb, USNA IAEP; DOS to Bundy, 15 Feb, with T/605 DOS to E/TA on 13 Feb Rusk-Harman mtg, JFKL N/I; NEA-Kollek (Ben-Gurion’s office chef) mtg, 26 Feb, USNA ND B/5 Tel Aviv; USOS to Kennedy with “History of United States Interest in Israel’s Atomic Energy Activities” (san.), 30 March, JFKL N/I; and with Jones-Harman mtg, 28 March; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 103-4.

<sup>37</sup> D/31 Jones-Harman mtg, 10 Apr 61, FRUS 61-3:17; Jones to Rusk on Rusk-Harman mtg, 11 Apr; NEA-Gazit mtg, 1 May, both USNA SAEM.

ity), persuaded Kennedy to agree to meet Ben-Gurion privately to discuss, e.g., security issues and the nuclear program. The meeting was set for 30 May.<sup>38</sup>

Kennedy wanted a scientist from a neutral country to accompany the US visitors in order to make the findings more credible in the eyes of the world, especially the Arabs. The Israelis turned down such USG requests, saying that the US alone was invited because it had publicly supported Israeli statements about the reactor and deserved assurances. Since the DOS wanted the US visit to take place before Kennedy met Ben-Gurion, it came to prefer pressing for a neutral visit only in that meeting.<sup>39</sup>

In the meanwhile, the Israelis (and their American friends) made requests for a US security guarantee for or a defense pact with Israel and a clearer US or multilateral statement against aggression in the area. Arguing that they needed a deterrent, the Israelis moreover again showed interest in the Hawk system. Also Reid suggested Kennedy to consider giving Israel stronger security assurances, or ballistic missiles, to promote stability in the area. But when Rusk probed into the idea of even just a US reactivation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, Kamel said that this would appear as interference on Israel's behalf, not ease Arab fears of Israel.<sup>40</sup> Thus, as the new ASOS/NEA, P. Talbot, told Harman in May, the USG questioned the usefulness of both a guarantee and a statement. It saw its clear opposition to aggression, its relationship with Israel, and Israel's own military power as enough to deter the Arabs. Neither the Western Europeans nor the Soviets were expected to join the US in any statement; the Arabs were expected to see one as "an attempt to coerce them into making peace with Israel and as an abandonment of an impartial attitude on the part of the United States". The USG also saw moves toward becoming Israel's principal arms supplier as harmful to regional stability and a reason for Moscow to increase arms supply to the UAR. Israel was to acquire advanced and heavy arms from Europe; the US supported its military effort in other ways.<sup>41</sup> Another DOS/NEA memo noted that the USG did not want to give security guarantees also to avoid entrapment in Israeli-provoked hostilities<sup>42</sup>.

The USG still saw little chance of regional arms control. Disarmament and security guarantees conflicted with Nasser's power ambitions among Arabs. Israel portrayed them as alternatives to its own military build-up but was thought to support them mainly for bargaining purposes.<sup>43</sup>

Key indications of what Israel planned to do at Dimona were the amount of uranium acquired (indicating how frequent fuel load changes were planned), what would happen with

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<sup>38</sup> Hersh 1991 p. 101; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 104. On Feinberg, see Hersh 1991 pp. 93-8; Karpin 2006 pp. 129-37.

<sup>39</sup> Bundy to Kennedy, 11 May 61, JFKL SM B/62 Bundy.

<sup>40</sup> D/6 (fn 36), D/9 DOS to E/C, 8 Feb 61, FRUS 61-3:17; Harman to Rusk, 27 Feb, USNA ND B/5 Tel Aviv; NEA- American-Israel Public Affairs Committee mtg, 20 March, *ibid.* B/4 chron. memcons; DOS/AE-Gazit mtg, 16 May, USNA IR 2.

<sup>41</sup> D/39 Talbot to Rusk also fn 4, 1 May 61, FRUS 61-3:17.

<sup>42</sup> NEA to PPS, 23 Aug 61, USNA RNA.

<sup>43</sup> USIB working group memo (san.), 6 Apr 61, CIA FOIA; D/39 (fn 41) FRUS 61-3:17; NEA to PPS (fn 42).

the produced plutonium, and whether it had or planned to build a reprocessing plant. A CIA bulletin noted that France, though now only cooperating with Israel in the peaceful nuclear field, had already delivered to it 85 tons of natural uranium, which would suffice for the reactor for 2 years, and was to deliver further 385 tons over a 10 years' time. The already delivered fuel was to be returned to France after use, but it was unclear what would happen with the rest. In the summer, the French answered a USG inquiry only that Israel would return plutonium produced at Dimona to France. The JCS expected France to continue to provide fuel but to probably demand safeguards. The USG had, however, found out that Israel had sought unsafeguarded uranium supply from, e.g., Argentina, and its own fuel production capacity was enough for it to have stockpiled enough fuel for about a year's use in a 40 MW-reactor (indicating that the Dimona reactor was thought to have been upgraded from the announced capacity), and production of plutonium for one bomb.<sup>44</sup>

The CIA bulletin also referred to a statement "that Israel has started construction of an underground plutonium factory"<sup>45</sup>. This is notable in that in the following several years, in those estimates by the CIA and other USG agencies that have been declassified, Israel was argued to have *no* such plant<sup>46</sup>. Together with the late 1960 AEC view that the Dimona site included such a plant, this supports Hersh's and Cohen's claims that some USG officials at least had indications of its existence but sought to keep it secret.

On 20 May 1961, two US scientists visited the Dimona site. They were informed that the plant, expected to be ready in 1964, was an experiment in preparation for a possible power generation program. Plans also existed for a *pilot* reprocessing plant (since the reference in the CIA bulletin was to an *underground* plant, it seems not to have meant this one). The visitors were given no material in writing, and no pictures were allowed, but they reported that they were "satisfied that nothing was concealed from them and that the reactor is of the scope and peaceful character previously described", though when ready, it would produce "small quantities of plutonium suitable for weapons". To verify this, they saw a next inspection as needed a year later.<sup>47</sup> Cohen argues that 1) the scientists' "mission was not to challenge what they were told, but to verify it"; 2) they were probably unaware of US intelligence on the site; and 3) Israel organized the visit so that they were unable to "detect any activities embarrassing to Israel (and the United State)" – hinting that the USG did not

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<sup>44</sup> CIA Bulletin (san.), 27 Apr 61, JFKL N/I Ben-Gurion visit Arab-Israel situation; D/95 (fn 29) FRUS 61-3:17; DOS to Bundy with "Chronology of Israel Assurances of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Related Events", 18 March 64, USNA RNA.

<sup>45</sup> CIA Bulletin (fn 44).

<sup>46</sup> Hersh 1991 notes the CIA Office of National Estimates did not believe all intelligence reports about the Dimona site and thus NIES were naïve about it (pp. 147-8). Green 1984 argues that until 1968, NIEs on Israel's nuclear efforts were only internal memos based on less interagency coordination than formal NIEs (p. 164).

<sup>47</sup> D/13 AEC scientists Staebler & Croach draft "Notes on Visit to Israel" with "Memorandum of Discussions with Mr. Pratt and Staff", D/14 "Highlights on Other Technical Facilities", both 23 May 61, NSA EBB IB:1st American Visit to Dimona; D/53 DOS to Bundy on the visit, 26 May, FRUS 61-3:17.

want to discover such. But Cohen notes that the scientists also failed to ask an obvious question: did the Dimona project, as described by the hosts, make sense?<sup>48</sup>

In the meeting with Ben-Gurion, Kennedy stressed the need not only to have peaceful aims but also to give that impression: the Arabs would otherwise pursue nuclear weapons. Ben-Gurion allowed the USG to share the findings of the Dimona visit with them and accepted the idea of a neutral country visit to Dimona (no evidence exists that *periodic* visits were explicitly discussed). He justified the nuclear project with the prospect of water desalination, “Israel’s main – and *for the time being*, only – purpose”. But the future was uncertain: he noted that “in three or four years we might have need for a plant to process plutonium” since it was possible that in a decade or so, the UAR would achieve a nuclear capability. Albeit with no direct link to the Dimona plant, Ben-Gurion brought up Israel’s security and interest in Hawk missiles. Kennedy said that despite the defensive nature of the Hawks, introducing missiles into the area would escalate the arms race. Neither did he support a proposal Ben-Gurion made for a US-Soviet declaration for the independence and integrity of all states in the area.<sup>49</sup> Cohen notes that the two men avoided a real confrontation neither wanted as Kennedy asked no hard questions about the Dimona site and Ben-Gurion was considerate of Kennedy’s political situation and did not argue that Israel had a right to a weapon capability<sup>50</sup>.

Information that US allies had gives further clarity about Israel’s aims. In early June, the USG received information that during a recent trip to Canada, Ben-Gurion had said that Israel did not aim to develop nuclear weapons but maybe had to acquire a *capability* to do so if the conventional balance deteriorated and it got no great-power security guarantee<sup>51</sup>. The Canadians informed London also that Ben-Gurion had said that a PU-separation plant would be built at Dimona<sup>52</sup>. Probably this information reached the USG, too.

In June, the DOS informed the Arabs both that Kennedy had stressed US determination to prevent proliferation to Ben-Gurion and received assurances that Israel’s nuclear program was peaceful and of the Dimona visit.<sup>53</sup> Rusk wrote to UAR Foreign Minister M. Fawzi in a very reassuring tone that he was “happy to renew ... the personal assurance ... that we believe this [Dimona] reactor is exclusively for peaceful purposes” and that the USG would remain alert to the issue<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>48</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 105-8.

<sup>49</sup> My emphasis. Feldman to Bundy, 27 June 61, with Kennedy- Ben-Gurion mtg, 30 May, JFKL N/I; mtg memos, USNA ND B/5 Tel Aviv and D/57 FRUS 61-3:17; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 108-9 ref. also to Harman’s notes, ISA FMRG 3294/7. The 27 June memo does not include Ben-Gurion’s comment about uncertainty regarding the future.

<sup>50</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 109-11.

<sup>51</sup> DOS/NEA- FRG official mtg, 2 June 61, USNA ND B/4; DOS to Bundy with “Chronology...” (fn 44).

<sup>52</sup> UK Joint Intelligence Bureau “Atomic Activities in Israel”, 17 July 61, [http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/foi/pdf/israeli\\_nuclear1.pdf](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/foi/pdf/israeli_nuclear1.pdf) (11 May 07).

<sup>53</sup> D/59 Talbot-Arab Ambassadors mtg, 2 June 61, FRUS 61-3:17; DOS to Bundy with “Chronology...” (fn 44).

<sup>54</sup> D/65 DOS to E/C, 15 June 61, FRUS 61-3:17. As also Congressmen continued to make inquiries about the reactor to the USG, the DOS informed SFRC Chairman Fulbright in early June of the Dimona visit and



Cohen argues that for the next two years, the Dimona issue was not central in top-level US-Israel relations. Hersh notes Kennedy nonetheless remained concerned about the effects of Israel's moves on his test ban efforts.<sup>55</sup> And despite the Dimona visit and official support for Israel's reassurances about peaceful aims, USG memos clearly show that the USG continued to suspect military aims to underlie its nuclear program. Rusk noted in an internal memo that though the visit had shown that Israel *at the moment* had no nuclear weapon program (indeed, at the early stage of development that Israel's nuclear program was, Israel did not need to do anything that would have made the program seem as clearly military), the DOS was going to demand further, periodic visits. He thought that US pressure could stop Israel from acquiring a weapon capability.<sup>56</sup> In fall 1961, NIEs said "Israel may have decided to undertake a nuclear weapons program" and, because of Arab hostility, *at least* had decided to pursue a weapon *capability*. An aircraft-based, crude nuclear weapon capability seemed to be within its reach in 1966-67 and a missile-based capability in the 1970s, assuming it acquired a full-sized PU-facility. The weakness of Arab defenses meant that an unsophisticated delivery capability sufficed for it. It already had French nuclear-capable aircraft and was expected to get more advanced French aircraft. Its launch of a meteorological rocket gave support for reports that it also wanted an own missile capability.<sup>57</sup> In a Kennedy-Adenauer meeting, after Adenauer said that "Strauss [who, as noted above, had close contact to Peres] had told him that Israel would soon get the bomb", Kennedy commented that there was "no doubt that Israel was acquiring know-how in this [weapon production] matter." He said the Dimona plant would continue to be subject to US inspections but admitted the limits of what could be achieved in that way; it was hard, but maybe possible, for Israel to make a bomb there.<sup>58</sup>

To escape the role of a "guarantor of Israel's nuclear intentions", over the year after the Dimona visit the USG tried to arrange open, neutral country visits to Dimona. The DOS first expected early success, and in the fall Israel confirmed that Ben-Gurion accepted a neutral visit. Though the DOS in principle saw *IAEA* safeguards as desirable also in the Near East, it argued to the British that early pursuing of them was useless: 1) neither Israel nor the UAR were willing to accept them before other countries did; 2) such would start only after the reactor went critical and the Arabs had to be calmed down already before that; 3) France was unlikely to accept *IAEA* inspections of spent fuel from Dimona after its return to France (as *IAEA* procedures required). Thus the DOS wanted "ad hoc" inspections of the facility until it went critical, preferably openly by a neutral state, other-

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that Kennedy had discussed Israel's nuclear aims with Ben-Gurion. Fulbright to ActSOS Bowles, 22 May 61, DNSA NP00773; USOS Bowles to Fulbright, 5 June, DNSA NP00782; NE to Talbot for Talbot-Fulbright disc., 3 June, USNA ND B/3 chron. inter-office M.

<sup>55</sup> Hersh 1991 pp. 104-5; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 111.

<sup>56</sup> Rusk to DepSOD Gilpatric, 30 Aug 61, USNA CDF B/2059.

<sup>57</sup> D/6b NIE 4-3-61 "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK", 21 Sep, NSA EBB NIES; NIE 35-61 "The Outlook for Israel", 5 Oct, LBJL I:I.

<sup>58</sup> Private Kennedy-Adenauer mtg (at Kennedy's wish, parts stricken from the record), 21 Nov 61, JFKL NSF C/G B/79a Adenauer visit.

wise maybe secretly by the US. The USG kept on bringing the neutral visit up with Israel and Sweden until summer 1962 (when the next visit was needed) but could not persuade Sweden to take the task<sup>59</sup> (that a nuclear weapon option was considered also in Sweden probably played a role here<sup>60</sup>).

London in turn desired *Canada* to inspect the Dimona reactor: it hoped to get more information about a visit from Ottawa than it got from the USG and thought such a visit to convince Arabs. It repeatedly proposed this to the USG in spring and summer 1962. The USG first replied that it was better if Sweden made an inspection and then, when it was clear that Sweden would not make one, that though it in principle supported the idea of a Canadian visit, it wanted to make the next visit itself, arguing that its assurances would satisfy the Arabs.<sup>61</sup> In the latter case, the USG preference probably resulted from unwillingness to allow for further delays with the visit<sup>62</sup>.

### 8.1.3 The Dimona issue in Israel and among Arabs

Despite US assurances, Arabs expressed suspicions about Israel's nuclear aims to the USG. Lebanese Foreign Minister P. Takla said that Israel and the FRG had a deal on nuclear weapon development and the US was not to believe Israeli assurances. US officials feared that such beliefs increased the risk of Nasser attacking the Dimona site. The Lebanese also told the USG that if Israel produced nuclear weapons, Moscow would give the Arabs access to the weapons.<sup>63</sup>

But after the first reactions to the Dimona revelation, the Arabs overall remained quite silent about Israel's nuclear program. Evron suggests that until the 1967 war, this was because they thought it had not yet progressed far, and after the war, Israel's demonstrated conventional power pushed the issue down on the list of Arab concerns. According to a later account of a journalist close to Nasser, until about late 1965 Nasser thought Israel was not pursuing nuclear weapons but just trying to bluff. Cohen argues Cairo played the issue down when Israel's and others' silence allowed it because it lacked reliable information about Israel's moves, estimated them to present no early threat, and expected the US not to

<sup>59</sup> DOS/NE to Talbot, n/d (late June 61), USNA ND B/4; NE to Talbot on Talbot-Harman mtg, 14 Nov, *ibid.* chron. ASOS/NEA corresp.; D/132 NEA to Johnson (san.), 19 Oct; D/227 DOS to UK Emb. Washington, 29 March 62, both FRUS 61-3:17; Chronology on Dimona visits (n/a), n/d (probably March 64), LBJL KD 2; DOS to Bundy with "Chronology..." (fn 44).

<sup>60</sup> On the situation in Sweden, see, e.g., Paul 2000 pp. 84-91.

<sup>61</sup> Shalom 1996 pp. 5-6 ref. to, e.g. UK Emb. Washington to British Foreign Office (BFO), 10 Apr 62, FO 371/164363 ER 1241/1/G and to USG to BFO, 15 Aug, *ibid.* 3/G.

<sup>62</sup> Shalom 1996 maintains that the USG clearly preferred to deal with the Israeli nuclear issue alone – because London had little leverage over Israel, any potential humiliating failure of the USG to make Israel promise restraint was better kept secret from everybody, and the USG wanted to keep benefits of potential success for itself, to be used to boost prestige among Arabs (p. 6). It indeed seems that the USG preferred to act alone, but Shalom's suggestions for why this was the case are not proven.

<sup>63</sup> T/1212 Emb. Beirut to Rusk, 23 June 61, JFKL N/I; T/24 Emb. Beirut to DOS, 7 July; T/2051 Amb. Stevenson (M/UN) to Rusk, 9 Dec, both USNA CDF B/2059.

let Israel get nuclear weapons. Cairo also did not want to increase the credibility of the deterrent Israel was pursuing or attach attention to its unconventional weapon efforts. The issue was less important for Nasser than gaining leadership among Arabs, and publicity around it would have caused embarrassment by making it clear that Israel's nuclear program was much more advanced than Egypt's. Cohen argues Israel's policy of nuclear ambivalence and Egypt's policy of appearing to ignore the issue were mutually reinforcing and both promoted by US assurances to Nasser about the Dimona reactor.<sup>64</sup>

Egypt's nuclear program was not advanced but its missile program was somewhat more so. The program benefited from the know-how of West German specialists working in it. Their involvement had started in 1950 but became publicly known only in 1962. It then led to protests by Moscow and the Israelis, who even used terror attacks to drive the Germans home.<sup>65</sup>

In Israel, the Dimona plant caused *hidden* debates about nuclear weapons; according to Cohen, no part of Israel's elite was willing to challenge Ben-Gurion's peaceful uses -claim. Still, in the early 1960s, opposition to nuclear weapons slowly grew and got organized. Owing to fears of Arabs following suit if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, it especially took the form of support for a regional NWFZ. For instance, in March 1962 prominent Israelis proposed the government of Israel (GOI) to pursue a ban against "introduction of nuclear weapons to the region" – a formula the GOI itself soon adopted. Ben-Gurion tried to evade such challenges by stating support for *complete* regional disarmament, on conditions of verification and respect for all sides' sovereignty and territories. Cairo's boasting with its missile program fuelled cabinet and public debates on security strategy and advanced or deterrent weapons. The US Embassy reported signs of such debates in fall 1962 and spring 1963, commenting that "the development of strength seems widely recognized, both in the Government and out, as likely eventually to include nuclear armament."<sup>66</sup>

Peres now started to pursue a deal on nuclear-capable missiles with a French company and reached one in April 1963. But according to Evron and Cohen, the debates and anti-nuclear arguments, together with US pressure, led Ben-Gurion to decide not to base the national security strategy on nuclear weapons. After mid-1962, he acquired more tanks instead of further advancing the nuclear project and modifying Israel's military doctrine and the IDF to nuclear weapons. The two authors note that all this implied that, as also Ben-Gurion now put it, "Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East" and

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<sup>64</sup> Evron 1991 pp. 282-4; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 243-5, 254-5; Karpin 2006 pp. 200-1 ref. to a 2002 account by journalist Haikal.

<sup>65</sup> See Samra 2002 pp. 41-6.

<sup>66</sup> E/TA to DOS on debates in Israel, 1 May 63, JFKL N/I; Green 1984 pp. 156, 161 ref. to "Rockets Now – What Next?", *New Outlook Magazine*, Sep 62; Evron 1991 pp. 279-80; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 116, 137, 143-50 ref. to "Professors Against Nuclear Armament in the Middle East" (in Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, 12 Jan 62, and to Airgram (A)-232 Amb. Barbour (E/TA) to DOS, 9 Oct, JFKL NSF B/118.

followed an opaque proliferation path.<sup>67</sup> Nuclear weapons were thus to be only weapons of the last instance for Israel.

#### 8.1.4 Arms limitation and the Hawk sale

The motivation for nuclear weapon (and missile) development for both Israel and the UAR depended on what the other side was doing or feared to plan. A way to reduce the motivations (and so solve a collaboration problem) was to make each side confident that the other was not pursuing the weapons. Reactor inspections could help but were basically just a way to *discover* material diversions to weapon purposes *at a particular point in time*. Despite the pessimism in the USG about the prospects of disarmament, in early 1962 the USG started pursuing an Arab-Israel arms limitation deal. It came to consider linking this to security guarantees. Thus the USG considered to promote cooperation through both reactor inspections that would reduce chances of unnoticed defection and by reducing the risks the possibility of defection implied for each side. The first arms limitation efforts were quite feeble, but the idea attached gradually more USG attention. Nonetheless, the initiative was throughout characterized by much pessimism.

Especially as the Israelis feared France to downscale its support to them as its problems in Algeria were easing, by May 1962 they and their friends in the US started strongly criticizing various aspects of US policies to press the USG for deeper, institutionalized security cooperation: they wanted not only security guarantees but also regular military consultations and arms supply, especially the Hawk system. They argued the USG *had* to agree because its increased aid for the UAR released Arab funds for arming and said that Israel could accept US economic aid for Syria and the UAR and be otherwise more cooperative if it had stronger, even secret US guarantees against Arab aggression. They complained that existing US assurances were “qualified” since US arms supply was limited and the USG opposed joint contingency planning. Peres, now Deputy Defense Minister, demanded a USG effort to stabilize the region and make Israel feel less isolated. He wanted uni- or multilateral guarantees for Israel or stronger Israel-US or -NATO ties through membership or joint efforts in, e.g., R&D. Peres also said to Bundy that though the absence of nuclear weapons in the area was in Israel’s interest, if others seemed to aim to pursue them, Israel’s stance would be reconsidered.<sup>68</sup>

Kennedy now launched a review of policies for stabilizing the Near East. The resulting reports give an overview of US goals, policies, and options in the area. The DOS/NEA in-

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<sup>67</sup> Evron 1991 p. 280; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 116, 137-42, 150 ref. to his 1996 interview with Zak (formerly of *Ma’ariv*). On French-Israeli missile cooperation, see Crosbie 1974 pp. 157-61, 205.

<sup>68</sup> The USG only promised to again study Israel’s air defense situation. See D/259 Komer-Gazit mtg, 30 Apr 62; D/273 DepASOD/ISA W. Bundy to Talbot on mtg with Peres, 23 May; D/275 DOS to E/TA, 24 May; D/277 M. Bundy to Talbot on 21 May mtg with Peres, 28 May; D/278 DOS to E/TA on Rusk-Harman mtg, 28 May; D/290 Talbot to Rusk with NEA draft memo, 7 June, all FRUS 61-3:17. Though the Hawks were a defensive system, as Jervis 1978 points out (p. 203), such can also be used as a cover for attacks.

cluded in US interests in the area “*limiting the spread of Soviet influence, identifying ourselves adequately with the aspirations of the peoples for modernization and development, and preserving Western access to oil reserves and lines of communication*”. The goal of decreasing tensions led to a preference for *quiet* diplomacy; overt pressure was seen as unhelpful.<sup>69</sup> The US posture towards Israel was seen to imply strong support, almost a tacit alliance: it included that the US 1) as far as a policy of Arab-Israel impartiality allowed, assisted Israel significantly financially to enable it to “meet its security and growth ... objectives without directly implicating the United States on the sensitive aspects”; 2) backed it with “an *unwritten but effective security guarantee*” – as Arabs were aware of this, Israel was in a position to show restraint; 3) helped it find arms suppliers; 4) allowed sales of unclassified military hardware to it; but 5) “avoid[ed] close military relationships and consultations as well as partnership with Israel in ventures outside of Israel”. Israel’s military power and awareness that the West would intervene to protect it deterred “indefinitely” major Arab hostilities. Thus closer US-Israel security relations were neither needed for Israel’s security nor had foreign policy benefits for the US, though they were a way to please Israel’s friends in the US. Many factors spoke against such: they would have, e.g., 1) seriously harmed US-Arab relations, ended the policy of impartiality, and turned Arabs increasingly to Moscow; 2) made Arabs see the US as responsible for all Israel’s military moves; 3) given Moscow a propaganda weapon; 4) encouraged Israeli demands for advanced weapons; and 5) undermined friendly Arab regimes.<sup>70</sup>

NEA officials favored postponing the decision on the Hawks and first pursuing a private arms limitation deal, starting with a quiet probe with Nasser and, if that went well, with Ben-Gurion. Despite Israeli and domestic pressures, the DOS and the DOD accepted the idea. But Israel was seen to need the Hawks and thus the DOS favored selling them if the probe created no clear hope of an early deal. Moreover, neither the NEA itself nor Komer had high hopes of success with Nasser.

To promote an arms limitation deal and as a fairly safe response to Israeli demands for security guarantees, the DOS favored making unilateral, private reaffirmations to both Israel and the Arabs of the aggression-clause of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration: such were less objectionable to Arabs than some new formulation and were a way to give both sides reassurance. But the DOS wanted to avoid any *special US-Israeli* security relations.<sup>71</sup> This idea was, however, first only left simmering.

In August 1962, Feldman was sent to Israel to, among others, inform the Israelis that Kennedy would sell the Hawk system unless Nasser agreed on arms limitation. Ben-Gurion of-

<sup>69</sup> D/314 NEA memo, 30 June 62, FRUS 61-3:17.

<sup>70</sup> My emphasis. D/290 (fn 68); D/296 Talbot (Emb. Athens) to NEA, 15 June 62; D/314 (fn 69) all *ibid.*; D/2 Talbot to Rusk “United States Policy toward Israel”, 9 July, FRUS 61-3:18; Rusk to Kennedy with “United States Policy Toward Israel”, 7 Aug, JFKL KI 1.

<sup>71</sup> D/290 (fn 68); D/296 (fn 70); D/306 Komer to Bundy, 22 June; D/314 (fn 69) all FRUS 61-3:17; D/2 (fn 70) FRUS 61-3:18; Komer to Bundy and Feldman, 23 July, with DOS policy package; Rusk with “United States...” (fn 70) with Att. B) Security Assurance, both JFKL KI 1.

ferred to “agree to no missiles at all if Nasser would agree to arms limitations and controls” and said “he would like to exclude weapons of every kind from the area.”<sup>72</sup> According to Bundy’s and Feldman’s later accounts, Feldman also let the hosts know that in return for the sale, the USG hoped to get regular access to the Dimona plant<sup>73</sup>. But at least in Feldman’s report, no evidence exists of such a tie; based on literature review, also Ben-Zvi concludes that neither Dimona nor Israel’s nuclear posture was discussed<sup>74</sup>. That *periodic* visits were agreed upon seems anyway unlikely since the USG later pressed Israel to agree on such. Caution with the claim seems warranted also because the two former officials had an interest in presenting the Hawk sale as having also benefited the US somehow.

The probe with Nasser thus de facto took the form of an ultimatum. Badeau gave him a letter from Kennedy that informed of the planned Hawk sale to Israel and stressed that regional arms control could still be pursued before Israel and the UAR had operational missile capabilities. Nasser was not excited about arms control, expected a strong Arab reaction to the sale, and argued that a Western sale of even defensive missiles to Israel would make Moscow willing to supply the Arabs with various missiles; thus the US itself could be blamed for a stronger Soviet role as a regional arms supplier.<sup>75</sup>

After this feeble arms limitation effort, Israel got the Hawks. This was the first major weapon system the US sold to Israel, and thus a tangible sign of a relaxing US arms policy<sup>76</sup>. Domestic pro-Israel pressures seem not to have been decisive for the sale; Spiegel argues convincingly that the USG sold them because Soviet arms supply to Arabs was translating the USG support for Arab-Israel stability, and a military balance that promoted this, into a commitment to *maintain* an arms balance, and Ben-Zvi that Kennedy (in vain) hoped for Israeli quid pro quos especially regarding Palestine refugees.<sup>77</sup>

The time now came when the USG felt a need for another visit to Dimona: the US scientists had in May 1961 seen one as needed in a year’s time and the USG had told the Arabs that it would continue to monitor Israel’s moves. In summer 1962, the UAR indeed asked for US assurances about the peacefulness of Israel’s nuclear aims. The DOS instructed Emb. Cairo that as far as it knew, nothing had changed since summer 1961. But as a new visit seemed needed to keep the Arabs and the press calm and Sweden had not agreed to make one, the DOS started pursuing another US visit.<sup>78</sup>

But though the USG argued that a visit would be instrumental in dampening world interest in the Dimona issue, the Israelis were uneager about it. During the summer, the GOI made public statements that its nuclear program was peaceful – to weaken pressure for a visit,

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<sup>72</sup> D/24 Feldman (E/TA) to Kennedy, Rusk & NEA, 19 Aug 62, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>73</sup> Bundy 1988 p. 510; Hersh 1991 pp. 109-10 ref. to his 1989 interviews with Feldman.

<sup>74</sup> Ben-Zvi 1998 p. 122.

<sup>75</sup> D/31 Badeau (E/C) to Kennedy, Rusk & NEA, 24 Aug 62, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>76</sup> See Walt 1987 p. 95; Hersh 1991 p. 110.

<sup>77</sup> Spiegel 1985 esp. p. 108; Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapter 4; Ben-Zvi 2002.

<sup>78</sup> NE to Talbot, 22 June 62, USNA IR; DOS to E/C, 11 July, JFKL N/I.

USG officials thought. The USG suggested that two AEC scientists, who were to inspect the Nachal Soreq reactor, would also visit the Dimona site. Israel postponed replying, but in September the two men were taken to a 40-minute surprise visit there. Hersh argues that USG agreement to sell the Hawks was the key reason why Ben-Gurion agreed on a visit. The visitors were denied access to one big building but saw no signs of non-civilian activities. They were invited to return to the site the next day but did not do so owing to their travel plans (which the Israelis were aware of). In this way, Israel suppressed the demand for a visit, though the DOS saw the short visit as inadequate. A little later it nonetheless instructed posts in Arab countries and elsewhere to inform their hosts of a visit to Dimona that had provided “no evidence of preparation for nuclear weapons production”.<sup>79</sup>

In late 1962, Kennedy met Meir. Hersh suggests the USG aim with the meeting was also to undermine Ben-Gurion politically as so little progress had been made on safeguarding the Dimona plant. Kennedy’s briefing materials noted that “important question marks” existed about it and that Israel’s position on inspections had hardened.<sup>80</sup> In the meeting, Kennedy reaffirmed the US interest in a secure Israel in strong words: the US had “a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East really comparable only to that which it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs” and, though they were not formally allied, considered the Israelis “close and intimate allies”. But he also stressed that it was in neither Israeli nor US interest if the US neglected relations with Arabs. He reminded that Israel’s security depended on the US and the relationship was “a two-way street” and expressed hope that “Israel would give consideration to our problems on this atomic reactor. We are opposed to nuclear proliferation. Our interest here is not in prying into Israel’s affairs but we have to be concerned because of the over-all situation in the Middle East”. Meir assured the Dimona issue would cause no trouble between the two states.<sup>81</sup> Kennedy thus did not condemn Israel’s nuclear weapon ambitions directly but stressed that undesirable *consequences* from such had to be avoided.

For instance Hersh and Schoenbaum suggest that Kennedy’s assurance, together with the Hawk sale, indicated a turning point in US relations with Israel: the USG accepted the role of the ultimate guarantor of Israel’s security. Also Walt argues that a *de facto* alliance was emerging as the USG wanted to maintain the regional arms balance while it and Moscow gave aid to Arabs, gain freedom of action at home to pursue rapprochement with Cairo,

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<sup>79</sup> T/861 DOS to E/TA on Talbot-Harman disc., 22 June 62, JFKL N/I; NEA to Bundy on the visit, 18 Sep, USNA MWH B/6; D/87 DOS to posts abroad, 31 Oct, FRUS 61-3:18; DOS to Bundy on Kennedy-Meir mtg with scope paper, 21 Dec, USNA ND B/6; NE to Talbot on the visit (san.), 27 Dec, LBJL KD 2; Chron. on Dimona visits (fn 59); DOS to Bundy with “Chronology ...” (fn 44); Hersh 1991 pp. 94, 108-10 ref. to his 1989 interviews with Feldman; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 111-2 ref., to e.g., DOS A-4726, 24 Oct 62, JFKL N/I, to T/721 Barbour to Rusk, 3 Apr 63, USNA B/3727, and to his 1994 interview with Ne’eman who arranged the visit. In fact, the 27 Dec memo that is based on the visitors’ comments, notes that they confirmed the reactor was for *research*, not for power generation, saying nothing about potential military uses. Nor does the 21 Dec memo include such a notion. The DOS Chronology (fn 44) said that no signs of military activities were seen.

<sup>80</sup> DOS on Kennedy-Meir mtg (fn 79) with talking points, 21 Dec 62; Hersh 1991 p. 117.

<sup>81</sup> D/121 Kennedy-Meir mtg, 27 Dec 62, FRUS 61-3:18.

and make Israel cooperate on peace efforts and nonproliferation. Further explanations he offers are Kennedy's pro-Israel feelings and Israel's friends' growing role within the USG. But as noted above, Spiegel and Ben-Zvi conclude based on more detailed studies on decision-making in the USG that these forces had no key role in making the USG willing to deepen relations with Israel; central was instead Israel's growing strategic value in USG eyes and a perceived need to act to maintain the arms balance. And as Green points out, it is also significant that Kennedy insisted that US-Israel relations were "a two-way street".<sup>82</sup> Moreover, though they were in strong terms, Kennedy gave security assurances to Israel only privately, in an unspecific, non-binding form. Whatever feelings he or his men had towards Israel, these were not enough to make him commit the US clearly to Israel's help in the world's and especially Arab eyes and to seek congressional approval for any alliance. And later developments show that the depth of security relations with the US did not satisfy the Israelis. In a early 1963 meeting with Barbour, Ben-Gurion also questioned the value of Kennedy's assurances by saying that though he trusted that these were sincere, Israel had to "rely upon itself".<sup>83</sup>

Next, I turn the attention to US-FRG relations and the question of nonproliferation in European and global settings, the two aspects being closely linked.

## **8.2 Germany's nuclear status and nuclear weapon cooperation in NATO**

With the coming in power of the new US government, the FRG-US relationship ran into a difficult phase. Kennedy embarked on a tougher line with allies: the US had done much for Europe and it was time to ensure its interests were promoted; if it had to defend the Free World, its allies had to in return follow its lead. Reportedly, Kennedy's election shocked Adenauer, who had hoped for further Republican rule. He had had close relations with and been consulted thoroughly by Dulles but with the new USG, Bonn often came to see consultations as insufficient. And as this USG also presented a new strategy for NATO, it came to be debated and doubted in the FRG whether this gave enough protection.<sup>84</sup> Still, US officials thought that though West Germans feared US troop withdrawals, the tie to the US remained the basis of Bonn's security and foreign policy, especially because relations with Paris were cooler than Adenauer wished<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>82</sup> Green 1984 pp. 182-3; Spiegel 1985 p. 108; Walt 1987 pp. 95-6; Hersh 1991 p. 118; Schoenbaum 1993 p. 137; Ben-Zvi 1998 Chapters 3-4 and p. 136.

<sup>83</sup> D/173 Barbour to DOS on 21 Jan mtg with Ben-Gurion, 22 Jan 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>84</sup> Bundy's outline for Kennedy's remarks at NSC (san.), 17 Jan 62, DNSA CC000138; D/125 (fn 7) FRUS 61-3:8; Richardson 1966 p. 65; Mahncke 1972 pp. 93-101; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 157-8; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 303-4. On the debate in the FRG, see Cioc 1988 pp. 12-37.

<sup>85</sup> Desp. 1122 Tyler to DOS, 8 Feb 61, DNSA BC01991. DOS/IR Research memo REU-59, 3 Aug 62, concluded similarly that *all* West German parties increasingly saw an "exclusively Western orientation" as the only option for the FRG and that its security would continue to depend on the US: the Europeans were alone



I now first outline the new US strategy and Bonn's reception of it. Then I move on to discuss 1) the emergence of nonproliferation cooperation on the US-Soviet agenda, first through talks related to the 1958-62 Berlin crises (8.2.2) and then as a separate question (8.2.3), and 2) the simultaneous development of Kennedy's policy on nuclear organization of NATO. During his election campaign, Kennedy argued, quite in line with Eisenhower, that the "inevitable" spread of nuclear weapons and knowledge had to be *organized properly*, in case of Europe through a NATO force instead of wasteful national efforts<sup>86</sup>. But in reality, his stance on the MLF as such was unsettled and hesitant. For him, it came to be one option among others, another prominent one being a force based on US-British-French national contingents.

### 8.2.1 The new US defense strategy

In anticipation of Moscow's intercontinental second-strike capability and loss of US nuclear advantage over the USSR (which in fact happened in late 1963 only) that clearly increased risks involved for the US in security guarantees for NATO states, and resulting doubts regarding the credibility of the massive retaliation –strategy, the US started to move towards a new strategy in 1956-57. But the implications of the change became clearer and the "flexible response" -strategy was presented to NATO only after Kennedy came to office.<sup>87</sup> The new strategy was to create multiple military options to enable the West to keep eventual hostilities limited and respond to aggression also short of starting all-out nuclear war. It implied a greater role for conventional defense and thus the US increasingly pressed its allies for conventional build-up. The strategy had in principle somewhat contradicting effects on the credibility of deterrence and defense: the existence of limited and conventional options could make a US reaction to limited aggression more likely, and so boost the credibility of its commitments, but they also made an all-out nuclear response less likely, which could reduce the deterrent effect of that option.<sup>88</sup>

The new strategy caused much debate and opposition among US allies who feared it to enable the US to leave them to fight alone a war in Europe without a result of escalation and strategic retaliation<sup>89</sup>. The cooperative solution in NATO was thus challenged in several ways: the US proposed a new solution to the coordination problem (which joint strategy to

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unable to deter Moscow. Despite his keenness on Franco-German cooperation, also Adenauer did not let that overshadow ties to NATO and the US (DNSA BC02844).

<sup>86</sup> Owen with Kennedy on Hart (fn 5).

<sup>87</sup> JCS on military balance, 10 July 59, DNSA BC01513; Ahonen 1995 p. 36; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 179-89.

<sup>88</sup> A further aspect of the strategy was mutual counter-force instead of counter-city attacks as a way to limit nuclear war and thus increase the credibility of US guarantees (as Soviet retaliation against US *cities* was hoped to be avoided at least early in war). See US-UK mtg (fn 1), 5 Apr 61; D/17 McNamara to Kennedy, 20 Feb; D/82, D/120 McNamara at NAC, 5 May and 14 Dec 62, all FRUS 61-3:8; McNamara's speech, 16 June, DNSA NP00879; Freedman 1989 pp. 230-44, 290-1; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 286-7, 315. The latter argues the counter-force strategy was launched to make allies trust the US and forget about own nuclear forces, though the USG itself did not really believe in it (pp. 315-9).

<sup>89</sup> On the strategy debates in NATO in 1961-7, see Haftendorn 1994 pp. 31-105; Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 225-41.

use to counter the Soviet threat) and the solutions to both the general and the nonproliferation collaboration problems became endangered as others' concern about abandonment by the US grew. Thus new institutional mechanisms were needed to provide reassurance that this would not happen<sup>90</sup>. As a result, NATO debates on how the allies could get some kind of a role in the US nuclear deterrent intensified in the 1960s. NATO states came to agree on the flexible response -strategy formally only in 1967.

At the same time, also this administration stressed the importance of consultations in NATO<sup>91</sup>. Gradually, this led to the emergence of another approach to nuclear sharing, beyond "hardware" solutions like a MLF, and another potential way to provide NATO allies reassurance that the US would not defect. Especially McNamara favored giving them more information about US weapons and strategy, a role in nuclear decision-making, reaffirmation of the US commitment to Europe, but no control over nuclear weapons<sup>92</sup>. Sharing information was crucial since 1) secrecy made it hard to convince allies of the new strategy and the credibility of US guarantees<sup>93</sup> and 2) as Eisenhower and Dulles had argued, trust among allies is a two-way street.

Kennedy first did little about the MLF proposal but to let it stay alive. In a May 1961 speech, he said that the USG was willing, together with allies, to seek good ways to ensure the availability of nuclear weapons for the defense of the whole NATO area and a political control mechanism "that meets the needs of all of the NATO countries". The US was prepared to commit Polaris submarines to NATO and, *after* NATO's non-nuclear goals were achieved and if the *allies* wanted, study the idea of a MLF.<sup>94</sup> Because of these conditions, European reactions were reserved. Kennedy's special assistant A. Schlesinger later argued that Kennedy himself thought he was "only mentioning a remote possibility".<sup>95</sup>

In line with its existential deterrence thinking and doubts regarding chances to keep nuclear warfare from escalating, the new USG emphasized a need for central control of nuclear weapons<sup>96</sup>. This made large nuclear forces stationed in Europe problematic. Still, these forces clearly grew after 1961 (though the US did not provide *allies'* troops with all delivery systems that had been planned) because the USG saw them as a way to keep the atmosphere in NATO good, dampen doubts about its commitment and interest in national nuclear forces, and, later, ensure West German support for a MLF and make more conventional forces available for Vietnam.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> See also Riecke 1997 pp. 205-6.

<sup>91</sup> See US-UK mtg (fn 1), 5 Apr 61; McNamara's speech, 16 June 62, DNSA NP00879; D/120 (fn 88) FRUS 61-3:8.

<sup>92</sup> Mahncke 1972 pp. 219-20; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 181-2.

<sup>93</sup> Schwartz 1983 p. 179.

<sup>94</sup> Kennedy's speech, 15 May 61, PPK 192.

<sup>95</sup> Schlesinger 1965 p. 854; Schwartz 1983 p. 89.

<sup>96</sup> D/17 (fn 88) FRUS 61-3:8; US-UK mtg (fn 1), 5 Apr 61; McNamara's speech, 16 June 62, DNSA NP00879.

<sup>97</sup> DepUSOS/P Thompson to Rusk on Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; Kissinger 1965 p. 178; Richardson 1966 p. 80; Costigliola 1994 p. 205.

After West Germans had reluctantly accepted reliance on nuclear weapons, it was now hard for Bonn to accept a greater role for conventional defense. Because of the country's vulnerable position, Bonn was sensitive to anything that appeared to weaken nuclear *deterrence* and continued to stress its importance for the West. Moreover, it was not really feasible to defend West Berlin, a likely target of Soviet aggression, with conventional weapons at all.<sup>98</sup>

In practice, the USG demanded from its allies only full implementation of past NATO plans for conventional build-up. It continued to stress its commitment to Europe and support for greater consultations in NATO. Kennedy and his advisor Acheson assured Adenauer in spring 1961 that US troops and nuclear weapons would stay in Europe, the US would use nuclear weapons to protect Europe if needed, and the focus on conventional forces was just an effort to correct earlier over-emphasis on nuclear weapons.<sup>99</sup> But Bonn continued to express doubt about US reliability. To the DOS, Adenauer seemed hypersensitive about US commitment: he had throughout the post-war period "suffered from an almost pathological fear" of a US-USSR "deal at the expense of Germany" and was very sensitive about the credibility of the US deterrent and any signs of troop withdrawals.<sup>100</sup>

To USG concern, especially Strauss loudly criticized the flexible response -strategy. The Germans also complained about a bad atmosphere and discrimination in NATO. In the early 1960s, Strauss and Adenauer continued demands regarding Bundeswehr armaments and fast adoption of various nuclear sharing schemes: NATO's becoming a nuclear power, a European nuclear force, a bipolar NATO with a European role in controlling nuclear forces (but Strauss publicly stressed that European integration had to happen in a strong Atlantic context), and more consultation and information, especially regarding US forces in the FRG. But though the Kennedy administration expected the *allies* to prepare concrete proposals for nuclear sharing and a MLF if they wanted such and encouraged them to do so, Bonn tended to wait for USG initiatives. McArdle Kelleher explains such passiveness that characterized its nuclear weapon policies in general with its need to protect the US commitment. In early 1962, Bonn reportedly did make a proposal for a large, mixed-manned joint nuclear surface fleet – but ignored in the proposal the USG demand for prior accomplishment of conventional build-up. As the USG kept its course with the new strategy, Strauss soon started implementing it in practice: the conventional capabilities and

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<sup>98</sup> Mahncke 1972 pp. 106-7; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 156, 168; Freedman 1989 pp. 242, 293, 326. On USG views about Bonn's desire to base NATO strategy on early use of nuclear weapons, see USG mtg, 9 Aug 62, Naftali 2001 pp. 311-34. To USG officials, Bonn seemed ignorant about tactical nuclear weapons and their effects and to *hope* a mere threat to use nuclear arms to deter Moscow in order to be able to save money.

<sup>99</sup> D/97-8 Acheson to Kennedy and Rusk on Adenauer-Acheson and -Kennedy discs., 10-2 Apr 61, FRUS 61-3:13; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 161-2.

<sup>100</sup> DOS scope paper for Adenauer's visit to the US, 12 Apr 61, DDRS.

manpower goal of the Bundeswehr were increased. But he continued to criticize the strategy and stress the role of nuclear weapons in European defense.<sup>101</sup>

Both he and Adenauer were also hinting that if no progress was made on nuclear sharing, a German nuclear weapon effort could be possible. For instance, Adenauer argued to Kennedy that the MLF proposal “had achieved its purpose” of reducing European tendencies towards national nuclear forces. He referred to a *rebus sic stantibus* -clause in his 1954 pledge and noted that “*nevertheless*,... Germany had not undertaken anything in this respect *as yet*” and “was not considering any nuclear experimentation” and no pressure existed to change the situation.<sup>102</sup> Such hints implied a threat that unless the risk of US defection from the nonproliferation bargain was alleviated, defection by the FRG might follow.

Another issue where the Kennedy administration from early on had to seek agreement with Bonn was which side would carry the cost of the balance-of-payments effect of US troops stationed in the FRG (Bonn and London faced this issue, too). The Eisenhower administration had first been willing to carry this cost, but as US balance-of-payments deficit much grew in 1958-60, in late 1960 it had asked Bonn to contribute to the costs. In fall 1961, the two states agreed that Bonn would do so by making large “offset” purchases of military hardware from the US.<sup>103</sup> As Theiler notes, the offset scheme was a further way to alleviate the suasion problem and ensure fair burden-sharing in NATO<sup>104</sup>.

### 8.2.2 Germany’s nuclear status and the Berlin crises

Against this somewhat troubled background, the USG also had to decide how to react to demands Moscow was making regarding Berlin. Since 1958, Moscow’s demands for changes to the status of West Berlin and recognition of the GDR had resulted in much East-West tension. Trachtenberg suggests that the Berlin crises of 1958-62 resulted largely from Soviet concern about German access to nuclear weapons – it tried to use its strong position on Berlin to prevent steps towards that – and that also Bonn’s key worry in the crises was that the West would agree to ascertain its non-nuclear status. This argument deviates from other accounts of the crises, also by USG officials: typically, the nuclear issue is not seen as (alone) crucial. Schlesinger does note that Khrushchev maintained that he feared that the FRG would soon get nuclear weapons and told an American journalist that before that happened, he wanted to settle the situation regarding Berlin and the two German states. But

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<sup>101</sup> D/97-8 (fn 99); D/111 Dowling to DOS, 5 July 61; D/126 Kennedy-Stikker mtg (san.), 6 Feb 62; D/140 Rusk-Strauss mtg, 9 June, all FRUS 61-3:13; T/1403 Harriman (E/B) to Rusk on 6 March 63 mtg with Strauss, 8 March, JFKL POF Germany B/117a security Adenauer mtg III; Schlesinger 1965 p. 853; Richardson 1966 pp. 75-6, 84; Mahncke 1972 pp. 104-5, 110-3; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 184-6, 193, 271 ref. to Strauss’s 27 Nov 61 speech, FRG *Bulletin*, 1 Dec, and remarks at NAC mtg, *FAZ*, 15 Dec; Ahonen 1995 pp. 35-40.

<sup>102</sup> My emphasis. Kennedy-Adenauer mtg (fn 58), 21 Nov 61. See also D/140 (fn 101) FRUS 61-3:13; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 186 ref. to Strauss’s speech (fn 101).

<sup>103</sup> See Morgan 1974 pp. 82-3, 104; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 100-1; Haftendorn 1994 pp. 228-30.

<sup>104</sup> Theiler 1997 pp. 122-3.

Schlesinger also stresses the role of the refugee flow from the GDR to the West and a desire for political gains as Khrushchev's motivations. At the time, Acheson saw Moscow's demands as a general test of US commitment; US Ambassador in Moscow, L. Thompson, argued they had just the goal of strengthening Moscow's position in Eastern Europe. Rusk portrays the refugee question as central in his account of the crises and does not even mention the nuclear issue.<sup>105</sup>

Whether or not the nuclear status was really the key motivation for Khrushchev, Germany's nuclear status did get a significant role in Moscow's rhetoric and USG ideas for a deal on Berlin. In East-West talks on such a deal – especially assured freedom of West Berlin in return for Western concessions in other issues – Moscow presented Germany's nuclear status as central<sup>106</sup>. By fall 1961, also the USG was clearly open to the idea of precluding a German nuclear force as a part of a deal. Its thinking is shown for instance by a DOS/PPC outline for a possible “fall-back” stance with Moscow on a European security system. The idea was a NATO-WP security arrangement that would create a sustainable military equilibrium; reduce dangers of accidental war, surprise attacks, and uncontrolled escalation; prevent war initiated by the superpowers' allies; and restrain proliferation – goals that were in the interest of both superpowers. One part of the scheme was to prohibit non-nuclear NATO and WP states from producing and owning nuclear weapons and have the NWSs agree not to give control over warheads to NNWSs or station MRBMs in Central Europe or any nuclear weapons close to the Iron Curtain. Because of political and military factors, the US had to oppose complete denuclearization of Germany, and subjecting *only* Germany to restrictions entailed a risk of resentment. Since Khrushchev worried that Bonn might get nuclear weapons, the PPC expected him to agree on concessions in other matters to prevent that. A further potential way to reassure Moscow about West Germany's non-nuclear status was to keep it informally on track about improvements in security systems for US warhead stockpiles in Europe. The PPC noted that probably also the West wanted the FRG to have no own nuclear force but had to keep quiet about that.<sup>107</sup> As the idea was to prohibit also *ownership* of nuclear weapons by NNWSs, it is questionable whether a MLF would have been possible under it.

During fall 1961, the DOS stance became that as a part of a Berlin agreement, the US could agree to deploy no MRBMs in Central Europe and on that Germans would get no nuclear

<sup>105</sup> Schlesinger 1965 pp. 347, 381-3; Rusk 1991 Chapter 12; Trachtenberg 1991 pp. 169-73, 191; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 247, 253-4, 280, 328-31. Also Richardson 1966 does not present Germany's nuclear status as a key issue in his analysis of the crises and argues that Moscow pursued no one goal above others (pp. 245-336; see esp. p. 301). For accounts of the crises, see, e.g., DOS Historical Office “Crisis over Berlin” Nov 58-Dec 62 I, DNSA BC02933; Trachtenberg 1991 pp. 169-234.

<sup>106</sup> See D/70 Nitze-Menshikov mtg, 15 July 61; D/164 Rusk-Gromyko mtg, 30 Sep; D/168 Special Assistant Bohlen to Rusk, 3 Oct; D/170 Kennedy-Gromyko mtg, 6 Oct, all FRUS 61-3:14; DOS research memo on Soviet stances on Berlin and Germany, 4 Apr 62, DNSA BC02762.

<sup>107</sup> USOS/P McGhee to DOS with PPC “A Security Arrangement for Central Europe”, 21 Aug 61, USNA AG R&D. Similarly, diplomat Harriman argued to Kennedy that cementing a permanent non-nuclear status for Germany in an agreement with the USSR would be good also for the US for security reasons. Harriman to Kennedy (draft), 1 Sep, DNSA BC02430.

warheads, either through a renouncement by Bonn of manufacturing *and* owning them and/or, preferably, a Four-Power nondissemination agreement. The DOS favored including the latter in Berlin talks with Moscow. Also proposals related to a non-aggression pact (NAP) and the Oder-Neisse line were possible, but Germany's nuclear status was in the DOS seen as the key way to promote a Berlin agreement with Moscow. A tie to that issue offered also a way to make Moscow respect a Berlin agreement.<sup>108</sup>

Towards Bonn, the USG was speaking only of a unilateral German *reaffirmation* of the 1954 pledge, not a prohibition (covering even ownership) in a formal agreement. Moreover, documents in the Kennedy archive reveal that Kennedy even hinted to Adenauer that West Germany's non-nuclear status did maybe not need to be a permanent fact. He expressed hope that the FRG would not consider an own nuclear weapon effort as long as US weapons were deployed in the FRG and NATO protected it. But he noted that though the 1954 pledge "should continue in effect for the time being at least", "he did not know what conditions might prevail three or four years from now". Taking into account that Adenauer argued that his pledge was valid *rebus sic stantibus*,<sup>109</sup> it is likely that Kennedy said so for tactical reasons and to avoid confrontation. A few days later, moreover, he said in a magazine interview that the US did not want the FRG to control nuclear weapons<sup>110</sup>.

Also Kennedy's global nonproliferation policy was taking form, one goal becoming a treaty to prohibit further states from developing nuclear weapons or acquiring control over them. Both a special NWS nonproliferation undertaking and a prohibition of transferring control over and information needed in production of nuclear weapons were now for the first time included in a US proposal for general disarmament. By March 1962, the USG included a nonproliferation agreement also on its agenda with Moscow, hoping progress on that to ease tensions in Europe and improve relations to Moscow. To secure bargaining chips regarding Berlin, it wanted to discuss nonproliferation moves that concerned Europe with Moscow in the context of Berlin talks, rather than in the general disarmament talks in Geneva. But though Moscow wanted a *Germany-specific* solution and to prohibit any "transfer of nuclear weapons to the GDR or FRG either directly or indirectly through military alliances of which they are members", the USG kept its nonproliferation stance as generic, as it also assured to Bonn.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Memo to ASOS/EUR Kohler, 25 Sep 61 (approved by Rusk 27 Sep); DOS/PM to ASOS Smith with re-draft of Smith's 25 Oct memo, 26 Oct, both USNA AG R&D; Kaysen (fn 11), 22 Aug; D/141 USG action memo, 5 Sep; D/164, D/170 (fn 106) all FRUS 61-3:14.

For instance Komer saw the option to give the FRG nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip: he argued that if the Berlin crisis escalated, the USG could strengthen its posture by *threatening* to do so if its position in Berlin was at risk (though it in reality would not do so). Komer to Bundy (san.), 20 July 61, JFKL GEB WHM. Kissinger 1965 points out an inconsistency between a fear of Bonn breaking the 1954 promise and a belief that another treaty would eliminate that risk (pp. 142-3).

<sup>109</sup> Kennedy-Adenauer mtgs, 21 Nov (fn 58) and 22 Nov 61, JFKL N/G Adenauer visit.

<sup>110</sup> Kennedy's interview by *Izvestia* editor, 25 Nov 61, PPK 483.

<sup>111</sup> Kohler- Amb. Grewe (FRG) mtg, 2 March 62, JFKL N/G; D/20, D/30 US draft principles for negotiations, n/d (given to Moscow 22 March) and 3 Apr, FRUS 61-3:15; DOS on Soviet stances (fn 106), 4 Apr; D/186

Bonn opposed including nuclear weapon prohibitions in a Berlin agreement and tried to prevent the inclusion of a NPT in the US-Soviet agenda. In isolation of and before a general peace settlement, regarding which Germany's nuclear status was needed as a bargaining chip, Bonn did not want to make any non-nuclear pledges towards Moscow or accept a special military status or any new discriminatory arms or nuclear restrictions. It argued that such would unnecessarily reduce NATO's options and strength and feared that the result would be US withdrawal from Europe. But it did stress to the USG that, assuming NATO continued to protect the FRG, it did not seek national control over nuclear weapons beyond existing NATO schemes or plan changes to the 1954 pledge. At the same time, Adenauer stressed that this covered only weapon manufacturing, not stockpiling or use. Bonn was very unhappy with the US negotiation position on Berlin in general (already in the late 1950s, any potential signs of USG preparedness to be flexible towards Moscow at German cost in order to reach a Berlin settlement had created concern in Bonn).<sup>112</sup> It tried to *appear* cooperative to the USG and expressed guarded support for nonproliferation, a NPT, and a NAP, assuming the issue of non-recognition of the GDR would not be affected.<sup>113</sup>

As the first priority the USG was to avoid general war and the Berlin situation posed an important risk in this respect, the USG thus was prepared to seek a deal with Moscow even if that implied harm to cohesion in NATO. It seems to have expected to be able to force also Bonn to accept such a deal if need be. Kennedy had overall become quite disturbed by Adenauer's and other Germans' complaints and questioning of the credibility of the US commitment, made despite US reassurances and its troops in the FRG; Bonn made no such complaints about France. Also Adenauer's complaints about US weakness in the Berlin situation and a lack of feasible proposals by Bonn for talks with Moscow in particular frustrated him.<sup>114</sup>

Also multilateral action for a NPT was taking place. In late 1961, the UNGA unanimously accepted a resolution calling for efforts for an agreement on the NNWSs giving no NNWSs control over or information needed in producing nuclear weapons and on the NNWSs not acquiring control over the weapons. The USG interpreted this to allow a MLF; Moscow did

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Kennedy to Stevenson, 23 May, FRUS 61-3:7; USG mtg, 3 Aug, Naftali 2001 pp. 207-8; Rusk-Schröder mtg, 14 Oct, JFKL N/G 15-31 Oct; Bader 1968 p. 50; Kohler 1972 p. 55.

<sup>112</sup> DOS scope paper for Adenauer visit, 12 Apr 61, DDRS; Adenauer to Kennedy, 4 Oct, DNSA BC02525; D/174 Acheson-Grewe mtg, 11 Oct; D/222 Kennedy to Macmillan, 22 Nov, both FRUS 61-3:14; Kennedy-Adenauer mtg (fn 109), 22 Nov; Rusk-Schröder mtg, n/d, JFKL N/G Feb 62; T/2583 E/B to Rusk on 27 Apr mtg with Brentano, 28 Apr 62, DNSA BC02785; DOS "Crisis..." (fn 105) pp. 92-3; Richardson 1966 pp. 271-2, 291; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 187-9; Schwarz 1991 p. 684; Küntzel 1992 pp. 53-7; Ahonen 1995 p. 34; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 274-82, 329-30, 339-40.

McArdle Kelleher argues that the USG stances invalidated the basic bargain about West Germany's NATO membership and called into question Adenauer's foreign policy goals: equality in NATO, reunification pursued from a strong bargaining position, and no concessions made for lesser goals (p. 192).

<sup>113</sup> See Rusk-Schröder disc., 11 March 62; E/B to DOS on Nitze-FRG official mtg, 16 Apr, both JFKL N/G.

<sup>114</sup> USG mtg, 9 Aug 62, Naftali 2001 pp. 321-2; Kennedy-Eisenhower mtg, 10 Sep, Naftali & Zelikow 2001 pp. 120-9 (see also p. 470); Schlesinger 1965 pp. 403-4; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 193.

not.<sup>115</sup> In early 1962, a new Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was launched as a forum for disarmament and arms control talks.

### 8.2.3 Nonproliferation cooperation with Moscow?

In spring 1962, each superpower presented a new package proposal for disarmament, including a NPT. Though they disagreed on how to deal with nuclear sharing schemes, bilateral talks led to a joint communiqué in support of a NPT – adding to doubts in Bonn about the trustworthiness of the USG. To Bonn's and Paris's displeasure, in April the US also presented rough outlines for a NPT at the ENDC. Though the USG assured Bonn that its nonproliferation efforts were not directed at Germany in particular, dispute between the two sharpened and Bonn came to openly oppose the US position. It told the USG that it would not go beyond the 1954 pledge and stressed that the option of a MLF had to be kept open. Soon, efforts for a Berlin agreement drifted to a standstill since Moscow was for some reason after all not interested in one.<sup>116</sup>

By summer 1962, concern about nuclear proliferation in general was quite widespread among top USG officials. The DOD saw political pressure by superpowers, combined with probably “stronger incentives and sanctions than have seriously been considered so far”, as central in stopping proliferation. Also general nonproliferation agreements remained on the US agenda.<sup>117</sup>

Though the USG had for bargaining purposes so far wanted to cover the topic in the Berlin talks, Kennedy and Rusk now agreed that this path had come to its end since “tying it organically to Berlin” was something “the Germans would never accept”; a separate effort for nonproliferation agreements was needed<sup>118</sup>. In August, Rusk and Soviet Ambassador A. Dobrynin returned to this topic. They agreed it was undesirable if a fifth nuclear power emerged but disagreed on how to act. Moscow wanted a Germany-specific solution first since it would take time to reach a general NPT. To protect US-German relations, the US favored pursuing a NPT from the outset. Rusk argued that also other states' nuclear aims mattered: though Germany was Moscow's key concern and China especially important for the US, both had reason to be interested in, e.g., Israel's and Egypt's moves.<sup>119</sup>

<sup>115</sup> UNGA Res. 1665/XVI, 4 Dec 61; Keeny (NSCS) on NPT, 24 Dec 68, LBJL NPT I 1-3; ACDA/NPT.

<sup>116</sup> DOS on Soviet stances (fn 106), 4 Apr 62; D/34, D/50 Adenauer-Nitze and -Dowling mtgs, 13 Apr and 14 May; D/44 Kennedy-Brentano mtg, 30 Apr, all FRUS 61-3:15; D/54 *ibid.* fn 5 ref. to T/2826 E/B to DOS, 22 May, USNA CDF 762.0221/5-2262; D/146 British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home -Rusk mtg 25 June, 26 June, FRUS 61-3:13; ACDA/NPT; Seaborg 1987 pp. 80-1; Küntzel 1992 pp. 58-62; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 346-9.

<sup>117</sup> D/42 McCone notes on Principals' mtg, 24 July 62, NSA EBB LTBT; McNamara “Diffusion...”, 27 July (fn 57).

<sup>118</sup> USG mtg, 3 Aug 62, Naftali 2001 pp. 206-8; ACDA/NPT. See also D/265 Rusk-Alphand mtg, 28 Feb 63, FRUS 61-3:7 on US opposition to a bilateral deal with Moscow on Germany's nuclear status.

<sup>119</sup> Rusk-Dobrynin mtg, 8 Aug 62, JFKL ATB B/261; Kaysen on Aug 62 mtgs, 9 July 63, AHP B/541 Bb 8; ACDA/NPT. Rusk similarly portrayed Near East states as potential proliferators in May 1963. D/287 Rusk-Dobrynin disc., 18 May 63, FRUS 61-3:7.



It started seeming that Moscow would agree on the generic line of action: Foreign Minister A. Gromyko sent Rusk a message noting that US and Soviet positions on nonproliferation were quite similar. He expressed willingness to pursue a general NPT and seemed to indicate openness even towards one that would not prohibit a MLF. After the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy in letters to each other acknowledged a need to work together on nuclear arms control. This further increased optimism in the USG regarding progress on nonproliferation.<sup>120</sup> At the same time, the experience of the crisis made stopping proliferation increasingly important for Kennedy<sup>121</sup>.

The USG was also pursuing a nuclear test ban treaty that would cover either all nuclear testing (a comprehensive test ban treaty; CTBT) or only some test types (a partial or limited test ban treaty (LTBT)). The DOD argued a CTBT was probably necessary, but alone not enough, to prevent wide proliferation, and at least a way to slow it down, even though testing was not fully necessary for nuclear weapon production. A ban on atmospheric testing only was not expected to make weapon production much harder or to create a norm against proliferation. In late August, the US and the UK jointly tabled proposals for both a PTBT and a CTBT at the ENDC. A ban was presented as a way to limit arms racing, stop fall-out from nuclear tests, and prevent proliferation. Kennedy stressed publicly that the proliferation threat made a ban urgently needed.<sup>122</sup>

The USG discussed a NPT also with its allies. The Germans said a NPT was acceptable if it did not prevent a MLF (which, as will be discussed in the next section, Bonn was now in general starting to demand) and if China joined it. The USG in turn expected Moscow to possibly agree to press China to join if the FRG agreed to join. Kennedy authorized, against JCS wishes but with DOS, DOD, and ACDA support, further talks with Moscow. ACDA and the DOS expected Moscow in the end to accept a NPT that did not prohibit a MLF – a belief that may partially explain why many DOS officials supported a MLF. But Gromyko warned Rusk that unless early progress was made on a NPT, Moscow would again press for a Germany-specific solution. Rusk used this argument in turn to persuade Bonn accept a NPT, though he did stress US opposition to a Germany-specific deal. The

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<sup>120</sup> D/222 Rusk-Dobrynin mtg with Gromyko to Rusk, 23 Aug 62, *ibid.*; Foster to Kennedy with “Agreement on Non-diffusion of Nuclear Weapons”, 21 Sep, JFKL ATB B/261; Rusk to Kennedy on a NPT, 21 Sep, USNA PDA B/9; Rusk-Schröder mtg, 14 Oct, JFKL N/G 15-31 Oct; Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s letters, 28 Oct, DNSA CC01569, PPK 493; Kaysen on Aug 62 mtgs, 9 July 63, AHP B/541 Bb 8; ACDA/NPT; Seaborg 1981 p. 176; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 387.

<sup>121</sup> Schlesinger 1965 p. 893; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 115. *Le Monde Diplomatique* (English ed.) portrays the crisis as “the main factor in the establishment of a global non-proliferation policy”: the superpowers saw that the involvement of a third nuclear power could have made the crisis uncontrollable. “The Bomb Proliferates”, 3 Nov 05, <http://mondediplo.com/2005/11/03sixtyyears> (18 Jan 06).

<sup>122</sup> McNamara “Diffusion...” (fn 57), 27 July 62; Kennedy’s news conf., 29 Aug, PPK 352; Seaborg 1981 pp. 168-71. Already in spring 1961, hope had, in vain, existed in the USG that progress on a ban could be made in a Kennedy-Khrushchev summit. See, e.g., Schlesinger 1965 pp. 348, 368-70.

USG also came to argue to Bonn that it was partially to avoid such solutions why it in general started to pursue global nuclear limitation agreements.<sup>123</sup>

To protect NATO cohesion, the JCS was against NPT talks. It favored responding to the spread of nuclear capabilities with security aid to friendly states and argued that the early dangers of proliferation were exaggerated, a NPT might have no effect on China, and France could reject it, though its signature was crucial. As Moscow was anyway unlikely to give nuclear weapons to its allies that it did not trust, a non-transfer declaration would have just restricted NATO's options for Moscow's benefit. Since Moscow did not want the FRG to get nuclear weapons, the JCS favored keeping its nuclear status as a bargaining chip (even though the US would not give the FRG nuclear weapons).<sup>124</sup>

In December 1962, Rusk informally presented his thinking on NPT language to Dobrynin. The text was formulated to protect existing and potential NATO nuclear sharing schemes. The meeting made the DOS pessimistic about the chances of an early agreement. Still, Rusk discussed the text with London, Paris, and Bonn that, respectively, was in full agreement, postponed a reply, and agreed assuming China's adherence. In January, Dobrynin in turn presented Moscow's position to Rusk. Though it differed from the US stance in several ways, Rusk argued to Bundy that if the three US allies accepted the US text, disagreements with Moscow could be solved.<sup>125</sup> As for Israel's stance on nonproliferation agreements, it was supportive but non-committal: Meir said in the fall before the UNGA that Israel supported arms control and disarmament in general and all moves to protect the humanity from nuclear weapons<sup>126</sup>.

The efforts for a NPT now got troubled especially by East-West controversy on the MLF plan. Moreover, Paris gave no clear reply on the US draft language, though it did hint that its acceptance stance was possible if Moscow accepted the draft as a negotiation basis. In April 1963, the USG gave the draft to the Soviets, but these turned it down because it allowed a MLF. In June, the CIA estimated that even if the FRG moved towards nuclear weapons, Moscow would not become more cooperative on a NPT but rather react with "threats, appeals, and proposals for regional disarmament." The CIA moreover already ex-

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<sup>123</sup> Foster "Agreement...", Rusk on NPT (fn 120), 21 Sep 62; Rusk-Schröder mtg, 14 Oct, JFKL N/G 15-31 Oct; Rusk to Kennedy, 27 Nov; Bundy to Rusk, 28 Nov, both JFKL ATB B/261; ACDA "Prospects for Disarmament and Arms Control", 8 Nov, *ibid.* S:Adenauer visit Bb IV bilat. problems; ACDA/NPT; D/361 Rusk (E/B) to DOS on mtg with Adenauer, 10 Aug 63, FRUS 61-3:7.

<sup>124</sup> ASOD to Bundy, 5 Oct 62, with McNamara and JCS stances on a NPT and DOD studies on its implications, incl. JCS chairman Lemnitzer to McNamara, 18 Sep, Taylor to McNamara, 3 Oct, and McNamara to Foster, 4 Oct, JFKL NSF Kaysen B/376 nuclear energy nuclear diffusion.

<sup>125</sup> DOS memo on talks with Moscow, 13 Dec 62, DDRS; D/248 Rusk-Dobrynin mtg, 10 Dec; D/249 EN on Rusk's talks with allies, 12-5 Dec; D/257 EN on Rusk-Dobrynin mtg and Rusk to Bundy, 10 Jan 63, all FRUS 61-3:7.

<sup>126</sup> Green 1984 p. 163 ref. to Mark, C. (1969) "Israel and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", *Study for LC Legislative Reference Service*, 6 Feb 69, p. 16.

pected China certainly and France and Israel possibly not to join a NPT even if the US and the USSR agreed on one.<sup>127</sup>

In the meanwhile, the USG was also continuing the effort for a test ban treaty. That is discussed in section 8.4. But next, I turn attention to Kennedy's policy regarding nuclear organization of NATO.

#### 8.2.4 Kennedy and the nuclear organization of NATO – the first years

Fuelled by Adenauer's and Strauss's hints at a risk of German nuclear ambitions emerging, worries about Bonn's aims were by early 1962 evident also in the West. Stikker told the USG that he was very concerned: the FRG wanted to soon become a first-rate power and have a national nuclear force or a share in a MLF; atmosphere in the FRG was characterized by emergence of a nationalistic movement and insecurity about US strategy; prompt action was needed since Adenauer's successor was doomed to fail to keep nationalism checked; and Strauss was speaking "very aggressively" about nuclear sharing and even Adenauer was emphasizing the country's power.<sup>128</sup> H. Kissinger, a consultant to the USG, argued after a trip to Europe that unless the USG kept Bonn on board and gave it responsibility in the Berlin talks, the FRG could realign towards France<sup>129</sup>. A USG memo argued that growing concern about dependency on the US was causing a "strong German drive for nationally manned and owned MRBM's". Unless the US took counteraction, pressures for a national nuclear force threatened to grow in the FRG, leading to "extremely grave effects on NATO and Western security".<sup>130</sup>

Even more than stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons, deployment of mid-range (i.e., de facto strategic) missiles in Europe could strengthen the tie between strategic US forces and Europe's defense and so decrease chances of abandonment by the US. Compared to tactical systems, involvement in mid-range systems had for US allies also the benefit that the latter required target planning also during peace time: thus involvement implied greater access to targeting information and some role in planning regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Strauss demanded prompt setting up of a MRBM force based on national contingents under SACEUR. But in fall 1961 (probably to please the British), Bonn rejected also mobile

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<sup>127</sup> D/269, D/275 Kennedy to Macmillan, 28 March and 15 Apr 63, FRUS 61-3:7; Foster to Kennedy "Attached Agreement on Non-diffusion of Nuclear Weapons", n/d, with Rusk to E/P, 14 May, JFKL ATB B/261; NIE 4-63 on nuclear proliferation (san.), 28 June, LBJL I:A. On Soviet opposition to a NPT that would allow NATO nuclear sharing, see D/98 (fn 11) FRUS 61-3:6.

<sup>128</sup> Finletter (US Ambassador to NATO) to Kennedy on Stikker's visit, 5 Feb 62, JFKL POF B/103 S:NATO; Rusk-Stikker mtg, 5 Feb, JFKL MLF; D/126 (fn 101) FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>129</sup> Kissinger "Summary of Conversations in Germany", 21 Feb 62, JFKL N/G.

<sup>130</sup> "Nuclear Sharing and MRBM's" (n/a), 9 Feb 62, JFKL MLF.

MRBM deployments in *the FRG* (having already rejected stationary missiles). Still, it continued to press for deployments in Europe in general.<sup>131</sup>

Also SACEUR still wanted mid-range missiles to Europe. But the Kennedy administration did not want to deploy land-based MRBMs to *allies'* forces and thus saw proposing deployments to *its* forces in Europe as unfeasible. MRBMs would have increased risks of escalation and accidental use and problems in ensuring controlled NATO action in crises. Deployments to allies' forces would have clearly helped these toward "de facto national strategic nuclear capabilities" against Moscow: the planned security systems (similar to those for other nuclear stockpiles in Europe) were insufficient if a technologically advanced ally seriously tried to overcome them. The aspect that a MLF offered a safer way to deploy MRBMs than nationally-manned, land-based forces was a major justification used for it in the USG<sup>132</sup> (if a MLF was set up, the USG aimed to ensure that no ally would get national control over any part of it<sup>133</sup>). However, the Kennedy administration came to see, first, that no early military need existed for a MRBM system and, later, that no such need existed at all. It thus came to see also a MLF as militarily unnecessary, and as being, moreover, of little direct value: the MLF thus became a clearly politically motivated idea<sup>134</sup>.

Being generally unwilling to give allies room for independent military moves and expecting them to otherwise take measures to enable bypassing the lax custodial arrangements of the Eisenhower era, the Kennedy administration wanted stricter control of its nuclear stockpiles in Europe. Also the inclusion of a NPT on the US-Soviet agenda made the question of whether the US controlled the warheads topical (though Moscow was seen to make a clear distinction between proliferation and US stockpiles abroad). The DOS/L now argued that control over warheads included both "a) possession or access to possession, and b) actual ability to use a nuclear weapon" and that at the time, no way existed to *both* preclude a host country from having control *and* ensure operational readiness to use the weapons. Existing arrangements did not prevent an ally from getting warheads in its *possession*. Even stronger US custodial troops offered only a way to "delay a takeover, resist insurrectionary formations ... or unauthorized local commanders" and greater ability to destroy the weapons. Existing systems against unauthorized use were also possible to overcome. The DOS and the JCAE much favored stronger custodial and security schemes in order to gain control in the sense of making a takeover and use of warheads hard enough to give the US time to eliminate them or get them back under its control. The US started to tighten the arrangements through, e.g., permissive action links (PALs) that were to prevent arming or

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<sup>131</sup> Kohler & McGhee to Rusk with Rusk to McNamara (draft), 27 Oct 61; "Recent Developments Regarding MRBM's" (n/a), 6 Nov, both JFKL MLF; McNamara to Strauss and Strauss's reply, 5 and 8 Dec, DDRS; Rusk-Schröder disc., 11 March 62, JFKL N/G; Tuschhoff 2002 p. 112.

<sup>132</sup> Kohler & McGhee (fn 131) with Acheson to McNamara, 19 July 62; D/115 Rusk to McNamara (san.), 29 Oct, FRUS 61-3:13; "Nuclear Sharing..." (fn 130), 9 Feb 62. See also Trachtenberg 1999 p. 311.

<sup>133</sup> See NSAM 40 (fn 1) p. 9.

<sup>134</sup> D/130 USG mtg, 15 March 62, FRUS 61-3:13; Taylor to Kennedy, 12 Apr, JFKL POF B/103 S:NATO; Bundy 1988 p. 489. Also Moscow later admitted that a MLF had little military value. D/53-4 US-USSR mtgs, 5-9 Dec 64, FRUS 64-8:11.

launching a weapon unless a specific code was given.<sup>135</sup> Tuschhoff points out that the PALs cemented the dependency of the FRG on *political* decisions by the USG and eliminated hopes the Germans had entertained that SACEUR would get authority to decide about the use of those weapons<sup>136</sup>.

But the USG did not ignore pressures to give the allies new reassurance that would strengthen trust in continuing cooperation in NATO. In spring 1962, it activated on both the information and the hardware tracks to nuclear sharing. Especially proponents of a MLF within it were arguing that offering nuclear sharing would help to make allies accept the flexible response -strategy. Also several other reasons added in the USG to perceptions of a need to offer further nuclear sharing: concerns about German aims; the open question of mid-range missiles; allies' increased desire for information about US nuclear forces as a result of the Berlin crisis; and hope that nuclear sharing could help overcome Bonn's opposition to a NPT.<sup>137</sup>

But the USG was studying also other solutions to the organization and coordination of nuclear forces in NATO than a MLF. Various schemes were proposed where 1) the USG would declare France as having progressed far enough on nuclear weapons to be able, under the AEA, to get weapon information (assuming France made the conventional build-up efforts NATO plans required) and help it and the UK to maintain their nuclear forces; 2) the three states would commit nuclear forces to NATO but remain able to withdraw them; 3) they would promise not to unilaterally give nuclear weapons or information to other states; and 4) the FRG would not get nuclear weapons, but the other three would guarantee to cover NATO's nuclear needs and possibly involve Bonn in making guidelines for and deciding about the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>138</sup>

For Kennedy, a MLF made sense only if it indeed prevented proliferation, made Paris abandon its nuclear weapon program, and kept Bonn from starting one. Though almost any multilateral control formula could require a change to the AEA, he hoped to reassure the allies without having to try to do that and so strain his relations with the Congress. He realized that this maybe meant that a MLF would not solve NATO's problems. In spring 1962, he questioned whether it made sense to continue with the idea: it had failed to make Paris abandon its weapon program, leaving only the goal of preventing Bonn from launching

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<sup>135</sup> The DOD was more satisfied with the existing schemes and stressed that these were based on intra-allied trust. DOS/L to Rusk, 8 March 62, USNA AG R&D; attachments to DOD-AEC "On-Site Survey of Security Measures at Atomic Weapons Storage Facilities for the Support of Non-U.S. NATO Forces", June 62, DNSA NH01149; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 285, 309-11.

<sup>136</sup> Tuschhoff 2002 p. 330.

<sup>137</sup> Read (DOS/ES) to Bundy with "Early History of the MLF", 30 Oct 64, LBJL S:MLF II 2; Küntzel 1992 p. 64; Haftendorn 1994 p. 114.

<sup>138</sup> Kaysen to Bundy with "Elements of a possible deal with the French re nuclear weapons", 10 Jan 62; "Nuclear Sharing..." (fn 130), 9 Feb, both JFKL MLF.

one. He was doubtful whether a MLF under a US veto would achieve that and meet European needs and did not want to waste money in an uncertain effort.<sup>139</sup>

Bundy was arguing that if the allies were educated about nuclear weapon affairs, which he saw as the key early move towards solving NATO's problems, a MLF under a US veto would meet their concerns.<sup>140</sup> This stance shows that at least some key USG officials thought that what NATO needed was less some new measure to make the US less capable of abandoning its allies than an effort to educate and so make these *understand* that the strategy the USG proposed sufficed to protect them.

Kennedy in any case always wanted to retain a US veto over any MLF (also central control over nuclear weapons required this)<sup>141</sup>. But for political reasons, the Kennedy administration's *tactic* on this issue became, as the DOS proposed, to study all potential control schemes for a MLF with allies but make clear the legal issues involved and then have *allies* conclude that they could not agree on anybody else but the US President having the final control over a MLF – i.e., the USG aimed to show goodwill but try to strengthen its bargaining position by stressing the limits of its win-set and moreover ask the allies for overt concession that would create demand for a quid pro quo. The DOS argued that a statement against giving up the veto could kill the MLF proposal. McNamara insisted on the veto, expected giving it up to lead to partial US withdrawal from Europe, and wanted to avoid any promises about a veto-free MLF. According to Schwartz, also he was skeptical about the MLF: it threatened to risk the central control over nuclear forces and divert resources from conventional build-up; existing US commitments to Europe were enough; and the allies were likely in the end to have little interest in a plan that implied great costs but included a US veto. Still, even he saw it as politically advantageous to make a *proposal* for a MLF. He and Rusk came to favor indicating acceptance of the idea of a seaborne, mix-manned force to allies, leaving the question of control open.<sup>142</sup> Owing to tactical considerations, the public USG stance on the veto thus remained ambiguous: the USG hinted especially that giving it up might be possible if Western Europe integrated thoroughly and created a joint force that included complete British and/or French nuclear forces.<sup>143</sup>

Another factor looming behind the nuclear sharing talks was US concern about a possibility of Franco-German nuclear weapon cooperation, talks on which were rumored to take place. US Emb. Paris was making careful probes but saw now signs of such cooperation. Emb. Bonn argued it was for both sides only a future option, though bilateral scientific co-

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<sup>139</sup> D/126 (fn 101), D/130 (fn 134), D/173 NSCEC mtg, 12 Feb 63, FRUS 61-3:13; Bundy "Some interim conclusions about the responses to the President's Eight questions", 17 June 62, JFKL 8Q; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 314; Naftali & Zelikow 2001 p. 144 fn 65.

<sup>140</sup> D/130 (fn 134) FRUS 61-3:13; Bundy "Some interim..." (fn 139).

<sup>141</sup> NSAM 40 (fn 1) p. 9; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 312.

<sup>142</sup> Kaysen to Bundy on DOS-DOD mtg, 22 Feb 62; Rusk & McNamara to Kennedy, 29 March, both JFKL MLF; D/130, D/133 USG mtgs, 15 March and 16 Apr, FRUS 61-3:13; Military representative Taylor to Kennedy, 12 Apr, JFKL POF B/103 S:NATO Schwartz 1983 pp. 94-5.

<sup>143</sup> Bundy on MLF, 24 June 63, LBJL S:MLF Bundy papers; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 312. For an example of such an ambiguous statement, see Kennedy's news conf., 14 Feb 63, PPK 65.

operation probably prepared German scientists for potential weapon efforts.<sup>144</sup> Strauss answered Norstad's and USG inquiries that neither Paris nor Bonn had made any initiative and the option had not been discussed and would become topical only if NATO fully failed to solve its nuclear problems<sup>145</sup> – thus again also subtly pressing for nuclear sharing.

This issue was linked to the question of whether the USG would assist France's nuclear and missile programs (possibly as a part of some nuclear "trilateralism" scheme) – and whether the FRG would and could be forced to accept still clearer nuclear inequality in NATO. Views on these issues much diverged in the USG. Kennedy worried that the French nuclear effort would, especially in the post-Adenauer era, make the Germans follow suit (as senior US diplomat A. Harriman told him, also Khrushchev seemed seriously worried about this) and also about London's reaction to US help for Paris. McNamara argued that though a NATO "pecking order" suggested that France's going nuclear would make the FRG interested in following suit, allies' opposition would hinder this even if the USG aided France and that ways could be found to make the Germans accept this. In that, Kennedy's military representative M. Taylor stressed the value of a MLF: because of insufficient conventional forces and US strategy to avoid early use of nuclear weapons, he saw a German desire to follow Paris's example otherwise as a real risk. Kennedy was at the same time also concerned that financial problems and US unhelpfulness could push Paris seek German help for the force de frappe. McNamara argued that even if de Gaulle proposed cooperation, Bonn was likely to reject it as long as it trusted the US commitment. The DOD and Taylor favored assisting Paris as a way to prevent it from cooperating with, e.g., Israel or the FRG, and indicated hope that aid would improve relations with Paris and persuade it to cooperate fully in NATO. McNamara (and the DOS) saw de Gaulle as unlikely to help Bonn get a *national* nuclear force.<sup>146</sup>

Rusk, the DOS, and Kennedy's science and technology aide J. Wiesner opposed assisting Paris because aid was expected to cause much trouble with Bonn and others, make Bonn ask for similar treatment, and weaken chances of understandings with Moscow. The DOS argued Bonn would reject any cooperation offer by de Gaulle as long as the US opposed national nuclear forces in general and did not signal a more approving stance towards the force de frappe. It was argued that only aid for France would create pressure for a national nuclear force in the FRG, and thereafter elsewhere. The effect on the FRG alone was "enough to throw into disarray our efforts to promote European integration, strengthen the Atlantic Community, and stabilize East-West relations". Rusk doubted the wisdom of abandoning the general stance of opposition to proliferation and helping some states get

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<sup>144</sup> T/6066 Gavin to Rusk, 15 June 62; T/1538 E/B to Rusk, 10 Dec, both JFKL NGF.

<sup>145</sup> T/4161 Stoessel (political aide to SACEUR) to Rusk on Norstad-Strauss disc., 6 March 62, JFKL N/G; D/140 (fn 101) FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>146</sup> Harriman (fn 107), 1 Sep 61; D/126 (fn 101), D/130, D/133 (fn 142), D/131 Taylor to Kennedy, 3 Apr 62, FRUS 61-3:13; Nitze-Norstad mtg 23 March 62, 4 Apr, DNSA NH00968; McNamara to Kennedy on European nuclear matters (san.), 16 June; DOS on the same, n/d; both JFKL 8Q; USG mtg and EN, 29 Sep, Naftali & Zelikow 2001 pp. 215-8; D/5 Harriman to Kennedy, 23 Jan 63, NSA EBB CNP.

nuclear weapons, arguing that “would start us down a jungle path from which I see no exit”. In the official line, the DOS stance won in spring-summer 1962 and the USG did not offer nuclear cooperation to France. But it continued to consider the option, and in the fall the DOD had further private talks with the French on the subject.<sup>147</sup>

Bonn opposed US nuclear aid for France. Strauss argued to the USG that such a policy change would give an impression that French blackmail had succeeded and tempt other states to follow the example. But he did not think that US aid would create early pressures for a German nuclear force: “public opinion would be against it as long as NATO was effective”.<sup>148</sup> Indeed, in April he formulated in the Bundestag the basic needs of the FRG in the nuclear field as 1) *information* about US nuclear weapons in Europe; 2) *guarantees* that these would not be withdrawn against European will; and 3) a right to *a say* (Mitspracherecht) regarding the use of nuclear weapons stationed in the FRG. Thus he did not portray a joint nuclear force as necessary.<sup>149</sup>

Paris’s stance on nonproliferation in general and towards the FRG in particular was ambiguous. Between summer 1961 and fall 1962, de Gaulle and others now told the USG and London that they would not give nuclear weapons to any state, now rejected the idea of promising that categorically; now (referring to both Israel and the FRG) argued that proliferation was maybe unstoppable, now expressed opposition to German possession of nuclear weapons; and now gave no clear answer on whether they would help the FRG to get a nuclear capability, now said that they did not aim to give it nuclear weapons. Paris opposed a NPT. It tried to use the USG hope of it cooperating on nonproliferation to get help for the force de frappe: it indicated that if it got US help and a nuclear force, it would be able to cooperate, also regarding Israel, but if its legitimate needs were not met, it would maybe have to “assist proliferation”, and if it could not produce a nuclear force alone, it maybe had to seek German aid.<sup>150</sup>

While the USG was activating somewhat regarding the MLF plan, it also gave new assurances to the allies about its participation in European defense. Stikker proposed in February 1962 that it would assure that it would maintain enough nuclear weapons in Europe to cover targets of interest to the allies and provide information to support the assurances to some restricted NATO group. The USG expressed its agreement to the NAC in March.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, the DOD and the DOS now moved on with the information approach to nuclear sharing. In a May NAC meeting, the USG both gave a major presentation on the flexible

<sup>147</sup> D/80 Rusk to DOS/Executive Secretariat (ES) (san.), 7 Oct 61, FRUS 61-3:7; D/132 Rusk to Kennedy, 13 Apr 62; D/133 (fn 142); D/227 (fn 9) all FRUS 61-3:13; DOS on European nuclear matters, n/d (16-7 June), JFKL 8Q; USG mtg and EN, 29 Sep, Naftali & Zelikow 2001 p. 215.

<sup>148</sup> D/133 (fn 142) FRUS 61-3:13; D/44 (fn 116) FRUS 61-3:15; Kennedy-Strauss mtg, 8 June 62, JFKL N/G.

<sup>149</sup> See Haftendorn 1986 p. 174.

<sup>150</sup> T/3441 Stoessel to Rusk on Norstad-French official de Rose mtg, 12 Jan 62, JFKL MLF; Klein to Bundy, 30 March, with DOS memo, 23 March, JFKL MM B/321 Klein; D/254, D/144 US-French mtgs, 20 June and 31 May, FRUS 61-3:13; Rusk-Alphand mtg, 7 Sep 62, JFKL ATB B/261; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 371 ref. also to “Anglo/French Co-operation”, 25 May 62, UK PREM 11/3712.

<sup>151</sup> See Rusk-Stikker mtg, 7 Feb 62, JFKL MLF; Tuschhoff 2002 p. 149.



response -strategy, declared its intention to share more information on nuclear strategy and after such education increase allies' participation in strategy formulation and decision-making, strongly argued that small, independent nuclear forces made little sense, and vaguely indicated willingness to place nuclear submarines under NATO command. The allies now for the first time got detailed information about US nuclear weapons in Europe, and a NATO Nuclear Committee was set up for their participation in nuclear strategy.<sup>152</sup>

It seemed to USOS G. Ball, who visited Bonn, that the Germans did not really believe in the MLF idea because the French and British were uneager about it and such a force was expensive. Strauss also seemed to think that the US was not serious about it and could be persuaded to support nationally-manned MRBMs in Europe.<sup>153</sup>

Top USG officials wanted to keep the MLF idea alive for *tactical* purposes, but the prospects of a MLF coming about seemed weak. In early summer, Kennedy inquired of his aides whether it was “not a fact that the NATO nuclear concept is stillborn – really not developing in any way and no longer a likely prospect?” McNamara replied a MLF seemed only possible in a longer run and if the US carried most costs and strongly pushed it on the allies. The DOS saw a MLF as possible if Bonn showed clear interest, but it was just as likely to pursue nationally-manned MRBMs. Bundy concluded Kennedy was “right in believing that the current MRBM proposal [the MLF] is not going to get very far”. But it was “doing some educational good” and it was “worth letting the argument go forward for a while.”<sup>154</sup>

When Strauss visited Washington in June 1962, German nuclear aims and a MLF were on the agenda. Strauss stressed the importance of Atlantic cooperation and seemed to agree that national nuclear forces were neither needed nor desirable and “would mean the disintegration of NATO”. He said that unlike Paris, Bonn was not interested in nuclear weapons because of prestige. Having renounced the production of nuclear weapons, the FRG was likely to “raise the nuclear problem in the 60s”, but the issue was unsettled. Moreover, he brought up the French argument that separate nuclear forces would increase the credibility of the Western deterrent and the question about the effects of future US-Soviet nuclear parity (the Americans stressed the un-divisibility of Western defense to him). The DOS impression was that he was not pursuing a “German nuclear capability or co-determination”

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<sup>152</sup> Rusk to McNamara with “Suggested Program”, n/d, JFKL MLF; McNamara at NAC restricted session, 5 May, DNSA NH00971; Mahncke 1972 pp. 119-26; Schwarz 1989 p. 575. See also D/132 (fn 147) FRUS 61-3:13; D/120 (fn 88) FRUS 61-3:8; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 167-8, 172-4. Bonn had gotten some data about the targeting of tactical nuclear weapons in 1960. Lauk 1979 p. 48. On Bonn's ability to get information about US plans for nuclear weapons in NATO until spring 1962, see Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 141-9, and on information sharing by the USG in spring 1962 and German assessments thereof, pp. 149-56. Stanley 1962 describes this NAC mtg as a success for the USG as all allies except France joined it in opposing national nuclear forces. He argues the US presentation of its plans must have made London's and Paris's existing and planned nuclear forces seem very small, which added to the credibility of the USG position (pp. 555-7).

<sup>153</sup> T/2858-9 E/B to Rusk on Adenauer- and Schröder-Ball mtgs, 23 May 62; Bundy to Kennedy, 7 June, all JFKL N/G.

<sup>154</sup> McNamara, DOS, and Bundy to Kennedy, 16-7 June 62, JFKL 8Q.

but was concerned about the implications on NATO of Paris's national nuclear effort. Strauss welcomed the information sharing initiative; Bonn saw information about strategy and forces as a precondition for active involvement in nuclear strategy. Strauss portrayed the NAC meeting as "a turning point" in nuclear sharing and the first genuine NATO strategy discussion. In the MLF idea he saw various problems, including shared control.<sup>155</sup> Still a year later, he remained unconvinced of it and favored land-based MRBM deployments<sup>156</sup>.

Despite McNamara's aim to share information, the idea had insufficient support in the DOD and the JCS. Moreover, the AEA prohibited sharing some data McNamara would have wanted to give to allies. The allies' lacking familiarity with nuclear issues implied further hindrances. Overall, the result was that the initiative did not go far.<sup>157</sup> By early 1963, Stikker saw that the US was sharing so little information that the Nuclear Committee "had been stillborn"<sup>158</sup>.

In summer 1962, Adenauer was again playing the nuclear card – with some effect. He told Rusk that "in 1954, when ... he had renounced the manufacture of ABC weapons ... Dulles had said to him that the *rebus sic stantibus* doctrine would of course apply". Bonn considered the 1954 restrictions valid only as long as also other 1954 circumstances did not change. But Paris had already violated WEU rules by insufficiently accounting for its nuclear stockpiles; moreover, it was pursuing nuclear weapons.<sup>159</sup> Adenauer's statement, which remains partly excised in the meeting memo, clearly impressed Rusk: later, he noted Adenauer had said "the WEU restrictions were no longer binding by virtue of *rebus sic stantibus*". Adenauer's comments, Bonn's opposition to discrimination and further non-nuclear commitments, and its comments that no pressure for a national nuclear force existed *at the time*, made Rusk, his aide C. Bohlen, and ASOS/EUR F. Kohler think that Bonn wanted to maintain a nuclear option and such pressure would emerge if no nuclear sharing solution was found.<sup>160</sup>

The DOS did not accept Adenauer's claim about Dulles's remark at face value and, as discussed in section 7.2.1.3, investigated the matter – with inconclusive results. In any case, the DOS/L saw the *rebus sic stantibus* -doctrine as disputed. The DOS argued Adenauer made the claim because he indeed feared that in the absence of a MLF, the French nuclear effort would create pressure in the FRG for following suit.<sup>161</sup>

Trachtenberg argues that though the USG had thought that Bonn at least for the time being did not want own nuclear weapons, the view began to change towards late 1961 and by

<sup>155</sup> Kennedy-Strauss mtg, 8 June 62; DOS to posts abroad on Strauss's visit, 13 June, both JFKL N/G; D/140 (fn 101) FRUS 61-3:13; Richardson 1966 p. 81; Mahneke 1972 p. 121.

<sup>156</sup> Kissinger on 17 May mtg with Strauss, 3 June 63, DDRS.

<sup>157</sup> Buchan "The Coming Crisis on the MLF", 23 June 63, LBJL S:MLF II 1; Schwartz 1983 p. 180; Haftendorn 1994 p. 167.

<sup>158</sup> Schlesinger to Komer, 18 Feb 63, with Kissinger on a 12 Jan mtg with Stikker, 21 Jan, JFKL GEB 1.

<sup>159</sup> D/145 Adenauer-Rusk mtg (san.), 22 June 62, FRUS 61-3:13; Rostow to Harriman, 2 July 63, AHP TBT3.

<sup>160</sup> D/146 (fn 116), D/147 Bohlen memo, 2 July 62, FRUS 61-3:13; Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA.

<sup>161</sup> DOS "German Nuclear Developments and *rebus sic stantibus*", 6 July 62, JFKL NCG.

summer 1962 many key officials were worried about German ambitions. According to him, until then the USG had erroneously thought Adenauer, who was also seen as a protective force against nationalism in the FRG, to oppose Strauss's national nuclear weapon ambitions, a view Adenauer had tried to maintain to make the USG more lax about the control of nuclear weapons in NATO. Trachtenberg argues the USG continued to play German nuclear aims down in outward communications to avoid direct confrontation with Bonn and to make the issue seem un-topical enough to be on the Berlin agenda without it seeming like a big concession.<sup>162</sup> Thus the USG used similar tactics as with Israel: dealing with a problem quietly, without open, possibly escalating disputes that attach unwanted attention.

But Buchan suggests that the DOS and the DOD misunderstood the Germans in another way: Adenauer only argued that Bonn needed to somehow match the status upgrade nuclear weapons gave for Paris and London and Strauss just demanded a greater German *role* in control over weapons deployed in the FRG, but the USG *thought* they wanted *full* control over some weapons. Thus it "created a purely theoretical model about German demands upon its allies and about the conceivability of Germany deciding to acquire national nuclear weapons if they were not satisfied", the DOS at times ignoring Emb. Bonn views on this.<sup>163</sup> And indeed, though Strauss's comments can be interpreted as a thinly veiled threat of a German nuclear force – he continued to argue that none was needed at least "as long as the NATO guarantee remained adequate" (whereas he in any case favored a European over a German force)<sup>164</sup> – he indeed said that a German force could become topical *only* if US protection clearly weakened. Moreover, he probably anyway made such statements largely for bargaining purposes, rather than to necessarily express his true views. Overall, it does seem that Bonn's primary goal was proper consultations in NATO, even if some in the USG feared that it wanted control nuclear weapons.

Not all USG officials did. In summer 1962, Emb. Bonn and a DOS research memo argued that as long as the West Germans felt secure, their nuclear ambitions could be "constructively channeled" and that Bonn did at the time not aim at a national or French-German weapon effort. Early revival of German nationalism was also very unlikely.<sup>165</sup> A NIE expected Bonn only in the absence of any NATO or European scheme for control over nuclear weapons to come one day see a national force as necessary for status reasons. It had probably not decided to pursue a nuclear force and was politically, economically, and technically unable to do so in the near future. But its growing military and economic power was

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<sup>162</sup> Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 341-2 ref. also to Macmillan-McNamara mtg, 29 Apr 62, UK PREM 3783 p. 28; Trachtenberg 1999 App. 6: "The U.S. Assessment of German Nuclear Aspirations", <http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/appendices/appendixVI.html> (25 May 05). For US views of Adenauer as a protector against resurgent nationalism and worries about the post-Adenauer era, see, e.g., Amb. Thompson (E/M) to Dulles, 9 March 59, DNSA BC00922; D/11 Kennedy-de Gaulle mtg, 2 June 61, FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>163</sup> Buchan (fn 157), 23 June 63. Also Mahncke 1972 argues that for Bonn, neither a national nuclear force nor cooperation with Paris was realistic option, but the US took the possibilities seriously and thus was interested in a MLF (pp. 148-50).

<sup>164</sup> Kissinger (fn 156), 3 June 63.

<sup>165</sup> DOS memo, 6 July 62, with T/6 E/B to DOS, 2 July, JFKL NCG; REU-59 (fn 85).

likely to make it more assertive in NATO security matters. The West Germans wanted to maintain security ties to the US, but repeated “crises of confidence” were likely because of their sensitivity towards any potential signs that the US would give up its commitments or deal with Moscow at their expense.<sup>166</sup>

Growing concern about German aims, the failure of the information sharing plan, and the unresolved question of MRBM deployments all contributed to increasing promotion by the DOS of a MLF as a solution to NATO’s problems since summer 1962. The DOD and ACDA remained unenthusiastic, but lack of progress in relations with Moscow, continuing feeling in NATO that the alliance needed strengthening, and concern about proliferation in Europe weakened opposition. Also in the DOD, it was seen that a MLF might reduce otherwise significant pressures on the FRG and Italy to acquire control over nuclear weapons in another way. Kennedy remained hesitant. In July 1962 statements, motivated by a desire to show support for European integration, he said that he would discuss any European proposal for a European solution regarding NATO’s nuclear deterrent, and in September Bundy said in a speech that the USG would not oppose a truly joint European nuclear force integrated to US forces. But according to Schlesinger, with both such statements and the MLF plan, Kennedy was just “throwing out a variety of ideas” for allies to consider, seeing them as able to decide what was best for them. In instructions for MLF talks with allies, Kennedy stressed a need to make clear that conventional build-up came before a MLF, the force was maybe militarily unnecessary, and the allies would have to pay the bulk of its large costs. He expected this to make early agreement on a MLF unlikely. Emb. Bonn was moreover informed that the USG did not aim to move on early with a MLF but just wanted to *maintain allied interest* (a further indication of the tactical nature of the MLF proposal).<sup>167</sup> In all, the MLF efforts were still feeble: Bundy later argued the US had given “the impression that we did not believe what we were saying<sup>168</sup>”.

In Bonn, interest in a MLF was growing. Haftendorn argues that only after the failure of the 1962 information sharing approach, Strauss came to favor a joint nuclear force, and that also Foreign Minister G. Schröder first made his preference for a consultative sharing scheme clear<sup>169</sup>. In the summer Bonn expressed support for a MLF: even if dependent on the US, it would together with information-sharing help solve NATO’s problems. In August, Schröder already argued that consultation alone was not enough: *only a MLF* seemed to offer a way to tie the US “irretrievably to European defense”, tie the “hands of future German governments”, and enable Bonn to resist French cooperation initiatives.<sup>170</sup> Ade-

<sup>166</sup> NIE 23-62 “The Outlook for West Germany”, 25 July 62, LBJL I:G.

<sup>167</sup> D/141 Kennedy to Finletter, 14 June 62, FRUS 61-3:13; T/281 DOS to E/B, 30 June, JFKL NGF; Kennedy’s speech and news conf., 4-5 July, PPK 278-9; Kennedy-Nitze mtg, 30 July, Naftali 2001 p. 87; Schlesinger 1965 p. 855; Sommer 1966 p. 44; Mahncke 1972 pp. 131-2; Bundy 1988 p. 497.

<sup>168</sup> USG mtg, 18 Feb 63, JFK MM B/317 mtgs with Kennedy.

<sup>169</sup> Haftendorn 1986 pp. 175-6.

<sup>170</sup> D/145 (fn 159) FRUS 61-3:13; Rusk to Johnson with “The MLF: What and Why?”, 8 Apr 64, LBJL S:MLF I 3. See Brown & Desai 2005 for an argument that Bonn’s policies regarding and commitments about

nauer reportedly in vain tried to persuade de Gaulle to support a MLF. But the West German military was unconvinced.<sup>171</sup>

The FRG did already control various nuclear delivery systems, and despite worries in the USG about German ambitions, sales of further US systems were planned. The FRG already had nuclear-capable short-range missiles and mid-range aircraft. Though the aircraft was expected soon to obsolesce as a delivery capability against the USSR, US military was at the time uneasy about German nuclear-equipped aircraft. The USG opposed the idea of German *submarines* with nuclear warheads, but a deal on Mace missiles that had a sufficient range to reach targets in the USSR was on the US-FRG agenda. For instance the DOS Office of Science Advisor (SA) saw in fall 1962 that because of the risks involved, selling any further mid-range missiles for allies' national forces was not in line with US policy. It noted, however, that the Mace system also had obsolescing features. Kennedy was unenthusiastic even about giving German forces tactical nuclear capabilities. When Adenauer complained to him about a lack of such and inequality between Bundeswehr and US forces in the FRG, Kennedy just stressed the importance of conventional forces and argued that NATO already had enough nuclear-armed troops.<sup>172</sup> That Mace supply was nonetheless agreed upon is indicated by the fact that in a February 1963 USG meeting, Taylor, then JCS chairman, referred to Germany's Mace missiles<sup>173</sup>.

### 8.2.5 The Nassau agreement: a multinational or multilateral nuclear force?

London was in USG plans supposed to take part in any MLF. But it disliked the idea of a mixed-manned force: Europeans wanted no German "finger on the trigger". It made it clear to the USG that it favored for NATO a nuclear organization based on a US-British-French nuclear force, with the US and maybe the UK helping to create the French component, to be coordinated with the US similarly as the British force. Bonn would get a role in decision-making for but not operation of the force, and more information would be shared with non-nuclear allies. As discussed above, similar schemes were considered in the USG. London saw this as a sufficient solution to NATO's problems; both it and Paris saw it as feasible to force Bonn to stick to the 1954 pledge. But the DOS argued that such discrimination

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nuclear weapons, including those related to rearmament, nuclear sharing in NATO, and the NPT, were all partly a general effort to tie the hands of future German governments.

<sup>171</sup> T/189 E/P to Rusk on 13 Aug mtg with German official, 14 Aug 62, JFKL N/G; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 190-1; Schwartz 1983 pp. 92-3.

<sup>172</sup> See DepUSOS Johnson to DepASOD/ISA Rowen, 30 Aug 62, USNA PM B/2 nuclear sharing NATO dispersal: Bundy to Kennedy, 7 June, JFKL N/G; Rusk-Amb. Alphan (France) mtg, 7 Sep, JFKL ATB B/261; D/157 Kennedy-Adenauer disc., 14 Nov, FRUS 61-3:13. For data on operational nuclear-capable mid-range systems of the German Air Force and NATO in general in 1960-2, see Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 114-6.

<sup>173</sup> D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13. Based on an 3 Apr 58 Bundeswehr memo, Tuschhoff 2002 argues that after the failure to get the planned number of Matador missiles, the German Air Force abandoned its earlier plan to later acquire Mace missiles (p. 113). But Taylor's comment indicates that Maces were later again introduced to Bundeswehr plans.

implied a risk of a German nuclear force and thus favored a MLF.<sup>174</sup> Elsewhere in the USG, more support existed for London's stance.

Mahncke argues that USG failure to consult its allies during the Cuban crisis strengthened perceptions in the West that a nuclear sharing solution in NATO was needed. Trachtenberg suggests that after the crisis, Kennedy was in turn prepared to accept open nuclear inequality in NATO: instead of a MLF, which seemed to cause problems in NATO and in talks with Moscow, Kennedy and McNamara aimed to pursue a trilateral force also London favored and thus more liberal policy towards the UK and France but not the FRG. But many DOS officials did not share this view and to avoid adverse German reactions, officially the USG continued to support a MLF. He argues this situation also led to the ambiguity of the Nassau deal.<sup>175</sup>

That US-UK agreement was a result of an earlier deal on US supply of nuclear Skybolt missiles to the UK. The deal in practice meant that the UK would become dependent on American long-range nuclear delivery systems and was linked to agreement on a US nuclear submarine base in Scotland. As the Skybolt production program ran into problems and the missiles were expected to soon become obsolete, in late 1962 the two states agreed in Nassau that the US would instead supply Polaris missiles for British submarines.<sup>176</sup>

Trachtenberg bases his argument on, e.g., memos of the Nassau conference, but also a memo on a pre-Nassau USG meeting indicates that Kennedy and McNamara indeed were open to the idea of a trilateral nuclear force and to forgetting about a MLF. McNamara argued that recent talks with allies clearly showed that "our current position with respect to a multilateral force simply will not work": the Europeans would not pay for a MLF *and* conventional forces required by NATO. Thus "it was time to move on to a more realistic arrangement and one which would better serve our own interests." MLF-proponent Ball urged caution because of French and German reactions to US supply of Polaris to the British (which would contradict official USG support for a multilateral nuclear solution in NATO). Especially taking into account the *public* USG stance opposed to national nuclear forces, Kennedy decided to offer Polaris to the UK on the condition that they would be assigned to "a *multilateral or multinational* force in NATO" – a vague concept not necessarily implying a mix-manned MLF.<sup>177</sup> The public nonproliferation stance was reaffirmed the next day: Kennedy said in an interview that the emergence of several *uncoordinated* nuclear forces in Europe would be wasteful and not in the interest of peace. Moreover, to the

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<sup>174</sup> DOS to Bundy on 30 Sep Kennedy-Home disc., 28 Sep 62, JFKL MLF; D/402 US-UK mtg, 19 Dec, FRUS 61-3:13; Bundy 1988 p. 495.

<sup>175</sup> Mahncke 1972 pp. 133-4; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 314, 355-6, 364-7 ref. beyond to memos discussed below to, e.g., US-UK mtg, 19 Dec 62, UK PREM 11/4229, and to DOS/PM to Rusk, 9 Jan 63, USNA CDF 740.5611/1-936.

<sup>176</sup> On the Skybolt/Nassau affair, see a thorough report consultant Neustadt prepared at Kennedy's request, based on interviews with and documents of both US and British officials: "Skybolt and Nassau: American Policy-Making and Anglo-American Relations", 15 Nov 63, DDRS. See also Schwartz 1983 pp. 96-105; Bundy 1988 p. 471-2, 490-3.

<sup>177</sup> My emphasis. WH mtg, 16 Dec 62, JFKL BMR.

public he said that though the US would not stop European nuclear weapon efforts, aiding any ally was another matter as that would create pressure to help several allies.<sup>178</sup>

In Nassau, Kennedy did make the point to the British that supply of Polaris to them would create problems with Paris, whose nuclear weapon effort the US had not wanted to aid in order to avoid demands by the FRG and others for similar help. He noted that a *multinational* nuclear solution was needed in NATO. But though Ball stressed the German problem and spoke for a mixed-manned force, Kennedy indicated that a multinational force did not have to mean that: he expressed preparedness to consider also the kind of a trilateral scheme London favored, assuming, as London argued, that its effect on the FRG would not seem as too grave.<sup>179</sup> The official, public line agreed upon was that the aim of the Polaris deal was “the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies” and that the missiles “and at least equal U.S. forces, would be made available for inclusion in a NATO multilateral force” and be used for NATO defense unless – an escape clause for the UK – the “supreme national interests” of the UK were at stake. As an immediate step, it was agreed that some existing nuclear forces of both states, and some nuclear forces stationed in Europe, would be assigned to NATO. These came to be called “Paragraph 6 forces” according to the relevant paragraph of the Nassau statement.<sup>180</sup> Multilateralism was not defined more exactly, probably since neither side wanted to commit itself to any one scheme. Statements about a *multinational* force would also have upset Bonn. US negotiators used the terms multilateral and –national interchangeably, and thus the concept covered national forces assigned to NATO. The lack of a clear requirement for the UK to take part in a mixed-manned MLF disappointed the MLF-lobby in the USG, but the deal allowed interpreting it as one pleased: in support of either a MLF or a trilateral force based on national contingents.<sup>181</sup>

As a further step towards some kind of joint solution, and as a major policy change, the USG offered Paris “similar” cooperation as to London. What this exactly meant was to be figured out in talks with the French: the less advanced status of their nuclear weapon program made Polaris missiles as such less attractive to them. Though many accounts (including Haftendorn’s in many ways excellent study) argue that the US offered (just) somewhat irrelevant cooperation on Polaris, in reality giving Paris even nuclear *warheads* was not excluded in the USG. In any case, the USG meant the offer to imply “willingness to recognize France as a nuclear power and to bring substantially to an end the exclusive quality of the US-UK relationship”, assuming Paris would pursue a multilateral policy. Again, multilateralism was not clearly defined. De Gaulle’s cooperation was uncertain, but according to Neustadt, those who interpreted the Nassau deal in support of a trilateral force, including

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<sup>178</sup> Kennedy’s interview, 17 Dec 62, PPK 551.

<sup>179</sup> D/402 (fn 174) FRUS 61-3:13. Tuschhoff 2002 argues that the USG hoped the UK to make its Polaris a part of a *multilateral* force, while London wanted a *multinational* solution (pp. 277-8). But this view overlooks the divisions within the USG.

<sup>180</sup> Joint statement on Nassau agreement, 21 Dec 62, PPK 554.

<sup>181</sup> Neustadt (fn 176) pp. 93-4, 100-2, 112-3; Schlesinger 1965 p. 865.

McNamara and ASOD/ISA P. Nitze, were hopeful that he would cooperate and the MLF could be forgotten.<sup>182</sup>

Could a basically trilateral scheme have been a sustainable solution for NATO? Considering the goal of coordinating nuclear forces in NATO, such a solution was satisfactory, assuming no further national nuclear force emerged. Proponents of the scheme believed that the FRG could be kept from pursuing an own force. Another question was whether agreement on NATO strategy with Bonn was possible if NATO's nuclear organization became trilateral and excluded it. But a scheme for organizing nuclear forces was not the only way to enhance West German confidence in NATO strategy; the stockpiling scheme and increased consultations were other options. So a chance existed that the solution could work.

But strong feelings also existed in the USG that overt discrimination of the FRG was unviable and the legacy of WWII and the 1954 accords would not restrict a strengthening FRG forever. It was argued that if the Germans felt like second-class citizens in the nuclear field, European integration would run into problems and unilateral German moves towards reunification become more likely. To preclude nationalistic pressures, Bonn had to be able to argue at home that the FRG had in practice no worse nuclear status than its key European allies. Before the Nassau deal, US missions in Europe also expressed concern that supply of Polaris to the UK could result in Bonn's abandoning the MLF for the sake of cooperation with Paris or a national nuclear force and make Paris and Bonn less willing to accept the UK into the European Economic Community (EEC), a matter that was being negotiated about.<sup>183</sup>

Though the US tried to present the Nassau deal in a multilateral context, Bonn realized that it did not necessary imply a MLF. This strongly upset Adenauer, Strauss, and others. Bonn's complaints to the USG about discrimination in NATO intensified: it accepted "U.S. nuclear dominance" but could not accept dominance by the US and the UK and maybe France. The Germans also worried that the deal and the Par. 6 force meant changes to existing deployment arrangements and thus maybe a "step towards atomic disengagement" (this hardly was the US goal with Par. 6 forces; rather, these were something concrete and multilateral that could be set up early). Bonn argued that all this suggested to the public that for the US, a nuclear defense line existed west of Rhine, conventional German forces were an "expendable cushion", and the FRG was just "a satellite".<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Rusk to E/P, 1 Jan 63, JFKL BMR; Neustadt (fn 176) pp. 97-8, 100-5; Schlesinger 1965 p. 866; Haftendorn 1994 pp. 13, 45.

<sup>183</sup> D/56 M/European Communities to DOS, 16 Dec 62, FRUS 61-3:13; T/1594 Dowling to Rusk, 18 Dec, JFKL NCG; Steering group on implementing Nassau decisions "Post-Nassau Strategy", 2 Jan 63, JFKL NSF Kaysen B/376 NATO S:European nuclear force Nassau.

Despite negative financial effects on the US, the USG supported Britain's entry in the EEC because of the economic and political benefits for Western Europe and the need to tie the FRG to the West. See D/11 Kennedy-de Gaulle mtg, 2 June 61, FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>184</sup> T/1641 E/B to Rusk, 23 Dec 62, JFKL N/G; T/1712 Dowling to Rusk, 7 Jan 63, JFKL NCG; Schlesinger (fn 158), 18 Feb.



To the surprise of many in the USG and London, in a January 1963 press conference de Gaulle rejected both the entry of the UK to the EEC, the idea of French participation in a NATO nuclear force, and the US offer of *Polaris*, saying that France had no use for them at the time and ignoring the option of getting some other nuclear aid from the US. Based on a study of the background of de Gaulle's move, Davis argues that especially London's failure to accept de Gaulle's guarded, vague proposals just before the Nassau meeting for joint efforts on nuclear weapons and missiles, and its preference for cooperation with the US, were the key reason for de Gaulle's rejection of Britain's EEC membership. Moreover, after the MLF-supporters in the DOS convinced Kennedy that some reassurance regarding a MLF was needed as the Nassau deal was alienating Bonn, Ball discussed the MLF plan with Adenauer. Though de Gaulle maybe would have rejected the US offer anyway, Ball seems to have "sabotaged" what others in the USG meant as an attempt to persuade Paris to accept a trilateral force. Ball told Adenauer and French officials that the Nassau deal implied early action towards a *mixed-manned* force; the ambiguity of the Nassau deal enabled him to say so. But de Gaulle was not interested in any mixed-manned, multilateral force.<sup>185</sup>

### 8.2.6 De Gaulle's challenge and US strategy for Europe

A week after de Gaulle's press conference, Paris and Bonn signed the bilateral Elysée Treaty on cooperation in foreign, economic, military, educational, and scientific affairs. Especially because of the timing, this appeared as an exclusive move at the expense of NATO unity.<sup>186</sup>

It seems Adenauer seriously considered allying with France to create an independent power block. His aides were concerned that the old man would make moves that would destroy Western unity and cause grave problems with the US and the UK. Despite frequent US reassurances, Adenauer continued to fear that Americans entertained ideas of withdrawing from Europe and of deals with Moscow at German expense or would not protect the FRG. De Gaulle tried to benefit from the concern and referring to force de frappe assured Adenauer that France considered Germany's defense as its own; no ocean separated these two countries. Richardson argues that though it did not want to break US-European ties, by backing de Gaulle Bonn in fact enabled his far-going anti-Atlantist action.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> D/266 Bohlen to DOS, 24 Jan 63; D/270 Bohlen to Bundy, 2 March, both FRUS 61-3:13; Kissinger on mtg with French general Stehlin, 25 May, DDRS; Bundy (fn 143), 24 June; Neustadt (fn 176) pp. 95, 100-2, 107-12; Schlesinger 1965 p. 866; Schwartz 1983 pp. 96, 105; Davis 1998; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 359-69, 391-4. Kennedy thought Macmillan had not understood de Gaulle's proposal for nuclear cooperation and said at the NSCEC that the US had thus "narrowly averted a disaster". D/64 NSCEC mtg, 31 Jan 63, FRUS 61-3:13.

At least MLF-critics like Kissinger 1965 argued that the MLF-lobby became too committed to the idea to be able to realistically consider various policies, which resulted in a series of misjudgments (pp. 157-8).

<sup>186</sup> Treaty of Elysée, 22 Jan 63; Neustadt (fn 176) pp. 109-10; Schwartz 1983 p. 105.

<sup>187</sup> D/301 Blankenhorn's diary, 13 June 62, BDFD; D/37, D/73 Adenauer-de Gaulle and -French official mtgs, 21 Jan and 4 Feb, APD 63; Richardson 1966 pp. 63-6; Schwarz 1991 pp. 814-6. Later de Gaulle simi-

### 8.2.6.1 Renewed concern about French-German nuclear weapon cooperation

Moscow argued that Paris's interest in cooperation with Bonn covered nuclear weapons<sup>188</sup>. This seemed possible also to the USG and it continued to monitor the matter. There were rumors of plans for such cooperation and an unconfirmed report that Bonn had offered financial help for the force de frappe. But on balance, it seemed in winter 1962-3 to Emb. Bonn and the DOS that no such cooperation was planned. In early 1963, a German general told Kissinger that the French had offered nuclear cooperation in late 1962. A French general later confirmed to Kissinger that he had made an unofficial probe but said that the French Foreign Office was against the idea and de Gaulle had taken a stance clearly in opposition. Bohlen, now Ambassador to France, argued to Bundy that de Gaulle primarily pursued the force de frappe to ensure security vis-à-vis Germany and had no clear concept for dealing with the German nuclear issue. French officials denied that the Elysée treaty would cover nuclear weapons and told the USG that they expected Bonn to honor its 1954 commitments. They argued bilateral nuclear weapon efforts were anyway unpractical at the time since France was not strong enough to protect the FRG if Moscow made German nuclear weapons a casus belli. In May, Foreign Minister M. Couve de Murville said to Kennedy that Paris would never aid a *German* nuclear weapon effort.<sup>189</sup>

When concluding the Elysée Treaty, Adenauer and de Gaulle did discuss the possibility of German nuclear or missile efforts. Adenauer said that the FRG would respect its commitments but referred to a rebus sic stantibus -clause in his 1954 pledge and noted that the FRG was free to participate in research on missiles that "were just as important as nuclear warheads". De Gaulle showed interest in cooperation on missile and biological weapon development and argued that if no progress was made on disarmament, Germany would one day want nuclear weapons. That would anger the US and eliminate chances for an understanding with Moscow. Still, France would not try to stop Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. Adenauer agreed with the analysis but stressed that the FRG did not want nuclear weapons unless global developments forced it to get them. He also said that he welcomed the French nuclear weapon program.<sup>190</sup>

To Bonn, it seemed that though Paris was eager for other arms cooperation, it wanted no bilateral nuclear force, which moreover could have meant an end to NATO. Some German officials favored close relations with Paris because it supported deterrence (instead of lim-

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larly argued to Chancellor Erhard that France, probably unlike the US, would without delay defend the FRG with its future nuclear weapons. D/423 Erhard-de Gaulle mtg, 21 Nov, APD 63.

<sup>188</sup> See D/261 Rusk-Dobrynin mtg with Soviet statement, 7 Feb 63, FRUS 61-3:7; D/384 GFO State Secretary Carstens-Soviet Emb. talk, 9 Oct, APD 63. Brzezinski 1964 refers to indications that Moscow's fear of such cooperation was behind its interest in better relations with the US (p. 129).

<sup>189</sup> T/1538 (fn 144); T/2973 E/P to Rusk, 25 Jan 63, JFKL N/G S:Adenauer-de Gaulle talks; Schlesinger to Komer, 18 Feb, with Kissinger on 10-1 Jan talks with German general Speidel and de Rose, 25 and 21 Jan, JFKL GEB 1; Klein with DOS on Franco-German cooperation (fn 10), 26 Feb; D/270 (fn 185), D/271 Kennedy-Couve de Murville mtg, 25 May, FRUS 61-3:13; Kissinger on 25 May mtg with general Stehlin, 28 May, DDRS; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 371-3.

<sup>190</sup> D/37 (fn 187) APD 63.

ited war) strategy and according to Schwarz, there were some talks about proposing nuclear weapon cooperation to Paris. But since Paris seemed to want no *equal* nuclear partnership, for instance Schröder and others in the GFO saw nuclear weapon cooperation with it as much less useful as that with the US.<sup>191</sup>

In spring 1963, there were signs of Paris's interest in German and maybe Italian financing for its enrichment plant. Rumors circulated about Bonn already giving such aid. At the same time, Bonn was interested in acquiring a new HEU-reactor. Quite coincidental or not, the rumors helped Bonn's position with the USG when it inquired whether it could buy quite much HEU from the US. The AEC was eager to sell both the reactor and the fuel. Though the fuel sale had "a very high military potential", also in the DOS many factors were seen to speak for it, including that it would give the US safeguards rights and that restrictions on HEU supply could make other Europeans more willing to take part in the French plant.<sup>192</sup>

USG estimates still saw no *early* pressure for a West German nuclear force but expected that to emerge unless the risk of abandonment by the US was alleviated. In February 1963, the DOD saw the motivation for Bonn to decide to acquire nuclear weapons as moderate. In the absence of a test ban or a MLF, pressure on it to seek control over nuclear weapons was likely to clearly grow within a decade. It was estimated that if Bonn decided so, it could test a weapon in 4-5 years and achieve operational aircraft and IRBM capabilities in 6 and 7 years, respectively. Expecting now in general no wide proliferation within a decade, the CIA thought also the FRG not to go beyond civilian nuclear efforts in the near future. But also it expected German interest in an own nuclear force to grow if the US would seem unlikely to use nuclear weapons to defend the FRG.<sup>193</sup>

### 8.2.6.2 Re-evaluation of European strategy

De Gaulle's moves altogether seemed to be directed against the US and the transatlantic relationship. Kennedy took the situation seriously and reacted very negatively to the Elysée treaty. At the NSC Executive Committee (NSCEC), he called for a "cold, hard attitude towards the situation which may develop in Europe"<sup>194</sup>. His reactions show that real fears of de- or realignment by allies existed in the USG and even drastic responses were considered. Though his administration had so far taken little concrete, decisive action to ensure that Bonn remained content with the NATO solution to its security even in face of the

<sup>191</sup> D/26 on German-French cooperation, 15 Jan; D/240 Grewe on alternatives to MLF, 26 July; D/283 also fn 5 Carstens-Groepper (Amb. to the USSR) disc., 7 Aug, all APD 63; Schwarz 1991 p. 819; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 195.

<sup>192</sup> The US had also already supplied HEU to several states and to Euratom. EUR unsent draft memo and attached note, 17 Apr 63, USNA ERA B/3 Germany; Memo to Finletter, 5 July, *ibid.* B/4 military application NATO; DOS/SCI on supplying HEU to the FRG, 6 May, USNA CFPF AE-11-2 Ger W B/4161.

<sup>193</sup> McNamara "Diffusion...", 27 July 62 (fn 57) and 12 Feb 63 (update), DNSA NP00941; ACDA "US Position for a Test Ban" with "Country Nuclear Weapons Capabilities", 26 Feb, USNA NRA; NIE 4-63 (fn 127).

<sup>194</sup> D/169 NSCEC mtg, 25 Jan 63, FRUS 61-3:13.

flexible response -strategy and challenges posed to NATO cooperation by France – the USG had just made verbal assurances, the information sharing effort had failed, and the MLF initiative had not moved far – the new developments shocked the USG into action.

Kennedy noted that US leverage with Europe was decreasing: leverage given by its earlier relative economic strength and financial aid was gone and Paris's nuclear weapon effort (that could maybe lead to an EC nuclear force) weakened the leverage resulting from the US role in European defense. The decreased appeal of the US threatened to make Europeans see the tie to it as risky in possibly entrapping them in a war in a case like the Cuban crisis. If Paris and Moscow reached some deal on cooperation, it was possible that also Bonn would accept it. If the FRG did not need the US, the whole NATO strategy was pointless. To enable prompt reactions to any further anti-US action by de Gaulle, Kennedy wanted a review of the levers the US still had with the Europeans. He launched a reappraisal of the whole European policy, including the MLF plan (its long-term value, Soviet reactions, US veto, effect on NATO cohesion), talks with Moscow, US-French relations, Franco-German relations and the chance of nuclear weapon cooperation, what kind of a Franco-Russian deal Bonn would accept, remaining chances of a "tripartite deal" with Paris, whether force de frappe could deter Moscow, and whether to close military facilities in France or withdraw some troops from Europe.<sup>195</sup>

For Kennedy, even the withdrawal option was clearly worth studying. He argued that de Gaulle's confidence that the US would defend Europe enabled him to exploit the US. But the US did not depend on Europeans' support and had to be able to "march out" if these seemed to want to push it out. Acheson on the contrary proposed as a response to the situation to give assurances against early troop withdrawals for "peripheral" (e.g., financial) reasons. But Kennedy saw the threat to withdraw as about the only possible US sanction and thought promises against it to weaken US bargaining power with allies. The DOS was studying the option of disengaging from Europe, which was pointed out to have always been the US goal once Europe became able to defend itself, but Rusk also stressed that the US was not to let de Gaulle push it away easily: it was engaged in Europe owing to the view that its own defense demanded that. McNamara argued that in case of French anti-US action, an alternative to disengagement was to strengthen ties to other European states.<sup>196</sup> Indeed, this became the course pursued.

Ball argued in the USG that "Adenauer was entirely out of tune" with other Europeans and could soon lose power and that the Bundestag might not ratify the Elysée Treaty. Kennedy saw little chance of influencing Paris and was hesitant to *demand* Bonn in a bossy way to

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<sup>195</sup> D/169, D/64 NSCEC mtgs, 25 and 31 Jan 63, FRUS 61-3:13; Kennedy's instructions for Amb. Bruce (E/L), 5 Feb, JFKL BMR.

<sup>196</sup> D/169, D/64 (fn 195) FRUS 61-3:13; Kennedy's secretary to Bundy, 1 Feb 63, with Acheson "Reflections on the Jan debacle", 31 Jan; NSCEC mtg (san.), 5 Feb, JFKL NSF MM B/316 40<sup>th</sup> NSCEC. Trachtenberg 1999 argues that Kennedy's reaction was "no mere fit of pique"; these sentiments had been developing for some time already (p. 374).

make the treaty more NATO-friendly but did see a need to put pressure on Bonn. However, Acheson and the Ambassador to the FRG, W. Dowling, argued that *threatening* it with *weakening support* was unviable as that would undermine those in Bonn who were arguing that the US was reliable.<sup>197</sup> Acheson suggested that if Bonn clearly promised full cooperation in NATO, the USG could instead offer it intimate, informal talks on strategy formulation and existing and planned forces for European defense. Another idea that emerged was some kind of NATO Executive Committee for “political crisis management” with the US, the UK, France, the FRG, Italy, and one more NATO ally on a rotating basis. Especially Ball favored involving the Europeans more in world affairs as otherwise they got “psychotic”. Moreover, de Gaulle was unable to match such an offer.<sup>198</sup>

The USG expressed its concern about the Elysée Treaty clearly to Bonn. Kennedy argued to Amb. H. Knappstein that because of the FRG, the US had proposed a MLF and forgone chances for closer French-US cooperation by, e.g., refusing aid to the force de frappe and rejecting Paris’s idea of a US-UK-France directorate in NATO. Bonn recompensed it badly. He warned of grave consequences if Bonn backed French anti-Americanism. With his lead, US officials made a series of threats to the Germans: Americans would want to and could withdraw from Europe if the allies thought they were able to defend themselves (but that would be a disaster for the Free World); US policy towards Europe was not to be taken as granted; and ratifying the Elysée Treaty without modifications “would mean Berlin’s end”. Knappstein reported to Bonn that the treaty could fully change US-FRG relations. At the same time, Kennedy’s tactic with Bonn included assurances about USG commitment to the security of Western Europe and that the greater US focus on conventional defense by no means implied giving up the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy.

Bonn responded with a campaign to reassure the USG. German officials stressed that Bonn wanted both close relations with the US and cooperation with France, which was a way to bring France out of isolation in NATO and promote Britain’s entry into the EEC. They assured NATO remained the basis of Bonn’s foreign policy and the US its main arms supplier, denied any Franco-German deal existed on nuclear weapons, and stressed Bonn would give no help for the force de frappe in the unlikely case Paris asked for it.<sup>199</sup>

The USG reappraisal of European policies led to no direct changes: Rusk concluded at the NSC that no need existed at the time for such. But Richardson points out that the re-evaluation made the USG see the FRG as a more important ally and increased its prepared-

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<sup>197</sup> D/169, D/64 (fn 195) FRUS 61-3:13; NSCEC mtg (fn 196), 5 Feb 63.

<sup>198</sup> Steering Group (fn 183), 2 Jan 63; D/64 (fn 185) FRUS 61-3:13; Acheson “Reflections...” (fn 196). To Ball, Adenauer seemed very interested in the idea of the US involving its allies more in world affairs. Bundy for the record, 30 Jan, JFKL BMR.

<sup>199</sup> D/49-50, D/52, D/58, D/65 Knappstein to Schröder and Adenauer, 23-30 Jan 63; D/51, D/82 Carstens-Dowling and –ASOS/EUR Tyler discs., 24 Jan and 5 Feb; D/83 Carstens to Schröder, 6 Feb, all APD 63; PPK 65 (fn 143); DOD to Rostow, 19 Feb, with Gilpatric-Hassel-Schröder disc., 13 Feb, JFKL BT B/6 NATO; D/177 Rusk-Hassel mtg, 25 Feb, FRUS 61-3:13; DOS to E/B on the same, 27 Feb; Bundy to Tyler & Nitze with Kennedy-Hassel mtg, 27 Feb, both JFKL N/G S:Hassel visit.

ness to consult Bonn. The USG now also offered Bonn regular staff consultations.<sup>200</sup> Another indication of its increasing effort to reassure Bonn of the trustworthiness of its commitment was the increased activity regarding the MLF idea, discussed in the next section.

At the same time, USG pressure on Bonn bore fruit: Bonn embarked on a more pro-US line and in key topical issues such as a MLF came to support US rather than French stances. Reason for this were the opposition by West German public to anything that weakened US-European ties, and, related to that, changes in internal power relations in the CDU/CSU. The Elysée Treaty added to discord in the party (fuelled by the US and the UK, it seems), leading to weakening of Adenauer's position. A political scandal forced Strauss to step down; the new Defense Minister, K. von Hassel, took a reconciliatory tone with the US. During the Bundestag ratification process, a pro-NATO preamble was added to the Elysée Treaty – as a rare example of the Bundestag using its power to correct the government's foreign policies. Bonn's armament purchases continued to be focused on the US. In February, the two states reaffirmed the offset arrangement (thus de facto restricting the potential scope of Franco-German weapon cooperation); in return for Bonn's purchases, the USG in fall 1963 promised not to withdraw troops for economic reasons and to provide Bonn with nuclear delivery systems. Already in April 1963, Dowling reported that US-FRG relations were on the strongest basis ever. Kissinger points out that though the USG and Paris competed over Bonn's orientation, *Bonn* faced a risk of isolation, and closeness with one side always pushed it to reassure the other of its attachment.<sup>201</sup>

In public, Bonn now praised the value and trustworthiness of the US as an ally. In a June speech, Schröder stressed the importance of US-FRG relations and argued that Europe could depend on the US, which was not treating Europe as a satellite by misusing its great military and economic power or trying to deal with Moscow at European cost. Bonn's key goal was to ensure that the US continued to have shared interests with the FRG.<sup>202</sup>

Bonn also again showed interest in various kinds of bilateral cooperation with the US, including greater space research cooperation and US supply of nuclear fuel for a military research reactor, possibly having in mind R&D for submarine propulsion. In the USG, it was seen as important to appear cooperative towards Bonn in order to find out about its plans

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<sup>200</sup> NSC mtg, 2 Apr 63, JFKL NSF MM B/314; Richardson 1966 p. 71; Haftendorn 1994 p. 60.

<sup>201</sup> West German focus on US arms would only grow: a Nov 1964 agreement made the FRG practically dependent on US armaments. Trachtenberg argues the US advised Erhard and the SPD to oppose the Elysée Treaty unless it was modified. A clear division was emerging in Bonn between "Atlantists" and "Gaullists", the former group being clearly stronger. But Richardson points out the inaptness of the often used term German Gaullists: key men usually meant, incl. Strauss and von Brentano, mostly shared with de Gaulle little more than doubts about US policies and a preference for tougher diplomatic stances towards Moscow. T/2821 E/B to Rusk, 21 Apr 63, JFKL N/G; Kissinger 1965 p. 207; Richardson 1966 pp. 68-71, 83-4; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 220-1; Schwarz 1991 pp. 825-39; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 377 ref. also to, e.g., DOS/EUR-Bahr (SPD) mtg, 21 Feb 63, USNA CF POL 4 France-WG; Anderson 2002 p. 11. Soon after the Elysée Treaty was announced, the French told Adenauer they had heard that the US and the UK would try to bring about a political crisis in Bonn. D/73 (fn 187) APD 63.

<sup>202</sup> T/66 M/Düsseldorf to Rusk, 28 June 63, JFKL N/G.

and prevent it from seeking other partners. Bonn also seemed increasingly interested in uni- and bilateral (instead of Euratom) R&D in the civilian nuclear field.<sup>203</sup>

### 8.2.6.3 NATO multilateral force as a remedy for de Gaulle?

A MLF now had keen supporters in the USG. They argued that despite a US veto and lacking military value, a MLF had several symbolic and political benefits for the US and the FRG. It would prevent West German interest in nuclear weapon cooperation with Paris or in a national nuclear force from *emerging*; make Bonn more receptive to a NPT; make the UK and maybe later France give up national nuclear forces (despite de Gaulle's moves, the argument continued to be used); promote European integration; give Bonn a status increase in NATO; make allies pay for nuclear forces; educate them in nuclear matters; create one concrete US-European tie; and strengthen NATO cohesion. Several of these rationales became increasingly important in early 1963: moreover, de Gaulle's moves heightened the need for some response to his challenge to the NATO solution to European security.<sup>204</sup>

But Kennedy remained hesitant regarding a MLF and argued that close Franco-German relations could prevent a full German role in a MLF; the time was maybe not right for the idea and it was "finished"<sup>205</sup>. He continued to question whether a MLF under a (for him indispensable) US veto would appeal to Europeans. He thought a MLF offer would maybe just whet German nuclear appetite and expressed strong concern that the US was associating itself too much with an idea that could fail but still agitate Paris and Moscow; Moscow was protesting about NATO nuclear sharing and the MLF plan that would give "West German revenge-seekers" control over nuclear weapons. Kennedy wanted to proceed cautiously, not press a MLF on allies, and give the idea up if it would seem to fail.<sup>206</sup>

Also Acheson argued that though the Germans needed "fuller sense of sharing" (that McNamara advocated), a MLF was maybe not a very good means to this. But he saw more concrete MLF talks as a way to deal with the situation de Gaulle had caused.<sup>207</sup> This view of MLF *talks*, but not necessarily creation of any force, as a way to reassure the allies, es-

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<sup>203</sup> Kennedy-Lenz (German Research Minister) mtg, 4 June 63, JFKL N/G; DOS memo, 26 July, with "German Interest in Certain Military Atomic Energy Investigations"; DOS/EUR telegram (not used), 14 Oct, both USNA ERA B/3 Germany.

<sup>204</sup> See Steering Group (fn 183), 2 Jan 63; D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13; Rostow to Kennedy, 19 Feb, JFKL PR; Merchant to Kennedy, 21 March, JFKL MLF Merchant; "Briefing for the President – Notes on the MLF: Status and Needed Decisions" (n/a), 6 Dec, DDRS; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 229, 236; Lauk 1979 pp. 44-5; Schwartz 1983 p. 106; Küntzel 1992 pp. 65, 70-2; Costigliola 1994 pp. 182-3; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 164.

<sup>205</sup> D/169, D/64 (fn 195) FRUS 61-3:13; Kennedy-Ball disc., 30 Jan, JFKL BT B/6 ML. After a 28 Jan meeting, Bundy wrote that despite Kennedy's doubts about a MLF until then, he now seemed to accept the essentials of Ball's and Taylor's points about it. Bundy for the record, 30 Jan, JFKL BMR. The impression seems to have been erroneous. It is not surprising that in a situation where even Kennedy's close aide was not fully aware of his views, lacking clarity and mistaken perceptions about the USG stance existed in general.

<sup>206</sup> NSCEC mtg (fn 196) 5 Feb 63; D/261 (fn 188) FRUS 61-3:7; USG mtg (fn 168), 18 Feb.

<sup>207</sup> Bundy for the record, 30 Jan 63, JFKL BMR; Acheson "Reflections..." (fn 196).

pecially the FRG, after de Gaulle's moves indeed came to characterize the approach of top USG officials.

Kennedy felt that after de Gaulle's action, the USG (having in vain waited for its allies to propose something) also needed to make some *concrete* proposal regarding nuclear organization in NATO – but not to press it on allies. The plan was that Amb. L. Merchant would discuss a concrete proposal, *not* conditional of conventional build-up, with them. But first, the question was what exactly to propose.<sup>208</sup>

Kennedy saw *national deterrents* as “the *logical course for each country*”, and though de Gaulle's action had weakened the early prospects of a trilateral force, he had not abandoned the idea of a *multinational* force (or even of nuclear weapon cooperation with Paris). As a less risky, more realistic alternative to a MLF, he favored a Paragraph 6 force based on (some) US and British nuclear forces and tactical nuclear forces stationed in Europe, with no multilateral ownership or operation, controlled by an Executive Committee of participating states (including the FRG), and used under SACEUR, existing NATO rules, and US veto. He saw this solution as maybe acceptable to Bonn since it involved no costly new forces. Both Bonn and London were moreover anyway pushing for immediate talks on Par. 6 forces, to which Bonn seemed willing to assign its nuclear-capable F-104 aircraft and Mace missiles.<sup>209</sup>

Also in line with Bundy's, Rusk's, and Bruce's views, Kennedy decided to keep both the Par. 6 and MLF options open under the label of multilateralism. To respond to de Gaulle's challenge and give Bonn something, the plan was to launch a Par. 6 force and emphasize it but to suggest that a multilateral, mixed-manned, seaborne force could be later added to it. The hope was that the second step would never have to be taken. Records of USG meetings reveal that Kennedy and several other senior officials clearly did not plan to offer a MLF genuinely but as a tactical move to prevent greater Franco-German cooperation and to strengthen allies' trust in the US and thus their cooperativeness; the MLF was an ostensible bargaining chip aimed to imply no tangible change to US policy. Herter, now US trade representative, concluded in a USG meeting that the USG was willing to discuss a MLF but hoped allies to turn the idea down. Bruce argued that the USG had to give them “a means, even a *façade*, of answering de Gaulle's argument” on a need for European control over nuclear weapons. Rusk hoped US focus on Par. 6 forces to discourage allies from wanting to control a multilateral force but argued that *offering* only Par. 6 forces was not enough because of the Nassau promise of multilateralism.<sup>210</sup>

As an alternative way to increase allies' confidence in continuing US involvement in Europe, Kennedy saw a promise not to withdraw before helping them to get a joint European nuclear force. But Rusk doubted whether the allies necessarily wanted control over

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<sup>208</sup> D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13; Seaborg 1987 p. 90.

<sup>209</sup> My emphasis. D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13; USG mtg (fn 168), 18 Feb 63.

<sup>210</sup> My emphasis. D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13; USG mtg (fn 168), 18 Feb 63.



nuclear weapons at all or would ever want a European force; they wanted equality with each other, not with the US.<sup>211</sup> This stance indicates that he thought Bonn to desire no national control over nuclear weapons but just closer cooperation with the US.

Despite the tactical nature of the Par. 6/MLF proposal, it would have been awkward for the USG if it seemed keen on an idea that was in the end rejected. Thus the MLF proposal had to appear as a direct result of allies' wishes – to be rejected by them. Since Kennedy had recently made pro-MLF statements, Bundy saw that to avoid appearing to try “sell something nobody really wants”, the USG now had to stress that the idea depended on European views<sup>212</sup>. DOS/PPC Chairman W. Rostow wrote to Kennedy that though Bonn would continue to demand equal treatment and over time seek equal status with London and Paris, “the gamble of engaging the Germans on the multilateral track seems worth trying if Merchant can handle it so that failure occurs as a result of European choice.<sup>213</sup>” Kennedy noted to Ball that “we ought to make it look like this is something in response to something which they wish for – not that we have to sell them. Livy [Merchant] is probably not going to be very successful so we don't want it to look like it is an American initiative and an American failure.<sup>214</sup>” According to Schlesinger, Kennedy also told the MLF-men not to talk to allies as if a MLF as such was his goal<sup>215</sup>.

But others in the USG did want a MLF, and Kennedy to commit himself. Ball argued that even by mentioning a MLF, Kennedy took a step to that direction, but wanted him to do more and to clearly commit some prestige, in which case he saw realization of a MLF as possible.<sup>216</sup>

As Kennedy decided to offer a MLF as a potential step after Par. 6 forces, the next question was what kind of a MLF to offer. Paris argued that though the US tried to make a MLF appear as a way for allies to get control over nuclear weapons, in reality the US would retain control<sup>217</sup>. Bundy thus saw the US veto in a MLF proposal as problematic in enabling de Gaulle to say that only he promoted an independent Europe. Even if no clear US stance on the veto was urgently needed – at the time, Bonn preferred a close Atlantic connection – European demands for equality made it important to *discuss* the matter. As serious US-European differences were unlikely, Bundy even did not see giving up full control over nuclear weapons some day as an impossible idea. But like Kennedy, also Rusk saw a US veto over any force as necessary because of Moscow's opposition to any German control over nuclear weapons. Still, he and Merchant agreed with Bundy that it was tactically better to have allies themselves come see a US veto as sensible after learning more about nuclear realities through MLF talks or a Par. 6 force. Merchant and Bruce noted they might then want

<sup>211</sup> D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>212</sup> Bundy for the record, 13 Feb 63, JFKL BMR.

<sup>213</sup> Rostow to Kennedy, 19 Feb 63, JFKL PR.

<sup>214</sup> Kennedy-Ball disc., 25 Feb 63, JFKL BT B/6 NATO.

<sup>215</sup> Schlesinger 1965 p. 874.

<sup>216</sup> Merchant-Ball disc., 22 March 63, JFKL BT B/6 NATO.

<sup>217</sup> See D/127 E/P to DOS, 21 Feb 62, FRUS 61-3:13; D/357 Adenauer-de Gaulle mtg, 22 Sep, APD 63.

no costly MLF at all. Also Dowling and others argued a US veto was no problem for Bonn, at least if a NATO Executive Committee was set up and included it: Bonn trusted the US and primarily wanted a status upgrade. Rusk favored *non-bindingly* indicating to allies that changes to the control scheme could be later considered, but Kennedy wanted to ensure that doing so would in no way entrap the US and approved instructions for talks in Europe only after removing all suggestions of future changes in the US stance on the veto.<sup>218</sup>

A further issue was whether the MLF offer would be for submarines or surface ships. Surface ships were very vulnerable (and thus militarily of little real value; but by now, the USG anyway saw no military reason for a new European mid-range force) and less appealing to allies, but the Congress was more likely to allow assigning them. The US military and the CIA saw assigning submarines as dangerous: these were expensive and hard to operate and their reactor technology had to be kept secret. Dowling also thought that even a surface force could appeal to Bonn. Kennedy thus wanted to offer only that. For tactical reasons, it was decided to present the case for both force types to European generals so that *they* would favor a surface force.<sup>219</sup>

At an official level, this plot succeeded with the Germans especially because a surface force was cheaper and realizable more easily and quickly. But Bonn hoped that submarines could be later added to a MLF. The USG wanted to keep up that hope and did not exclude the option but promised nothing.<sup>220</sup> But for instance Strauss considered a surface force “ridiculous, too vulnerable, their missiles too inaccurate and their warheads too powerful”. He argued to Kissinger “that most German officers at NATO shared his view” and that the presentation by the US military “had been extremely unconvincing”<sup>221</sup>.

Only now Kennedy and Bundy realized that if warheads would be under joint custody, even a MLF under US veto required changes to the AEA. Kennedy disliked the idea of pursuing such changes; considering the tactical nature of the MLF proposal, launching such an effort must have seemed pointless and maybe politically dangerous. But others in the USG stressed that a promise of joint custody was needed to make allies interested in the proposal. To make it seem serious enough, Kennedy thus told the press that he aimed to send it for congressional review. But he remained reluctant to promise to give up US ownership and custody of warheads. Other USG officials argued that joint ownership was central for a MLF and that together with mixed-manning, it made US custody unfeasible. But

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Bundy to Kennedy (draft) “The U.S. and de Gaulle”, 30 Jan 63, DNSA NP00936 (author identified by Trachtenberg 1999 p. 284), and for the record, 13 Feb, JFKL BMR; NSCEC mtg (fn 196), 5 Feb; D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13; USG mtg (fn 168), 18 Feb; USG mtg, 21 Feb (dated 23 Feb), JFKL MM B/317 mtgs with Kennedy; NSC mtg (fn 200), 2 Apr.

<sup>219</sup> D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13; USG mtg, 21 Feb 63 (fn 218). On the surface ship/submarine issue, see also Seaborg 1987 pp. 86-8.

<sup>220</sup> D/191 (fn 9) FRUS 61-3:13; Tuschhoff 2002 p. 294.

<sup>221</sup> Kissinger (fn 156), 3 June 63.

in any case, the MLF itself and not any participant was to own the warheads; this was justified also with reference to Moscow's views (in opposition to any German ownership).<sup>222</sup>

In late March 1963, Bundy wrote that though undecided about the MLF, Kennedy seemed to be "giving it enough support so that it will be clear that we have made a fair effort – and that is what is essential." Only if Bonn fully backed a MLF initially based on surface ships and under US veto, Kennedy was prepared to press the idea with the Congress.<sup>223</sup> The JCAE, crucial for the Congress's stance, was unenthusiastic about a MLF, but in the USG it was hoped that its attitude would change<sup>224</sup>. For those USG officials who saw the MLF mostly as a tactical move, it was of course just needed that congressional opposition would not be as strong and overt as to make the proposal seem fully unrealistic.

But Schlesinger argues that Merchant's team now came to press the plan in Europe more strongly than Kennedy aimed, "giving an impression of a major American campaign and stirring opposition wherever they went." Seaborg notes the team nevertheless reported so positively about the talks that it seemed to the USG that a preliminary agreement on a MLF could be soon signed<sup>225</sup> (which of course did not have to mean that a final agreement would ever be reached).

After the Elysée Treaty, Bonn was expressing support for a MLF to the USG. Von Hassel inquired whether the force could be based on *national* contingents, but McNamara replied that the US wanted no further national nuclear forces and it had to both be and appear multinational.<sup>226</sup> The USG also informed Bonn that it insisted on a veto. No open objections followed. Excluding a start-up period, Bonn opposed a MLF control scheme based on unanimous decisions, but it seemed to the USG that the problem clearly was not the US veto but those of other Europeans. Bonn's stance became that despite a US veto, involvement in and planning for a MLF would improve the "psychological-political situation" in NATO.<sup>227</sup>

It is unclear how much a MLF as such appealed to Adenauer: he later told, e.g., de Gaulle and Kissinger that he was interested in it for political reasons and since he wanted to support a *US* proposal<sup>228</sup>. Some authors suggest that he and others in Bonn supported a MLF in reality as a potential step towards a *national* force<sup>229</sup>, while they argued to the USG that a MLF was needed to prevent *other* Germans from wanting that. Other authors reject the

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<sup>222</sup> USG mtg, 21 Feb 63 (fn 218); PPK 75 (fn 5); D/191 (fn 9) FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>223</sup> Bundy for the record, 27 March 63, JFKL BMR.

<sup>224</sup> See Seaborg 1987 pp. 88-90.

<sup>225</sup> Schlesinger 1965 p. 874; Seaborg 1987 p. 90.

<sup>226</sup> D/82 (fn 199) APD 63; DOD to Rostow (fn 199), 19 Feb; Ball-Tyler disc. on Kennedy-Hassel mtg, 27 Feb, JFKL BT B/4 WG; McNamara-Hassel mtg (san.), 28 Feb, JFKL N/G S:Hassel visit.

<sup>227</sup> D/145 Schröder-Rusk mtg, 10 Apr; D/149 German Defense Ministry to Carstens, 17 Apr; D/175 Schröder-Canadian official disc., 29 May, all APD 63; D/191 (fn 9) FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>228</sup> D/357 (fn 217), D/170 Adenauer-Kissinger disc., 17 May, APD 63; Schwarz 1991 pp. 811-3.

<sup>229</sup> See Costigliola 1994 p. 185; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 236-7 ref. to, e.g., Stikker to Acheson, 19 Dec 60, Truman Library Acheson Papers AP/85/DOS and WH advisor.

claim<sup>230</sup>. Küntzel moreover suggests that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Bonn in general sought through NATO schemes an ability to independently initiate a nuclear attack. The contrary argument is presented by, e.g., McArdle Kelleher, who argues that Bonn's primary goal in all efforts for a stronger nuclear role was increased *influence* on US policies and *status* increases. Later in 1963, a NIE argued that Bonn supported a MLF *not* because of national nuclear ambitions but to gain nuclear equality with key European allies, please the US, and tie it to Europe.<sup>231</sup>

Many observers have argued that the MLF initiative was largely born out of “mistaken motivations and mutual misunderstandings”: Bonn had not demanded a greater role regarding *strategic* nuclear weapons but supported a MLF to please the US especially after the Elysée Treaty and to protect US-European ties, while the USG expected the idea to please Bonn and mitigate against potential German nuclear ambitions<sup>232</sup>. Moreover, though the proposal was for top USG officials primarily a tactical move, the need to make allies consider it serious and the ambiguous terms Kennedy and others thus used created a setting where MLF-enthusiasts in the USG were able to seriously pursue it.

Even if the initiative was based on misunderstandings, Bonn and Adenauer now came to clearly support it, and not just to reassure the US. Bonn saw a MLF as a way to increase West Germany's security and enhance the credibility of US security guarantees by tying the US to Europe, increasing European participation in and influence over planning for and use of nuclear weapons, and promoting military integration in NATO. Moreover, in it Adenauer saw a counter-measure against developments indicating an inferior role for the FRG in the West (Nassau talks, US offer of cooperation on nuclear forces to London and Paris, force de frappe) and against any undesirable superpower deals on arms control. The MLF offered also a possible compromise between different fractions in his cabinet. But because of questions related to the control and operational viability of such a force, and its great costs, he and others in Bonn also had reservations.<sup>233</sup>

In May 1963, the NAC discussed the idea of a Par. 6 –type, multinational, Inter-Allied Nuclear Force (IANF) that would include British bombers, the three Polaris submarines the US had assigned to NATO, and other nuclear delivery systems assigned or to be assigned to NATO, including German F-84 and F-104 aircraft. Bonn saw such a force just as a step towards a MLF and hoped that further US and the British Polaris submarines and French

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<sup>230</sup> See Sommer 1966 pp. 44-5; Mahncke 1972 p. 167; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 196.

<sup>231</sup> NIE 23-63 “West Germany Under Erhard”, 18 Dec 63, LBJL I:G; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 6; Küntzel 1987.

<sup>232</sup> See Klein to Bundy, 20 May 64, with Newhouse (SFRC Staff Consultant) “Balancing the Risks in the MLF”, 20 March, LBJL S:MLF I; Neustadt to Bundy, 7 Nov, with a memo on US stance on a MLF, 4 Nov, LBJL S:MLF II 2; Klein to Bundy, 30 Nov, with memo by Minister Hillenbrand (E/B), 25 Nov, *ibid.* 1; Sommer 1966 p. 45; Ziebura 1972 p. vii; Kissinger 1965 pp. 133, 141-4.

<sup>233</sup> Richardson 1966 pp. 69-70; Sommer 1966 p. 45; Kohler 1972 p. 114; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 231-4, 265-6; Lauk 1979 p. 47; Schwarz 1991 p. 812; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 pp. 191-2. See also Mahncke 1972 pp. 157-69 and on Bonn's stances and interests in a MLF and the proposal and US-FRG relations in general, McArdle Kelleher 1975; Lauk 1979 pp. 38-64.

MRBM submarines could be later added to it. But no NATO state was very interested in and took initiative with the IANF, with the result that no concrete action followed.<sup>234</sup>

Despite Moscow's propagandistic protests against a MLF, the USG expected it to prefer it to land-based MRBMs. If Bonn would seem to be getting closer to controlling MRBMs, tensions and even risk of conflict with Moscow were expected to grow, and a US veto in a MLF was seen as a way to prevent that. Kennedy assured Khrushchev that with all its ideas for multinational and –lateral forces in NATO, the USG tried to halt the spread of national nuclear weapon capabilities.<sup>235</sup> Within the USG, Rostow argued a MLF would be better from a Soviet perspective that deployment of MRBMs and warheads in Europe under existing custodial schemes, under which warheads could not “be in U.S. custody in any meaningful sense”, especially as the FRG was now the only major NATO state after all prepared to host MRBMs.<sup>236</sup> However, in fact the USG now saw little real military need for *any* new mid-range missile system in Europe<sup>237</sup>.

Whether because of a true concern about the future or just to strengthen the case for a MLF, Ball wrote to Kennedy in preparation for Kennedy's June trip to Europe that Europe was facing a clear danger of dangerous nationalism. It was especially unclear what would happen in the FRG after Adenauer stepped down. Though the Germans maybe did not yet want nuclear weapons, Paris's nuclear effort threatened to “stir competitive ambitions” and “resentment against discrimination”. History showed that “ganging up” against the Germans would not make them stick to any promises: discriminating them over time was impossible. The FRG had to be tied “institutionally to the West” to prevent it from one day starting to flirt with Moscow.<sup>238</sup>

MLF-opponents on the contrary challenged the expectation of national nuclear weapon ambitions in the FRG (for instance London argued so) and/or argued that the MLF proposal would just whet German nuclear appetites (this was Paris's point).<sup>239</sup> As mentioned above, Kennedy shared the latter concern. Schlesinger also argued that “maybe, after the MLF has raised the possibility of German participation” in nuclear affairs, no government in Bonn would be able to forgo demanding that<sup>240</sup>.

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<sup>234</sup> Haftendorn 1994 p. 121; Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 307-12.

<sup>235</sup> Kohler to Bruce, 8 Feb 63, AHP TBT 3; D/173 (fn 139) FRUS 61-3:13; D/274 Kennedy to Khrushchev, 11 Apr, FRUS 61-3:7.

<sup>236</sup> Rostow to Harriman, 2 and 9 July 63, with “MRBM deployment in MLF and under current practice”, AHP TBT 3. Brzezinski 1964 made similar arguments (pp. 127, 132-3). Later, also Rusk argued to the Soviets that a MLF would give more security against German control over nuclear weapons than the existing stockpile schemes. Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA..

<sup>237</sup> Bundy 1988 p. 496.

<sup>238</sup> D/79 Ball to Kennedy, 20 June 63, FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>239</sup> A-2605 E/P to DOS on Couve de Murville-Home disc., 12 Apr 63, JFKL MLF; D/189 Couve de Murville-Rusk mtg, 7 Apr; D/271 (fn 189); D/402 (fn 174) all FRUS 61-3:13.

<sup>240</sup> Schlesinger to Bundy, 27 March 63, JFKL MLF Merchant. Also Kohler 1972 argues that the MLF proposal made it seem to Bonn that demanding nuclear sharing was a legitimate way to ensure influence in NATO (p. 118).

Now *demanding* a MLF, Adenauer's cabinet once again tried to make use of allies' concerns about German aims – but stressed that *it* had no ambitions for a national force. Schröder argued to the USG that though no strong movement for such a force now existed in the FRG, in the absence of a MLF proliferation elsewhere would create one and that “Germans would ultimately seek equal status with UK and France as nuclear power”, which they preferred to get through a MLF. He argued that though a *European* MLF had little advantage, lack of progress on an Atlantic force would enable de Gaulle would to appear “as the only one offering Europe participation in an atomic force”. Von Hassel said at the WEU that Bonn wanted no national nuclear force but a part in nuclear responsibility and planning in NATO and demanded far-going nuclear sharing, including eventual removal of the US veto over a MLF (he argued that otherwise Paris would never join it).<sup>241</sup>

The USG did realize that Bonn was making remarks about emerging nuclear desires to press for a MLF, but the realization did not eliminate concerns about German aims, especially as both France and the UK were violating the WEU Treaty (by, respectively, rejecting inspections of nuclear warhead production and maintaining insufficient forces in continental Europe), which was problematic in light of Adenauer's *rebus sic stantibus* -claim. According to Rostow, many in Washington tended to see the WEU as a stronger safeguard against German nuclear weapons than it thus legally was.<sup>242</sup>

Even in Bonn, not all were keen on a MLF. SPD leader F. Erler argued to Ball that a MLF would cause unnecessary costs and Europe rather needed a greater role in strategic planning, along McNamara's May 1962 plan.<sup>243</sup>

For realization of or (maybe just ostensible) progress towards a MLF, it was necessary that also other allies, especially the British, promised to join it. For this purpose, a letter was sent from Kennedy to Macmillan in May 1963. The USG presented a MLF as a way to preempt an otherwise clear risk of Paris-Bonn nuclear axis and noted that Bonn had come to

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<sup>241</sup> See T/2630 E/B to Rusk on 3 Apr Stevenson-German officials' disc., 4 Apr 63; T/1215 M/Berlin to Rusk on Hassel-Cleveland (ASOS/ International Organization Affairs (IO)) mtg, 5 June; *Reuters* WEU Nightlead, 6 June; T/47 McGhee to Rusk on mtg with Schröder, 4 July, all JFKL N/G; D/175 (fn 227) APD 63. See also Schrafstetter 2004 pp. 127-8. Passive support for a MLF was also increasing among the West German public. See Brown & Desai 2005. A GFO memo on key foreign policy issues to Adenauer's successor Erhard said that the FRG sought neither national control over nuclear weapons nor a role in the French effort but saw forces adequate to deter aggression as necessary, was satisfied with the dual-key system, and stood by the 1954 pledge not to produce nuclear arms. D/231 Carstens's memo, 17 July, APD 63.

<sup>242</sup> See Brubeck (NSCS) to Bundy, 2 July 63, with DOS-Emb. FRG mtg, 25 June; Rostow to Bundy, 20 Sep, with Rostow to Rusk with DOS/PPS “WEU Treaty Restrictions on German Nuclear Rearmament”, 19 Sep, both JFKL N/G.

<sup>243</sup> Talks with Erler demonstrated USG discord on a MLF: Bundy noted to Kennedy that Ball had pressed Erler too much on it, and Kennedy told Erler only that his view of the MLF had improved. Bundy to Kennedy on mtg with Erler, 24 Apr 63; DOS to E/B on Ball- and Kennedy-Erler mtgs, 24-5 Apr; DOS to Bundy, 2 May, with Kennedy-Erler mtg, 25 Apr, all JFKL N/G. To a member of Adenauer's cabinet, Kennedy expressed hope of early progress on a MLF. Bundy on a talk with Minister Krone and Kennedy-Krone disc., both 15 May, *ibid*.

support a MLF to ensure protection by allies, not because of any independent aims.<sup>244</sup> But London refused to make such a promise<sup>245</sup>.

Though he let the letter to be sent to Macmillan, Kennedy in general continued to oppose pushing a MLF on allies. Indeed, as discussed in section 8.4, he was prepared to drop the idea for the sake of a NPT. Nonetheless, in fall 1963 he said to Schröder that prompt progress on a MLF was needed and the US, the FRG, and Italy in particular had to demonstrate its viability by putting one (non-nuclear) mixed-manned ship into operation. He authorized MLF negotiations with allies and told the new Ambassador to the FRG, G. McGhee, that the USG was serious about a MLF and would “go ahead even without the British”.<sup>246</sup> But probably such stances were largely tactical reactions to trouble with Bonn over a test ban (discussed in section 8.4.2), with the aim of giving allies the *impression* that the MLF proposal was serious. According to later accounts by US officials, Kennedy never committed his prestige fully and for him, a MLF remained an option among others, to be slowly pursued if allies wanted. Another likely reason for his reservations was unwillingness to let the MLF proposal to cause domestic debates before the 1964 elections.<sup>247</sup>

To counter the MLF plan, London proposed in late 1963 a Nuclear Control Commission for joint nuclear planning in NATO. Nothing came of the idea immediately, but the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), created in 1966 and discussed below, closely resembled the proposal.<sup>248</sup>

Before discussing the test ban, I again turn the attention to the case of Israel, where the nonproliferation policy of the USG was becoming increasingly active.

### **8.3 Israel-US battle on security guarantees, visits to Dimona, and arms limitation**

In spring 1963, as Israel pressed for security assurances and various further indications of it pursuing nuclear weapons caught US attention, USG officials came to favor a stronger effort for a private Israel-UAR arms limitation, possibly backed by US security assurances. Thus the USG aimed to create an informal institution that would help them cooperate with each other. The USG considered also, in case the first idea failed, to try to per-

<sup>244</sup> D/195 (fn 235) FRUS 61-3:13; Schwartz 1983 pp. 109-11.

<sup>245</sup> In addition to the Tory cabinet, also the British Labor party opposed a MLF: it “would bring Germany too close to nuclear weapons”. Its preferred policy was to give up the independent British nuclear force in return for a share in US nuclear policy (without vetos or fingers on triggers) for both the UK and the FRG. See UK Emb. Moscow to British Foreign Office, 13 June 63, with draft Soviet-Labor mtg, 10 June, AHP TBT Bg 2.

<sup>246</sup> Kennedy-Schröder mtg, 24 Sep 63; Read to Bundy, 1 Oct, with Kennedy-McGhee mtg, 19 Sep, both JFKL N/G Oct 63; Schwartz 1983 pp. 113-4.

<sup>247</sup> Klein, 20 May 64, with Newhouse memo (fn 232); Schlesinger 1965 p. 875; Seaborg 1987 p. 92; Rusk 1991 p. 236. Rusk notes Kennedy and he were “never that sold on the MLF” and though they would have supported a MLF had the allies wanted it, they “more or less lost interest” as these were not that interested. Also Ball 1968 notes Kennedy was never convinced of a MLF and rather saw it as a bait to allies (pp. 218-9).

<sup>248</sup> Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 165.

suade Israel alone to nuclear and missile restraint by offering stronger security assurances. According to Cohen, the White House was now coming to think that the *only* way to prevent Israel from going nuclear was to give security guarantees<sup>249</sup>. At the same time, the USG started seeking a proper agreement on regular inspections of the Dimona plant. Shalom argues that the USG switch in 1962-63 to a more active and concerned stance towards Israel's nuclear efforts resulted from several factors: Kennedy's growing popularity and international prestige especially after the Cuban missile crisis; Ben-Gurion's reduced authority in Israel that made the USG to expect him to be less resistant to pressure; weakening of Israeli-French ties that made Israel militarily more dependent on the US; Ben-Gurion's worry about the balance-of-power against Arabs and his probes for great power security guarantees that indicated a chance to exchange guarantees to Israeli nuclear restraint; and increasing urgency felt in the USG about Israel's nuclear efforts.<sup>250</sup>

### 8.3.1 Exchanging security assurances to arms limitation?

In most declassified USG documents (especially formal estimates), assessments of whether Israel was indeed pursuing nuclear weapons remain excised, though they do show that Israel was expected fairly soon to have a *capability* to produce them – it was seen as able to make a nuclear test in 2-3 years after a decision to do so<sup>251</sup> (Arab SSM and especially nuclear efforts were still seen to have little prospect of becoming militarily significant any time soon<sup>252</sup>). But some personal and discussion memos reveal that USG officials also thought that Israel indeed was pursuing nuclear weapons<sup>253</sup>. A NEA memo at USNA cites a May 1963 SNIE, as such still excised, saying that unless pressed, Israel would try to “produce a nuclear weapon sometime in the next several years<sup>254</sup>”. US Science Attaché R. Webber was following the actions of key Israeli scientists to find out if Israel launched a crash program for combined nuclear weapon and missile development (he thought Israel at the time pursued separate, slower programs)<sup>255</sup>. Referring to reports about Israel pursuing a missile capability and the inadequacy of the previous Dimona inspection, Kennedy inquired in February with his men about early plans to find out what Israel was up to. As an-

<sup>249</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 126-7.

<sup>250</sup> Shalom 1996 pp. 3-4.

<sup>251</sup> The US had no evidence of Israeli or UAR chemical, biological, or radiological weapon programs (that each said the other had), but both seemed capable of producing some chemical or biological but no radiological weapons. McNamara “Diffusion...”, ACDA “US Position...” with “Country...”, 12 and 26 Feb 63 (fn 193); D/239 SNIE 30-2-63 “The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel” (san.), 8 May, FRUS 61-3:18; NIE 4-63 (fn 127). It seems that in the latter, Israel was listed among states that probably had the resources to produce both nuclear weapons and delivery systems within a decade but had no weapon program.

<sup>252</sup> D/139 (fn 33); D/140 Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment, 24 Jan 63; D/239 (fn 251) all FRUS 61-3:18. According to D/239, the UAR was possibly able to produce some deployable SSMs in about a year.

<sup>253</sup> This evidence seems trustworthy since the memos all give a similar picture.

<sup>254</sup> The SNIE 30-2-63 (fn 251) is cited in Talbot to Rusk, 14 May 63, USNA RNA. Also a CIA presentation to the JCS (30 July, D/62 NSA EBB LTBT) referred to this expectation. Also a still classified Jan 1963 NIE on nuclear weapons and Israel was reportedly of the kind that would alarm Arabs. Referred to in D/139 (fn 33) FRUS 61-3:18; NE to Komer, 2 May, with NEA to Badeau, LBJL KD 2.

<sup>255</sup> DOS to Bundy, 24 March 63, with NEA “Israel's Atomic Energy Programs”, 15 March, LBJL KD 2.



other memo at USNA shows, later in the spring he, in words of a NEA official, worried about “the apparent Israeli intent to develop a nuclear weapon capability in the next few years” and inquired about the matter every few days.<sup>256</sup> Memos at Kennedy archives show that Komer in turn argued to Kennedy, referring also to a DOS view, that “Israel, unless deterred by outside pressure, will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years, and could have a very limited capability by 1967-8<sup>257</sup>”. Rusk discussed “Israel’s development of nuclear weapons” with McCone and though the discussion memo is largely sanitized, it shows that he at least noted that the USG was considering how to make Israel *change direction* and *make at least the USG aware* of its actions and aims. According to a German memo, Rusk told Schröder that Israel seemed to pursue nuclear weapons and the US had been unable to ascertain that its nuclear program was for civilian purposes only.<sup>258</sup>

The Israelis were in turn complaining about the threat posed by the UAR – the one Arab power they said they really feared – and making various claims (that US intelligence did not support) about its weapon development. They argued that, e.g. quiet, joint US-Israel planning for the case of an UAR aerial attack, was thus necessary.<sup>259</sup> They complained also about the role of Germans in Cairo’s SSM program (see section 8.1.3), but Komer saw this partially as an attempt to justify “going ahead on their own nuclear program”.<sup>260</sup>

It was unclear to the USG what the situation with French safeguards on the Dimona reactor was and what exactly was still included in Israeli-French nuclear and missile cooperation. The DOS saw it as possible that the two had secret cooperation outside Israel in either field but thought Paris would not give Tel Aviv nuclear weapons. At least towards the USG, Paris kept distance to any Israeli nuclear weapon efforts. The French expressed worry about Israel’s aims and said that the Dimona site seemed to include no chemical separation plant, though they were maybe unaware of some Israeli facilities, and that France had preemptively bought uranium from its former colonies after finding out that Israel tried to buy it without safeguards.<sup>261</sup>

Concern about Israel’s nuclear moves, together with the general USG focus on nonproliferation, explains why Israel-UAR arms limitation again raised interest in the USG even though hopes of success were not high. In late 1962, a DOS official proposed another probe into quiet, tacit arms limitation with Nasser and Ben-Gurion, and in spring 1963, the DOS was outlining such an initiative. Komer saw “the likely escalation of the arms race

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<sup>256</sup> Kennedy’s secretary to Bundy with note from Kennedy, 11 Feb 63, JFKL SM B/62a Bundy; NEA to Rusk “White House Concern with Arab-Israeli Matters”, 11 May, USNA RNA; NEA-Ball disc., 16 May, JFKL BT B/5 Israel.

<sup>257</sup> Komer to Kennedy (san.), 12 Feb 63, JFKL N/I; Komer to Kennedy (fn 30), 31 May.

<sup>258</sup> D/200 Rusk-McCone disc. (san.), 26 March 63, FRUS 61-3:18; D/145 (fn 227) APD 63.

<sup>259</sup> See Rostow on 10 March mtg with Harman, 11 March 63, JFKL PR March-May 61; D/206 DOS to E/TA, 4 Apr; D/207 Talbot-Feldman disc., 5 Apr, both FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>260</sup> D/197 Komer to Kennedy (san.), 22 March 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>261</sup> NE (fn 251), 2 May 63, with NEA memo; Talbot to Rusk (fn 251), 14 May; D/271 (fn 189) FRUS 61-3:13; D/303 USG mtg (san.), 23 July, FRUS 61-3:18; DOS to Bundy with “Chronology ...” (fn 44); Crosbie 1974 p. 169.

into a nuclear-missile phase” as a key risk of Arab-Israeli tension and argued to Kennedy that the arms limitation idea was the best chance to prevent that, and a way to “both limit the risks of local war and reduce our indirect subsidies to Israel to compensate for Soviet arms to the UAR”. Ben-Gurion’s complaints about UAR advanced weapons and Nasser’s concern about the Dimona reactor and Israel’s biological weapons possibly made both receptive to a deal; “a discreet sounding with Nasser” had showed that the idea was realistic.<sup>262</sup> In March, Kennedy then requested from the DOS, the CIA, and the AEC both 1) a DOS study on how to halt a nuclear weapon program by Israel or the UAR, get better assurances from them, and make them see the dangers involved in such moves, 2) improved intelligence and assessments on both states’ advanced weapon efforts and their effects, and 3) efforts for an early, thorough visit to Dimona<sup>263</sup>.

Soon thereafter, as Peres was visiting Washington, Kennedy seized the opportunity to shortly discuss Israel’s nuclear program and stress the importance of Israel’s not acquiring nuclear weapons. Peres gave “an unequivocal assurance that Israel would not do anything in this field unless it finds that other countries in the area are involved in it”; “non-introduction” was becoming Israel’s official policy.<sup>264</sup>

### 8.3.2 The US effort for a scheme for regular visits to Dimona

While the DOS was planning the arms limitation initiative, further discussed in section 8.3.3, on a separate but related track the USG pursued further visits to Dimona. The Israeli response was a strengthened campaign for security assurances. Signs that the USG should soon again give Arabs reassurance about the reactor added to the need for a visit. When Komer visited the UAR in April, Nasser again threatened with pre-emptive action and following suit if Israel pursued nuclear weapons.<sup>265</sup>

Whereas one visit to Dimona was needed soon, the USG started also seeking a scheme for *periodic* visits so that it would not have to press Israel for each visit separately. It wanted visits every six months to be able to ascertain the frequency of fuel load changes: for civilian uses, a change was required about every two years, but in case of weapon-material production, semiannual discharging was expected<sup>266</sup>. Thus in late March, Amb. W. Barbour was instructed to tell Ben-Gurion that the US hoped to make quiet, thorough visits to

<sup>262</sup> D/155 Komer to Kennedy, 9 Feb 63, FRUS 61-3:18 also fn 2 ref. to Polk (DOS/PPC) “The Palestine Problem: The Next Phase” 3 Dec 62, PPS Lot 69D121 Near and Middle East, and to Komer to Bundy, 9 Feb 63, with Polk-Nasser disc., JFKL NSF Palestine refugees II; D/197 (fn 260), D/222 Kennedy’s mtg on Jordan, 27 Apr, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>263</sup> D/199 NSAM-231 “Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities”, 26 March 63, *ibid.*

<sup>264</sup> D/207 (fn 259) *ibid.*; DOS to Bundy with “Chronology ...” (fn 44); Hersh 1991 p. 119; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 118-9, 380 fn 21.

<sup>265</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 197, 245-6 ref. to A-767 Badeau to Rusk, 18 Apr 63, USNA CFPF POL UAR.

<sup>266</sup> See D/298 DOS to E/TA, 11 June 66, FRUS 64-8:18.

Dimona semiannually, starting in May, and to inform certain states about them. Ben-Gurion postponed replying, but the US kept on bringing the matter up.<sup>267</sup>

Ben-Gurion got an excuse to further delay his answer when Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in April made a statement in favor of an Arab military alliance that would aim at liberating Palestine. Though the DOS thought the proclamation to have little impact on the regional security situation, Ben-Gurion reacted by writing to 50 heads of state on dangers in the region.<sup>268</sup> To Kennedy, he suggested a joint superpower guarantee for the security and territorial integrity of all Middle East states and withholding of aid to states who acted hostilely or did not recognize others. He blamed the US for strengthening the UAR with economic aid, argued that Arab weapon programs made the Hawk system insufficient as a deterrent for Israel, but noted that Israel would be able to prevail over the three Arab states if it had to.<sup>269</sup>

Kennedy saw a joint guarantee as unrealistic: Moscow would give no such support for Israel. He was concerned that Israel, not Arabs, might make unwanted moves. But as Israeli and domestic pressure for a pro-Israel policy and clearer security guarantees had been growing and was expected to further grow before the 1964 elections, he wanted to somehow ease it. But that had to happen without harm to other US interest in the area; also the planned arms limitation effort required decent relations with Cairo. He and the DOS saw reaffirming US opposition to aggression in the area and assurances to help attacked states, along the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, as an option – even though Arab dislike of a reaffirmation had kept him so far from making one. Moreover, though the move was maybe needed for domestic reasons, Komer and the DOS saw it as alone not enough for Israel.<sup>270</sup>

Komer argued that the USG would have to yield to the pressure for stronger security assurances for Israel at some point, especially if Arab unity really grew, but in return had to ensure Israeli cooperation in arms limitation. ACDA moreover saw a great-power security guarantee as needed to motivate Israel not to pursue nuclear weapons.<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>267</sup> DOS to Bundy, 24 March 63, with DOS “Israel’s Atomic Energy Programs”, 15 March, LBJL KD 2; T/658 DOS to E/TA, 27 March, JFKL N/I; DOS to Bundy with “Chronology . . .” (fn 44); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 118-9 ref. to Harman to Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), 4 Apr, ISA FMRG 3377/11.

Hersh 1991 argues Barbour was very pro-Israel and even willing “to operate the American embassy as a subsidiary, if necessary, of the Israeli foreign ministry” (pp. 159-60 ref. to his 1989-91 interviews with former Embassy officials).

<sup>268</sup> Cohen notes that other Israeli leaders considered this reaction exaggerated. D/217 DOS to certain posts, 19 Apr 63, FRUS 61-3:18; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 119-20, 380 fn 23-4 ref. to Bar-Zohar, M. (1987) *Ben-Gurion* (in Hebrew) Vol. 3, Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, pp. 1550-2.

<sup>269</sup> D/220 DOS to Bundy on Ben-Gurion to Kennedy, 27 Apr 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>270</sup> NEA to ActSOS, 5 Jan 63, DOS to Bundy, 30 Apr, both USNA TD; D/222 (fn 262), D/230, D/232 Komer to Bundy, 30 Apr and 1 May; all FRUS 61-3:18; NEA to Rusk, 11 May (fn 256). An updated USG assessment on the regional situation and military balance concluded that Israel was relatively strong and did not need to worry. Komer to Kennedy (san.), 2 May; DOS to Bundy, 9 May, both DDRS; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 120-1.

<sup>271</sup> ACDA App. A) “Motivation for Nuclear Capabilities in the Middle East”, 26 Apr 63, USNA NRA; D/230 Komer to Bundy, 30 Apr, FRUS 61-3:18.

The USG came to use the exchange Ben-Gurion had initiated on the security situation to press on the Dimona visits. In his 4 May response, Kennedy assured Israel's security was very important for the US but gave no support for Ben-Gurion's proposal and alarm. Instead, he referred to advanced weapon development as the key long-term threat in the area. Barbour was also again told to stress Kennedy's hope for prompt acceptance of six-monthly visits to Dimona. But Ben-Gurion now argued to the Americans that he had in May 1961 agreed on a *single* visit by a neutral state and again postponed replying. Harman indicated to the USG that whereas no agreement existed about regular visits, a single visit was a possibility; at the same time, he pressed for bilateral security consultations. Moreover, he said that Israel wanted the US also to inspect Arab reactors. Komer wrote to Bundy that this demand was "nonsense": the only Arab reactor, in the UAR, could not produce enough material for a bomb. Instructed to use previous Israeli statements as points of reference and to resist attempts at delays or demands for security guarantees, Barbour again took regular visits up with Ben-Gurion.<sup>272</sup>

The domestic reason for reactivating the Tripartite Declaration was pressing enough. In a 8 May news conference, Kennedy said that the US supported "the security of both Israel and her neighbors", sought to limit arms racing and spread of communism, condemned the use or threat of force in the area, and would act in the UN and on its own to halt aggression<sup>273</sup>.

The statement was insufficient even for Israel's friends in the US, and Kennedy felt pressed to make further moves to please them<sup>274</sup>. The Israelis remained unsatisfied, and in a 12 May reply to Kennedy's letter, Ben-Gurion – without mentioning the reactor – again stressed Israel's need for security assurances. He suggested as an alternative to a US-USSR declaration a US-Israel security pact, US arms supply to Israel, and (though he doubted its practicality) a plan for general regional disarmament. Unilateral US statements along the 1950 Declaration were useless. He said also in public that US support for Israel was not enough and an Israeli deterrent was the best way to ensure peace in the region.<sup>275</sup>

Shalom and Cohen argue that Ben-Gurion made such quite unacceptable demands to the USG to protect the Dimona project and introduce a choice between Israeli nuclear weapons and US guarantees. They point out that Ben-Gurion could hardly expect the superpowers to make a joint declaration or the USG to agree on a defense pact, especially as

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<sup>272</sup> D/236, D/243 DOS to Barbour, the former with Kennedy to Ben-Gurion, 4-10 May 63, *ibid.*; Feldman-Harman mtg with Komer's comments to Bundy, 6 May, JFKL N/I; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 121 ref. to IMFA to Emb. Washington, 5 May, ISA FMRG 3377/9 and to T/833 Barbour to Rusk, 5 May, JFKL NSF B/119a. During a visit to the UAR, Komer was in fact taken to a surprise visit to the reactor. The Israelis found out about this (through Feldman, Komer suspected) and their press portrayed it as a presidential inspection mission. Komer saw this as an attempt to ruin US credibility in Cairo. See Feldman-Harman mtg and Komer to Feldman, 6-9 May, both with Komer's comments to Bundy, JFKL N/I.

<sup>273</sup> Kennedy's news conf., 8 May 63, PPK 169.

<sup>274</sup> NEA to Rusk, 11 May 63 (fn 256).

<sup>275</sup> Ben-Gurion to Kennedy, 12 May 63, JFKL N/I; D/246 DOS to Bundy, 14 May, FRUS 61-3:18; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 121-3 ref. to Ben-Gurion to Feldman and to Kennedy, 7 and 12 May, ISA FMRG 3377/6 and /9, and to "Ben-Gurion Sees War Peril in U.S. Curb on Arms", *NYT*, 14 May.

nothing had become of his 1957 idea of a Israel-NATO tie and the USG had repeatedly refused to give formal security guarantees. Moreover, he himself doubted whether US guarantees would help in case of emergency, as he had made clear to Barbour in early 1963. The concerns he expressed were exaggerated, and presenting demands in a provocative way in the public was bound to irritate Kennedy.<sup>276</sup>

In Israel, Barbour continued to demand Dimona visits – and Ben-Gurion in return to tie such to US visits to UAR nuclear plants and a security guarantee. But he also noted that in case of war, Israel had to be self-reliant.<sup>277</sup>

Also M. Gazit of Israel's Embassy pressed for a stronger US commitment for Israel in a meeting with Komer, threatening otherwise with an increase in “the current “hullabaloo”” in US-Israel affairs. Komer said that he understood that Israel sought quid pro quos for regular inspections to Dimona but that also created suspicions. He privately asked whether Israel's recent statements that its defense required strengthening and its campaign against German scientists in the UAR “could be part of a campaign to justify Israeli development of nuclear weapons, or to threaten this as an alternative if we didn't come through with a security pact”. Gazit only grinned in response.<sup>278</sup>

On 18 May, Kennedy again wrote to Ben-Gurion. He postponed an answer to the 12 May proposal but stressed the importance of regular visits to Dimona and urgency of nuclear arms control. He noted that Israel's developing a nuclear weapon capability would have a destabilizing impact in the world, push larger states towards following suit, and press Arabs closer to Moscow. He expressed strong commitment to Israel's security but threatened that “this support would be seriously jeopardized in the public opinion in this country and in the West, if it should be thought that this Government was unable to obtain reliable information” on Israel's nuclear activities.<sup>279</sup>

According to Cohen, Kennedy's letter caused alarm in Jerusalem and fuelled dispute on how to deal with the USG interest in the nuclear program. Ben-Gurion still wanted to both protect the program and avoid confrontation with the USG. Meir argued Israel “should tell them the truth and explain why”: if it maintained that the reactor was for peaceful purposes, it could not use it as a bargaining chip, and its close ties to the US made Israel unable to tell the USG to mind its own business.<sup>280</sup>

Continuing on his course, Ben-Gurion replied Kennedy that he saw Paris's condition to its help “that the reactor will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes” “as absolutely binding” and that France and Israel had an arrangement on the Dimona reactor that was “similar” to the US-Israeli one on the Nachal Soreq reactor. Still, he accepted “further an-

<sup>276</sup> Shalom 1996 pp. 12-13; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 123.

<sup>277</sup> T/894 Barbour to Rusk, 15 May 63, JFKL N/I.

<sup>278</sup> 14 May Komer-Gazit talk, 15 May 63, JFKL KI.

<sup>279</sup> T/835 DOS to E/TA with Kennedy to Ben-Gurion, 18 May 63, JFKL N/I. See also Cohen, A. 1998 p. 128.

<sup>280</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 129-32 ref. to Bar-Zohar 1987 (fn 268) p. 1554, to IMFA to Harman, 27 May 63, ISA FMRG 3377/9, and to IMFA “A discussion on Israeli-U.S. Relationship”, 13 June, *ibid.* /6.

nual visits to Dimona”, “such as have already taken place”, by the US or a neutral state. He suggested a visit for when the reactor was completed – around the turn of the year. He expressed sympathy for Kennedy’s global nonproliferation policy but singled out general great power disarmament as the only way to prevent proliferation in China, Europe, and India, without commenting on Kennedy’s point that Israel’s actions had a critical impact. Concerning future aims, Israel’s position remained to see what happened in the area. Though he referred to his proposal for a security pact, he did not directly tie it to the nuclear issue.<sup>281</sup>

The DOS, the AEC, ACDA, and the CIA all remained unsatisfied. By delaying the visit, Israel reserved a bargaining card. Ben-Gurion’s comment about the future did not exclude weapon efforts. The IAEA minimum requirement for a Dimona-type reactor was thorough inspections every six months. An inspection was needed before the reactor went critical as thereafter parts of it became inaccessible. To be “reasonably sure” about what it was used for, the USG needed long enough visits “for a truly thorough examination” and access to all parts of the plant and any related, especially fuel production or plutonium separation facilities, at least in June/July 1963, June 1964, and thereafter every six months.<sup>282</sup>

These requirements were included in Kennedy’s reply. However, Ben-Gurion resigned before it was delivered. Hersh, Shalom, and Cohen speculate that the Dimona issue and his problems with Kennedy may have played part in his decision or made other Israeli leaders want to get him out of office. Kennedy’s reply was left to wait for a new Prime Minister.<sup>283</sup>

All the time, the Israelis continued press for more institutional security cooperation with the US, arguing that the regional arms balance was deteriorating and Jerusalem was plagued by a lack of trust towards the US. They sought, e.g., a unilateral, formal, maybe just private security guarantee, arms supply and joint planning (these, they pointed out, made also NATO guarantees credible), or at least regular consultations between military officials on Israel’s security situation. They pressed also London for a security guarantee, but the British would not go beyond a public statement Macmillan made in May along Kennedy’s lines.<sup>284</sup>

The Israelis also threatened the USG that unless the demands were met, Israel would continue to move closer to France and the FRG<sup>285</sup>. But such rare Israeli attempts to boost bar-

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<sup>281</sup> Barbour to Rusk on Ben-Gurion’s reply, 27 May 63, JFKL N/I; D/258 DOS to Bundy, 29 May, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>282</sup> US scientists preferred half-yearly visits from the start, but the DOS preferred this schedule since it came closer to Ben-Gurion’s proposal and was thus politically more viable. D/267 DOS to Bundy, 12 June 63, FRUS 61-3:18; D/258 (fn 281) *ibid.* also fn 1 ref. to Komer to Bundy, 29 May, JFKL N/I.

<sup>283</sup> DOS to Barbour with Kennedy to Ben-Gurion, 15 June 63; T/1048 Barbour to Rusk, 17 June, both JFKL N/I; T/1043 Barbour to Rusk, 16 June, USNA SNF B/4162 atomic energy Israel; Hersh 1991 pp. 121-4; Shalom 1996 p. 26; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 134-5.

<sup>284</sup> NE-Israel Emb. mtgs, 24 May and 26 July 63, USNA ND B/7 Tel Aviv; Schlesinger to Talbot on disc. with Harman, 5 June, JFKL KI 1; T/521 E/L to Rusk, 30 July, JFKL N/I; Gazit-DOS/PM mtg, 9 Aug, JFKL KSG.

<sup>285</sup> Gazit-DOS/PM mtg, 9 Aug 63, JFKL KSG.

gaining power with the USG by hinting at potential alternative patrons were not very powerful: Israel's moving closer to the Europeans and giving up pressure for closer ties with the US would maybe not have been so bad for the US at all, especially from the point of view of US-Arab relations.

### 8.3.3 The plan for nuclear and missile limitation

Based on a DOS/NEA working group's ideas, the DOS proposed Kennedy in May 1963 secretly pursuing an Israel-UAR deal on nuclear and missile restraint that would rely on informal, US-supported verification and safeguards on nuclear plants. If prospects of a deal seemed reasonable after first probes, the plan was in later talks to maybe indicate that stronger security assurances for both sides were possible. The goal was to reach a deal by June 1964. If Nasser refused to cooperate, another option was a deal on arms limitation and US security assurances with Israel only.<sup>286</sup>

The way to strengthen the assurances to both states was a legally *unbinding* executive agreement or a unilateral policy statement that if aggression threatened either side, the US promptly decide with it how to react. If a deal was made with Israel only, the planned measure was a letter by Kennedy containing 1) a similar policy statement and assurances towards Israel and 2) the quid pro quos required from Israel. Though Ben-Gurion had asked for clearly more binding measures, the USG was willing to offer only such assurances that neither tied it into automatic action nor required congressional approval.<sup>287</sup> Moreover, the USG seems to have considered giving only verbal assurances, not launching any tangible or institutional forms of security cooperation, such as joint contingency planning, regular military consultations, or guaranteed arms sales, to strengthen the assurances. That the USG bothered to pursue a plan that gave Israel in practice little new in return for significant quid pro quos appears very optimistic in light of Israeli demands and the value the Israelis had so far attached to freedom in the nuclear program.

Though also the NEA group and Komer thought that both sides' suspicions made chances of a deal only "reasonable", several factors were seen to strongly speak for the effort. First was the fact that the Israelis and their friends saw the time suited for a strong push for an overt, special US guarantee, close military consultations, broad US arms supply, and an end to US aid to the UAR. The US needed quid pro quos for any security assurances, including already during negotiations a stop to the campaign for a US policy change in the Middle East and cooperation on safeguarding nuclear plants, with more demands to follow if assurances were realized. Especially important were non-nuclear and -SSM pledges, but

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<sup>286</sup> ACDA and the CIA participated in the NEA working group. Talbot to Rusk with "Plan of Action", 14 May 63; Rusk to Kennedy with "Framework and Tactics for Negotiations", 16 May; Rusk to Kennedy on mtg with McCloy, 14 June, all USNA RNA; D/250 Komer to Kennedy (san.), 16 May, FRUS 61-3:18; Komer to Kennedy with memo (fn 30), 31 May. See also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 126-7.

<sup>287</sup> D/250 FRUS 61-3:18, Talbot with "Plan...", Rusk with "Framework..." and "Possible United States-Israel Security Assurances" (all fn 286).

Israel was likely to make such only if Cairo did, too. A Israel-UAR deal was moreover better than a US-Israel deal only because the US had to show evenhandedness to Arabs and assurances for Israel only had serious potential downsides, such as Soviet assurances for Arabs, undermining of pro-US regimes and serious harm to commercial US interests in the area, and weakening of US diplomatic power in general. Second, both sides were expected to otherwise pursue advanced weapons, Israel also nuclear weapons, with the result of limiting US options in case of hostilities, pushing the UAR closer to Moscow, and increasing the risk of pre-emptive attacks. Third, the USG had to act somehow after its expressions of concern about arms racing and proliferation in the area. Both sides had recently indeed indicated interest in a US effort. Fourth, the time for an effort had come since it was easier to control weapons neither side yet had. And fifth, even if the plan failed, it had several benefits: it gave “time to stall on Israel security guarantee”; a justification towards Nasser for a guarantee for Israel (if he accepted the plan, as necessary to get Israel on board; otherwise as necessary for Israel’s security); and a reference point for future efforts.<sup>288</sup>

The plan was to first try to make Nasser promise to give up the SSM program in return for Israel’s not going nuclear. As Kennedy’s emissary, McCloy was to argue to Nasser that though the USG truly opposed Israeli nuclear weapons, it was unable to prevent Israel from acquiring them unless the Arabs agreed on restraint. One problem was the fact that the US had assured him that the Dimona reactor was for peaceful purposes only; now he was to get a letter that referred to “Israel’s *intent* and capability [to] develop nuclear weapons”. Another problem was that though Nasser was thought to have a large upside in a deal (Israel was soon going to be superior also in the missile field, and Egypt’s relative strength was conventional power), he was expected to suspect Israeli-French nuclear and missile cooperation to go on despite any deal. A counter-argument on this was that the US was more important for Israel than France and that to protect its global nonproliferation policy, the USG had reason to ensure Israel’s adherence to a deal. A third issue was that though the USG tried to make the deal feasible for Nasser with its private nature, Arab public opinion was expected to affect his stance. References to his earlier statements in opposition to nuclear arms races and testing were seen as a way to make a deal politically easier for him. Komer suggested that Nasser’s interest in the plan could also be increased through hints that UAR advances on weapon development (meaning probably SSMs) would force the US to help Israel get similar capabilities.<sup>289</sup>

Ben-Gurion was to be approached only after a successful probe with Nasser. Making him interested was expected to be harder since the Israelis preferred self-reliance, and maybe

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<sup>288</sup> NEA to Komer with arms limitation package incl. “Range of Approach”, 9 May 63, JFKL MEC 1; Talbot with “Plan...”, Rusk with “Framework...” (fn 286); Komer to Kennedy with memo (fn 30), 31 May.

<sup>289</sup> My emphasis. NEA (fn 288) incl. “Steps to Help Nasser”, 9 May 63; Talbot with “Plan...”, Rusk with “Framework...” (fn 286); D/277 Komer to McCloy, 19 June, FRUS 61-3:18; Komer to Kennedy with memo (fn 30), 31 May.



require bringing up security assurances. But it was seen as possible that he would accept the idea since, e.g., he wanted stronger US involvement in Israel's security and Israeli advances in weapon development would make Cairo seek Soviet guarantees. Optimistically, Komer and the NEA group expected Ben-Gurion to acknowledge the deep US opposition to proliferation and try "to maximize his advantages within this context if he cannot circumvent it".<sup>290</sup>

The two states were to promise "not to *develop, test, manufacture, or import* nuclear weapons or surface-to-surface missiles" strategic in regional terms at home or abroad, including a prohibition of foreign weapon stockpiles on their territory. All civil nuclear and space programs were to be safeguarded and the US *promptly* given access "to any *potential* production facility for nuclears or missiles considered suspicious by the U.S. or the other country"; refusal was to imply a violation of the deal. Despite the focus on nuclear weapons and missiles, it was possible to discuss also, e.g., bacteriological and chemical weapons, but these were seen as no key issue.<sup>291</sup> Thus the aim was not to leave open any such options as Bonn's 1954 pledges did and to avoid both such stationing schemes that increased the precariousness of the East-West situation in Europe and such consuming exchanges as on the Dimona reactor so far.

For Komer and Bundy, expressing preparedness to quiet talks on security matters was also a way to "buy time" with Israel regarding any further security assurances<sup>292</sup>. Komer moreover saw security guarantees and arms limitation as "indissolubly linked" as the US could only give guarantees if Israel forwent nuclear weapons, which it would only do if Nasser did, which Nasser would only do had the US not yet given new assurances for Israel.<sup>293</sup>

A DOS/NEA letter to Ambassadors in the area offers insights into USG thinking around the plan, named Cane, and the Israeli nuclear problem in general. Kennedy wanted to seriously consider stronger guarantees for Israel (i.e., the matter was not yet decided) because it seemed that only if its long-term security concerns were eased, Israel would refrain from proliferation and preventive war. But in fact, Israel was only to formally get what it in practice already had. Still, the US wanted in return thorough Israeli cooperation not only on safeguards on nuclear efforts and information about arms plans but also on several Arab-Israeli issues and generally on US policies in the area. Nonetheless, negative Arab reactions were expected. The USG aimed to offer Cairo the same deal as to Israel, but probably in vain, and anyway firmly express support for Egypt's security and possibly give greater access to conventional weapons, assuming cooperation in advanced weapon

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<sup>290</sup> Talbot with "Plan...", Rusk with "Framework..." (fn 286); Komer to Kennedy with memo (fn 30), 31 May.

<sup>291</sup> My emphasis. Talbot with "Plan..." (fn 286); Komer to Kennedy with memo (fn 30), 31 May.

<sup>292</sup> Komer to Bundy with Bundy's comments, 9 May 63, JFKL KI WHM.

<sup>293</sup> Komer to Kennedy, 17 May 63, JFKL KI WHM.

limitation. The letter also pointed out the need to consider domestic opinions in the context of Middle East policies.<sup>294</sup>

Kennedy was pessimistic about any Israel-UAR arms limitation. Presumably reflecting his view, Bundy expressed serious doubt “of the wisdom of “signing on to a non-starter””. Kennedy also accepted a point by McCloy that Ben-Gurion (then still in power) would maybe not agree on arms limitation “because he thinks he can get a guarantee from us anyway”.<sup>295</sup> That Kennedy nonetheless authorized pursuing the idea was probably because the situation seemed to demand action from the perspectives of both the Israeli nuclear issue and Israel’s pressure for security guarantees, and no better idea had come up. This pessimism was probably reflected also in what Komer saw as lack of seriousness about the initiative by Rusk and other top DOS people and in the fact that McCloy was the one to make the first probes with Nasser and Ben-Gurion even though his personal plans implied a tight schedule for the probes.<sup>296</sup>

As also the NEA letter shows, the Cane plan was not just a nonproliferation effort. Though Kennedy was concerned about the Dimona reactor, he seems to have considered safeguarding it in some way as the key nonproliferation policy to pursue. His comments to his staff indicate that he authorized the Cane plan to respond to Israeli pressure for closer security ties and because of the general situation in the area, of which Israel’s nuclear effort was one but not the only important aspect. As the possibly anyway necessary acceptance of closer ties to Israel enabled demanding quid pro quos, it made sense to pursue such, and the USG seems to have singled out nuclear limitation as one of them because in that issue, pressure on Israel was acceptable to the US electorate. In a meeting on McCloy’s mission, Kennedy and his aides “agreed that opposition to nuclear proliferation was one issue on which US opinion would be solidly behind the Administration” and thus the “best bargaining lever with Israel”, which was needed as Israel was expected to strongly press the USG for moves advantageous to it before the 1964 elections. Kennedy noted the Cane plan “grew out of two things, our concern over nuclear weapons and the risks of war over Jordan” (both a dispute over access to Jordan waters and the internal situation in Jordan were causing concern at the time); if the plan failed, “we’re likely to have both sides developing nuclear weapons and the Israelis moving into Jordan on the earliest excuse they can find”. The US was to “give Israel reasonable assurances” in return for a promise of restraint in *either* matter. He argued that Nasser would benefit even if Israel as a result only came to show restraint regarding Jordan. The US goal was “to stay out of the politics of the area.

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<sup>294</sup> Talbot to Ambassadors, 27 May 63, USNA ND B/7 letters to field.

<sup>295</sup> D/231 WH staff mtg, 1 May 63, D/273 “President’s Meeting on McCloy Exercise”, 15 June, both FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>296</sup> Komer to Bundy, 28 May 63, JFKL MEC WHM; Talbot to Rusk, 4 June, USNA RNA.

All we want to do is to prevent Israel from going to the West Bank, which would inevitably involve us”.<sup>297</sup>

In late May, Kennedy sent Nasser a letter to prepare him for the Cane effort. The letter noted that though no Near East state was developing nuclear weapons, Israel’s nuclear program could enable it to do so within a few years. Moreover, both it and the UAR were developing offensive missiles. Thus the USG was thinking how to prevent serious trouble in the area. He asked Nasser to receive an emissary to discuss this. Nasser indicated that he was open for talks but warned against “proposals framed primarily in terms of Israel’s interest as a prelude to the U.S. elections”.<sup>298</sup>

### 8.3.4 Arms limitation probe with Nasser

In late June 1963, McCloy met Nasser and put forward the idea that both the UAR and Israel would separately, publicly or privately, undertake towards the US or maybe the UN to forgo “the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and check the further development or use of offensive missiles”. The US was in return prepared to help regarding verification and maybe civilian nuclear efforts and space research. Though Nasser agreed to study the idea and stressed that he did not aim to pursue nuclear arms, his answer came to be that as “a matter of principle”, he could not make no deal that would limit his country’s sovereignty and make it seem like a US satellite. Further problematic issues were verification (he rejected inspections), a possible impression of an Israel-UAR deal, and how to justify that the UAR, of all NNWSs, would make such a non-nuclear promise. He suggested a general NNWSs’ promise instead, though acknowledged that none could be reached quickly, and was open to “some form of renunciation ... in a “collective” setting such as the UN”. He said that he could maybe in a letter exchange (which could be made public) give Kennedy assurance against aims to seek nuclear weapons or attack Israel. He suspected that the USG was under heavy Israeli pressure and wanted to avoid an impression of acting because of Israel’s propaganda campaign against Egypt. He was not very interested in any new US assurances against aggression.

McCloy asked Nasser think about the proposal and discuss it later again with Badeau. His impression was that the key reason for Nasser’s stance towards the proposal was that the political price for him was too high, especially taking into account Israel’s propaganda attacks.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> D/273 (fn 295) FRUS 61-3:18. Similarly, Komer had proposed restraint on both the nuclear issue and the West Bank as preconditions for security talks with Israel. Komer to Bundy with Bundy’s comments, 9 May 63, JFKL KI WHM.

A summer 1963 NEA memo noted that the US public almost unanimously supported nonproliferation efforts; contrary action by Israel was likely to clearly harm its standing in the US. “Scenario with Eshkol”, n/d, USNA RNA.

<sup>298</sup> D/257 DOS to E/C with Kennedy to Nasser, 27 May 63; D/266 DOS to Bundy, 11 June, both FRUS 61-3:18. On the Cane effort, see also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 246-51.

<sup>299</sup> D/283, D/285 McCloy (E/C) to DOS, 28-30 June 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

Komer was quite optimistic about McCloy's report and still hope that some kind of a deal or unilateral promise could be reached with Nasser: Nasser had revealed he had no nuclear aims or capabilities or great plans regarding missiles. Despite his objections to the US plan, his openness towards a public renouncement and idea of a written assurance were positive steps.<sup>300</sup>

Komer pointed out that McCloy had failed to stress 1) that instead of Israeli pressure, the proposal was primarily driven by USG worries about Israel's aims and a view that Israel would only show restraint if it was certain that Cairo did not pursue nuclear weapons or missiles, and 2) the benefits from a deal to the UAR because of Israel's advantage in the nuclear field.<sup>301</sup> Badeau soon discussed the idea again with Nasser and also stressed that if Cairo accepted IAEA safeguards on any (future) reactors, that would help the USG to demand such from Israel, too. But Nasser continued to stress his inability to accept any verification measures. Komer felt the US had still not succeeded to make him see how he would benefit from the deal and that the US in fact saw little verification as necessary.<sup>302</sup>

In the meanwhile, the USG and Moscow were making progress towards a nuclear test ban treaty, a development I consider next. As discussed in section 8.5, Israel's and Egypt's joining of the PTBT came to somewhat ease the sense of urgency in the USG regarding special arms limitation measures for them.

## **8.4 The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty**

A nuclear test ban had been on Kennedy's agenda from the start of his term and indeed already in the Senate. As mentioned above, a key reason for his interest in it was that it could help both to limit arms racing, reduce fall-out, *and* hinder proliferation. He repeatedly indicated to his aides that halting proliferation especially to China was the key reason for his interest: otherwise a test ban, which also had opponents, was not worth the trouble it would cause within the USG and with the Congress. He also said publicly that even an uncertain hope of limiting proliferation was for him the major justification for it. But as former AEC Chairman G. Seaborg notes, it is somewhat unclear how exactly he saw the ban and non-proliferation as linked, assuming China was not to join the ban. An ACDA memo explained the link so that though a US-UK-USSR deal on a test ban would not keep China and France from testing, it would possibly have a curtailing effect on them and thus reduce proliferation pressures on others; it was thought that, e.g., Israel might refrain from going nuclear if it got also through a test ban reassurance that Arabs would not do so, either. Also a Soviet official argued to the USG that if a ban was reached, the world opinion would

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<sup>300</sup> D/288 Komer to Kennedy, 3 July 63, *ibid.*

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>302</sup> D/292 DOS to Badeau, 7 July 63, *ibid.* also fn 2 ref. to T/120 Badeau to DOS, 11 July, DOS CF POL 7 US/McCloy; T/126 Badeau to DOS and Komer to Kennedy, 12 July, JFKL NSF Countries B/169a UAR-Israel arms limitation.

have a restraining effect on China.<sup>303</sup> It was moreover thought in the USG that Moscow could be interested in a effort to prevent China from going nuclear, maybe even with action or threat of action against its nuclear plants, if the US prevented the FRG from doing so. According to former ACDA official G. Bunn, Kennedy also hoped Moscow to be able to somehow keep China from nuclear testing.<sup>304</sup> But the USG wanted no direct tie between efforts for a test ban and for a NPT as it was possible that Paris would cooperate on a NPT but not a test ban<sup>305</sup>.

Though it had been discussed in the multilateral for a in Geneva since 1954, clear progress on a test ban started taking place in trilateral US-British-Soviet contacts in spring 1963. The prospects of an early CTBT seemed weak because of disagreement over verification of underground activity, but the West saw somewhat better chances for a first step ban on testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.<sup>306</sup>

Signs that agreement could be possible led to a special mission by the US and British emissaries Harriman and Lord V. Hailsham to Moscow in July 1963. In a June speech where he announced the test ban talks, Kennedy spoke of the responsibility of both the Americans and the Soviets in seeking to secure peace, in competition but mutual tolerance (to reduce allies' concern that he would seek détente at their cost, he also stressed the US commitment to and identity of interests with Western Europe in particular). Though Khrushchev had so far rejected a PTBT, the speech seems to have made a very positive impression on him and helped to change his stance.<sup>307</sup>

But Harriman's goals in Moscow were not planned to be tightly limited to a test ban. How hard he was to pursue further nonproliferation measures was a delicate and divisive issue within the USG. In January, Harriman had proposed to Kennedy efforts for an understanding with Moscow on China and Germany, based on a test ban and a NPT (he saw a NPT as over time needed in restraining Germany)<sup>308</sup>. But agreement on a NPT possibly required

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<sup>303</sup> D/125 (fn 7) FRUS 61-3:8; D/5 (fn 146) NSA EBB CNP; D/45 ACDA on test ban and the proliferation problem, 13 Feb 63, NSA EBB LTBT; PPK 75 (fn 5); ACDA "Points to be covered in preparation of forthcoming July 15 mission of Governor Harriman to Moscow", 20 June; memo on the same topic (n/a), n/d, both AHP TBT Bg 1; D/203 USG mtg, 27 July, FRUS 61-3:7; Seaborg 1981 pp. 181-2, 188, 193-4; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 99-100. On whether a partial test ban indeed hindered proliferation, see Bader 1968 pp. 54-8.

<sup>304</sup> D/265 (fn 118) FRUS 61-3:7; DOS Far Eastern Affairs to Harriman, 21 June 63, AHP TBT Bg 1; Bunn 1992 p. 36. On Kennedy and Johnson administrations' decisions regarding China's nuclear weapon program, see Burr & Richelson 2000.

<sup>305</sup> D/269, D/275 (fn 127) FRUS 61-3:7.

<sup>306</sup> See documents in FRUS 61-3:7; Pautsch 1994 pp. 119-23. On test ban negotiations and USG stances towards it under Kennedy, see Bunn 1992 pp. 26-46.

<sup>307</sup> Kennedy's speech, 10 June 63, PPK 232; NSA 2003 ref. to Taubman, William (2003) *Khrushchev*, New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 583-4, 602-7. Geyelin 1966 argues that the speech, which became a turning point in relations with Moscow, was also an attempt to persuade the US public and the Congress to support a policy of détente, but that in this respect, Kennedy never succeeded to carry the Americans with him (pp. 75-6). On the speech and its effect in promoting cooperation between the superpowers, see also Bunn 1992 pp. 44-6.

<sup>308</sup> D/5 (fn 146) NSA EBB CNP; Burr & Richelson 2000 pp. 67-8.

giving up the MLF plan. Trachtenberg argues that the USG was now moreover seeking a general settlement in Europe<sup>309</sup>.

#### 8.4.1 Broad nonproliferation goals

Despite the ongoing MLF talks with allies, ACDA, Harriman, Nitze, Bundy, and his deputy C. Kaysen favored modifying or abandoning the MLF plan if a NPT seemed achievable with Moscow<sup>310</sup>; support for a MLF was generally lacking, Franco-German rapprochement seemed in practice to lead to no undesirable action, and Moscow indicated interest in arms control<sup>311</sup>. Also Kennedy came to support the idea. Bundy argued to him in mid-June 1963 that the USG had to stop what had indeed become USG *pressure* for a MLF: especially as even Bonn supported a MLF to please the US, USG pressure was seen in no good light in France, the UK, and the US. The allies were wary of the costs of a MLF and only some keen proponents of European integration really wanted it – assuming the US veto could be lifted early if a European MLF became possible. Getting the AEA changed because of a MLF would politically draw “directly upon the Presidential account”, which needed to have enough credit for, e.g., test ban ratification. Last but not least, Moscow said that a MLF was a hurdle to stability in Europe. Thus pushing it made it impossible to get “many of the things we now hope Harriman can talk about” (indicating that a broad agenda indeed was planned for his trip to Moscow). Bundy wrote that the MLF plan had proceeded thus far 1) because of a post-Nassau need for a “proposal [i.e., not necessarily a realized *force*] designed to meet the nuclear ambitions of Europe” and 2) because MLF-supporters in the DOS (including Ball, Merchant, and Rostow) had pushed it stronger and quicker than Kennedy and Rusk aimed and repeatedly persuaded Bundy to support their stance – though skepticism would have been warranted. To protect USG prestige, he favored not fully abandoning the MLF plan but giving up pressure and talking more about other ways to meet NATO’s nuclear needs, such as consultation and nonproliferation. It was important to get Adenauer support this line; otherwise Bundy expected little opposition. Kennedy seems to have overall accepted and was clearly influenced by these points.<sup>312</sup> In a USG meeting,

<sup>309</sup> Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 388-9.

<sup>310</sup> Merchant to Harriman, 17 June 63, AHP B/539 Bg 1; ACDA “Points ...” (fn 303); D/296 FRUS 61-3:7 fn 1 ref. to Kaysen to Kennedy, 20 June, JFKL NSF Kaysen Harriman instructions. A further rationale for linking a NPT to a test ban was JCS opposition to the ban; it was probably thought that the opposition would weaken if action against Chinese nuclear weapon aims was agreed upon with Moscow, which seemed possible only if the USG abandoned the MLF plan. See Burr & Richelson 2000 p. 70.

<sup>311</sup> Schwartz 1983 pp. 111-3; Seaborg 1987 pp. 90-2. In a survey made in the US in March (Kennedy got its unpublished results in May), 21 % of respondents favored pooling together some US and allies’ nuclear weapons under NATO control, 38 % wanted the US to keep full control over the weapons, and 40 % were uncertain. Bundy to Kennedy, 16 May, with Benton & Bowles report “A Study of Attitudes toward Cold War Issues” (Table 14), Apr 63, JFKL SM B/62 Bundy.

<sup>312</sup> Bundy to Johnson, 6 Dec 64, with Bundy to Kennedy, 15 June 63, LBJL S:MLF III 2; Costigliola 1994 p. 181.

he said the MLF plan was “not doing very well anyway” and brought up the option of giving it up. To his approval, Bundy proposed keeping the force afloat as a *bargaining chip*.<sup>313</sup>

In late June, Kennedy also told Macmillan that the MLF plan was to be modified if a test ban came in sight. According to Reeves, the two men privately agreed that MLF talks had to be promptly *stopped* since it was clear that a MLF was unable to prevent proliferation.<sup>314</sup>

Emb. Bonn assessed that a MLF was important only for a small (but important) group in the FRG; Adenauer and Schröder supported it for political reasons and were not too committed; and a wider interested circle did not fully believe in it and already suspected allies’ views to mean that it was dead. The worst expected effect in the FRG of a failure of the MLF plan was that those attracted to France (e.g., Strauss) would get a stronger basis to argue for a pro-France course.<sup>315</sup> In sum, the effects of a failure of the MLF plan on the FRG probably did not seem prohibitive to the USG.

According to ACDA’s briefing book and early versions of Harriman’s instructions for Moscow, he was to make clear the USG interest in a nonproliferation deal and possibly discuss the topic even beyond a test ban. He was to indicate that a test ban would mean that no more nuclear powers would emerge among US allies and that if the superpowers agreed that there would be none on either side, including China, the West could be able to seek alternatives to a MLF. China would maybe not sign a test ban treaty but a key goal was that it would not test nuclear weapons: a tacit understanding about preventing its going nuclear was a part of the US-USSR deal pursued. That an end to China’s nuclear weapon effort was a condition for dropping the MLF was to be stressed also to the allies. In return for acceptance of a NPT, and as an alternative to a MLF, the US could offer especially Bonn a greater role in NATO nuclear planning and strong security guarantees for beyond 1969 (according to the NAT, NATO states had a right to withdraw from the treaty in 1969). West Germans were expected to accept a NPT if their security was protected through, e.g., the stockpiling scheme, and not to be overly keen on control over nuclear weapons as such.<sup>316</sup> Thus when considering both to abandon the MLF plan and to ask Bonn to accept a stronger non-nuclear commitment, USG officials aimed by strengthening security cooperation with the FRG in other ways to reduce concern about abandonment by the US.

MLF-supporters in the USG reacted strongly against the idea of dropping the MLF for the sake of a NPT. Merchant warned that doing so would have grave consequences in NATO. Rostow argued to Harriman in a series of memos that the USG was not to agree to prohibit a MLF in return for Soviet cooperation regarding China. The US had to avoid seeming to deal with Moscow behind allies’ backs and a risk existed that Moscow would use probes

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<sup>313</sup> USG mtg, 21 June 63, JFKL KDH; Seaborg 1987 pp. 90-2.

<sup>314</sup> Excerpt from Kennedy-Macmillan mtg, 29 June 63, AHP TBT Bg 1; Reeves 1994 p. 538.

<sup>315</sup> E/B to Rusk “MLF”, 9 July 63, AHP TBT 3.

<sup>316</sup> Bbs “US-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement for Discussion at the Moscow Mtg” (san.) and “Nuclear Diffusion”, 20 June 63, JFKL ATB B/265 Harriman trip; ACDA “Points...”; memo on the same topic (both fn 303); Kaysen to Kennedy, 20 June, with memo on the same topic, JFKL ATB B/265 Harriman Moscow C.

on détente to pursue divisions in the West. He saw Moscow as very unlikely to use force against China's nuclear program and questioned how much a small Chinese nuclear force would harm US interests. He argued to Kennedy that the MLF plan was not to be given up as it was probably the strongest incentive for Moscow to take arms control seriously.<sup>317</sup>

Reflecting such disputes, later versions of Harriman's instructions say nothing about dropping the MLF if Moscow agreed to cooperate regarding China. According to the final instructions, Harriman could indicate that the US would try to make states associated with it respect any possible nonproliferation agreement if the USSR did likewise; the MLF plan was simply consistent with nonproliferation. In a NSC meeting on the instructions, Kennedy wondered if the China issue could be somehow dealt with, but Harriman expressed doubt about Moscow's willingness to discuss it.<sup>318</sup>

But though the impression was thus given generally to USG officials that the MLF plan was protected, Kennedy remained interested in pursuing nonproliferation even at its expense. In forwarding the draft instructions to Kennedy before the NSC meeting, Kaysen noted that they did not explicitly cover the MLF; it was better Kennedy and Harriman would alone discuss that matter<sup>319</sup>. When the two men met on their own, Kennedy noted he was prepared to make use of the improved popular and cabinet feelings towards the US in the FRG (created by his recent trip there) "as much as seemed useful if there was something to be achieved by it." Harriman's first stance in Moscow was to be that the MLF plan was consistent with nonproliferation, but if it seemed useful "in terms of the China problem or otherwise", Harriman was to judge "how useful it was to indicate to the Soviets that in certain circumstances we might not need to go forward with this proposition". Still, he was to make no *specific* promise about the MLF.<sup>320</sup> According to another account, Kennedy agreed Harriman could propose cooperation in stopping China's nuclear efforts and when Harriman noted that as a "sweetener", the US needed to "throw in the MLF", Kennedy commented "of course ...it would be a great relief to get rid of that!"<sup>321</sup>

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<sup>317</sup> Merchant to Harriman, 17 June 63, *ibid*; Rostow to Harriman "Non-Proliferation" and "Test Ban Treaty", both 2 July, and memo on MLF with "MRBM deployment in MLF and under current practice", 9 July; Rostow to Kennedy, 8 July, all AHP TBT 3. Rostow thought that the MLF plan was to "be bargained away only for its cause", i.e., Moscow's MRBMs aimed at NATO Europe. Rostow to Harriman, 30 July, JFKL NSF Kaysen B/376 nuclear matters test ban & rel. negs Aug 63.

<sup>318</sup> Kaysen to Harriman with draft instructions, 5 July 63, AHP TBT Bg 1; Agenda for NSC mtg with draft instructions, 9 July, AHP TBT 3; NSC mtg, 9 July, JFKL ATB B/265 Harriman Moscow C; Instructions revised at the NSC and approved by Kennedy, 10 July, AHP B/541 Bb 8; Seaborg 1981 p. 228. Cohen, A. 1998 argues that Harriman was to find out whether Moscow would prevent proliferation by China if the US did so especially regarding the FRG and Israel (pp. 156-8). But as Moscow had been showing quite little interest in Israel's case, it seems unlikely that the USG would have seen it as a key bargaining chip with Moscow. It is unknown whether Harriman was told of or instructed to mention in Moscow the US nonproliferation efforts with Israel; Cohen notes that in general, consideration of Israel's case was limited to a small circle (pp. 158, 388 fn 16 ref. to his 1995 interviews with Kaysen). In Harriman's accounts (mtg memos on and reports) of the talks in Moscow, Israel's case does not figure prominently.

<sup>319</sup> Kaysen to Kennedy, 9 July 63, JFKL ATB B/265 Harriman Moscow C.

<sup>320</sup> Kennedy-Harriman mtg, 10 July 63, JFKL ATB B/265 Harriman Moscow D.

<sup>321</sup> Reeves 1994 p. 546 ref. to Harriman for the record, 20 Dec 67, AHP B/479.



Despite the discord with de Gaulle, for Kennedy a test ban deal could imply also a more liberal nuclear policy towards France, including supply of nuclear test data or even weapons if France joined the ban (its joining was important for Moscow). Kennedy brought up this option in the USG in February 1963 and in mid-June said to his aides that “if we ever got a test ban agreement, we would certainly wish to offer the French nuclear cooperation in return for their accession”. Also Bundy argued that France would only join a ban if it got all the data that testing would give. The USG made a guarded probe on the idea and Couve de Murville expressed some interest.<sup>322</sup> In the NSC meeting on Harriman’s mission, Kennedy said he wanted to remain free to give nuclear weapons to existing NWSs, especially France. Rusk saw this as no problem: Moscow accepted France as a nuclear power.<sup>323</sup>

Others in the USG opposed the idea. One concern was that such a US-French deal would alienate Bonn from the US and make it more willing to orientate towards Paris, also in nuclear weapon affairs – a situation likely to help also Strauss’s political comeback attempts<sup>324</sup>. Indeed, the “Strauss-factor” – his demands regarding security policy and nuclear weapons and the chance of him gaining power – was clearly in general strengthening Bonn’s bargaining power with the USG. Rostow in turn argued that it would be very hard to ask the Congress to accept both nuclear aid to France and a treaty that had nonproliferation as a goal.<sup>325</sup>

In a 2 July speech, Khrushchev spoke in favor of both a test ban and a NAP with the West. To DOS/INR, Moscow indeed seemed interested in better relations with the West, though a small chance existed that it was just trying to make China more cooperative by *appearing* to pursue détente. The DOS/L considered a joint statement on European security at the conclusion of a test ban possible, including possibly that pending a German peace treaty all sides would respect existing external boundaries and internal administrative division of Germany. But though he was as such not so much against a NAP, Bonn’s opposition (the probable Soviet goal was that a NAP would imply acceptance of a permanent division of Germany) and de Gaulle’s strong dislike of deals made without his involvement made Kennedy oppose linking a NAP to a test ban.<sup>326</sup>

Signs existed that early progress with Moscow on a NPT could be hard to achieve. Khrushchev told the British Labor party leader J. Wilson that he was interested in a NPT but it was “not for us as each country must decide on its own policy<sup>327</sup>”. A Soviet official indi-

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<sup>322</sup> Bundy for the record, 14 June 63, JFKL BMR; D/262, D/295 ENs FRUS 61-3:7, citing Seaborg’s account of 8 Feb USG mtg (in his *Journal* (1989-92) Vol. 5, Berkeley: Univ. of California, pp. 140-2) and T/5959 DOS to E/P and T/5194 E/P to DOS, 14-5 June, USNA CFPF POL 1 US.

<sup>323</sup> NSC mtg (fn 318), 9 July 63.

<sup>324</sup> Schlesinger to Bundy with memo to Kennedy, 22 July 63, JFKL ATB B/265 Harriman Moscow B.

<sup>325</sup> Rostow to Kennedy, 23 July 63, with memo to Rusk, 22 July, JFKL POF B/100 S:disarmament test ban Moscow 1.

<sup>326</sup> D/309 EN on 3 July 63 USG mtgs, FRUS 61-3:7; DOS/INR to Rusk with RSB-99 on Moscow’s stances for test ban talks; DOS/L to Fisher on NAP, both 5 July, AHP TBT Bg 1; EUR draft scope paper for Harriman, 7 July, *ibid.*; Bundy to Harriman (E/L), 12 July, *ibid.* 3.

<sup>327</sup> USSR-Labor mtg (fn 245), 10 June 63.

cated to ACDA that the MLF plan ruined the chances of a NPT even if it did not imply greater national control over nuclear weapons for Bonn: “both direct and indirect control of nuclear weapons” by Bonn was objectionable.<sup>328</sup>

When Harriman then went to Moscow in mid-July 1963, Kennedy continued to stress the importance of the China problem and instructed him to find out what Khrushchev thought about US or joint action to stop China’s nuclear effort. Harriman reported that he had probed on proliferation and China, but Khrushchev was evasive. As also Gromyko showed lack of will to discuss a NPT, Harriman got Kennedy’s approval not to press on that.<sup>329</sup> But there is no indication that Harriman would have clearly proposed joint action<sup>330</sup>. It did seem to Harriman, however, that Khrushchev was interested in a test ban as a way to isolate China (which would refuse to join)<sup>331</sup>. As no direct progress on a NPT was thus made in Moscow, Kennedy also did not have to decide about the destiny of the MLF plan.

But agreement on a PTBT was reached. Kennedy announced this in a 26 July speech, presenting the ban as a possible step towards both “reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement” and “preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them<sup>332</sup>”. The three NWSs and several NNWSs signed the treaty on 5 August. The PTBT is of unlimited duration but allows a member state to withdraw after informing other signatories three months in advance “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.<sup>333</sup>”

To persuade Paris to join the PTBT, Kennedy told de Gaulle that the US would in return give France the data that atmospheric testing would give and declared France advanced enough in its nuclear weapon effort to be able to get assistance under the AEA. But de Gaulle rejected the offer.<sup>334</sup>

Another challenge was to make the Senate ratify the PTBT. According to Schlesinger, Kennedy was determined to get that done even if it meant he would not be re-elected, but

<sup>328</sup> ACDA-USSR Emb. mtg, 21 June 63, AHP TBT Bg 1.

<sup>329</sup> D/326 Kennedy to Harriman, 15 July 63, FRUS 61-3:7; Harriman (E/M) to Rusk on 15 July mtg with Khrushchev, 16 July; E/M to Rusk on Harriman-Hailsham-Gromyko disc., 17 July; T/195 Harriman to Rusk, 18 July, all AHP B/540 Bb 5 IC; DOS to E/M, 18 July, AHP B/541 Bb 9 Outgoing. See also Seaborg 1981 p. 239 and, on the Moscow talks, Bunn 1992 pp. 36-8.

<sup>330</sup> In 1964, a DOS officer searched through the Moscow records to see whether Harriman had proposed joint action against China. He found no evidence of that. Martino to Read, 2 Oct 64, AHP TBT Bg 1.

<sup>331</sup> T/195, T/304 Harriman to Rusk, 18 and 23 July 63, AHP B/540 Bb 5 IC and 6 IC 7. Also a private comment by Mrs. Gromyko indicated this: a ban was needed “so that when those Chinese have their first nuclear explosion, we will have a basis on which to call them to account.” Kohler on 22 July disc. with Mrs. Gromyko, 23 July, AHP B/541 Bb 8. Also Bunn 1992 argues Moscow’s goal with the test ban was to isolate China (p. 14).

<sup>332</sup> Kennedy’s speech, 26 July 63, PPK 316.

<sup>333</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water (PTBT), 5 Aug 63. Moscow first opposed the exit clause, especially one tied to testing, but the USG insisted on it; because of a risk of extensive nuclear testing by China, the Senate was expected to require an exit clause. See D/45 (fn 303) NSA EBB LTBT; D/328 Harriman to DOS, 16 July 63; D/332 DOS to Harriman also fn 5, 18 July, both FRUS 61-3:7.

<sup>334</sup> D/352 Kennedy to de Gaulle, 25 July 63; D/358 Bundy to Bohlen with de Gaulle to Kennedy, 4 Aug, both *ibid.*; Schlesinger 1965 p. 914.

success was uncertain especially because of opposition to the ban in scientific and military circles. Since JCS support was crucial for Senate acceptance of the treaty, Kennedy had to agree on “safeguards” the JCS demanded regarding further underground testing and maintaining capabilities to resume atmospheric testing. The public widely supported the PTBT, and the Senate ratified it in September.<sup>335</sup>

Prospects of early progress on a NPT now seemed weak to the USG. After the Moscow mission, Harriman reported that the only issue the Soviets wished then to discuss was a NAP<sup>336</sup>.

But despite Soviet avoidance of the topic during Harriman’s mission, Khrushchev maybe would have been interested in an effort for a NPT and to keep China from going nuclear. Whereas Kennedy was willing to sacrifice the MLF for the sake of a NPT, Selvage shows that in fall 1963, Moscow was in turn willing drop the demand about prohibiting a MLF in a NPT if the USG promised to prevent Bonn from getting sole control over nuclear weapons. According to a Soviet memo, Gromyko also suggested to Kennedy in October that if the USG promised that no MLF would come about and that the idea would be abandoned some day, Moscow would agree on a NPT that would not explicitly prohibit a MLF; but the USG rejected the idea. Selvage argues that Khrushchev was willing to accept a MLF to reach a NPT as he wanted détente with the West and wanted a NPT especially to stop China’s nuclear weapon effort.<sup>337</sup> That he and Kennedy, despite similar goals, failed to make progress on a NPT, was probably because discord within each capital and alliance made both so guarded that they failed to make their goals clear to each other.

#### 8.4.2 West Germany and the test ban – a general European settlement?

Some US officials had expected that Bonn could have interest in a test ban as a *non-discriminatory* nonproliferation measure<sup>338</sup>. But Bonn turned out not to be happy about the ban. The US and the UK did not consult their allies much before or during the negotiations, a matter Bonn came to protest about. Bonn in turn failed to see that a ban was becoming reality and that both it and the GDR were expected to join it – a possibly somewhat problematic issue since it did not recognize the GDR.<sup>339</sup>

But the USG had not kept Bonn fully in the dark or even excluded the possibility of a NPT and the MLF being covered in the Moscow talks. On 20 June, a DOS official answered an inquiry by the Germans on whether Harriman’s agenda included nondiffusion efforts and could lead to an abandonment of the MLF only that it was too early to know the agenda. Soon thereafter, Kennedy visited the FRG and met German leaders especially to brief them

<sup>335</sup> See *ibid.* pp. 909-13.

<sup>336</sup> Harriman “Outlook for Future Discussions with USSR”, 30 July 63, AHP B/541 Bb 8.

<sup>337</sup> Selvage 2001 pp. 2-6, 20, with a Soviet memo to Polish leaders, early Oct 63.

<sup>338</sup> DOS/L to Fisher, 5 July 63, AHP TBT Bg 1.

<sup>339</sup> See Bader 1968 pp. 51-3; Pautsch 1994 pp. 120-6, 129.

on the coming Moscow talks. He stressed publicly the importance of the test ban and non-proliferation.<sup>340</sup>

Whether Bonn would join the ban was no prominent topic in the Moscow talks. This probably did not mean that its adherence was not seen as crucial but that all sides expected it to join. That the PTBT was not to affect the non-recognition of certain regimes was discussed in general and as related to, e.g., China and Germany. To enable a maximal number of states to join the treaty, the three states agreed that each of them would be a depository to it and some states could join it only with one of them and each of them did not need to accept all states' memberships; the depositories were only to inform each other of signatures to the treaty. The USG also assured Bonn already during the Moscow talks that the status of the GDR was not at stake.<sup>341</sup>

Nevertheless, Bonn came to express strong concern that the PTBT would mean implicit recognition of the GDR. This was a sensitive issue also because of Adenauer's *rebus sic stantibus* -claim: also specifically in response to remarks by Wilson about a possibility to recognize the GDR and Germany's borders, and referring explicitly to the non-ABC weapon pledge, Bonn had earlier in 1963 again argued that any change to the 1954 deal could mean changes to the whole understanding. Though the USG informed Bonn after the Moscow talks that it hoped Bonn to sign the PTBT early, Bonn was against doing so. But it considered joining the PTBT after it would have come to force and public statements would have been made about the recognition issue. In Bonn, it was debated whether joining was a too big concession regarding the GDR; for instance Adenauer, Strauss, and von Brentano opposed the ban fiercely.<sup>342</sup>

Bonn's signature was important for Moscow and Americans in general, and thus for Kennedy. He argued to the Germans that their failure to sign would lead to a catastrophe. Bundy further stressed to them that because of Bonn's problem with the GDR, the US had made the effort and solved the non-recognition problem with the scheme with three depositories (the GDR was to sign the PTBT only in Moscow). The USG was now also taking care to deal with the non-recognition issue in its statements so that Bonn would get no chance to reject the ban because of it.<sup>343</sup> Though the USG rejected as potentially counter-productive Bonn's idea of attaching to the PTBT an interpretation note that the treaty did

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<sup>340</sup> Rusk's aide Sullivan-FRG Emb. disc., 20 June 63, AHP TBT Bg 1; Kennedy's news conf., 24 June, PPK 260; Seaborg 1981 p. 224.

<sup>341</sup> See T/304 (fn 331), 23 July 63; D/349 USG mtg also fn 8 ref. to T/232 Rusk to E/B, 24 July, FRUS 61-3:7; PTBT, 5 Aug; Pautsch 1994 pp. 123-4.

<sup>342</sup> D/107 Carstens to FRG Emb. London, 27 Feb; D/238-9 Carstens on Schröder-USG official mtg and to FRG Embassies, 26 July, all APD 63; Pautsch 1994 pp. 129-31, 147; Schrafstetter 2004 p. 131.

<sup>343</sup> D/241 Minister von Lilienfeld (Emb. Washington) to Schröder, 27 July, APD 63; Kennedy- and Bundy-Ball discs., 27 July, JFKL BT B/9 USSR; USG mtg, 2 Aug, JFKL ATB B/265 Rusk Moscow briefing. On the non-recognition issue, see also Pautsch 1994 pp. 131-53.

not mean mutual recognition by all sides, it was willing to make a declaration about this to the Senate.<sup>344</sup>

Though this aspect has received quite little attention, the ban implied, as a report by Emb. Bonn points out, a new restriction on the FRG beyond the WEU Treaty, even though opponents of the PTBT in Bonn publicly tended to argue otherwise: under Art. 1 the signatories “refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion” in the three environments. This limited Bonn’s freedom to aid France’s weapon program. Emb. Bonn saw it as possible that this aspect in particular had made CSU politicians unhappy about the ban.<sup>345</sup>

As Schrafstetter shows, a major point raised in Bonn was that the ban appeared as a US-Soviet deal at the cost of especially the FRG. Internal memos show that officials in Bonn saw as another problem that unlike the 1954 pledge (which was moreover tied to a specific security situation), the PTBT implied a non-nuclear pledge towards non-allies and could weaken Bonn’s hand in peace negotiations. For instance Bonn’s Ambassador to Moscow argued against joining since doing so would ease Soviet concern about German nuclear armament, and that concern was the only thing that made a reunification deal possible. But to avoid international isolation and since the USG pressed Bonn to join the PTBT and could otherwise suspect German-French anti-US or nuclear weapon cooperation, other German officials thought that the FRG had to join. It was also argued that a national or German-French nuclear weapon program was anyway politically and economically unfeasible; thus joining the ban was less of a giveaway.<sup>346</sup>

Despite US reassurances, Adenauer continued to argue that the PTBT would change the legal status of the GDR. Bonn also complained about inadequate consultations during the PTBT negotiations. The USG in turn stressed the need to avoid any impression of German nuclear weapon aims and pressed Bonn to join the treaty promptly.<sup>347</sup> Kennedy was very disturbed by Bonn’s stances. After Adenauer strongly questioned US policies in a meeting with McNamara and maintained that the PTBT as a success for Moscow, Kennedy set to make his dislike of such attitudes clear. He sent Adenauer a message asking for similar trust in his administration as Adenauer had showed to its predecessor and subtly warned that also some Americans thought that Germans were not to be trusted.<sup>348</sup> Kennedy in-

<sup>344</sup> D/244, D/260 Schröder to Rusk, 29-31 July; D/270 Schröder-McGhee talk; D/272 Lilienfeld to Schröder on mtg with Ball, both 3 Aug, all APD 63. Pautsch 1994 notes that the US and the UK were unwilling to go further to meet Bonn’s demands on the non-recognition issue in order not to risk the agreement with Moscow altogether (p. 143).

<sup>345</sup> PTBT, 5 Aug 63; A-338 E/B to DOS on CDU/CSU issues and the PTBT, 16 Aug, JFKL N/G. Klein forwarded the memo to Bundy on 29 Aug, calling it “an extremely interesting piece”. Ibid.

<sup>346</sup> D/245, D/262 West German diplomats Müller-Roschach and Krapf on PTBT, 29 July and 1 Aug; D/283 (fn 191) all APD 63; Schrafstetter 2004 pp. 131-2.

<sup>347</sup> D/252, D/257 Adenauer-Tyler and -McNamara discs., 30-1 July; D/270 (fn 344); D/288 Knapstein to GFO, 8 Aug, all APD 63; D/203 E/B to DOS on Adenauer-McNamara mtg, 5 Aug, FRUS 61-3:15; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 394-5.

<sup>348</sup> D/203 (fn 347) FRUS 61-3:15; Bundy to Read with Kennedy to Adenauer, 6 Aug 63, JFKL POF S:disarmament test ban Moscow 2.

structed Rusk, who was to visit the FRG, to express to Adenauer dislike of German complaint storms and repeated comments about “the greater reliability and wisdom” of, e.g., Dulles.<sup>349</sup>

Rusk also stressed to Adenauer that in USG view the PTBT implied no status change for unrecognized regimes and said that the USG would state so before the Senate. Adenauer dropped his opposition to the treaty. Kennedy and Rusk made the statements to Senate and on 19 August 1963, Bonn signed the PTBT in all three depository states. But towards the USG, it continued to complain about a lack of consultations during PTBT negotiations and to demand proper consultations on future disarmament and NAP talks.<sup>350</sup>

Trachtenberg notes Bonn had to follow the US order to sign since it lacked alternative allies: France was militarily no real substitute and Moscow opposed a strong, independent Germany. McArdle Kelleher argues that under Adenauer, the goal of reunification in general set frames for Bonn’s nuclear weapon policies: though the goal was a reason to try to keep the nuclear option as a bargaining chip for reunification negotiations, Bonn’s dependency on US stances in any such talks precluded any moves that would have weakened NATO support for Bonn’s reunification goal.<sup>351</sup>

The lack of consultation about the PTBT once again strengthened worries about the US commitment in Bonn. To lock the US to the defense of the FRG and to prevent superpower rapprochement at its cost, Bonn was now, as discussed in section 8.2.6.3, demanding a MLF<sup>352</sup>. Bonn now also wanted a European MLF not to be precluded; Schröder grounded this to Rusk in September by noting that the original US stance left the option open (assuming any force remained in close connection to US forces). Rusk said that an independent Europe would mean an independent US, but Schröder stressed the need to maintain close US-European ties. But he also again hinted at Bonn’s alternatives by referring to Paris’s seduction attempts. Rusk assured him that though London appeared to prioritize a NPT over a MLF, the USG did not.<sup>353</sup> But as the discussion above on Kennedy’s stances for the Moscow talks show, this was not quite true.

The Adenauer era ended and, with no succession crisis the USG had feared, a new government led by L. Erhard (CDU) came in power in October 1963. Improving relations with the US became a key priority for it. Also the USG made efforts to reassure the West Ger-

<sup>349</sup> T/394 DOS to Rusk (E/B), 8 Aug 63, JFKL ATB B/265 Rusk Moscow Adenauer & Schröder. Rusk 1991 notes Adenauer’s comments about the good old times with Dulles were amusing since Dulles had told Rusk of problems also he had had with Adenauer (p. 197).

<sup>350</sup> Kennedy to the Senate on PTBT, 8 Aug 63, PPK 324; D/361 (fn 123) FRUS 61-3:7 ref. also to Adenauer to Kennedy, 17 Aug, USNA presid. corresp. Lot 66D204 Adenauer-Kennedy II; DOS circular T/283 on Rusk before the Senate, 12 Aug, JFKL ATB B/265 recognition; D/302 also fn 4 Carstens to Schröder, 14 Aug; D/308 also fn 3 Schröder to Rusk, 17 Aug, both APD 63; Schrafstetter 2004 p. 131. Nevertheless, a later DOS memo (on attitudes towards a CTBT and a NPT, 12 Dec 64, FOIA) noted that the FRG signed and ratified the PTBT “without significant opposition”.

<sup>351</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 274-5; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 394-6.

<sup>352</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 241-3.

<sup>353</sup> Rusk-Schröder disc., 20 Sep 63, DNSA NP00961 and D/349 APD 63.

mans of its commitment to their security and, as noted in section 8.2.6.2, promised to keep troops in the FRG as long as needed, with explicit reference to the offset purchases. But it also stressed Bonn that it would not accept a continuing double standard of Bonn being very sensitive towards the idea of any US troop withdrawals from the FRG but not reacting when other allies made such.<sup>354</sup>

The Germans continued to stress that though they did not want a national nuclear force or to produce nuclear weapons, some nuclear sharing in NATO was needed. Erhard stressed the FRG needed certainty that the same weapons would be available for its defense as for the defense of other states. Strauss, now Chairman of CSU Bundestag group, argued in favor of a European nuclear force.<sup>355</sup>

Bonn was also unhappy about the idea of a NPT. It said the 1954 pledge had settled the matter for it and whereas that had been given in return for promises of nuclear protection and promotion of reunification, a NPT threatened to weaken its position on those issues. It stressed that the pledge had been only made towards allies; *Moscow* had no right to demand Bonn to respect it. Probably to both press for a MLF and prevent a NPT, in December it introduced a link between the two: Schröder told Rusk that Bonn would only consider joining a NPT after a MLF was created. On this stance, Bonn came to insist for several years.<sup>356</sup>

Trachtenberg goes so far as to argue that the PTBT was a part of a US-Soviet understanding on a stable European order that emerged in 1963 and that Germany's non-nuclear status was central to the order and dominated Soviet policies towards the West. He suggests that Moscow, fearing that NATO could maybe fail to keep the FRG under control and that steps towards making the FRG an equal ally would one day result in access to nuclear weapons, was by now pressed to reach an understanding on Germany with the US, especially as the MLF plan and cooperation with France seemed to be improving Bonn's chances to get control over nuclear weapons. According to Trachtenberg, the informal superpower deal on a European order was based on mutual acceptance of 1) division of Europe and Germany; 2) freedom of West Berlin; 3) a non-nuclear status for Germany and thus discrimination in NATO; and 4) military presence of the US in Europe as a way to keep the FRG under control and to protect it. The FRG had to accept all this to protect West Berlin and because it

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<sup>354</sup> D/397 Schröder-McGhee disc., D/398 Knappstein to GFO on disc. with Rusk, D/402-3 Erhard- and Schröder-Rusk mtgs, 22-6 Oct, APD 63; E/B to DOS on 25 Oct Erhard-Rusk mtg, 26 Oct, JFKL N/G; D/38 NSAM 270, 29 Oct, FRUS 61-3:9; Kennedy's press conf., 31 Oct, PPK 448; Richardson 1966 p. 71; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 205; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 397-8.

<sup>355</sup> D/393 Erhard-Acheson disc., 19 Oct, APD 63; M/Munich to Rusk on 31 Oct Taylor-Strauss mtg, 1 Nov, JFKL N/G.

<sup>356</sup> D/367 Schröder-Rusk-Home disc., 27 Sep; D/384 (fn 188); D/459 Schröder-Butler (British Foreign Minister) disc., 9 Dec, all APD 63; D/39 Carstens on mtg with McGhee, 10 Feb, APD 64. For a reaffirmation of this stance, see, e.g., D/120 Lilienfeld to Johnson with Erhard to Johnson, 25 Feb 66, FRUS 64-8:11.

lacked alternatives to the alliance with the US. The PTBT, Trachtenberg suggests, was the one *formal* part of this deal.<sup>357</sup>

USG records from summer 1963 give some support for Trachtenberg's thesis, but the evidence is mixed on whether the USG or Moscow wanted a general settlement, and his conclusions appear somewhat exaggerated. At least Harriman and McNamara indeed were willing to include in the Moscow talks some sort of a broad security package<sup>358</sup>. Records of talks in Moscow on a NAP, which could have been an opening towards a general settlement, give no clear picture on how far either side was willing to go. The US-British stance on a NAP was that they had to consult allies, and Moscow agreed not to link the PTBT directly to a NAP, assuming the others really pursued a NAP with allies. In this context, Hailsham and Harriman stressed a need to protect access to West Berlin and brought up the desirability of a NPT. But the Soviets strongly opposed broadening the NAP proposal to cover for instance access to Berlin. Harriman and Hailsham argued it was also possible to consider, e.g., German borders in the context of a NAP.<sup>359</sup> This does suggest Western interest in a broad deal, but together with Soviet unwillingness to discuss nonproliferation (whereas in that respect especially *China's* case was on the table), the impression is that though it made the NAP proposal, Moscow was not prepared to bargain seriously on a broad settlement. Trachtenberg argues that though Moscow was not prepared to give *formal* promises regarding Berlin, the test ban, Germany's nuclear status, and freedom of West Berlin became anyway linked<sup>360</sup>. But it is not proven Moscow accepted any such tie.

And, similarly as Harriman argued, Quester suggests that a desire to increase the prestige price of testing for *China* primarily motivated Moscow to the PTBT and that the ban was seen as less important regarding Germany's nuclear status. Moreover, Richardson argues that after the Cuban crisis in 1962, greater US self-confidence and weaker Soviet pressure on Berlin made efforts for a Berlin settlement unnecessary for the USG.<sup>361</sup>

Records of other East-West talks of the time similarly give no clear support for Trachtenberg's thesis. The Soviets did stress to the Americans and the British the centrality of the German problem in superpower relations and a need for an early acknowledgement of the status quo through a peace treaty and recognition of the GDR. But again, they indicated little interest to really bargain on this. Though they expressed support for the freedom of West Berlin, they indicated they would not be helpful in Berlin issues, admitted a settlement was hard to achieve, and argued that Western forces had to leave Berlin. They also

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<sup>357</sup> He argues China's nuclear status was so crucial for the USG partly because otherwise a general nonproliferation undertaking would have been clearly directed against the FRG only and that when it became clear that China would not adhere to a test ban, the USG had to get Moscow's acceptance of the freedom of West Berlin as a quid pro quo for Germany's non-nuclear status. Trachtenberg 1999, esp. pp. 379-401.

<sup>358</sup> D/303 Kaysen to Bundy, 28 June 63, FRUS 61-3:7; Trachtenberg 1999 p. 388.

<sup>359</sup> E/M and Harriman to Rusk on Harriman-Hailsham-Gromyko mtgs, 17 and 23 July 63, AHP TBT Bb 5-6 IC; Trachtenberg 1999 pp. 388-9.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 388-9.

<sup>361</sup> Richardson 1966 p. 71; Quester 1970 p. 253.



indicated that they were already satisfied with the Berlin and Germany situation after the construction of the Berlin wall.<sup>362</sup> In meetings with Khrushchev and British Foreign Secretary Lord A. Douglas-Home in August, Rusk agreed that the German question was central for US-Soviet relations, said that the USG was prepared to include in Berlin talks also other issues of Soviet concern, including borders and nuclear weapons, and stressed that the USG did not want the Germans to get control over them and that its forces in the FRG brought stability. Both Rusk and Khrushchev saw better chances of progress towards an understanding than a few years earlier. But as the British argued that a general settlement was at the time impossible, Rusk said that none was urgently needed.<sup>363</sup>

The PTBT was a step towards a global nonproliferation regime, especially by establishing US-Soviet cooperation in the field, and as discussed above, it did restrict Bonn's options regarding cooperation with France. But though Trachtenberg sees the PTBT as central for German non-nuclear status, it did not solve the proliferation problem: the USG and Moscow continued efforts for a NPT and to be concerned about proliferation to, e.g., the FRG. Forgoing testing in certain environments, or even anywhere, does not prevent nuclear weapon production, and PTBT signature did not prevent for instance Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it does seem that for Kennedy and maybe also Moscow, *China's* nuclear status was the key reason to pursue a test ban. The USG also continued to see Germany's nuclear status as a bargaining chip towards Moscow: for instance, the DOS considered in late 1963 to include in Western concessions for a general settlement "a non-diffusion agreement (specifically directed at direct or indirect German control of nuclear weapons) and dropping the MLF<sup>364</sup>".

Within the USG and in FRG-US relations, the PTBT was not portrayed as a significant change to West Germany's nuclear status, and the question about that status remained topical also after it. Throughout the 1960s, Bonn continued to play with others' fears of its potential nuclear ambitions. Only when later joining the NPT, Bonn made a broad, though still not complete, non-nuclear commitment. The NPT, if any treaty, to some extent settled Germany's nuclear status for the time being. That Bonn saw the NPT as a bigger issue than the PTBT (or at least wanted to give this impression) is indicated by that it was during the NPT negotiations when its making a further non-nuclear commitment became a really big issue and the major battle about this was fought (whereas it maybe also had a stronger bargaining position in the later situation).

Both Cohen and Trachtenberg argue that a wish to break the stalemate on a NPT with Moscow and the goal of keeping China and Germany non-nuclear had also been a key reason

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<sup>362</sup> See, e.g., USSR-Labor mtg (fn 245), 10 June 63; D/186, D/201 Khrushchev-Harriman mtgs, 26 Apr and 27 July; D/208 Khrushchev-Rusk mtg, 9 Aug, all FRUS 61-3:15.

<sup>363</sup> D/204, D/207-8 Khrushchev-Rusk(-Home) mtgs, 5-9 Aug, FRUS 61-3:15. After the PTBT, the tendency to see the division of Germany as a fact did somewhat increase. See D/4 Schröder on reunification, 6 Jan, APD 64.

<sup>364</sup> DepUSOS "A European Settlement" Att. B), 11 Dec 63, USNA PDA B/2.

why Kennedy in spring 1963 started pressing Israel on the nuclear issue. Israel was “a test for the U.S. global nonproliferation policy” since an early nuclear test by it was feared to have strong proliferation effects in Europe and Germany; nonproliferation efforts towards it were to improve the chances of a NPT. Kennedy thus continued a strong nonproliferation effort focused on Israel also after the Moscow talks failed to lead to progress on a NPT.<sup>365</sup>

### **8.5 Partial agreements on visits to Dimona and US-Israel security relations**

Rusk and Komer saw the PTBT as a potential new opening for pressing Israel and pursuing UAR-Israeli nuclear limitation in a “collective” setting, as Nasser wished. But Kennedy saw Israel’s joining it as alone not enough and stressed the need for inspections of nuclear plants. The CIA expected Israel to join the PTBT and continue nuclear efforts “up to the testing stage” and later test underground or withdraw from the treaty if need be.<sup>366</sup> The USG pressed Israel to sign the treaty early and in this issue, Israel cooperated. After the UAR had announced it would join and press commentaries had called for Israeli action, Israel joined the PTBT on 8 August 1963. Barbour reported that the Israelis thought signing to cost nothing and had accepted the treaty with no “foot-dragging” or strings attached.<sup>367</sup>

But regarding the Dimona visits, the Israelis remained less helpful.

#### **8.5.1 The Dimona visit arrangement and a slow-down of the arms limitation plan**

Soon after L. Eshkol in late June became the new Prime Minister, he received Kennedy’s response to Ben-Gurion’s letter on Dimona visits. Like the undelivered letter to Ben-Gurion, this both listed the demands for visits and warned the USG commitment to Israel to be in danger if the USG appeared unable to get proper information on such an important matter as Israel’s nuclear activities. Cohen argues Eshkol was “hardly aware of Kennedy’s global nuclear agenda” and saw the demands, which caused him much concern, as inappropriate especially as he had just come to office.<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 113-7, 158, 388-9 fn 18 ref. also to his 1995 interviews with Kaysen; Trachtenberg 1999 App. 8 “Kennedy and the Israeli Nuclear Program”, <http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/appendices/appendixVIII.html> (12 Dec 05).

<sup>366</sup> D/300 Komer to Kennedy, 23 July 63, D/303 (fn 261) FRUS 61-3:18; Rusk to Kennedy, 23 July, D/301 (san.) *ibid.* and USNA RNA Cane (pp. 3-4); D/62 CIA presentation to JCS, 30 July, NSA EBB LTBT.

<sup>367</sup> A-101 Barbour to DOS, 5 Aug 63, JFKL KI M nuclear energy program; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 161. In the USG, the Cane effort was thought to have helped make Cairo join the PTBT. DOS/PPS to NEA, 2 Sep, USNA RNA.

<sup>368</sup> Rusk to Barbour with Kennedy to Eshkol, 4 July 63, JFKL N/I; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 154, 159 ref. to his 1995 interview with M. Eshkol. The content of the Kennedy-Eshkol exchange was kept secret in both countries. *Ibid.* p. 161.

Cohen suggests the change in Israeli leadership reduced US interest in the Cane plan since Eshkol's stance on security guarantees was unknown. However, a NEA memo shows that at least not all USG officials thought so: the NEA expected Eshkol to try get US-Israeli security relations clearly deepened in return for any cooperation on arms limitation plan.<sup>369</sup>

Probably to take pressure off the Dimona issue, Eshkol told the press that "scientists and students from friendly countries will no doubt be invited to visit" the plant once it was completed. To Kennedy, he replied that he needed time to study the request for visits.<sup>370</sup>

A document from the Kennedy archives reveals that Eshkol probed with Barbour into the idea of Israel promising to *first consult* the US if regional developments one day forced it to pursue nuclear weapons. Barbour gave no reaction to this. But to Eshkol's comments that Israel would protect its security and sovereignty and that the warning in Kennedy's letter had caused surprise, Barbour said that Israeli nuclear weapon efforts could probably indeed jeopardize the US commitment.<sup>371</sup> Cohen notes the USG continued to press Israel for a reply on the visits through both diplomatic channels and reconnaissance flights over the Dimona site<sup>372</sup>.

In Israel, Meir still favored a less secretive stance towards the USG and some other leaders wanted to give in on US nonproliferation efforts. Like Ben-Gurion, Eshkol wanted to appear cooperative to the USG, accept visits to Dimona, but delay them and protect the nuclear project by controlling them tightly. Cohen argues that though he was maybe less committed to the project than Ben-Gurion, he was politically able to neither clearly redirect it under US pressure nor – after Ben-Gurion had always maintained that the reactor was for peaceful purposes and in fear of negative US reactions – link it overtly to Israel's security.<sup>373</sup> Thus he continued the strategy of avoiding confrontation through deception.

According to Karpin, Eshkol also decided in a small circle in the GOI that he would not trade the nuclear weapon program for a US security guarantee<sup>374</sup>. On the one hand, this means that any potential USG effort to persuade Israel to do so would have de facto had little prospect of success. On the other hand, the Israelis made the decision knowing that the USG was quite unwilling to offer a similar, institutionalized security guarantee to them as

<sup>369</sup> The IDF in turn appeared unwilling to give up the nuclear efforts that had already been useful "as a psychological weapon against the Arabs". NEA "Scenario with Eshkol", n/d, USNA RNA; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 156.

<sup>370</sup> T/74 Barbour to Rusk, 17 July 63, JFKL N/I; DOS to Bundy with "Chronology ..." (fn 44).

<sup>371</sup> T/74 (fn 370).

<sup>372</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 161, 389 fn 29 ref. to *Ha'aretz*, 21 July 63.

<sup>373</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 159, 161-2, 164-8 ref. to his 1994-5 interviews with Ne'eman and Gazit. A "knowledgeable and reliable Knesset member" told the Americans that key Israeli parties were split on nuclear weapons, stances ranging from a desire to get them at any price to a preference for regional disarmament. T/234 E/TA to Rusk, 23 Aug 63, JFKL N/I.

<sup>374</sup> Karpin 2006 p. 238 ref. to GOI memo. Rusk 1991 later wrote (p. 325) that Israel never seemed really interested in allying with the US since it wanted to remain free to act as it liked, and Sorokin 1994 similarly argues that Israel decided in 1963-88 not to ally with the US but to pursue own arms build-up (pp. 431, 434).

for instance to the FRG; that kind of a guarantee and security cooperation might have been enough to persuade them to giving up the nuclear weapon program.

The need for reassurances to Nasser about the Dimona reactor and thus for visits there was again heightened by a comment by Nasser to McCloy that if he found out that weapon material was produced at Dimona, his only option would be “protective war<sup>375</sup>”. For instance Badeau took the threat seriously and thought that Cairo might attack just the plant and then wait for UN intervention (the DOD saw Egypt as unable to make a successful *general* attack on Israel).<sup>376</sup>

The USG also had to decide whether to act further on the Cane-idea. Nasser’s reaction had neither altogether killed the chances of a deal covering both Israel and the UAR nor clearly promised success. Because of Nasser’s topical political problems among Arabs and to give him time to consider the idea, it was decided to shortly delay further approaches to him on the deal as such, but as a back-up option Kennedy wanted to pursue the letter exchange Nasser had proposed. But the USG saw any progress with Nasser as possible only if the Congress would not take legislative action that would hinder US aid to Egypt, as the USG was concerned it maybe to do.<sup>377</sup>

Kennedy and others saw little point in a Cane-probe with Israel before Nasser was committed or at least the letter exchange had been made: Israel was expected to try to use talks on arms limitation, the Dimona reactor, or restraint in Jordan just to get security guarantees. And especially because of lacking success with Nasser and stabilization of the situation in Jordan, the DOS now clearly opposed giving any overt security guarantees: such would mean little real benefit for Israel but much trouble for the USG with Arabs and in practice tie the US to Israeli stances on many issues unless it and Israel negotiated about them separately in advance. But Komer expected Israel to insist on a guarantee and to cooperate regarding nuclear weapons and Jordan only if the US either paid a price or *forced* Israel. Some concession seemed also necessary to make the Israelis and their friends to stop the campaign against Kennedy’s policy towards Arabs. Thus Komer suggested considering various ways to assure Israel in return for nuclear restraint, such as clear security assurances (justified to Arabs as the US “succumbing to Israeli “nuclear blackmail””); an open letter about supporting Israel as long as it did not launch aggression; private assurances; or just demonstrating the credibility of previous assurances through joint military planning or arms supply. Kennedy still wanted to delay a reply to the request for security assurances and the Israelis to be told that going beyond his 8 May statement would imply opening doors for Moscow in the area.<sup>378</sup>

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<sup>375</sup> D/285 (fn 299) FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>376</sup> D/303 (fn 261) *ibid*.

<sup>377</sup> D/288 (fn 300), D/303 (fn 261) *ibid*.; Rusk to Kennedy (fn 366), 23 July.

<sup>378</sup> D/288 (fn 300); D/298, D/300 Komer to Kennedy, 19-23 July 63; D/303 (fn 261) all FRUS 61-3:18; Rusk to Kennedy (fn 366), 23 July. See also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 156, 166-7.

A memo available in part at the USNA unusually clearly shows how Rusk saw Israel's nuclear aims. He wrote to Kennedy that further pressure in the nuclear issue was justified and that "our primary problem remains that Israel may shortly manufacture nuclear weapons"; the Israelis had so far only made "extremely vague" statements to the contrary. Thus when any Cane probe would be made in Israel, its focus had to be on the nuclear issue. What the USG wanted from Israel was 1) "a clearcut written assurance" that it would not divert nuclear material to weapon uses or in any way try to acquire, develop, produce, or test such weapons, and 2) proper inspections of any reactors and related plants. Inspections were important also because of the need to reassure the Arabs.<sup>379</sup> A little later, the USG informed the British that it estimated Israel not to need much over two years to be able to make a nuclear test and produce crude bombs soon thereafter but had no evidence that the Israelis would have *decided* to go beyond acquiring a *capability* to do so.<sup>380</sup>

Also Paris's comments gave reason to think Israel sought a weapon capability. French officials told a Yugoslav diplomat that France had 1,5 years ago turned down Israeli requests for access to sensitive French nuclear facilities and for further nuclear aid beyond assistance in the construction of the Dimona plant. The French also informed the USG that though Israel had agreed to buy uranium only from France, it had also bought safeguarded uranium from South Africa.<sup>381</sup>

After USG pressure in the issue grew<sup>382</sup>, Eshkol replied Kennedy that he accepted periodic visits to Dimona. Citing technical reasons, he proposed a first visit only in late 1963, during reactor tests but before start-up. After June 1964, he expected the two states without trouble to "be able to reach agreement on the future schedule of visits", to be made as the USG wished. He said France would supply and control fuel for the reactor and receive the spent fuel. The US visitors were to get to "observe the procedure of uranium control". But though he had not fully made up his mind on this, he wanted the findings of the visits not to be disseminated. Barbour thought that it had clearly been hard for Eshkol to make the GOI agree on the visits and that Kennedy's personal interest had been crucial. "Important sections of opinion" in Israel favored tying the visits to a security guarantee, but Eshkol had not done so.<sup>383</sup>

Eshkol's reply did not remove all question-marks related to the Dimona plant and the USG aimed to seek more answers through intelligence and from France. The USG decided that though Eshkol did not explicitly allow regular, semi-annual visits and visits to other, related plants, it would "act as if he did". Though the DOS did not expect Eshkol at the time

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<sup>379</sup> Rusk to Kennedy (fn 366), 23 July. The key parts are sanitized in D/301 FRUS 61-3:18 but I found un-sanitized versions of pages 3-4 attached to another document at the USNA (RNA Cane).

<sup>380</sup> DOS to Bundy, 3 Sep 63, with NEA-UK Emb. mtg, 14 Aug, JFKL N/I.

<sup>381</sup> A-152 E/TA to DOS, 3 Sep 63; T/842 E/P to Rusk, 22 Aug, both JFKL N/I. Also South Africa informed the DOS of Israeli purchases. South African note to Rusk, 21 Oct, DNSA NP00962.

<sup>382</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 162 ref. to T/79 Emb. Washington to IMFA, 15 Aug 63, ISA FMRG 3377/10.

<sup>383</sup> T/204 Barbour to DOS with Eshkol to Kennedy, 19 Aug 63, JFKL N/I 26-31 July; D/317 Ball to Kennedy, 23 Aug, FRUS 61-3:18.

to agree on anything more, the reply to him thus referred to his agreement to accept US visits “on the regular basis that was proposed” and to the requirements of enough time and access to everywhere at the Dimona site and to related plants. Barbour also explicitly requested a visit before radiation would make inspecting the reactor’s interior impossible.<sup>384</sup>

A matter where the USG especially wanted to press further was the right to disseminate the findings; as a DOS memo explicitly noted a little later, ability to reassure Arabs and others was the central goal of the visits. Barbour thus again asked Eshkol to allow such reassuring: as also Ben-Gurion had acknowledged, this was a way to prevent Arab nuclear ambitions. Eshkol promised to reconsider this later. Cohen argues that based on the precedent with Ben-Gurion, the USG expected him in the end to agree.<sup>385</sup>

Since Eshkol’s reply on the visits was partly satisfactory, both Egypt and Israel had signed the PTBT, and Arab unity efforts were weakening, in fall 1963 the need for UAR-Israel arms limitation seemed somewhat less urgent to the USG. Still, to pursue the letter exchange Badeau showed Nasser in September a draft letter from Kennedy that referred to Nasser’s statements that the UAR would not pursue nuclear or offensive weapons or attack its neighbors and asked for confirmation. Nasser saw something like it as maybe possible but feared to become a target of Arab propaganda attacks. Regarding a US request for Cairo’s acceptance in principle of IAEA safeguards on any (future) reactors, Nasser inquired whether Israel would promise the same. Badeau admitted this was uncertain but argued that if the UAR did, that would put much pressure on Israel. Altogether, Nasser’s stances kept at least Komer hopeful.<sup>386</sup>

This was how far the Cane initiative got under Kennedy. It seems that pessimism characterizing it became a self-fulfilling prophecy as the USG did then not push it very hard with Cairo and Jerusalem (but maybe pessimism was also justified). However, the USG came to pursue Israel-UAR arms limitation also under President Johnson.

A little later, a Senate legislation initiative indeed threatened US aid to the UAR. This caused trouble in US-UAR relations, angered Kennedy, and seemed as a result of Israeli pressure, further expected to grow before the 1964 elections.<sup>387</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> D/317 (fn 383) also fn 1 ref. to Komer to Kennedy, 23 Aug 63, JFKL N/I; D/319 DOS to Barbour, 26 Aug, both FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>385</sup> D/317 also fn 1, D/319 (fn 384) FRUS 61-3:18; T/271 E/TA to Rusk, 28 Aug, both JFKL N/I; T/819 Rusk to E/TA, 21 March 64, USNA CFPF B/3068; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 164-6.

<sup>386</sup> D/323 Rusk to Kennedy, 10 Sep 63; D/324-5 DOS to Badeau, 12 Sep, all FRUS 61-3:18; Komer to Bundy, 10 Oct, with T/799 E/C to Rusk on 5 Oct Nasser-Badeau mtg, 8 Oct, JFKL NSF Countries B/169a UAR-Israel arms limitation.

<sup>387</sup> The USG was also concerned about how Arabs would take a safeguarded heavy water sale it made to Israel. See D/357 Bundy to Fulbright, 11 Nov 63; D/364, D/371 Talbot to Rusk, 18-23 Nov; D/368 Komer-Gazit mtg, 21 Nov, all FRUS 61-3:18.

### 8.5.2 US support for Israel's security – short of security assurances

Having eased US pressure regarding the Dimona visits for the moment, the Israelis continued to seek stronger US security assurances, which they now subtly portrayed as an alternative to own nuclear weapons. They suggested that such assurances would undermine the common view in Israel that it was short-sighted not to move towards a nuclear option and by referring to a hypothetical, hard choice between a national deterrent and reliance on foreign support, noting that it was possible that the US would after all not go to war for Israel or act fast enough against aggression.<sup>388</sup> Also the British informed the USG of various statements by senior Israeli officials that seemed like attempts to press for stronger security assurances with a threat of acquiring nuclear weapons. The Israelis had said that their conventional forces would soon reach a maximum strength, after which the only way to respond to strengthening Arab forces was unconventional weapon development; that only a great power guarantee for Israel would keep the region non-nuclear and if Israel got none, it needed “new deterrent weapons”; and that Israel could not give up “all right to a nuclear capability as a deterrent to Arab threats”.<sup>389</sup>

But soon, possibly reflecting a decision not to trade the nuclear option for US security guarantees, the Israelis started telling the USG that as getting security guarantees seemed unlikely, Israel was interested in measures that would show how the existing US assurances would be fulfilled, such as regular, maybe only informal consultations, joint planning, and information exchange. They hoped something like that to be promised in Kennedy's reply to the 12 May letter. They also brought up their desire to buy tanks and SSMs.<sup>390</sup>

The DOS, the DOD, and the JCS opposed security guarantees, joint planning, or arms supply to Israel: the US commitment to and ability to protect Israel were clear; the Arabs were not planning to attack Israel; Israel was able to defeat any Arab coalition; and it had arms sources in Western Europe. Thus it seemed to seek open US support because of political rather than military reasons. The agencies expected any US-Israel alliance to harm US-Arab relations and US interests; increase Israel's isolation in the area; limit US chances to act against aggression by any side; fuel uncontrollable arms racing; and push Arabs to ally with Moscow, whereas the spread of communism was the key threat to regional US security interests (access, oil to Western Europe, general stability). Joint planning implied a risk of pushing the US to Israel's side against the Arabs and the JCS feared also that Israel could on purpose make leaks about it to them. It saw as an acceptable addition to the security relationship only that the US would tell Israel how it assessed Arab capabilities and, at a general level, how it could help if the Arabs attacked – in return for greater clarity on Israel's plans for military build-up and a promise not to react to political trouble in neighbor-

<sup>388</sup> T/291 E/TA to Rusk, 30 Aug 63; NE-Gazit mtg, 11 Sep, both JFKL N/I.

<sup>389</sup> DOS to Bundy, 3 Sep 63, with NEA-UK Emb. mtg, 14 Aug, *ibid*.

<sup>390</sup> T/344 Barbour to Rusk on 13 Sep mtg with Eban, 14 Sep 63; Komer on 23 Sep mtg with Gazit, 24 Sep, all *ibid*.; DOS-Israel Emb. mtg, 29 Oct, JFKL KSG; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 168-9 ref. to T/61 Eshkol to Harman & Gazit, 10 Sep, ISA FMRG 3377/10.

ing regimes by pre-emptive moves without consulting the US. Owing to the PTBT, Eshkol's reply on the Dimona visits, weakening Arab unity, turndowns of Israeli requests for security ties by London and Paris, and US stances in the UNSC that increased Israel's trust in US support, the DOS also saw the time as suited for a turndown of Ben-Gurion's request. But especially Komer kept on arguing that the USG had to give Israel something, especially as elections were approaching. He did not see limited intelligence sharing and joint planning as very dangerous: the Arabs probably thought such already existed. Also Kennedy had at least earlier in the summer seen no problem "in staff talks about how we would come to Israel's help".<sup>391</sup>

In early October 1963, Kennedy replied to Ben-Gurion's letter. The reply stressed in various ways "the constant and special United States concern for the security and independence of Israel"; suggested that when the situation in Jordan had been unstable, the USG had demonstrated its will and ability to react quickly and strongly to threatening developments in the area; but questioned the advantageousness of more explicit commitments. It expressed openness to talks on Israel's security situation and preparedness to help Israel cope with threats as such emerged, as had been the case with the Hawks.<sup>392</sup> USG support for Israel's security thus remained on a non-institutionalized, ad hoc basis. Barbour reported Eshkol showed understanding for the reply but had said that Israel needed a practical deterrent, such as SSMS<sup>393</sup>.

Eshkol was disappointed about getting only this for the Dimona visits, but Cohen argues the reply indeed was "the most explicit and comprehensive presidential expression of an American commitment to Israel's security", as Harman and Gazit also pointed out to the GOI. Moreover, the USG had now accepted the idea of security dialogue.<sup>394</sup>

About the same time, Rusk namely agreed with Meir on high-level security dialogue on Egypt's unconventional weapon efforts<sup>395</sup>. As the dialogue meeting was planned, the Israelis stressed a need to make the US commitment more concrete and tried to broaden the agenda to a proper review of the regional arms balance and thus to a step towards joint planning and arms sales. In preparation, Eshkol also wrote Kennedy that as the UAR posed a serious future threat, Israel needed arms (especially naval ones, SSMS, and tanks), and

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<sup>391</sup> D/273 (fn 295); D/308 JCS to McNamara, 7 Aug 63; D/316 DepASOD/ISA Sloan to NEA, 22 Aug; D/327 DOS to Bundy on reply to Ben-Gurion with instructions to Barbour, 20 Sep, all FRUS 61-3:18; Komer to Bundy, 23 Sep, JFKL KI WHM; Komer to Kennedy, 26 Sep, LBJL N/I. The US had contingency plans for various military situations that would call for support for either Israel or the Arabs. See D/308. A mid-1963 JCS review showed that the US was able to react to any aggression against Israel within 30 hours. D/9 Rusk to Johnson, 16 Jan 64, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>392</sup> D/327 (fn 391), D/332 DOS to E/TA with Kennedy to Eshkol, 2 Oct 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

<sup>393</sup> T/420 Barbour to Rusk, 4 Oct 63, JFKL N/I.

<sup>394</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 169-70 ref. to T/571 Arad (Israeli representative at UN) to Harman, 4 Oct 63, T/103 Gazit to IMFA Director Yahil, 18 Oct, Harman to Yahil on talk with Feldman, 14 Oct, all ISA FMRG 3377/10, and to his 1995 interview with Gazit.

<sup>395</sup> A one-time US-Israel security dialogue had also taken place in July 1962. D/331 Rusk-Meir mtg, 30 Sep 63, FRUS 61-3:18; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 170-1 ref. to T/10, T/18, and T/34 Harman to Yahil, 2-3 Oct, ISA FMRG 3379/4 and 3377/10.



that he hoped the US commitment to imply that Israel would get them. But the USG wanted to avoid any impression of military consultations and strongly opposed broadening the agenda. With the dialogue, the DOS aimed to show interest in Israel's security, nothing more. It was also thought in the USG that though Israel now sought US arms sales, it did not really expect to get US SSMs but rather wanted a clear refusal that it could then use to justify cooperation with France or progress in missile or nuclear programs. Indirect US aid for Israeli arms purchases from Europe and, e.g., military visits, more information about US capabilities, and greater intelligence sharing seemed to USG officials as possibly sufficient gestures towards Israel before the 1964 elections.<sup>396</sup>

In the mid-November dialogue, the Israelis presented clearly more pessimistic estimates on the UAR threat than how the USG saw the situation. They argued that a growing threat made "either stronger security guarantees or a stronger deterrent posture" necessary for them. They complained that existing US assurances for Israel were weaker than those for other US allies in being informal and vague, not against communists, and including no joint planning; since the assurances lacked in military effectiveness, they did not deter like a formal alliance. But the Israelis also admitted that they had little real evidence of any serious UAR missile or ABC weapon efforts (Israeli leaders often said such evidence existed). The USG in turn repeated its stances against escalating arms racing and allying with Israel (but also its commitment to Israel) and argued that Israel's own reactor and SSM plans gave impetus for Cairo's missiles efforts. The Israelis tried to present discussed issues as points of agreement, but US officials stressed that the meeting was a mere discussion of Israeli intelligence and would lead to no follow-up action.<sup>397</sup> Nonetheless, Cohen argues that the USG now agreed that Israel needed modern tanks and, though unwilling to supply them itself, promised help in finding a source of supply – which implied that its arms policy was changing<sup>398</sup>.

Probably both to put pressure on the USG and to threaten or harass the Arabs, the Israelis continued to make occasional statements that hinted that their nuclear ambitions were not civilian only. For instance, Ben-Gurion told the *NYT* that Israel was possibly experimenting and had to experiment with the military uses of nuclear energy (he later denied having talked about nuclear weapons). Emb. Tel Aviv saw this in the context of his claim that it was "good to let Nasser worry a bit".<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> DOS to E/TA, 5 Oct 63; T/472 E/TA to Rusk, 17 Oct, both JFKL N/I; D/339 DOS to E/TA, 16 Oct; D/356 DOS to Bundy on Eshkol's letter, 9 Nov, both FRUS 61-3:18; T/514, T/518 E/TA to Rusk, 2-4 Nov, DDRS; Komer to Kennedy, 5 Nov, JFKL KSG WHM.

<sup>397</sup> D/359 DOS to certain posts, 13 Nov 63, FRUS 61-3:18; 14 Nov Komer-Rabin (military official) mtg, 18 Nov, JFKL KSG WHM; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 172-3 ref. to T/63 Harman to Ben-Gurion, 13 Nov, ISA FMRG 3379/4.

<sup>398</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 173.

<sup>399</sup> T/580 (unsent) E/TA to DOS, JFKL N/I; Pry 1984 p. 39; Hersh 1991 pp. 129-30 ref. to "The Little Old Man in the Desert Using Nuclear Energy", *NYT*, 16 Nov 63.

Soon after the security dialogue, Komer and Gazit had “a rather brisk exchange” on US-Israel relations. Gazit complained that these were too distant, stressed that Israel needed a strong deterrent, and indicated an Israeli aim to pursue a missile capability. Komer said Israel had always tried to force the US to abandon a “middle position” in the region and regretted its evasiveness especially on its nuclear and SSM plans towards “its guarantor, banker, and strongest friend in the world”: “what kind of a relationship was this?” The two states were like “ships passing each other in the night”. Israel’s attitudes on the Dimona reactor and SSMs made the USG suspect that it pursued a nuclear capability; the missiles made militarily sense only with nuclear warheads.<sup>400</sup>

This was the state of affairs when Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963. Israeli nuclear ambitions and pressure for closer security relations were thus among the issues that Johnson, who now resumed power in the US, had to deal with.

### **8.6 Conclusions regarding the Kennedy era**

In conclusion, considerations of national security determined also for the Kennedy administration the direction of policies regarding security relations in general and nuclear proliferation in particular towards both Israel and the FRG. Despite strong domestic pressures on Kennedy for Israel’s benefit, the administration refused to pursue clearly and overtly pro-Israel policies. It did try to reassure and please the Israelis with even very strong private statements of support, but after considering the possibility, it rejected the idea of giving formal security guarantees to Israel. In general, it quite consistently rejected Israel’s demands for measures that would have implied any institutionalization of the security relationship. Rather, it expressed willingness to help Israel to deal with security problems *as such emerged* – i.e., in no particular, continuous, institutionalized way. It agreed to sell the Hawk system, but as a one-off event, without promising further arms sales. Similarly, it only accepted ad-hoc, problem-specific military talks for information exchange with Israel. The reason for this stance towards Israel was that the USG expected any institutionalization of security cooperation with it to mean a risk to both 1) the balance-of-power vis-à-vis Moscow in that it would have alienated the Arabs and 2) its own freedom of action in the area in case of conflicts; an institutionalized relationship was not in its interest since it was not clear that in case of any hostilities in the area, the US would want to take Israel’s side. A deal on US security guarantees and Israeli restraint in security policies and towards the Arabs was thus hindered by 1) a severe collaboration problem that Israel would take action that would entrap the US in unwanted war or the US would fail to react in case of an Arab attack on Israel, and 2) USG refusal, because it wanted to protect relations to Arabs, to launch measures that would make defection harder by tying the two states closely together.

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<sup>400</sup> D/368 Komer-Gazit mtg, 21 Nov 63, FRUS 61-3:18.

It is somewhat unclear how Kennedy's strong private assurances of support for Israel should be interpreted: as basically serious or as an attempted bluff towards the Israelis. Even internal USG documents speak of a strong and clear US commitment to protect Israel. At the same time, the Israelis obviously did not think that the private assurances implied this. Arguing privately to the Israelis that they had a *de facto* US security guarantee was most probably at least to some degree a bargaining tactic to reduce pressure for more overt and binding commitments and to gain freedom to pursue a balanced Arab-Israel policy. That the USG itself saw formal, public commitments as a very different matter than informal, private ones is shown exactly by the fact that it so strongly opposed public commitments as such would tie its hands – indicating that it did not consider its hands being tied by the private, informal assurances. Moreover, the USG seems not even to have considered concluding with Israel an alliance treaty that would have required congressional approval.

To prevent the risk of military hostilities in the area from growing and Arabs' tilting towards Moscow, Kennedy and his men were likewise prepared to press the Israelis quite hard for safeguards on the Dimona plant. Kennedy showed special interest in the matter, sought clarity about Israel's aims, and wanted to prevent Israel from going nuclear and have the plant inspected. He was even willing to threaten Israel with weakening US support, even though he in doing so avoided talking about his *personal* support. He especially wanted to keep *other* states from thinking that Israel was pursuing nuclear weapons; a key determinant of the timing of demands for Dimona visits was the perceived need to reassure the Arabs. Also towards the Israelis, Kennedy stressed the need to avoid serious *consequences* from Israel's pursuing nuclear weapons.

Related to the effort to safeguard Dimona, USG officials men sketched a potential institutional way for Israel and the UAR to escape the vicious circle of nuclear arms and missile racing. But because of pessimism about chances of success, the Cane effort became fairly feeble. The USG itself did not expect the solution to sufficiently reduce the two sides' suspicions of each other, in part because it was not prepared to offer strong security assurances to support the deal, in part because it was not in line with UAR policies to accept such.

But the Israeli nuclear issue was in fact not very pressing during Kennedy's term: Israel was by 1963 not yet capable of producing weapon material and thus the USG did not need to decide how hard to press it not to put together and operationalize nuclear weapons. As Israel joined the PTBT without opposition, it also caused no urgent problem regarding global nonproliferation efforts.

To promote stability with Moscow and thus reduce the risk of a major war, and to protect the cohesion of NATO, keeping the FRG from getting own nuclear weapons was crucial for the administration. Kennedy seems to have considered it feasible to force the FRG both to ascertain its non-nuclear status through a nonproliferation undertaking outside NATO and to accept permanently a clearly secondary nuclear status in NATO compared to France

and the UK; he and some of his key aides were clearly open also to such *multinational* solutions to NATO's nuclear organization that implied a subordinated position for the FRG and support for the British and the French national nuclear forces (assuming some coordination between them and the US was agreed upon).

But though keeping Germany non-nuclear was important for stability in Europe and thus for global East-West relations, Küntzel's and Trachtenberg's claims that the German non-proliferation case was of a league of its own seem a little exaggerated. China's nuclear status seems to have been an important concern for Khrushchev, too, and the biggest proliferation concern for Kennedy, and his administration took pains to prevent proliferation also in, e.g., Israel's case. And though Germany's case was *important* for Kennedy, he seems to have been more *concerned* about China's and Israel's cases and to have thought that pressures for a West German nuclear force were not too strong for NATO to keep in check. Kennedy's achievements in nonproliferation were limited, also because his term became unexpectedly short. But the cases of Israel and the PTBT show that by 1963, he was making an effort to stop proliferation, and the PTBT and the agreement with Israel on regular visits to Dimona present partial successes of his nonproliferation policy.

At the same time, and increasingly after the spring 1963 re-evaluation of European policy, the administration saw it as necessary to offer Bonn further measures to make the US commitment seem credible. To this, the USG was pushed on the one hand by concerns about potential West German 1) resentment and re-alignment, which could have put the balance-of-power in Europe at risk and increased the risk of war, and/or 2) nuclear weapon ambitions that could have increased risks of military action by Moscow and disruption of NATO. On the other hand, also the need to persuade the FRG, and other NATO states, to accept the flexible response -strategy pushed the administration towards offering such new measures.

There were three basic types of such measures to make the US commitment seem more credible. First, the USG made further assurances about its commitment to European defense, including a promise to maintain the level of troops in the FRG as long as needed. Second, the USG planned greater information sharing and consultations, especially as a way to make the allies *understand*, and thus accept, its strategy, rather than to allow them to influence US policy. Third, the USG offered the MLF, which as such appeared as a tangible way to make a nuclear US response in case of warfare in Europe more likely. But taking into account the tactical nature of the proposal, also it was primarily an effort to make the allies simply *trust* the USG more by showing goodwill to them, without any tangible, binding mechanism being created.

## 9 President Johnson – 1963-69

As Vice President, Johnson had been faithful to Kennedy, and later he stressed that even after his victory in the 1964 elections, he saw himself as a “caretaker” of Kennedy’s policies and always tried to act accordingly<sup>1</sup>. Continuation of policies was provided also by Kennedy’s top foreign policy officials, most of whom at least first stayed in office under Johnson. Johnson shared Kennedy’s strong concern about relations with the Congress; his basic view was that good foreign policy has proper domestic backing as otherwise, a president becomes powerless. He was especially interested in and had ambitious reform plans regarding domestic issues. Thus especially after the Vietnam War came to strain his relations with the Congress (US involvement in the war, already grown under Kennedy, much increased under Johnson), he was unwilling to get into further battles over foreign policy with it.<sup>2</sup>

One general Senate stance limiting Johnson’s freedom of action was opposition to any new security commitments abroad. Especially owing to the Vietnam War, this resulted from both a perception that the burden of such commitments had become too great and a desire to protect the one key right the constitution granted the Senate in foreign affairs, namely that to declare war. Thus it was generally uneager to ratify treaties that implied increasing the president’s right to decide about military action.<sup>3</sup>

Though Kennedy had nonproliferation high on his agenda, the proliferation problem was by no means solved during his term. The PTBT was not enough as a general nonproliferation measure and progress on a NPT had only been made up to the point of US-Soviet and UNGA agreements in principle over its desirability. In many individual cases, including those studied here, issues were likewise not settled: Israel’s aims with the Dimona plant remained unclear, and many USG officials thought action was needed to prevent German nuclear ambitions.

Some disagreement exists on how committed Johnson was to nonproliferation<sup>4</sup>. But one priority Johnson shared with Kennedy and was committed to early on was peaceful coexistence with Moscow, and he came to see also a NPT as a way to promote that.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Schlesinger 1965 pp. 702-5; Johnson 1971 p. 19. Geyelin 1966 argues that in foreign aid, Latin American, and third world issues, Johnson in fact was at odds with Kennedy’s policies (pp. 37-8).

<sup>2</sup> Geyelin 1966, esp. p. 149; Morgan 1974 p. 142; Rusk 1991 p. 472.

<sup>3</sup> See Kohler 1972 pp. 97-9.

<sup>4</sup> Rusk 1991 notes Johnson “believed in arms control, but ... never took a strong personal interest in it”, though also under him, “controlling the spread of nuclear weapons was one of our highest priorities” (p. 284). Cohen, A. 1998 argues proliferation was a less central issue for Johnson than it had been for Kennedy, and that even after China’s nuclear test he was not eager to make nonproliferation central in US policy, and that especially Israel’s case, he was less willing than Kennedy to press with the matter (pp. 193-6, 207, 215). According to Seaborg 1987, Johnson took no personal initiative on a NPT until spring 1966 but his doing so thereafter was crucial for the realization of a treaty. Gavin 2004 in turn argues that already when China’s test was feared to put in motion a chain of proliferation, US nonproliferation policy became under Johnson clearly stronger than it had been under Kennedy, a key change being that the USG came to cooperate with Moscow

First, the prospects of progress for a general nonproliferation regime also seemed to again improve. During his first months as president, Johnson put emphasis on the matter by repeatedly calling for a NPT and other disarmament measures – in a speech at the UNGA, in a letter to Khrushchev that was released to the public, and in a message to the ENDC, to which he drew special attention in a broadcasted speech. At the same time, Soviet officials were indicating to ACDA that the MLF plan did not prevent talks on a NPT and that detailed discussions and US assurances could maybe make Moscow agree that the plan did not even prevent a treaty.<sup>6</sup> In early 1964, the USG also asked the FRG and certain other allies to declare, as a step towards a NPT, that they would not produce nuclear weapons alone or with others or acquire national control over them. But Bonn disliked the idea: it wanted to take no steps towards a NPT before a MLF was secured. The USG called the request off.<sup>7</sup>

During Johnson's term, a CTBT continued to be considered in the USG and internationally and especially some NNWSs pressed for it. But as a result of continuing East-West disagreement over verification, opposition by various sides in Washington, and Johnson's lack of initiative, little progress was made on it.<sup>8</sup>

I start the discussion of Johnson's term by outlining his general attitudes towards Israel, the execution of the Dimona inspection scheme Kennedy had secured and another USG attempt at Arab-Israel arms limitation. After then outlining Johnson's general attitudes towards the FRG, I study the strengthening effort and, subsequently, abandonment of US initiative for a MLF in 1964. After a brief outline of nuclear development in the FRG, in section 9.4 I consider the development of Johnson's general nonproliferation policy and USG promotion of especially IAEA safeguards. Section 9.5 focuses on how regional developments in the meanwhile led to USG efforts to bargain with arms sales to get Israeli concessions in, e.g., the nuclear issue, at the same time as further signs emerged of Israel's nuclear weapon ambitions, on which the troubled Dimona visit scheme could provide only little clarity. Even after Johnson abandoned the initiative on a MLF, nuclear sharing in NATO continued to be an open question and cause problems for the USG in both its relations with allies and NPT negotiations with Moscow; to this issue I return in section 9.6. Sections 9.7 and 9.9 further concern the NPT negotiations and the role Bonn played in them. At the same time as these went on, the Six-Day War took up the USG agenda in the Middle East. Partially as its consequence, the USG continued to move towards becoming Israel's key arms supplier. These matters are studied in section 9.8 and 9.10.

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to control even its allies, especially the Germans (pp. 101-2). Lavoy 2004 argues that nonproliferation's becoming a key US priority under Johnson clearly helped to slow down proliferation.

<sup>5</sup> Geyelin 1966 pp. 47, 65-6; Johnson 1971 pp. 24-5, 462-90; Schwartz, T. 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Johnson at UNGA, 17 Dec 63, PPJ 51; Johnson to Khrushchev, 20 Jan 64, PPJ 122; Johnson to ENDC and his remarks, 21 Jan, PPJ 129-31; ACDA to Rusk, 21 Feb, USNA PDA B/9; Johnson 1971 pp. 464-5; Seaborg 1987 p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Also Rome opposed the US idea. D/39 Carstens on mtg with McGhee, 10 Feb, also fn 1, 11, APD 64; ACDA/NPT.

<sup>8</sup> See Seaborg 1987 pp. 201-43.

### 9.1 Johnson, visits to Dimona, and missile limitation probes

Johnson's attitude towards Israel was reportedly very positive<sup>9</sup>. Moreover, it was only a year to elections when he came to power: thus pleasing domestic audiences was increasingly important<sup>10</sup>. In early 1964, he assured in a letter to Eshkol that the USG would continue to support Israel's security and the integrity of all states in the region, noting that "high on our agenda is the assurance of Israel's future security, *in ways which will stabilize rather than upset* the situation in the area". Johnson promised soon to answer the inquiry Eshkol had made with Kennedy regarding supply of arms to Israel.<sup>11</sup>

Since many Israelis and Arabs saw the change in US leadership as implying a more pro-Israel stance, the DOS/NEA was concerned that Israeli pressure for security assurances and arms sales would grow before the elections and Arab-Soviet ties maybe strengthen. Indeed, especially as Kennedy had failed to persuade Nasser to become more cooperative, Johnson had little interest in continuing an accommodative line with him. Nasser soon blamed the US to be unfair towards Arabs and to help Israel towards nuclear weapons, and US-UAR relations steadily worsened from 1964 to early 1967. One reason for this was that the Congress increasingly set limits for US aid to Egypt. But even Johnson tried to avoid *appearing* too pro-Israel.<sup>12</sup>

Though CIA estimates on the Israeli nuclear issue continued to be vague and/or still remain sanitized, other USG documents show clearly that in 1964, more or less all involved parts of the USG thought Israel was pursuing nuclear weapons or at least a capability to produce them quickly (when Israel was still building up the capability, it anyway had to do nothing that would have made it clear whether it indeed would also produce weapons). In early 1964, indications appeared that Israel was developing nuclear-capable SSMs in France. A DOD memo noted that the DOS, the DOD/ISA, Bundy, and Komer were very worried about such moves, seen as a further move towards a nuclear deterrent and undermining US policy in the area if similar Arab action followed.<sup>13</sup> In May, Bundy and McCone said in a USG meeting at the presence of all key officials that "the intelligence community thought that Israel's covert program was aimed at a nuclear capability<sup>14</sup>". Komer in turn considered it an "inescapable conclusion" that Israel was "at least putting itself in a position to go nu-

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., Quandt 1977 p. 37; Cohen, W. I. 1994 p. 282.

<sup>10</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 points this out (p. 195).

<sup>11</sup> My emphasis. D/1 Johnson to Eshkol, 2 Jan 64, FRUS 64-8:18. The Dimona reactor was not mentioned in the letter. On Johnson's policy towards the Arabs and Israel in general, see Spiegel 1985 Chapter 5.

<sup>12</sup> D/371 Talbot to Rusk, 23 Nov 63, FRUS 61-3:18; A-434 E/TA to DOS, 17 Dec, DDRS; T/1871 CIA on Nasser's reaction to speech by Johnson (san.), 9 Feb 64, DNSA NP00970; D/2 Komer to Bundy, 14 Feb, FRUS 64-8:21; CIA intelligence cable, 5 March, DDRS; Walt 1987 p. 96; Ben-Zvi 2004 pp. 2, 27-8.

<sup>13</sup> The DOD/ISA suspected that the Israeli Embassy had not made the IMFA quite aware of US opposition to Israel's going nuclear or of how Israel's acquiring missiles could make Cairo pre-empt or at least push Arabs towards Moscow. D/13 ISA to McNamara, 15 Feb 64, FRUS 64-8:18; "Chronological Summary of the Arms Probe with Nasser and Related Events 1963-4", n/d (after 7 June 64), USNA MEC B/3.

<sup>14</sup> D/57 "Israeli Tank Discussion with the President", 16 May 64, FRUS 64-8:18.

clear<sup>15</sup>”. The DOS saw Israel as able to get a capability to produce nuclear arms by converting equipment in about two years; its desire for “an unmatched, economic counter-deterrent” against Arabs appeared “destined to lead to development of nuclear warheads”.<sup>16</sup> In late 1964, ACDA argued “Israel may well be seeking a nuclear weapon capability<sup>17</sup>”.

The DOS listed Israel among the potential early proliferators whose decisions affected proliferation prospects in the world in general. But those prospects were not seen to have much effect on the UAR-Israel situation, which the NEA saw as “self-contained” in that it could be dealt with separately and the topical Chinese nuclear test had little effect on it<sup>18</sup>. This was probably true since security was clearly the key motivation for Israel to pursue nuclear weapons and other states’ going nuclear in other regions had little direct effect on its (or Egypt’s) security.

Rostow thought that a desire to preserve relations to the US was the only thing that could cause Israeli nuclear restraint, but the DOS expected also US pressure for restraint to be over time insufficient. It was concerned that Israel’s capabilities for nuclear weapon production could further grow through an acquisition of a large power reactor (in spring 1963, Webber had concluded Israel aimed to get one); the US was hardly able to stop an Israeli (or UAR) nuclear program (seemingly) devoted to electricity production and other peaceful uses. Thus the DOS wanted to promote IAEA safeguards, consider the viability of a regional NWFZ, and to have reliable non-communist states participate in both sides’ reactor programs (a problem with any US role in an Israeli reactor was how to make Arabs see that it resulted from a desire to safeguard the reactor).<sup>19</sup> Komer argued “the earlier we try to halt it [Israel’s attempt to secure a nuclear weapon capability] the better chance we have”<sup>20</sup>.

Inspections of the Dimona plant were the key way to monitor and thus in practice somewhat limit Israel’s nuclear activities. But also the agreed-upon scheme for regular visits soon became more a façade than a way to really ascertain Israel’s aims.

### 9.1.1 Visits to Dimona – US hope to clarify Israel’s intentions?

The first regular Dimona visit agreed upon with Eshkol took place only when Kennedy was no longer able to exert pressure regarding its terms. A visit was arranged for 17-8 January 1964; in practice, the US scientists got to spend one day at the site. The visit was similar to the previous ones and set the tone for those to come: short visits took place at intervals of

<sup>15</sup> D/63 Komer to Johnson, 28 May 64, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>16</sup> DOS “Near East arms race” in Bb for Eshkol’s visit, 28 May 64, LBJL KEV; DOS on national attitudes towards a CTBT and a NPT, 12 Dec, *ibid.* B/10 file copy; DOS “Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons”, 12 Dec, USNA BP.

<sup>17</sup> ACDA “Value and Feasibility of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, 10 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/2 P/3.

<sup>18</sup> NEA “Talking Points”, 7 Dec 64, LBJL MEC 1.

<sup>19</sup> DOS to Bundy, 24 March 63, with NEA memo, 15 March, LBJL KD 2; D/9 Rusk to Johnson, 16 Jan 64, FRUS 64-8:18; Rostow’s memo, 19 Nov, FOIA.

<sup>20</sup> D/63 (fn 15) FRUS 64-8:18.



over a year and the visitors were not allowed to access all areas at the site, carry own measuring equipment, or take samples. Combined with Israeli camouflage efforts and the visitors' lack of knowledge of Hebrew, such terms enabled Israelis to deceive them about activities at the plant. The visit (and later ones) revealed no weapon activities, especially not that a fuel reprocessing plant was being built underground at the site.<sup>21</sup>

The visitors were left with questions about whether the Dimona project made sense if it was just for civilian purposes – they reported the center was so “diversified and well-equipped” that it “probably represents the largest per capita investment in nuclear development facilities in the world” – but thought that Israel’s goal of technological leadership in the region somewhat explained it. The reactor had gone critical in late 1963, but this “did not significantly impair inspection.” The scientists found out that Israel was to produce 5-6 times as much uranium fuel as the 26-MW reactor needed if used for the stated purposes. After 1-2 fuel loads supplied by and to be returned to France, the Israelis aimed to fuel the reactor with domestic-produced cores. They indicated that they had indefinitely postponed the construction of the pilot reprocessing plant. The Israelis also said the reactor would maybe be declassified in a year or so. A DOS summary concluded that the plant had “no weapons-making capability *at present*”, but a later DOS memo noted that the impression created was that Israel sought a capability to produce nuclear weapons quickly. The team saw the next visit as necessary within a year, assuming it was longer than this one; alternatively, two visits at six months’ intervals were needed.<sup>22</sup> In a thank-you message to Eshkol, the USG referred to a deal on semi-annual visits<sup>23</sup>.

Hersh and Cohen suggest that the scientists were kept in the dark also by the USG: though they were told to find out whether Israel was pursuing a reprocessing capability, they were not briefed thoroughly before the visits or given existing CIA intelligence that suggested suspicious activities at the site. As shown above, CIA and AEC officials at least strongly suspected already in 1960-61 that Israel was building a reprocessing plant. Cohen was told by Komer that the visitors did not know that already in 1962-63, the intelligence community suspected the Dimona site to include such a plant and by former CIA Director R. Helms that “the dominant urge at the time was to contain any firm American acknowledgement of an Israeli nuclear capability.”<sup>24</sup> It seems DOS/NE officials remained unaware

<sup>21</sup> “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal”, *Sunday Times*, 5 Oct 86; Hersh 1991 pp. 195-7 ref. also to Feinberg’s comments; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 187 ref. to Péan, P. (1981) *Les deux bombes*, Paris: Fayard, pp. 111-20.

<sup>22</sup> My emphasis. The visitors made no explicit conclusion regarding weapon production capabilities in their report. Inspectors’ report on visit to Israel, DDRS; D/12 DOS to Bundy, 11 Feb 64, with “Summary of Findings of Dimona Inspection Team”, 6 Feb, FRUS 64-8:18; “Chronological Summary...” (fn 13); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 177-80. On the visits in general, see pp. 177-94; Hersh 1991 pp. 111-2.

<sup>23</sup> Komer to Bundy, 20 Oct 64, LBJL KI 1; “Recap on Dimona Inspection” (n/a) with “Chronology of Dimona Inspection by US” (san.), 20 Oct, LBJL KD 2.

<sup>24</sup> Hersh 1991 p. 112 ref. to his contacts with reprocessing expert Culler who visited the Dimona site four times; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 187-8, 193, 394 fn 43 ref. to his 1996 contacts with Culler and 1992-7 interviews with Helms and Komer.

of the reprocessing plant, presenting Israel's lack of one still in 1966 as an indication that no decision had been made in Israel on whether to acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>25</sup>

Even if some in the USG preferred not to see what Israel was doing, at the same time other officials, including Komer, complained to the Israelis about their secrecy towards the USG (see, e.g., section 8.5.2). Though some officials were probably honest in doing so, for others this was maybe a tactic to avoid admitting to the Israelis that the USG was aware of their weapon aims. Doing so would have forced the USG to answer the hard question of how to react, which it probably wanted to avoid as long as possible; it was not in the interest of the USG to get into a position where it either had to tacitly agree on Israel's weapon effort or take strong action against it.

### 9.1.2 Tanks for Israel and the missile limitation effort

All sides had been increasingly pressing for changes to the US arms policy in the Middle East. As the pressure was expected to further grow, in late 1963 the DOS saw an early reaffirmation of the restrictive policy as needed. The JCS thought that the regional military balance demanded no major arms sale to any side but rather an agreement among suppliers to restrict sales to the area. But the Israelis continued to press especially for a US sale of modern tanks, arguing to the USG that it was a test of US commitment. The approaching elections made some move to meet Israel's security needs necessary, and to prevent Israeli pressure for a security guarantee, the DOS favored helping it to find a supplier for tanks.<sup>26</sup>

The DOS, Komer, and Bundy wanted to link the tanks to missile and nuclear restraint. The link was also a way to stall on the tanks until an optimal time regarding the 1964 elections (or even later if US-Arab relations demanded). Komer did not expect pressure on missiles to cause problems at home since the USG appeared otherwise pro-Israel and even Zionists in the US opposed proliferation.<sup>27</sup>

Though no explicit tie was made, Israel's arms needs and the Dimona reactor were according to Komer tacitly seen as related issues. Pry argues Johnson saw conventional arms sales as a way to improve Israel's security so that it would not need nuclear weapons. Cohen

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<sup>25</sup> NE to ASOS Hare with Att. B) "Nuclear weapons and missile development: current appraisal of Israeli programs", 2 Feb 66, LBJL KNP. It seems the NE was not keeping information from the visitors: before a 1965 visit, it aimed to have them prepared by informing them about various signs suggesting Israeli nuclear aims that had lately come up and telling them to stay at the site as long as needed for a proper inspection. But also it saw it as useful to stress them that the US goal was to be able to reassure *the Arabs* about Israel's aims. NE to Talbot, 14 Jan 65, USNA IAI/D RRI B/8.

<sup>26</sup> D/371 Talbot to Rusk, 23 Nov 63; D/375 DepASOD/ISA to Taylor, 2 Dec; D/383 JCS to McNamara, 7 Dec, all FRUS 61-3:18; D/3 Rusk-Harman mtg, 3 Jan 64; D/9 Rusk to Johnson, 16 Jan; D/26 Bundy-Eban mtg, 5 March, all FRUS 64-8:18. On the role of the approaching elections and problems this meant for US policy towards the UAR, see also Cohen, W. I. 1994 pp. 288-91. Ben-Zvi 2004 provides a detailed account of USG decision-making regarding the tanks in 1964-5 (esp. Chapter 2).

<sup>27</sup> D/9 Rusk to Johnson, 16 Jan 64, FRUS 64-8:18; Komer to Johnson, 18 Feb, LBJL KI Nov 1; Bundy to Komer, 31 Dec 63, with Komer to Harriman, 30 Dec, LBJL KIS; Komer to Harriman, 10 Jan 64, *ibid.*; Komer "The UAR/Israeli missile problem", 13 Feb, LBJL KIMD.

suggests similarly that Johnson and Eshkol came to tacitly agree on exchanging Israel's not going overtly nuclear to secure arms supply – the nuclear issue thus becoming for Israel a way to press for conventional arms.<sup>28</sup> The latter aspect was in the USG seen as a problem also regarding a link between the tanks and Israeli missile restraint<sup>29</sup>.

Bundy and Komer kept a tough line with the Israelis on the nuclear issue and warned them in spring 1964 repeatedly against going nuclear, saying that acquisition of a nuclear delivery capability by any state in the area would force the USG to reconsider its policies and that if Israel would seem to pursue nuclear weapons, the firm US support for it could weaken. They argued that Israel's plans for missiles that required nuclear warheads to be efficient, together with its nuclear program, created suspicions, whereas UAR missiles, about Israel fed an exaggerating press campaign, had little value owing to lack of nuclear warheads. They said the USG had a right to know about Israel's missile plans and use of military budget to see whether military assistance to it was financially justified and since Israel's moves could escalate the regional arms race and imply military risks also for the US.<sup>30</sup>

But the Israelis insisted that Cairo's moves gave them a right in principle to pursue SSMs<sup>31</sup>. Gazit moreover argued to Komer that if the USG did know more about Israel's plans, it "would probably raise even more of a ruckus" than so far. He indicated Israel was developing a missile capability and the US should not press on the matter early, though later talks were possible. He probed into whether the US would, in return for Israeli missile restraint, agree to sell SSMs later if UAR missile efforts lived up to Israeli fears, but Komer expected the US to be against selling SSMs to anybody. When Komer indicated that he was coming to feel certain that Israel was pursuing nuclear weapons or at least a capability to produce them, Gazit did not deny this but argued that 1) Israel needed a deterrent even more than France did since the Arabs would get stronger over time and 2) its leaders had to appear as protecting the nation.<sup>32</sup>

In a 21 February message to Eshkol, also Johnson expressed concern that Israel would plan moves that could escalate the regional arms race without enhancing its security. Israeli and US estimates differed on the UAR SSM threat and the effects of different ways to react to it. Johnson now linked the Dimona reactor to security: its going critical and Israel's security and the regional arms race were "*related problems*".<sup>33</sup> Eshkol replied that Israel would abandon its SSMs plans if Nasser did and suggested the US to warn Nasser that it would

<sup>28</sup> Pry 1984 p. 11; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 173-4, 196, 236-7 ref. to his 1991-5 discussions with Komer.

<sup>29</sup> See DOS to Bundy, 20 March, with Att. A) "Israeli Missile Acquisition", LBJL KIS 2.

<sup>30</sup> D/7 Bundy-Harman mtg, 10 Jan 64, D/26 (fn 26) FRUS 64-8:18; Komer on mtgs with Gazit, 16 Jan, 13 Feb, and 21 Apr, LBJL KI 1.

<sup>31</sup> D/8 Feldman-Harman mtg, 15 Jan 64, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>32</sup> Komer argued to Gazit that there was time to react to growth in Arab power or their progress with SSMs also much later. He thought Israel was maybe interested in French SSMs now because it thought Paris might later refuse to sell them. Komer on mtgs with Gazit, 16 Jan, 13 Feb, 24 March, and 21 Apr 64, LBJL KI 1.

<sup>33</sup> My emphasis. D/14 DOS to E/TA with Johnson to Eshkol, 20 Feb 64, FRUS 64-8:18.

otherwise give Israel missiles. He denied Israel's SSM plans had anything to do with nuclear warheads (expressing horror to the idea) and strongly opposed a USG suggestion that tank supply depended on Israel's giving up the SSM plans. This stance made the DOS/NEA think that the tanks could not help secure missile restraint.<sup>34</sup> Trying to justify their military build-up and tank needs, the Israelis also kept on arguing that existing US security assurances were insufficient and questioning whether the US would act quickly enough to protect Israel if needed<sup>35</sup>.

Badeau had proposed another arms limitation probe with Nasser before a decision on the tanks would be made. USG interest in the idea is also explained by Eshkol's support in principle for mutual SSM limitation and Nasser's remarks to Western diplomats indicating growing concern over Israel's nuclear aims and renewed threatening with preventive action. But hopes of success were still low: Komer was in favor of making a try but argued to Johnson that it would not succeed, and both Bundy and the Israelis expressed pessimism regarding the prospects of arms limitation. But the probe was seen as *reassurance* and *warning* to Nasser that a flow of Soviet arms to Cairo could create a flow directly from the US to Israel and thus as a way to justify arms supply to Israel towards him<sup>36</sup>: it was more a tactical move than a genuine arms limitation effort.

In a letter to Nasser, Johnson expressed opposition to proliferation anywhere, and in a 3 March meeting with Nasser, Talbot stressed that the USG was following Israel's nuclear efforts closely and had "no evidence of Israeli production of nuclear weapons" but pointed out that the future was open. He argued that if no formal UAR-Israel deal on arms limitation was viable, the two states could follow the US-USSR parallel of arms control by "mutual example". But Nasser saw talks on the topic as useless: the Arabs did not trust Israel. He said missile development was necessary for the UAR but refused to shed more light on those plans. Nuclear weapons were another matter: the UAR lacked resources to develop them and using them against Israel was anyway unfeasible because of possible collateral damage to Arab areas. He was still willing to consider both a declaratory letter that he did not plan to acquire them (though the 1963 US draft letter had some problems) and accepting IAEA safeguards when the UAR would decide to acquire a new reactor. But Talbot also got the impression that Nasser might reject both ideas if the US agreed to supply arms to Israel.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> D/17 E/TA Air Attaché to ASOD/ISA, 24 Feb 64; D/21 NEA to DepUSOS, 28 Feb, both *ibid*.

<sup>35</sup> T/919 Barbour to DOS, 4 March 64, LBJL N/I 1 IV Cb 2; DOS to Bundy, 17 March, with Rusk-Eban mtg, 4 March, LBJL N/I MM. Gazit said that as the Arabs would come to accept Israel's existence only if they saw that it would always remain stronger than them, Israel aimed to remain so by any means. Crawford-Gazit mtg, 19 March, *ibid*. Cb.

<sup>36</sup> NE draft talking points on arms limitation, 20 Feb 64, LBJL MEC 1; D/18-9 Rusk and Komer to Johnson, 25-6 Feb; D/26 (fn 26) all FRUS 64-8:18; "Chronological Summary ..." (fn 13).

<sup>37</sup> The USG had hoped to use the occasion also to inform Nasser of the findings of the Dimona visit, but Israel did not allow that (see below). D/20 Johnson to Nasser, 27 Feb 64; D/22 DOS to Talbot (E/C), 29 Feb; D/24 Talbot (E/C) to DOS, 4 March; all FRUS 64-8:18.

Johnson decided to postpone the tank decision until a June meeting with Eshkol; his advisors recommended doing so because of 1) Arab tenseness at the time that could affect US base rights and access to oil, 2) the need for a bargaining chip because of Israel's SSM plans, and 3) an expectation that if the USG agreed on a sale, the Israelis would press for further concessions before US elections. In March 1964, Johnson requested the DOS, the DOD, and the CIA to thoroughly review of the tank situation and related matters, including Israel's missile plans and whether and how the US was to try make Israel change them.<sup>38</sup>

Especially as Nasser had again threatened with preventive action and the Dimona reactor had gone critical, passing the findings of the visit to the plant to him was important for the USG. The USG (even Johnson himself) repeatedly asked Eshkol to allow this, warned that the threat of preventive attacks was real, and argued that Nasser would probably anyway find out about the visit. But Eshkol maintained that unclarity about Israeli capabilities deterred Nasser and Nasser would maybe use information about the visits publicly. Barbour saw that as something that could harm Eshkol even enough to fully risk the Dimona visit deal. Eshkol made claims about UAR-Indian nuclear cooperation but also probed with the USG into the idea that Israel would get assurances about UAR missile actions and Cairo about Israel's reactor. By mid-April, Komer and Bundy came to favor delaying further pressure in the matter: Eshkol seemed to want a bargaining chip for his meeting with Johnson.<sup>39</sup> Since it is questionable whether reassuring Nasser would have been disadvantageous for Israel, it indeed seems that the Israelis might have just sought to make of the issue a bargaining chip with the US.

Signs existed that also the Soviets were worried about Arab-Israel nuclear and missile proliferation (Emb. Tel Aviv was playing ignorant to them and wrote to the DOS that it could not "reveal to them what we know about Dimona" unless an understanding on arms limitation in the area came into sight – an indication also of awareness of Israel's military aims<sup>40</sup>). But when the USG made probes into joint action against proliferation in the area, Moscow said that various other issues, such as the German situation and the MLF plan, demanded settling first.<sup>41</sup>

The USG continued to press Israel for missile restraint. In early April, Feldman visited Israel and asked the Israelis to buy no more SSMs, stressing the dangers involved in pursuit

<sup>38</sup> D/13 DOD to McNamara, 15 Feb 64, D/27 Bundy to Johnson, 8 March; D/29 Bundy to Johnson, 13 March; D/32 NSAM 290 "Meeting Israeli Arms Requests", 19 March, all FRUS 64-8:18; Komer to Johnson, 5 March, LBJL KI 1; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 201.

<sup>39</sup> T/919 Barbour to DOS, 4 March 64, LBJL N/I 1 IV Cb 2; T/2024 Badeau to DOS, 6 March; T/1057 Barbour to Rusk, 17 Apr, both USNA CFPF B/3068; D/12 (fn 22); D/31 DOS to E/TA with Johnson to Eshkol, 19 March; D/43 Komer to Johnson, 16 Apr, all FRUS 64-8:18; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 197-200.

<sup>40</sup> E/TA to NEA, 12 Apr 64, USNA NRI B/8.

<sup>41</sup> The regional arms race worried also US allies and the NE favored approaching especially Canada and the UK in order to coordinate their potential action. NE to DepASOS/NEA Jernegan, 19 March 64, USNA RNA; E/TA to NEA, 12 Apr, USNA NRI B/8; NE to Jernegan, 16 Apr, LBJL MEC 1. Later, Gazit told the USG that a Soviet diplomat had said in May that the superpowers had no shared interests in Middle East arms control. DOS to Bundy, 4 Jan 65, with NE-Gazit mtg, 14 Dec, LBJL KI.

of such nuclear-capable systems. Eshkol promised to make no large missile purchases without consulting the US and said Israel could not afford such early (aiming probably at a stronger case for US military aid). He told the USG to continue approaches on missiles to Nasser, instead of pressing Israel; the Israelis seemed to the USG to have decided to ignore superior US intelligence that Cairo's SSMs plans were not very serious. But Israeli leaders in fact had no unified stance on whether Israel would forgo SSMs even if Cairo stopped its SSM program. Eshkol also once again stressed Israel's need for self-reliant defense and expressed doubt that the US would intervene militarily in case of a Soviet-backed attack on Israel. Israel also rejected IAEA safeguards on its nuclear reactors. USG officials came to see pressing Israel to give up its missile efforts as useless.<sup>42</sup>

Memos by Komer shed light into White House thinking around the Israeli nuclear issue. Komer saw Eshkol's promise to consult the US on missiles as insufficient. Exaggerated claims about UAR missile development – in mid-April, Israeli Chief of Staff also declared that it “had forced Israeli into the missile era<sup>43</sup>” – seemed as an excuse for Israel's SSM program, which made sense only combined to nuclear warheads. Israeli claims and secrecy around missile aims, together with the changed stance on reassuring the Arabs about the Dimona reactor, strengthened Komer's belief that Israel was pursuing a nuclear force. He argued to Johnson that since the USG clearly opposed proliferation, it had to *try* to stop that, and it was time to increase pressure on Israel. But the USG also had to decide whether it would eventually accept Israel's going nuclear. Komer thought the Israelis did maybe not see that their going nuclear could maybe erode the USG nonproliferation policy altogether and would cause much trouble with the US and that keeping the Arabs guessing about the reactor was risky. He doubted US ability to make Israel *abandon* nuclear weapon plans short of the “probably unacceptable costs” of allying with it but saw pressure behind the scenes as a way to *slow down* Israel's moves towards nuclear weapons, increase US leverage in other issues, and allow postponing action regarding the tank sale.<sup>44</sup>

In a late April reply to Johnson's March inquiry, the DOD and the DOS recognized Israel's need for tanks, but to avoid adverse Arab reactions, they favored only helping Israel find another supplier. But they also wanted to both seek a multilateral agreement with allies and Moscow about supplying no advanced arms to the area and continue pursuing a UAR-Israel deal on arms limitation. A further probe to Nasser was thus planned. Regarding verification (critical for Nasser in 1963), Komer saw as sufficient the US inspection arrange-

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<sup>42</sup> D/33 Komer to Feldman, 23 March 64; D/36-7 Barbour to DOS, 4-7 Apr, all FRUS 64-8:18; Davies (NE)-Gazit mtg, 6 Apr, LBJL N/I II MM; T/1033 E/TA to Rusk, 9 Apr, *ibid.* Cb. Peres came to justify the secrecy on missiles by saying that conditions agreed upon with another country constrained Israel. Komer-Peres mtg, 5 June, LBJL KEV 1.

<sup>43</sup> NEA “Talking Points”, 7 Dec 64, LBJL MEC 1.

<sup>44</sup> Komer to Bundy, 10 March 64, LBJL KIS; Komer to Johnson, 11 Apr, LBJL KNP; D/43 Komer to Johnson, 16 Apr, FRUS 64-8:18; Komer to Bundy, 22 Apr, LBJL KI 1; Komer to Bundy, 23 Apr, LBJL N/I II Cb; T/1140 Barbour to Rusk, 15 May, LBJL KEV 2; Komer “The UAR/Israeli missile race”, 29 May, LBJL KIMD; Komer to Bundy with Komer to Johnson, 28 May, LBJL KEV.

ments with Israel and, regarding UAR activities, only intelligence or some secret visits to missile plants.<sup>45</sup>

In hope that Israel would do likewise if Nasser privately promised nuclear and missile restraint, the DOS instructed Badeau in early May 1964 to again discuss arms limitation with Nasser. Badeau warned Nasser that advanced weapon efforts in the area would push Israel towards nuclear weapons despite US efforts to prevent that. He suggested UAR-Israel arms limitation could be based on a tacit deal with no special verification scheme. Badeau also asked for cooperation on IAEA safeguards. Nasser wanted to consider the matter and promised to provide the letter assuring he did not aim at nuclear weapons.<sup>46</sup>

Israeli officials were now using claims about domestic pressure to acquire nuclear weapons to press for a tank sale. They argued to the USG that Eshkol and other US-oriented Israelis had to get something tangible, i.e. tanks, as a sign of US commitment; otherwise it was possible that Israel's defense policy would move "towards establishment [of an] independent nuclear deterrent", as some Israelis attracted to Gallois's arguments wanted<sup>47</sup>. Also Israel's friends in the US pressed for a tank decision. Komer worried that the whole Middle East policy would crumble. Johnson asked Jewish leaders to keep quiet about the tanks so that publicity would not complicate matters for European allies who were hoped to sell the tanks.<sup>48</sup>

Israel had informed the USG of the secret West German arms sales to it (see section 7.6.1) only in spring 1963. Thereafter diversions of US-designed and -produced armaments had led to quiet USG protests with Bonn. But now, the USG indeed hoped Israel's tank needs to be covered through sales tanks the US had sold to the FRG.<sup>49</sup>

In mid-May, Feldman informed the Israelis that the USG would not sell the tanks directly but was prepared to secretly help arrange a sale from Europe and maybe later consider ways to help Israel finance the deal. Having secured such help, the Israelis appeared fairly satisfied. Barbour reported that they had said they were unlikely to press for security guar-

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<sup>45</sup> D/47 DOS & DOD to Standing Group "Response to NSAM 290", 25 Apr 64, FRUS 64-8:18; DOS to Bundy, 20 March, with Att. A) "Israeli Missile Acquisition", LBJL KIS 2; Komer to Jernegan, 12 March, LBJL MEC 1; NE to Jernegan, 16 Apr, *ibid*.

Also conclusions of an ACDA-DOS study group on Israel-UAR proliferation were supportive of such probes on arms limitation: the group saw little hope of a NWFZ or help from a NPT but considered pursuing unilateral promises of restraint and IAEA safeguards the most promising courses of action. ACDA/International Relations to Foster & Talbot on the group's report, 19 May, USNA NRI B/2.

<sup>46</sup> D/50 DOS to Badeau, 3 May 64, FRUS 64-8:18; D/52 Badeau to DOS, 8 May, *ibid*. also fn 1 ref. to T/5168 DOS to Badeau, 6 May, USNA CFPF POL 7 US/McCloy; Nasser-Badeau mtg, 7 May, LBJL MEC 1 (last p. missing).

<sup>47</sup> T/5377 E/L to Rusk on 28 Apr 64 mtg with Minister Evron (Israeli Embassy), 29 Apr, LBJL N/I II Cb. For similar Israeli arguments, see also Komer on mtg with Gazit, 21 Apr, LBJL KI 1.

<sup>48</sup> D/53 Feldman to Johnson, 11 May 64, FRUS 64-8:18 also fn 1 ref. to Johnson-Bundy disc., 13 May 3:35 p.m., LBJL Tape F64.26 Side B PNO 7; Komer to Bundy, 15 May, LBJL N/I II Cb.

<sup>49</sup> Samra 2002 pp. 49-50.

antees any time soon – presumably since they expected to get none and also Eshkol now believed Israel had to be self-reliant.<sup>50</sup>

Johnson's instructions to Feldman show that the USG sought to make the Israelis see its "impartial" position in the area as a mere façade. The tank decision was justified by the fact that despite its deep commitment to Israel's security, the USG had "to maintain *at least an appearance of balance between Israel and the Arabs*", whereas US aid indirectly helped Israel buy arms from Europe and thus ensure a power advantage over Arabs.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, Komer said to Peres that US even-handedness was a myth as US action in reality favored Israel<sup>52</sup>.

When Johnson met Eshkol in early June 1964, he stressed US opposition to proliferation and suggested that if Israel's aims were peaceful, it should accept IAEA safeguards and let the USG inform Nasser about the Dimona visit. Eshkol said Israel was not producing nuclear weapons but argued against revealing this to Cairo and that reassurances about the reactor would not keep Nasser from pursuing nuclear weapons. He said Israel would acquire no missiles if also Nasser forwent them. But the USG continued to press regarding reassuring Nasser and Israel finally consented, assuming the US did not say it had *visited* Dimona (since Talbot had in March already told Nasser that the US had "no evidence of Israeli production of nuclear weapons", the USG in fact got little more than a permission for what it had already done). It seems the USG at this point did not take up the next visit to Dimona. Eshkol noted that Israel ultimately had to be self-reliant for security and, as Cohen points out, gave no assurances regarding the plant or Israel's nuclear aims. The USG avoided the topic of security guarantees.<sup>53</sup>

A few days later, Badeau gave Nasser a letter from Johnson that asked Nasser to confirm his earlier statements suggesting that the UAR would not acquire nuclear weapons. Nasser indicated preparedness to cooperate and accept IAEA safeguards when the construction of a power reactor became topical, but not before; he wanted to avoid criticism about assenting to foreign pressure. He noted that as the military wanted more and better weapons, it was therefore also hard for him to stop the SSM efforts. To Badeau, he seemed open to further arms control talks.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>50</sup> D/57 (fn 14); D/58 Israeli-US officials' mtg, 17 May 64; D/63 (fn 15), all FRUS 64-8:18; T/1140 Barbour to Rusk, 15 May, LBJL KEV 2.

<sup>51</sup> Original emphasis. D/55 Johnson to Feldman, 15 May 64, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>52</sup> Komer-Peres mtg, 5 June 64, LBJL KEV 1.

<sup>53</sup> Cohen notes that Johnson seems to have made no link between the tanks and the nuclear/missile issue. But as Feldman had in May already promised the Israelis help with the tanks, making such a link now would probably not have been very viable. Johnson-Eshkol mtg, 1 June 64, AHP B/474 Israel and D/65 FRUS 64-8:18; D/68 Komer to Johnson, 3 June, *ibid.*; Talbot-Peres discs., 3 June, USNA CFPF B/3068 and LBJL KD 2; "Recap..." with Dimona inspection chron. (fn 23); Komer to Bundy, 20 Oct, LBJL KI 1; "Chronological Summary..." (fn 13); Hersh 1991 p. 135; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 203-5.

<sup>54</sup> D/59 Johnson to Nasser, 20 May 64; D/62 DOS to Badeau, 28 May; D/71 Badeau to DOS, 8 June, all FRUS 64-8:18; T/5592 DOS to E/C, 29 May, DNSA NP00979.



In July, Nasser sent Johnson a letter where he assured that the UAR did not aim to acquire nuclear weapons and rejected the idea of a balance of nuclear deterrence in the area. Cairo also introduced a resolution to the Organization of African Unity in favor of a global NNWS agreement to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. The DOS saw Nasser's assurance as satisfactory regarding the nuclear proliferation problem.<sup>55</sup> In the missile issue, no real breakthrough had been made.

As a next step, Kamel suggested the USG that it would approach Nasser with a "specific program to build on" his assurances<sup>56</sup>. In fall 1964, McCloy was again sent to Cairo. Accompanied by new US Ambassador L. Battle, he proposed Nasser a tacit, informal UAR-Israel *missile* limitation deal: the UAR would give a private, written or oral, assurance that it would acquire no more SSMs and the US would press Israel to do likewise. No verification beyond what Nasser himself wanted was needed; the US was prepared to supply Cairo with intelligence on Israel's actions. But Nasser said that the Palestine problem made a regional arms race unavoidable. He promised to consider missile limitation but saw its chances as weak. It seemed to the Americans that he was especially concerned about political risks for him: he again stressed that missiles were important for the military, which had much power in the UAR.

As Eshkol had allowed this, McCloy told Nasser (in a somewhat stronger, positive form than Talbot's March assurance) that Israel at the time did not have or produce material for nuclear weapons. Nasser received USG information that Israel was pursuing SSMs with "almost casual acceptance" and this time did not threaten with pre-emptive war. McCloy saw him as more open than in 1963 and recommended further talks without pressing for early answers.<sup>57</sup>

The USG saw the arms limitation dialogue as helpful in mitigating the effect of Israeli advanced weapon efforts in Cairo. The Israelis, however, complained about US-UAR talks conducted without prior consultation of them.<sup>58</sup>

Also IAEA safeguards were on the USG agenda during Eshkol's June 1964 visit. The general USG policy to promote them is discussed in section 9.4.1. But before going into that, I discuss Johnson's stances towards the FRG, developments regarding the MLF plan in 1964, and nuclear development in the FRG.

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<sup>55</sup> Nasser to Johnson, 26 July 64, LBJL MEC 1; D/86 DOS on the letter, n/d, FRUS 64-8:18 also fn 2-3.

<sup>56</sup> D/87 Bundy-Talbot-Kamel mtg, 10 Aug 64, *ibid.* also fn 2 ref. to 10 Aug Johnson-Kamel mtg, 11 Aug, LBJL NSF UAR Kamel visit.

<sup>57</sup> D/96 Nasser-McCloy mtg, 28 Sep 64; D/97 McCloy memo, 29 Sep; D/98 McCloy-DOS mtg, 6 Oct, all FRUS 64-8:18. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> McCloy mission, see also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 252-3. Rusk wrote Johnson (12 Aug, D/89 FRUS 64-8:18) that McCloy would tell Nasser that Israel would probably accept "nuclear and missile self-denial" if Nasser showed restraint on missiles. McCloy's report suggests he did not mention the nuclear side.

<sup>58</sup> T/362 DOS to E/TA, 30 Oct 64, LBJL N/I 1 III Cb 1; DOS to Bundy, 4 Jan 65, with NE-Gazit mtg, 14 Dec, LBJL KI.

## **9.2 Johnson, West Germany, and the NATO multilateral force**

The goal of peaceful coexistence with Moscow implied a need to push also Bonn towards détente. But Johnson saw the Germans as “a powerful, talented people with dangerous tendencies<sup>59</sup>”. He was more worried than Kennedy had been about the future of the FRG and feared the emergence of a second Hitler<sup>60</sup>. He and his key officials saw the FRG as the most precious matter of Cold War competition, a focus of competition with de Gaulle, a powerful yet cooperative ally, and a major trade partner in both military and civilian fields. Johnson saw it as best to let the FRG become as influential and respected as its economic strength implied, but at the same time the Germans had to be handled with care and tightly tied to the US.<sup>61</sup>

The stance that involvement in Europe was crucial for the US continued to characterize USG thinking throughout the Johnson era. Whereas by summer 1966, the DOS saw that the US had “successfully closed off Soviet post-war hopes for hegemony in Europe”, for instance Rostow stressed in fall 1965 that the US had to stay involved in Europe (and Asia) because of its strong interest in the regional balance-of-power and the “political immaturity” and relative “military weakness” of key regional states.<sup>62</sup> A DOS paper from late 1968 similarly argued that the US had to maintain its commitments to Western Europe because of the latter’s value in the global balance-of-power.<sup>63</sup>

Khrushchev was arguing that USSR-FRG reconciliation could be possible. He said to, e.g., British Labor party leaders that when the West Germans would see that they would not meet their goals through an alliance with the US, they would want a new Rapallo treaty with Moscow. He argued that their true interest was in ties to Moscow: the Western powers and the FRG were all exporting nations but the USSR was an importing one. He argued Bonn might seek a pact with Moscow especially when it would see that reunification was not in the cards; reunification was as likely as “world revolution”, but the possibility of it kept the FRG in the Western block, which was why the West rejected a peace treaty with the two Germanies.<sup>64</sup>

The USG estimated Erhard to be interested in bargaining with economic aid to get Soviet concessions regarding reunification. Any such deal was likely to cause problems in the West, and just Soviet hints of interest could lead in the FRG to “intensive political debate in which the unity of government colation and perhaps interallied relations might be considerably bruised.” The USG did not expect Moscow to be generous enough for a deal

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<sup>59</sup> Costigliola 1994 p. 173.

<sup>60</sup> Also Brands 2006 argues so (p. 86).

<sup>61</sup> See Rostow to Johnson, 23 Oct 65, LBJL BMA; Geyelin 1966 pp. 27-8; Seaborg 1987 p. 104; Costigliola 1994 pp. 173-5; Schwartz, T. 2003.

<sup>62</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 8 Nov 65, LBJL BMA; Rostow’s memo with Deputy National Security aide Bator & Davis (NSCS) “European Score”, 27 June 66, LBJL NSF Komer B/5 Rostow.

<sup>63</sup> PPC “U.S. Policy towards Western Europe”, Dec 68, LBJL NSF SF B/50 transition PPC pp. 14-5.

<sup>64</sup> See UK Emb. Moscow to BFO, 13 June 63, with draft Soviet-Labor mtg, 10 June, AHP TBT Bg 2.

to come about, but it was seen that in this less hostile situation, a fear of a Soviet attack was not enough to glue NATO together.<sup>65</sup>

From early on, Johnson and Erhard tried to improve US-German relations and create an atmosphere of trust; Geyelin writes they got along so well that Erhard became Johnson's "favorite foreigner"<sup>66</sup>. Erhard repeatedly assured that ties to the US (not France) were the top priority for Bonn. The USG in turn stressed that its troops would stay in the FRG, the ally's security was important for it, and it would not deal with Moscow at German expense. Johnson and Erhard also told each other of secret approaches Moscow and Paris in vain made to them.<sup>67</sup> At the same time, such revelations are a way to show that the mutual relationship is not the only option and thus to increase own bargaining power.

In late 1963, a NIE expected security ties to the US to remain central under Erhard and the FRG to be in general a relatively cooperative ally in various military issues. But also problems existed: Bonn continued to question the flexible response -strategy, demand access to tactical nuclear weapons for NATO troops in case of an attack, and fear US troop withdrawals.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, under the surface concerns that the ally would defect from cooperation continued to smolder on both sides. In Bonn, concern existed that the US strategy did not guarantee nuclear retaliation in case of an attack on the FRG, and thus provide a credible deterrent, and that the US would withdraw troops or compromise German interests to promote détente with Moscow and reach a NPT. In the USG, it was feared that if Bonn became dissatisfied with the US, it might study alternatives to cooperation with it, and that if no MLF was realized, it might join the French or start an own nuclear weapon effort.<sup>69</sup> For the USG, somehow strengthening cooperation to reduce such concerns and make allies accept the flexible response -strategy was becoming a key challenge, closely related to that of finding a solution to nuclear organisation and sharing in NATO.

In the 1960s, relative calm in East-West relations in Europe was generally increasing NATO states' room for independent action. Kissinger argued in 1965 that Cold War bipolarity meant that neither superpower could accept clear advances by the other in allied or unallied states so that the difference between these groups was likely to blur and alliances weaken: an alliance gave little if neutrality entailed few risks. The stable bilateral nuclear balance implied in turn that allied states had greater freedom to pursue their own interests even against their patrons' wishes. Key NATO states were indeed following their

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<sup>65</sup> DepUSOS "A European Settlement", 11 Dec 63, USNA PDA B/2; NIE 23-63 "West Germany Under Erhard" (including the citation), 18 Dec, LBJL I:G.

<sup>66</sup> Geyelin 1966 p. 87.

<sup>67</sup> See FRUS 64-8:15, incl. D/11 McGhee to DOS on talk with Erhard, 13 Feb 64; D/22 Johnson-McGhee mtg, 23 March; D/34 Johnson to Erhard, 5 May; D/43 McGhee to DOS, 23 May; D/60 McGhee to Johnson, Rusk, & USOS, 6 July.

<sup>68</sup> NIE 23-63 "West Germany Under Erhard", 18 Dec 63, LBJL I:G.

<sup>69</sup> On both sides' concerns, see, e.g., Klein to Bundy, 5 Aug 64, DDRS; D/44 Foster's draft COP position paper on nonproliferation, 14 Aug; D/46 Thompson to Rusk, 25 Aug, both FRUS 64-8:11; Rostow to GC, 13 Dec, FOIA.

own ideas: France by opposing various US policies and wishes (as had become evident in early 1963, and further by pulling out of NATO's integrated military structure in 1966); the UK by pressing hard for early progress in arms control and refusing to support a MLF; and the FRG by strongly demanding nuclear sharing and creating problems in NPT efforts.<sup>70</sup>

MLF-proponents in the DOS kept on arguing that because of Soviet missiles aimed at Western Europe and Paris's progress on nuclear weapons, a MLF was needed as a non-discriminatory way to tie the FRG to the West and to keep it from cooperating with Paris and so establishing a nationally-manned missile force with nuclear warheads under nominal French custody.<sup>71</sup> But other observers in Washington argued that at least apart from Strauss and another CSU politician, K. Guttenberg, no West German political leader demanded German control over *strategic* weapons and no public interest existed in a national nuclear force. Such observers suggested that it was more a US than a German expectation that without a MLF, the FRG would pursue a nuclear force alone or with France: the Germans knew that doing so would cause grave trouble with Moscow and allies and that no national force could substitute NATO.<sup>72</sup>

Soon after Johnson came to office, Rusk gave him quite an optimistic briefing on the prospects of the MLF initiative, presented as an effort to prevent the Germans from pursuing nuclear weapons through other routes. Johnson also got a very optimistic DOS memo on the prospects of the plan. In the NSCS, however, it was seen that as little eagerness about a MLF existed in Europe or in the Congress, it was best just to keep the idea alive without pressing it – its success was anyway uncertain. Bundy wrote Johnson a little more reserved memo that pointed out Kennedy's unwillingness to press a MLF on the Congress and allies, McNamara's reservations but willingness to *propose* a force, and discord in Europe over it. Johnson seems to have accepted the view that the initiative was the way to deal with German aspirations and prevent resentment, but Geyelin notes he was before the 1964 elections so preoccupied with domestic politics that he did not much focus on the effort.<sup>73</sup> It seems that his lack of full awareness of Kennedy's thinking on the plan – especially its tactical nature – now helped the MLF-supporters to strongly press the idea.

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<sup>70</sup> Kissinger 1965 pp. 15-8; Mahncke 1972 pp. 211-3. Also Rusk noted that since the Europeans no longer were under an acute Soviet threat, they enjoyed "the luxury of playing around in pursuit of other objectives". Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA. On the perception of allies' strive for greater independence, see also Church 1966.

<sup>71</sup> DOS to Bundy, 5 Feb 64, with Eisenhower-Merchant mtg, 15 Jan, LBJL S:MLF I 2; Rostow to Rusk, 6 Apr, *ibid.* 3; Rusk to Johnson, with "The MLF: What and Why?", 8 Apr, LBJL S:MLF 1.

<sup>72</sup> Klein to Bundy, 20 May 64, with Newhouse (SFRC Staff Consultant) "Balancing the Risks in the MLF", 20 March, LBJL S:MLF I. Bonn did recognize the latter point. See GFO to all posts on MLF, 17 Sep, PAA R/305/II A6B43 II8 10.

<sup>73</sup> Klein to Bundy, 5 Dec 63, USG mtg and DOS notes to Johnson on MLF (n/a), 6 Dec, all DDRS; Bundy to Johnson "MLF-An Alternative View", 6 Dec 64, LBJL S:MLF III 2; Geyelin 1966 p. 142; Seaborg 1987 pp. 95-7 ref. to Bundy to Johnson, 6 Dec 63, LBJL NSF memos to President Bundy 1. Also Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 argue that Johnson was until Dec 1964 ignorant "of the complex negotiations surrounding the MLF issue" (p. 171).

### 9.2.1 Growing pressure for a multilateral force

The USG was in fact increasingly divided over the MLF also because of its effect on East-West relations, arms control efforts, and proliferation. Especially ACDA saw a NPT as a better way to halt proliferation.<sup>74</sup> But the MLF-supporters pressed with the idea and wanted Johnson to set a timetable for the MLF plan. In April, Johnson first got an optimistic DOS memo in favor of a MLF and reports on briefings with allies and leading Congressmen who expressed no clear opposition. Then in a USG meeting on the MLF, Bundy told Johnson that “a consensus” supported a MLF, though the JCS, McNamara, and ACDA director W. Foster “had serious reservations”. Foster said that Geneva talks had showed that Moscow was very opposed to a MLF and that this could harm disarmament efforts. At the same time, Rostow was arguing that especially after insufficient consultations so far, the US had to show respect for allies’ interests in disarmament policy formulation and negotiations in order to keep Bonn from bilateral deals with Moscow and from uni- or bilateral nuclear weapon efforts. Johnson agreed on 1) informing allies that he favored a MLF, though also he did not want to press it on them; 2) seeking an agreement on it by year end; and 3) broadening congressional consultations on it. Setting a timetable made the plan more concrete – and was something Kennedy had not done.<sup>75</sup>

Later, Johnson said about the MLF that he had in spring 1964 “thought Kennedy was for it, and it was mine to carry on, and I thought Congress was for it.” He argued he had not meant to decide much about it at all but to postpone the issue to year end and that MLF-supporters just stuck to his comment on dealing with it after the elections. Nevertheless, on 20 April he also publicly stated support for a MLF.<sup>76</sup>

The FRG remained the only ally officially committed to a MLF, and neither the USG nor Bonn wanted a purely bilateral MLF. But a German document shows that the MLF-enthusiast Finletter now told Erhard that Johnson wanted to pursue the force irrespective of how many allies were behind it and expected Italy and the UK to join in later if the FRG and the US demonstrated that they were serious about the force and maybe even signed a treaty on it. To win other allies over, in June Erhard and Johnson jointly declared the goal of completing a MLF treaty by year end (another move that could be seen as indication of a commitment by Johnson). But a condition remained that at least one more ally would join the treaty.<sup>77</sup>

Also Erhard’s cabinet played with foreign fears of German nuclear ambitions while assuring that *it* did not seek nuclear weapons. On NATO’s 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary in April, Erhard

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<sup>74</sup> Klein, 20 May 64, with Newhouse “Balancing...” (fn 72); Costigliola 1994 pp. 181-2.

<sup>75</sup> Rostow to Rusk (fn 71), 6 Apr 64; Rusk “The MLF...” (fn 71), 8 Apr; 10 Apr USG mtg on MLF, 11 Apr, USNA LBM I; D/98 Erhard-Finletter disc. also fn 3, 16 Apr, APD 64; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 115-6; Seaborg 1987 pp. 97-100.

<sup>76</sup> Johnson’s speech, 20 Apr 64, PPJ 272; USG mtg, 6 Dec, DDRS; Geyelin 1966 p. 160.

<sup>77</sup> D/98 (fn 75) APD 64; Johnson-Erhard statement, 12 June, PPJ 400; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 245; Seaborg 1987 p. 105; Küntzel 1992 p. 74.

reaffirmed the non-nuclear pledge. He said Bonn wanted a MLF as a way to strengthen NATO and US-German relations and to show, also to Moscow, that it was not interested in other nuclear weapon projects. But if no MLF came about, future German leaders would maybe face pressure for such projects. Von Hassel told McNamara that he wanted a MLF as a way to tie the US to the FRG and because he distrusted his countrymen. He said, however, that even Strauss wanted no independent German nuclear force but a European one; he, Erhard, and Schröder none of the two. Bonn also made further public references to the 1954 pledge and the stance that it wanted no national control of nuclear weapons.<sup>78</sup> At the same time, the GFO kept on stressing to the USG that the 1954 deal was based on West German commitments (including acceptance of armament restrictions, complete integration of forces in NATO, and forgoing nuclear weapon production) made *in return* for security guarantees, presence of US and British forces in the FRG, and recognition of Bonn as the sole legitimate German government. As London faced economic pressure to reduce troops in the FRG, von Hassel stressed in NATO that large cuts would make Bonn reconsider its commitments and make also a greater German role in the Standing Group necessary.<sup>79</sup>

Elite opinion polls made in the FRG in summer 1964 (the results were first published in June 1966) indicate the personal views of German leaders about security matters. Wide support existed for NATO and little reason to fear early nationalistic moves. 64 % of the respondents rejected a national nuclear force as “unnecessary for national prestige or national independence” and 94 % as “not credible to the nation’s enemies”; 95 % considered it not worth costs. 90 % thought the country’s military security depended fully or largely on the US deterrent, 79 % were confident about a continuing US commitment to Europe’s security, and 93 % saw “alliances and international instrumentalities as the best means for defending the national interest of the country”. 90 % supported efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to states not yet owning them and 65 % further arms control agreements made even without consulting Bonn.<sup>80</sup>

The results demonstrate discord on a MLF among the otherwise unified German elite: 34 % were “clearly in favor”, 34 % “definitely opposed” it. If a MLF was created, 58 % favored German participation, further 13 % conditionally, and 17 % “definitely opposed” it. The fairly low level of support is striking in light of Bonn’s official pro-MLF stance. The

<sup>78</sup> McGhee to Rusk, 6 March 64, LBJL S:MLF Cb I 1; Emb. Brussels to Rusk on Prime Minister Lefevre-Erhard talks, 27 Apr, *ibid.* II 2; D/98 (fn 75) APD 64; A-2002 E/B to DOS & DOD on 9 May McNamara-Hassel mtg, 11 May, LBJL NSF Komer B/20 Germany; GFO to all posts, 17 Sep, with Att. 7) Bonn’s statement, 16 Sep, PAA R/305/II A6B43 II 8 10; Informationsfunk der Bundesregierung, 17 Sep, and GFO to Emb. NATO, 14 Dec, both *ibid.* 48; Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; Mahncke 1972 p. 167.

<sup>79</sup> Rostow- Müller-Roschach mtg, 8 Oct 64, JFKL N/G; D/110 Grewe to GFO, 4 March, APD 65. In the USG, it was, as before, seen that French and British violations of the WEU Treaty gave Bonn a chance to justify violations. DOS mtg, 3 Nov 64, USNA LBM 2.

<sup>80</sup> All percentages are of respondents who answered the particular question. Similar interviews were made in France. Deutsch 1967 pp. 359-63. He concluded no national nuclear ambitions seemed to exist at the time in the FRG that had to be checked by offering a NATO force. His summary report was published in June 1966 (Deutsch 1966).

conclusion of the study was that instead of *desiring* a MLF, West Germans seemed to *accept* it if the US wanted it.<sup>81</sup>

Tuschhoff points out that the planned MLF was to cover only 25 % of the targets SACEUR wanted to cover with mid-range systems. Though Bonn expected (at least in early 1964) SACEUR to demand further MRBM forces under his authority even if the MLF was realized, the MLF did have the risk that other allies would present it as the sole solution to MRBM needs. Moreover, for Bonn another potential problem was that the MLF would be a *special* nuclear force and could contribute to an increasing de-linking of conventional and nuclear forces, in line with the flexible response -strategy but against Bonn's wishes.<sup>82</sup>

Already the Kennedy administration had seen a new MRBM force in Europe as militarily unnecessary. And by spring 1964, the UK, Benelux states, Denmark, and Norway opposed land-based MRBMs in Europe under existing control schemes since such were both unnecessary and problematic if located in the FRG. West German views on MRBMs in the FRG varied, but a desire to avoid having further Soviet missiles aimed at the FRG caused hesitation.<sup>83</sup>

As lack of enthusiasm in NATO and Moscow's opposition made quick *political* decisions in favor of a MLF hard to reach, the US MLF-lobby pursued the idea through talks on *technical and legal* details of the force. In such talks, several NATO states were prepared to participate. Agreement was reached on such details as that the command and control of the mixed-manned ships would reflect financial contributions of about 40 % by the FRG and the US each and 20 % by other participants. The planned control scheme was that the force could be used under a 67 % majority, the US thus having a veto. The demonstration project of one mixed-manned ship was realized. Many allies, also the UK, took part in it.<sup>84</sup>

In the fall, Bonn and the US MLF-lobby started pushing for a *bilateral* agreement on the MLF, with a chance for other allies to join in later. Erhard wrote to Johnson to stress a need for a prompt tabling of a joint draft treaty, owing to domestic timing concerns and expected UN resolutions that would call for stopping the MLF talks until a NPT was reached. Probably encouraged by Finletter's comment in April, he suggested that to persuade other allies to join a MLF, 1) the two states would be prepared to sign a MLF treaty first alone but make clear this was not to be a bilateral project; and 2) NATO strategy consultations would generally be improved in the same context. Erhard soon expressed his support for bilateral action in public, and to prevent harm to US-French relations, the USG then precluded bilateral moves. Still, when visiting the US, Bonn's NATO representative W. Grewe got an impression that if necessary, the USG would sign a treaty first just with

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<sup>81</sup> Deutsch 1967 p. 363.

<sup>82</sup> Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 278-81.

<sup>83</sup> Klein to Bundy on land-based MRBMs, 27 Apr 64, LBJL S:MLF I 3; Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA.

<sup>84</sup> D/104 also fn 22 GFO official on MLF, 21 Apr, APD 64; Kissinger 1965 p. 135; Seaborg 1987 pp. 107-8.

Bonn.<sup>85</sup> A memo from Bundy shows that he was mistaken: the USG tactic was to “make others just a little bit nervous by refusing to be categorical on this subject in public” though it did oppose a bilateral MLF<sup>86</sup>.

Press reports on the 1958 FIG cooperation on nuclear armaments now further threatened to make Bonn’s MLF enthusiasm appear in a bad light. Bonn once again made a public statement that it did not pursue national control over nuclear weapons but supported a MLF.<sup>87</sup> But it was getting the message through at least to some allies that if no MLF came about, this would have consequences. For instance Luxembourg feared that in the absence of a MLF, the Germans would surely try satisfy their nuclear aspirations in another way and associate with the force de frappe, and that this force could practically become German-controlled if France one day had a weak government.<sup>88</sup>

While some lower-level officials were spreading contrary ideas to allies, top USG officials still clearly wanted the US to have a veto over any MLF. Neither the USG nor the Congress also wanted to change the AEA to allow giving up control over the weapons. Thus even if a MLF was realized, the allies were to get no ability to independently decide to use it. Costigliola argues that the USG designed the MLF to mislead the allies by making them feel, without really being, involved in decision-making. But internal memos from Bonn show that it was both clear and acceptable to Bonn that the US would have a veto (though Bonn opposed any other national vetos). The public USG stance regarding the veto in the future was somewhat ambiguous: the USG kept on indicating that in case of European integration, giving up the veto was maybe possible. Still, it stressed that if the allies would one day want full independence on nuclear weapons, the US would likewise become fully independent. It seemed to the USG that all possible MLF members accepted a US veto; Bonn did not see European control as crucial; and even if Europe integrated, the allies would probably want to maintain the US security commitment (which implied a veto).<sup>89</sup> As the allies were thus unlikely to come to seek elimination of the US veto, it was not very risky for the USG to encourage European integration with such unbinding comments.

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<sup>85</sup> D/263 Erhard to Johnson, 30 Sep, APD 64; D/281 Grewe to Erhard, 10 Oct, *ibid.*; Johnson to Erhard, 7 Oct, LBJL S:MLF II 1; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 116-7.

<sup>86</sup> See Bundy to Johnson, 8 Nov 64, LBJL S:MLF II 1.

<sup>87</sup> “Strauss Denies He Made Nuclear Accord With Paris”, *NYT*, 15 Oct 64; D/292 Etford to Schröder, 21 Oct, APD 64 also fn 7-9 ref. also to *Die Welt*, 14 Oct p. 4 and to a statement in *FRG Bulletin* p. 1320.

<sup>88</sup> T/136 Rivkin (Emb. Luxembourg) to Rusk, 16 Nov 64, LBJL S:MLF Cb III 1.

<sup>89</sup> See Smith to Rusk “MLF Briefing” with Att. B) questions & answers (Q&A), 5 May 64, USNA PM B/2 nuclear sharing MLF; D/40 COP mtg, 23 July, FRUS 64-8:11; D/21 Bonn’s position paper on ANF, 18 Jan, APD 65 also fn 13 ref. to statement by Bundy on the condition of a US veto, *The Times*, 15 Dec 64 p. 10; Rostow to Johnson, 2 Sep 66, with “Non-proliferation Treaty; the Organisation of the West; and Arms Control”, 12 Aug, LBJL BNP; Foster to Johnson, 15 Sep, LBJL NPT II; Costigliola 1994 pp. 180-5. See also Bundy to Johnson (fn 86), 8 Nov 64, and on the control issue Mahnecke 1972 pp. 141-5.



### 9.2.2 Opposition to a jointly owned nuclear force

Growing opposition to a MLF by Moscow, Paris, and London implied that the idea was increasingly running into trouble<sup>90</sup>. Moscow maintained that a MLF was an opening to German control over nuclear weapons and renewed Cold War hostility and said that it was a obstacle to a NPT and progress on German reunification. In late 1964, it increasingly expressed its opposition with both proposals for talks on international problems and threats of creating a WP MLF. It also threatened with tensions if the FRG got nuclear weapons.<sup>91</sup> Bundy argued Moscow's stance was mostly "tactical but ... built on their genuine fear of Germany" and accepted by many "peace lovers and liberals" everywhere<sup>92</sup>. USG officials also thought that Moscow used the MLF to attack NATO in general. Some argued further that though it opposed a NPT that allowed a MLF as long as a MLF was being planned, it could be more flexible later or if a MLF was realized (but possibly execute some concrete threats such as creating a WP MLF).<sup>93</sup> Quester points out that in the 1950s and 1960s, Moscow often seemed more keen to embarrass Bonn than to ensure it got no access to nuclear weapons: regarding, e.g., nuclear sharing, safeguards in the NPT (discussed in section 9.7.2), and status of the GDR, it took stances that attacked Bonn and were clearly unacceptable to the West.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>90</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 246-52, 256; Küntzel 1992 pp. 75-7.

<sup>91</sup> DOS/INR to ActSOS RSB-118 on Soviet opposition to MLF, 16 Dec 64, LBJL S:MLF III 1; Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 246, 256. On Moscow's opposition to MLF, see also Fisher briefing for the GC, 1 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/4 gen. briefing; DOS RSB-119, 21 Dec, FOIA; D/86 Kosygin-Harriman mtg, 21 July 65, FRUS 64-8:11; Bundy to Johnson (san.) with Foster to Johnson, 10 Oct, LBJL MLM; Brzezinski 1964; Mahncke 1972 pp. 204-9. Gromyko told Rusk Moscow opposed a MLF "on broad political grounds, because of FRG revisionism". ACDA/NPT p. 18. Mahncke argues Moscow saw very limited chances for independent German nuclear efforts but wanted to fully preclude them. It opposed a MLF also because this could have enhanced Bonn's status, strengthened NATO, and given an example for its own allies. Brzezinski suggests that also a general concern about proliferation was behind Moscow's stance. On Soviet criticism of NATO nuclear sharing, see also D/D/98 Khrushchev to Kennedy, late Apr 63, FRUS 61-3:6; D/13, D/53 US-USSR mtgs, 27 Feb and 5 Dec 64, FRUS 64-8:11.

Selvage 2001 notes that after Khrushchev lost power and China made its nuclear test, in late 1964 Moscow agreed with WP states on opposing a MLF (pp. 2, 14).

A. Mikoyan's son gave potential indication of Soviet views at the RAND think-tank in the US. He argued a MLF both added to post-WWII concessions to Bonn, which would end up in large German influence on US policies, and indicated lack of interest in better relations with Moscow. Closeness to nuclear weapons was likely to make Bonn tougher towards the East and thus increase the danger of war. Otherwise he indicated trust in the WEU as an obstacle to German nuclear weapon activities. Wolfe (RAND) to DOD, 4 Dec 64, with mtg memo, 1 Dec, LBJL CNP B/7 RAND. See also Wolfe to DOD/ISA with his 25 Nov "The MLF and Soviet Policy", 27 Nov, *ibid.* Wolfe argued Moscow was moreover concerned about decreasing chances of a deal with Bonn. He speculated that Khrushchev's downfall might have been related to his playing with that idea: MLF plans maybe undercut his reconciliatory stance towards Bonn in Moscow. On the role Khrushchev's interest in détente with the West played in his downfall, see also Selvage 2001 p. 12; Schwartz, T. 2003. The GDR argued that both nuclear activities in the FRG and nuclear sharing schemes involving it were revanchist attempts by Bonn to get control over nuclear weapons. See Doernberg et al 1965. On its opposition to West German control over nuclear weapons and stances on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation in general, see Kötter & Müller 1990 pp. 7-18.

<sup>92</sup> Bundy to Johnson (fn 73), 6 Dec 64.

<sup>93</sup> See E/M to Rusk, 10 Aug 64, LBJL S:MLF Cb II 1; DOS RSB-119, 21 Dec, FOIA; D/60 McCloy at GC mtg, 7-8 Jan 65, FRUS 64-8:11.

<sup>94</sup> Quester 1970 pp. 115, 286.

Paris now strongly opposed a MLF and said that it was a US attempt to divide NATO and prevent a “European Europe”. It tried to persuade Bonn to abandon the idea and declared a tradeoff between it and European integration, German reunification, bilateral cooperation, and French cooperation in NATO. A key question for Bonn was whether de Gaulle had anything to offer as a substitute for a MLF. In July, de Gaulle said to State Secretary K. Carstens (GFO) that Bonn would get a much greater nuclear role through cooperation with France than through a MLF. But when Erhard in turn stressed to de Gaulle that the FRG needed nuclear protection, asked about the nature of the force de frappe, and probed into shared control over it, de Gaulle made it clear that the force would be purely French (but argued that the security of the FRG was best protected through close ties to France). This seems to have made Erhard think that de Gaulle aimed to give Bonn only a role of a vassal. For nuclear protection, Erhard preferred dependence on the US.<sup>95</sup> A later GFO memo argued that a MLF was the only way for the FRG to get a role in Western nuclear strategy and boost its status: Paris had not offered shared control over its force, which anyway would have provided less protection than US forces. De Gaulle, however, told Erhard’s critic Adenauer that in a time of lacking German-French solidarity, the force de frappe was solely French, but it would become a part of the defense of a politically integrated Europe – an option the Germans were keen on. Adenauer, though retired, for his part persuaded the CDU caucus to delay action with the MLF plan.<sup>96</sup>

To the USG, Paris argued Bonn was very unlikely to decide early to pursue nuclear weapons; thus no MLF was needed to prevent that. It indicated it would not give nuclear weapons to the FRG or any other state, agreed there should be no more proliferation, but noted that the problem was how to prevent it. A document in the USNA reveals that the French even admitted to the USG that the idea of a French-dominated “European deterrent... was good only for political speeches”.<sup>97</sup> To Rusk, de Gaulle seemed to want to protect France by keeping the FRG in a subordinated position<sup>98</sup>.

Schröder warned the USG that though the force de frappe was not enough to protect Europe, if the MLF plan failed many Germans might support the idea of participation in the French force (even though Paris would retain final control over it). Erhard in turn

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<sup>95</sup> D/186 also fn 9 Carstens’s talks with the French, 4 July, APD 64; D/60 (fn 67) FRUS 64-8:15; Neustadt to Bundy, 7 Nov, with D. Mark on US stance on a MLF, 4 Nov, LBJL S:MLF II 2; Bundy to Johnson (fn 73), 6 Dec; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 247-50; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 195. According to Strauss 1989, he and others thought that a comment de Gaulle made about preparedness to cooperate with the FRG in all fields covered nuclear weapons but Erhard did not react to the offer (pp. 316-8). On Paris’s stances on a MLF, see also Seaborg 1987 pp. 103-4. Tuschhoff 1999 suggests that Paris’s failure to offer institutional mechanisms to enforce the extended deterrence it offered explains why Bonn was not interested in substituting the US deterrent for the French one.

<sup>96</sup> De Gaulle said it was good that Bonn had so far forgone nuclear weapon production but European integration would make it necessary to reconsider this. D/318 Adenauer-de Gaulle disc., 9 Nov, APD 64; Adviser Brzezinski to Bundy, 11 Dec, USNA LBM 4; D/365 Krapf on NATO’s nuclear problem, 24 Sep, APD 65; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 p. 117.

<sup>97</sup> Couve de Murville-Ball disc., 2 Dec 64, USNA LBM 3; Rusk (E/P) to DOS on Rusk-Prime Minister Pompidou mtg, 14 Dec, LBJL S:MLF Cb III 2.

<sup>98</sup> Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA.

expressed concern to McGhee that as Bonn would not give the financial support Paris desired for the force de frappe, the force threatened to destroy France financially, and urged the USG to use cost arguments to persuade de Gaulle to abandon it in favor of a MLF.<sup>99</sup> In all, as the prospects of early Franco-German nuclear weapon cooperation seemed weak, the US had less need to offer immediate substitutes to it<sup>100</sup>.

The USG and Bonn still saw Britain's participation in a MLF as necessary. But the Britons in general strongly disliked the idea of any German involvement or moves in the nuclear weapon field. The Labor government that came to power in fall 1964 wanted a NPT to be reached promptly. Regarding nuclear sharing with non-nuclear allies, it preferred to give them a role in decision-making instead of sharing hardware.<sup>101</sup>

London stuck to *multinational*, Nassau agreement Par. 6 -solutions to a NATO nuclear force: it proposed an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), based on existing and thus cheaper forces, with the NWSs having the final say over its use, and connected to a NATO nonproliferation agreement. The British Polaris submarines were moreover left out of the proposed force. Other NATO states saw this primarily as a mere attempt to add to problems in MLF talks. Still, the proposal met with fierce opposition by the French, who considered it more likely to succeed than a MLF and thus more dangerous.<sup>102</sup>

Bonn opposed the ANF proposal. Regarding the nonproliferation clause, Bonn again told the USG that it wanted to save further such commitments as bargaining chips for reunification talks with Moscow (the MLF treaty was planned to include only a preambular reference to nonproliferation). It also wanted nonproliferation to be dealt with globally, not in a Western European context.<sup>103</sup>

But seeing British participation in any joint force as necessary, top USG officials wanted to be flexible regarding the form of a force. Especially those who thought that Bonn supported the MLF plan to please the USG argued that as long as any appearance of a

<sup>99</sup> D/363 Schröder-Bundy disc., 27 Nov; D/380 Erhard-McGhee disc., 11 Dec, both APD 64.

<sup>100</sup> Küntzel 1992 argues that Bonn's *assurances* about the primary role of US-FRG relations decreased the need for the USG to offer substitutes for French temptations (p. 72). But the assurances as such were also suited for hinting to the USG that Bonn had other options, too. On Bonn's assurances, see also D/60 (fn 67) FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>101</sup> Though Labor had earlier indicated that it would be prepared to give up the independent deterrent (see Chapter 8 fn 245), after coming to power it started supporting maintaining the national force. Bundy to Johnson (fn 86), 8 Nov 64; US-UK mtg 8 Dec, 10 Dec, USNA LBM 4; Geyelin 1966 p. 166; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 250-2; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 132-3; Küntzel 1992 pp. 76, 87; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 pp. 167-9. On British stances on a MLF, see also US Information Agency (USIA) to Johnson, 4 Dec 64, LBJL S:MLF III 2; Seaborg 1987 pp. 101-2.

<sup>102</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 255-6; Lauk 1979 pp. 47, 56-57; Küntzel 1992 pp. 79-81; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 pp. 166-71. See the latter on the ANF proposal in general. They argue it was a serious nonproliferation effort and not, as often argued (see, e.g., Freedman 1989 p. 328), just a move to prevent a MLF. Mahncke 1972 suggests it was only that but Paris saw it as a serious compromise attempt (p. 202). Dalma 1965 argues it was on the contrary "less transparent and harder to realize" than a MLF (p. 6).

<sup>103</sup> D/339 Carstens-Ball disc., 16 Nov, APD 64; D/8 Knappstein to GFO on 7 Jan disc. with Rusk, 8 Jan; D/21 (fn 89) both APD 65; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 173.

status decrease or failure by Bonn was avoided, Bonn would come to accept modifications to plans.<sup>104</sup>

The lack of European and even of broad West German interest in a MLF did not help the idea in the US. In the Congress, opposition to a joint force existed among various groups (though Bundy thought that strong support by allies could have created a majority for a force). Now also many US and NATO military men, Norstad and L. Lemnitzer, his successor as SACEUR, opposed a MLF, and others, including the JCS, were uneager about it. Arguments about German ambitions were used in contradicting ways to argue against a MLF. Sen. C. Holifield told Johnson that West German officials had privately said that Bonn supported the MLF plan partially because it appeared as a step towards national control over nuclear weapons. Others in turn argued that no pressure for a national nuclear force existed in the FRG, anyway: the French example was there seen as irrelevant because of Germany's special position, even German Gaullists wanted to retain the US commitment, and the UK was accepted as a nuclear power.<sup>105</sup>

### 9.2.3 Silent abandonment of the multilateral force

Owing to such domestic and foreign views on a MLF, USG interest in it was going down. In October 1964, ASOS/EUR W. Tyler and Klein argued to Bundy that it was maybe a bad idea; top officials needed to review it and its effects on NATO. Only a bilateral MLF was at all possible in time by year end but such a force would have had negative effects on NATO and relations with Moscow. Bonn's arguments about domestic political reasons for an early MLF treaty were questionable. Also questions about MLF command, control, and financing remained open. Klein argued that the USG needed to turn away from the ship scheme to something else, possibly based on existing forces and the ANF proposal – except it Johnson already felt too committed to the present plan to do so.<sup>106</sup>

But shelving the MLF *altogether* seemed unwise to many in the USG. A DOS memo argued both the USG and Bonn were too committed to it to do so and that doing so implied a grave risk to the standing of the US in the FRG and elsewhere and even of making West Germans question the Atlantic orientation. Others argued Erhard's cabinet had committed its prestige to a MLF and, e.g., Erhard, Schröder, and von Hassel would see its abandonment or watering down as betrayal (though others in Bonn opposed a MLF for various reasons).<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Neustadt with Mark on MLF (fn 95), 4 Nov 64; Bundy to Johnson (fn 86), 8 Nov.

<sup>105</sup> See Eight Senators to Johnson, 7 Sep 64, LBJL S:MLF II 2; Holifield to Johnson, 3 Oct, DNSA NP00998; Mark on MLF (fn 95), 4 Nov; Bundy to Johnson, 8 Nov (fn 86) and 6 Dec (fn 73); Mahncke 1972 pp. 196-9; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 253.

<sup>106</sup> Tyler and Klein to Bundy, 9-10 Oct 64, LBJL S:MLF II 2.

<sup>107</sup> DOS/INR to Rusk REU-61 on potential changes to the MLF plan, 28 Oct 64, *ibid.*; Klein to Bundy, 30 Nov, with Hillenbrand (E/B) memo, 25 Nov, *ibid.* 1.

Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and other USG officials now agreed that the MLF plan needed modification: though a joint force was the best available way to secure West German ties to NATO, it had to include the UK and thus flexibility was needed regarding its form. The lacking support in Europe, harm to nonproliferation efforts, divisive effect in NATO, and likely problems with the Congress were making especially Bundy open to major changes or letting the idea just drift for some years. He thought Johnson was not too committed to a MLF to let it sink, though the sinking had to be done carefully. But he saw the pro-MLF passions of lower-level officials as a problem and stressed a need to ensure top-level control of MLF-related actions. Having won the elections of 3 November 1964 with the largest popular majority ever, Johnson was according to Seaborg also himself giving more attention to the MLF plan.<sup>108</sup>

USG officials now saw the goal of reaching a MLF treaty by year end as unrealistic. Also Erhard told McGhee that he no longer expected one to be signed in time but wanted that to happen in early 1965.<sup>109</sup>

In early December, the DOS still reassured Bonn that though no majority existed in the Congress for a MLF, once concluded, a MLF treaty and the needed changes to the AEA could get its approval<sup>110</sup>. In public, Johnson said that the US continued to work on nuclear sharing to meet allies' concerns, referring both to a need to treat the FRG respectfully and to West German rejection of "all separate adventures, especially ... and most wisely, in the field of nuclear weapons"<sup>111</sup>.

Johnson was to meet the new British Prime Minister, J. Wilson. Before that, he undertook a series of meetings with aides to decide about a stance towards the MLF. Having until then not been fully informed about it and Kennedy's stances and hesitation<sup>112</sup>, he inquired why Kennedy had been reserved. In response, Bundy wrote a "devil's advocate" memo in order to make also the arguments against pressure for a MLF finally clear to Johnson – though for political reasons he still favored pressing nuclear sharing in the meeting with Wilson. The basic argument against pressure for a MLF/ANF was that the force had many loud opponents in France, Moscow, the military, the JCAE, and the Senate and realizing it required a strong presidential effort. Though the reasons for Kennedy's reserve had varied over time, in the end he had thought especially that no MLF was worthwhile if reachable only through strong US pressure. As less European interest existed than Kennedy had

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<sup>108</sup> Bundy to Johnson, 8 Nov 64 (fn 86); Bundy to Rusk, McNamara & Ball, 25 Nov, USNA Lot Ball B/27; Seaborg 1987 pp. 121-2 ref. to Mtg memo, 31 Oct 64, LBJL S:MLF. Bundy wrote to Johnson that disagreement existed on policy towards Paris: Rusk wanted "public debate" since Paris's actions were "outrageous", but Bundy and probably McNamara favored a cooperative policy as a way to undercut Paris's claims that the US did not want a unified Europe.

<sup>109</sup> Bundy now wrote Johnson that the 1964 goal had been "always optimistic, but the Germans and our MLF advocates both wanted a target to keep the work going." D/307 Erhard-McGhee disc., 3 Nov, APD 64; Bundy to Johnson, 8 Nov (fn 86).

<sup>110</sup> T/3485 FRG Emb. Washington to GFO, 2 Dec 64, PAA R/305/II A6B43 II8 10.

<sup>111</sup> Johnson's speech, 3 Dec 64, PPJ 788.

<sup>112</sup> See, e.g., USG mtg, 6 Dec 64, DDRS; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 pp. 171-2.

required, a MLF was only justified if it seemed necessary for NATO cohesion and nonproliferation.<sup>113</sup>

In the memo, Bundy outlined what indeed became Johnson's new tactic with the MLF initiative. Bundy noted that if Johnson decided to continue "half steam" with the MLF, no MLF would come about, but as he alone could not be blamed for that, many key risks could be avoided, including harm to US-FRG relations and de Gaulle's attracting other Europeans (who were not too impressed by his ideas; very few Germans preferred reliance on France to that on the US). An alternative way to show benevolence to allies was to strengthen consultations in NATO and indicate that if the Cold War heightened back to where it was when the MLF idea came up, a MLF could be pursued again. Bundy expected such changes to create only manageable problems with Bonn.<sup>114</sup>

Probes into senators' views revealed to Johnson that these were opposed to giving up US custody of nuclear weapons in a MLF. He had meetings with his key aides in order to decide about the destiny of the MLF initiative, concluding that the idea of a MLF was likely to fail anyway and that pressing for it was not worthwhile. The USG meeting memos shed light into his thinking about the Germans in general and demonstrate the discord in the USG over nuclear sharing in NATO. They also show that Johnson was clearly very concerned about the cost for him of trying to sell the MLF at home: he argued that his administration's account at the Congress would be emptied if it tried to push a MLF, noting that "I worked like hell to get to be President and I don't want to set it off all at once." He also saw insufficient support for a MLF in Europe and said that "if Europe isn't for it, then the hell with it." And he did not want to press the British hard just to please the Germans, suggesting that his aides were telling him "to kick mother England out the door into the cold, while I bring the Kaiser into the sitting room", which was something the Congress and the US public would dislike (as also Wilson knew this, Johnson thought Wilson to have a strong bargaining position with him). But he was also clearly concerned about the possibility of a new Hitler, German resentment that could lead to a WWII, and Bonn's pursuing a national nuclear force – he considered the latter possible even sooner than what his aides expected. Johnson saw a "need to appease the inferiority complex of the Germans... We had to do more than tell them [that they were equal]; we had to give them symbols of their equality." But regarding McNamara's point that the abandonment of the seaborne force would lead to a re-emergence of demands for land-based MRBMs in Europe, Johnson even suggested telling the allies to "defend yourselves". McNamara saw that as unfeasible since the Germans would then seek nuclear weapons but noted that though the military wanted land-based MRBMs, such were unfeasible in being "politically unacceptable to all governments". Rusk said that as before, he favored a Par. 6 -force, "a multi-national force with a multilateral component – the Nassau idea". Ball argued that the

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<sup>113</sup> Bundy to Johnson (fn 73), 6 Dec 64.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. On Bundy's ideas for tactics with Wilson and the MLF proposal, see also USG mtg, 6 Dec, DDRS.

USG was committed to the MLF in European eyes and McNamara and Bundy noted that Finletter and others had indeed given the impression in Europe that also Johnson was committed. But Johnson said that he was not, that at home the USG was clearly not committed, and that only White House commitments mattered. Besides, “face-saving wasn’t his principal object in life.”<sup>115</sup>

Johnson’s preferred tactic was to make a strong case to Wilson that the Germans could not be treated badly. Expecting Wilson to reject a joint force, he aimed to agree with him on both sides’ talking to the Germans, after which “we’ll conclude that nobody is for it.” Thus he rejected a stance of commitment to a MLF/ANF his men had proposed for the Wilson talks, called off US efforts to promote the force, and left allies to take initiative. He followed his plan in a private meeting with Wilson where he stressed that though he “had no intention of forcing the matter [Atlantic nuclear problem] now... his overwhelming interest was to make sure that the Germans did not get us into World War III ...the object was to keep the Germans with us and keep their hand off the trigger.” According to his new guidelines for MLF talks, which he leaked to the press, US officials were not to push for a MLF and any agreement on it had to support nonproliferation efforts.<sup>116</sup>

Some keen MLF-supporters took Johnson’s decision very hard. Both Finletter and G. Smith, who had headed a MLF-unit in the DOS, soon resigned. Smith’s unit was closed down altogether.<sup>117</sup>

To avoid alienating Bonn, the USG officially continued to support a MLF but left the ball for London and Berlin to play in bilateral talks. Since the allies had shown little initiative so far, Johnson correctly hoped the plan to wither away under growing opposition and German-British disputes. In this way, he hoped to avoid becoming guilty for the failure of the plan in West German eyes.<sup>118</sup>

Owing to rumors about weakening US interest in a MLF, Bonn asked for a USG statement in support of the idea. But the USG informed Bonn that though Johnson supported a MLF, he did not want to force it into life, and that domestic opposition made such statements impossible. As Johnson took distance from the idea, in early 1965 CDU leader R. Barzel already said to McGhee that the plan was practically dead. But Seaborg notes that since the USG continued to stress its interest in NATO nuclear sharing (Johnson did so again in a mid-January press conference), it did not become fully clear to the allies in general that the USG had de facto abandoned the MLF idea.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> USG mtgs, 5-6 Dec 64, DDRS.

<sup>116</sup> USG mtgs, 5-6 Dec 64; Bundy on Johnson’s account of mtg with Wilson, 7 Dec, all DDRS; NSAM 322 guidelines for NATO talks, 17 Dec, LBJL JNM. On the developments, see also Geyelin 1966 pp. 167-9, 176; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 121-2; Seaborg 1987 pp. 123-8; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 pp. 171-2.

<sup>117</sup> Seaborg 1987 p. 129.

<sup>118</sup> Costigliola 1994 pp. 187-91; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 178.

<sup>119</sup> D/392 Schröder-McGhee disc., 19 Dec, APD 64; D/3 Schröder-McGhee disc, 7 Jan, APD 65 also fn 38-9 ref. to Emb. Washington to GFO, 10 Dec and 12 Jan; T/2647 McGhee to Rusk on disc. with Barzel, 15 Jan, LBJL S:MLF Cb IV; Johnson’s press conf., 16 Jan, PPJ 22; Seaborg 1987 pp. 169-71.

Like Johnson, many in the USG continued to worry about German nuclear ambitions. Some continued to argue also that a failure with a MLF/ANF would over time lead to undesirable German reactions. According to USG memos, rumors of Bonn's nuclear cooperation with Israel or France remained unsubstantiated and neither West German public, cabinet, nor military seemed willing to harm relations with allies and foes with a national nuclear weapon effort. But DOS officials argued that perceptions of discrimination or threatened security, or failure of the MLF plan, would make the Germans first to seek stronger ties to the US but over time probably to want more nuclear equality with key allies and thus to pursue a national or a Franco-German force. Also McNamara thought that in the absence of a joint force, even greater consultations and US pressure (including threats to withdraw troops) might not keep the FRG from going nuclear, certainly not if further states went nuclear. Advisors to the USG suggested that especially China's becoming a real nuclear power (especially if India or Japan seemed to follow suit) could over time make the Germans anxious and interested in bilateral deals with Moscow.<sup>120</sup>

But for instance JCS Chairman E. Wheeler argued that strong outside pressure was enough to keep the FRG from going nuclear, and former DepSOD R. Gilpatric expected the FRG to do anything that would risk its relations with the US even if new nuclear sharing schemes turned out to be unfeasible. A CIA memo portrayed the FRG as no immediate proliferation problem: it was unlikely to start a nuclear weapon program in the 1960s since it had insufficient domestic sources of uranium and a strong popular sentiment existed against nuclear weapons.<sup>121</sup>

In line with Kennedy's earlier concerns, some outside observers argued that instead of offering a way to satisfy German desires, the MLF plan had indeed just whet Bonn's nuclear appetite. Kissinger argued the USG itself had created nuclear ambitions in the FRG with attempts to solve a problem thought to exist and promoted German nuclear interests in a way Bonn itself could not do. The Germans just wanted political equality with France and the UK, but as they were *thought* to want nuclear weapons, their statements were misinterpreted. The MLF initiative was counterproductive in indicating that possession of nuclear weapons was a precondition for equality and influence in NATO. Instead of preventing Franco-German projects, it had thus helped Bonn to argue that it needed an alternative if nothing came out of it. Also Beaton argued that though in the US, the

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<sup>120</sup> See Gilpatric on 9 Dec talk with GC members, 10 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/1 P/1 MLF; DOS on national attitudes and "Factors..." (fn 16), 12 Dec; Rostow to GC, 13 Dec, FOIA; D/56 GC mtg, 13-4 Dec, FRUS 64-8:11; Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; McNamara briefing on proliferation, 7 Jan, JFKL GD; McCloy to Gilpatric, 8 Jan, USNA DAC B/11.

<sup>121</sup> Gilpatric to GC members with "Tentative Thoughts on Certain Proliferation Problems", 4 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/1 P/1 MLF; CIA to Keeny, 8 Dec, with 1 Dec briefing for GC "Nuclear Weapon Programs Around the World" (san.), LBJL CNP B/6 NIE 4-2-64; Wheeler briefing on proliferation, 7 Jan 65, JFKL GD.



Germans were thought to be interested in nuclear weapon affairs for prestige reasons, they really just wanted their security to be somehow ensured.<sup>122</sup>

Though Johnson abandoned the MLF, Geyelin argues that he accepted the argument that to keep the Germans from pursuing an own nuclear force, they had to be offered *something*, and came to want to give the allies a greater role in decisions about joint defense<sup>123</sup>. However, for instance Bundy's arguments discussed above suggest that though the USG saw it as advisable to offer something else to allies if the MLF was abandoned, what was seen as needed was still a *gesture* of goodwill and trust, rather than any real increase allies' influence.

The development of Johnson's policy on nuclear sharing is discussed further in section 9.6. Next, I briefly outline nuclear development in the FRG and then go on to discuss general USG policies in the field of nuclear nonproliferation.

### **9.3 Broad nuclear development in West Germany**

Excluding the multi-purpose reactor discussed in section 7.4.2, most (pre-commercial) power reactors commissioned in the FRG by 1968 were of relatively proliferation-resistant types. The FRG was both importing reactors and developing nuclear technologies itself: by the latter half of 1964, it had on its own built a big fuel fabrication plant and six research reactors. The reactors used foreign-supplied materials and were safeguarded. According to a USG memo, the FRG also had some significant, independently constructed R&D facilities *not* under safeguards (as Euratom safeguards applied to all civilian uses of nuclear materials in the member states, it seems the reference was to *military* R&D plants). The FRG operated two small uranium mines and got under safeguards large amounts of natural and enriched uranium from the US. The AEC estimated that by early 1968, West German nuclear reactors would produce about 400 kg plutonium – enough for a large number of nuclear weapons if the plutonium was separated from spent fuel somewhere.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Kissinger 1965 pp. 141-4, 154-6; Beaton 1966 p. 64. Also Mendershausen 1972 wrote that even the idea of a German nuclear force at least partially resulted from US statements about the inevitability of proliferation to the FRG (p. 420).

<sup>123</sup> Geyelin 1966 pp. 168, 260.

<sup>124</sup> AEC to Gilpatric, 27 Nov 64, with "US International Program for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" with App. C "Estimated PU Production in Foreign Reactors", n/d, LBJL CNP B/3 P/4 gen. I; AEC to Gilpatric on foreign nuclear programs, 16 Dec, with summaries of them, Aug 64, *ibid.* B/2 P/4. Contradicting the AEC information, a CIA briefing to the GC (fn 121) said that all nuclear material in the FRG was safeguarded. It seems the CIA official making the briefing was either not aware that Euratom safeguards did not apply to military facilities in the FRG or chose not to point this out in that briefing. The US supplied the FRG quite open-handedly with both low- and highly enriched uranium. The maximum quantity under the bilateral agreement was 2500 kg and in the US-Euratom agreement 70000 kg (for comparison, the limit was only 10 kg for Israel but 14500 kg for India and 2700 kg for Japan). The AEC was free to provide any amount of the 2500 kg enriched up to weapon-grade (90 %) when supplied to a West German R&D reactor with a fuel load of max. 8 kg (a similar limit existed for Israel and others; the US supplied France with no uranium enriched to over 60 %). ISA/DOD to NSCS with AEC on material limits in civilian cooperation agreements, 10 Nov, LBJL CNP B/2 P/4 I. For reactor data, see Keck 1993a p. 187; IAEA 2003.

Also a government-financed project for nuclear propulsion had started in 1963 in the FRG. The official aim was to develop ships for commercial uses, but such were not expected to become economical for a long time to come. Thus understandably, interest in military nuclear ships or submarines has been suspected to have been behind the effort.<sup>125</sup> The view seems justified taking into account Bonn's interest in nuclear propulsion and military reactors (discussed in section 7.4.3).

The West German also had a fast breeder reactor (FBR) project in Karlsruhe. FBRs pose relatively large proliferation risks since 1) they are economically feasible only when proliferation-risky fuel recycle is provided for; 2) the technology makes PU-extraction from fresh fuel relatively easy; 3) PU-quantities produced in FBRs are large; and 4) FBRs enable producing weapon-quality plutonium without attracting attention since basic reload intervals can be used for taking the material out. At the start of the 1960s, termination threatened the Karlsruhe project because little present or expected future economic need to produce fuel in FBRs existed. But Bonn's eagerness to secure returns from its financial contributions to Euratom came to the help of the project. In 1960, the FRG and other Euratom member states got the Euratom commission to abandon the idea of an integrated FBR project and instead to offer financial participation in national FBR programs. Bonn presented the Karlsruhe project as a candidate for such cooperation to Euratom, at the same time expanded it, and, as agreement on partial Euratom financing was reached, increased its financing for the project. The project remained basically under German control, but Belgium and the Netherlands came to cooperate in it. This was in Bonn seen as politically desirable because it helped alleviate suspicions that a goal of getting material for military uses was behind the project.<sup>126</sup>

Owing to its indigenous technology development, the FRG was also becoming a supplier of nuclear equipment. Thus the DOS wanted it to participate in Western supplier meetings. In the mid-1960s, its export policies did not create concern for the USG: Bonn supported the idea of safeguards and, as far as the USG knew, had demanded them on all large equipment exports.<sup>127</sup>

#### **9.4 The Johnson administration's general policy on safeguards and nonproliferation in 1964-65**

Beyond such attempts to reduce individual states' incentives to acquire nuclear weapons as the MLF proposal, the USG could try to promote the goal of nonproliferation through technical measures to make diversion of nuclear assistance harder (safeguards) and by seeking political commitments by other states not to produce nuclear weapons (especially

<sup>125</sup> A nuclear-propulsion ship was taken into operation in the latter half of 1968 and retired a decade later. See, e.g., Radkau 1983 pp. 155-9; Keck 1993a pp. 184, 187.

<sup>126</sup> See Keck 1981 pp. 69-76, 97, 215.

<sup>127</sup> DOS "Nuclear Export Controls of Other Countries", 11 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/9 file copy.

a NPT). But many states, including not only Israel and the FRG but also, e.g., other Euratom states, India, and Sweden<sup>128</sup>, proved less than happy to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. The USG itself was in turn debating whether a strong nonproliferation policy and efforts for a NPT were in US interest at all.

#### 9.4.1 Promotion of safeguards

In 1961, the IAEA had agreed on safeguards for small reactors, and in 1963, the US and the USSR agreed on supporting IAEA safeguards and broadening them. The USG generally wanted to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, persuade all nuclear suppliers to demand similar safeguards as it did (which was not yet the case), and change its bilateral safeguards into IAEA ones. Since, e.g., UAR and Israeli missile and nuclear programs had benefited from Western assistance, the USG felt a need to coordinate export controls with its allies, and in June 1964 Rusk approved efforts to seek French, British, and West German cooperation on nuclear and missile technology export controls and on promoting IAEA safeguards in the Near East in particular. China's nuclear test in fall 1964 came to give the US further impetus to revise export policies and to try persuade all nuclear suppliers to demand safeguards.<sup>129</sup>

The Dimona visits enabled the USG to *say* that it verified Israeli claims about the plant. But Cohen argues that the USG was getting uneasy in that role and that it therefore was by summer 1964 pressing Israel on IAEA safeguards. However, that the USG did so (only) now probably also resulted from the fact that IAEA safeguards were, as discussed in section 8.1.2, only applied after reactors went critical. As the expiration of the original agreement on the Nachal Soreq reactor was approaching, the USG pressed for a switch to IAEA safeguards there, too, but Israel was opposed. IAEA safeguards were on the agenda in the Johnson-Eshkol meeting, but Israel continued to reject such on the Dimona reactor. However, it came to accept such on the Nachal Soreq reactor (after a nine-month extension to bilateral safeguards) and in principle on a possible desalination project.<sup>130</sup>

In Washington, cooperation on desalination (including supply of suitable nuclear reactors) was seen as a possible quid pro quo for Israeli and UAR acceptance of IAEA safeguards. Though the Israelis according to Hersh suspected that the US goal was partially to divert

<sup>128</sup> See, e.g., Seaborg 1987 pp. 269-73.

<sup>129</sup> In spring 1965, the USG and Moscow came to agree on a revision of the IAEA safeguards system. See "Chronological Summary ..." (fn 13); Fisher briefing for GC, 1 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/4 gen. briefing; NEA "Talking Points", 7 Dec, LBJL MEC 1; Seaborg briefing on proliferation, 7 Jan 65, JFKL GD; Hall 1965 pp. 610, 613; Seaborg 1987 p. 269; Küntzel 1992 pp. 109, 114-5; Müller 1994 p. 316; Lavoy 2003. See Gilpatric's aide Rivkin on Atoms for Peace, 14 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/2 P/3 on the pros and cons of US nuclear export policy and different safeguards schemes.

<sup>130</sup> Johnson-Eshkol mtg, 1 June 64, AHP B/474 Israel and D/65 FRUS 64-8:18; D/68 Komer to Johnson, 3 June, *ibid.*; "Recap..." with Dimona inspection chron. (fn 23); "Chronological Summary..." (fn 13); Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 203-5, 216. The USG warned Israel that if no new safeguards deal was reached in time for the Nachal Soreq reactor, Israel would have to return the reactor's fuel. DOS on the US-Israel cooperation agreement, 28 May, LBJL KEV 2.

Israel's resources from weapon efforts, they did want the USG to commit itself early to a desalting project. But the USG wanted to study the idea thoroughly before making any big commitments.<sup>131</sup>

The goal of promoting IAEA safeguards in general made it desirable to have them applied also in Euratom member states. Though not opposed to the system as such, these wanted to neither accept double controls nor abandon Euratom safeguards; they saw the latter as an integrative and equalizing measure and better than IAEA safeguards. Euratom states also wanted to deal with the US directly (not through the IAEA) in nuclear matters. In support of Euratom safeguards, the French told the USG that in the early 1960s, Prime Minister M. Debré had wanted to do away with Euratom but changed his mind because its "safeguards were in fact only real control over Germany's renunciation of atomic weapons" and had the extra benefit of equality, which prevented German resentment.<sup>132</sup>

In summer 1964, the IAEA asked Bonn to show support for it by subjecting some reactors also to its controls. Though those were less thorough than Euratom safeguards, Bonn was not receptive: it feared them to make Euratom controls less needed and create an advantage for France, which would not accept IAEA safeguards. Moreover, German officials wanted to retain also acceptance of IAEA controls as a bargaining chip for reunification talks.<sup>133</sup>

As discussed in section 7.4.1, the USG had relied on Euratom safeguards regarding the nuclear material it supplied to Euratom states. A planned, unusually large sale of plutonium (425 kg) to FBR projects in France and the FRG made USG officials in fall 1964 more concerned about the lacking US control rights and especially Johnson's science and technology aides worry about the potential for military implications and harm to efforts for general acceptance of international safeguards. But the AEC, eager to sell the material for financial reasons and to benefit from cooperation with the Europeans on FBRs, pushed forward with the sale, arguing that the UK would otherwise sell the material. Moreover, it was seen in the USG that to keep others from producing nuclear materials, the US had to meet their legitimate needs.<sup>134</sup> The sale took place, and also US supply of enriched uranium to Euratom remained liberal. Euratom states accepted dependence on US fuel supply for the time being but still considered the idea of a European enrichment facility; moreover, France was constructing its own enrichment plant.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>131</sup> "List of reassuring moves we might make to Eshkol" (n/a), 30 Apr 64; T/1140 Barbour to Rusk, 15 May, both *ibid.*; Komer to Bundy, 9 Jan 65, LBJL N/I 1 III Cb 2; Hersh 1991 p. 154. On the desalination initiative, see also Schoenbaum 1993.

<sup>132</sup> M/EC to DOS & AEC on mtg with Euratom official, 10 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/3 P/4 Euratom.

<sup>133</sup> D/331 Müller-Roschach on safeguards, 13 Nov, APD 64.

<sup>134</sup> Science aide Hornig to Johnson, 30 Sep 64; Rivkin to Hornig, 18 Dec, both LBJL NSF SF B/15 Euratom Jan 65-Feb 67; Rivkin to GC members, 9 Dec, with memo on PU-deal, n/d, with 1) Seaborg to Bundy, 30 Sep, and 2) memo to Rivkin on US control rights, 20 Oct, LBJL CNP B/2 P/4; AEC to Rivkin with "Additional Comments on U.S. Euratom Safeguards", 15 Dec, *ibid.* B/3 P/4 Euratom; AEC to Rivkin, 17 Dec, *ibid.* II; "Achievement of a weapons capability by additional nations" (san.), n/d, *ibid.* I; AEC to Bundy, 15 Jan 65, *ibid.* Euratom; GC mtg, 1 Dec; Seaborg briefing on proliferation, 7 Jan 65, both JFKL GD.

<sup>135</sup> DOS/Euratom pp. 73-6.

### 9.4.2 Nonproliferation policy under development

In expectation of and after China's first nuclear test in fall 1964, increasing urgency was felt in the USG to find a solution to the *global* nonproliferation problem. Also this factor spoke in favor of an abandonment of the MLF plan, which was creating hurdles to progress towards a NPT.<sup>136</sup> The USG was pressed to take initiative on a NPT also because if non-aligned states, which were pressing with the matter, were let to become the key driving force for a NPT, protecting NATO's nuclear sharing schemes was bound to be hard.<sup>137</sup>

Since summer 1964, ACDA was stressing that despite the MLF talks, the US had to keep up efforts for a NPT, which offered the only chance of long-term nonproliferation success. Especially as several states already had capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, delay with a NPT increased the risk that further states would decide to go nuclear before a NPT was reached. If they did, that would heighten tensions in general, push others to follow suit, and undercut the MLF as a nonproliferation measure. Moreover, an impression that the USG compromised nonproliferation efforts for the sake of NATO nuclear sharing was argued to harm efforts to persuade, e.g., India and Israel not to pursue nuclear weapons and seem like a permission to do so.<sup>138</sup>

USG officials saw a NPT much more as a potential *political* obstacle to going nuclear than a *technical* hurdle as shown by the fact that though ACDA favored safeguards (that were a technical hurdle to unrestricted pursuing of nuclear weapons), it was also interested in a NPT that did not require them in case Moscow or other key states were opposed to mandatory safeguards. Rusk also thought that a requirement of tight safeguards would keep states from joining a NPT.<sup>139</sup>

A NPT was also seen as no wonderworking medicine in the USG. The CIA argued that though further test bans or a NPT would "impose legal, moral, and political restraints of some consequence", they would be unlikely to prevent nuclear weapon efforts by states that had strong incentives to acquire such weapons<sup>140</sup>. Any NPT could also be exited, though the example of the PTBT had so far shown that states were unlikely to use that option<sup>141</sup>. ACDA argued that despite an exit clause, a NPT promised a good way to help "*halt or at least hinder* proliferation" by *postponing* (i.e., not necessarily preventing) national decisions to go nuclear. It saw the *decisions* as crucial: the exact timing of an acquisition of a weapon capability was less important.<sup>142</sup>

<sup>136</sup> See also, e.g., Keeny on NPT, 24 Dec 68, LBJL NPT I 1-3.

<sup>137</sup> Seaborg 1987 pp. 133-4.

<sup>138</sup> Fisher to Rusk, 15 June 64, LBJL S:MLF I 2; D/44 (fn 69) FRUS 64-8:11; Foster to Bundy with Foster to Gilpatric, 4 Nov, LBJL GC 2; Fisher at GC mtg, 1 Dec, JFKL GD; ACDA/NPT pp. 6-8, 11.

<sup>139</sup> D/44 (fn 69) FRUS 64-8:11; Rusk 1991 p. 287.

<sup>140</sup> NIE 4-66 "The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation", 20 Jan 66, LBJL I:A.

<sup>141</sup> "The US, the USSR, and the Issue of Nonproliferation" (san.; n/a), 9 June, CIA FOIA.

<sup>142</sup> My emphasis. See Fisher (fn 138), 15 June 64; Fisher briefing for GC, 1 Dec, LBJL CNP B/4 gen. briefing.

ACDA favored portraying a MLF clearly as a nonproliferation policy, encouraging allies to make non-acquisition statements, stressing to Moscow that the weapons in any MLF would never be given to national control, and either promising to maintain a veto over a MLF or agreeing to include in a NPT an assurance that no MLF would result in an increase in the number of powers that could decide to use nuclear weapons. Also McNamara was supportive of that idea. The USG did let Moscow know that the NWSs would maintain control over a MLF, at least until European integration led to a “melding” of national nuclear forces, and stressed that a MLF would not give US allies control over or enable them to acquire nuclear weapons. But the DOS and the JCS opposed including such notions in a NPT; for instance Amb. Thompson argued doing so to help German Gaullists and Paris in their criticism of US policy and support for Bonn’s cooperation on the force de frappe.<sup>143</sup>

After China’s nuclear test in October 1964, Johnson made a statement that the US would support NNWSs threatened by nuclear blackmail. Soon afterwards he (at Bundy’s initiative) set up a committee of distinguished men from outside the current USG – and thus less entangled in bureaucratic battles of the time – under the former DepSOD Gilpatric to consider the prospects of proliferation, its effects on the US, whether it was always undesirable, different nonproliferation policies, and how to harmonize them with possibly conflicting policies such as a MLF, Atoms for Peace, and military aid. Being announced just before US elections, some saw the Gilpatric Committee (GC) as electioneering. But for instance Brands argues that behind it was also Johnson’s desire for a coherent nonproliferation policy. But when it was launched, several lower-profile USG task forces were already considering how to deal with China’s nuclear moves and their effects. Maddock suggests the GC in reality was part of a battle between the DOS and the NSCS over the prioritization of a MLF or a NPT.<sup>144</sup>

Though officially the USG was opposed to proliferation, nonproliferation was by no means a fully established, generally accepted goal within it. Beyond ACDA, also McNamara was really concerned about proliferation. But though Rusk had in 1962 seen abandoning a general nonproliferation policy and aiding France’s nuclear weapon program as unwise

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<sup>143</sup> Klein & Rivkin to Bundy & Hornig, 2 June 64, LBJL NSF SF B/10 disarmament I 1; Fisher (fn 138), 15 June; D/44 (fn 69), D/46 (fn 69), D/53 (fn 91) FRUS 64-8:11; Foster to Gilpatric (fn 138), 4 Nov; ACDA/NPT pp. 8, 11-2, 17-22. On ways seen in the USG to ensure that a MLF would open no doors for national nuclear forces, see DOS “Talking Points on MLF and Non-dissemination”, 27 Nov, FOIA.

<sup>144</sup> For instance, in August 1964 Rusk set up an interagency group chaired by Thompson to coordinate the consideration of what to do about nonproliferation. That committee proposed tactical manoeuvres aimed at gaining control over nonproliferation initiatives at the UN and protecting nuclear sharing options and US image.

In addition to Gilpatric, the GC included former CIA head A. Dulles, former SACEUR Gruenther, McCloy, prominent lawyer A. Dean, high-rank business man A. Watson (he also consulted the USG in trade matters), Eisenhower’s former science aide G. Kistiakowsky, and nuclear physicist H. York. It was supported by a staff of USG officials under NSCS member Keeny. Johnson’s speech, 18 Oct 64, PPJ 686; NSAM 320, 25 Nov, LBJL JNM; GC mtg, 1 Dec, JFKL GD; Keeny on NPT (fn 136); ACDA/NPT pp. 13-5; Seaborg 1987 pp. 133-8; Brands 2006 pp. 91-2; Maddock 2007. On the GC, see also Gavin 2004 pp. 107-12.

(see section 8.2.4), he now questioned whether such a general policy was in US interest, in particular regarding India and Japan. He and Thompson did not see nonproliferation *in general* as the key foreign policy goal. To many USG officials, they seemed to even favor proliferation in some situations. Rusk preferred country-specific to generic efforts to tackle proliferation and doubted whether a NPT anyway was a better generic policy than a non-transfer declaration by NWSs; he expected some states (such as, possibly, India and Japan) not to join a NPT and argued that it did not really stop states from later going nuclear even if they did join. But he thought that nonproliferation could be the key foreign policy goal in some *specific* cases like Israel, and in that case he also was prepared to show strong opposition to proliferation. McNamara agreed that it made sense to study what the best USG stance towards proliferation would be but stressed that the study had to be kept secret since the world already thought the USG was opposed to it.<sup>145</sup>

In addition to China, the nuclear aims of India, Japan, Sweden, Israel, and the FRG were getting the most USG attention. Each of them had a technological readiness to develop the weapons and was thought maybe one day to do so. Their decisions were expected to greatly influence those of others. Rusk argued that, e.g., Israel and India were more urgent proliferation concerns than NATO states, but for instance McCloy saw that the effects of them going nuclear would be much less serious than those of proliferation in Europe.<sup>146</sup>

ACDA expected that if the superpowers reached an agreement on a CTBT or a NPT, almost all states could be persuaded to join it, with the exceptions of France (CTBT) and China (CTBT, NPT). It expected that at least if under strong US pressure, Bonn would join either and argued that the West could use its economic leverage to make also Israel cooperate. The DOS saw Israel's acceding to such treaties as dependent on Arabs' doing so, existence of exit clauses, and possibly US security assurances for the case of a massive attack against Israel.<sup>147</sup>

The MLF/ANF remained an obstacle in US-Soviet NPT talks until fall 1966 since neither side backed out of its claims about a MLF. Moscow would not allow a MLF in a NPT and portrayed it as an opening to a German nuclear force. The USG, unwilling to publicly fully abandon the MLF, insisted that it was a measure that enabled it to tackle proliferation pressures in NATO (some USG officials also wanted to retain the option of an Asiatic

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<sup>145</sup> D/50 COP mtg, 23 Nov 64, FRUS 64-8:11; Rusk-GC mtg and Thompson's talking points for Rusk, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; Rusk to Johnson on GC report (draft), n/d, USNA DAC B/11; Keeny to Bundy, 26 March, with Bundy's comment, LBJL GC 1; Seaborg 1987 pp. 135-40; Rusk 1991 p. 285; Gavin 2004 pp. 112-7.

<sup>146</sup> See Fisher (fn 138), 15 June 64; D/44 (fn 69) FRUS 64-8:11; DOS on national attitudes (fn 16), 12 Dec; Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA; McCloy to Gilpatric, 8 Jan, USNA PDA B/11; Ball 1965 p. 224.

<sup>147</sup> ACDA "Value and Feasibility of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", 10 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/2 P/3; DOS on national attitudes (fn 16), 12 Dec; Fisher to Ball, 18 Dec, with "Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", 16 Dec, USNA BP.

MLF). To reassure Moscow, Johnson also stressed in public that a MLF/ANF was a nonproliferation measure.<sup>148</sup>

The GC argued in its early 1965 report (Seaborg notes that S. Keeny of the NSCS had largely drafted it, but Brands argues Gilpatric had done so without much involvement by other GC members<sup>149</sup>) that the spread of nuclear weapons indeed was against US interests and any success in preventing it was only possible if the USG urgently strengthened efforts to do so: the world was “fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons”. If a nuclear chain reaction started in Asia or the Middle East, also European states, especially the FRG, were very likely to go nuclear. Central in nonproliferation efforts was a NPT. The GC argued that the US had to be willing to strongly press key states, among others the FRG, France, Israel, and the UAR, to adhere to it. The latter cases required specific nonproliferation efforts, such as assurances for Israel against UAR aggression, explicitly conditional on its not acquiring a nuclear weapon capability (however, GC members in general doubted the wisdom of making further security commitments to stop proliferation: the credibility of existing guarantees for, e.g., Berlin and the perception of US ability to defend its allies were feared to much weaken if further similar guarantees were given). Efforts for a NPT were to proceed irrespective of progress with a MLF/ANF. GC members disagreed on whether the FRG would in the absence of a MLF/ANF one day acquire an own nuclear capability but agreed that it was urgent to seek other ways to ensure both a permanent nonnuclear status for it and that pending reunification, it would remain fully integrated to the West.<sup>150</sup>

Rusk, seeing a NPT as less important, was critical of the report: though many recommendations in it closely resembled existing or planned USG policies, others were questionable and could much harm NATO. Pressing Bonn to join a NPT and at the same time giving up the MLF/ANF effort, or threatening to withdraw troops from the FRG if Bonn pursued nuclear weapons (as the GC also suggested), was likely to seriously weaken West German confidence in the US. Since the report stressed a need for a NPT irrespective of the destiny of nuclear sharing schemes, Johnson ordered its distribution to be tightly limited and contents to be kept secret.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> See, e.g., D/52 Thompson to Fisher, 28 Nov 64; D/53 (fn 91); D/54 Johnson-Gromyko mtg, 9 Dec; D/152 Rusk-Gromyko mtg, 22 Sep 66, all FRUS 64-8:11; Johnson’s press conf., 16 Jan 65, PPJ 22; Foster-Soviet official & scientist mtg, 15 Feb, LBJL GC 1; Keeny on NPT (fn 136).

<sup>149</sup> Seaborg 1987 p. 140; Brands 2006 p. 99. See the latter for a detailed account of the Committee’s work and its members’ views.

<sup>150</sup> D/60 GC mtg, 7-8 Jan 65; D/64 GC report also fn 1, 21 Jan, both FRUS 64-8:11. ACDA did see in general that “where legitimate security concerns” were behind interest in nuclear arms, the US was to “consider, where feasible, the desirability of security arrangements, in which the U.S. participates or assists”. D/44 (fn 69) *ibid*.

The GC drafted a NSAM on preventing proliferation in line with the report (USNA DAC B/11) but the USG did not issue it.

<sup>151</sup> Rusk on GC report; Keeny to Bundy (both fn 145); ACDA/NPT p. 21; Seaborg 1987 pp. 145-6; D/63 EN FRUS 64-8:11; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 216.



Schwartz, Gavin, and Brands argue that Johnson, however, largely agreed with the report. Gavin and Brands also suggest that it resulted in increased USG activism on nonproliferation and a policy change towards less focus on NATO nuclear sharing and more on nonproliferation and cooperation with Moscow.<sup>152</sup> But though Seaborg notes that Bundy later said that the GC report had failed to satisfy Johnson because of later leaks and public speculation but not so much because of the content of the report, he also writes that the report seemed to have no effect on USG actions and that though Johnson stressed the importance of nonproliferation in public, he otherwise remained passive. According to Hersh, the White House was still not keen to make nonproliferation a top priority, and Quester notes that many DOS officials remained critical of a NPT because of concerns related to particular states and European integration. Geyelin argues that though Johnson had first been excited about the GC and the study became “one of the most careful, far-reaching, and thoughtful disarmament studies ever undertaken”, he seemed to soon lose interest and felt that the time was not right for it.<sup>153</sup> As discussed in section 9.6, Johnson indeed switched to a more active policy on the NPT and agreed to fully give up the MLF only gradually by fall 1966 and for several reasons with no direct link to the report. Moreover, a strong nonproliferation policy, including a NPT, had had supporters especially in ACDA even before the report was made<sup>154</sup>. It thus seems that the GC report was rather an *indication* of a direction into which thinking in Washington was developing, than a cause of a *policy* change.

A memo from the Johnson archive hints that it was now considered in the USG even to abandon efforts for a NPT or a CTBT as hopeless: in March 1964, something prompted Keeny to argue to Bundy against doing so. Even Keeny was pessimistic about the prospects of the treaties as such: he wrote that proposals for them helped improve the international atmosphere, even if such treaties were “not considered practicable of attainment in the foreseeable future”.<sup>155</sup>

No concrete follow-up on the Gilpatric report took place. Keeny warned Bundy that together with recent passivity in the USG about ACDA’s arms control proposals, this would make USG officials think that it had been decided to abandon the nonproliferation agenda. Leaks to the press and the Congress were then likely, and that would harm the USG internally and externally. He proposed key officials to review the report that “except in the degree of urgency expressed” was very similar to a common view about US goals. He suggested a NSAM on nonproliferation; public reaffirmation of a nonproliferation

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<sup>152</sup> Schwartz, T. 2003 pp. 52-63; Gavin 2004 p. 130; Brands 2006 p. 85. See also p. 84 on various interpretations of Johnson’s views of the report.

<sup>153</sup> Geyelin 1966 p. 151; Quester 1973 p. 24; Seaborg 1987 pp. 147-9, 181 ref. to his 1986 talk with Bundy; Hersh 1991 p. 153.

<sup>154</sup> Maddock 2007 further argues that in the end, pursuing a NPT was the only of the many GC recommendations the USG adopted (and it was, of course, not its idea).

<sup>155</sup> Keeny to Bundy (fn 145), 26 March 65.

policy by Johnson; and continuing stressing of the issue with other world leaders.<sup>156</sup> Bundy reacted by arguing to Rusk and McNamara that the US was not to appear to be burying the goal of nonproliferation: though the GC report was maybe too optimistic about the prospects of early progress, it was undesirable to let pessimism color US policies.<sup>157</sup> But Bundy did not speak of any concrete nonproliferation action: important was a *public impression* that nonproliferation was a USG goal.

In summer 1965, public pressure for a stronger USG nonproliferation policy was mounting. At the same time, various statements and reports on US stances hinted to the public that a NPT was increasing in importance for the US, even at the expense of NATO nuclear sharing. At least partially, these resulted from political competition and disagreement over priorities in Washington, and desires by some to push for a policy change, rather than a change that had already taken place. First, in a *Foreign Affairs* article addressed to Moscow in particular, Foster stressed a need for progress towards a NPT and for US-Soviet cooperation on this, even if it meant some erosion of US alliances (he made a similar statement to the Congress). Though he said nothing about dropping the MLF proposal as such, it was possible to conclude that he implicitly favored doing so. Indeed, within the USG he was arguing that as the MLF talks had led to results within the set schedule and were preventing urgently needed progress on a NPT, the USG was to let Moscow quietly know that though it would not publicly abandon the MLF, it would not push for it, and propose to seek NPT language that neither allowed nor prohibited a MLF explicitly. The COP favored the latter idea but opposed giving up support for a MLF/ANF.<sup>158</sup>

Second, somewhat exaggeratingly, the press reported that the secret GC recommendations included sacrificing the MLF for the sake of a NPT, if needed<sup>159</sup>. And third, in his much publicized maiden speech in the Senate, R. Kennedy stressed a need to move on nonproliferation and demanded from the USG immediate efforts for a NPT and an extended test ban. He noted that both Israel and India were able to produce a bomb within a few months' time. Johnson did not take the speech well: it irritated him that 1) his political competitor tried to take over the nonproliferation agenda, especially as he had planned shortly to make a public pro-nonproliferation statement himself, and 2) Kennedy, whose

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Bundy also asked Keeny to draft a NSAM "less one-sided than Gilpatric's". Bundy later circulated that draft among top USG men, but it was rejected (see below). Ibid.; Bundy to Rusk & McNamara, 27 March 65, LBJL GC 1. As Maddock 2007 points out, instead of supporting GC recommendations as such, Bundy just sought a reaffirmation of the goals of nonproliferation and a CTBT.

<sup>158</sup> Foster to COP members with memo on a NPT, 16 July 65, USNA PDA B/8; ACDA/NPT pp. 24-7; Foster 1965; Mahncke 1972 pp. 214-5; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 257; Seaborg 1987 p. 162; Küntzel 1992 pp. 83-4; Brands 2006 pp. 104-5. Foster described his article as statement on ACDA's behalf that implied no policy change and had DOS, DOD, and WH clearance. Foster-*Ma'ariv* editor mtg, 13 July, LBJL N/1 1 IV MM 2.

<sup>159</sup> "Atom-Curb Panel Stirs U-S. Dispute", *NYT*, 1 July 65; Mahncke 1972 pp. 214-5. The USG response to rumors about the GC report was that "US policy on non-proliferation and the MLF remain as defined in official policy statements". DOS to E/B, 8 June, FOIA. Press speculation on the report was not unitary: *Time* reported that it warned that superpower cooperation on nonproliferation could weaken NATO. "Nuclear Proliferation: Status and Security", 23 July.

family was befriended to Gilpatric, seemed aware of the content of the GC report (also other suspects existed for the leakage). The speech and the press story put pressure on the USG to release the report, but doing so still seemed impossible to top USG officials.<sup>160</sup>

Kennedy's speech added to pressure on Johnson to appear active on nonproliferation. Shortly after it, a NSAM was issued that told USG agencies to assist ACDA in developing an arms control plan, including for preventing proliferation. But Seaborg notes that was ACDA's established task, anyway, and that the NSAM seemed to lead to no special action. Bundy sent Johnson also a draft NSAM on nonproliferation in particular, which said that in cases of conflict between that and other US interests, Johnson wanted greater emphasis on nonproliferation – implying the kind of policies the GC had recommended. Opposition to such a further-going NSAM persisted in the USG: it was not issued. But in a message to the ENDC, Johnson did stress US preparedness to make an effort to reach agreements on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.<sup>161</sup>

As Kennedy's speech indicated, knowledgeable Americans also outside the USG recognized that Israel was moving towards nuclear weapons. *Time* reported that Israel “probably intends to go nuclear as soon as possible”. An opinion poll, published in the *Newsweek*, showed that US nuclear scientists expected Israel to be the next state to make a nuclear test.<sup>162</sup>

The hints that a NPT was increasing in importance for the Americans at the expense of NATO issues caused concern in Bonn<sup>163</sup>. To calm the Germans down, Rusk told the press that a NPT and a MLF were fully separate questions and assured Knapstein that “there will be no non-proliferation treaty without MLF”. But he also stressed that an increase in the number of nuclear powers in NATO would break the alliance.<sup>164</sup>

In summer 1965, Moscow signalled willingness to continue NPT talks, possibly in reaction to perceived hints of greater USG flexibility regarding the MLF. Johnson sent Harriman again to Moscow to map possible areas of agreement in arms control. Haftendorn suggests Harriman got the impression that Moscow was very interested in a NPT.<sup>165</sup>

But in the press, the prospects of an effective NPT were presented as weak; *Time* reported that as almost all nuclear-capable states had rejected the idea of joining one, influential USG officials supported instead such moves as an Asiatic MLF and global guarantees

<sup>160</sup> Keeny to Johnson, 22 June, with *United Press International* on Kennedy's speech, 23 June 65; Keeny to Bundy, 22 June, both LBJL GC 1; Seaborg 1987 pp. 146-9; Hersh 1991 pp. 152-3; Gavin 2004 pp. 129-30; Brands 2006 pp. 104-5.

<sup>161</sup> NSAM 335 “Preparation of Arms Control Program”, 28 June 65, LBJL JNM; Bundy to Johnson with unnumbered NSAM “Prevention of the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 3 July, LBJL GC 1; Johnson to ENDC, 27 July, PPJ 386; Seaborg 1987 p. 147. The draft NSAM was probably the same Keeny drafted in the spring.

<sup>162</sup> “Nuclear Proliferation: Status and Security”, *Time*, 23 July 65; “The Bomb: from Hiroshima to...”, *Newsweek*, 9 Aug.

<sup>163</sup> Mahncke 1972 p. 215; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 257; Küntzel 1992 pp. 83-4.

<sup>164</sup> D/275, D/316 Knapstein to GFO, 9 July and 3 Aug, APD 65.

<sup>165</sup> Mahncke 1972 pp. 215-6; Haftendorn 1986 p. 640.

against nuclear aggression as US nonproliferation policies<sup>166</sup>. The situation was also complicated by NATO disputes: the allies did not agree on a common NPT draft. London pressed for fast progress on a NPT, which it (unlike Bonn) wanted to preclude a MLF not under NNWSs' vetos. It argued that *only* the MLF plan was preventing agreement on a NPT with Moscow, a stance the USG did not share.<sup>167</sup>

As London and several NNWSs pressed for action on a NPT, in August the US for the first time presented a draft NPT to the ENDC. This left open the options of a joint nuclear force of integrated Europe (i.e., the "European option") and a MLF not controlled by existing nuclear powers. Because of NATO allies' stances, the original US draft had been weakened so that IAEA safeguards were not mandatory. But the USG aimed to pursue a stronger safeguards clause later. Since many NNWSs – especially India, Sweden, and the UAR – wanted to tie a NPT to disarmament to make it less one-sided, the draft included a notion that the treaty would at times be reviewed. But the USG accepted no binding tie to disarmament. Neither US allies nor Moscow were pleased with the US draft. In September, Moscow presented its own draft, which was harsh on nuclear sharing. It received no support from the West and fuelled pessimism about the prospects of a NPT.<sup>168</sup>

One effect of the NATO disputes was to increase USG interest in discussing a NPT with Moscow alone, even without British involvement<sup>169</sup>. Indeed, the NPT became largely negotiated and drafted bilaterally by the superpowers. In this matter, they shared basic interests. They realized that a bilateral consensus would give them a much better position than competing initiatives to press others to accept a NPT and to prevent them from using US-Soviet differences for their benefit.<sup>170</sup> If a joint stance was reached, they could present it as something others had to accept if they wanted a NPT at all. Owing to differences in interests between, e.g., NATO states, which had interest in ensuing that US security

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<sup>166</sup> "Nuclear Proliferation: Status and Security", *Time*, 23 July 65.

<sup>167</sup> The UK and Canada prepared own NPT drafts. London seemed determined to act on nonproliferation and present its draft at the UN even at a risk of public NATO discord. This prospect made the USG propose in NATO to prohibit in a NPT allowing the number of nuclear decision-makers to grow. London was unhappy with this formula but agreed to postpone presenting its draft. According to Seaborg, Rusk saw this US-UK dispute as the sharpest ever in NATO. ACDA/NPT pp. 28-35, 42; Mahncke 1972 pp. 215-6; Seaborg 1987 p. 158; Kuntzel 1992 p. 88; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 175. On NATO disagreements, see also D/87 COP mtg, 22 July 65, FRUS 64-8:11.

Because of the disputes, Italy proposed that instead of a NPT, key NNWSs could first declare to forgo nuclear weapons for some time. Rusk and the DOD, but not ACDA, were interested in the idea, and the USG came to support it *in case* it became clear that progress on a NPT was impossible. Italy continued to promote the idea, but the USG did not want to seem to be giving up on a NPT and persuaded Italy in summer 1966 not to present the idea at the UNGA. DOS to M/G, 27 July, and other docs. in LBJL NPT II; D/316 (fn 164) APD 65; ACDA/NPT pp. 48-9, 87-8.

<sup>168</sup> Keeny on NPT (fn 136); ACDA/NPT pp. 47, 50-1; McArdle Kelleher 1975 p. 257; Seaborg 1987 pp. 155-6, 161-2, 166, 276-8; FRUS 64-8:11 summary; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 175. On US and Soviet drafts, see also Kohler 1972 pp. 58-61.

<sup>169</sup> Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 175.

<sup>170</sup> See D/152 Rusk-Gromyko mtg, 22 Sep 66, FRUS 64-8:11; Kohler 1972 pp. 71-2.

guarantees remained vital, and non-aligned states, which favored nuclear disarmament, NNWSs also proved unable to act in a unified way in the matter<sup>171</sup>.

Next, I turn attention to how the situation with Israel developed in the meanwhile.

### **9.5 Israel protects its nuclear freedom of action**

The Dimona visit scheme was again causing problems and further signs of Israel pursuing nuclear weapons appeared. Against that background, the USG came to make a relatively strong but not fully successful effort to bargain with the security relationship to achieve Israeli nuclear restraint.

As shown in section 9.1, the consensus in the USG was by 1964 that Israel was pursuing nuclear weapons or at least a capability to develop them quickly, plus delivery systems. DOS documents refer to various further indications that emerged during 1964 that Israel had decided to pursue nuclear weapons. It had upgraded the Dimona reactor, had acquired and planned further to buy suspiciously large amounts of unsafeguarded (and relatively expensive) uranium ore from, e.g., Argentina, and was securing a much bigger capacity for fuel production than needed for research. The Israelis continued to talk about plans to build a PU-separation plant. The restraining effect possibly provided by French technicians that had been working at the site was gone as these had left the place. Israel. Israel's defense strategy towards the UAR hinted at nuclear ambitions: lower-level officials were saying that the strategy included an ability to destroy the Aswan dam – possible only with nuclear weapons. Israel continued claims about UAR nuclear weapon efforts, probably to free own hands. As Israel had given no firm promise not to develop nuclear weapons and had also earlier deceived the USG, the Americans expected it not to consult them about going nuclear but to try keep a decision to do so secret until it had the weapons.<sup>172</sup> In late 1964, DOS officials said to the French that Israel could soon construct a nuclear weapon. Both sides expressed uncertainty about Israel's aims.<sup>173</sup> But CIA estimates on the issue were still vague. In the fall, a NIE expected Israel to *possibly* develop nuclear weapons within a *decade*. To the GC, the CIA even argued Israel “probably has decided not to build nuclear

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<sup>171</sup> See *ibid.* p. 77.

<sup>172</sup> The Aswan dam made the UAR the most vulnerable country to nuclear weapons in the area and thus likely to favor their absence in it. Davies to Talbot, 28 Oct 64, USNA NRI B/8; Rostow to Rusk, 4 Nov, *ibid.* B/1; Bundy to DOS, 24 Nov, with “Technical assessment”, 5 Nov, LBJL N/I 1 III MM; NEA “Talking Points”, 7 Dec, LBJL MEC 1; DOS “Factors...” (fn 16), 12 Dec; Talbot to ActSOS, 18 Dec, with “Danger Signs of Israeli Nuclear Intentions”, USNA BP. According to Crosbie 1974, French technicians were present at the Dimona site until the end of the 1960s (p. 169 fn 42).

<sup>173</sup> Probably to downplay the issue, the French argued that possession of nuclear weapons did not have the same effect on small states, such as Israel, as on larger ones: the former “could not provoke general wars but only local wars” and were thus only a regional problem. They said that in Israel's case, also they had tried to control that problem. Couve de Murville-Ball disc., 2 Dec 64, USNA Lot Ball B/27 MLF 3; Rusk to DOS (fn 97), 14 Dec.

weapons”, though it was likely to go nuclear if it felt it was losing its conventional advantage over the Arabs.<sup>174</sup>

The DOS/NEA and ACDA saw weak prospects of peace in the region and thus of elimination of reasons for Israel and the UAR to go nuclear. But as outside pressure was thought to have chances of success, pursuing safeguards and separate non-nuclear pledges was still seen as the best way to deal with the proliferation problem in the area. Sanctions, stronger US security assurances or joint planning, and UAR SSM restraint and acceptance of safeguards were other potential ways to persuade Israel to exercise restraint, but the need not to sever relations with either Arabs or Israel limited the freedom of action of the USG. The DOS wanted to continue pressing Israel to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities and, unless it cooperated, possibly gradually harden stances towards it in general. Even halting all military support and eliminating the tax breaks on charity spending for Israel were listed as potential ways to press it.<sup>175</sup> But of course, another question is whether any real chance for so drastic moves existed from a domestic point of view. For instance Bundy later argued that halting economic and military aid to Israel was no real option for any USG<sup>176</sup>.

### 9.5.1 Problems with the Dimona visit scheme

In any case, the USG tried to keep some control over the situation with the Dimona visit scheme. Eshkol’s assurance to Kennedy that scheduling further visits to Dimona would cause no trouble proved not to be true. Kennedy had asked for another visit in summer 1964, but in early 1964 the visitors had recommended either a long visit within a year or two visits at six months’ intervals. Probably this is why the USG only in fall 1964 proposed a further visit to Israel. After delaying a reply, Eshkol personally asked Johnson to postpone the visit until after fall 1965 elections in Israel. Johnson in turn wanted to give no reply before the US elections.<sup>177</sup>

The new signs of Israel pursuing nuclear weapons had increased concern in the DOS and made the request seem more suspicious; the NE saw it as possible that Eshkol and Ben-Gurion, despite their political differences, had jointly designed a political crisis in Israel to delay the visit. Though Barbour reported that Eshkol’s domestic situation was problematic, the NE and Komer saw no real need to delay the visit. The NE argued Israel was (as before regarding Jordan waters, Hawks, and tanks) just trying to bargain with the visit to get

<sup>174</sup> NIE 4-2-64 “Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade” (san.), 21 Oct 64, DDRS; CIA, 8 Dec, with GC briefing (fn 121).

<sup>175</sup> NEA “Talking Points”, 7 Dec 64, LJBL MEC 1; DOS “Factors...” (fn 16), 12 Dec; DOS to Johnson with memo on possible pressures on Israel, 18 Dec, USNA BP; NE “The UAR and Israel and Nuclear Weapons Control”, 17 Dec, FOIA.

<sup>176</sup> Bundy 1988 p. 512.

<sup>177</sup> T/240, T/301 DOS to E/TA, 26 Sep and 14 Oct 64; T/375, T/407, T/437 Barbour to DOS, 7, 15 and 21 Oct, all USNA CFPF B/3068; Feldman to Johnson with Eshkol’s message, 19 Oct, LJBL KI 2; D/101 Bundy to Rusk, 23 Oct, FRUS 64-8:18; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 180-1.

something (this time SSMs and aircraft) and maybe to protect a weapon effort. Not demanding a visit promptly was dangerous as that could encourage the Israelis to maintain that the visits were politically sensitive and make proponents of nuclear weapons more free to press their stance on Eshkol. An early visit was crucial since a two-year interval between visits was enough to enable Israel to produce enough plutonium from Israeli-fabricated fuel elements for 1-2 test weapons. It was argued that the only way to prevent Israel from pursuing nuclear weapons indeed was to ensure that it could not do so secretly from the USG; a threat to halt aid was seen as alone insufficient, though the NE proposed using also that threat unless Israel accepted a visit.<sup>178</sup>

In late fall, Barbour was instructed to tell Eshkol that to be able to reassure other states, Johnson saw semiannual visits as necessary and asked for an immediate visit. But to show Eshkol that it was forthcoming, the USG was willing, findings of this visit allowing and unless a pressing reason emerged, to postpone informing Nasser of the findings and the next visit thereafter until after the Israeli elections. Thereafter, it wanted to continue with six-monthly visits. Barbour was instructed to counter Eshkol's possible reference to problems with GOI "hard liners", i.e., any attempt to present his domestic win-set as limited, by pointing out that Ben-Gurion himself (probably with GOI approval) had accepted periodic visits.<sup>179</sup>

Despite Barbour's insistence, Eshkol agreed to a visit only in late January 1965<sup>180</sup>. The USG accepted the delay assuming a *thorough* visit, implying a visit of at least two days, access to all facilities at the Dimona site, and permission to "perform physical inventory and make independent measurements". The DOS argued that so far the visits had at the most allowed to determine the "nature [of] facilities at site and productive capacity at time of visit"; intelligence people and the AEC saw deeper inspection as "imperative". Though domestic politics somewhat explained Eshkol's stance, the USG saw no reason why a secret visit to Dimona would harm Eshkol in elections. For it, any further delays with the visit were signs of nuclear weapon ambitions.<sup>181</sup>

Eshkol argued that the USG demands seemed to imply a change from a "visit by scientists as guests of Israel", as agreed, to "inspection", which was problematic for sovereignty reasons. He insisted that the visit would be alike those the US had made so far and not last over 1,5 days. The Israelis said that most of the demands were unlikely to cause problems but opposed use of US measurement equipment.<sup>182</sup> The DOS accepted a "visit" of "invited guests" for 29-30 January, assuming access to all needed data and areas at the site<sup>183</sup>.

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<sup>178</sup> Komer to Bundy, 21 Oct 64, LBJL KD 1; Davies to Talbot, 28 Oct and 15 Dec, both USNA NRI B/8, and 29 Oct, LBJL KD 1; T/492 Barbour to Talbot, 2 Nov, LBJL N/I 1 III Cb 1; Bundy (fn 172), 24 Nov, with "Technical..."; Komer to Johnson, 17 Nov, LBJL KI 1.

<sup>179</sup> T/492 Barbour to Talbot, 2 Nov 64, LBJL N/I 1 III Cb 1; D/109 DOS to Barbour, 25 Nov, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>180</sup> T/660 Barbour to Rusk, 7 Dec 64, LBJL N/I 1 III Cb 1.

<sup>181</sup> D/113 DOS to Barbour, 14 Dec 64, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>182</sup> D/119 Barbour to DOS, 4 Jan 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>183</sup> T/568 DOS to E/TA, 5 Jan 65, USNA CFPF B/3068.

The visit again lasted only ten hours but the visitors thought they saw what activity was taking place at the site – which included no evidence of a weapon program. At least yearly further inspections seemed necessary to them. But the visit did not reassure the USG: Israel's attitude and actions kept the DOS and Komer suspicious that Israel was developing nuclear weapons, maybe at another site, without the US having found out about it.<sup>184</sup>

As an institutionalized scheme on proper, regular inspections of the Dimona site could have made it hard to keep the nuclear weapon effort secret, the Israelis thus did their best to prevent that. Though Kennedy had reached a written agreement on regular visits, after US leadership changed each inspection came to cause dispute with Israel, showing that the private assurance to Kennedy was of limited consequence.

At the same time, the Israelis tried to push the USG to institutionalize the security relationship. In late 1964, they again proposed both public, high-level and less formal, secret military US-Israel consultations, portraying them as regular consultations the US *had agreed upon*. The USG opposed especially public talks and denied that any such agreement existed, though lower-level, ad hoc meetings took place quite often.<sup>185</sup>

### 9.5.2 Attempt to buy Israeli nuclear restraint with guaranteed arms supply

Around the time Johnson became President, the USG had by and large abandoned the idea of trying to exchange Israeli nuclear restraint for security guarantees since guarantees were thought to cause too much trouble. But the Johnson administration came to pursue the same result through other kind of security assistance: direct arms sales to Israel, as a change to its long-standing policy.

The background was that in early 1965, the USG was troubled by a request by King Hussein of Jordan to buy tanks and supersonic aircraft. The request was supported by other Arabs who were also aware of the US role in Israel's tank deals with the Europeans. As such, the USG saw no big problem in Jordan's getting the armaments. It was also clear that if it refused, Jordan would look for other sources and possibly buy what it needed from Moscow and re-align towards it.

But the Israelis opposed a US sale; after all, the US had not sold tanks directly to them, and they argued that Jordan might one day use the weapons against Israel. The Israelis regretted that their lack of possibilities and desire to get Soviet support prevented them from simi-

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<sup>184</sup> Komer to Bundy, 6 Feb 65, LBJL KD 1; Komer to Bundy, 6 Feb, with DOS to Bundy, 5 Feb, and with "Preliminary draft report of Dimona Inspection Team" (san.), LBJL N/I 1 III MM.

<sup>185</sup> T/558 DOS to Barbour, 1 Jan 65, LBJL N/I 1 III Cb 2. Prompted by a political speech referring to this option, in the fall Harriman and Peres also discussed the idea of Israel joining NATO. Harriman said NATO states would probably welcome no further members, but Peres also noted that probably no Israelis planned to pursue membership, anyway. DOS to Bundy, 26 Oct 64, with Peres-Harriman mtg, 7 Oct, LBJL KI 2.



larly using that option to press the US. Israel's stance made Johnson greatly worried about the Congress's reaction to any sale to Jordan.<sup>186</sup>

A further problem was that Bonn, which had been planned to sell the tanks to Israel, withdrew from the deal. In fall 1964, the press namely found out about its long-term, secret arms sales to Israel and also about some help the FRG was giving to Israel's nuclear program. Arabs reacted with strong displeasure and Bonn was unwilling to let its relations to them deteriorate further.<sup>187</sup>

To persuade Israel to accept the sale to Jordan, Komer, with the support of the DOS and Ambassadors to the area, started suggesting that the US would let go of the policy of selling no offensive weapons to the area and say that if Soviet arms supply disrupted the Arab-Israel military balance, to correct the situation it would sell weapons to Israel (assuming Israel had no other source, as seemed now to be the case with tanks). Komer argued that the increasing Soviet arms flow to the Arabs possibly made the policy change anyway necessary and the sale to Jordan would give an excuse for it. The Arabs were likely to dislike the change, but he thought that they might become less bellicose towards Israel if Israel got arms from the US.<sup>188</sup> In fact, the sale of the (albeit defensive) Hawk system in 1962 had in practice already been such a corrective move, but the USG had not presented it as a general change of policy.

Moreover, Komer argued that as Israel felt that the Arab threat was growing, its going nuclear was possible unless it got enough US support, and arms sales were a less bad form of support than security guarantees and joint planning. Hersh argues that sometimes after early 1965, Eshkol also suggested to the USG that Israel would not go nuclear as long as it would be guaranteed enough US arms to offset the Soviet arms supply to the UAR, and that Johnson came to accept the idea.<sup>189</sup>

In return for offering to change the arms policy, the USG aimed to secretly demand Israeli concessions: promises not to cause trouble over Jordan waters or acquire nuclear weapons and acceptance of IAEA safeguards and US support for friendly Arab regimes. Barbour thought, however, that maybe only a mutually inspected agreement with Arabs would make Israel fully forgo the nuclear option, though a chance existed that it would accept IAEA controls for the time being and promise not to pursue the weapons without consulting the USG first.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> T/921 E/TA to DOS, 5 Feb 65, *ibid.*; D/142 DOS to Talbot (Emb. Amman), 8 Feb, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>187</sup> NE to Komer, 6 Nov 64, LBJL KI 2; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 205; Samra 2002 pp. 47, 51-2. In 1965, GDR President Ulbricht blamed Israel and the FRG for having completed "joint preparations to produce atomic weapons". See Pry 1984 p. 35.

<sup>188</sup> See Komer to Bundy, 7 Feb 65; T/959 Barbour to DOS, 11 Feb, both LBJL N/I 1 III MM; D/138 Komer to Johnson, 6 Feb; D/142 (fn 186); D/155 Rusk to Johnson, 19 Feb, all FRUS 64-8:18. Whether Israel was really unable to cover its tank needs from other sources seems debatable: Crosbie 1974 argues it lost interest in French tanks when cheaper US tanks became available (p. 185).

<sup>189</sup> D/138 Komer to Johnson, 6 Feb 65, FRUS 64-8:18; Hersh 1991 p. 139.

<sup>190</sup> T/959 (fn 188); D/155 Rusk to Johnson, 19 Feb 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

In February 1965, Komer visited Israel to reassure the Israelis and sound out the situation. He reported that acute concern over a weakening security situation was “generating a pre-emptive psychology” and “could even lead at some point to a decision to go nuclear if this appeared to be the only way to maintain a deterrent edge”<sup>191</sup>. The Israelis were thinking again to ask for greater US security support and Komer expected heavy pressure on this. He recommended a prompt change in the arms policy, also to get more Israeli concessions in return.<sup>192</sup>

As action on Jordan’s request was urgently needed, Johnson authorized Komer to negotiate a secret deal with Israel on the conditions listed above. The one on safeguards was softened to “a firm written reiteration of Israel’s intentions not to develop nuclear weapons”, to be certified by acceptance of IAEA controls on all nuclear plants, which Israel, however, did not have to do right away if it gave the promise about its aims.<sup>193</sup> US documents give the impression that the nuclear issue was not decisive in the USG choice to pursue the deal<sup>194</sup>.

After Harriman joined Komer in Israel, the two men reported that a deal seemed possible with some changes such as acceptance of IAEA safeguards only if Cairo did. Washington told them to oppose such a change but to say that it would demand safeguards from Cairo when that would be topical.<sup>195</sup>

Washington wanted the deal to take the form of a memo signed by both sides stating the other terms and a letter by Eshkol in support of the US policy of pursuing good relations with Arabs. Based on a US draft, Israel was to promise “not to develop or obtain nuclear weapons and, before any direct sale of arms is initiated, ... certify this by accepting IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities”<sup>196</sup>.

The Jordan waters issue and various new demands by Israel complicated the negotiations. Eshkol agreed to “reiterate existing public commitment “not be first to introduce nuclear weapons into Near East””<sup>197</sup> but said he was politically unable to accept IAEA safeguards before all key states or at least the UAR did. Harriman answered that the proposal was to be accepted as a package and the US would only promise a prospect of arms sales if Israel did so. The Israelis argued the nuclear and the arms sale questions were unconnected.<sup>198</sup> Harriman reported that to help Eshkol get GOI acceptance for the US sale to Jordan, the US needed to offer a *concrete* promise of a direct arms sale. That could make a deal (in-

<sup>191</sup> D/150 Komer to DOS, 15 Feb 65, *ibid*.

<sup>192</sup> T/972 Komer (E/TA) to Johnson, ActSOS & Bundy, 14 Feb 65, LBJL N/I 1 III Cb 2.

<sup>193</sup> D/157 Johnson to Harriman & Komer, 21 Feb 65, *ibid*.

<sup>194</sup> See docs. in LBJL KIS 1.

<sup>195</sup> D/158-9 Harriman & Komer (E/TA) to Rusk, and DOS to them, 25 Feb 65, FRUS 64-8:18; Eshkol-Meir-Harriman-Komer mtg, 25 Feb, AHP IM.

<sup>196</sup> D/160 DOS to Harriman, 26 Feb 65, FRUS 64-8:18. Based on another US draft, Israel was to reaffirm “assurances that Israel will not develop, purchase, or deploy nuclear weapons” and its preparedness to accept IAEA safeguards on any reactors. Israel-US mtg with “U.S. draft memo of understanding”, 26 Feb, AHP IM.

<sup>197</sup> D/164 Harriman to Johnson, Rusk, & McNamara, 27 Feb 65, *ibid*.

<sup>198</sup> D/161, D/164 Harriman to DOS and Johnson, Rusk, & McNamara, 26-7 Feb 65, *ibid*.; Supplement to T/1091 on Israeli-US mtg, 27 Feb, LBJL N/I 1 IV MM 1.

cluding assurance not to develop nuclear weapons) possible, “leaving question of IAEA to future”.<sup>199</sup>

Washington now told him to seek a deal on the nuclear issue on the basis that Israel would give “complete assurances with respect to the non-acquisition and non-manufacture of nuclear weapons” and “give favorable consideration to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable”, at the latest when Nasser would accept them. An exit clause regarding safeguards was possible for the case Arabs acquired a nuclear weapon capability and rejected safeguards.<sup>200</sup>

Since the USG was not concretely promising any arms sales, the Israelis wanted to stop the talks and continue them with a high-level visit to Washington. Eshkol assured “Israel had no plans for development [of] nuclear weapons” and that he wanted to cooperate on preventing proliferation but said *the IAEA* would approve of IAEA safeguards only if Nasser did<sup>201</sup> – again trying to present the domestic win-set as limited. Komer saw this stance as a result of both bargaining tactics and “domestic political reasons and Israel’s particular psychology”<sup>202</sup>.

Moreover, Eshkol next wanted to leave the clause on nuclear weapons out of any memo of understanding and not to go beyond the non-introduction statement, even if he had earlier maybe “said something more”. He also nullified his statement on accepting IAEA safeguards if Nasser did by saying that he “was just talking”: no safeguards could be considered while Egypt was working in India on nuclear weapons. His comments suggested that the situation would be different in case of stronger US-Israel security ties. The Americans continued to strongly stress US opposition to proliferation and Komer even warned the Israelis that the USG “would not only oppose but resist with every resource at our command Israel’s going the weapons way ... If there were no assurance on this, everything else would be called into question”.<sup>203</sup>

With the Jordan issue pressing, Washington wanted no delay. USG documents reveal that also others in the USG were prepared to use tough words and threats with the Israelis. Rusk told the negotiators to stress that the US opposed “any Israeli flirtation with nuclear weapons” and would do anything to prevent proliferation in the area. They were “to press Israelis to utmost”; Johnson increasingly thought even support for Israel had its limits and if no policy in line with US interests in the area was possible, someone else had to take responsibility for stability there.<sup>204</sup> Harriman and Komer replied they had stressed all key points “to point of rudeness”, but “even Soviets are less tough bargainers than Israelis”. Eshkol had made promises against nuclear flirtation, but the Israelis refused to commit to

<sup>199</sup> D/165 Harriman to Johnson, Rusk, & McNamara, 28 Feb 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>200</sup> D/166 Rusk to Harriman, 28 Feb 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>201</sup> D/167 Harriman to Johnson, Rusk, & McNamara, 28 Feb 65, *ibid.*

<sup>202</sup> D/168 Komer to Johnson & Rusk, 28 Feb 65, *ibid.*

<sup>203</sup> Israeli-US mtg, 1 March 65, AHP IM.

<sup>204</sup> D/169, D/171 Rusk to Harriman, both 1 March 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

never going nuclear at least until Cairo's aims were clear, partly since they hoped a *chance* to go nuclear to deter Cairo. Though the two men promised to again threaten with weakening US support for Israel, Komer argued that the threat lacked credibility. He proposed offering Israel something more on arms sales instead.<sup>205</sup>

After a final talk with Eshkol, Harriman left Israel and reported that the Jordan waters were the biggest problem. Eshkol did not plan a nuclear weapon acquisition in the existing situation and would repeat any earlier promises, such as the non-introduction pledge. As Eshkol was unable to do more without GOI and IAEC approval, seeking of which would cause public debate, Harriman proposed not pushing him further but accepting the deal he offered, noting that the US could still later threaten to halt arms supply if Israel acted against its wishes.<sup>206</sup> It thus seems Eshkol succeeded to make the US negotiators believe that his domestic situation clearly limited his possibilities to make concessions in the nuclear issue.

But Washington told Komer to try yet another idea: it changed its offer from institutionalization of security cooperation through guaranteed arms supply to a mere one-off sale – and lesser Israeli quid-pro-quos. The proposal was that Eshkol would in a letter promise cooperation on Jordan waters, to say *publicly* that “Israel will not be the first to acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability in the Arab-Israel area”, and to keep the deal secret, and approve the US sale to Jordan and policy of pursuing good relations with Arabs. The US would in return *exceptionally* make a similar sale to Israel without “creating any precedent for the future”.<sup>207</sup> Komer further stressed to the Israelis that the USG needed the “firmest possible understanding that Israel won't go nuclear” and demanded “nuclear self-denial”. Eshkol rejected the proposal but indicated that if Johnson promised to “meet Israel's needs for tanks and “a few” planes in the next year or so”, he would try to be helpful.<sup>208</sup>

At the same time, a DOS/NEA paper based on comments by US officials in Israel concluded that “all indications are toward Israeli acquisition of a nuclear capability”. The USG failure to push through its demands on the latest Dimona visit had given the impression that it was “not serious” about nonproliferation, which possibly made further visits harder to arrange. Owing to an expectation of Cairo getting a nuclear weapon capability by 1970-72, Israel's plan seemed to be to get one in 1968-69. Indications existed that it had the know-how for PU-separation, as did “evidence that parts of the Dimona facility had been purposely moth-balled to mislead the visiting team”. The officials thought Israel was “preparing all necessary elements for production of a nuclear device, leaving undone only last-minute assembly”. Barbour argued the Dimona visits “hung by only a thread”, as it was getting politically harder for Eshkol to go ahead with them, and put the blame for the

<sup>205</sup> D/170 Harriman to Rusk, D/172 Komer to Bundy, both 1 March 65, *ibid.*

<sup>206</sup> D/173 Harriman to Rusk, 2 March 65, *ibid.*; Saunders (NSCS) to Bundy, 2 March, LBJL KI 1.

<sup>207</sup> D/175 DOS to Komer & Barbour, 3 March 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>208</sup> D/177 Komer to Johnson & Rusk, 5 March, *ibid.*; A-696 E/TA to DOS, 17 March, with Israeli-US mtg, 5 March, AHP IM.

shortness of the latest visit on local officials.<sup>209</sup> A NIE issued a few days later saw Israel as indeed capable of producing some bombs by 1968-69 and “warheads by about 1971 without outside assistance, if a decision to go ahead were given at this time”<sup>210</sup>.

The NEA memo probably further strengthened the feeling in the USG that despite Eshkol’s assurances, Israel was pursuing nuclear weapons and half-way promises were useless since it had deceived the USG before, too. As the talks in Israel stalled, Bundy told Komer that Johnson now wanted “a prompt and clear-cut understanding limited as closely as possible to the immediate problem of Jordan arms sale”. Feinberg had made it clear that Israel refused to limit its sovereign rights. Since it seemed impossible to get assurances on Jordan waters and nuclear weapons at the time, the White House preferred leaving both issues to later talks.<sup>211</sup>

Komer was told to make a final offer: the USG would agree to sell Israel some tanks on good terms and maybe some aircraft if Israel and its friends in the US tacitly accepted the Jordan sale; the broader understanding offered first was impossible because Israel refused to meet the conditions regarding Jordan waters and nuclear weapons. But now Israel finally made a counterproposal.<sup>212</sup> The details of a deal, the exceptionality of which Komer stressed, were then quickly sorted out. In a secret understanding memo of 10 March, the USG reaffirmed its support for Israel’s security, agreed to sell it directly tanks and combat aircraft (unless other Western sources existed), and noted that it could sell arms also to Jordan. Israel also reaffirmed a promise “not [to] be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area”.<sup>213</sup> As Warren Cohen argues, USG inability to extract greater concessions in return for arms supply probably resulted from Israeli confidence that domestic pressures would anyway force the USG to agree to supply arms<sup>214</sup>.

Komer wrote to Johnson that he had made clear the determined US opposition to Israeli nuclear weapons and “as a bonus” reached “a written promise ... for what promises are worth”<sup>215</sup>. The comment indicates that in the absence of IAEA controls, USG officials saw the non-introduction pledge as no real solution to the nuclear problem.

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<sup>209</sup> Barbour seemed less certain than other Embassy officials that the Israelis were decidedly on the weapon path. D/178 NEA to Talbot on observations based on talks with E/TA officers (san.) also fn 1, 5 March 65, FRUS 64-8:18. Also Rusk soon got the memo.

<sup>210</sup> D/187 NIE 30-65 “The Arab-Israeli Problem”, 10 March, *ibid.* The only way Cairo could get nuclear weapons within 2-3 years was through foreign supply, but also that was very unlikely. But signs existed that Cairo wanted to buy a large reactor capable of weapon material production from the West. T/12728 E/C Office of Air Attaché to USAF Chief of Staff (san.), 17 Jan, DNSA NP01098.

<sup>211</sup> D/181 Bundy to Komer, 7 March 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>212</sup> Before the Israelis made the proposal, Komer had told them that he would return home since no deal was reached but, it seems, not yet made the latest US offer. D/182 DOS to Komer, 8 March 65, *ibid.*; D/183 Komer to Rusk & Bundy, 10 March, *ibid.* fn 3 ref. to Israel’s proposal in T/1143 Komer to DOS, 10 March, USNA CFPF DEF 12-5 ISR.

<sup>213</sup> D/184-5 E/TA to Rusk, McNamara, & Bundy, and DOS, 10-1 March 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>214</sup> Cohen, W. I. 1994 pp. 293-6.

<sup>215</sup> D/190 Komer to Johnson, 13 March 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

Avner Cohen notes the deal underpinned Israel's policy of nuclear opacity. He sees the Harriman-Komer mission as Johnson's test regarding his ability to press nonproliferation on Israel and argues that instead of the confrontational approach Kennedy had followed, "Johnson preferred to craft a practical compromise suitable for both sides." Cohen suggests the two sides around this time reached a tacit understanding that allowed them "to avoid public confrontation over Israel's nuclear program, without compromising the interests of either": Israel agreed not to *overtly* go nuclear, which was the key USG concern as *open* nuclearization could have pushed other states to follow suit.<sup>216</sup> But though such a deal was made, it was still to take some years before USG officials in general accepted that this was the best nonproliferation undertaking they could press Israel to make. Crucial in the deal was moreover also the fact that by agreeing to sell arms to Israel, the USG gave a further sign that it would help Israel ensure that the conventional balance would not turn to Arab advantage: a tacit US-Israeli bargain on arms supply *and* not going overtly nuclear was emerging. The bargain was based on no institutional mechanism to promote cooperation but on chances to sanction defection afterwards: the US could stop arms supply and Israel could go overtly nuclear.

FRUS documents show that Johnson followed the talks in Israel closely and himself cleared instructions to Komer and Harriman. Thus it seems the effort had his personal support – unlike some later situations, discussed below, where he towards the Israelis even took distance from other USG officials' concern about Israel's nuclear ambitions. Moreover, this situation shows that like Kennedy, also Johnson was prepared to have strong words used with the Israelis on the nuclear issue. However, a USG memo from late 1964 shows that he was in general skeptical about the capability of the USG to successfully bargain and get *quid pro quos*<sup>217</sup>. The spring 1965 experience must have strengthened that feeling regarding Israel and it seems he was becoming quite pessimistic about the chances to make Israel refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons<sup>218</sup>.

Within hours after the deal, Emb. Amman was authorized to offer an exceptional sale of certain arms to Jordan and to tell Hussein that similar sales could be made to Israel. A week later, Emb. Cairo got instructions to inform Nasser of a coming, exceptional sale to Israel and once again stress the benefits of Israel-Arab arms limitation and that the USG sought to ensure Israel would not pursue nuclear weapons.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 207, 214-5 ref. to his 1996 interview with a former US intelligence official.

<sup>217</sup> See USG mtg, 5 Dec 64, DDRS.

<sup>218</sup> Cohen, W. I. 1994 also argues that frustration with Middle East issues and preoccupation with Vietnam led Johnson and his top aides to lose interest in the former area, and thus domestic factors became central in US policy (p. 296).

<sup>219</sup> D/186 DOS to Emb. Amman, 10 March 65; D/192-3 Johnson to Nasser, DOS to E/C, 18 March, all FRUS 64-8:18.

### 9.5.3 Further indications of Israel's nuclear weapon effort

In March 1965, a front-page *NYT* story that grew out of comments by Eban, now Israel's Deputy Prime Minister, revealed the Dimona visits. In Israel, the story was a part of a political clash between Ben-Gurion's and Eshkol's camps. Though it was based on Israeli comments, the Israelis complained to the USG about it and an impression that they subordinated to US wishes by accepting inspections to the plant. US officials in Israel saw it as possible that both Israeli groups sought through such leaks a justification to refuse further visits. The USG stance was that it did not oppose publicity around the visits and the story resulted from Israeli leaks.<sup>220</sup>

Cohen argues that since Arab awareness of Israeli nuclear weapon capabilities was necessary to make them a deterrent, the Israelis saw rumors and leaks from unidentified sources as useful<sup>221</sup>. USG documents show that they chose to make similar leaks also to the USG. Such Israeli statements gave conflicting indications about Israeli aims but in sum suggested it was moving towards nuclear weapons. For instance, Kissinger told the USG in early 1965, after a visit to Israel, that unlike in 1962, the Israelis had little confidence or interest in US guarantees, seemed to have decided that Israel needed nuclear weapons, but preferred appearing not to "introduce" them to the area. He thought only the strongest security guarantees would persuade Israel to stop its clearly ongoing nuclear weapon program. According to him, Eshkol doubted the US could and would help Israel in an emergency quickly enough; Peres, who seemed to be the keenest proponent of nuclear weapons, wanted Israel to avoid conventional clashes with Arabs as it was soon to have a sea-based nuclear deterrent; and Eban supported these views.<sup>222</sup> And "a usually reliable" Israeli source told a US official that though Israeli missiles made little sense with conventional warheads, "when we need the right kind of warhead, we will have it... and after that, there will be no more trouble in this part of the world." In 6-8 months' time, peace was to emerge as Israel was to "have something that will scare everybody."<sup>223</sup> But though Peres had in 1964 predicted a "balance of terror" to emerge in the region in 5-7 years' time and to include nuclear weapons, he in summer 1965 argued publicly that this would happen only

<sup>220</sup> T/891, T/922 DOS to E/TA and DOS circular T/1691, 8-14 March 65, USNA CFPF B/3068 (see also other docs in *ibid.*); T/1205 E/TA to DOS, 22 March; T/970 DOS to E/TA, 23 March, both LBJL KD 1; "Israel Permits U.S. to Inspect Atomic Reactor", *NYT*, 14 March; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 184-5 ref. also to his 1996 interview with *NYT* reporter Finney. On Eshkol-Ben-Gurion competition and changes in Israel's nuclear establishment and strategic thinking under Eshkol, see pp. 219-42. Israel's nuclear program was quite segmented under Peres, who had tried to control it with a "divide and rule" tactic. When Eshkol's team resumed power also over the IMD and the nuclear weapon program, reorganization was started to make it more economic and efficient. Also the IAEC was reorganized. In May 1966, Bergmann had to leave its chairmanship, which was now reserved for the Prime Minister. Lefever 1979 p. 66; Pry 1984 p. 19; Green 1984 p. 175. See DOS-E/TA correspondence, USNA CFPF B/3068, on Bergmann's resignation and press speculation about it.

<sup>221</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 237-8.

<sup>222</sup> In the DOS, it was wondered why the Israelis would have told Kissinger all this. See E/TA to Jernegan, 4 Feb 65, with summary of Kissinger's debriefing, 1 Feb, LBJL KI.

<sup>223</sup> E/TA Air Attaché to Air Force Chief of Staff, 30 March 65, LBJL N/I 1 IV Cb. The editor-in-chief of *Ma'ariv* argued to Foster that Arab awareness of Israel's clear advantage in nuclear know-how and ability to produce nuclear weapons quickly clearly helped deter war. Foster-Dissentchik mtg, 23 July, *ibid.* MM 2.

in about a decade and possibly through chemical weapons only. He supported a policy of not making a first introduction of nuclear weapons to the area *and* of eliminating chances of being caught unawares if Arabs went nuclear. He wanted Israel not to let nuclear affairs to spoil Israel-US relations but try to cooperate and abandon “stupid tactics” that had raised US suspicions. Barbour commented Peres had possibly “tailored his remarks somewhat for the Washington market” to improve his own image.<sup>224</sup>

In spring 1965, Webber argued in a paper to the DOS that from economic and human resource cost-benefit perspectives, the Dimona effort was “*not* a sensible research project” but a “colossal blunder” if no military aim was behind it. There were few signs of useful scientific research at the site. Israel had no need to pursue fuel and reactor self-sufficiency for civilian purposes: several willing suppliers existed in the West. Though no evidence existed of a PU-separation plant, Israel seemed to pursue a capability to make nuclear weapons quickly and be capable of testing them in 1968. An IAEA recruitment campaign for, e.g., chemical engineers (possibly hinting at PU-separation) for the Soreq plant appeared as a potential cover-up for recruitment for the Dimona site.<sup>225</sup> Six months later, Webber argued in a briefing in Washington that though AEC scientist U. Staebler, who had visited Dimona, thought that the plant could make sense also in the absence of a weapon effort, the non-introduction pledges were unreliable and Israel was probably securing a capability to produce both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons (but not producing them yet). He suspected that it was capable of reprocessing plutonium somewhere and would reach full capabilities for weapon production in 5-8 years. He recommended much more frequent and thorough inspections of the Dimona plant.<sup>226</sup>

But a DOS research memo from May 1965 painted a more ambiguous picture of Israel’s aims. It argued that though the facility seemed to make sense only as a potential source of weapon material, the impression from the latest US visit of a slow-down of efforts suggested that the Israelis had maybe come to see a Dimona-based weapon effort as unfeasible because the amount of plutonium the reactor could produce would be quickly used in a test program. According to this memo, testing was necessary in development of warheads for Israel’s light aircraft and missiles. It was possible, but unlikely, that the Israelis either had misled the US team in Dimona or had unknown facilities elsewhere. Israel’s fuel production plant had been taken from operation and the DOS still lacked evidence of a reprocessing plant but, e.g., evidence on continuing Israeli efforts to buy large amounts of uranium ore “forced to assume that at least some preparation for plutonium production has taken place”. Israel was expected to maintain the weapon option but to seek US security guarantees before realizing it in case the regional military balance developed unfavorably.<sup>227</sup>

<sup>224</sup> A-955 E/TA to DOS, 15 June 65, DNSA NP01117; A-22 Barbour to DOS, 7 July, LBJL N/I 1 IV Cb 3.

<sup>225</sup> Original emphasis. A-742 E/TA to DOS (Barbour cleared Webber’s draft), 9 Apr 65, USNA CFPF B/3068; Webber to NE, 9 Apr, USNA NRI B/8. See also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 190-3.

<sup>226</sup> Webber’s debriefing, 18 Nov 65, USNA NRI B/7.

<sup>227</sup> DOS/INR to Rusk RES-11, 10 May 65, LBJL KD 1.



Though the attempt to tie a change in the arms policy to Israeli acceptance of IAEA safeguards had produced little result, the USG continued efforts to promote the safeguards in the area, sticking to a tough tone with Israel. Recognition that the visits to Dimona gave no certainty about Israel's actions and aims made Israeli acceptance of IAEA safeguards increasingly important for the White House.<sup>228</sup> The USG pressed also Cairo on safeguards and Nasser now gave Talbot a clear promise to place any future reactors under IAEA safeguards. Cairo had after the *NYT* story shown concern about the Dimona plant and Talbot reassured Nasser that the USG had "satisfied our own curiosity" about it.<sup>229</sup>

Barbour informed Meir of Rusk's recent private comment that the USG "would pull out" if Israel went nuclear. Meir seemed "impressed".<sup>230</sup> Talbot in turn stressed Johnson's worries about proliferation and the usefulness of IAEA controls in the area to Eshkol. Eshkol's reply offered little hope of progress. He argued that even if Nasser first accepted safeguards in order to get a reactor, he would later take the promise back. Disarmament had to proceed from conventional arms to missiles and only last to nuclear weapons. Talbot's report reveals an unusually open comment by Eshkol about Israeli aims: though much effort and money and a delivery system were still necessary before Israel could have a nuclear force, the GOI had to ensure the survival of the Israelis and *could not afford to give up the weapon option unless it got a binding security guarantee*.<sup>231</sup>

Eshkol also again probed into security guarantees with the Britons. He said to them that Israel was not producing nuclear weapons but had to keep its eyes open – whereas a reliable Western security commitment would change the situation. The USG was also informed of British-French talk on Israel's nuclear aims: both sides suspected Israel to have decided to make nuclear weapons but said that they had no evidence of this or of an Israeli plan for PU-separation. The French thought Israel might test its weapon directly on Cairo if it were attacked.<sup>232</sup>

Though Paris tried to give the impression of taking distance from Israel's nuclear efforts, others were not so sure about this. The DOS/INR saw it as possible that it had agreed to supply nuclear warheads for Israel's French missiles in case Arabs got such weapons. In the summer, the press speculated that Paris was undertaking PU-separation on Israel's behalf.<sup>233</sup> In the fall, the DOS instructed Emb. Paris to keep an eye on the real chance of "an Israeli-French nuclear weapons arrangement"<sup>234</sup>.

<sup>228</sup> See Komer to Bundy, 6 Feb 65, with DOS to Bundy, 5 Feb, *ibid.*; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 206 ref. to his 1992-5 interviews with Komer.

<sup>229</sup> D/208 Talbot (E/C) to DOS, 18 Apr 65, FRUS 64-8:18; T/3653 Battle to Rusk, 18 Apr, DDRS; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 253-4.

<sup>230</sup> D/206 Barbour to DOS, 16 Apr 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>231</sup> D/210 Talbot (E/TA) to DOS, 23 Apr 65, FRUS 64-8:18; T/1362 Talbot to DOS, 23 Apr, LBJL KD 1.

<sup>232</sup> NE-UK Emb. mtg, "Eshkol Visits London" (excerpt from *Current Foreign Relations* no. 14), both 7 Apr 65, LBJL KI; T/68, T/282 (san.) E/L to DOS, 6 and 20 July, LBJL KD 1.

<sup>233</sup> RES-11 (fn 227); "The Bomb: from Hiroshima to...", *Newsweek*, 9 Aug 65. Referring to Israel's enhancing weapon production capabilities, the USG had in the spring again asked Paris to pass on any information about proliferation in the Middle East. De Murville told the USG that though Paris had no evidence Israel that

In May 1965, the DOS asked Johnson to authorize pursuing IAEA controls on all nuclear plants in Israel. It saw “a breakthrough” in preventing proliferation as urgently needed, also since Eshkol had said that Israel could not promise never to produce nuclear weapons unless it got binding guarantees and Israel’s initial dishonesty about the Dimona site led to assume that it would not consult the USG when deciding about nuclear arms. The USG line with Israel affected its nonproliferation (nuclear and SSM) efforts towards the UAR and others: as others were aware of US leverage over Israel, lack of public controls on the Dimona reactor weakened the credibility of US nonproliferation policy in general and made it easier also for Cairo and others to reject IAEA controls. If the plant was for civilian purposes, the only downside for Israel from accepting the controls was to lose “the questionable deterrent” based on uncertainty about its capabilities. The DOS plan was to demand in the upcoming arms sale talks both a further visit to Dimona and an agreement on IAEA controls after the fall 1965 elections in Israel.<sup>235</sup> But the chances of success were again seen as weak: Komer argued to Johnson that the Israelis would not give up the nuclear option but it was suitable to remind them of Johnson’s views and reciprocity in US-Israel relations<sup>236</sup>.

Johnson sent Eshkol a letter that suggested that after the elections, the US visits to Dimona would be replaced by IAEA safeguards, which could have an exit clause for the case Arabs failed to agree on similar controls. He warned that if Nasser thought Israel was going nuclear, Cairo could move closer to the Soviets who might deploy nuclear missiles in the UAR. Israeli restraint could help Nasser show that, too, and provide impetus also for others to renounce nuclear weapons. The USG expected Cairo to accept IAEA controls on any major reactor it would acquire. Eshkol’s first reaction was to note that giving up a “psychological deterrent” would clearly influence Israel’s security.<sup>237</sup>

Israel’s American friends were again pressing the USG to get tougher with Nasser. According to Rusk, US-UAR relations already “hung by a strand of spider web”. Probably to press for greater support for Israel, a Congressman told him that “a [nuclear] weapons project could not be precluded if Israel felt it a question of national survival” and that the Israelis were worried that Nasser would get such weapons from China (which Rusk, however, saw as unlikely).<sup>238</sup>

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was producing weapon material, he thought Israel was unlikely to accept IAEA controls as it wanted to maintain the weapon option. D/196 DOS to Bohlen, 23 March, FRUS 64-8:18; T/5448 Bohlen to DOS, 26 March, USNA CFPF B/3068. A year later, the French told the USG that they had a while ago acted to stop nuclear material supply from Gabon to Israel. Rusk- Amb. Lucet mtg, 21 Feb 66, LBJL KNP.

<sup>234</sup> A-5077 DOS to E/P (san.), 8 Nov 65, LBJL KD 1.

<sup>235</sup> D/214 Rusk to Johnson, 10 May 65, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>236</sup> Komer to Johnson, 19 May 65, LBJL KD 1. Despite “good evidence” on Israeli interest in nuclear arms, Komer thought Israel had not yet decided to build a bomb. Komer to Bundy, 2 July, LBJL KNP.

<sup>237</sup> D/218 Johnson to Eshkol, 21 May 65, FRUS 64-8:18; T/1510 Barbour to DOS, 25 May, USNA CFPF B/3068.

<sup>238</sup> See Rusk-Reid mtg, 25 May 65, LBJL KI 3.

In his reply to Johnson two months later, Eshkol referred to security threats and proposed taking up IAEA safeguards only after the elections in Israel. Komer wrote to Johnson that Israel would obviously accept the safeguards only if really forced or given major carrots. Though “heavy artillery” was to be used only after the elections, continuing pressure on Eshkol seemed advisable as a way to “keep the Israelis from going nuclear in the next few years (though not from getting ready)”. Barbour informed Eshkol of Johnson’s deep unhappiness with the reply and that, assuming Eshkol remained in power, the USG would return to the matter right after the elections and expect the GOI to consider action on safeguards. Otherwise the issue threatened to altogether shadow US-Israel relations. Eshkol promised such consideration but said he was at the time unable to do anything more than to stick to the non-introduction pledge.<sup>239</sup>

DOS officials in Israel and Washington saw that most Israeli leaders wanted at least to secure a nuclear weapon option, seen also as a psychological weapon against Arabs. It was also clear that even if it did renounce the option, Israel would have scientific capabilities to pursue nuclear weapons later. Suspicious activities took place in Dimona and Israel had acquired a large amount of unsafeguarded uranium. It still seemed to have no PU-separation plant but getting one was seen as not very hard. Still, the lack of a plant and an impression of “uncertainty and slowdown” at the Dimona site were seen to suggest that it had not yet decided to acquire the weapons. Since Israel maybe anyway trusted its weapon design, it was seen as possible that it would in any case postpone testing to avoid negative reactions. Now the expected effect of an Israeli nuclear capability was that Cairo would request Soviet support but *not* strike preemptively. A PPS memo indicates that the USG was moving to the direction of trying to limit Israel’s moves to *opaque* proliferation: it argued that though the US sometimes failed to use its leverage over Israel for its benefit, if it made the nuclear issue central in dealings with it, preventing *overt* weapon efforts seemed feasible for quite some time.<sup>240</sup>

According to Cohen, around the mid-1960s the CIA office in Tel Aviv, and by 1965-66 the US intelligence community in general, thought Israel had a nuclear weapon program, and also Barbour knew what Israel was doing but preferred to look the other way since he saw arms supply as a better way to restrain Israel than open confrontation.<sup>241</sup> There is little reason to consider the argument ungrounded. Nevertheless, an early 1966 NIE argued Israel was unlikely to pursue nuclear weapons any time soon, though it was able to test a weapon two years after a decision to do so and had enough uranium for some weapons.

<sup>239</sup> T/75 E/TA to DOS with Eshkol to Johnson, 26 July 65, *ibid.* 2; Komer to Johnson, 29 July and 10 Aug; T/116 Barbour to Rusk, 10 Aug, all LBJL KD 1; D/231 DOS to E/TA, 30 July, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>240</sup> A-106 E/TA to DOS, 4 Aug 65, LBJL KI 2; A-5077 DOS to E/P (san.), 8 Nov, LBJL KD 1; Rostow to Planning Group members, 14 Jan 66, with DOS/PPC memo on Near East arms, 13 Jan, AHP B/433 Arab-Israel 3; NE to Hare with Att. B) “Nuclear weapons and missile development: current appraisal of Israeli programs”, 2 Feb, LBJL KNP; PPS draft “The Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Problems for the West”, 14 Feb, USNA PDA B/8; PPC on proliferation, 18 May, USNA PDA B/8.

<sup>241</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 214-5, 293 ref. to his 1992-6 interviews with Feldman, Komer, and former intelligence officials. See also Cordesman 2003 p. 44.

With the help of Western arms supply, the Arab-Israel military balance, on the expected development of which Israel's decision probably depended, was likely to remain good enough in the near future. But the CIA warned that if the balance seemed to deteriorate, "even a combination of international agreement, pressure from the US, and explicit US security guarantees might not restrain the Israelis."<sup>242</sup>

The USG continued approaches also to Nasser on safeguards and nonproliferation and saw US aid as a possible incentive. But Nasser promised nothing new regarding safeguards.<sup>243</sup> After press reports on Israeli advances in the nuclear field, towards late 1965 the issue attracted more attention among Arabs. Arab officials' comments to the USG show that they were skeptical about the US reassurances about Israel's reactor. In the fall, Foreign Minister H. Nuseibeh told Rusk that Amman believed Israel already was capable of manufacturing a weapon and would show by March that it had a missile capability. Cairo spread rumors about its nuclear efforts and Soviet nuclear guarantees for it. Also the threat of preventive war reappeared in its statements. The USG stressed to the Egyptians the strength of its opposition to proliferation, promised forceful action if it took place in the area, and said it was not so worried that Israel would acquire nuclear weapons but followed the matter closely. The Egyptians suspected Israel had rejected USG requests for safeguards on the Dimona plant and said that the French had told them that French aid had probably enabled Israel by now to produce plutonium. But Cairo's silence on the issue, both in public and in US-Egypt relations, was soon re-established. It was largely maintained throughout the pre-1967 war period, though occasional articles in the Arab press argued that Israel was becoming capable of producing nuclear weapons.<sup>244</sup> Egypt had little success in its nuclear efforts: partially owing to financing problems, it was unable to buy a big reactor, and its attempts to buy nuclear weapons or related technology from the USSR and China bore no fruit<sup>245</sup>.

In fall 1965, Rusk probed into Israel-UAR arms limitation with Gromyko. In quite a different tone than with the Arabs, he noted Israel was fully capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons and though it was not doing so, it was "three months pregnant". Despite the non-introduction pledge, it maybe "would some day announce that it had developed nuclear weapons, even without having first tested them". Gromyko did not appear overly interested

<sup>242</sup> NIE 4-66 "The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation", 20 Jan 66, LBJL I:A. In fall 1966, the CIA continued to argue that "neither Egypt nor Israel is likely to have nuclear weapons by 1970". D/319 CIA "Arab-Israeli Arms Survey", 1 Sep, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>243</sup> D/252 DOS to Battle, 17 Nov 65; D/253 Battle to DOS, 24 Nov, both FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>244</sup> The DOS instructed Emb. Amman to stress to Nuseibeh the US opposition to proliferation and alertness on the matter and that the USG had no evidence of any state in the area being able to make nuclear weapons soon or having decided to acquire them. Rusk-Nuseibeh mtg, 6 Oct 65, LBJL KNP; D/249 DOS to Emb. Jordan, 4 Nov; D/274 Johnson-Sadat (President of the UAR National Assembly) mtg, 23 Feb 66; D/277 DOS to E/C on 25 Feb Rusk-Sadat mtg, 28 Feb, all FRUS 64-8:18; DOS/IAI to NEA, 1 Sep, with "Arab Atomic Authorities Warn That Israel Will Achieve Its Bomb in September", *al-Hayah*, 29 July, USNA NRI B/8; "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense", *NYT*, 4 Feb; Lefever 1979 p. 72; Hersh 1991 p. 138; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 255-7, 261-2.

<sup>245</sup> See "Soviet Said to Offer Cairo Atom Defense", *NYT*, 4 Feb 66; Lefever 1979 p. 73; Einhorn 2004 p. 46.

in arms limitation efforts and said that great power arms limitation was needed before smaller powers could be expected to follow suit.<sup>246</sup>

But in early 1966, signs emerged that Moscow wanted Israel-Arab stability: it for instance made a statement that the Dimona plant had to come under IAEA safeguards. Also it argued that *China* would otherwise maybe aid Cairo in nuclear development (the USG continued to see that as unlikely), implying it would not give such help itself. This stance was seen to maybe indicate interest in proper safeguards in the NPT, even if Moscow was likely to leave the promotion of such to the US. Moscow also made proposals for a Middle East NWFZ but demanded that it would cover also Greece and Turkey.<sup>247</sup> The USG continued probes with it into a deal on limiting arms sales to the region and showed interest in an informal NWFZ without the two states. Now Rusk told Dobrynin that the USG was “convinced that the Israelis were not planning to make nuclear weapons”, but Dobrynin was skeptical. He doubted Israel and Egypt would like a NWFZ but indicated that Moscow would not disseminate nuclear weapons to the area.<sup>248</sup>

#### 9.5.4 US aircraft for Israel and inspection of the Dimona reactor

In the latter half of 1965, US-Israeli talks started on a possible aircraft sale (as agreed in March). Israel’s proposals implied that the US would fully modernize its air force. The USG doubted whether it really had no other sources of supply. Komer said to the Israelis that their stances on the Dimona site and safeguards would greatly affect sentiments in Washington and their nuclear aims had to be considered if they sought nuclear-capable aircraft as the USG was “so suspicious that Israel might go nuclear.” An Israeli general saw this as irrelevant: Israel “could deliver a nuc in a Boeing 707.”<sup>249</sup>

In early 1966, the USG started pressing Israel for another visit to Dimona. The Israelis accepted the idea but said that Eshkol’s problems with his new cabinet could cause delay. Komer saw such comments as “largely evasions” especially after the US had for the same reason already forgone a visit for a year.<sup>250</sup> During a visit to the US, also Eban (now Foreign Minister) reaffirmed the commitment to the visits but stressed the need to keep them secret. He referred to domestic problems caused by publicity and the fact that the GOI had agreed on the visits without thoroughly consulting the Knesset. Rusk was tough with him: after referring to military and economic US support for Israel, he noted that “the only major question that could have a disastrous effect on U.S.-Israeli relations was Israel’s attitude on

<sup>246</sup> D/97 Gromyko-Rusk mtg, 1 Oct 65, FRUS 64-8:11.

<sup>247</sup> T/2566 E/M to DOS, 21 Feb 66, USNA CFPF B/3068; D/282 DOS to E/C on 22 March Rusk-Kamel mtg, 24 March, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>248</sup> D/294 Rusk-Dobrynin mtg, 26 May 66, *ibid.* also fn 2 ref. to Rusk-Dobrynin mtg, 18 March, USNA RG330.

<sup>249</sup> Komer on 14 Oct mtg with Israeli officials, 18 Oct 66, LBJL NSF Komer B/33 Israel security dialogue 12-3 Oct. Ben-Zvi 2004 provides a detailed account of USG decision-making regarding A-6 aircraft in 1965-6 (esp. Chapter 3).

<sup>250</sup> D/263 Komer to Bundy, 21 Jan 66, FRUS 64-8:18.

proliferation”; the US stance on proliferation was “extremely clear and utterly harsh”. Israel’s aim to cause ambiguity among Arabs had the same effect in the US. Though Eban stressed the seriousness of the non-introduction pledge, Rusk noted that the result could still be “a precarious situation somewhat akin to eight months of pregnancy”. He also requested public assurances; private statements “were of limited value”. Eban promised to try to persuade the GOI to allow a visit to Dimona and to consider IAEA controls. But he said that the Arabs’ role in the IAEA made Israel prefer the US controls.<sup>251</sup>

The USG was now troubled by press reports on US arms sales to the Middle East and resulting allegations of it contributing to the regional arms race<sup>252</sup>. Nonetheless, talks on the aircraft sale went on. Israel wanted sophisticated, nuclear-capable A-6 aircraft, but McNamara was fully against selling them: the US did not have many A-6s and selling them was likely to fuel the regional arms race. Komer argued that since concern over the conventional balance was the key reason why Israel would acquire nuclear weapons, selected arms sales were the best possible way to prevent that, but the US needed to seek quid pro quos, such as a promise not to use US aircraft as nuclear carriers.<sup>253</sup>

McNamara informed Eban that the US would not sell the A-6s and suggested a sale of up to 48 A-4E Skyhawk aircraft. But a sale had conditions (which were to be kept secret): Israel had to accept a US sale of supersonic aircraft to Jordan, promise not to “regard the US as a major arms supplier”, reaffirm a pledge “not to be the first power in the Middle East to manufacture nuclear weapons”, accept “periodic inspection of Dimona”, and promise “not to use any US-supplied aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier”. Eban replied that “we will not use your aircraft to carry weapons we haven’t got and hope we will never have”.<sup>254</sup> Later, Israel agreed on all conditions but only if allowed to give some promises as policy affirmations, instead of having them as explicit conditions for a sale. Eshkol namely wanted no formal deal that would give an impression that he had “bargained away Israel’s future nuclear policy and opened the Dimona facility to US inspection for the sake of “a mere 48 airplanes.””<sup>255</sup> The USG agreed Israel would in a separate letter reaffirm the pledge “not to be the first to develop nuclear weapons in the Middle East” and acceptance of visits to Dimona.<sup>256</sup> Thus the Skyhawks and the nuclear issue came not to be formally and directly linked. The Israeli letter also talked about inviting US scientists to Dimona “from time to time”, not “periodically” as the US demanded. The DOS nonetheless aimed to pursue visits twice a year.<sup>257</sup>

<sup>251</sup> D/269 Rusk-Eban mtg, 9 Feb 66, *ibid*.

<sup>252</sup> Komer to Hare & ASOD/ISA McNaughton, 10 Jan 66, LBJL MEC 1; “Middle East Arms Race”, *NYT*, 10 Jan.

<sup>253</sup> D/263 (fn 250), D/267 Komer to Johnson, 8 Feb 66, FRUS 64-8:18; “President’s Meeting on Israel/Jordan Matters”, 12 Feb, LBJL KI 1.

<sup>254</sup> D/271 McNamara-Eban mtg, 12 Feb 66, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>255</sup> D/283 McNaughton to McNamara, 31 March 66, *ibid*.

<sup>256</sup> T/899 E/TA to DOS on Barbour-Eban mtg, 14 March 66, LBJL N/I VI Cb Dec 66-July 67; D/283 (fn 255) FRUS 64-8:18. On the deal, see also Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 212-3.

<sup>257</sup> D/283 (fn 255) FRUS 64-8:18 also fn 5 ref. to A-242 DOS to E/TA, 28 March 66.

As Barbour again brought the next visit up, Eshkol finally offered a one-day visit. This was clearly less than what the DOS had hoped for, but it accepted the offer since it expected to get no better one soon.<sup>258</sup> A short visit took place in early April. According to a DOD memo, the visitors found that “there is no evidence that Israel is producing or intends to produce nuclear weapons material”. This conclusion resulted from the views that the reactor was used for research (some of it partly financed by the USG) and operated in a way unsuitable for weapon production and that the site lacked a reprocessing plant. They found it unlikely, though possible, that the hosts would have cheated them. But they were left with questions about a large amount of Argentine uranium that “could have been (or could in the future be) run through the reactor between U.S. visits without being detected”. It was also possible that related plants existed in an unknown place. The DOD described the information as the best available: no contrary, “convincing intelligence from other sources” existed.<sup>259</sup>

Karpin argues that in early 1966, reports on Israel’s missile acquisition from France provided a wake-up call for Arabs regarding Israel’s nuclear aims. After Nasser then again threatened with preventive war against Israel’s nuclear program, and meeting Rusk’s demand for *public* assurances, in May 1966 Eshkol said before the Knesset that Israel neither had nuclear arms nor would be the first to introduce them into the area and also proposed regional nuclear arms control. At the same time, he said that the Dimona site would continue to be used for training and research and made no claims about peaceful uses. Israeli officials thereafter often repeated the non-introduction pledge and support for such regional arms control that included conventional arms.<sup>260</sup>

Next, Barbour returned to the topic of SSMs with Eshkol. Eshkol said Israel did not and, within a few years, would not have strategic missiles. He expressed hope that “within that period of time UAR will abandon its missile program, in which event Israel will do likewise”.<sup>261</sup> After such comments, the DOS wanted to again pursue SSM limitation based on separate UAR and Israeli promises of restraint. In mid-June, Barbour was instructed to discuss this with Eshkol.<sup>262</sup> But the available US documents indicate no further early action on the matter.

Also nuclear sea-water desalting remained on the USG agenda. Seaborg and some others favored a broad cooperation program on it, but other US officials in, e.g., ACDA, were concerned because of both economical and technological issues and the PU-production capabilities reactor supply would result in. The DOS thought US money would be well used in desalting *if* the UAR and Israel in return accepted IAEA controls; however, Israeli ac-

<sup>258</sup> T/698, T/761 Rusk to Barbour, 1 and 19 March 66, USNA CFPF B/3068.

<sup>259</sup> D/289 DIA to McNamara on the visit, 4 May 66, FRUS 64-8:18. See also Cohen, A. 1998 p. 186.

<sup>260</sup> “Mideast Atom Curb Is Urged by Eshkol”, *NYT*, 19 May 66; Lefever 1979 pp. 67-8; Green 1984 pp. 175-6 ref. to Mark, C. (1969) “Israel and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, *Study for LC Legislative Reference Service*, 6 Feb 69, p. 18; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 233; Karpin 2006 pp. 200-1, 273-4.

<sup>261</sup> D/293 E/TA to DOS, 24 May 66, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>262</sup> D/301 DOS to E/TA, 17 June 66, *ibid*.

ceptance of IAEA controls on all reactors seemed hard to reach. The USG made feasibility and financial studies on nuclear and non-nuclear desalting cooperation with both states. Probably partially to avoid pressure for full IAEA safeguards, in the course of talks Israel took the stance that a desalting project could just as well be non-nuclear.<sup>263</sup>

The DOS aimed to keep up pressure regarding the Dimona site. Barbour was to stress to Eban Johnson's seriousness about preventing proliferation in the area and the great importance of the issue for US-Israel relations, ask about the Argentine uranium, and demand six-monthly, "full access to Dimona's facilities and records" without delays and having to negotiate about each visit separately. The USG was also still waiting for a reply to Johnson's May 1965 letter on IAEA safeguards.<sup>264</sup> But before Barbour made the approach, the *NYT* revealed the latest Dimona visit. The Israelis again protested to the USG. Though the story was likely to further weaken Israeli cooperation regarding the visits, Barbour argued to Eban that it showed that regular, public visits were the best solution. Eban expected Eshkol to reject the idea but noted that Israel might one day open the site to the scientific community. A little later, Emb. Tel Aviv reported to Washington that the Israelis had indicated unwillingness to discuss sensitive issues at the time and it seemed best to wait for a better moment for a further approach on the visits.<sup>265</sup>

Though US-UAR relations had been deteriorating, in the summer Kamel told Rusk and Johnson that Cairo "would accept international controls over its atomic activities", a statement on which Rusk laid much value. At the same time, Kamel warned that Israel's acquiring nuclear arms would mean Soviet bases in the area.<sup>266</sup>

In late July 1966, Rusk argued to Israeli diplomat G. Rafael that if Israel accepted IAEA safeguards, Moscow and Arabs would accept a regional NWFZ. But Rafael said safeguards were not on GOI agenda, which was occupied by worries about conventional arms (on which Moscow promised no restraint). Rusk argued in favor of treating nuclear weapons apart from other arms and that Israel's stance meant that it wanted "to hang on to the threat of nuclear weapons". True to his tough line, Rusk again stressed that US support would vanish if Israel went nuclear and that even if it maintained the option, the US "would not be with you".<sup>267</sup>

Rusk was also to meet Eban in the fall. In preparation, Barbour (noting he was acting on own initiative) expressed Eban a wish of Israel making a *fully clear, public* non-nuclear pledge and an expectation that the issue would be on Rusk's agenda. Eban repeated the

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<sup>263</sup> Schultze (Bureau of Budget) to Johnson's Special Assistant Valenti (draft), 20 Sep 65; DOS to all posts, 11 Jan 66, both LBJL NSF Komer B/19 desalinization; D/299, D/305 Rostow to Johnson, 14 and 25 June; D/377 E/TA to DOS, 11 Jan 67, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>264</sup> T/1052 DOS to E/TA, 2 June 66, USNA CFPF B/3068; D/298 DOS to E/TA, 11 June, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>265</sup> T/2563 DOS to certain posts, 28 June 66, DNSA NP01171; T/1377, T/9, T/297 E/TA to DOS, 28 June, 1 and 25 July, USNA CFPF B/3068; "U.S. Again Assured on Negev Reactor", *NYT*, 28 June; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 186.

<sup>266</sup> D/307 DOS to E/C, 13 July 66; D/315 Johnson-Kamel mtg, 12 Aug, both FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>267</sup> D/312 DOS to E/TA, 28 July 66, *ibid*.



non-introduction promise and said Rusk's stressing of the matter had impressed him and that he would study the idea. But he said that other issues were more urgent than the nuclear question and argued that US threats of giving up its support if Israel acted against its will clashed with the nature of US-Israeli relations. Barbour noted that the USG did not threaten Israel with sanctions but an end to its support for Israel was possible. Barbour thought Eban maybe had or would seek Eshkol's authorization to do something helpful in the nuclear issue.<sup>268</sup>

Rusk did not discuss nuclear weapons with Eban but Barbour did so again a little later. Eban said that as Cairo seemed to have become more relaxed about Israel's nuclear plans, Eshkol agreed that it was good to reassure Nasser. Still, Egypt's untrustworthiness made it necessary to protect Israel's nuclear plants and reject IAEA safeguards, though Eban did not exclude all chances of a solution to the issue. He reassured the GOI supported a NPT and hoped to join it, instead of being the target of special nonproliferation efforts. Barbour still saw promising signs on the issue.<sup>269</sup>

The DOS/NEA still saw little prospect of *multilateral* action to stabilize the region. Ideas for such came again up in the fall as the French suggested a fourpartite declaration with Moscow along the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. The NEA welcomed studying the idea and telling Paris to pursue the declaration but was pessimistic. A joint statement on territorial integrity of Middle East states was maybe possible but no agreement to restrict arms sales seemed viable, at least beyond nuclear weapons and offensive missiles: Moscow was unlikely to give up arms sales and it was also in US interest to sell arms to friendly states in the area. The US had an ad hoc working group with the UK and Canada on Near East arms control and it had been planned to maybe invite France, the FRG, and Italy to join at some point, but French-Israeli nuclear and missile cooperation and the weak chances of Soviet cooperation in regional arms control meant that the time for that had not come.<sup>270</sup>

The Middle East was soon to face another time of crisis at the same time as further signs of Israel becoming able to produce nuclear weapons appeared. These developments are discussed in section 9.8. Next, I discuss how the search for a solution to the nuclear organization of NATO progressed after Johnson decided on giving up US initiative on a MLF/ANF in late 1964.

## **9.6 Nuclear sharing in NATO and the nonproliferation treaty**

From spring 1965 onwards, the focus of key USG officials, led by Bundy, started slowly shifting from hardware sharing schemes to information sharing and greater consultations in NATO, especially with the FRG. Some DOS officials still stuck to pro-MLF/ANF stances

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<sup>268</sup> D/322 E/TA to DOS, 14 Sep 66, *ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> D/331 E/TA to DOS, 3 Nov 66, *ibid.*

<sup>270</sup> NEA to Rostow, 9 Dec 66, USNA NRI B/8.

but also these gradually took more the form of opposition to foreclosing of the option in a NPT than of pressing for setting up of a joint force. The shift in USG focus also came to be important for the achievement of progress in the NPT talks with Moscow. Bonn's stances made the switch hard, but indeed it started now slowly but concretely getting a somewhat bigger role in NATO nuclear affairs, after the US nuclear sharing initiatives had for the last years mostly led to little real action.

### 9.6.1 Towards a consultative nuclear sharing solution in NATO

Bonn and London made no progress in their MLF/ANF talks during the first months of 1965. Thereafter, the matter became less urgent since too little time was left for ratification of any agreement in the Bundestag before elections in the FRG in fall 1965.<sup>271</sup>

Though the USG and Erhard had reached some level of mutual trust, this did not apply in general to the West German political elite, within which suspicions regarding US aims were common. Erhard's opponents, especially CDU/CSU Gaullists, increasingly attacked his pro-US policy, pointed out that Paris was an alternative partner, and often managed to make him appear as a weak bargainer who unnecessarily sacrificed German interests to please the US.<sup>272</sup>

Having repeatedly made assurances about US interest in West German security, also Johnson by now found continuing German questioning of the US commitment disturbing. The situation also again fed USG concerns about possible Franco-German nuclear weapon efforts. The USG indicated to Bonn that if Bonn accepted any French offer of such cooperation, the US would have to reconsider its strategy and maybe withdraw troops. Bonn assured that even in the unlikely case Paris made such an offer, the FRG was only interested in a role in a NATO force.<sup>273</sup>

In early 1965, remaining MLF/ANF-enthusiasts in the DOS proposed USG statements in support of a MLF. Top USG officials rejected the idea. Bundy now thought that a right time would *never* come for a MLF and the USG had to consider whether some other nuclear scheme could replace it.<sup>274</sup> To his approval, Kissinger wrote in the summer based on trips to Europe that giving up pressure for a MLF had been a good decision and a relief to most European leaders. He warned that DOS men, who still tried to keep the MLF/ANF alive even in talks with allies, prevented serious pursuing of alternatives to it.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>271</sup> See docs. in APD 65.

<sup>272</sup> D/83 E/B to DOS, 11 Jan 65; D/88 McGhee to Johnson, 26 Jan, both FRUS 64-8:15; Mahncke 1972 pp. 194-6; Boutwell 1990 p. 42; Costigliola 1994 pp. 185-6.

<sup>273</sup> D/12 Carstens on mtg with McGhee, 12 Jan, APD 65; D/86 Bundy to McGhee, 14 Jan, FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>274</sup> See Bundy to Ball, 31 Jan 65, USNA LBM 5; Bundy to Johnson and Rusk, 2-4 March, LBJL S:MLF III 1.

<sup>275</sup> Klein to Bundy, 26 July 65, with Bundy's comment and Kissinger to Bundy, 20 July, LBJL FGN 1. In April, a NIE expected the FRG to continue to remain close to and dependent on the US. Unless it gained a greater nuclear role in NATO, Bonn was likely to consider, e.g., a European or Franco-German force, but these options appeared unrealistic in the near future. In that case, even interest in a national nuclear force was expected to grow somewhat in the FRG. But "all responsible West German leaders" opposed one at the time.

Some German leaders were showing interest in such alternatives. In the spring, both H. Krone, Minister for Special Affairs (CDU), and W. Brandt, SDP candidate for chancellorship, argued to the USG that though the Germans had a legitimate need to participate in shaping NATO strategy and be heard regarding the use of nuclear weapons, national or joint *ownership* of nuclear weapons was not crucial (Krone) and they did not aim to become a nuclear power (Brandt). Also SPD leader Erler indicated he favored a stronger German role in NATO's nuclear planning but no new nuclear force.<sup>276</sup>

As the hardware-approach to NATO nuclear sharing was being buried with the MLF/ANF, the information-sharing and consultative approach was again gaining ground. And finally, a concrete new measure was really implemented to increase allies' involvement in nuclear affairs. In mid-1965, when the failure of the MLF was apparent and another way to respond to West German concerns about US strategy needed, McNamara re-launched such efforts. His aim was also to reduce allies' interest in a hardware scheme or national nuclear forces. The idea was to involve them more in strategic planning for US nuclear forces under SACEUR and so make them 1) understand and accept US strategy, 2) see that the USG took their interests into account, and 3) thus remove concerns about the credibility of the extended deterrent.<sup>277</sup> Though the allies became more *involved* in nuclear affairs, the USG aim was thus still not necessarily that they would *influence* US strategy-making; rather, it sought to persuade them to accept its thinking.

In early summer 1965, McNamara proposed in NATO a temporary Special Committee (SC) on nuclear defense to study ways to improve consultations and US allies' role in nuclear planning. To enhance the working conditions, give a more exclusive feeling, and minimize the risk of confidential information ending up in Moscow, the SC was to include only some NATO states. Officially, the USG did not portray the SC as a substitute for a MLF/ANF (talks on that continued, too), but soon it became increasingly seen as one in the USG.<sup>278</sup> Greater information sharing was now possible than in 1962 since the US AEA had been modified in this respect; opposition to information sharing had weakened in Washington because of concerns over West German moves in case the US offered no greater nuclear sharing<sup>279</sup>.

Bonn's first reaction to the "McNamara Committee" was reserved. To it, the SC seemed to be only an organ for study and consultation, not for real planning, and to promise no share

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NIE 23-65 "Prospects for West German Foreign Policy", 22 Apr, LBJL I:G. In the press, it was argued that due to expected US and Soviet reactions, the FRG had at the time no interest in a national nuclear force, and the presence of foreign troops in it and WEU surveillance of its industrial capabilities anyway prevented it from pursuing one secretly. "Nuclear Proliferation: Status and Security", *Time*, 23 July.

<sup>276</sup> FRG Emb. Washington to GFO on Krone's March 65 trip to the US, PAA R/305/II A6B43 II8 10; D/101 DOS to E/B on Brandt-Erler visit, 15 Apr, FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>277</sup> Buchan 1962; Buchan 1963 pp. 632-7; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 180-1; Costigliola 1994 pp. 191-2, 202-4; Mackby & Slocumbe 2004 pp. 194-5.

<sup>278</sup> McNamara to press on SC, 27 Nov 65, FOIA; Mahncke 1972 p. 220; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 181-2; Küntzel 1992 pp. 98-9.

<sup>279</sup> Haftendorn 1994 pp. 167-8.

in NATO's nuclear *responsibility* since it implied no sharing of the nuclear *burden*. Thus it expected the SC to give it a smaller nuclear role than a MLF/ANF. Though suspecting that the force was being abandoned, Bonn insisted that it and the SC were complementary. It maintained that a nuclear sharing solution in NATO and a MLF/ANF in particular were preconditions to and greater priorities than a NPT. Schröder stressed that participation in strategic planning and targeting was not enough for the FRG and that though it did not seek a national nuclear force, it had to be protected with similar weapons as those that threatened it. He said also in public that to be able to join a NPT *and* forgo nuclear weapons, the FRG needed either a role in a nuclear weapon system that would guarantee its security or progress towards reunification. Though Bonn's allies were familiar with this stance, the hint at a national nuclear option was suited for reawakening their concerns. This in turn pushed Bonn to again reassure them that it had no national nuclear aims, even in case NATO found no nuclear sharing solution.<sup>280</sup> By making such stances public, Schröder and Erhard's government in general took a risk of limiting their domestic win-set on the matter, with the goal of a stronger international bargaining position.

West German statements continued to refer to Adenauer's 1954 pledge and vary in whether they pointed out that the pledge concerned only production in the FRG. In a June 1964 speech and press statement by Erhard, a fall 1964 statement by the government, its internal position papers in early 1965, and Erhard's discussion with Johnson in late 1965, references were simply made to a promise to refrain from producing nuclear or ABC weapons<sup>281</sup>. But for instance in July 1965, Carstens instructed Bonn's mission in NATO to point out in discussions over NPT drafts that the FRG had already forgone ABC weapon production *on its territory*. Schröder in turn said to Harriman that the FRG had forgone production of *own* nuclear weapons. Grewe moreover argued in Bonn against any unnecessary repeating and thus strengthening of the pledge: rather, Bonn was to consider whether all parts of the 1954 "package" remained valid.<sup>282</sup>

As also Schröder's comments on a NPT show, to justify its opposition to further non-nuclear commitments, Bonn stuck to the stance that Moscow's interest in such promises had to be used to push for progress on reunification. It suggested its allies that once a MLF existed, it could offer Moscow to withdraw from the force in return for such progress. But

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<sup>280</sup> Klein to Bundy, 26 July 65, with Kissinger to Bundy, 20 July; T/988 McGhee to Rusk on Schröder's 6 Oct interview, both LBJL FGN 1; D/232 McNamara-Erhard disc., 4 June; D/235 GFO on SC proposal, 4 June; D/272 Schröder-McGhee disc., 9 July (also fn 5-8 ref. to Schröder's interview, *FRG Bulletin*, 9 July p. 949); D/281 Carstens to mission NATO, 14 July; D/300 Erhard-Harriman disc., 24 July; D/301 Carstens on British draft NPT, 24 July; D/348 Schröder-McGhee disc., 13 Sep; D/365 (fn 96); D/415 Schröder-Brosio (NATO Secretary General) disc., 13 Nov, all APD 65; E/B to DOS, 22 Oct, 25 and 30 Nov, 1 Dec (2 pcs.), all FOIA; ACDA/NPT p. 29; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 219, 256; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 p. 182; Küntzel 1992 pp. 85-7; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 194. On Schröder's comments and their effects, see also Mahncke 1972 pp. 232-4.

<sup>281</sup> Informationsfunk der Bundesregierung, 17 Sep 64; GFO to Emb. NATO, 14 Dec, both PAA R/305/II A6B43 II8 48; D/21 (fn 89); D/36 Carstens to posts abroad, 25 Jan 65; D/466 Johnson-Erhard disc., 20 Dec, all APD 65.

<sup>282</sup> D/21 fn 6 ref. to Grewe's tel., 18 Jan; D/281, D/300-1 (fn 280) APD 65.

because of a lack of foreign support for this approach, not all in Bonn favored pushing the tie. Some favored rather bringing up in NPT talks such arguments that would appeal to other allies, too. A prominent defense study group argued that the nuclear status was not suited for bargaining on a general settlement and that non-nuclear commitments would only increase Bonn's diplomatic maneuverability in Eastern Europe.<sup>283</sup>

USG officials saw Bonn's desire for bargaining chips in reunification and Berlin talks as both the key reason for Bonn's unhappiness about a NPT and an incentive for it to pursue a national nuclear force<sup>284</sup>. The USG opposed linking a NPT and progress on reunification and made this clear to Bonn, saying that otherwise also others would make their specific concerns preconditions to a NPT, and stressing how bad it would look if only the FRG would stay out of a NPT.<sup>285</sup> Bonn stuck to linking the issues but only lightly: it told the USG that as a matter of principle, it had to demand steps towards reunification, but it did not expect the issue to be resolved in the context of a NPT.<sup>286</sup>

Some factors spoke also for the US in favor of keeping the nuclear status of the FRG open, as the scholar F. Iklé argued to the USG: the open status strengthened the Western bargaining position regarding a European settlement; forcing the FRG (and Japan) into a strict nonproliferation regime was a way to eliminate a key Soviet worry and weaken Moscow's interest in cooperating on nonproliferation; and the FRG was the key reason for any interest also by Paris in nonproliferation.<sup>287</sup> But there is no indication of USG interest in keeping Germany's nuclear status open because of bargaining reasons.

After the superpowers had tabled the NPT drafts, Bonn's interest in a MLF/ANF again grew in fall 1965<sup>288</sup>, probably also since the SC proposal hinted that hardware sharing would be forgotten if not forced back on NATO agenda. But the West Germans were divided, undecided, and unclear about what kind of nuclear sharing they wanted. Minister L. Westrick (CDU) told the USG they wanted "*greater participation in their nuclear defense*" (refusing to elaborate)<sup>289</sup>. The government informed the press that it planned to give the USG "'concrete proposals' for a joint nuclear force": NATO needed "*an integrated nuclear weapons system*".<sup>290</sup> To some observers, it seemed that the cabinet

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<sup>283</sup> See Rostow- Müller-Roschach mtg, 8 Oct 63, JFKL N/G; D/12 (fn 273); D/21 (fn 89); D/36 (fn 281); D/46 Krapf to mission NATO, 29 Jan; D/81 Carstens-Cattani (Italian Foreign Ministry) disc., 17 Feb; D/288 GFO official on stance towards a NPT, 20 July; D/299 Knappstein to GFO, 23 July, all APD 65; DOS/ISA to Bator, 21 Oct, with a German paper on the nuclear options of the FRG (san.), LBJL FGN 1.

<sup>284</sup> McNamara to Kennedy, 16 June 62, JFKL 8Q; DOD/ISA to Thompson with "Comments on Background Paper on National Decisions Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons", 5 Feb 65, USNA PDA B/9.

<sup>285</sup> D/275 Knappstein to GFO on disc. with Rusk, 9 July; D/300 (fn 280); D/306 fn 2; D/348 (fn 280), all APD 65.

<sup>286</sup> D/306 Schröder to Rusk, 27 July; D/320 on West German-US officials' disc., 6 Aug; D/348 (fn 280) all APD 65. Some Germans continued to stress links between a MLF, German non-nuclear promises, and reunification. See D/62 Carstens-Lord Chalfont (British ENDC representative) disc., 8 March, APD 66.

<sup>287</sup> Iklé "Possible consequences of a further spread of nuclear weapons", 2 Jan 65, LBJL CNP B/7.

<sup>288</sup> Küntzel 1992 p. 89; Schrafstetter & Twigge 2000 p. 175.

<sup>289</sup> McGhee to Rusk on ASOS/EUR Leddy-Westrick mtg, 2 Nov 65, LBJL MLM.

<sup>290</sup> "Erhard Will Give Johnson Nuclear Force Proposals", *NYT*, 23 Oct 65.

avored a MLF/ANF but the SPD preferred “*participation not tied to a specific weapons system.*”<sup>291</sup> A prominent West German defense study group in turn argued that no new “nuclear organization” was needed: Bonn was rather to seek equality with the UK and France through political means; “avoid any formalization of the difference between non-nuclear and minor nuclear powers”; “press for regional or bilateral arrangements” instead of a global NPT; and pursue bilateral, strategic “co-determination” with the US.<sup>292</sup> H. Schmidt (SPD) demanded a veto for Bonn regarding the use of nuclear weapons in Germany<sup>293</sup>. CDU politician K. Birrenbach argued to McGhee, Rusk, and McNamara that Bonn wanted to *participate “in every phase” of nuclear decision-making*, that equality with other Europeans would largely satisfy West German status needs (a US veto in any force was accepted), and that a major role in a joint nuclear force was no worse than having a small national force. He said that despite flexibility regarding the details of a MLF/ANF, generally all in Bonn (except the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Strauss) favored a *multilateral, “integrated nuclear system”*, which could be built on existing weapons. No bilateral scheme was suited for improving Bonn’s status and mitigating against other Europeans’ fears.<sup>294</sup> But Birrenbach privately indicated to a reporter (who informed the USG) that Bonn stuck to a pro-MLF/ANF stance for bargaining reasons and in reality wanted status, not hardware. This increased hope in the USG that Bonn would drop insistence on hardware if it got a prominent consultative role and the hardware option remained open in theory. Smaller NATO states were expected to accept such a German role if it was portrayed as a substitute for hardware.<sup>295</sup>

After fall 1965 elections, Erhard again formed the government. As political scientist R. Neumann reported to the USG after a trip to Europe, many West German observers saw the new cabinet as weaker than previous ones. Nuclear issues were increasingly central in a key topic of equality in NATO and a notable “nationalist clientele” had emerged. According to Neumann’s report, especially young Germans wanted greater national independence, as shown by rejection of a discriminating NPT. Strauss and Guttenberg, supported by Adenauer and another prominent CDU politician K. Kiesinger, had tied their support for the government to opposition to a NPT, and also the SPD rejected any NPT that prevented any nuclear sharing.<sup>296</sup> A German EEC official also told the USG that the government had a policy agreement on showing “strong interest in a nuclear role”, strengthening NATO, protecting the European Communities, and that “Strauss and others

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<sup>291</sup> Neumann to Bundy with “Post-election shifts in German politics”, 1 Nov 65, LBJL BMA 3.

<sup>292</sup> DOD/ISA to Bator, 21 Oct 65, with the German study group’s paper (san.), LBJL FGN 1.

<sup>293</sup> Haftendorn 1994 p. 179.

<sup>294</sup> T/1156, T/1740 McGhee to Rusk on Birrenbach’s statements, 23 Oct and 13 Dec 65, LBJL MLM and PP Bator B/21 Erhard visit; US-FRG mtg, 8 Nov, LBJL BNS 2. Strauss demanded a bilateral NATO with a British-French nuclear pool on the European side. See *Associated Press* on his comment, 25 Oct, LBJL FGN 1.

<sup>295</sup> ISA to Bator, 6 Dec 65, with a report on Birrenbach’s comments, 12 Nov, LBJL BPM.

<sup>296</sup> “Post-election...” (fn 291). Schwartz, D. N. 1983, however, argues that after the elections, Erhard was able to accept the SC as “de facto compensation” for a MLF (p. 182).

have the right to enter the picture ... if they are not satisfied.”<sup>297</sup> Whether or not this was the Germans’ aim, stressing the cabinet’s domestic vulnerability was also a way to try to strengthen its bargaining position with the USG on, e.g., a MLF and a NPT by giving the impression, true or ostensible, of a limited win-set.

In preparation for visits by both Wilson and Erhard to the US, a new wave of debate started in the USG on the NATO nuclear sharing solution. The situation was again complicated by contradictory messages that pro- and contra-hardware camps in the USG gave to Bonn. But a memo by Bundy reveals that top USG officials agreed already in September on preparing a new nuclear sharing proposal for Johnson, involving no “complex new weapons system, but rather systems of consultation and staff participation which will be both more modest and more practical”<sup>298</sup>. Also JCAE members stressed to USG officials that giving allies control over the use of nuclear weapons had no chance of Congress’s approval and that lifting secrecy on the stockpiling arrangements was a better way to boost allies’ trust in the US. JCAE chairman C. Holifield also publicly expressed opposition to a MLF/ANF and support for the SC.<sup>299</sup>

MLF-supporters in the DOS still wanted a hardware scheme. A German document shows that Finletter even fretted to the Germans about a decrease in their MLF efforts, urged them to press their demands during Erhard’s visit to the US, and said that the USG in reality had little interest in disarmament<sup>300</sup>. Rostow proposed Johnson a complex nuclear sharing and nonproliferation scheme with the UK and the FRG, including consultations and a jointly-owned nuclear force. He thought the UK could be persuaded to give up its nuclear force for the Atlantic area (while letting it keep an aircraft-based force for responsibilities in other areas) in return for such a force, a non-nuclear status for the FRG, and economic sweeteners by Bonn; London had indicated preparedness “to give up the national deterrent and accept equality with the Germans”<sup>301</sup>.

McGhee thought that Bonn wanted *some* form of nuclear sharing that would both give equal status with Paris and London and better ensure West German security and could be content with “a high-level alliance group with greater influence over decision-making,

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<sup>297</sup> Narjes (German cabinet chef of EEC President Hallstein)-DOS mtg, 23 Oct 65, LBJL BNS 1.

<sup>298</sup> Bundy to Johnson on 11 Sep Bundy-Rusk-McNamara-Ball mtg, 12 Sep 65, DDRS.

<sup>299</sup> JCAE members argued that a MLF would be for the FRG only a step towards nuclear weapons. Holifield questioned in general the value of a nonproliferation policy and US ability, especially in India’s and Israel’s cases, to stop others from going nuclear. He noted that if also the FRG wanted to do so, it was maybe the best to let it do so but try to delay it and give no aid. Draft summary of talks with JCAE, 12 Oct 65, LBJL NSF C. Johnson B/3 MLF; Seaborg 1987 p. 173.

<sup>300</sup> D/411 German diplomat von Braun to Krapf, 10 Nov, APD 65.

<sup>301</sup> Rostow stressed that to preclude interest in cooperation on the force de frappe or a bilateral deal with Moscow, West Germans had to be treated as equals and made see that the US respected their interests. Rostow to Johnson, 27 Sep, 23 Oct, and 8 Nov 65, LBJL BMA. Also McNamara had indicated a belief that the UK could come to give up its nuclear force. McNamara briefing on proliferation, 7 Jan, JFKL GD. Though Ball agreed that no *new* hardware was needed (see Bundy to Johnson (fn 298), 12 Sep; Seaborg 1987 p. 174), also he continued to speak for a hardware scheme (see Ball to Bundy with draft proposal for a joint force, 2 Nov, LBJL BPM).

nuclear strategy, targeting and weapon development”, especially if it included “coproduction and access to nuclear technology”: a MLF was unnecessary, but a mere consultative role was insufficient in a longer-term perspective as the Germans were likely to come to demand some kind of co-ownership. But he noted that Erhard had never seemed very knowledgeable about or fully convinced of the MLF/ANF plan as such and also von Hassel and Schröder presented their goals in more general terms. To keep the Germans from feeling isolated, McGhee saw a nuclear sharing solution as needed before a NPT was reached. But he thought that Bonn tied the two issues largely just to get an excuse to reject a NPT and become entitled to greater nuclear sharing if it had to accept it.<sup>302</sup>

ACDA wanted the USG to clearly abandon the MLF/ANF plans: otherwise no NPT was possible before a force was agreed upon, in which case it expected both India and Israel in the meanwhile to go nuclear. New Delhi was pushed towards a decision to do so, which would then make others, first Pakistan, Israel, and the UAR, to follow suit. Increasing signs existed that Israel was “moving closer to a decision to go nuclear.” If proliferation thus proceeded, no NATO sharing scheme was likely to be enough for Bonn. ACDA wanted to pursue a NPT that prohibited a MLF/ANF but not existing NATO schemes or greater consultation. Indications existed that Moscow could agree on that. Also Paris had less reason to protest against consultations than a hardware scheme.<sup>303</sup> But for instance Rostow saw a NPT as unfeasible because it was dangerous to let the Germans feel pushed into a permanent second-class status from all sides, and anyway as just a way to win some time since several countries had indicated a NPT would not affect their likelihood to acquire a national nuclear force. The real task was to mitigate against the *incentives* to pursue nuclear weapons in, e.g., the FRG, Israel, and India.<sup>304</sup>

Though Bundy thought that ACDA gave too little attention to German issues, he acknowledged the USG was making no progress on nonproliferation and favored abandoning the MLF/ANF. With his lead and DOD support, the NSCS planned a new approach to the issue. The reasoning was that since the real German needs regarding nuclear weapons were to keep all options open for the future (partially as bargaining chips for reunification talks) and to get a public status increase in NATO, no early hardware scheme was necessary and a generous consultative solution enough. That way, the Germans were to be prevented from seeing nuclear weapons as the only way to escape a second-class status. The MLF proposal had been useful in demonstrating USG preparedness to respond to allies’ wishes for further nuclear sharing (i.e., it had to some

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<sup>302</sup> D/128 Vice President Humphrey-McGhee disc., 1 Sep 65, FRUS 64-8:15; McGhee to Rusk, 11 Oct, LBJL MLM.

<sup>303</sup> Bundy to Johnson (san.) with Foster to Johnson, 10 Oct 65, LBJL MLM. Speaking unofficially, Foster argued to the Germans that a ANF/MLF and joint ownership of a nuclear force would give them little since the US would “never give up the veto”. E/B to DOS on Foster-Hassel talk, 2 July, LBJL NPT II (only p. 1). Also in Bonn, further proliferation was seen as something that could create interest in a national force in the FRG. See D/365 (fn 96) APD 65.

<sup>304</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 27 Sep, 23 Oct, and 8 Nov, LBJL BMA.



extent fulfilled Kennedy's tactical goals), but it was time to move on: inconclusive talks made Germans stick to unrealistic ideas, though few of them really wanted a MLF. The consultative solution was to include, beyond the SC, "special additional most-favored-nation treatment on all matters of nuclear policy" including jointly deciding about the use of US nuclear forces deployed in the FRG, consultations about any US use of nuclear weapons when possible, later membership in the Standing Group, and increased access to US information and intelligence – in all, equality with London except on the production and control of warheads. Also France was to be offered all this. A MLF/ANF could be pursued in the future especially if a new force became militarily necessary. These officials questioned the view that only a joint force would over time be enough for the FRG and argued that the UK would give up its nuclear force more easily if it was clear that the FRG was not on the way to getting one. For them, a further benefit of (but not the rationale for) abandoning the MLF/ANF plan was that it would improve the prospects of a NPT. But Moscow had to be informed that attacking the consultative scheme would make a NPT impossible.<sup>305</sup> In all, together with the assurances the USG had already in spring 1962 given against withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe such a scheme came quite close to what Strauss had then presented as the basic nuclear needs of the FRG. But the proposal first stayed in the drawer and was not pursued with Bonn before Erhard's visit, as its designers had proposed. Probably this was because Bonn proved still so insistent on a hardware scheme.

In November, Johnson conferred with his aides on nuclear sharing. His deputy national security aide F. Bator told a British official afterwards that no final decision on the MLF/ANF was made but all agreed that "we must push on with consultation, making the fare as rich as possible". He expected the USG in the end to clearly want no new hardware.<sup>306</sup> Bundy wrote to Johnson a little later that he increasingly shared "Wilson's reluctance to have the Germans involved in any hardware solution". As it was "clear that the Germans no longer really expect that we will support an MLF", pursuing some other nuclear sharing scheme, and progress on a NPT, was possible. But it was maybe tactically useful to tell Moscow privately about abandoning the MLF before doing so publicly.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> See Bundy to Johnson (san.), 10 Oct 65, LBJL MLM; Memo to Bator, 11 Oct, LBJL FGN 2; several drafts of "Outline of MLF Problem" and "Outline of Communiqué" for Johnson-Erhard mtg, Klein's draft memo (san.), and Keeny's draft "Understanding with the Germans on the use of German bases and nuclear weapons", 12-4 Oct, *ibid.*; "Possible Content for Discussions" (n/a; withheld) with a memo on German needs (n/a), n/d, *ibid.* 1; Bundy "The case for a fresh start on Atlantic nuclear defense" with Att. A) draft cooperation plan, B) Johnson-Erhard communiqué, C) understanding on bases and weapons in the FRG, and D) timetable, 18 Oct, USNA Ball B/29 nuclear problem and LBJL BPM; Bundy to Rusk, McNamara, & Ball with "A phased approach to nuclear weapons cooperation", 5 Nov, LBJL MLM; Bator to Bundy with McNamara's special aide Yarmolinsky to Bator with "A Proposal for Nuclear Consultation", 18 Nov, LBJL BNS 2. At the same time, the USG was considering how to respond to a potential French withdrawal from NATO. See LBJL FGN 1-2.

<sup>306</sup> Bator-UK official mtg, 15 Nov 65, LBJL BNS 1.

<sup>307</sup> Also he referred to a recent idea about moving the British nuclear force out of NATO area. D/102 Bundy to Johnson with 24 Nov 65 Bundy-Dobrynin disc., 25 Nov; FRUS 64-8:11; Bundy to Johnson, 19 Dec, LBJL PP Bator B/21 Erhard visit.

In the first SC meeting in fall 1965, the FRG and Italy continued to stress that the SC was no substitute for a MLF/ANF. The work of the SC was divided into three subgroups. Together with the US, the UK, Italy, and Turkey, the FRG became a member in the most important one: the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). When drafting its terms of reference, McNamara proposed including the study of hardware schemes. Aiming to protect them, von Hassel turned the idea down. While the British made comments, to US concern, that the SC was largely about making the allies *feel* but maybe not really be involved, it seemed to the Germans that McNamara indeed wanted to involve the SC in key strategy issues, not just technical planning. The head of US Mission to NATO, H. Cleveland, reported to Washington that much positive interest existed in the SC.<sup>308</sup> Still, even if the US was *involving* the allies, this does not necessarily mean their *influence* on US decisions grew: the big change was that they become better *informed* about US nuclear plans and capabilities. But for instance Tuschhoff, who notes that as West German troop contribution to NATO grew in the 1960s, Bonn also got greater access to SHAPE and NATO command posts and thus to critical information, argues regarding NATO defense planning in general that the access did enable Bonn to exert influence<sup>309</sup>.

In Bonn, Birrenbach suggested in preparation for the Johnson-Erhard meeting Erhard to make Bonn's interest in a ANF/MLF clear to Johnson, whom he saw as still undecided about the force. But for instance senior GFO official S. Schnippenkötter favored leaving the force aside for the time being – foreign and Bundestag opinions made it unviable – and seeking a role in NATO nuclear planning.<sup>310</sup> McCloy proposed Erhard to make clear to Johnson that Bonn needed a real nuclear role in NATO but not to insist on a particular hardware scheme: “the MLF had been a false start.” Though the USG stance was not set, greater consultations and involvement in space issues were potential options. Erhard's comment shows that he saw insistence on a MLF/ANF as a bargaining chip: though he did not want to push for a force if one was unfeasible at the time, Bonn wanted to avoid having to join a NPT “without having achieved participation in nuclear affairs.” But if NATO's nuclear problem was solved, the FRG would be able to join a NPT and not care about prestige if Israel, India, or Egypt went nuclear.<sup>311</sup>

When Erhard visited the US, Johnson argued NATO's strength and US commitments were enough and a new nuclear system would be wasteful. But according to a later DOS memo, the USG acknowledged in principle that the FRG was “entitled to equitable nuclear sharing

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<sup>308</sup> DOS-DOD message on SC to posts in NATO states, 1 Nov 65, FOIA; D/437 Grewe to GFO, 27 Nov, APD 65; Cleveland's summary on NATO mtg, 18 Dec, FOIA; T/11357 Cleveland (E/P) to DOS, 29 Jan 67, LBJL S:NPT I 1; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 182-3; Küntzel 1992 pp. 98-9. On setting up of and work in the SC, see also Haftendorn 1994 pp. 169-74.

<sup>309</sup> Tuschhoff 1999 p. 148.

<sup>310</sup> Schnippenkötter thought Bonn was in return to forgo acquiring nuclear weapons and declare that a reunified Germany should join a NPT. D/417 Birrenbach to Schröder, 13 Nov; D/443 Schnippenkötter memo, 3 Dec, both APD 65.

<sup>311</sup> Memos on 6 Dec 65 Erhard-McCloy mtg: McCloy to Bundy and T/1642 McGhee to Rusk, 8 Dec, LBJL BMA and BNS 2; D/445 APD 65.

if and when an arrangement could be worked out by the common consent by the nations concerned".<sup>312</sup> Erhard still said a greater European nuclear role in NATO was a precondition to a NPT, demanded a hardware scheme, and presented a memo on its preferred elements. This expressed opposition to a spread of national control over nuclear weapons but hinted that a NATO nuclear solution was needed to prevent proliferation and argued that studies in the NPG would probably be insufficient as such. Non-nuclear allies needed a real "share in nuclear responsibility", including a co-owned, mixed-manned force, over the use of which would be decided jointly (a US veto was accepted).<sup>313</sup> Also Schröder argued during the visit for a joint force based on existing weapons (creating a fully new force was too hard). Rusk noted to him that Bonn already had a de facto veto regarding nuclear weapons stationed in the FRG and if the FRG were attacked, the US would have to react even just to protect its own troops and weapons in the country. Schröder insisted that a joint force would be an even stronger deterrent.<sup>314</sup> Erhard argued that de Gaulle's claim that "a nation protected by others with no say of its own" lacked sovereignty was not fully ungrounded but stressed that Bonn aimed under no NATO nuclear solution at national control over nuclear weapons. He favored "a fully integrated system" because of a risk of "some criminal" again coming to power in Germany, whereas "it was impossible to assume that Germany will go forever without a nuclear deterrent".<sup>315</sup> But this does not necessarily imply that he meant a *national* deterrent, as Trachtenberg suggests<sup>316</sup>: maybe a credible US or a multilateral deterrent was enough for him.

Contradictory messages by Americans were confusing the Germans and made them see it as feasible to continue demanding a hardware scheme. In early 1966, both Erhard and a GFO official complained to Kissinger that in the fall, several Americans had told Bonn to demand ownership of nuclear weapons, which it then did, but prior to Erhard's visit to the US, the US stance on ownership got cooler. During the visit, it appeared that Rusk somewhat favored co-ownership, McNamara was reserved, and Johnson hoped Erhard not to insist on hardware. Erhard wanted greater consultations rather than co-ownership as such, but also many Americans had told him that co-ownership was needed to make consultations real. He seemed to lack determined stances and vaguely argued that an ownership scheme would help if, e.g., Israel or India went nuclear. He said some in Bonn saw co-ownership as a way to torpedo the NPT efforts but accepted Kissinger's point that trying to do so would just benefit Moscow and the FRG had to join a NPT if one was reached. The GFO in turn saw the NPG as insufficient solution for NATO and still wanted a hardware scheme to get

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<sup>312</sup> Johnson-Erhard mtg, 20 Dec 65, D/119 FRUS 64-8:13 and D/466 APD 65; Response to NSAM 345 (DOS redraft of DOD draft; san.), 6 May 66, FOIA.

<sup>313</sup> Johnson-Erhard mtg (fn 312); Bonn's memo "The Nuclear Question", 20 Dec 65, LBJL BNP. Mahncke 1972 argues Bonn clung to a MLF because 1) Erhard, Schröder, and von Hassel had made personal efforts for it; 2) only owning weapons was thought to guarantee a say in nuclear decision-making; and 3) Bonn wanted to bargain with it over the NPT and a greater role in nuclear planning (pp. 230-2).

<sup>314</sup> D/468 Rusk-Schröder disc., 20 Dec, APD 65.

<sup>315</sup> Johnson-Erhard mtg (fn 312).

<sup>316</sup> Trachtenberg 1999 p. 398.

a nuclear option that would protect the interests of the FRG in case a NPT came about or NATO threatened to dissolve in 1969. But Kissinger summarized that the military and most key politicians in the FRG were clearly more interested in a detailed consultative than a hardware scheme and nobody demanded an equal status with the UK. However, Erhard and others saw a NPT as a threat to German interests and indicated preparedness to join only if Moscow made commitments about reunification.<sup>317</sup> Later, Kissinger argued to the USG that as German leaders were “so eager to be agreeable”, it was hard to see whether they truly wanted some nuclear schemes or thought that they were expected to want them. To him it seemed that some Germans also backed US ideas to get in return support in, e.g., reunification matters.<sup>318</sup>

In correspondence with Wilson after Erhard’s visit, Johnson argued that a need existed to respond to Bonn’s interest in a joint force but noted that Bonn demanded only a ANF-type of force based on existing weapons: a MLF was no longer on the table. In reply, Wilson only expressed hope that the SC would solve NATO’s nuclear problems. As the Germans became aware of the exchange, it was argued in Bonn that the chances of a satisfactory nuclear sharing solution were weak. In internal memos that again show that insistence on a MLF/ANF was a bargaining tactic at least for some in Bonn, a GFO official proposed that to maintain the ground gained in MLF/ANF talks without being seen as a only demander of nuclear sharing, Bonn was to continue talks on it and hinting at interest in a future European force so that the US would be pressed to offer a NATO scheme. He saw also greater civilian nuclear efforts as a way to boost both the country’s status and allies’ interest in a MLF.<sup>319</sup>

Those efforts had already given quite much potential for weapon production. In January 1966, a NIE estimated the FRG to be able to test a nuclear weapon two years after a decision to do so; three months later the estimate was down to one year. A test was possible with currently safeguarded plutonium but to build up a nuclear force, the FRG needed to import unsafeguarded uranium (domestic uranium resources were not mentioned in NIEs; probably they were too limited to be of much significance for a nuclear force). The FRG already possessed a large number of nuclear-capable aircraft and smaller-range missiles and was also capable of producing mid-range missiles (the Germans had gained experience with missiles also through their role in the stationing scheme for US missiles and in manufacturing US-designed missiles and navigation systems for nuclear-capable aircraft). It was estimated to take the FRG at least five years from a decision to do so to produce a force of 100 IRBMS. But the security relationship with the US was expected to keep it

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<sup>317</sup> Kissinger to Bundy, 7 Feb 66, with Erhard-Kissinger mtg, 28 Jan, and summary of talks in the FRG, LBJL NRG 2.

<sup>318</sup> Kissinger “The Nuclear Issue and the German Domestic Situation”, 4 Apr 66, *ibid.* 1.

<sup>319</sup> D/46 GFO official on a joint force and Wilson-Johnson and -Erhard exchanges, 25 Feb, APD 66.

from testing nuclear weapons or developing a purely national missile system in the next years, even if proliferation continued elsewhere.<sup>320</sup>

McGhee indeed argued that the FRG in practice had “no hope at all of ever obtaining a national force”, a project it could not to hide and neither Moscow nor the West would allow. The US reaction to such moves would be to “withdraw our forces and support for Germany”, that of other NATO states probably to “disassociate themselves” from it, and that of Moscow probably a preemptive attack. The Embassy also stressed the lack of support for any such effort in the West German public, especially if pursued against allies’ wishes and as long as the FRG was protected by the US. An early Franco-German nuclear weapon effort seemed impossible.<sup>321</sup>

Moscow’s true stance towards various existing and potential NATO schemes was unclear. In fall 1965, it reacted to press reports on US stockpile arrangements with the FRG by publicly attacking both that scheme, MLF/ANF plans, and the SC as covers for West German access to nuclear weapons. Though this and further similar statements suggested Moscow would maybe accept no nuclear sharing in a NPT, in spring 1966 other Soviet comments hinted that despite the public stance, it would not insist on prohibiting existing NATO schemes and consultations in a NPT. It seemed to Western diplomats that Moscow did want a NPT in order to prevent Germany from getting nuclear weapons, but as also the West wanted it, it tried to extract a maximum price for cooperation, especially regarding Germany’s nuclear status, but could tolerate some NATO nuclear schemes once such were in place.<sup>322</sup>

By 1965, the DOS, the DOD, the AEC, and the JCAE in fact saw the control arrangements for and security of nuclear warheads stationed overseas as generally acceptable, owing to constant progress with control schemes. US ability to prevent organized seizure of warheads by a host state was limited, but the PAL systems gave the US probably some hours time to destroy any seized weapons.<sup>323</sup>

Internal West German memos show that officials in Bonn thought that those deployments gave the FRG no control over nuclear weapons: the warheads were under sole US control and German guarding of them gave no influence over their use. Bonn was also seen to have no de facto veto over them since all its troops were to be under SACEUR command after

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<sup>320</sup> NIE 4-66 “The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation”, 20 Jan 66, LBJL I:A; NIE 4-67 “Proliferation of Missile Delivery Systems for Nuclear Weapons”, 26 Jan 67, LBJL I:A ref. to NIE 23-66 “West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons”, 28 Apr 66. A German memo notes that the FRG was also fairly close to achieving a full nuclear fuel cycle. D/46 (fn 319) APD 66.

<sup>321</sup> D/13 A-1512 E/B to DOS on NIE 23-66, 12 Apr 66, NSA EBB NIEs; D/163 McGhee to Rusk, 25 Aug, FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>322</sup> D/453 FRG Emb. Moscow to Schröder on Western Ambassadors’ mtg, 9 Dec, APD 65; ACDA/NPT pp. 51-2, 57-8.

<sup>323</sup> See Johnson (NSCS) “U. S. policies on nuclear weapons” (san.), 12 Dec 64, LBJL CNP B/3 P/5 weapons dispersal; McNamara briefing on proliferation, 7 Jan 65, JFKL GD; Draft summary of talks with JCAE group, 12 Oct, LBJL NSF C. Johnson B/3 MLF.

any alert<sup>324</sup> (thus instead, SACEUR had a veto). Such views meant that though Bonn was argued to have a *de facto* veto, it could see a formal veto as a gain in status and influence.

The Defense Ministry of the FRG saw a German veto over the use of nuclear weapons by *German* forces alone as 1) military of little value since US forces in the FRG could have used their weapons even if Bonn used its veto and 2) problematic in creating loyalty conflicts for Bundeswehr troops. But Bonn became interested in a veto over the use of nuclear weapons also by *US* forces in Germany. Demanding such a veto was less problematic for it than a veto over a MLF because use of nuclear weapons in Germany was a special concern for Bonn and no such justification for (undesirable) vetos also for other allies as its veto over a MLF would have been.<sup>325</sup>

Pressure for a NPT was growing in the world and to respond to Soviet criticism of its NPT draft, the USG prepared a new one. After talks with allies and assurances to Bonn that the text implied no preclusion of any joint nuclear force, in March it presented to the ENDC a text that allowed for a joint force assuming an existing national force was melted into it. Moscow rejected the draft.<sup>326</sup>

The prospects of a NPT seemed weak. Bonn stuck to the MLF/ANF plan: again in February 1966, Erhard told Johnson that *if* a joint force was realized, Bonn could make further non-nuclear commitments. To avoid being blamed for a failure of a NPT, which it was even in the West suspected to aim at, Bonn proposed an alternative in its “Peace Note” of 25 March (this was also an attempt to appear cooperative in relations to the East): all allied NNWSs in the East and the West would make similar intra-alliance promises not to manufacture nuclear weapons as Bonn’s 1954 pledge; other measures would be designed for unaligned states; and the NWSs would agree to give others no national control over nuclear weapons. To prevent suggestions that it aimed to take advantage of options left open by the 1954 pledge, it included in the note a statement that it did not strive for national *ownership* of nuclear weapons but favored shared responsibility for nuclear defense in NATO. Moscow’s reaction was negative, that of Bonn’s allies unenthusiastic. Bonn’s stances on nonproliferation followed the proposal as long as Erhard was in power.<sup>327</sup>

Despite Bonn’s insistence on a hardware scheme, also other kinds of nuclear sharing interested it. It wanted information about both the technical side of NATO’s nuclear defense and the political conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. Some in Bonn also indicated willingness to forget the hardware scheme to the USG. In April, Erler expressed

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<sup>324</sup> D/365 (fn 96) APD 65; D/97 Grewe to GFO, 1 Apr, APD 66.

<sup>325</sup> See Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 321-2.

<sup>326</sup> D/30 Krapf on US draft NPT, 4 Feb; D/49 also fn 15 Erhard to Johnson, 25 Feb, both APD 66; D/120 Lilienfeld to Johnson with Erhard to Johnson, 25 Feb, FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT p. 55; Keeny on NPT (fn 136); Küntzel 1992 pp. 95-7.

<sup>327</sup> Note der Bundesregierung zur deutschen Friedenspolitik, 25 March 66, <http://sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.de/1/31/4/76.php> (extract; 20 May 05); ACDA/NPT p. 59; Kohler 1972 pp. 115-6; Küntzel 1992 pp. 95-7.

acceptance of institutionalized influence (beyond the SC) on US decisions about the use of nuclear forces as the NATO nuclear sharing solution. CDU/CSU politician Barzel welcomed the SC and noted on the MLF that an idea can be left simmering without cooking it.<sup>328</sup>

Such comments made burying the hardware scheme altogether at least for the time being seem increasingly sensible to the USG. Moreover, despite statements by Rusk and McNamara to the Congress that the US would maintain its veto over all nuclear weapons, the JCAE was making it clear that it opposed a MLF. McGhee now saw the MLF as a dead idea that had been a mistake altogether and had to be buried: neither Johnson, the Congress, nor Erhard wanted it. Kissinger argued to the USG that in Erhard's cabinet, only von Hassel and Schröder wanted a MLF/ANF, the latter for basically extraneous reasons, and Erhard and others would not mind if it failed. The force had strong opponents and a debate that would grow over it could become disastrous for the CDU. London clearly opposed anything involving German ownership of nuclear weapons. Though such a scheme still had support in the DOS, Bator thought it would also offer Bonn no good way to boost its status: the only scheme possible was one with at least a US veto and the role of the FRG strictly controlled to prevent it from getting closer to a national force, which would need to be made clear to the public and indicate lacking trust.<sup>329</sup>

Though checking German power remained a central goal of USG policy towards Europe<sup>330</sup>, Johnson thought that the Germans also needed “a place in the sun<sup>331</sup>”. As a way to give that, his top officials now agreed on making plans for stronger consultative arrangements (though for tactical reasons, Rostow and Ball still did not want to publicly abandon the MLF/ANF). In reference to Erler's stances, the aides proposed to Johnson exploring ideas for allies' involvement in planning, and something more, for US forces, *without offering any detailed plan* for allies to criticize but by gradually guiding them to a right path. This indeed became the US tactic for dealing with the issue from now on. Also the scheme the NSCS had planned in fall 1965 (giving Bonn, e.g., a say regarding the use of German-based nuclear weapons and a right to be consulted about any US use of nuclear weapons

<sup>328</sup> D/97 Grewe to GFO, 1 Apr; D/104 Lilienfeld to GFO on 5 Apr McNamara-Erler disc., 12 Apr; D/128 Knapstein to GFO on Barzel's Apr visit to the US, 2 May, all APD 66.

<sup>329</sup> Wilson to Johnson, 29 March 66, LBJL NRG 1; Bator to Johnson with “A Nuclear Role for Germany – the Question of Hardware”, 1 Apr, LBJL BNS 1; Bator to Johnson, 4 Apr; Kissinger “The Nuclear Issue and the German Domestic Situation”, 4 Apr; DOD draft on conf. of US Embassies in Europe with “Schaetzel-McGhee Exchange on MLF”, 5 Apr; Bator to Johnson with 1) Bator to Johnson's Special Assistant Moyers and 2) Rusk to Johnson, 12 Apr; Rostow to Johnson, 21 Apr, all LBJL NRG; Seaborg 1987 pp. 181-2 ref. to JCAE *Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Hearings*, 87<sup>th</sup> Congress/2 Feb-March 66 pp. 26, 43, 74, 98.

<sup>330</sup> The USG continued to see NATO as a way to both 1) provide for European defense and an acceptable West German role in it and 2) manage Germany's relations with other Europeans and Moscow. NATO's role in controlling and restraining the FRG was also central in other Western Europeans' continuing support for it. See NIE 20-66 “Western Europe: Problems and Prospects”, 12 May 66, LBJL NSF NIEs B/5 20; Wilson to Johnson, 29 March, LBJL NRG 1; Bator to Johnson, 9 June, *ibid.* 2.

<sup>331</sup> Bator to Johnson with “A Nuclear Role for Germany – the Question of Hardware”, 1 Apr, LBJL BNS 1.

when possible; also London had proposed this to the USG) was presented to Johnson as a way to give a clear, public upgrade in Bonn's role in nuclear planning.<sup>332</sup>

Johnson then formally asked his men to develop proposals for “enlarging the *participation in and understanding of* nuclear planning” in NATO, with or without a joint force but including *no* nuclear surface ships or mixed-manned submarines<sup>333</sup>. Thus a MLF was clearly excluded but a Par. 6 type of force was still an option. As the highlighted text shows, the USG aim remained to increase allies' involvement, not necessarily their influence.

An explicit goal being to prevent German or Franco-German nuclear adventures, the DOS and the DOD prepared proposals for, e.g., a permanent NPG with restricted membership (the SC was temporary) to provide general guidelines for policy and to review, study, and report on nuclear questions, and for an arrangement with the FRG (and possibly other allies) on the proposed veto and consultation rights. As a first step, the DOS and the DOD proposed talks with Bonn and London on the matter. But no early action was taken.<sup>334</sup>

The effort to find a nuclear sharing solution for NATO needs to be seen in the context of a bundle of problems that now troubled NATO and altogether created real concern in member states that NATO would dissolve after April 1969. The NATO crisis came fully into the open in spring 1966 when de Gaulle announced the withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated military structure and then asked allies' forces to leave France<sup>335</sup>. Haftendorn argues the discord was basically about three issues: 1) credibility of extended deterrence; 2) West European order and US, West German, and French roles in it – a French-led “European Europe” that Paris sought or Atlantic partnership preferred by the USG and Bonn, which further wanted equality on the European side; and 3) estimates of Soviet aims and chances of *détente*.<sup>336</sup>

The issue of nuclear sharing was intertwined with all the disputed matters in complex ways. First, it played into the question about NATO strategy – whether some new nuclear sharing measure was needed to make extended deterrence more credible and the flexible response -strategy stronger in European eyes and thus ensure that the institutional solutions to both the basic and the nuclear collaboration problem in NATO (see section 7.2.1.4) remained solid. Second, any solution to NATO's nuclear organisation was indicative of whether the FRG had equal status with France and the UK. Third, disagreement about Soviet aims played into the dispute over a NPT between the USG and Bonn, whereas the

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<sup>332</sup> Ibid.; Bator to Johnson, 4 Apr 66, with Att. A) “A Proposal for Nuclear Consultation” and B) Understanding on bases and weapons in the FRG (compare to fn 305); Bator to Johnson with 1) Bator to Moyers and 2) Rusk to Johnson, 12 Apr; Rostow to Johnson, 21 Apr, all LBJL NRG.

<sup>333</sup> My emphasis. NSAM 345 “Nuclear Planning”, 22 Apr 66, LBJL JNM.

<sup>334</sup> Response to NSAM 345 (fn 312); Rusk & McNamara to Johnson, 28 May 66; DOS/EUR “Nuclear Policy” (san.), 19 Sep, both DDRS.

<sup>335</sup> On the background of the French moves, see Haftendorn 1994 pp. 11-5, 26.

<sup>336</sup> Haftendorn 1994 pp. 11-22.



prospects of a NPT depended on whether the US and the USSR could agree on acceptable nuclear sharing.

### 9.6.2 US-Soviet agreement on nuclear sharing compatible with a nonproliferation treaty

USG officials' increased willingness to finally abandon NATO hardware sharing plans reflected the fact that a NPT, even at the cost of NATO unity, and cooperation with Moscow were becoming greater priorities in Washington<sup>337</sup>.

As Seaborg argues, now came the time when Johnson started taking personal initiative on a NPT, which was central in making a treaty possible. Several factors pushed him to this direction. As Johnson came to stress, the NPT talks were for the superpowers an attempt to promote at least reasonably good bilateral relations, which was increasingly important as the Vietnam War was straining the relations in a dangerous way and the USG wanted to avoid direct Soviet involvement in the war. At the time, arms control offered the only arena for doing so. The war also made it necessary for the USG to show willingness to promote international stability and stop nuclear arms racing and to improve Johnson's image. At home, various sides pressed him to take initiative on a NPT. In early 1966, Senator J. Pastore introduced a Senate resolution in favor of strong *presidential* efforts for a NPT (with strong safeguards); it got unanimous Senate approval in May. Rusk, McNamara, and Foster backed the resolution in much-publicized JCAE hearings, though Rusk positioned a NPT clearly as less urgent than McNamara, who said it made sense to even go through trouble to achieve it (the two men indicated also that strong US reactions to any proliferation were possible by saying that if a state involved in a prolonged conflict decided to acquire nuclear weapons, the US could stop economic aid to it, consider giving its opponent a security guarantee or military aid, or try to disengage from the area). The new US ambassador to the UN, A. Goldberg, proposed Johnson to go to Geneva to make a plea for a NPT to give boost for both the negotiations and the President's image. Various officials, including Keeny, ASOD/ISA J. McNaughton (probably also on McNamara's behalf), and ACDA leaders, were trying to get Johnson make nonproliferation a greater priority. ACDA and Keeny argued that if the superpowers agreed on a NPT, almost universal adherence was achievable, including all feared proliferants, excluding China, but time was getting short and without a NPT, proliferation was unstoppable. Seaborg notes Johnson was in general skeptical about ACDA's value and had little direct dealings with it, but now Foster got to brief him. Also the public widely supported a NPT.<sup>338</sup> And Johnson indeed started moving

<sup>337</sup> See also Lauk 1979 pp. 65-70.

<sup>338</sup> McNamara before JCAE on nonproliferation (draft), 1 March 66; Rusk before JCAE on Senate Res. 179, n/d, both USNA PDA B/8; Fisher to Johnson, 12 May; Keeny to Rostow (san.), 18 May, both LBJL NRG; D/131 Foster to Rusk, 25 May, FRUS 64-8:11; Keeny to Rostow on Rostow's draft memo on NPT, 9 Aug, LBJL BNP; Keeny on NPT (fn 136); ACDA/NPT pp. 64, 73-4, 81; Johnson 1971 pp. 462-5; Seaborg 1987 pp. 157, 180-5, 191, 197, 214 ref. to JCAE *Hearings* (fn 329) pp. 26, 74, 98, to Valenti to Johnson, 19 March,

to a stronger pro-NPT stance, showing in public in summer 1966 clear interest in a compromise on a NPT with Moscow and stressing the value of US-Soviet cooperation<sup>339</sup>.

ACDA (and London) argued that a NPT that allowed NATO consultation and deployment schemes could be reached with Moscow if 1) no new hardware scheme was pursued; 2) the European option was restricted to the only realistic option in terms of US and British policy, i.e., integrated Europe inheriting its members' nuclear weapons; and 3) the NPT text did not explicitly mention NATO schemes. Towards mid-1966, Moscow was indeed indicating to the USG serious interest in a NPT and willingness to proceed on the basis that the MLF/ANF plan was dead, assuming the US agreed not to change NATO nuclear schemes and go beyond strategy and targeting consultations to cooperation on weapon production and use decisions. Though the Soviets favored prohibiting a MLF/ANF in a NPT, they showed understanding for the ACDA view that NPT language that neither prohibited nor allowed it was maybe the only solution.<sup>340</sup>

Many in the USG still thought Moscow was interested in a NPT merely as a way to attack Bonn and NATO. Though also Rusk had argued so, according to Seaborg he now, probably in order to follow Johnson's lead, started giving more attention to a NPT. This was crucial as such and since US allies had much trust in Rusk and thus the chances of their cooperation grew. Bilateral talks were launched between ACDA's deputy director A. Fisher and Amb. A. Roshchin to map the prospects of a simplified formula for the core of a NPT, i.e., the prohibition of transfers of nuclear weapons to NNWSs (Art. 1-2).<sup>341</sup>

The USG itself was still divided over whether to agree to preclude hardware sharing in a NPT. The reason for hesitation was especially the expected German reaction, even though Bonn was seen to consider a hardware scheme (especially von Hassel still demanded it) a bargaining chip for, e.g., reunification talks, without really expecting its realization.<sup>342</sup> Erhard was to visit the US in September and expected to ask the US to keep the option of a MLF/ANF open in a NPT. To make a NPT possible before proliferation got out of control, ACDA favored telling him that the USG no longer wanted to harm NPT talks by maintaining unrealistic options of a co-owned force or a European force into which no national nuclear force was melted. Also DOD goals with Erhard included an at least tacit abandonment of hardware options and a promise to join even a NPT with no European clause. In return, it and Bator wanted to both promise consultations and, assuming the Congress and the

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LBJL NSF Valenti, to his 1985 contacts with Rostow and Keeny, and to his 27 Dec 66 talk with Johnson; Haftendorn 1994 pp. 18-9. On NPT negotiations in general, see Kohler 1972. On US-Soviet cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation, see Walsh 2004.

<sup>339</sup> Johnson's press conf. and speech, 5 July and 26 Aug 66, PPJ 320, 411.

<sup>340</sup> Fisher to Johnson, 12 May 66, LBJL NRG; D/131 (fn 338) FRUS 64-8:11; M/G to DOS, 14 June; Foster (M/G) to Fisher on Foster-Roshchin disc., 16 June; M/G to DOS (san.), 16-7 June; M/G to Foster, 23 July, all LBJL NPT II; Owen to Rostow, 22 July, with ACDA on achievement of a NPT, 20 July, LBJL S:NPT I 2; T/120 Goldberg (M/G) to Rusk & McNamara on mtg with Chalfont, 11 July; Keeny to Rostow, 20 Sep, with Kissinger on 15 Sep disc. with Soviet official, 19 Sep, both LBJL BNP; ACDA/NPT pp. 74-5, 81-2.

<sup>341</sup> Keeny on NPT (fn 136); Seaborg 1987 pp. 189-90.

<sup>342</sup> Response to NSAM 345 (fn 312); ACDA/NPT p. 85.

JCS allowed, move on with the idea of offering a veto over the use of nuclear weapons from or in Germany. A veto was something Erhard could present at home as an achievement: Adenauer had not been given that.<sup>343</sup> But the DOS/EUR continued to argue that the MLF/ANF and European options were politically important for Bonn as “a claim to equality with Britain and France” and that giving them up altogether would have bad effects on West German politics and feelings towards the US<sup>344</sup>. Rostow, though opposed to fully giving up NATO (or Asian) collective nuclear options for the sake of a NPT, saw it as feasible to promise Moscow to maintain a veto over any force: as McNamara argued, the US commitment to Europe anyway required it, and if that was made clear to the allies, who primarily wanted to ensure the commitment, Rostow expected them to accept a NPT that prevented giving up the veto.<sup>345</sup>

Nevertheless, in the latter half of 1966 the USG and Moscow came to reach a compromise on the core of the NPT, in the way ACDA proposed: the US agreed to prohibit a joint nuclear force except for a case that an integrated Europe inherited the French and/or British nuclear weapons, and Moscow accepted existing NATO nuclear schemes and NPG consultations as not contrary to a NPT. As greater consultations made a choice between nuclear sharing and a NPT unnecessary, such were increasingly seen in the USG as a better solution to NATO’s nuclear problem than a MLF/ANF<sup>346</sup>. Even though this was no original USG aim with the MLF proposal, by making it the USG had created a bargaining chip for NPT negotiations with Moscow: the existence of the option (even if Kennedy and Johnson did not really want a MLF) probably helped to make Moscow accept NATO’s stockpile and consultative schemes under a NPT.

In September, the US first informed Moscow that it would not accept a NPT that would require changes to existing NATO schemes or prohibit NPG consultations. These, it assured, would not become a voting arena on the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>347</sup> The view was weakening in the USG that Moscow just wanted to use the NPT talks to attack NATO, and Foster was hopeful of the chances of a NPT on these terms, assuming the USG assured Moscow it would not give nuclear weapons to the ownership of the FRG or any state group that included it. Foster expected Bonn’s opposition to such a US-Soviet deal to be softer if the idea of NPT review conferences was introduced and the NPT allowed a European option of some kind. That option, seen as valuable regarding the goal of European integration and politically important for Erhard, was becoming increasingly central in Bonn’s demands as the prospects of a MLF/ANF weakened.<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Owen, 22 July 66, with ACDA memo (fn 341); ISA to Bator with “Erhard Visit Scope Paper”, 20 Sep, LBJL PP Bator B/21 Erhard visit 1; Bator to Johnson with memo about the visit, 25 Sep, *ibid.* Erhard; ACDA/NPT pp. 98-9.

<sup>344</sup> Owen, 22 July 66, with ACDA memo (fn 341) and DOS/EUR comment.

<sup>345</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 2 Sep 66, with 12 Aug memo (fn 89).

<sup>346</sup> See also Küntzel 1992 p. 99, 104-5.

<sup>347</sup> ACDA-Soviet mtg, 9 Sep 66, LBJL NPT II.

<sup>348</sup> Bator to Johnson, 2 March 66, LBJL BNS 1; Foster to Rusk (san.), 15 Sep, DNSA NP01196; Foster to Johnson, 15 Sep, LBJL NPT II.

Next, Gromyko and Rusk discussed a NPT. Rusk stressed that the US would neither help any state get nuclear weapons nor give up a veto over its weapons. Despite differences on how to formulate a prohibition of transferring nuclear weapons or a right to fire them to state groups, the two men found that fundamentally, the US and the USSR seemed to agree on what to prohibit and just had to find a way to express that.<sup>349</sup> The search for a mutually acceptable formula continued. The fact that this happened at a relatively low level between Foster and Roshchin suggests that the two sides wanted the talks to have an air of being of a technical nature, as if no big political concessions were involved. In late September, the two men tentatively agreed on Art. 1 language. Central was an understanding that the NPT would narrowly concern proliferation: what it did not explicitly prohibit was not forbidden. Moscow now seemed to accept that neither NATO deployments nor the NPG involved “transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them”, which was to be prohibited. The draft allowed for a European force in case a federation inherited existing nuclear forces. Fisher saw its content as very similar to US policy as laid out in the AEA and its application. But Washington still was not prepared to accept the text and sent it back for further drafting.<sup>350</sup>

Just a few days earlier, Erhard and Schröder had finally indicated during a visit to the US that they would give up pressure for a MLF/ANF. They agreed to publicly stress the importance of nonproliferation efforts; Bonn wanted also other states to make non-nuclear pledges and get no control over nuclear weapons. But some nuclear solution for NATO remained a precondition for its joining a NPT and it kept on stressing that NATO’s and European nuclear options had to be protected and no obstacles allowed for European integration. Erhard argued to the USG that, e.g., the offset purchases, NATO strategy, and nonproliferation were intertwined questions and *some* nuclear solution was needed “anywhere along the spectrum from a “hardware” solution to “any kind of a voice””.<sup>351</sup>

In addition to the issue of nuclear sharing and disputes over strategy that were troubling NATO, also the offset arrangement was now namely causing trouble among the US, the UK, and the FRG. As the British sterling was under much pressure, London was pressed to reduce troops in the FRG unless their balance-of-payments effect was largely offset. A British withdrawal threatened to much increase the anyway existing domestic pressure on the USG to withdraw troops, especially in the face of the Vietnam War. Moreover, a British withdrawal was potentially problematic also because the UK had in the 1954 WEU agreement promised to maintain its forces in the FRG and Bonn had made the *rebus sic stantibus* -claims. At the same time, Erhard was economically and politically pressed to *reduce* offset purchases from the allies. Though the USG assured that its commitment to the FRG remained strong, Bonn once again expressed great sensitivity about troop withdraw-

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<sup>349</sup> D/153 Rusk-Gromyko mtg, 24 Sep 66, FRUS 64-8:11. The NPT was to apply in peace time only: Rusk noted that “if war did occur, then, all bets were off”.

<sup>350</sup> ACDA-Soviet mtgs, 27 Sep 66; Foster-Roshchin mtg, 28 Sep; Fisher to Moyers, 30 Sep, all LBJL NPT II; D/248 Rostow-Barzel disc., 23 Feb 68, FRUS 64-8:15; ACDA/NPT pp. 104-8.

<sup>351</sup> US-FRG mtg (incl. the citation), 25 Sep 66, AHP B/464 Germany; DOS to E/B on Erhard’s visit and on DOD-Knappstein mtg, 7 and 26 Oct, LBJL NPT II; Keeny on NPT (fn 136); ACDA/NPT p. 111.

als. McGhee feared grave consequences on NATO and US-FRG relations if the US indeed made such. Johnson later argued the situation contained the risk of dissolving NATO defenses altogether. But agreement was reached in trilateral talks in spring 1967. The FRG continued to offset the costs of foreign troops, but this was no longer tied strictly to *military* purchases and it was allowed to do so partially through monetary or other measures. The US came to make limited withdrawals, which Bonn accepted owing to the idea that these troops, though stationed as reserves in the US, remained committed to Europe. The agreement covered only one year, but further negotiations resulted in similar deals in the following years.<sup>352</sup>

At the same time, the trilateral talks, and US-FRG staff talks, helped towards agreement on NATO strategy; Haftendorn stresses the role of institutional cooperation mechanisms in facilitating consensus-finding. Schwartz and she further argue that by educating allies to US thinking and demonstrating US willingness to let them contribute to nuclear planning, the NPG played a key role in the acceptance of the flexible response -strategy, whereas agreement also became easier after France, a strong opponent of that strategy, stopped participating in NATO's military functions. By the end of 1967, the NATO crisis was overcome so that member states finally accepted the flexible response -strategy and no longer considered the continuation and strength of NATO to be at risk.<sup>353</sup> This means that the USG had succeeded to guide NATO to a new joint solution to the coordination problem involved in NATO strategy and to alleviate allies' concerns about abandonment enough to ensure that the solutions to the general and the nuclear collaboration problems remained solid.

Haftendorn shows that one element of the agreement was a common assessment that though the USSR had great military capabilities, it had become more careful and would not attack Western Europe as long as escalation to general nuclear war was possible, though the risk was not to be ignored and conflict caused by accidents or miscalculation was possible. Before any open hostilities, a political warning period of several weeks was expected, which enabled a somewhat greater emphasis on reserve forces not stationed in Continental Europe. The consensus on strategy in turn implied a compromise. First, conventional defense (which the US wanted to emphasize) was to be used as long as possible in all situations except a nuclear surprise attack; it was agreed that NATO was by and large capable of doing this. Also the FRG agreed to strengthen its conventional forces. Second, selective use of tactical nuclear weapons (which the FRG insisted on) was positioned as possibly needed; by fall 1963, McNamara had concluded that focus on strengthening conventional capabilities *only* was unviable because of allies' unwillingness to pay for them. Still, the role of tactical nuclear weapons was to improve the efficiency of *conventional* forces.

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<sup>352</sup> See D/171 McGhee to DOS, 20 Sep 66, FRUS 64-8:15; US-FRG mtg (fn 351), 25 Sep; Johnson 1971 pp. 206-10; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 223-6; Morgan 1974 pp. 167-75, 179; Haftendorn 1994 pp. 73, 228-84; Schwartz, T. 2003. The offset arrangement is considered in detail also in Trevorton 1978; Zimmermann 2002. On pressure in the Congress for troop withdrawals, see Brady 2004 pp. 138-9.

<sup>353</sup> Schwartz, D. N. 1983 p. 187; Haftendorn 1994 pp. 22, 31, 59-60, 90-1, 95, 104.

Third, strategic nuclear weapons had a central role in deterrence (especially Bonn wanted this to be clearly acknowledged).<sup>354</sup>

Several authors stress that the strategy agreed upon thus implied US acceptance, against its original aims but as especially the increasingly bargaining-powerful Bonn wanted, and owing both to a need for agreement on force goals and concerns that NATO would dissolve after 1969, of an explicit role for nuclear escalation in strategy and large de facto reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in NATO defense<sup>355</sup>. But various other factors also gave incentives for the USG to accept modification of the original flexible response -strategy. The costs of conventional US troops were a hard issue also for it, especially as US involvement in Vietnam and domestic opposition to it grew. Moreover, after much resources had been used on tactical nuclear weapons and they had become a part of NATO forces (whether or not a very useful part), it could have been politically unfeasible to suddenly give them no role at all. Besides, since the East-West situation in Europe was in general more stable, the likelihood of having to use any weapons was reduced.

Tuschhoff raises the question of why Bonn did not use the strategy revision to return to a fully conventional defense strategy that it had first preferred in the 1950s and that could have increased the chances of independent defense and instead pressed the USG for measures that would increase confidence in the US commitment. The explanations he suggests include that, first, full conventionalization would have had great costs in terms of equipment acquisitions and troop reorganization and training. Second, unlike in the 1950s, the FRG no longer got USG military assistance but was a customer with much purchasing power and could thus more independently decide about its military procurement. Third, greater independent (conventional) defense capabilities could have led to a weakening in allies' preparedness to defend the FRG. And fourth, participation in nuclear systems was a way for the FRG both to make the allies' commitment tangible and to secure access to information about US military plans.<sup>356</sup>

Because of its compatibility with the NPT, the NPG was now becoming clearly the nuclear solution for NATO. The temporary NPG had already increased US allies' exposure to strategic planning and in USG view also somewhat Bonn's voice in NATO nuclear affairs. According to Schwartz, McNamara was determined to keep the NPG from becoming similarly ostensible and thus resented as his 1962 Nuclear Committee had been. In its fall 1966 report, the NPG recommended that an organ like it be institutionalized; also the USG favored that.<sup>357</sup>

The USG stance on acceptable NPT language remained open. In early October, Johnson discussed it with his aides. No meeting memos are available, but according to the aides'

<sup>354</sup> Ibid. pp. 62, 65, 73-4, 78, 80.

<sup>355</sup> Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 189-90; Haftendorn 1994 pp. 346-9; Tuschhoff 1999 p. 145; Tuschhoff 2002 pp. 225-41.

<sup>356</sup> Tuschhoff 2002 p. 330.

<sup>357</sup> Response to NSAM 345 (fn 312); Schwartz, D. N. 1983 pp. 183-6.

accounts, he both clearly supported nonproliferation and NPT efforts *and* did not want to risk the continuation of NATO or preclude such schemes that could one day become necessary for keeping especially the Germans satisfied in NATO and were not contrary to non-proliferation or implied no changes to the AEA.<sup>358</sup>

Moscow informed the USG that it did not demand a prohibition of consultative schemes in a NPT, but also it was not fully committed to any compromise language. Foster-Roshchin drafting effort continued. On 5 December, Moscow formally proposed a compromise text, which Foster recommended the USG to accept. Wary of the dangers of insufficient consultation with the Germans or trying “to jam down their throats” a US-Soviet deal, the USG had repeatedly reassured Bonn that it was kept up-to-date on NPT negotiations and that US allies would be consulted before agreements were made with Moscow. Thus the USG still accepted the text only unofficially, assuming successful consultations with allies. These now got the text.<sup>359</sup>

This draft came to be a part of the final NPT text. Its Art. 1 concerns the actions of NWSs, defined in Art. 9 as states that had “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”. Each of them “undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly [this de facto referring to alliance nuclear arrangements]; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.” Art. 2 lays out prohibitions on NNWSs. They undertake “not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”<sup>360</sup> The USG interpreted this to prohibit the transfer of any nuclear explosive devices or control over them but not of their delivery systems. Moreover, it saw that the NPT did “not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense” or “with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory” that did not involve the prohibited

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<sup>358</sup> See Rusk on Johnson’s views, 3 Oct 66, LBJL NPT II 81-110; Keeny on NPT (fn 136); Johnson 1971 pp. 478-9; Seaborg 1987 p. 193 ref. also to Transcript, E. Rostow Oral History Interview, 2 Dec 68, by P. Mullahan, tape 1 p. 15, LBJL. Haftendorn 1994 suggests the USG now decided to make a compromise with Moscow on alliance nuclear arrangements (pp. 154-5), but the accounts indicate that Johnson did not clearly authorize any specific NPT compromise text. She refers to ACDA/NPT (to no exact page), but the source does not say that such a decision was made on this occasion.

<sup>359</sup> Rusk-Gromyko mtg, 10 Oct 66, LBJL NPT II; DOS/EUR correction on the former, 18 Oct, *ibid.* 81-110; Keeny on NPT (fn 136); ACDA/NPT pp. 111-25, 134-5. On USG concern about forcing a NPT on the FRG and assurances to Bonn to the contrary, see, e.g., D/15 Johnson to Erhard, 4 March 64; D/181 Rostow to Johnson (san.) with CDU/CSU memo (san.), 10 Oct 66, both FRUS 64-8:15; Foster to Johnson, 15 Sep, LBJL NPT II; DOS to E/B (fn 351), 26 Oct. See also D/180 US-FRG mtg, 8 Feb 67, FRUS 64-8:11.

<sup>360</sup> NPT, 1 July 68.

transfers.<sup>361</sup> As Küntzel points out, the NPT leaves open the possibility of a NNWS assisting the weapon effort of a NWS or of a non-NPT state (which is of potential significance also regarding the European option). In the 1965 US draft, the possibility was closed, but later drafts for some reason allowed it, possibly because the superpowers wanted to retain a chance to benefit from such aid.<sup>362</sup>

Since the superpowers did not want to publicly accept realities they were prepared to live with (e.g., deployment schemes and consultations as (the only) NATO nuclear sharing solutions), they were unable to agree on all details of what the NPT *allowed*. Thus they agreed that it narrowly concerned what was *prohibited*. As a result, the NPT text became ambiguous and allowed varying interpretations, which as such were not in the interest of a strong treaty. But ambiguity was probably necessary to make a NPT possible and acceptable to both the superpowers and many other states<sup>363</sup>.

The task facing the superpowers now was to persuade key NNWSs to accept and join the NPT (it seemed unviable to *force* them to join). NNWSs stressed that also NWSs had to make concessions in connection to a NPT. Demands regarding, e.g., disarmament and security assurances created a sense of urgency for the superpowers: the longer it took for them to agree on NPT text, the more others' demands grew and the harder it became to get, e.g., India and Israel to join a NPT. For instance India even prepared its own NPT draft that included an *obligation* to nuclear disarmament and safeguards also on NWSs' nuclear activities, but the US persuaded non-aligned states from officially presenting any drafts. Still, the strong bargaining position of key NNWSs threatened, to US and Soviet concern, to further improve and their demands to grow as the UNGA accepted Pakistan's late 1966 proposal for a conference of NNWSs (CNNWS) by July 1968 for consideration of various issues related to the NPT. Lauk notes that the superpowers' NPT drafts progressively made a balance between NWS and NNWS commitments clearer.<sup>364</sup> But as shown below, also a tactical issue was involved: expecting demands by NNWSs, the superpowers on purpose saved some concessions to later drafts.

One key state to be made to accept the US-Soviet agreement on a NPT was the FRG. Negotiations with it are described in the next section. Despite the topicality of its nuclear ambitions, the USG undertook much less consultation on a NPT with Israel. One explanation for this is the fact that it was formally not allied to the US. Moreover, Moscow's stances did not make Israel's participation as crucial for the USG as was the case with the FRG. Israel did also not seek chances to influence the content of the NPT. The major USG effort to

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<sup>361</sup> D/232 USOS Katzenbach to Clifford, 10 Apr 68, with 1) Q&A on US interpretations given to Moscow, 28 Apr 67, 2) EUR-FRG Emb. mtg, 13 March 68, and 3) proposed statement at NATO mtgs, FRUS 64-8:11.

<sup>362</sup> Küntzel 1992 pp. 248-9. On NPT loopholes in general, see pp. 137, 244-67.

<sup>363</sup> Küntzel 1992 argues similarly (p. 266).

<sup>364</sup> DOS/PM memo, 14 Jan 65, FOIA; UNGA Res. 2028/XX, 19 Nov; D/152-3 Rusk-Gromyko mtgs, 22-4 Sep 66, FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT pp. 89-90, 130-1; Buchan 1966 p. 10; Kohler 1972 p. 75; Lauk 1979 pp. 74-5; Seaborg 1987 pp. 355-7.



make Israel join the NPT came to take place only after the Six-Day War and the conclusion of the NPT; it is discussed in section 9.10.

As a result of the McNamara Committee initiative, a Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), open to all allies, and a permanent NPG with restricted membership (the US, the UK, the FRG, Italy, and three other NDAC states on a rotating basis) were established in NATO in late 1966. The key tasks of the NPG came to be to operationalize NATO's nuclear doctrine (especially which weapons to use, where, and when) and to define the exact moment of use and targets of nuclear weapons.<sup>365</sup>

Some disagreement exists over how influential the NPG really became. For instance, according to Costigliola, it had little real influence on US decisions, but Mackby & Slocombe argue Bonn got a strong role "in developing NATO nuclear doctrine and policy"<sup>366</sup>. Theiler in turn somewhat contradictorily argues that NPG consultations became a further institutional way to reduce the risk of abandonment from European perspective *and* that the NWSs' continuing right to alone decide about the use of nuclear weapons was a way to reduce the risk on them of entrapment to war<sup>367</sup>.

Here it is useful to make a distinction between *participation* and *influence*. The fact that the allies got more involved in the strategy-making process and got more information about US plans and forces did as such not mean that as a result, the USG would have made any different decisions than if the allies had not been involved. The discussion above shows that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' goal with the information-sharing initiative was to make the allies *understand* and then *accept* US strategy, *not* to allow them to influence US decisions. After all, the non-nuclear allies gained no way to force NWSs to act in any way or to stick to any guidelines in the event of war<sup>368</sup>. Also Costigliola suggests that McNamara used the NPG successfully to make allies *accept* the flexible response -strategy and to "make national and multilateral nuclear forces appear impractical and unnecessary", whereas the allies could exert influence in the NPG only "within the boundaries of what McNamara had established as the dominant discourse."<sup>369</sup> Nevertheless, Mahncke and Lauk argue that though allies' involvement depended on US willingness to share information and their nuclear dependency continued, the NPG did allow Bonn to have a meaningful *role* in nuclear planning even without possessing nuclear weapons. By the mid-1970s, West German officials also considered a *mutual* learning process to take place in the NPG. As Boutwell notes, greater consultations, together with an increased role for allies in the stockpiling scheme, did give concrete assurance about the US commitment. Schwartz ar-

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<sup>365</sup> Mahncke 1972 pp. 242-51; Lauk 1979 p. 104; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 p. 185. On the setting up and operation of the NDAC and the NPG in 1966-9, see Haftendorn 1994 pp. 173-9.

<sup>366</sup> Costigliola 1994 p. 204; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 176. Lauk 1979 argues the NPG allowed a mutual learning process by the US and its allies (p. 103).

<sup>367</sup> Theiler 1997 pp. 113, 118.

<sup>368</sup> Mahncke 1972 p. 250.

<sup>369</sup> Costigliola 1994 pp. 202-4.

gues that owing to the NPG and the reached consensus on strategy, the allies came for over a decade to hardly ever openly question the credibility of the extended deterrent.<sup>370</sup>

Thus access to US information and thinking and a feeling of involvement reassured Bonn enough to make security dependence on the US acceptable. And though the NATO solution to cooperation problems went through a crisis after the US proposed a switch to a new joint strategy and the allies, concerned that the flexible response -strategy might reflect a weakening US determination to protect them, did first not want to accept it, in the end the US largely succeeded to reassure them and to establish a strategy.

Though West German leaders failed in the attempt to make a NPT conditional of a MLF, by demanding a MLF they did create a bargaining chip that could be traded away for other concessions, such as greater consultations in NATO. Bonn also sought other measures to upgrade its nuclear status: it continued to press for a right to a say regarding the use of nuclear weapons in or from Germany in the NPG and during Kiesinger's August 1967 visit in Washington<sup>371</sup>. This issue is considered further in section 9.9.3.

Even in hindsight, it is hard to say whether the MLF plan was a good or bad nonproliferation policy. Just the fact that no force was established implies no failure since Kennedy and his aides saw the proposal as a tactical move. But as not all USG officials followed the guarded line of the top officials, the proposal became counterproductive in producing German *demands* for hardware sharing and by making a desire for a greater West German nuclear role seem legitimate. This created problems for the USG also in its relations with other allies and Moscow and in NPT negotiations. The MLF plan and, as its result, Bonn's stronger bargaining position probably prolonged the NPT negotiations, which gave extra time for opposition to a NPT rise in some countries. Pressure on all states to join the NPT might have in general been stronger had it been negotiated quickly and with greater support by, e.g., the FRG. In this way, the MLF plan had negative effects on nonproliferation. But with nuclear sharing talks and resulting greater consultations in NATO, together with the deployment schemes, the USG did succeed to keep West Germans satisfied with ties to the US and sufficiently secure to forgo seriously pursuing options outside NATO. It is unknown whether they would have acted differently in any case, but though fears of West German nuclear ambitions seem in retrospect unnecessary, it is possible that had no preventive action been taken, such could have emerged. As Richardson points out, already their *emergence* would have created a crisis in NATO and then a MLF would no longer have been enough for the FRG<sup>372</sup>.

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<sup>370</sup> Mahncke 1972 pp. 248-9; Lauk 1979 pp. 103-5; Schwartz, D. N. 1983 p. 190; Boutwell 1990 pp. 51-2. See Mahncke on the development of NATO nuclear planning schemes. NATO states agreed on provisional guidelines for nuclear first use, developed in the NPG, in late 1969 but on general guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons only in 1986. Haftendorn 1994 p. 97.

<sup>371</sup> Haftendorn 1994 p. 179.

<sup>372</sup> Richardson 1966 p. 208.

### **9.7 West German views on a nonproliferation treaty and Bonn's role in negotiations on it**

Officially, Bonn in principle accepted the idea of a NPT – being politically unable to oppose it. But in reality, it was quite much against it, criticized details of NPT drafts, and made increasing demands regarding the treaty and circumstances around it. Together with criticism of a NPT from within the CDU/CSU, this created questions about the sincerity of Bonn's official stance. The East block blamed it for trying to prevent a NPT altogether and also the USG suspected that to be its goal.<sup>373</sup>

A number of issues related to the NPT were disputed between the superpowers and NNWSs. I focus here on those that Bonn raised particularly strongly. In intensive talks on a NPT with the USG, Bonn tended to just keep on introducing demands, according to Preisinger for instance presenting them to the USG in April 1967 as a 52-point list<sup>374</sup>. But it was not alone: of NATO states also especially Italy made many strong, often similar objections to a NPT. For its part, Paris made it clear early on that it would not join a NPT. But as Germany's non-nuclear status was important for de Gaulle, Paris limited its criticism of the treaty.<sup>375</sup>

The US negotiation position towards Moscow could have been more flexible had the US needed to consider only narrowly its interests (though on, e.g., existing NATO arrangements, the superpowers had differing interests). But to please Bonn, the USG tried to promote also its demands, which tended to be further apart from those of Moscow than its own views<sup>376</sup>. Though the primary negotiations on the NPT took place between the superpowers, in practice the USG often acted as a mediator between Bonn and Moscow. But when other states made similar demands as Bonn, it avoided naming Bonn as an initiator when it took the issues up with Moscow.

Bonn's key demands in the context of the NPT concerned a) nuclear sharing: NATO schemes and the "European option"; b) freedom in civilian uses of nuclear energy; c) treaty duration and exit right; and d) security assurances. All these points were related to security, also point b) since civilian nuclear activities could create a latent nuclear weapon option.

As discussed above, Bonn especially opposed making non-nuclear promises towards *Moscow* without getting anything in return. Its chances to reject a NPT, if one came about, against US wishes were limited. But the criticality of Bonn's signature for both superpow-

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<sup>373</sup> D/235 NSCS to Rostow, 3 Nov 67, FRUS 64-8:15; ACDA/NPT pp. 85, 196-7; Kohler 1972 p. 131; Seaborg 1987 pp. 300, 359; Küntzel 1992 pp. 91, 150-4; Preisinger 1993 p. 151.

<sup>374</sup> Preisinger 1993 p. 151. See also Küntzel 1992 pp. 161-9. The demands were outlined also in "Denkschrift der Bundesregierung an die Mitglieder des Genfer Abrüstungsausschusses", 7 Apr 67 (repr. in Häckel 1989 pp. 73-5). On the demands, see also Petri 1970.

<sup>375</sup> See, e.g., CIA to Rostow, 9 May 67, with memo on NPT negotiations, 8 May, LBJL S:NPT II 2; ACDA/NPT.

<sup>376</sup> Küntzel 1992 even argues that the debate over the NPT was primarily internal to NATO: the Three Powers tried to ensure the FRG would remain in a subordinated position, and Bonn tried to get rid of that (p. 270).

ers, and USG desire to protect US-FRG relations from allegations that it forced the FRG to sacrifice its interests for the sake of an agreement with Moscow, gave Bonn leverage regarding the content of the treaty. Probably also concerns about potential Franco-German cooperation helped Bonn in the matter. But as Häckel points out, it is hard to say just *how* much Bonn influenced the NPT. Other states made similar demands as it and since it was no member of the UN and only had an observer status in the ENDC, it did not participate in multilateral NPT talks. Instead, it used negotiations with the USG to promote its special interests related to the NPT – leading once again to trouble between the two. Publicly, it criticized aspects of the superpowers' NPT drafts similarly as other NNWSs. It actively sought other NNWSs' support for its views and so limited Soviet ability to blame it for lacking cooperation.<sup>377</sup>

Next, I describe the course of the USG-Bonn battle over the NPT in 1967 in general and add some words regarding the European option. Thereafter, I discuss in more detail Bonn's demands related in particular to the freedom of nuclear activities, safeguards, treaty duration, and exit rights. The issue of nuclear sharing has already been covered. Bonn's demands regarding security assurances are discussed in section 9.9.1.

### 9.7.1 US-German negotiations and West German debates

Controversies in the CDU/CSU between a Erhard-Schröder camp and that of Adenauer, Strauss, and other Gaullists, together with the failure to prevent a NPT, USG coldness towards Bonn's hardware sharing ideas, and the offset issue, led to the fall of Erhard's government in November 1966. With it, Bonn's support for a MLF/ANF went down.<sup>378</sup> Erhard's cabinet had failed in its gamble of publicly limiting its win-set regarding a MLF and a NPT.

A CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition cabinet came to power, with Kiesinger as Chancellor and Brandt and Schröder as Foreign and Defense Ministers. It lacked a clear, unanimous stance on the NPT. According to Küntzel, the coalition sought a more independent role in NATO and better relations to the East. The first goal precluded simple acceptance of a discriminating NPT while the second called for cooperativeness. Discord over priorities rendered the coalition incapable of solving the issue and Bonn did not join the NPT during its

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<sup>377</sup> Kohler 1972 pp. 130-1; Lauk 1979 p. 76; Häckel 1989 pp. 21, 23; Küntzel 1992 pp. 57-8, 243-4; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 198. Many NNWSs whose support Bonn sought were states that were seen as potential proliferants and did not join the NPT until much later, if at all. The cooperation laid the basis for Bonn's liberal export policies towards them. Kötter & Müller 1990 p. 22. Küntzel argues that of all signatures to the NPT, that of Bonn was the hardest to achieve and it influenced the NPT text more than any other NNWS (p. 269), but this argument may be affected by the author's focus on the case of the FRG in particular. Paul 2000 argues that in addition to objections to its specific content, Bonn opposed a NPT because it feared it to "help formalize the territorial status quo in Central Europe" and strengthen the status of the GDR (p. 40). But this issue in fact caused fewer problems in connection to the NPT than to the PTBT.

<sup>378</sup> D/201 McGhee to Rusk, 25 Feb 67, FRUS 64-8:15; McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 250, 259-63; Boutwell 1990 p. 44; Küntzel 1992 pp. 93, 97-8, 100-2.

term. But the coalition was according to McArdle Kelleher unanimous in goals of 1) protecting the US commitment; 2) equality in NATO nuclear schemes; and 3) international recognition of the FRG as a major power.<sup>379</sup>

Rusk first expected the new cabinet to “come very close to accepting” the NPT Art. 1 draft<sup>380</sup>. But Bonn found many reasons to complain about it. Whereas McGhee stressed to Brandt how bad it would look if the FRG prevented a NPT and argued that its adherence would help make “the real targets” Israel and India more receptive, key members of Kiesinger’s cabinet gave the USG no unanimous impression about stances on a NPT and expressed reservations – but acceptance in principle. Brandt stressed that Bonn did not want to cause problems regarding nonproliferation and would in the context of the NPT only raise issues that were in the interest of all NNWS. His view was that the European clause could be forgotten: a unified Europe was far away and if it came about, it would not be bound by an earlier treaty, anyway. But he was uncertain the cabinet would agree on this. Schröder said that before a NPT was realized, it had to be seen how the NPG worked, and demanded further security assurances for the FRG if it joined a NPT.<sup>381</sup> Kiesinger said Bonn opposed “German possession or control of nuclear weapons” but aimed to keep options open and ensure the security of the FRG, whereas he but acknowledged that German opposition to a NPT would be looked very askance abroad.<sup>382</sup>

As Brandt expected, other West Germans continued to insist on the European option. Soviet statements that a NPT would foreclose it added to the sensitivity of the issue. German officials argued to the USG that to avoid harm to European integration and to those West Germans who favored full security reliance on the US, the option had to be left open.<sup>383</sup> Also EEC President W. Hallstein stressed its value as a final political goal of European integration and a way to check pressures for national nuclear capabilities.<sup>384</sup>

The US interpretation on the European option was that the NPT did “not bar succession by a new federated European states to the nuclear status of one of its former components”, assuming the new state “control[led] all of its external security functions” (otherwise it did not need to have “all governmental functions”)<sup>385</sup>. Bonn wanted the USG to include in its interpretation that steps *towards* an integrated force were acceptable *while* integration was underway, but the USG did not agree. In principle (but not politically), explicit acceptance of the European option was less crucial because of Brandt’s stance that a fully integrated Europe would not be bound by earlier treaties and the position Rusk took with the Germans

<sup>379</sup> McArdle Kelleher 1975 pp. 298-9; Küntzel 1992 pp. 119-26.

<sup>380</sup> Rusk (E/P) to DOS & Fisher, 15 Dec 66, LBJL NPT II.

<sup>381</sup> D/188 McGhee to DOS on mtg with Brandt, 8 Dec 66; D/193 McCloy-Brandt mtg, 17 Dec, both FRUS 64-8:15; T/7342 McGhee to Rusk on mtg with Brandt, 20 Dec, LBJL BNP; ACDA/NPT pp. 123-4, 137.

<sup>382</sup> McGhee to DOS & WH on 20 Dec 66 McGhee-Kiesinger mtg, 21 Dec, AHP B/464 Germany.

<sup>383</sup> Counselor von Staden-DOS mtg, 13 Dec 66, FOIA; T/7721 Hillenbrand to Rusk, 4 Jan 67, LBJL BNP; T/8272 McGhee to DOS, 17 Jan, LBJL S:NPT I 1; T/11357 (fn 308). See also Kaysen to Bator on mtg with Birrenbach, 23 Jan, DNSA NP01205.

<sup>384</sup> T/3157 Schaezel (Emb. Brussels) to Rusk, 5 Jan 67, LBJL BNP.

<sup>385</sup> D/232 with Q&A (fn 361) FRUS 64-8:11.

that “European political unification could justify the invocation of the withdrawal clause of the treaty”.<sup>386</sup>

In January 1967, Kiesinger’s government “agreed, in principle, to join the [NPT] enterprise<sup>387</sup>”. But the USG recognized that this did not imply it would easily accept the NPT. Especially Schröder and Strauss, now Finance Minister, seemed to be against it.<sup>388</sup> The effort to make Bonn join the NPT led to stormy times in US-FRG relations. To avoid strain and protect NATO, Rusk and Johnson saw “patience, explanation and friendly persuasion”, instead of overt pressure, as the way to make Bonn (and Rome) accept a NPT, even if that took time<sup>389</sup>. But though the USG said to the Germans that Bonn did not have to accept the Art. 1-2 text “on a take it or leave it basis”— it welcomed “constructive suggestions”— it warned that big problems could ensue with Moscow and maybe the US if changes to the text were indeed pursued.<sup>390</sup>

Domestic debates over the NPT in the FRG were vehement. As Küntzel points out, the “anti-NPT-hysteria” threatened to cause international isolation but also improved Bonn’s bargaining position: it could argue that the electorate would not accept a NPT unless its concerns were met. Kiesinger argued to the USG that otherwise the debate, which Strauss in particular was fuelling, threatened to disrupt his coalition, which implied a risk of Strauss becoming Foreign Minister in a new cabinet. He said he tried to calm the debate down but stressed that West Germans were not to be let think that Bonn was *pressed* to join the NPT. Especially Moscow’s statements had created that impression and raised doubts that it would use Bonn’s signature against it. Brandt said Bonn accepted a NPT as an idea but the concrete treaty was problematic and the cabinet’s position was determined by the need to secure Bundestag support for it.<sup>391</sup> Irrespective of what Kiesinger’s and Brandt’s true stances were, references to needs to secure ratification and prevent other politicians from attacking them and the NPT was of course also a bargaining tactic, which got extra credibility from popular opposition to the NPT – no matter who in reality fuelled it.

Grewe, whose views were known to have support in Bonn, expressed to the USG a more negative stance to a NPT. He argued that irrespective of its exact letter, the NPT would be a giveaway to the Soviets, who wanted it to “keep Germany permanently down”. Moreover, it would have bad effects on FRG-US relations and West German politics by 1) “institutionalizing inequality” in Europe; this was something German extremists could attack (the 1954 deal had been “essentially based on a concept of German equality with France

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<sup>386</sup> D/180 (fn 359), D/183 Fisher to Rusk, 25 Feb 67, both *ibid.* On the European option in US-FRG negotiations, see also Lauk 1979 pp. 90-2.

<sup>387</sup> T/8272 (fn 383).

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*; ACDA/NPT p. 142.

<sup>389</sup> T/150895 Rusk to Foster, 8 March 67, LBJL S:NPT I 1.

<sup>390</sup> D/197 McGhee to DOS on mtg with Brandt, 27 Jan 67, FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>391</sup> T/8272 (fn 383); D/180 (fn 359) FRUS 64-8:11; D/200 McGhee to DOS on mtg with Kiesinger, 22 Feb, FRUS 64-8:15; Rostow to Johnson, 8 May, with Rostow-Lilienfeld mtg, LBJL S:NPT II 2; Küntzel 1992 pp. 157-60.

and the UK”); and 2) foreclosing the option of deeper NATO nuclear sharing; the possibility had enabled Bonn to accept inequality so far (he did admit that the NPG could still become useful). But he saw the FRG as unable to stay out of a NPT alone. He said that though the US wanted its allies to accept the NPT draft before agreeing on it with Moscow, Bonn wanted to first hear other key NNWSs’ reactions; he seemed to hope that these would prevent a NPT. He, and others, said Rome shared Bonn’s views but wanted Bonn to get the blame for non-cooperation.<sup>392</sup>

Though Kiesinger and Brandt wanted good terms with the USG, the atmosphere in the FRG was not too positive towards the US. McGhee reported to Washington that West Germans thought that the US had “without adequate consultation, presented Germany with a *fait accompli* in the NPT” that it *had* to accept. Almost all Germans saw the NPT as “a sign of a new pattern of world organization being worked out secretly together” by the superpowers; “fears and accusations of American disinterest and abandonment, voiced by men of much influence in Germany, [had] reached disturbing proportions”. Also the fall of Erhard’s government, which had had close ties to the US, and the offset issue had undermined the US standing. The NPT draft had little real support in Bonn: a majority in the SPD just saw “lengthy soul searching” as unbeneficial since the FRG had to join the NPT anyway; some in the SPD and a CDU majority wanted to improve the NPT to protect the country’s industrial competitiveness; and some in the CDU staunchly opposed it. McGhee saw “considerable further education, as well as possible arm-twisting in the crunch” as possibly needed to secure a clear Bundestag majority for the treaty.<sup>393</sup>

But Foster reported to the DOS that NPT talks in Bonn run better than the impression given in the press. Kiesinger, Brandt, and others had assured that the FRG would join the NPT, though to prevent, e.g., Strauss from blaming them for selling out cheaply under US pressure and electoral success by the far right, in public they had to strongly defend German interests.<sup>394</sup>

The USG saw Bonn’s objections to a NPT as rooted in anxiety about the country’s status and a US-Soviet deal behind its back. Though that was not the heart of the matter, Bonn opposed a NPT also because of concern about technological disadvantages and a loss of the European option. To protect its international image, the FRG was expected to join the NPT at least if other key NNWSs did. But the issue was expected to harm US-German relations and, despite the government’s recognition of security dependency on the US, further intensify West German criticism of US policies, especially as the threat of Soviet aggression was not imminent. Some West German arguments hinted to the USG that Bonn did not

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<sup>392</sup> T/11357 (fn 308). He saw Grewe’s as “a rather rosy view” of the 1954 deal.

<sup>393</sup> T/9759 McGhee to DOS, 21 Feb 67, LBJL S:NPT I 1; D/201 (fn 378) FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>394</sup> T/2744 Foster to Rusk, 11 March 67, LBJL S:NPT I 1. For a similar argument, see Rostow-German industrialist talk, 20 Apr, LBJL PP Bator B/22 Johnson’s trip Adenauer funeral.

foreclose the idea of going nuclear some day, but it was not expected to do so in the near future, whether or not a NPT came about.<sup>395</sup>

For instance Bader argued that Bonn opposed a NPT since it wanted to retain the bargaining power *the option* to go nuclear gave it, even though it did not plan to do so<sup>396</sup>. But Bonn's true ambitions are a matter of considerable disagreement. Several observers have argued that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it always wanted to retain the option, and some authors have suggested that even real interest in a nuclear force existed. But others see nothing suspicious in Bonn's aims and take its non-nuclear pledges at face value.<sup>397</sup> In light of Bonn's stances in all talks about non-nuclear commitments and freedom of nuclear activities and of its frequent use of the nuclear option as a bargaining lever, it in any case seems justified to say that the option was valuable to it and it wanted to retain it.

Kiesinger continued to say one thing to the USG and another to the public. In March 1967, he noted to McGhee that he hoped the NPT to be signed by May "on conditions which would be considered to be honorable for Germany"<sup>398</sup>. After talks with US Vice President H. Humphrey, he said that he felt confident and reassured about the treaty. In public, Kiesinger said that Bonn had not yet decided to join it. The DOS thought Bonn in reality tried prevent the NPT without appearing guilty of that.<sup>399</sup>

Again bargaining with the need for any NPT to be ratified in the FRG, Kiesinger said in a meeting with Johnson in April that *he* saw the draft as acceptable but Moscow's role in the NPT and its comments that Bonn would *have* to sign it meant that the *Bundestag* could reject it. He assured that his cabinet fully trusted the US but complained about political problems caused for him in the context of the NPT by Strauss's views, general German fears of the USSR, and Foster's summer 1965 article that a NPT was needed even if it meant erosion of US alliances (see section 9.4.2). Though Johnson stressed his commitment to the FRG, he also expressed dislike of the recurring German questioning of US reliability: in

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<sup>395</sup> CIA to Rostow with memo on NPT negotiations, 28 Feb 67, LBJL S:NPT I 2; DOS/INR to Rusk REU-13 on West German opposition to a NPT, 1 March, AHP B/493 NPT; NIE 23-67 "Bonn's Policies under the Kiesinger Government", 30 March, LBJL I:G. Also Seaborg 1987 argues Bonn's opposition to a NPT resulted from unwillingness to give up the weapon option for all times (p. 359).

<sup>396</sup> Bader 1966 pp. 698-9.

<sup>397</sup> Sommer 1966 argues neither intellectual nor popular support existed in the FRG for seeking national control over nuclear weapons and nothing suggested the situation would change (pp. 39-40). McArdle Kelleher 1975 notes that during the Adenauer and Erhard terms, nothing seems to have been done to secure a national weapon capability, which was first also technically not fully unproblematic and created no wide interest among the public or the elite in the FRG (pp. 277-80). Schwarz 1989 argues that Adenauer never wanted to give up the weapon option and accept a permanent non-nuclear status for the FRG but his successors at least from the Grand Coalition onwards indeed cherished it (p. 577). The latter claim seems exaggerated taking into account Bonn's objections to the NPT. Küntzel 1992 suggests that throughout the Cold War, the red line in Bonn's nuclear policies was to maintain the weapon option and it never went beyond temporarily forgoing it (pp. 13, 270-1). He argues the CSU opposed a NPT since it wanted to maintain a strong European option and suggests that while the freedom of industry was a central issue for the SPD, interest in a weapon option may have played a role also for SPD politicians (pp. 124-7).

<sup>398</sup> D/203 McGhee to DOS, 3 March 67, FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>399</sup> T/150895 Rusk to Foster, 8 March 67, LBJL S:NPT I 1; D/208 M/Berlin to DOS on Humphrey's visit, 6 Apr, FRUS 64-8:15; ACDA/NPT pp. 196-7, 205.



the face of it, it was uncertain whether the USG could maintain so large troops in Europe. He had already “changed the [NPT] draft 25 times for the benefit of the FRG” and though also he was not happy with the present draft and did not want to hurry with a NPT or do anything for Soviet benefit at German cost, he did not want to be seen as “the guardian of Germany”, either.<sup>400</sup>

Since the NPT non-transfer formula enabled various interpretations, Bonn demanded clarifications from the USG. This gave such orally, but Bonn wanted a more formal approach and binding Soviet acceptance of key Western interpretations. Owing to Bonn’s demands and to prevent Moscow from later challenging its or West German stances, the USG agreed to make its interpretations public and gave them to Moscow. It assured Bonn that Moscow knew that the USG did not consider existing NATO arrangements, the European option, or NPG consultations prohibited and persuaded Bonn to agree not to push for a public Soviet comment; it was hardly possible for Moscow to explicitly accept NATO schemes.<sup>401</sup> Though Moscow privately objected to the US aim to publicly state its interpretations, the USG expected them to become public during Senate hearings and persuaded Moscow not to publicly oppose them, arguing that otherwise the whole NPT could fail. Because the interpretations were so important for NATO, Seaborg stresses the centrality of this understanding for the whole NPT.<sup>402</sup> Crucial for reaching it was most probably that the USG told Moscow that it did not see its interpretations as *formal reservations* (that would have aimed “to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application” to it<sup>403</sup>), or special understandings about the treaty. Moscow also explicitly denied any US right to unilaterally make interpretations that would bind other states.<sup>404</sup> Haftendorn points out that as the interpretations later were through Senate hearings included in the legislative history of the NPT in the US, they did come to bind the US<sup>405</sup>.

As intensive consultations on the NPT went on, German-US relations started to improve. In fall 1967, McGhee reported that these had become much calmer, one reason being changes made to the NPT to please Bonn (meaning probably especially steps the USG had taken to alleviate Bonn’s concern about the freedom of nuclear industry, discussed in the next section). Anti-US feelings had weakened and Bonn seemed satisfied with the level of consultation with the US. But a NPT was still “not a happy prospect for the FRG” and continued to cause problems in US-German relations. To protect them from attacks by German nationalists, the USG wanted to move carefully with the NPT. It seemed to the DOS that none

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<sup>400</sup> Kiesinger argued German distrust of the US had emerged in 1959 when Eisenhower met Khrushchev in Camp David to discuss the Berlin crisis. D/214 Kiesinger-Johnson mtg, 26 Apr 67, FRUS 64-8:15; ACDA/NPT pp. 205-6.

<sup>401</sup> D/180 (fn 359), D/232 (fn 361) FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT pp. 137-40, 144-5, 159.

<sup>402</sup> T/2371 M/G to DOS, 17 Feb 67; T/146956 Rusk to Foster, 1 March, both LBJL S:NPT I 1; M/G to Rusk on mtg with Soviet official, 15 May, *ibid.* 2; D/232 with attachments (fn 361), FRUS 64-8:11; Seaborg 1987 p. 196.

<sup>403</sup> Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 19, 23 May 69.

<sup>404</sup> See ACDA/NPT pp. 199, 215-8.

<sup>405</sup> Haftendorn 1994 p. 158.

of 50-60 top West German leaders really supported the treaty: “attitudes range from total hostility ... to distaste but grudging acceptance, represented by Kiesinger and now by Brandt.” The Germans felt consciously misled since the US had backed away from what had been earlier discussed in NATO (probably meaning talks in summer 1965 before the US tabled its first NPT draft, which had left open the European option and a MLF not controlled by NWSs) and were primarily dissatisfied since they saw the NPT as a super-power ““deal” made behind Germany’s back at her expense”. The USG found out that clear pressure had emerged in the cabinet to torpedo the NPT but Brandt had persuaded Kiesinger to take a more cooperative course. Rostow thought Bonn would probably sign the NPT but the Bundestag would maybe not ratify it. McGhee warned that the US might even have to choose “between the NPT and keeping Germany as an ally” but later reported that the Germans realized that far-going objections to the NPT were risky.<sup>406</sup>

### 9.7.2 Safeguards, export controls, and the freedom of nuclear industry

After the Grand Coalition came to power, ensuring the freedom of civilian nuclear industry became a central concern Bonn expressed regarding the NPT; it maintained that Moscow’s tried through the treaty to gain control over nuclear development in the FRG. To prevent chances for industrial espionage, disturbance of industrial activities, and thus harm to the competitive position of the FRG compared to NWSs (under the NPT, only NNWSs had to accept IAEA safeguards), Bonn also wanted minimal, non-intrusive safeguards to be applied to enforce a NPT. According to Seaborg, for it and other US allies, competition by both the USSR and the US was a concern, though they expressed that concern only regarding the USSR. Bonn also wanted no tight controls to hinder its exports. Concern moreover existed in Bonn that under the NPT, supplier states could come to use nuclear fuel supply as a political weapon. Müller suggests the FRG opposed restrictions in the nuclear field so fiercely because civilian nuclear activities were a symbol of progress, especially as military nuclear development was no option for it.<sup>407</sup> Concern about competitiveness probably was central for Bonn’s demands for freedom in the civilian field<sup>408</sup>, but it is of course possible that they also grew out of a desire to protect a weapon option.

Bonn’s goal of ensuring the freedom of nuclear activities was largely met. The USG promised publicly that a NPT would not hinder civilian nuclear activities and assured Bonn that the treaty would not affect safeguarded fuel supply to the FRG. But Quester suggests that US supply of cheap enriched uranium, which had persuaded the FRG to acquire reactors using such fuel and so made it dependent on US supply, was also a subtle lever to ensure

<sup>406</sup> D/229 E/B to DOS, 9 Sep 67; D/235 (fn 373) both FRUS 64-8:15; D/215, D/221 Rostow to Johnson, 7 Nov and 5 Dec, FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT p. 322.

<sup>407</sup> Kaysen (fn 383), 23 Jan 67; T/9047 Hillenbrand to DOS, 3 Feb, LBJL S:NPT I 1; D/180 (fn 359) FRUS 64-8:11; D/248 (fn 350) FRUS 64-8:15; Seaborg 1987 pp. 289, 297; Küntzel 1992 pp. 115-7, 147; Müller 1995 p. 181.

<sup>408</sup> Of course, over time also economic competitiveness affects states’ power positions and thus security.

that Bonn would sign the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards (though no indications exist that the lever was used overtly). To Moscow, the USG argued that ensuring the freedom of peaceful nuclear cooperation was in general needed to persuade NNWSs to join the NPT. But Bonn placed its demands higher: the civilian uses had to be *promoted* in a NPT and NNWSs needed access even to knowledge gained in military nuclear activities that had civilian applications to prevent harm to their technological and economic development.<sup>409</sup>

And indeed, Art. 4 of the NPT grants an “inalienable right” for all NPT states “to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination” and promises facilitation of “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information” for this purpose.<sup>410</sup> Seaborg points out that in this issue, the price NNWSs demanded for the NPT was exaggerated as even states with no real weapon option received this promise. Küntzel moreover argues that as signing the NPT thus came to imply only a gesture of political will, no tangible hindrance to proliferation, and unrestricted access to nuclear technology, decisions about going nuclear became solely political, and the atmosphere of trust created by the NPT and the artificial differentiation between military and non-military uses of nuclear energy enabled wider spread of nuclear technologies and thus proliferation.<sup>411</sup>

A related issue was what kind of safeguards would be used to enforce the NPT; IAEA safeguards were no universal standard yet and safeguards for second-generation reactors were only being developed. A problematic aspect was the discrimination involved: the superpowers wanted to demand safeguards only from NNWSs. For instance the FRG, Italy, and Canada expressed objections to this idea. A key issue was also the relationship between IAEA and Euratom safeguards. To avoid double controls, Euratom states wanted to be subjected only to Euratom safeguards, which they wanted to maintain as politically valuable regarding European integration and to avoid giving France, as a NWS, a privileged position in Euratom. They were concerned that an unknown, less developed IAEA control system, in which communist states participated, would be much more disturbing than the already developed system among friends. Also in this issue, the US acted as a de facto mediator between them and Moscow.<sup>412</sup>

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<sup>409</sup> D/200 (fn 391) FRUS 64-8:15; ACDA/NPT pp. 151, 161, 200; Quester 1973 p. 182; Küntzel 1992 pp. 144-7, 261-2.

<sup>410</sup> NPT, 1 July 68.

<sup>411</sup> Seaborg 1987 pp. 361-3; Küntzel 1992 pp. 258-67. See also Quester 1972 pp. 494-5. After 1974, Bonn made use of Art. 4 against US efforts to make its allies forgo full fuel cycles. Müller 2000 p. 8. On 15 May 68, the US also stated at the UN that no state had “to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research”. On the contrary, the NPT was to make the field of nuclear power production more open to all states. Ref. to in Bonn’s 28 Nov 69 declaration, <http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf> (6 March 06). A related issue in NPT negotiations was how NNWSs could benefit from “peaceful nuclear explosions” (PNEs) in, e.g., construction activity, if such became feasible. See Seaborg 1987 pp. 309-52, 364-6. Also Bonn presented objections to a prohibition of PNEs under a NPT, arguing that would increase a technology gap between NNWSs and NWSs. See, e.g., T/11357 (fn 308).

<sup>412</sup> Bonn also expressed concern that France would abandon Euratom altogether if IAEA safeguards were introduced. The USG saw this as unlikely because it had the lever of stopping the supply of U-235 and plutonium, on which France’s civilian nuclear program depended. D/190 Rusk to Foster, 8 March 67, FRUS 64-

Moscow opposed any special treatment of Euratom. It wanted either the IAEA to have universal responsibility for safeguards and NPT supervision or to have no safeguards clause, though it by late 1966 took a stance that safeguards were worthwhile. But it did not want to enable Bonn to reject the NPT because of Euratom issues and recognized the value of Euratom controls in ascertaining the civilian nature of West German nuclear activities. Its demand for equal treatment of all NNWSs had the justification that otherwise also, e.g., Arab states could launch their mutual safeguards system. Moscow wanted to avoid problems with its allies as a result of privileges for US allies and told the USG that its allies would not accept NPT safeguards before Euratom states did. It was not opposed to just continuing with existing safeguards arrangements in Europe (probably this meant the schemes it had for Eastern Europe and the Euratom system)<sup>413</sup>, but that option was not helpful regarding general acceptance of a NPT and safeguards.

The USG wanted a strong safeguards clause to a NPT, but especially Rusk, White House aides, and ACDA thought that the US should, as a fall-back position, accept even a NPT without one if it would be able to reach only such a treaty with Moscow. The US stance between Moscow and Euratom was complicated by the expectations that potential proliferants would welcome the absence of safeguards and most future NPT-states would back Moscow's stance. As noted above, in early US drafts the safeguards clause was weak since many NNWSs were expected to be uneager about strong, discriminating controls. Later the USG sought a stronger clause but tried to take the Euratom concerns into account. Sympathetic to those, and to overcome the impasse in NPT negotiations and disputes in US-FRG relations that the issue was causing, some DOS officials continued to favor non-obligatory safeguards: it was argued that safeguards anyway did not guarantee that a state did not pursue weapons at secret sites. But especially the Senate, the DOD, the JCS, and the AEC saw safeguards as important (and as a benchmark for the US stance that arms control had to be verified). For instance Senator Pastore was arguing that the Senate might accept only a NPT with safeguards.<sup>414</sup> Thus adding a relatively strong safeguards clause to the NPT was important for the USG.

To prove the concern ungrounded that IAEA safeguards would hinder industrial activities, allow for espionage, or weaken NNWSs' competitive position, the USG offered to place "all nuclear activities in the United States – excluding only those with direct national security significance" under IAEA safeguards at the time when NPT safeguards would be applied to NNWSs<sup>415</sup> (indeed, it had since 1962 subjected some nuclear activities to safeguards in order to help establish IAEA competencies and train inspectors). Bonn welcomed

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8:11; Keeny to Rostow, 9 Nov, LBJL S:NPT II 2; ACDA/NPT pp. 148-50; Quester 1973 p. 173; Küntzel 1992 pp. 215-7.

<sup>413</sup> D/172 Foster to Rusk, 11 Jan 67, FRUS 64-8:11; M/G 17 Feb and 15 May (fn 402); ACDA/NPT pp. 119-21, 164, 236.

<sup>414</sup> D/172 (fn 413), D/190 (fn 412) FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT pp. 11, 39, 45, 64-7, 119-20, 166, 174, 373; Seaborg 1987 pp. 276-9, 284-8.

<sup>415</sup> Johnson's speech, 2 Dec 67, PPJ 515.

the offer: Brandt said it could eliminate Bonn's worry about competitiveness. London was willing to follow the US example, but Moscow had no interest in the idea.<sup>416</sup>

Since the safeguards issue was so problematic, the superpowers first postponed drafting an article on them. After fall 1967, Moscow indicated interest in a compromise but still wanted only IAEA safeguards to be explicitly mentioned in a NPT. The final solution regarding Euratom was that after the NPT entered in force, a separate IAEA-Euratom agreement was to be negotiated, under which Euratom performed controls and the IAEA verified them.<sup>417</sup> Switching soon to pure IAEA controls on all Euratom activities was anyway unfeasible because the IAEA had only 12 inspectors; it was expected to take some years before its safeguards system would be in full operation.<sup>418</sup>

Also the details of IAEA safeguards to be applied to enforce the NPT were left to be determined in separate negotiations after the NPT was signed. The NPT preamble and Art. 3 require NNWSs to accept such safeguards as the IAEA would agree upon "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The general principle was to apply safeguards on the production, use, or processing of "source or special fissionable material ... in all peaceful nuclear activities" in or under the control of a NNWS "at certain strategic points". The safeguards were to be implemented so that they would not harm civilian activities or "the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes".<sup>419</sup> Thus they were limited in several ways (see also Art. 1-2 above). They did not concern military nuclear activities (the NPT only prohibits the NNWSs from *producing nuclear explosive devices*, not from undertaking any military nuclear R&D). Only nuclear material (not plants) was to be safeguarded, and only at *certain agreed-upon points* in the fuel flow (not anywhere, anytime). Moreover, involvement by a NNWS in activities in a NWS and not controlled by the NNWS (such as West German involvement with 49 % in facilities in France) did not have to come under the safeguards.<sup>420</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> This issue was one case where the USG used other states' demands as "camouflage" to Bonn's demands: when it asked Moscow to make a similar offer, it referred only to Japanese and Indian concerns about discrimination. D/193-4 Foster and Rostow to Johnson, 6-8 Apr 67; D/198 Rusk-Gromyko mtg, 23 June; D/221 (fn 406), all FRUS 64-8:11; DOS to E/B, 22 Apr, with Brandt to Rusk, 21 Apr, LBJL S:NPT I 1; ACDA/NPT pp. 198-203, 368-9; Seaborg 1987 pp. 294-5.

<sup>417</sup> The USG assured its European allies that its fuel supply would continue during IAEA-Euratom negotiations and progress in them would affect NPT ratification in the US. D/215 (fn 406) FRUS 64-8:11; DOS/Euratom p. 103; Küntzel 1992 pp. 148-9, 156-7, 171-83, 225-8; FRUS 64-8:11 summary. On the safeguards negotiations, see DOS/Euratom pp. 81-108; ACDA/NPT. On the relation of Euratom to IAEA controls (incl. later changes), see, e.g., Preisinger 1993 pp. 114-24.

<sup>418</sup> ACDA/NPT p. 165. Häckel 1989 notes that NPT opponents in the IAEA blocked efforts to improve the Agency's control capabilities (p. 34).

<sup>419</sup> NPT, 1 July 68.

<sup>420</sup> See Küntzel 1992 pp. 137, 255-8.

Preisinger argues that an existing, more comprehensive IAEA control system was thus reduced to a minimum<sup>421</sup>. It is true that though the 1965 IAEA model safeguards agreement (that continued to apply to some existing projects) aimed at verifying that items covered would be used in *no* way to promote any military aims, the new 1970 agreement aimed to prevent the use in *nuclear explosives* only. And though the 1965 agreement covered plants and materials, the new one covered materials only. But it did so regarding *all* imported and domestically-produced materials in any peaceful nuclear activities in a non-nuclear NPT state: earlier item-specific safeguards were changed into full-scope ones for such states. Both agreements covered only processed nuclear materials, not uranium ore.<sup>422</sup>

Bonn also did not want to let the NPT to hinder aggressive promotion of its nuclear technology exports as a part of its effort to create an independent nuclear industry. The NPT did lead to a certain strengthening of export controls through a *standardization* of minimum requirements for NPT states (also France, though it stayed outside the NPT, came to follow them): until then, no general standard had existed<sup>423</sup>. But also the export controls became limited. According to the NPT, no signatory is “to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material [i.e., uranium ore was again excluded], or (b) equipment or material *especially* designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, *to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes*” unless the material was properly safeguarded.<sup>424</sup> Thus no safeguards were demanded on transfers of dual-use items or to NNWSs for military uses or to NWSs (e.g., from the FRG to France). Moreover, no full safeguards covering all of a *non-NPT* recipient’s nuclear activity were required; requirements to notify other states about transfers were limited; and items not explicitly listed as controllable were excluded from controls.<sup>425</sup>

Many observers give Bonn much of the questionable credit for the NPT’s becoming so liberal regarding the civilian uses, surveillance of compliance, and exports<sup>426</sup>. It indeed appears that in these issues, Bonn had much influence on the NPT. But the blame for the watering down of the NPT need not be given for it alone. The US had even earlier been assur-

<sup>421</sup> Preisinger 1993 p. 156.

<sup>422</sup> Euratom safeguards also covered uranium ore. See Gardner 1994 pp. 67-76 on multilateral safeguards and their development.

<sup>423</sup> Preisinger 1993 p. 39; Müller 1994 pp. 316-7.

<sup>424</sup> My emphasis. NPT Art. 3, 1 July 68.

<sup>425</sup> Küntzel 1992 pp. 256-8; Müller 1994 pp. 316-7. The export control regime was later much strengthened. See Preisinger 1993; Gardner 1994. In the 1970s, the West German nuclear industry and technology exports made a major breakthrough and Bonn’s liberal export policies led to proliferation concerns. For instance, in 1975 it agreed to sell Brazil a large technology package, incl. enrichment and reprocessing plants. Despite international protests, only in the 1990s (after widely published export scandals) Germany decidedly switched to a restrictive export policy and changed its legislation accordingly. On its nuclear export policies, see Kötter & Müller 1990 pp. 22-5; Preisinger 1993 pp. 158-68; Kelle 1995. But also other states used to have liberal export policies. Even the US continued nuclear cooperation with states that did not join the NPT and did not demand full-scope safeguards from them; only the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act introduced such a demand regarding exports to NNWSs. Ribicoff 1976 p. 765; Gardner 1994 p. 64.

<sup>426</sup> See Kötter & Müller 1990 p. 23; Küntzel 1992 pp. 14, 258-73; Preisinger 1993 pp. 154-6; Müller 2000 p. 8. Whereas Küntzel is more critical, Preisinger and Müller see Bonn’s interest in avoiding discrimination in the civilian field as understandable since the FRG was a “aspiring technology and trade state”.

ing that a NPT would not interfere in civilian uses, though the concept of a special article to *promote* them indeed emerged in spring 1967 when Bonn was voicing its demands. But also other NNWSs demanded protection and promotion of civilian uses under a NPT.<sup>427</sup> Moreover, though the USG preferred strong safeguards, many key officials were prepared to accept a NPT without them, which indicates that the treaty was seen to concern less technical *capabilities* to go nuclear than *political promises* not to do so and helps explain that the USG found even only limited safeguards as acceptable.

At the time, nuclear power was insignificant as a source of energy but considered a great hope of the future, in the FRG and elsewhere. The commercial era of nuclear power started in the FRG under the Grand Coalition as two power plants were commissioned in 1967 that were not dependent on public subsidies. In 1967, also construction of a pilot plutonium re-processing plant started at Karlsruhe. The state-financed facility started operation in 1971. The growing independence of the FRG in the nuclear field and its becoming a major civilian nuclear power gave Bonn extra bargaining power in NPT negotiations. Several observers point out that the breadth of West German efforts implied that Bonn was, more or less intentionally, securing an advanced option of weapon production.<sup>428</sup>

The NPT prohibited only the production of nuclear explosive devices, not all military nuclear R&D. Such research was made also in the FRG, especially on the effects of nuclear weapons, including based on simulations of nuclear explosions. These research sites in Munster, Stohl, and Euskirchen did not become safeguarded as the NPT did not require that.<sup>429</sup> In 1964-67, Bonn in vain tried to persuade the USG to sell it a research reactor for military purposes. The reactor type could be used both in development of protective armors against the initial radiation of nuclear detonations and for calculating weapon configurations. The DOD favored a sale and the DOS came to support it as a way to demonstrate that a NPT would not harm German interests. But ACDA opposed a sale because of possible harm to NPT negotiations and to avoid drawing attention to the fact that the NPT required no safeguards on NNWSs' military nuclear facilities.<sup>430</sup>

### 9.7.3 The validity of the treaty and the exit option

Of significance for how permanent a non-nuclear pledge under the NPT would be were the questions of NPT period of validity and exit rights. Unlike the superpowers, for instance Bonn and Rome wanted a limited, short period of validity (Rome proposed a shorter period

<sup>427</sup> See ACDA/NPT pp. 201, 238-9; Seaborg 1987 pp. 361-3.

<sup>428</sup> See Beaton 1966 p. 37; Bader 1966 p. 697; Keck 1981 p. 41; Küntzel 1992 pp. 115-7, 132-6; Keck 1993a p. 300; Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 197; Research Center Karlsruhe website <http://www.fzk.de/fzk/idcplg?IdcService=FZK&node=0701&lang=en> (22 Nov 07). For an overview of nuclear development in the FRG, see IAEA 2003. See Brandt 1968b (p. 751) for a speech in the CNNWS on hopes regarding nuclear energy.

<sup>429</sup> Küntzel 1992 pp. 136-9.

<sup>430</sup> The USG let the Bundeswehr use a similar reactor in the US for experiments. DOS to Rostow (draft), 21 July 66; Kohler to DOS; Fisher to Kohler, both 17 Feb 67, all USNA CFPF Science, AE WG B/2898; Küntzel 1992 p. 137.

(5 years) than Bonn (10-20 years, after which a state could withdraw if it wanted but the NPT would remain in force)). Kiesinger did not want to take responsibility for tying the hands of the FRG for ever since it was possible that the US security commitment to the FRG would one day end. He argued that after a limited period, progress in disarmament and FRG-USSR relations could be evaluated and a permanent NPT considered.<sup>431</sup>

As in the case of the PTBT, the superpowers favored including in a NPT an exit clause for special situations. But Bonn argued it would be politically hard for it to ever use such a right and demanded explicit recognition of circumstances in which an exit was acceptable, such as dissolution of NATO, creation of ABM systems, threatening of a NNWS by a NWS, and introduction of restrictions on civilian nuclear activities.<sup>432</sup>

According to Art. 10 of the NPT, the treaty was to remain in force for 25 years, after which member states were to decide whether to extend it. It includes a similar exit clause as the PTBT (see section 8.4.1) and leaves each signatory to decide when an exit is necessary.<sup>433</sup> But the USG assured Bonn that the FRG could withdraw if its security was threatened, for instance if the US withdrew its nuclear forces from Europe<sup>434</sup>.

The final negotiation rounds on the NPT and the questions of security assurances and disarmament are discussed in section 9.9.1. Before that, I now return to the situation in the Middle East.

### **9.8 Israel's nuclear status, the 1967 war, and US arms supply**

A general nonproliferation regime was becoming reality but it was not said whether and how this was to affect the proliferation problem in Israel's case. In that issue, Johnson was as before between the fires. H. Saunders of the NSCS wrote that Johnson was "deeply committed to nuclear non-proliferation" and the Congress demanded him "not to feed arms races and to reach an understanding with Moscow". But Johnson's feelings for Israel were strong. According to Saunders, he had both "a political need as well as a personal desire to maintain a warm relationship with Israel"; Israel's retaining a qualitative military advantage over Arabs was also necessary for him.<sup>435</sup> Rostow in turn referred in a memo to Johnson to Johnson's "desire to do everything we can to help the Israelis"<sup>436</sup>. The Jewish electorate was moreover expected to be strongly contested by the Republicans in the 1968

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<sup>431</sup> D/214 (fn 400) FRUS 64-8:15; CIA on NPT (fn 375), 8 May 67; NSCS to Rostow, 20 Sep, with memo on visit by West German Science Minister, 19 Sep, LBJL S:NPT II 2. Also when it brought the validity issue up with Moscow, the USG tried to avoid the impression that it did so because of Bonn's stances. See Rostow to Johnson with Rusk to Johnson, 16 May, *ibid.* I 2; D/198 (fn 416) FRUS 64-8:11.

<sup>432</sup> Küntzel 1992 pp. 149-50. The USG saw for instance India's demand for an exit clause as reasonable: a NPT was not to guarantee China a power advantage in the area. See Thompson's to Rusk on Rusk-GC mtg, 7 Jan 65, FOIA.

<sup>433</sup> NPT, 1 July 68.

<sup>434</sup> See, e.g., D/248 (fn 350) FRUS 64-8:15.

<sup>435</sup> D/20 Saunders to Rostow, 16 May 67, FRUS 64-8:21.

<sup>436</sup> D/416 Rostow to Johnson, 8 May 67, FRUS 64-8:18.



elections. Though the Johnson administration was strongly supported by it, it thus seemed necessary that the Democrats would make clear that Jewish concerns would continue to be heard.<sup>437</sup>

At the same time, the DOS/IAI was suggesting that the USG was maybe doing too much for Israel compared to what it got. Massive economic, significant military, and much political support and a de facto security guarantee from the US to Israel had bought little progress in the Arab-Israel conflict, refugees, arms control, and IAEA safeguards, but some restraint on military actions and nuclear weapons (that a de facto guarantee was again mentioned in an internal memo indicates that the informal assurances for Israel were for the USG no mere rhetoric). But the IAI acknowledged that because of Israel's friends in the US, chances to scale down support were limited. Another option was also to do still more for Israel in order to secure better returns.<sup>438</sup>

### 9.8.1 Israel's nuclear capabilities

The USG tried to stick to a semiannual schedule for the Dimona visits. In late fall 1966, Barbour proposed Eban an early visit. No reply was forthcoming. Barbour was instructed to inform him of growing USG displeasure with the problems and delays in dealings over the reactor and to ask for both "automatic six-monthly procedure" for them and for IAEA safeguards. Based on a NEA/IAI draft, Barbour was to warn that the matter could "begin to color other aspects of US-Israeli relations", but the NSCS struck out that point since it was too threatening.<sup>439</sup> In early 1967, Eban again replied Barbour that IAEA controls would be a security risk. On grounds of domestic pressures and sovereignty, he opposed demands made only on Israel, not Egypt. Eban said mutual recognition was a prerequisite for arms control. A NPT was a possible solution, but he regretted Israel had not been chosen to a preparatory group for the CNNWS. Barbour also found out that Eshkol had promised his cabinet not to accept visits to Dimona more often than so far. He pointed out to the Israelis that though the USG wanted semiannual visits, in practice the dates proposed were close to the schedule followed so far. Eshkol promised to make an invitation soon.<sup>440</sup> But despite continuing USG pressure, none was forthcoming until Johnson decided to hold an assistance package for Israel until a visit was agreed upon; thereafter, an invitation followed quickly.<sup>441</sup>

<sup>437</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 20 Apr 67, with D. Ginsburg's draft "1968 – American Jewry and Israel", LBJL N/I VI M1.

<sup>438</sup> Saunders's memo, n/d, with DOS/IAI "U.S-Israel Relations", 8 Feb 67, LBJL N/I VI M2.

<sup>439</sup> D/351 E/TA to DOS, 29 Nov 66; D/375 DOS to E/TA, 30 Dec, both FRUS 64-8:18; Saunders's memo, 30 Dec, with draft tel. to E/TA, LBJL N/I VI M2.

<sup>440</sup> T/2345 Barbour to Rusk, 12 Jan 67; A-414 Barbour to DOS on 10 Jan mtg with Eban, 16 Jan, both *ibid.* Cb; D/377 (fn 263), D/391 DOS to E/TA, 23 Feb, FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>441</sup> See DOS-E/TA corresp., USNA CFPF B/2914; D/395 Rostow to Johnson, 15 March 67; D/397 on 16 March Johnson-Feinberg disc; D/401 Rostow to Johnson, 7 Apr, all FRUS 64-8:18.

In winter 1966-67, Israel was becoming able to produce a nuclear weapon. According to Cohen, it had by late 1966 tested all components for one (even if no bomb as such) and by early 1967 had a weapon design and was able to test delivery vehicles and produce enough material for a bomb<sup>442</sup>. Also the USG was coming to see Israel as approaching the weapon production capability. Even if CIA officials had kept low profile on indications of Israel constructing a PU-separation plant, the existence of such was becoming more widely known in the USG. In February, intelligence (albeit unconfirmed) appeared suggesting Israel was maybe building such a plant, had components for a nuclear weapon, and would need only 6-8 weeks to put one together. Reports by Emb. Tel Aviv did little to clarify matters: on the one hand, Barbour proposed caution with the intelligence since the Dimona reactor seemed not to be used at full capacity, and the Embassy reported that Israel was considering to open the site to foreign scientists, but on the other hand, some reports referred to indications of faster than assumed progress in Israel's nuclear program. The matter was put under thorough study within the USG. Cohen argues that because of Johnson's and some other top officials' wishes, the status assigned to Israel by the USG was not changed to a NWS.<sup>443</sup> Indeed, doing so would have been problematic because of the NPT: under it, Israel was not to be accepted as a NWS.

Even if a tacit Johnson-Eshkol bargain about secured conventional arms supply and Israel's not going overtly nuclear had come about in spring 1965, for instance memos by Rostow again show that the Israeli proliferation problem was not yet seen as solved more generally in the USG. He argued to Johnson that Israel's secrecy, the (unconfirmed) intelligence about a PU-plant, and its investments in SSMs sufficed to make the USG very worried. Thus it had to maintain leverage over Israel. He saw the general US-Israel relations as "the only counter big enough to sway Eshkol" in the nuclear issue, but the Israelis had so far been able to avoid a link to them. The key problem was that the Israelis wanted both a US security guarantee and independent military capabilities as an insurance policy; in case they would seek both *nuclear* weapons and a guarantee, great problems would ensue for the USG. "A much deeper understanding with them on the nuclear question" was necessary for a continuation of close US-Israel relations.<sup>444</sup>

US scientists visited the Dimona site in April, over a year after the previous visit. They still discovered no weapon effort or reprocessing plant. The visit did not disperse USG suspicions. To Rostow, enough question-marks remained "to make us want to avoid getting

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<sup>442</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 231-2 ref. to Péan 1981 (fn 21) p. 120. Also Green 1984 argues that by the 1967 war, Israel was capable of putting together and delivering nuclear weapons (p. 176). According to Hersh 1991 (pp. 162-6 ref. to interviews with former E/TA officials), E/TA reported at some point in 1966 that Israel was about to deploy nuclear warheads but Washington did not react.

<sup>443</sup> A-493 E/TA to DOS, 10 Feb 67, LBJL N/I VI Cb; T/142711 Rusk to Barbour, 23 Feb, USNA CFPF B/2914; D/391 (fn 440) FRUS 64-8:18 also fn 2 ref. to DepASOS/NEA Handley to Rusk, 22 Feb, with A-478 E/TA to DOS, 7 Feb, USNA CFPF AE 11-2 ISR (both reclassified by June 06), to Davies memo, 17 Feb, *ibid.* E 11-3 ISR, and to Barbour to Davies, 9 March, *ibid.*; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 298 ref. also to his 1997 interview with Helms.

<sup>444</sup> D/406 Rostow to Johnson, 18 Apr 67, FRUS 64-8:18; Rostow to Johnson, 20 Apr, LBJL N/I VI M1.

locked in too closely with Israel”; the USG had to consider “how closely we should identify ourselves with Israel in view of its unclear nuclear intentions and our interests in the Arab world”.<sup>445</sup> The NEA did argue that the visits provided enough clarity about activities at the Dimona site, but weapon efforts were thought to maybe take place elsewhere; suspicions were stirred by the still unverified reports about a PU-plant, an expected start to French SSMS deliveries in 1968, Israel’s secrecy about the Argentine uranium, and its rejection of IAEA safeguards on the Dimona reactor. Though the NEA had no proof of Israel producing nuclear weapons – much of its doings were “a closed book” to the US – it seemed to want an ability to do so because it feared to over time lose its conventional advantage over Arabs (though that was unlikely to happen for five years at least). It seemed Israel had maybe decided to reject advanced arms limitation unless Arabs accepted also *conventional* arms control.<sup>446</sup>

Nonetheless, arguing that progress on a NPT and the desalting plans made the time suited to pursue arms control, and as Cairo was making little progress on SSMS, in early May the NEA favored pressing Eshkol to stand by his word of giving up such efforts if Cairo did. To improve the US bargaining position, the NEA wanted to tie military and economic aid to Israel more closely to arms limitation. As the NPT seemed to offer a new opening on IAEA safeguards (assuming it included a strong safeguards clause), the NEA also aimed to consult soon with Israel and Egypt on the draft treaty.<sup>447</sup>

So far, the USG had discussed it with the Israelis less than with other potential early proliferants. It had briefed them on the NPT draft in March, but the Israelis had just said they would study it, and the USG did not know whether Israel would join the NPT. This was potentially critical: for instance Rostow saw Israel’s moves as a risk to the prospects of a NPT in general.<sup>448</sup> But before the USG started pressing Israel on the NPT, other issues took up the agenda with it.

### 9.8.2 The Six-Day War

In May-June 1967, the Middle East experienced another Arab-Israel crisis and war. This experience was important regarding US-Israel relations and the use of security cooperation in the USG effort to persuade Israel not to acquire nuclear weapons in that the limits of private, informal USG security assurances became clear for both sides and the USG saw concretely that it was the best for it to ensure that Israel was itself capable of defense against Arabs. Thus the crisis contributed to a growth in USG willingness to supply Israel with conventional arms.

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<sup>445</sup> D/416 (fn 436) FRUS 64-8:18.

<sup>446</sup> D/415 Katzenbach to Johnson, 1 May 67, *ibid*.

<sup>447</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>448</sup> Keeny to Rostow, 31 March 67, with ACDA “Status of non-proliferation consultations”, 29 March, LBJL S:NPT I 2; Rostow to Johnson, 18 and 20 Apr, LBJL N/I VI M1.

Cairo had repeatedly threatened with a preventive strike against Israel's nuclear program, but as discussed in section 5.4.1, risks of retaliation make such attacks rare. Especially as Israel was becoming able to produce nuclear weapons, the question arises what role its nuclear ambitions played in the UAR-Israel hostilities that erupted in spring 1967. Cohen argues they did not directly cause the 1967 war but contributed to the escalation of crisis as it seemed to Israel that Nasser might act on his threats of preventive war. In spring 1967, Israel's nuclear reactors did become key targets for Egypt in case of war and, in the latter half of May, Egypt made reconnaissance flights over the Dimona site. Maoz suggests these may have revealed heightened nuclear activity, indicating Israel maybe already had a bomb. Israel saw the flights as possible reconnaissance in preparation of an attack. At the same time, Egypt was moving its troops in the area and demanded the UN Emergency Forces (UNEF) to withdraw from the Sinai (they had been there since the Suez crisis). According to Cohen, in Israel all this strengthened fears of an attack especially on the Dimona plant and airfields and fuelled demands for pre-emption.<sup>449</sup>

A key issue in the crisis was Israel's access through the Straits of Tiran. After the 1956 Suez War, Israel had with Paris's help tried to get UN recognition for a right to ensure the freedom of passage, with force if necessary, and Israel had tied this issue to its withdrawal from areas it had occupied during the war. Its right of passage was confirmed, but the existence and nature of international guarantees for the right was less clear. The USG stance at the UN had been somewhat ambiguous, and it had publicly stated that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, passage through which no state was entitled to hinder, and that it was willing to *join* other states to ensure this was generally *recognized*. According to Isseroff, towards Israel it had also acknowledged Israel's right to open the Straits if it were closed.<sup>450</sup> But no explicit commitment about how *the USG* would try to help Israel ensure access thus existed.

In May 1967, the Israelis portrayed the 1957 US stance as a strong part of its assurances to them. But Rostow told them that though the US stood behind its words, this meant that if the UAR closed the Straits, the USG would consult with the GOI on how to react; it opposed premature action to ensure access.<sup>451</sup>

On 23 May, Nasser did close Israeli access through the Straits. Quandt argues he was encouraged to do so by the weak USG and Israeli reactions to the UNEF withdrawal (which in the US case resulted from preoccupation with Vietnam). Johnson publicly condemned Egypt's move as illegal.<sup>452</sup>

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<sup>449</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 266-72; Maoz 2003 pp. 53-4. According to Cohen, Israel deployed its first Hawks in 1965 close to the plant.

<sup>450</sup> See Eisenhower's statement, 20 Feb 57, PPE 35; Crosbie 1974 pp. 91-6; Isseroff 2007.

<sup>451</sup> See D/15 DOS circular tel., 18 May 67; D/25 DOS to E/TA on Harman-Rostow disc., 20 May, both FRUS 64-8:19; Johnson 1971 p. 291; Quandt 1977 pp. 41, 51-2.

<sup>452</sup> "A Summary of U.S. Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis May 15 - June 10, 1967" (n/a), n/d draft, USNA MC B/1; Johnson 1971 p. 291; Quandt 1977 pp. 41-3; Cohen, W. I. 1994 p. 299.

After mid-May, Johnson repeatedly wrote to Eshkol and Nasser, both to stress the US commitment to the integrity of all Middle East states and to demand them to do nothing that would heighten the crisis and make them guilty of starting war, and to Soviet Premier A. Kosygin, in favor of action to control the crisis and prevent violence. Kosygin in turn assured Johnson that Moscow tried to prevent a military conflict but would help the Arabs if Israel attacked them.<sup>453</sup>

At the same time, the Israelis complained to the USG about a weakening US commitment to Israel and in vain pressed for a clear, public USG statement about its will and ability to protect Israel, threatening otherwise with grave consequences. By early June, they argued that it was better for the US if Israel acted itself instead of counting on US action.<sup>454</sup>

Overall, USG stances in the crisis and its preparedness to take action were clearly affected by concern about risks of escalation and by the Congress's views. Johnson later noted that the potential in any Middle East crisis to escalate into general East-West confrontation made the crisis particularly worrisome. The USG approach was to try restrain Israel, avoid war that would make US support for it necessary, and use multilateral ways to get the Straits open. Also the Congress opposed unilateral US action. The USG probed into creating a multinational naval presence in the area to open the Straits, but this seemed to be an option only after all chances of UN action were exhausted, and many USG officials were skeptical about the idea. Especially because of the Vietnam War, the DOD opposed any action involving US forces. The USG supported London's proposal for a joint declaration by maritime powers on ensuring passage through the Straits, but by early June it seemed that other key states did not. Also possible ways to press both Jerusalem and Cairo for restraint were discussed in the USG. For instance, Johnson brought up the idea of sanctions through the International Monetary Fund and World Bank on both sides.<sup>455</sup>

The situation was for the USG complicated by a risk that opponents of Johnson's Vietnam policy in the Congress would at a critical moment oppose USG policies in the Middle East crisis. The opponents also used the crisis to justify demands to withdraw from Vietnam, arguing that the US could not handle simultaneous conflicts in both areas. According to McNamara, that was not true.<sup>456</sup>

In consultations in Washington on 25 May, Eban tried to extend the 1957 commitment to a US promise to *use force* to open the Straits. Johnson promised to do his best to get the

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<sup>453</sup> Rusk-Soviet official disc. with Kosygin to Johnson, 27 May 67, USNA MC B/14; T/203943 DOS to Barbour with Johnson to Eshkol, 27 May, DDRS; Crisis summary (fn 452); Quandt 1977 pp. 40, 42-3, 48-9; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 271-2.

<sup>454</sup> T/3648 Barbour to Rusk with Eshkol to Johnson, 18 May 67; T/3692 Barbour to DOS, 21 May, both USNA MC B/6 chron. Tel Aviv 3; Crisis summary (fn 452); Quandt 1977 pp. 40, 56, 58; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 271.

<sup>455</sup> Opening the Straits with force would have moreover required an anti-submarine unit, and the US had none close by. D/54 NSC mtg, 24 May 67, FRUS 64-8:19; Crisis summary (fn 452); Johnson 1971 pp. 288, 292-6; Quandt 1977 pp. 40-7; Cohen, W. I. 1994 pp. 299-301.

<sup>456</sup> D/54 (fn 455) FRUS 64-8:19; Johnson 1971 pp. 293-5.

Straits open but said that other moves would be considered only after chances of UN action were exhausted. He stressed that no presidential assurance for Israel helped unless the Americans and the Congress supported it but also that “Israel would not be alone unless it acted alone” – without promising any concrete (military) action.<sup>457</sup>

Based on US intelligence, Nasser did not seem to want war: Arab military power was insufficient and Moscow was expected to oppose aggression. But Israel appeared likely to act if other states did not move to open the Straits. It seemed strong enough to deal with the situation without direct US intervention and even to open the Straits, but only with large losses. Wheeler saw consideration of direct US intervention as required if prolonged warfare would take place.<sup>458</sup>

The risks of escalation depended on Moscow’s moves. Its public stance in the crisis was harder but private contacts indicated moderate attitudes. The CIA did not expect Moscow to use force against Western action to open the Straits or even if Israel attacked the UAR: it had limited capabilities to act in the area quickly, was hesitant to risk a military conflict with the US, and probably expected political intervention to prevent unacceptable Arab losses. Even in case of direct US intervention, Wheeler expected Moscow to keep out. But McNamara feared that after initial air warfare would use up Cairo’s supplies, Moscow would provide air support and Soviet personnel could become directly involved in warfare. The CIA thought that Moscow had already largely reached its key goal in the crisis: clearer US identification with Israel that “would further weaken the US position in the area, threaten US oil interests, and strengthen the Soviet position as friend and protector of all Arabs”.<sup>459</sup>

On 5 June, Israel pre-empted any potential UAR attack with aerial strikes that destroyed the bulk of Egypt’s air force within hours. The Israelis maybe thought Johnson tacitly accepted action by them, but it is debated whether this was what Johnson had aimed to indicate. It seems he thought the Israelis had promised the US one more week to find a solution before they would act and was upset by the move. But he only issued a statement that he was *disappointed* about the development – without portraying Israel as aggressor. Especially because of the risk of Moscow’s involvement, the USG continued to take care to avoid moves that would pull it into hostilities. As Moscow asked the USG to press Israel for a ceasefire, it agreed. A dangerous situation came about on 10 June when Moscow told

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<sup>457</sup> Crisis summary (fn 452); Quandt 1977 pp. 48-9, 51-2; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 271-2.

<sup>458</sup> D/54 (fn 455), D/79 CIA Board of National Estimates “The Middle Eastern Crisis”, 26 May 67, FRUS 64-8:19; Crisis summary (fn 452).

<sup>459</sup> D/54 (fn 455), D/79 (fn 458) FRUS 64-8:19; Crisis summary (fn 452). A recent book suggests that Moscow had Israel provoked into military action, aimed to destroy the Dimona plant after Israel would get the blame for aggression, planned an operation for this, but cancelled it as Israel’s campaign in the war was unexpectedly successful. Ginor & Remez 2007. This revisionist idea is challenged for instance by a forthcoming book that denies that Moscow would have sought a war. Ro’i & Morozov forthcoming. On Moscow’s role in the crisis and its outbreak, see also the debate Quandt’s review of G. Golan (2006) “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War”, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8:1, pp. 3-19 started on the H-Diplo -list in spring 2007 ([www.h-net.org/~diplo/](http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/)).

Johnson that it would intervene directly to stop Israel's action and Johnson ordered the 6<sup>th</sup> fleet closer to the area. But after this move, the situation between the superpowers and in the region quickly de-escalated.<sup>460</sup>

Israel had success also on the ground. By the ceasefire of 11 June, it seized huge areas from the Arabs. The GOI hoped Arabs to finally accept a peace settlement if Israel returned the occupied territories. But these remained opposed to the existence of Israel, turned down its peace proposal, and agreed on three no's towards it: no peace, recognition, or negotiations.<sup>461</sup>

During the war, Israel was concerned about the safety of the Dimona plant; it reportedly even shot down its own aircraft that was flying close to it<sup>462</sup>. Cohen argues it assembled and operationalized its first nuclear weapons on the eve of war when the GOI expected Egypt to attack and felt left alone: the USG gave it no strong support despite earlier promises and France even imposed an arms embargo on Israel.<sup>463</sup> But Cohen concludes and available US documents indicate that during the crisis, neither the US nor Egypt became *aware* of any Israeli nuclear weapons. As Cohen points out, making others aware would have been of little use for Israel: Moscow could have come to Egypt's help; the USG could have interpreted a secret revelation as blackmail and US-Israel relations could have suffered; and a few nuclear weapons were not enough for deterrence.<sup>464</sup>

The question about assembling nuclear weapons was anyway topical because the Dimona reactor had by now produced enough plutonium for a weapon. Other authors suggest that in its *post-war* isolation, when at least some Israelis saw their friends as untrustworthy and Soviet support for Arabs was growing, the GOI decided on the assembly of Israel's first

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<sup>460</sup> Crisis summary (fn 452); Transcript, H. McPherson, Jr. (Feldman's successor as the White House aide focused on Israeli issues) Oral History Interview 3, 16 Jan 69, by T. Baker, p. 25, LBJL (<http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/mcpherson/mcpher03.pdf>; 5 March 07); Johnson 1971 pp. 294-7, 302-3; Quandt 1977 pp. 60-3; Green 1984 pp. 200-1; Rusk 1991 p. 330; Schoenbaum 1993 p. 155; Cohen, W. I. 1994 pp. 300-4. Green suggests the USG "unleashed" Israel to take action since it was in its interest to embarrass Soviet-equipped Arabs, see how Eastern and Western weapon systems performed against each other, discredit Nasser, and maybe force Arabs to peace talks (pp. 198-9). He also maintains that the US in fact prolonged negotiations at the UN on a cease-fire resolution (pp. 201-2). But according to Rostow, the US position at the UNGA during the crisis was generally accepted as fair, which led to a "major political victory". Rostow to MCG "Stocktaking of Middle East Crisis of June 67", 22 Aug 67, USNA MECF B/1.

<sup>461</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 285.

<sup>462</sup> "German Magazine Says Israelis Have A-Bomb", *Washington Post*, 9 May 69; Hersh 1991 p. 131.

<sup>463</sup> See, e.g., Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 1, 274, and on Israeli disappointment with France, Crosbie 1974 pp. 190-4.

<sup>464</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 274-6. Maoz 2003 argues it is on the contrary unlikely that Israel operationalized nuclear weapons during the war since if it did, it would have been likely to threaten Nasser with them, and even if its goal would have been to blackmail the US, operationalization would have made sense only if it was made known to Arabs (pp. 53-5). But it is possible Israel did so secretly, as Cohen suggests, as a precautionary measure in case the Arabs advanced to its heartland or to move the weapons to safety if signs of a strike at nuclear sites appeared. Early in the crisis, threatening with them would have been disproportionate, and later no need to do so existed. Moreover, Israel could have silently tried to blackmail the US for help by threatening to go openly nuclear. But no indication exists that it did.

nuclear weapons. For instance Hersh argues that at least the “mass” production of warheads started in early 1968.<sup>465</sup>

The war probably resulted from miscalculations and incomplete or incorrect information about the other side’s aims and actions. Cohen concludes that Nasser’s wish to boost his position among Arabs primarily motivated him into provocations, though he maybe hoped a chance to attack the Dimona plant to appear in the course of events. He probably did not want war and hoped diplomatic intervention to keep the crisis from escalating.<sup>466</sup>

Available USG documents related to the crisis seldom mention nuclear weapons and give the impression that the nuclear issue played little direct role in it. One CIA memo mentions that one reason why Nasser gave up “his long-standing reluctance to risk military confrontation with Israel” may have been a belief that “showdown with Israel must come sooner or later, and might best be provoked before Israel acquired nuclear weapons”<sup>467</sup>. In May, the NSC briefly discussed whether unconventional arms existed in the area. Helms argued with some certainty that nuclear weapons did not; Wheeler was less sure<sup>468</sup>. An undated USG memo noted neither side yet had “operational advanced weapons”<sup>469</sup>.

After the war, the DOS was concerned that the experience of the war would make Israel change its nuclear weapon and missile policies (indicating no knowledge of changes so far). Barbour reported that he had not discussed the matter with the Israelis during the crisis and the press had not speculated on it. He thought that the Israelis would maintain a nuclear *option* but had made no recent big decisions about nuclear weapons and had little early reason to start producing them or missiles.<sup>470</sup>

Also another USG report gives the impression that Israel’s going nuclear was seen as no immediate prospect. During the conflict, a Middle East Control Group (MCG) with DOS, DOD, White House, CIA, and Treasury participation was established for the management of the crisis and development of a policy for peace in the area, and Johnson set up a NSC Special Committee (NSCSC) with his top men to coordinate US policy.<sup>471</sup> After the war, the NSCSC felt a need for “a better picture of the nuclear problem” in the area<sup>472</sup>. A MCG paper prepared soon afterwards noted that Israel and the UAR “*do not, of course, have nu-*

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<sup>465</sup> Pry 1984 pp. 21-2; Hersh 1991 pp. 175-9. Pry writes Israel probably went nuclear “by or before the early 1970s” (p. 29).

<sup>466</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 262-5 (on different explanations for the war, pp. 259-64); Steinberg 2000 p. 46; Maoz 2003 pp. 53, 59-60. Steinberg argues the war wanted by none resulted from “brinkmanship and competitive risk-taking” (p. 47).

<sup>467</sup> D/79 (fn 458) FRUS 64-8:19.

<sup>468</sup> D/54 (fn 455) *ibid.*

<sup>469</sup> “Contingency Planning on Arab-Israel Crisis” (n/a), n/d, with Att. 8) “Israeli capabilities”, AHP B/432 Arab-Israel 2.

<sup>470</sup> T/215923 DOS to E/TA, 24 June 67, USNA MC B/6 chron. Tel Aviv 3; D/326 Barbour to DOS, 27 June, FRUS 64-8:19. Hersh 1991 argues that Barbour told after the war his staff to stop reporting on Israel’s nuclear ambitions because Israel was an important ally of the US (pp. 160-8 ref. to his 1989-91 interviews with former Embassy officials).

<sup>471</sup> D/148 MCG mtg, 4 June 67, FRUS 64-8:19; NSC History, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc>; 1 May 07.

<sup>472</sup> D/281 Bundy on NSCSC mtg, 13 June 67, FRUS 64-8:19.



*clear weapons*”; also no claims to the contrary had been made. Israel was thought not to have decided to produce them before the crisis but only to want to maintain the option. According to the MCG, the Dimona reactor had produced enough plutonium for a weapon, but the spent fuel had neither gone through separation nor been returned to France. Contrary to earlier intelligence reports, Israel was for some reason thought to have *no* PU-plant “completed or in any advanced state of construction.” Building one and separating plutonium was estimated to take 1,5 years, after which Israel would be able to make about one weapon per year. Arabs had no ability to produce nuclear arms. Both sides had nuclear-capable aircraft, but because the vulnerability of such forces had been shown, missiles were likely to be the key delivery means for any nuclear weapons. The MCG expected “the nuclear factor” not to affect the UAR-Israel conflict early, but if no political settlement was reached, over time the conflict was likely to push both sides towards such weapons and maybe make Israel reject dependency on foreign military support.<sup>473</sup>

The MCG noted that if Israel went nuclear, that was likely to become known at some point and to infuriate Arabs. These were incapable of following suit early but expected to possibly build up conventional forces and get chemical weapons or even “strike Israel before it could build up a nuclear arsenal” – a little surprising expectation taking into account the massive Arab losses in the latest war. It seemed possible that Arabs would bend towards Moscow to get any “hedged Soviet pledges of nuclear support” they could. But Moscow was unlikely to station nuclear weapons in Arab states. As it had given them no direct military help during the war and wanted to avoid risks of nuclear confrontation with the US, it was possible that Arabs would try to get nuclear arms from China, which could see here a chance to increase its influence in the world.<sup>474</sup>

The memo argued that though action against proliferation in the area was increasingly needed, the US was now clearly less able to credibly reassure Arabs and Israel that the other side was not going nuclear. Possible ways to avoid proliferation were 1) clear non-nuclear pledges verified through IAEA controls by both sides as a part of a general settlement; but seeking this would have complicated the difficult road to a settlement and was rather an option for the future; 2) a NWFZ, which had the problem of coverage; and 3) both sides adhering to a NPT. Cairo had accepted the idea of a NPT with safeguards; Israel was “conspicuously silent”. Both sides’ stance towards non-nuclear promises was expected to much depend on the prospects of a general settlement, and Israel was thought to agree to abandon the nuclear option only if its long-term security was ensured.<sup>475</sup>

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<sup>473</sup> My emphasis. The paper noted that during the conflict, Moscow made no kind of nuclear or missile threats; instead, it and the USG consulted to avoid direct involvement. D/305 MCG to NSCSC “The Nuclear Factor In the Near Eastern Situation” with “Indigenous Capabilities to Develop Nuclear Weapons”, n/d (mid-June 1967), *ibid.*

<sup>474</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>475</sup> *Ibid.*

Still in June 1967, the USG saw tying a potential desalting project to Israeli acceptance of full IAEA safeguards also as one option. But thereafter, it abandoned the idea: in the fall, it saw instead Israeli cooperation regarding the Jordan waters as the key quid pro quo in a desalting project.<sup>476</sup>

After the war, rumors that Israel was building or had nuclear weapons spread in the Arab world and, referring to authoritative Israeli sources, also Western press reported that Israel was moving to this direction. Cohen suggests the GOI wanted to change the perception of Israel's nuclear status after it had become clear that the very ambiguous nuclear status had not deterred Arabs and Egypt was no longer capable of preventive attacks.<sup>477</sup> He also argues that as no pressing need now existed for the US to prevent a preventive attack by reassuring Cairo, the CIA office in Israel came to prefer stopping the visits to Dimona as these were "becoming an embarrassment for both governments"<sup>478</sup>.

In addition to being now unable to early threaten Israel militarily because of the nuclear issue, Egypt could not compete with it in the nuclear field: it used all available resources to re-build its forces and the nuclear program was as good as abandoned. Levite suggests Nasser and his successors decided not to seriously pursue nuclear weapons because of economic and technical issues, Israeli counterproliferation action, and carrots and sticks by the USG, probably including assurances of Israeli non-introduction.<sup>479</sup>

### 9.8.3 Growing pressure for US arms sales to Israel

The war, where Israel acted on its own and the US tried to avoid direct involvement, helped to clarify the US-Israel security relationship. Growing Soviet arms supply to Arabs after the war contributed to the same process. From Israeli *and* US perspectives, Israel had to be kept strong enough in conventional terms to deal with Arab threats on its own: for the USG, this was a way both to avoid a direct role in regional hostilities and to prevent Israel from going nuclear; Israel wanted not to depend on possibly unreliable foreign commitments. One consequence of the 1967 crisis was thus greater USG preparedness to supply Israel with arms.

<sup>476</sup> In early 1968 memos on desalting to Johnson, IAEA safeguards were not mentioned. Ibid.; Saunders to Rostow, 20 Nov 67, LBJL N/I VII M1; D/32 Secretary of the Interior Udall & Seaborg to Johnson, 3 Jan 68; D/33 Rostow to Johnson (san.), 5 Jan, both FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>477</sup> "Israel Said to Plan to Make Atom Bomb", *NYT*, 14 June 67; D/508 DOS to M/UN on King Hussein's comments to Rusk, 8 Nov, FRUS 64-8:19; Pry 1984 p. 30; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 6, 279, 281 ref. also to "An A-Bomb for Israel", *Newsweek*, 17 July.

<sup>478</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 214 ref. to his 1996 interview with former US intelligence officer.

<sup>479</sup> Cohen suggests that it was beneficial for Cairo that Israel did not declare its nuclear capability as this enabled it to ignore the fact and thus continue rejecting peace efforts. Moreover, as McPeak points out, had Israel declared it, the Arabs might have seen it unavoidable to acquire one, too, and this could have led to dangers based on the initial asymmetries, uncertainties, and vulnerability of nuclear arsenals. McPeak 1976 pp. 436-7; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 289; Levite 2002 pp. 63-4; Einhorn 2004 p. 47. Moreover, after the Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979, US-Egyptian security cooperation (incl. large US economic and military aid, major arms sales, and joint military exercises, contingency planning, and weapon production) further reduced Cairo's incentives for a nuclear weapon effort (see pp. 48-9).

Restoring the armaments of Middle East states in general was now a central issue for the USG, especially as Moscow used the Arabs' defeat to strengthen its position among them and clearly increased both its military presence in the area and aid to help them to replace material losses<sup>480</sup>. Thus the USG was pressed to sell arms to friendly Arab regimes. Israel continued to need some US weapons, but after the experience that both France and the US had halted military supply to the area during the war, Israel saw self-sufficiency as increasingly important, according to Cohen also in the form of domestic arms development and nuclear weapons. The USG let the Israelis know that after early July, the US arms freeze was kept up primarily because of congressional debates over arms sales, and Cohen notes that these saw the US as a more reliable supplier than France.<sup>481</sup> Israel and its friends came to press the USG to lift the freeze on arms supply to Israel and to sell it aircraft. As before, they objected to the idea of re-opening US arms supply to friendly Arab states. But supply especially to Jordan was again important for the USG since Moscow had offered full restoration of Jordan's forces in return for its becoming Jordan's sole supplier.<sup>482</sup>

A report of a DOS/DOD strategy study group and a paper by Rostow on the crisis offer insights into general USG thinking about the area. The memos show that in the USG, the whole situation was largely seen in terms of global East-West competition (Rostow even saw the latest crisis as basically one between Moscow and NATO). Moscow had much improved its position in the area since the late 1950s and was likely to try to further improve it until some stability (as in Europe) was reached, using Arab hostility towards Israel, military aid, and undermining of unfriendly regimes for its benefit. This was a problem for the US especially regarding the key issue of "the security and orientation of Western Europe": Moscow obscured the threat it posed to the area with *détente* rhetoric but threatened it indirectly through the southeast Mediterranean region, which thus became "a field of competition beyond which lie the ultimate targets of Europe and the worldwide position of the United States". As Europe was dependent on oil and London on its financial interests in the Middle East, Europe could be neutralized and NATO endangered unless the US maintained access to the area and its oil. *Any* setback to Moscow was in turn thought to benefit the US. The growing Soviet role in the area also bore a risk of Moscow becoming directly involved in regional hostilities and the USG becoming forced to decide whether to confront it directly.<sup>483</sup>

Though Moscow's dominance among Arabs had to be prevented, American feelings implied that the US had to ensure Israel's security. To somehow promote these partially conflicting goals, a general regional strategy that the DOS-DOD group proposed on the one

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<sup>480</sup> See "Stocktaking ..." (fn 460).

<sup>481</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 22 Sep 67, LBJL N/I VII M3; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 286-7. French companies and the military evaded de Gaulle's arms embargo on Israel to a large extent. See Crosbie 1974 p. 197.

<sup>482</sup> See, e.g., D/457 Saunders to Rostow, 4 Oct 67; D/458 DOS to E/TA, 7 Oct; D/463 Rostow to Johnson, 9 Oct, all FRUS 64-8:19; Saunders to Rostow, 17 Oct, with Eban-McNamara mtg, 14 Oct, LBJL N/I VII M3.

<sup>483</sup> D/22 DOS-DOD study group "Near East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa: a Recommended American Strategy", 17 July 67, FRUS 64-8:21; "Stocktaking ..." (fn 460).

hand included a smaller “public U.S. role in Arab-Israeli relations” and thus giving no general assurances “for the territorial integrity and political independence of all area states”. On the other hand, the memo shows that the US arms policy towards Israel was changing. Since 1) Israel’s moves were decisive for the proliferation prospects in the area (Arabs were expected to pursue nuclear weapons only if it did); 2) it was able to produce nuclear weapons fairly soon; and 3) a deteriorating conventional balance was a reason for it to pursue them, the group wanted the USG both to press it hard on safeguards and nuclear and missile limitation and maybe quietly promise to ensure its conventional advantage through arms supply from Western Europe and, if necessary, the US.<sup>484</sup> But the departments still wanted to avoid the US *itself* becoming Israel’s *main* arms supplier<sup>485</sup>.

The lack of a clear US security guarantee for Israel was now obvious to everybody. Israel’s stance was that all foreign commitments for its security had proven weak and would thus have a clearly less prominent role in its strategy; it needed an own capability to deter Arab aggression. The DOS confirmed to it that no *specific* US commitment to Israel’s security existed and in late 1967, Johnson said in public that though the USG was by now means indifferent towards Israel, the two had no binding security treaty.<sup>486</sup> Naturally, in order not to strain relations to the Congress, which opposed new commitments (and would have had to ratify any formal alliance treaty), the USG could anyway not publicly or formally stress the value of any private commitments. Its position was that it had tried to prevent the war and would not have let Israel to be beaten, that Israel did not ask for help, and that its dealing with the situation alone had been good for both states – thus acknowledging Israel’s need for self-reliance<sup>487</sup>.

FRUS documents show that also in the USG, it was clearly seen that especially owing to the Congress’s stances, the conflict had shown that USG assurances for Israel were of limited value. Bundy, who had left his position as National Security aide but was now a special consultant on the crisis, said in a USG meeting that the crisis and US stances during it raised the question of “how firm is the US commitment to Israel”. It was noted that no USG commitments had Congress’s backing. McNamara argued “Israelis won’t ever depend on guarantees. Eban [had been] given lesson in US constitutional processes, and he won’t forget it.”<sup>488</sup>

Bundy told also Eban in July 1967 that the war had been an upsetting experience for the USG as it had been unable to give such guarantees as Israel asked for and it became clear

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<sup>484</sup> The group did not favor conventional arms control efforts: as Moscow seemed to lack interest in such, also the US was to use arms supply for its benefit. Rostow argued that arms supply to Israel could also be a way to increase Moscow’s interest in arms limitation. D/22 (fn 483) FRUS 64-8:21; “Stocktaking ...” (fn 460).

<sup>485</sup> Saunders to Rostow, 31 Aug 67, LBJL N/1 VII M3.

<sup>486</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 12 Sep 67, *ibid.*; Rostow to Johnson, 25 Sep, with 19 Sep Goldberg-Eban mtg; Saunders to Rostow, 27 Sep, with Aide mémoire from Eban, 30 Aug, both *ibid.* 2; Saunders (fn 482) with mtg memo; Johnson’s interview, 19 Dec, PPJ 554.

<sup>487</sup> See Rostow (fn 481), 22 Sep 67; Saunders (fn 482) with mtg memo.

<sup>488</sup> D/280 NSCSC mtg, 13 June 67; D/281 Bundy’s mtg memo, both FRUS 64-8:19.

that all its assurances had their limits (it is of course possible that towards the Israelis, the USG sought to put the blame for US inaction on the Congress). He stressed that the US was very interested in ensuring Israel's defense and had accepted for several years, and now saw even more clearly, that only Israel's ability to defend itself relieved the US from a need to make hard decisions. But he said that if the USG ensured Israel's defense strength, it would in return demand concessions regarding the nuclear issue and, e.g., preventing Soviet arms supply to Jordan. Eban was forthcoming on other conditions but did not comment on the nuclear issue. Bundy thought that on it, the US would have to press Israel very hard.<sup>489</sup>

Though the USG wanted *quid pro quos* for any arms supply, Saunders wrote to Rostow that the DOS and the DOD did not seem willing to make enough arms sales to make a bargain on nuclear restraint or a peace settlement possible. E. Evron of the Israeli Embassy told the USG that it could achieve more if it did not present formal conditions but let the Israelis informally know it had certain expectations in return for arms sales and thus finally treated them as friends.<sup>490</sup> But instead of being marked by true friendship, US-Israeli relations according to Warren Cohen came just to worsen during the rest of Johnson's term<sup>491</sup>.

In early 1968, Eshkol came to the US, having interest especially in F-4 Phantom aircraft. The US agenda for talks included beyond the peace process also nuclear weapons, SSMs, and the NPT. In their meetings, Johnson promised Eshkol more Skyhawks and a Phantom decision during 1968. Avner Cohen argues he did not tie these to the NPT, which Eshkol did not fully reject, either. According to a memo by Rostow, Johnson wanted regional arms limitation probes to be made with Moscow and Arabs before he would agree to sell the Phantoms.<sup>492</sup>

A DOS memo still argued that the Dimona visits had made the USG quite but not fully certain that Israel had no nuclear weapon program, though it was likely to maintain the option for the unlikely cases of a deteriorating conventional balance and Arabs' going nuclear.<sup>493</sup> Similarly, an available intelligence assessment only referred to a *possibility* of Israel one day deciding to go nuclear. Israel had unsafeguarded fuel and "most of the facilities necessary for a small nuclear weapons program". On its own, it was able to test a weapon two

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<sup>489</sup> Bundy-Harriman-Eban mtg, 5 July 67, LBJL NSF NSCSC B/1 chron.

<sup>490</sup> Saunders to Rostow, 31 Aug and 12 Sep 67, LBJL N/I VII M3. Some DOS officers wanted to demand SSM restraint in return for aircraft sales. The Israelis said that flexibility existed in their SSMs plans and they only needed SSMs if the UAR got such: aircraft was more important for Israel. See Saunders to Rostow, 13 Sep, *ibid*.

<sup>491</sup> Cohen, W. I. 1994 pp. 305-6.

<sup>492</sup> Saunders to Rostow (san.), 29 Dec 67; Rostow to Johnson (san.), 5 Jan 68; Summary of Johnson-Eshkol mtg 7-8 Jan (san.), 8 Jan, all DDRS; Rostow "Follow-up items from the Israeli visit", 9 Jan, LBJL N/I XI 2 CM; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 295-7 ref. to his 1996 interview with General Hod. In mtg memos available in DDRS and FRUS, the nuclear issue and the NPT are not mentioned.

<sup>493</sup> DOS "The Nuclear Issue and Sophisticated Weapons", 2 Jan 68, DDRS.

years after a decision to do so and to *acquire* a PU-plant and to have a warhead for its missiles in 3,5 years. Testing was maybe not needed if it had received foreign weapon data.<sup>494</sup>

But according to later accounts by physicist E. Teller and former CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology C. Duckett, in spring 1968 the CIA came to think that Israel had already produced nuclear weapons. The assessment, which has not been found in USG documents, was based primarily on the views of Teller, who had close contact with Israelis and expected Israel not to make a public nuclear test; the USG still lacked proof that the Dimona site was used for weapon activities. Duckett later testified that Johnson was informed of the CIA view but kept it secret even from Rusk and McNamara. Cohen suggests this was because he did not want to harm the NPT negotiations and US standing in the eyes of Arabs, to whom the USG had made reassurances about the Dimona site.<sup>495</sup> According to him, in summer 1968 Helms also gave Johnson several reports that concluded that it would be hard for Israel to join the NPT. Also these reports were not disseminated in the USG.<sup>496</sup>

Primarily owing to the Vietnam War, on 31 March Johnson announced that he would not run for a second term – the initially limited domestic opposition to his Vietnam policy had been gradually growing until a communist offensive in Vietnam led in February to loud questioning of the war in the US; also McNamara, who had turned to oppose the war, stepped down. In the USG, Johnson's thus increased personal freedom of action even vis-à-vis the Israeli lobby was seen to enable new approaches to Middle East issues, though his pro-Israel feelings precluded major changes.<sup>497</sup>

Though a year's distance between visits to Dimona gave Israel a chance to discharge fuel loads frequently without it being noticed, it seems that the USG had abandoned hope of more frequent visits. On 30 Apr, Johnson authorized a request for another visit after Rostow wrote to him that Israel had also so far accepted visits a little over a year apart. Rostow argued a visit was "more important than ever": until spring 1967, the USG had been fairly sure Israel was not trying to produce weapon material at the site since it had to return the spent fuel to France, but in late 1967, signs had appeared of it running the reactor with unsafeguarded Argentine uranium. This meant that Israel had more use for a large PU-separation plant, though there was still no proof it had one. A visit was also a way to demonstrate that the USG really was against Israel's going nuclear.<sup>498</sup> In late June, US scientists got to make another visit to the site<sup>499</sup>.

As discussed in the next section, the NPT was in the meanwhile starting to become reality.

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<sup>494</sup> CIA with DOS/INR & DIA "The Arab-Israeli Handbook", 15 Jan 68, USNA MC B/11 pp. 43-4.

<sup>495</sup> Duckett's testimony for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Feb 78, DNSA NP01567; Hersh 1991 pp. 186-8 ref. to his 1991 interview with Duckett; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 297-8 ref. to his 1996 interview with Teller; D/130 EN FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>496</sup> D/1 Saunders to NSCES Smith, n/d, NSA EBB IB:Misc.; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 308 ref. also to his 1996 interview with Helms.

<sup>497</sup> D/129 Saunders to Rostow, 1 Apr 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>498</sup> D/156 Rostow to Johnson, 30 Apr 68, *ibid*.

<sup>499</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 300.

Though the Six-Day War and its aftermaths had further delayed any USG effort to persuade Israel to join the treaty, the question now became topical. As pressure to change the arms policy towards Israel was mounting, USG officials sought to tie a change to Israel's joining the NPT. This effort I consider in section 9.10.

## **9.9 Towards the nonproliferation treaty**

As many states were criticizing various aspects of the superpowers' NPT drafts, in fall 1967 Fisher argued that the NPT was "already somewhat over-ripe"; quick progress on it was needed<sup>500</sup>. The prospect of the CNNWS added to urgency for the superpowers, but the US got the conference postponed from spring to fall 1968 and thus created a chance for UNGA consideration of the NPT before it<sup>501</sup>.

Though unwilling to change the key content of the NPT, the superpowers wanted to make also non-aligned states *feel* involved in making it. For tactical reasons, the USG thus sometimes told both Moscow and its allies that though it as such accepted their proposals for changes to NPT drafts, it favored leaving it to the non-aligned to propose changes. It also tried to guide non-aligned demands to the inclusion of clauses it was anyway not opposed to.<sup>502</sup> Thus it tried to benefit from imperfect information by bargaining away for benefit anyway forthcoming concessions.

### **9.9.1 Final negotiation rounds**

Having reached a compromise on both the nondissemination prohibition and safeguards, in early 1968 the superpowers presented full, identical drafts for a NPT. Articles 1-3 remained practically unchanged, while negotiations on other articles continued, with focus on, e.g., disarmament, guarantees against nuclear blackmail, and treaty revision. Bonn's stance was that though the draft was better than earlier ones, it wanted the treaty to be more flexible, in which its duration and especially review and amendment procedures that enabled adapting it to future developments were central.<sup>503</sup>

Especially many non-aligned states wanted the NPT to include an obligation to nuclear disarmament and a notion that progress on it would be considered in periodic review conferences. Italy even proposed allowing NNWSs to withdraw from the NPT after a review if no

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<sup>500</sup> ACDA/NPT p. 335.

<sup>501</sup> D/214 Foster-Dobrynin mtg, 2 Nov 67, FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT pp. 402-3.

<sup>502</sup> It seems Moscow used similar tactics. See, e.g., D/225 Fisher to Rusk, 28 Jan 68, FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT pp. 182, 223.

<sup>503</sup> T/7559 E/B to Rusk, 24 Jan 68, LBJL S:NPT II 1; Seaborg 1987 pp. 301-2; Küntzel 1992 pp. 181, 184.

progress had taken place. NNWSs proposed especially such disarmament measures as a fissile material cutoff, a CTBT, and a freeze on the number of strategic delivery systems.<sup>504</sup>

Also Bonn portrayed inclusion in a NPT of a link to disarmament (including some reductions in nuclear forces) as NNWSs' legitimate interest and a way to make a NPT more balanced<sup>505</sup>. It seems to have considered a clause about evaluating progress on disarmament in review conferences as a potential emergency exit from the NPT: it inquired whether NNWSs could withdraw if no progress was made. Foster answered Amb. Knappstein that "such states might take this view".<sup>506</sup> As Bonn's security policy was based on nuclear deterrence, nuclear disarmament beyond a point that would affect the US extended deterrent was not in its interest (unless the security environment radically changed), though cut-down in Soviet forces aimed at the FRG were that. But a disarmament clause was useful for Bonn in that if Moscow came to blame it of non-compliance, it had the option of in return complaining about lacking progress in disarmament and possibly even opposing an extension of the NPT. It also demanded pursuing of conventional disarmament together with nuclear disarmament<sup>507</sup>.

The solution to the disarmament issue was that under the NPT, states undertake "to *pursue negotiations in good faith* on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Considering the tradition of propagandistic Soviet and US proposals for general disarmament, the inclusion of such notions is not surprising. The clause was somewhat strengthened in that the operation of the NPT could be reviewed in periodic conferences "with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised"; the preamble listed as one aim of the treaty "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament".<sup>508</sup>

The commitment to disarmament is not fully binding: as the marked passage shows, states commit themselves just to an attempt to negotiate. The USG stance was that it supported the demanded disarmament measures as such but, similarly as Moscow, did not want them to be tied to the NPT. But to make others less likely to exit the NPT and to dampen demands for disarmament, it supported the idea of review conferences.<sup>509</sup>

<sup>504</sup> UNGA Res. 2028/XX, 19 Nov 65; ACDA/NPT pp. 72-3, 154, 162, 238, 245, 254; Seaborg 1987 pp. 366-9. On the relation of arms control, especially the NPT, to disarmament, and NNWSs' and NWSs' stances on this in NPT negotiations, see Kohler 1972 pp. 27-38.

<sup>505</sup> E/B to DOS on Foster-Schröder disc, 3 July 65, LBJL NPT II (only p. 1); Denkschrift (fn 374), 7 Apr 67.

<sup>506</sup> DOS to E/B on Foster-Knappstein disc., 18 Jan 67, LBJL S:NPT I 1.

<sup>507</sup> See Brandt 1968b p. 751; Cioc 1988 p. 188. On the relation of the disarmament clause to West German security policy, see Fischer 1988.

<sup>508</sup> My emphasis. NPT Preamble, Art. 6 & 8, 1 July 68. The question of progress on disarmament became a key source of dispute in the conferences, and the tie has enabled some to argue that in the absence of disarmament, the NPT loses force. The tie was hardly in US interest, but probably the USG saw it as necessary for making NNWSs accept the NPT.

<sup>509</sup> ACDA/NPT pp. 47, 73, 254, 265-6; Seaborg 1987 pp. 367-9.



Bonn expressed worry about the possibility of the GDR attending review conferences, but the USG aimed to deal with the issue by reserving a right to object if the GDR sought to do so. To avoid recognition issues in general, the NPT came to follow the PTBT solution with three depository powers.<sup>510</sup>

Several NNWSs also demanded negative or even positive guarantees against nuclear threats from NWSs. But they differed in what kind of guarantees they wanted, if any: for instance NATO states generally opposed universal guarantees, which they feared to decrease the value and strength of NATO guarantees, and several non-aligned states considered positive guarantees that would promise action on their behalf incompatible with their foreign policy line.<sup>511</sup> While favoring inclusion in a NPT of a clause against nuclear blackmail, also Bonn opposed universal guarantees to NNWSs<sup>512</sup>.

But Bonn demanded further US nuclear guarantees for the FRG and a veto over US nuclear weapons stationed in the FRG. Whereas the USG was considering to offer a veto, it was unwilling to give further guarantees and argued that any such measures had to be (and in case of the veto, were being) considered in NATO, not in NPT negotiations.<sup>513</sup> Bonn also wanted to have NATO reaffirmed when the NPT was signed; the USG agreed (only) to say publicly that it was fully behind its existing defense commitments<sup>514</sup>.

The USG also refused to include security assurances in the NPT as such or to make new binding security commitments in general. It was only willing to make unbinding declarations at the UNSC about not threatening non-nuclear NPT states with nuclear weapons (assuming these did not act aggressively with NWS support) and helping NNWSs threatened by nuclear weapons.<sup>515</sup> In practice, such assurances did not commit it more than the UN Charter did<sup>516</sup>. Kohler notes that Soviet and Senate stances indeed pushed the USG to gradually back down from its broad, though ambiguous, assurance against nuclear threats after China's first nuclear test to more limited promises<sup>517</sup>.

Though many of its demands had been met, Bonn still in spring 1968 expressed unhappiness about the NPT, resorting to the old argument that it wanted to make no security-

<sup>510</sup> See T/7872 McGhee to Rusk, 6 Jan 67; DOS to E/B, 9 Jan, both LBJL S:NPT I 1; NPT Art. 9, 1 July 68.

<sup>511</sup> Fischer 1988 pp. 78-9, 89. On the security guarantee issue in NPT negotiations, see Kohler 1972; Seaborg 1987 pp. 371-3.

<sup>512</sup> E/B (fn 505), 3 July 65; Fischer 1988 p. 89 (on potential general security guarantees related to the NPT and their effect on the FRG, see pp. 75-92). The USG argued towards Bonn that its close allies did not need to worry about blackmail. D/180 (fn 359) FRUS 64-8:11.

<sup>513</sup> D/189 Fisher to Rusk with memo to Johnson, 5 March 67, FRUS 64-8:11; ACDA/NPT pp. 171, 183-4.

<sup>514</sup> T/192372 DOS to E/B, 27 June 68, LBJL S:NPT II 1; Johnson at NPT signing ceremony, 1 July, PPJ 349.

<sup>515</sup> D/163 Katzenbach to Johnson & Rusk (Emb. Seoul), 31 Oct 66; D/239 US-USSR mtg, 17 May 68, both FRUS 64-8:11. The USG told the Soviets that it preferred to give the assurances in a UNSC resolution instead of a unilateral declaration since a 2/3 Senate majority was needed for the latter. D/198 (fn 416) *ibid*. The need to reach Senate approval of the NPT probably explains why the USG did not want to include the assurances in the treaty.

<sup>516</sup> See D/229 NSC mtg, 27 March 68, and also D/223 M/G to DOS on Foster-Roshchin mtg, 15 Dec 67, FRUS 64-8:11; Lauk 1979 p. 86.

<sup>517</sup> Kohler 1972 pp. 90-2.

related commitment towards Moscow and complaining that it felt *forced* to sign the NPT. It still suggested a number of changes, such as stronger clauses on nuclear disarmament and against blackmailing and greater procedural flexibility. As a precondition for its signature, it demanded also a Four-Power guarantee for the land route to Berlin.<sup>518</sup> Publicly, Brandt argued that the FRG would welcome “an acceptable” NPT<sup>519</sup>.

But seeing an urgent need for progress on the NPT, partially owing to the expected CNNWS, the superpowers’ willingness to change the NPT had run out. The USG pushed for a quick UNGA vote on it. In its view, Bonn had had enough chances to influence the NPT, and it warned Bonn that if the FRG failed to join the NPT and instead acquired nuclear weapons, NATO and possibly the FRG itself could be destroyed.<sup>520</sup> To Schröder’s comment in July that Bonn still had problems with the NPT (Schröder said he hoped Bonn to be able to consider it favorably after the CNNWS), Johnson expressed surprise: his understanding was “the Germans had practically written the Treaty as it stands now”<sup>521</sup>.

### 9.9.2 Limitations of the treaty and the possibility of Israel joining it

The USG recognized that the NPT would not eliminate proliferation pressures and that a number of states would anyway ensure capabilities to develop nuclear weapons quickly if need be. The NPT allowed them to do so: under it, states could produce and stockpile safeguarded nuclear fuel and had chances to gain know-how useful for weapon efforts in civilian, non-nuclear military, and permitted nuclear military activities such as warship propulsion. Several states were likely to become able to produce a nuclear weapon within one year.<sup>522</sup> As Levite argues, the NPT indeed meant forgoing nuclear weapon *production* for the sake of a *latent* nuclear strategy. Because of the exit clause in the NPT, Quester even suggests that safeguards included in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements were a higher hurdle to proliferation than the NPT.<sup>523</sup>

The DOS/PPC saw the US as unable to do much to prevent proliferation. Threatening with sanctions was possibly counterproductive and the US was unwilling to give further security guarantees in order not to tie its hands and to avoid entrapment in unnecessary conflicts, maybe against the USSR. Conventional arms aid and strengthening existing guarantees by cooperating on “defensive nuclear forces” were possible nonproliferation policies. Any re-

<sup>518</sup> FRG talking points for call by US Amb. Lodge, 11 Apr 68, PAA R/305/II A6B32 273 094-5; D/262 DOS memo for NSC, 5 May, FRUS 64-8:15; Küntzel 1992 pp. 185-8.

<sup>519</sup> Brandt 1968a p. 485.

<sup>520</sup> D/229 (fn 516); D/239 (fn 515); D/240 Keeny to Rostow, 24 May 68, all FRUS 64-8:11; D/248 (fn 350); D/262 (fn 518) FRUS 64-8:15; Preisinger 1993 p. 151.

<sup>521</sup> D/284 Johnson-Schröder mtg, 24 July 68, FRUS 64-8:15. A DOS memo noted the US had since Jan 1967 consulted Bonn hundreds of times on the NPT. D/262 (fn 518) *ibid.* Foster argued Bonn “had written half of the treaty”. D/229 (fn 516) FRUS 64-8:11.

<sup>522</sup> These issues are pointed out in Owen to Rostow, 9 July 68, with DOS/PPC “After NPT, What?”, 28 May, LBJL S:NPT II 1.

<sup>523</sup> Quester 1972 p. 494; Levite 2002 p. 73. On that the NPT was no panacea to proliferation, see also Quester 1967.

duction in US involvement in the world was in turn thought to further fuel proliferation. But as also prestige was seen as a key reason for nuclear ambitions, security assistance was not expected to prevent proliferation in all cases.<sup>524</sup>

Cohen points out that the possibilities to develop even an advanced capability to produce nuclear weapons under the NPT meant that it was not impossible that Israel would join it. But because of the mandatory IAEA safeguards, the treaty did imply greater restrictions on nuclear activities than the bilateral US-Israel deals. Moreover, had Israel already *constructed* weapons, it could not join the NPT without violating it because Israel was not accepted as a NWS in it.<sup>525</sup>

In 1967-68, some USG officials expected Israel to join, though they tended to think that the US would have to pay a price for Israel's signature. ACDA thought that though Israel wanted to maintain a nuclear option, it would in the end probably join, assuming the right carrots and sticks, including some security assurances. Saunders and Rostow argued that to persuade Israel to join, maybe a US security guarantee and a US-USSR agreement to make no such arms sales to Arabs that would end Israel's conventional superiority would be needed. Though Moscow had seemed unwilling to make such an deal, the two men did not exclude the possibility in connection to a NPT. The NPT talks also offered a chance to discuss *regional* nuclear and missile limitation with it; Moscow was expected not to help Arabs get nuclear weapons and to maybe be interested in a NWFZ.<sup>526</sup> Of course, the USG knew that even if it joined the NPT, Israel would not be more than three months (the required notification period before an exit) away from going nuclear if it had the capability to do so<sup>527</sup>.

Cohen argues the USG saw Israel's joining as critical for the NPT in general, basing his argument on the fact that it argued towards Bonn that Israel was the real target of the NPT<sup>528</sup>. And as noted above, for instance least Rostow did see Israel's signature as potentially critical. But the argument used with Bonn does not prove the real USG view: it had reason to say so to keep Bonn from feeling that the NPT was directed against it. The limited scope and late timing of consultations with Israel on the NPT suggest that its joining was less crucial for the USG than that of, e.g., the FRG. Cohen writes that both the USG and the Israelis saw it as better to consult on the NPT only after a treaty text was agreed upon since the NPT negotiations first revolved around European issues and later, during and soon after the 1967 crisis, the situation in the Middle East was not good for such talks<sup>529</sup>.

<sup>524</sup> Owen with PPC memo (fn 522).

<sup>525</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 299, 302-3.

<sup>526</sup> DOS/INR to Rusk RSB-13 "Prospects Dim for a Soviet-US Arms Limitation Agreement for the Middle East Area", 2 Feb 67, USNA NRI 64-6 B/9 ad hoc discs; Keeny, 31 March, with ACDA memo (fn 448); Saunders to Rostow, 7 Apr, LBJL N/I VI M2; D/401 (fn 441), D/415 (fn 446) FRUS 64-8:18; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 294-5 ref. to his interviews with former ACDA officials Bunn and Gleysteen.

<sup>527</sup> See D/279 Saunders to Rostow, 14 Oct 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>528</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 294.

<sup>529</sup> Ibid.

In spring 1968, Rusk asked Eban for early support for the NPT in the UNGA and a statement of willingness to sign. Eban did not turn the idea down but the IMFA indicated that Israel would decide about the NPT only in late 1968. On 29 May, Israel indicated at the UN that it would *support* the NPT, though it saw some problems regarding its own adherence. When Rostow welcomed the move, Amb. Y. Rabin cut down unnecessary optimism by saying that the GOI saw it as disadvantageous to relieve Arabs from a fear of Israeli nuclear weapons.<sup>530</sup>

### 9.9.3 Initial signing of the nonproliferation treaty and delays with further action

As a result of spring 1968 negotiations, in March the superpowers had presented a new, joint NPT draft. Finally, quite much optimism existed in the USG about the prospects of a treaty. On 31 May, the two states introduced a re-revised draft, which became the one: a great majority of the UNGA, including Israel, voted in favor of it in June.<sup>531</sup> The US, the UK, the USSR, and 53 NNWSs signed the NPT on 1 July.

The security assurance issue was solved so that the three NWSs supported a UNSC resolution that welcomed their intention “to provide or support immediate assistance” to any non-nuclear NPT state “victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used”<sup>532</sup>. While towards other states, the three tried to portray the assurance as important, towards internal audiences (such as the US Senate) they stressed that they had made no new security commitments<sup>533</sup>. To further motivate others to join the NPT, in statements to the UNGA and when signing the NPT the US and the USSR stressed their commitment to nuclear disarmament and expectation of further arms limitation and reduction talks, especially on strategic missiles.<sup>534</sup>

On 2 July, the GOI informed the USG that as joining the NPT was related to Israel’s security, its situation was not comparable to that of states that were more secure and protected by great powers, especially after the 1967 crisis had demonstrated its need for self-reliance. The NPT did not guarantee that Israel’s foes would never get nuclear arms. Still, the GOI was going to carefully consider the treaty. Ball protested about this stance to Eshkol: all Is-

<sup>530</sup> D/155 DOS to E/TA with Rusk to Eban, 28 Apr 68; D/156 Rostow to Johnson, 30 Apr; D/165 Barbour to DOS, 3 May; D/189 DOS to E/TA (also fn 3 ref. to Israeli statement in UNGA 1st Committee, 29 May, UN doc. A/C.1/PV.1576), 6 June, all FRUS 64-8:20; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 300.

<sup>531</sup> D/229 (fn 516) FRUS 64-8:11 also fn 2; Küntzel 1992 pp. 184-5; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 300.

<sup>532</sup> UNSC Res. 255, 19 June 68. At the NPT signing ceremony, Johnson reaffirmed that if a non-nuclear NPT state was threatened by nuclear aggression, the US would be willing “to ask immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter”. PPJ 349 (fn 514).

<sup>533</sup> See Kohler 1972 pp. 93-100.

<sup>534</sup> See Johnson’s speech, 4 June 68, PPJ 288; D/249 Kosygin to Johnson, 27 June, FRUS 64-8:11; PPJ 349 (fn 514). On steps towards strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in summer 1968, see FRUS 64-8:11. When the USG increased these efforts, it worried about allies’ reactions. See D/254 Cleveland to Rusk, 12 July; D/258 Rusk to Cleveland, 22 July. Be it for US reassurances that followed or otherwise, the allies, also Bonn, welcomed the SALT. See D/286 Special Assistant Shaw to Bohlen, 2 Oct; D/293 NSC mtg, 25 Nov; D/295 Clifford to Johnson, 2 Dec.

rael's neighbors had signed the NPT. Eshkol said Israel wanted to keep the Arabs guessing about its nuclear capabilities and referred to problems the lack of Phantom aircraft caused for Israel. He said the coming CNNWS would affect Israel's decision on the NPT.<sup>535</sup>

Also Bonn refused to sign the NPT on 1 July, referring to political pressure by Moscow on it and to the 1954 pledge. Renewed trouble over access to Berlin helped, e.g., Strauss to argue that the NPT would enable Moscow to interfere in the affairs of the FRG and to find ever new grounds to blame it of non-compliance. Bonn's refusal to sign was no big surprise for the USG: McGhee had expected it to join the NPT if most other key states did but only after US interpretations were formally considered in Senate hearings on the NPT.<sup>536</sup>

Brandt aimed to have the cabinet vote on the NPT in the fall. First, Bonn continued efforts to improve the conditions under which to join the NPT, including by making its interpretations known at the CNNWS (overall, the conference turned out to suffer from internal differences). It also got other non-nuclear Euratom states to agree to ratify the NPT only after the separate Euratom-IAEA safeguards agreement was reached. It continued to seek a bilateral US security guarantee for the case NATO dissolved, but the USG only stressed its interest in NATO and did not exclude bilateral guarantees in case NATO did dissolve.<sup>537</sup> Probably the importance of this demand for Bonn had also weakened compared to the time when it was introduced since, as discussed above, NATO agreement on strategy had in the meanwhile reduced concerns about dissolution of NATO in 1969.

The USG did act to improve Bonn's nuclear status, albeit only in secret from the public and other allies, by giving it the formal consultation and veto rights regarding nuclear weapons that Bonn had been asking for and that had been considered in the USG at least since fall 1965. The timing of the move was probably influenced by tactics to get Bonn join the NPT. In April 1968, a notion was added to NATO guidelines that during a crisis, consultations between allies who owned, hosted, or were to use nuclear weapons were especially important. In the fall, Johnson then formally (and secretly) confirmed to Kiesinger that in case of *limited* use of US nuclear weapons *from or in* Germany, the two heads of state would *consult in forehand*, and the FRG had a *veto* against *limited* use of the weapons by German forces (the US naturally had to authorize any use, too)<sup>538</sup>. Reportedly, the two sides came to confirm the understanding after each change of government<sup>539</sup>.

<sup>535</sup> D/205, D/215 E/TA to DOS with Eban to Rusk and on 15 July 68 Eshkol-Ball mtg, 2 and 17 July, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>536</sup> D/267 McGhee to Johnson, 31 May 68; D/280 Rostow to Johnson with Kiesinger to Johnson, 24 June; D/284 (fn 521) all FRUS 64-8:15; D/259 Strauss-Rusk disc., 23 July, FRUS 64-8:11; Küntzel 1992 p. 188.

<sup>537</sup> The CNNWS was a success for Bonn: for the first time it equally participated in a global UN conference, which also gave it a chance to make itself known as a nuclear supplier. Kohler 1972 pp. 95-6, 142-3; Küntzel 1992 pp. 189-90, 194-5.

<sup>538</sup> D/286 Johnson to Kiesinger, 9 Sep 68, FRUS 64-8:15 also fn 3 ref. to Kiesinger's 17 Sep reply; Haftendorn 1994 p. 179. London had for long had a similar, broader understanding with the USG (see NSA 2005), and Rome had had a veto over the use of nuclear weapons by Italian forces since the early 1960s, a fact Bonn was unaware of (Tuschhoff 2002 p. 321).

<sup>539</sup> "Veto gegen Atomkrieg", *Spiegel*, 28/2005.

In practice, these promises were not very risky for the USG as they only committed it to what it probably would have done even had no explicit promises been made: it seems likely that if the circumstances just allowed, the USG would have anyway consulted its ally about crucial decisions directly concerning it, and it had already for long maintained that Bonn had a *de facto* veto against the use of nuclear weapons by German forces. Moreover, the consultation and veto rights did not apply to general war.

As discussed in section 9.6.2, many authors stress the NPG in particular as the solution to NATO's nuclear dilemma. But in fact, the USG introduced by fall 1969 *several* measures that *together* covered what Strauss had in April 1962 presented as the basic needs of the FRG in the nuclear weapon field and provided ways to deal with different sides of NATO's nuclear dilemma from Bonn's perspective. Participation in the NPG gave Bonn information about US nuclear weapons in Europe, which helped reduce concerns about the possibility of abandonment by the US, even though the possibility was not eliminated – Bonn got no way to *ensure* that the US would use its nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet attack against the FRG. The USG had already in 1962 assured its allies that it would maintain nuclear forces from Europe, and during NPT negotiations it had assured that the FRG could exit the NPT if it withdrew the forces. And now, Bonn got a right to a say regarding the use of nuclear weapons in Germany, which was a way to ease concerns caused by, e.g., the 1955 Carte Blanche exercise, that NATO's war strategy implied too great German sacrifices. Each measure was as such of limited value for Bonn's nuclear status – it remained a NNWS that controlled no nuclear weapons – and none of them fully bound the US to particular actions. But in sum they proved enough as institutional ways to make US security guarantees concrete and so ensure for decades to come that Bonn did not challenge other states' view that it should not become a NWS.

The coming into force of the NPT depended on its ratification by the US, the UK, and the USSR and the deposit of ratification papers by 40 other signatories<sup>540</sup>. Early approval by, e.g., the US Senate had first seemed possible, but the prospects soon weakened: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 led to a halt in the process in the US – for instance the Republican presidential candidate Nixon opposed moving on before Soviet forces left Czechoslovakia – and then to delays in NPT signature and ratification processes in the West in general. The USG also delayed a planned launch of strategic missile limitation talks with Moscow.<sup>541</sup>

Also US pressure on Bonn to sign relaxed. In Bonn, the Czechoslovakia crisis halted progress towards joining the NPT and led to a new demand: in return, Moscow was to commit itself also regarding the FRG to UN Charter Art. 2 prohibition of the use of force (that did not apply to WWII enemy states); the Western Powers reaffirmed a similar commitment

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<sup>540</sup> NPT Art. 9, 1 July 68.

<sup>541</sup> Helms to Rostow, 27 Nov 68, with CIA on prospects for the NPT; Fisher to Rusk, 12 Dec, both LBJL S:NPT II 1; Seaborg 1987 p. 379; FRUS 64-8:11 summary; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 301, 325.

towards Bonn in fall 1968. As a first step, Bonn brought about a resolution at the CNNWS on an equal right of all states to protection under Art. 2 (this implied also that being threatened with nuclear weapons was recognized as a sufficient reason to exit the NPT).<sup>542</sup>

The Czechoslovakia crisis and the delay with the US ratification strengthened the hand of NPT opponents in Israel. The press reported on Israeli problems with the treaty, albeit in a careful manner. The GOI was debating the matter but did not plan to decide on it before the US elections.<sup>543</sup>

Several states that had not yet signed or ratified the NPT were waiting for US ratification before acting. The situation was further complicated because 1) the SFRC wanted the NPT status of near-nuclear nations to be considered before US ratification and the USG had also told Euratom states that before it would request ratification, it would take into account how Euratom-IAEA safeguards negotiations progressed, but 2) delays with the NPT caused by the Czechoslovakia crisis in Italy and the FRG meant that the Euratom-IAEA negotiations could not start. The two states were unlikely to sign the NPT before the US Senate acted on ratification and it became clear that the next USG was behind the NPT. Still, in November the CIA did expect Bonn's signature, which was critical for the NPT, to be achievable after US ratification – the SPD saw the NPT as valuable for its détente policy. But at the same time, the CIA saw the NPT overall as unlikely to come into effect soon, if at all. It argued that though early US ratification would help, various objections to the NPT and the situations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe meant that “inertia and delay have already taken their toll of support and will be hard to overcome”. ACDA worried that delay with US ratification “would give further excuse for not adhering to countries like Israel, where a decision to go nuclear is still a very real possibility.”<sup>544</sup>

As a final attempt to get the NPT ratified during his term and thus increase pressure on others, according to Rostow especially Israel, to join it, Johnson planned a special session in the Congress. But he saw President-elect Nixon's support for the idea as indispensable. Referring to disputes among Republicans over the NPT, Nixon refused to push for ratification. No special session took place.<sup>545</sup>

At the same time, other USG officials were making an effort to persuade Israel to join the NPT by trying to make that a condition for a sale of advanced aircraft, which was for the USG a key step towards becoming Israel's key arms supplier. This effort is the focus of the next section. The ratification of the NPT and Bonn's joining it are discussed in Chapter 10.

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<sup>542</sup> “Besuch des Abgeordneten Dr. Birrenbach in Washington“, 16 Sep 68, PAA R/305/II A6B32 271 116-7; Kohler 1972 p. 140; Lauk 1979 pp. 88-9; Küntzel 1992 pp. 189-94. On the CNNWS and the “German Resolution”, see Schnippenkoetter 1968.

<sup>543</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 301-3 ref. to *Ha'aretz* articles.

<sup>544</sup> Helms with CIA memo, Fisher to Rusk (fn 541).

<sup>545</sup> Smith to Johnson, 29 Nov 68, LBJL NSF Rostow, Nixon transition; D/315 EN FRUS 64-8:20 ref. also to Rostow-Murphy disc., 24 Nov, LBJL NSF Rostow, Murphy; Johnson 1971 p. 490; Seaborg 1987 p. 379.

### **9.10 Sale of Phantom aircraft – a way to press Israel to join the nonproliferation treaty?**

A DOS/PPC memo noted that Israel was “unlikely to declare for a nuclear capability as long as it has conventional superiority”; thus conventional arms aid was a way to weaken proliferation pressures on it<sup>546</sup>. A potential important step regarding such aid was selling Phantom aircraft, Israel’s request for which was on the US-Israel agenda in fall 1968. The USG saw some justification for Israel’s worry about the future Arab-Israeli air balance, and Israel seemed to have no alternative supplier<sup>547</sup>.

On the one hand, the PPC comment also shows once again that it was Israel’s *overtly* going nuclear that the USG now especially wanted to avoid. On the other hand, several authors argue that the option to do so became Israel’s subtle bargaining card with the USG to ensure conventional arms supply (that would be lost if Israel went openly nuclear), whereas maybe the USG would have anyway ensured arms supply to it<sup>548</sup>.

Views varied in the USG on the desirability and bargaining value of a sale. Though also other issues were again thought to be at stake (including the peace process), at least some USG officials still saw it as possible to tie the Phantoms and ensured access to conventional arms (and maybe agreement with Moscow to limit arms supply to Arabs) to Israel’s joining the NPT and taking a non-nuclear path. Opponents of the sale and especially the DOD strongly favored such conditions. Johnson’s stance was softer and also some other officials were prepared to settle for less, referring to the earlier failures to tie arms sales to a non-nuclear pledge. Though the DOS first saw (as Evron had argued) that it was maybe best to ensure Israel’s security and then make demands, but not demand direct quid-pro-quo, it came to support the DOD demands.<sup>549</sup>

DOD and DOS staffs saw it as important that Israel would in return for a sale reaffirm the non-introduction pledge and promise to join the NPT and not to proceed with SSMs since 1) Israel clearly seemed to be securing an option to produce nuclear weapons quickly and 2) a sale was seen to imply that *the US would become Israel’s key arms supplier* – i.e., a change in the long-standing USG policy. The NEA argued that though the USG could not extract an absolute guarantee from Israel on never producing nuclear weapons, the Phantom talks offered the “*last best chance*” to get a commitment that would make it harder to take that step. It was also strongly felt that if the US wanted to stop the SSM program, it had to act now. But it seemed possible that Johnson would sell the aircraft even if some conditions were not met. Saunders doubted whether the F-4s as such were enough to give so much influence on Israel’s defense strategy, especially regarding SSMs.<sup>550</sup>

<sup>546</sup> Owen with PPC memo (fn 522).

<sup>547</sup> D/179 Saunders to ASOS Battle, 21 May 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>548</sup> Reiss 1988 p. 256; Evron 1991 pp. 290-1 ref. to his talk with Gazit; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 287.

<sup>549</sup> D/179 (fn 547), D/246 Saunders to Rostow, 4 Sep 68, *ibid*.

<sup>550</sup> My emphasis. D/279 Saunders to Rostow, 14 Oct 68, *ibid*. also fn 2 ref. also to Warnke to Clifford, 15 Oct, USNA RG330; D/2 NEA to Rusk (san.), 15 Oct, NSA EBB ICT.



Rusk brought up the NPT and a need for guarantees that Israel would not equip any Phantoms with nuclear arms with both Eban and Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Y. Allon. Whereas Allon only referred to the non-introduction pledge and the Dimona visits, Eban said that Israel had no nuclear arms, had not decided to reject the NPT, and would see what other states did and cooperate with those that sought stronger security guarantees. Allon also noted that the SSM program with the French had been halted, no domestic program existed yet, and SSMS were no great priority for Israel since when armed with conventional warheads, they had be very accurate to be efficient.<sup>551</sup>

In the meanwhile, Israel continued to change the general impression of its nuclear status: Eshkol and Eban said in public that Israel had the know-how to build nuclear weapons, though this did not mean that it was producing them. Cohen suggests Israel's goal was to show that its advanced capabilities justified getting US security guarantees in return for NPT signature.<sup>552</sup>

In October, Johnson met Eban. His aides had proposed him to stress that the USG would expect the Phantoms to eliminate pressures to acquire nuclear weapons or SSMs; that Israel should join the NPT; and that production or deployment of nuclear-capable missiles would seem like a confirmation that Israel was seeking nuclear weapons.<sup>553</sup> Johnson told Eban that he had already in January in principle decided to sell the Phantoms and aimed to do so, unless Moscow halted the arms flow to Arabs and agreed to discuss regional arms control, and if Israel cooperated in peace efforts and adhered to the NPT. But he said that the last point was no outright condition to a sale, though for instance the new SOD C. Clifford and Rusk found it important. As Eban argued that the USG thought too much of "Israel's nuclear capability", Johnson said he would talk about that with his men.<sup>554</sup> Thus he clearly took distance from the demand regarding the NPT.

But Rusk kept a much tougher line with Eban, saying that the USG "had reason to believe Israel [was] involved in nuclear weapons and missile programs". Israel's going nuclear would deeply affect US-Israel relations since it could lead to greater Soviet-Arab nuclear cooperation and because the NPT was important for the USG. The USG needed clarity about Israel's aims, in which joining the NPT was indispensable. Eban's comment "Israel had not decided to become nuclear power" or to reject the NPT was not enough if Israel, "part way down road to producing nuclear weapons", did not sign the NPT. Referring to, e.g., the Phantoms, Rusk asked for a change in Israel's stance on the NPT. Eban wanted the two issues to be unlinked, but Rusk said that the USG had to be sure that the aircraft would not be used to carry nuclear weapons. Afterwards, ASOS/NEA P. Hart informed Rabin that

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<sup>551</sup> D/250 DOS to E/TA, 11 Sep 68, FRUS 64-8:20; T/6760 M/UN to DOS on Rusk-Eban mtg (san.), 1 Oct, DDRS. Also Johnson met Allon, but according to a DOS memo on the meeting, they did not discuss the nuclear issue. DOS to Rostow with Johnson-Allon mtg, 11 Sep, LBJL N/I X M1.

<sup>552</sup> Pry 1984 pp. 39-40; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 6, 305-6 citing, e.g., *Ha'aretz* reports.

<sup>553</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 22 Oct 68, with talking points for Rusk-Eban mtg and Rusk to Johnson on Johnson-Eban mtg, 21 Oct, LBJL N/I X M1.

<sup>554</sup> D/284 Johnson-Eban mtg, 22 Oct 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

the aircraft negotiations would really start only after Israel's stance on the NPT was clear.<sup>555</sup>

The Israelis were upset. Rostow told Johnson they were infuriated since Hart had tied the F-4s to the NPT though Johnson and Rusk had just avoided doing so (Rostow's memo reveals that Rusk was unwilling to take responsibility for infuriating the Israelis: he had said to Rostow that he had told Eban only that Hart and Rabin were to "discuss certain political questions" before the Phantom talks).<sup>556</sup> The USG now informed Israel that the sale was not formally conditional of NPT signature, though also Johnson put much value on it. In return, Israel presented a memo that repeated its old points on the NPT. Eshkol told the USG that he expected the Phantom talks to continue with no link to it.<sup>557</sup>

ASOD/ISA P. Warnke still argued to Clifford strongly in favor of conditions to the sale. The ISA thought Johnson's order to start talks did not imply an unconditional sale; the Phantoms had to be connected to the NPT and satisfactory "assurances on matters affecting our own national security". He wanted to do everything possible to make Israel promise even much more than just to join the NPT, including that it would 1) forgo testing and deploying strategic missiles it already had; 2) not "acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons *without our advance knowledge or consent*"; 3) *give the USG full information* about any efforts for a nuclear capability; and 4) accept semiannual inspections of certain sites.<sup>558</sup> Thus emphasis was again on *finding out* what Israel was doing: the impression is that if Israel informed the USG that it aimed to go nuclear, the USG might in some circumstances have accepted this. Also to Rabin, Warnke came to stress the USG interest in full awareness of nuclear and missile efforts in the area and for a relationship of "mutual trust and confidence" with Israel<sup>559</sup>.

Warnke argued to Clifford that events that affected US security justified modification of any agreement with another state and that a clear link existed between US security and Israeli nuclear arms: Israel would only benefit from nuclear weapons if Arabs were aware of them, and if they were, he thought that Moscow would probably station such in Arab states and the region would become fully polarized. The US would be blamed for Israel's nuclear force especially after the Phantom deal made it Israel's key arms supplier. Beyond creating dangers in the area, nuclearization of the region could put US security and foreign policies

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<sup>555</sup> D/288 DOS to Barbour, 24 Oct 68, *ibid.* Cohen, A. 1998 suggests Rusk pressed on the NPT as he did not know of the CIA reports on Israel's nuclear weapons. Cohen notes Rusk, according to his own account, also threatened that if Israel introduced the weapons, it would lose US support and protection (pp. 308-9). In fact, Rusk 1991 does not say he did so in this situation in particular, though he mentions that the USG made such threats in general (p. 287).

<sup>556</sup> D/290 Rostow to Johnson, 25 Oct 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>557</sup> D/290, D/292 E/TA to DOS, 28 Oct 68, *ibid.* also fn 2 ref. to T/5863 E/TA to DOS with memo on NPT, 28 Oct, and to Rostow to Johnson, 29 Oct, LJBL N/I X CM. The Israelis complained that their press already linked the issues, but Rostow argued to Johnson that the GOI was itself causing that in order to make the USG to de-link them. Accepting a statement that they were not linked would have reduced the pressure the USG had created on the NPT.

<sup>558</sup> My emphasis. D/295 Warnke to Clifford (san.), 29 Oct 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>559</sup> D/308 Warnke-Rabin mtg (san.), 5 Nov 68, *ibid.*

at risk also in more general. And especially if protected by Moscow, Arabs might not be deterred by a nuclear Israel, and if they moved towards a large-scale attack, a pre-emptive nuclear attack by Israel was possible. Even limited (Soviet) retaliation in kind “would destroy Israel and face us with totally unacceptable alternatives”. If the US retaliated with nuclear weapons against the USSR or Arabs, the result would be, respectively, full nuclear war or a Soviet attack on the US, especially as Israel would have started the nuclear exchange. But failure to retaliate would greatly harm the global US position and its foreign policy goals: Warnke suggested that inability to protect Israel would seriously weaken Bonn’s confidence in the US, probably make it pursue a deal with Moscow, and destroy NATO.<sup>560</sup>

Thus the DOD aim still was, unless otherwise instructed, to tie the F-4s to “hard nuclear assurances” and start technical discussions only after receiving such<sup>561</sup>. But Rusk told Clifford in early November that Johnson was fully against pressing on the nuclear issue in the context of the sale<sup>562</sup>.

Clifford was clearly concerned: he said to Rusk that Israel had operational French missiles and, after a comment excised in the US document published in the FRUS series (very likely concerning nuclear weapons), that “this is the road to disaster. The Soviets will never let them have this in the Middle East. Sovs must know it now. They will send in Sov contingents and set up atomic weapons in Arab nations. It will be the most dangerous area in the world”.<sup>563</sup> According to Rostow, also he and Rusk were greatly worried “that Israeli policies could lead to a nuclear tragedy” and even Feinberg said that he opposed further Israeli nuclear moves and was in favor of Johnson’s stressing that to Eshkol<sup>564</sup>. Israel had presented to the USG a draft Phantom deal where it offered only a renewed non-introduction pledge and a promise not to use US aircraft as nuclear carriers – saying nothing about not *producing* SSMs or nuclear arms<sup>565</sup>.

Schoenbaum argues the US quest for quid pro quos was really given up already when the Congress had on 8 October taken a stance in favor of the US ensuring Israel’s deterrent power. Quandt and Smith & Cobban argue that Johnson refused to demand them because of political pressures at election time to sell the aircraft; Hersh says the unconditional sale was Johnson’s farewell present for Israel.<sup>566</sup> But as such, also the electorate and the Congress probably would have accepted USG pressure on Israel in the nuclear issue, and the also other possible explanations for Johnson’s stance exist. A remark by Johnson to Nixon that “he had hoped to get the Non-Proliferation Treaty ... approved before he authorized the

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<sup>560</sup> D/295 (fn 558) *ibid*.

<sup>561</sup> D/298 Rostow to Johnson, 31 Oct 68, *ibid*.

<sup>562</sup> D/299 Rusk-Clifford disc. (san), 1 Nov 68, *ibid*.

<sup>563</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>564</sup> See D/313 Walsh (DOS/ES) for the record, 9 Nov 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>565</sup> D/298 (fn 561) FRUS 64-8:20 fn 2 ref. to Rabin to Hart, 30 Oct 68, USNA RG330, to Saunders to Rostow, 31 Oct, LBJL N/I X CM, and to Hart to Rusk, 31 Oct, USNA CFPF DEF 12-5 ISR.

<sup>566</sup> Quandt 1977 p. 67; Smith & Cobban 1989 p. 61; Hersh 1991 pp. 190-2; Schoenbaum 1993 p. 169.

sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel<sup>567</sup>, hints that he may have hoped to persuade Israel to join the NPT in the context of the sale but the hope vanished as US ratification was delayed. Probably the weakened prospects of ratification made him less prepared confront Israel, especially at election time, on a treaty with anyway uncertain destiny. Moreover, he most probably wanted to avoid the risk of public dispute over a Phantom-NPT tie as that could have harmed the NPT signing and ratification processes. And his bargaining position was generally weak since he was on his way out of office so that no shadow of future dealings with him affected Israeli stances. Also his low domestic approval rating (about 43 percent<sup>568</sup>) was in this case a disadvantage since it indicated that little goodwill existed towards him that would have helped gain domestic approval for such unpopular choices as refusing to help Israel.

The weakened enthusiasm in Washington in general regarding the NPT after the Czechoslovakia crisis also helps explain Israeli preparedness to strongly resist a Phantom-NPT tie. Moreover, Cohen suggests the resistance was strong also because the Israelis first saw both presidential candidates as friendly towards Israel and, after Nixon was elected and based also on impression his aide Kissinger made on them, hoped Nixon to let the NPT issue to be pushed to sidelines.<sup>569</sup>

Rusk informed Israel that the USG in principle agreed to sell the F-4s and technical talks could start. Still, Warnke asked for Clifford's permission to require stronger assurances on nuclear arms and missiles, in the way Warnke had earlier outlined, but offering as "additional sweeteners" suggestions of further arms sales.<sup>570</sup> It seems Clifford did not turn down the idea since Warnke next argued to Rabin that the sale differed from earlier ones as 1) Israel seemed to be "on the verge of nuclear weapons and missiles capability" and 2) the sale, taking place when the Europeans no longer wanted to supply Israel with arms, would mean that the USG would abandon its preferred policy not to be the key source of arms for Israel and thus its own security would become more closely linked to that of Israel. Therefore the USG asked Israel to promise to join the NPT and not to acquire nuclear arms or acquire, test, or deploy strategic missiles. Dimona visits were a further possible demand. He suggested nuclear and missile acquisitions would constitute "unusual and compelling circumstances" that would justify canceling the deal later.<sup>571</sup>

According to Cohen, the US negotiators prepared a draft sale agreement that included the Israeli commitments Warnke sought, according to Rabin's account even significant supervision of Israeli defense R&D and production activities.<sup>572</sup> Rabin asked whether the de-

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<sup>567</sup> D/315 EN FRUS 64-8:20 ref. to Nixon's foreign policy briefing, 11 Nov 68, LBJL NSF Rostow, Nixon transition.

<sup>568</sup> For approval ratings, see [http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data\\_access/data/presidential\\_approval.html](http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/presidential_approval.html) (3 Nov 07).

<sup>569</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 326-7.

<sup>570</sup> D/300 Warnke to Clifford (san.), 2 Nov 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>571</sup> D/306 Warnke-Rabin mtg, 4 Nov 68, *ibid*.

<sup>572</sup> The draft of 5 Nov has not been found. Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 312-3 ref. to Rabin, Y. (1979) *The Rabin*

mands were formal conditions, and Warnke said he would recommend so. Rabin's own reaction was that Israel would not accept such terms; it had also repeatedly been told that the US would not demand such. He moreover did not agree that the whole US position as an arms supplier was at stake.<sup>573</sup>

Rusk had just again brought the NPT up with Eban, who said that "we haven't gone nuclear" but noted that when asked to give long-term security-related promises, Israel had to consider what the foundation of its security was<sup>574</sup>. According to Rusk's later account, Eban said that though Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, it would neither be the second to do so<sup>575</sup>.

Clifford and Rusk still tried to persuade Johnson to demand further non-nuclear assurances in return for the sale, but Johnson seemed to oppose any conditions, even reaffirmations of earlier pledges. The Israelis became aware of this.<sup>576</sup> Rabin then told Warnke that Israel found the proposed terms impossible and unrelated to the sale; it would not limit its sovereignty to get the aircraft. He proposed that regarding "the theoretical question" of using the F-4s as nuclear carriers, Israel would agree not to use any US-supplied aircraft in that way. It was also prepared to reaffirm the non-introduction pledge.<sup>577</sup> The next day, the men continued talks on the basis of no conditions to the sale. But Israel did not back out from the previous day's promises.<sup>578</sup>

Though Johnson opposed using the Phantoms to press on the NPT, he accepted that his views about proliferation were stressed in other contexts to the Israelis. A message from him to Eshkol expressed hope of Israel joining the NPT promptly; that was needed to prevent grave damage to the global US nonproliferation policy and the only way for Israel to show everyone that it had no nuclear weapon ambitions. The USG also wanted to see no operational strategic missiles in the area. Johnson hoped to hear good news on these issues in his planned meeting with Eshkol. But as Cohen points out, he made no threats or link to the F-4s. The next day, Eshkol postponed the meeting for health reasons. Johnson decided to drop it altogether.<sup>579</sup> The reply Eshkol later sent to Johnson on the NPT only repeated old stances<sup>580</sup>.

Though at least some USG officials indeed saw the Phantom sale as a key step towards a general policy change of the US' becoming Israel's key arms supplier, and seriously offering such a change might have bought greater Israeli concessions, the USG failed to portray

*Memoirs*, Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 141-2, and to his interviews with Warnke.

<sup>573</sup> D/308 (fn 559) FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>574</sup> T/253 M/UN to DOS on 3 Nov 68 Rusk-Eban mtg, 5 Nov, DDRS.

<sup>575</sup> Rusk 1991 p. 287.

<sup>576</sup> D/311 DepASOD/ISA Schwartz for the record (san. draft), 9 Nov 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>577</sup> D/309 Warnke-Rabin mtg, 8 Nov 68, *ibid*.

<sup>578</sup> D/313 (fn 564) *ibid*.

<sup>579</sup> D/316 DOS to E/TA with Johnson to Eshkol, 11 Nov 68, *ibid*.; DOS to E/TA, 13 Nov, LBJL N/I X M1; Rostow to Johnson with Johnson's comment, 13 Nov, DDRS; Cohen, A. 1998 p. 316.

<sup>580</sup> D/349 Rostow to Johnson, 12 Dec 68, FRUS 64-8:20 also fn 2 ref. to Eshkol to Johnson, 4 Dec, LBJL NSF special head of state corresp.

the sale as such. But it may of course be also that the Israelis expected a policy change to be anyway forthcoming. And Johnson's unwillingness to tie the F-4s to the NPT probably gave them the impression that at the decisive level, the USG was not dead set to make Israel join the treaty. And though his letter to Eshkol suggests he would have *wished* Israel to join it, it overall seems that he did not really have high hopes of Israel doing so.

Warnke was now seeking clarity on what the non-introduction pledge meant. To Rabin, he defined a nuclear weapon as the "components available that could be assembled to make a nuclear weapon", irrespective of whether they were in one place, and argued that testing was not necessary for nuclear weapons. But the Israeli definition of "introduction" included both "physical presence in the area", testing, and awareness by others. Thus no joint definition existed: Rabin did not see "an unadvertised, untested nuclear device" as a nuclear weapon, but Warnke argued that "mere physical presence in the area" meant introduction.<sup>581</sup> Indeed, promising only not to test or advertise a weapon comes close to admitting that it might be silently acquired.

The Israelis said that also the proposed US right to get the F-4s back if Israel violated any understandings related to the deal was unacceptable, unprecedented, and distrustful. Warnke in turn argued Israel might later have *understandable* reasons to think differently about the deal. Israel also wanted it to take the form of a letter exchange, not a jointly signed memo of understanding; in the former case, both sides had to stand behind their own definitions and statements only.<sup>582</sup>

Thus the deal constituted of a letter by each side. Rabin's letter expressed Israel's wish to buy F-4s, reaffirmation it would "not to be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons", and promise not to use any US aircraft to carry nuclear weapons<sup>583</sup>. Warnke's reply referred to Israel's promises, a USG stance that "physical possession and control of nuclear arms" would in this context mean introduction, and Israel's understanding that the US could cancel the deal *before delivery* in case of "unusual and compelling circumstances" caused by "action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter"<sup>584</sup>.

The USG clearly still saw Israel's pledges as no real guarantee against proliferation. Rostow wrote to Johnson that "the Israelis feel they could develop a nuclear device but would feel correct in saying they had not "introduced" it so long as they had neither tested it nor made its existence public" – which was far from enough for the US<sup>585</sup>. According to Cohen, Warnke now understood Israel already had nuclear weapons and would not join the

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<sup>581</sup> D/317 Warnke-Rabin mtg, 12 Nov 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>582</sup> See D/330, D/332 Warnke-Rabin discs., 22 and 26 Nov 68, *ibid*.

<sup>583</sup> Rostow to Johnson, 24 Dec 68, with Rabin to Warnke, 22 Nov, LBJL N/I XI 1 CM.

<sup>584</sup> D/333 Warnke to Rabin, 27 Nov 68, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>585</sup> D/349 (fn 580) *ibid*.

NPT, whereas Rusk still argued in the USG that even if Israel was “5-months pregnant”, it was maybe possible to stop it from getting nuclear weapons.<sup>586</sup>

The USG did formally reserve a right to cancel the Phantom deal if Israel got nuclear weapons, though the right was in the end limited to cancellation before delivery. Probably the main USG goal with this clause was to have an exit option in case Israel went openly nuclear at the same time as the F-4 deal became known – that would have put the USG in a hard position. Another likely USG aim was to maintain some leverage over Israel.

Though they already got the Phantoms, the Israelis were arguing that they would need a quid pro quo for joining the NPT. For the first time admitting the role of this factor, as one justification they referred to *Soviet* hostility towards them and the chance of Moscow giving nuclear weapons to Arabs<sup>587</sup>. They said only “ironclad security assurances” would enable them to join but at the same time stressed to the USG that they did not seek such and had learnt that no foreign guarantee could be trusted<sup>588</sup>. A DDRS document reveals that an IMFA official said that though Israel had the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, it did not plan to do so *within 6-10 months* but wanted to maintain the option in order to keep Arabs in fear and because of worries about the conventional balance. Emb. Tel Aviv thought that Israel would not join the NPT early and the CIA that it would not join unless the Arab-Israel situation improved.<sup>589</sup> The press reported that as conditions for NPT signature, Israel demanded from the USG security guarantees against NWSs, secured supply of conventional arms, and “a link between Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and regional peace”. Cohen argues Jerusalem was in fact telling the USG that national interests prevented it from joining the NPT.<sup>590</sup>

USG officials’ effort to bargain with the Phantoms for non-nuclear commitments shows that the tacit US-Israel deal on secured conventional arms supply in return for not going overtly nuclear had still not become a generally accepted or understood bargain in the USG. But partially as a result of these negotiations, it was clearly becoming that. Smith & Cobban moreover argue that the prioritization of Israel’s arms needs over the goal of non-proliferation laid the basis for a permissive US nonproliferation policy towards Israel over the decades to come<sup>591</sup>.

A DOS/PPC transition paper summarized views on the strategic situation in the Middle East and the Israel nuclear issue at the end of the Johnson era. It noted that since preventing hostilities involving both superpowers had to be the foremost goal for both the US and

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<sup>586</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 306, 318-9 ref. to his talks with Warnke and to USG mtg, 26 Nov 68, LBJL T. Johnson notes B/4.

<sup>587</sup> See “Israelis Reported to Be Reluctant at This Time to Sign Treaty Barring Spread of Nuclear Arms”, *NYT*, 20 Nov 68; CIA (fn 541), 27 Nov; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 289, 327 ref. also to *Ha’aretz* articles.

<sup>588</sup> CIA (fn 541), 27 Nov 68; D/346-7 E/TA to DOS on Governor Scranton’s visit, 11 Dec, FRUS 64-8:20.

<sup>589</sup> T/6081 E/TA to DOS on 13 Nov 68 IMFA official-Bader (SFRC consultant) mtg, 14 Nov, DDRS; CIA (fn 541), 27 Nov.

<sup>590</sup> “Israelis Reported...” (fn 587); Cohen, A. 1998 p. 326 ref. also to *Ha’aretz* articles.

<sup>591</sup> Smith & Cobban 1989 pp. 61-2.

Moscow, each had to be aware of how the other saw its vital interests, be cautious when those could be challenged, refrain from use of force in, e.g., the Arab-Israel conflict unless vital interests were at stake, and promptly consult each other in case of a crisis. The PPC saw war avoidance and preserving the state of Israel as the two key US interests in the area and both selling enough arms to keep up Israel's conventional advantage against Arabs and strong opposition to Israel's nuclear and missile efforts as key elements of US policy. It noted that there was "recent evidence that the Israeli are further advanced in their plans for producing nuclear weapons and accepting delivery of French missiles" than it had seemed. Emergence of an Israeli nuclear capability was still expected to destabilize the area and weaken disincentives to proliferation in general. The PPC had not yet abandoned all hope of success in this matter: since Israel was interested in nuclear arms especially owing to a fear of a deteriorating conventional balance, US arms supply as a way to reduce that motivation and to help the USG to demand, e.g., joining the NPT, IAEA safeguards, and slowing down nuclear and missiles plans. The PPC favored telling Moscow that if an understanding was reached on restraining arms supply to the area, the USG would press Israel more for nuclear and missile restraint.<sup>592</sup>

### **9.11 Conclusions regarding the Johnson era**

Basically, solutions to both Israel's and West Germany's nuclear status and USG stances and roles related to them were now reached. Israel acquired nuclear weapons but promised the USG not to become an *overt* nuclear power, and the US did not directly guarantee its security but came to open arms supply to it. The FRG in turn forwent the ownership and production of nuclear weapons on the condition that the US continued to credibly guarantee its security; especially after the strategy discord in NATO was overcome, various institutional measures introduced to allow the FRG to somehow participate in the US deterrent, and concerns that NATO would dissolve thus reduced, the prospects that this solution would hold indeed were quite good. But the settlements of each state's nuclear status was completed only after Nixon came to office. The next chapter offers an overview of the aftermaths under him and later. But before going into that, it is time to discuss some further conclusions regarding the Johnson era.

The Johnson administration perceived certain key strategic balance-of-power requirements similarly as its predecessors: these included both keeping the FRG as a satisfied member of NATO and trying to maintain decent relations with both Israel and its neighbors.

Both in Bonn's statements and USG assessments of its goals, the need to protect and promote the *status* of the FRG in, e.g., the nuclear field got an increasing role during the Johnson years. One probable reason for this is that the continuing stability in Europe made it

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<sup>592</sup> PPC "The Middle East: U.S. Policy in the Absence of a Settlement", Dec 68, LBJL NSF SF B/50 transition PPC.



less topical to stress military insecurity as a justification for any interest in nuclear weapons. In line with this perceived need, the Johnson administration acted to increase Bonn's *involvement* in nuclear affairs, though it did not enable Bonn to really exert *influence* on US decisions. But whereas the Kennedy administration had mostly just made and presented *plans* for such moves, the USG did now *establish* concrete mechanisms for greater participation. The solution to nuclear organization and sharing in NATO was tied to the increasingly urgent issue of gaining allies' approval for the flexible response -strategy: Johnson saw giving Bonn a stronger role in NATO's nuclear affairs as necessary for ensuring its continuing cooperation in NATO. Nevertheless, at the same time Johnson (though hesitant to make this move because of concern about West German reactions) eventually came to de facto give up the option of such nuclear sharing in NATO that would have given the allies control over any nuclear weapons as he agreed to tightly limit the possibilities of joint nuclear forces under the NPT. This he did because the NPT had become an important goal for him and other NATO states and the US Congress were clearly uneager about any co-owned and jointly controlled nuclear force.

During the Johnson era, such suggestions as still Kennedy had made that the status of the FRG as a NNWS was maybe only a temporary reality disappeared from USG comments to Bonn. But also this USG accepted the fact that Bonn tied its (future) NPT-signature and status as a NNWS to continuing nuclear protection.

Under Johnson, arms sales were established as the key form of US security assistance for Israel. The USG moved clearly further towards becoming Israel's key arms supplier, albeit each time on a one-off basis that implied no institutionalization of the security relationship. The possibility of giving Israel stronger and/or public security assurances was not raised in the USG even to the degree that was done under Kennedy. And though Israel still made some relatively weak demands for security guarantees and consultations, it clearly focused on making the case that it had to be self-reliant for security and thus needed US arms. This adjustment of policy and goals on each side reflected the realization that owing to the Vietnam War, the US Congress was increasingly clearly opposed to new security commitments; Washington's hesitation to take military action became moreover evident during the 1967 crisis, which also demonstrated the limited value of any private security assurances by the USG for Israel.

The most critical time of the period studied here to press Israel hard on the nuclear issue came during the presidency of Johnson – who was less willing to do so than Kennedy had been<sup>593</sup>. The USG continued to press for safeguards on the Dimona reactor but the effort suffered from Johnson's lack of interest. Bundy later noted that close USG concern about the reactor came to an end when Kennedy died, and Cohen argues that to avoid the risk that

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<sup>593</sup> Gavin 2004 argues that under Johnson, the USG in practice pursued a *stricter* nonproliferation policy especially in France's but also in Israel's case than under Kennedy (pp. 102, 131). But based on the cases studied here, Kennedy was the one who was prepared to go the furthest to try to stop proliferation when it was especially against US interests.

Israel would denounce the visit arrangement altogether and to protect relations to Israel, Johnson did not insist on tight inspection rules. Cohen further suggests that Johnson probably came to see through Israel's camouflage attempts at the plant and to see it as impossible to make Israel give up the weapon effort.<sup>594</sup> This view seems justified also in the light of this study. Under Johnson, the USG in practice accepted a visiting schedule that did not allow certainty about Israel's activities at the plant. Whereas the early 1965 attempt to make Israel promise nuclear and missile restraint in return for arms sales had Johnson's support (though Israel's nuclear aims were not the only issue at stake), after that discouraging experience that most likely fuelled pessimism regarding the chances of success, he seems to have had little interest in further similar attempts. It seems he came first to expect such attempts to be futile since the Israelis were determined to protect the nuclear option and then to suspect that Israel already had nuclear weapons; the fact that Israel was indeed pursuing them became clear to key USG officials in general during his term. Especially Rusk and Komer held a tough line towards the Israelis on the nuclear issue, and Johnson let them do so – as long as that had no big domestic cost for him. He was himself prepared to bring US opposition to proliferation repeatedly up with the Israelis but sometimes talked only of *general* US opposition, instead of his own views. His weak interest and lack of personal conviction as to the usefulness of pressing the Israelis made it viable for these to resist pressure and probably made his comments in opposition to nuclear proliferation seem somewhat hollow to them at least regarding Israel's case.

Whereas Kennedy and other key USG officials had been stressing both within the USG and to the Israelis that at least *the USG* needed to find out about Israel's nuclear activities, as the truth that Israel was developing nuclear weapons became clearer other officials including, it seems, Johnson preferred not being faced with the truth. That would have forced the USG to answer the hard question of how to react, which it rather avoided even considering as long as possible; it was not in USG interest to get into a situation where it either had to give green light to Israel's nuclear weapons or take strong action against it.

In the late 1960s, US policy became gradually confined to keeping Israel from becoming an *overt* nuclear power. How US officials saw the matter is indicated by Bundy's later comment that the Israeli nuclear issue was an example of a situation where "what you oppose before it happens is something which it is wise to accept when it becomes real."<sup>595</sup> It was more sensible for the USG to focus on ensuring that Israel's weapons would not have too bad consequences – that strong Arab reactions would be avoided, the efforts for the NPT protected, and risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons minimized – than to stubbornly wage a hopeless diplomatic battle to make Israel give up its weapons.

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<sup>594</sup> Bundy 1988 p. 510; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 177, 193-6.

<sup>595</sup> Bundy 1988 p. 512. He suggests that making Israel abandon its nuclear weapons would be impossible, wonders whether somebody thinks "that the Israelis will give up a bomb for which they have worked with such determination because of the nonproliferation preferences of Americans", and argues that carrying the responsibility for Israel's nuclear protection could have been too much for the US.

## **10 Epilogue – durable solutions to German and Israeli nuclear statuses**

The solution to Israel's nuclear status was opaque proliferation by Israel, no US-Israel alliance, and sufficient arms supply to make Israel secure without an overt NWS status. This was for the USG the best of available options: Israel provided for its security and the US did not have to jeopardize relations with Arabs. The FRG in turn forwent the ownership and production of nuclear weapons on the condition that the US continued to credibly guarantee its security. The combination of the stockpile scheme, consultations and planning in the NPG, and consultation and veto rights regarding the use of US nuclear weapons from or in Germany proved enough to keep the FRG as a satisfied, non-nuclear member of NATO. There are thus clear differences between the Israeli and the West German cases. But also similarities exist: both states' leaders were concerned about the risk of abandonment by the US, tried with differing level of success to secure the US commitment, and developed, respectively, nuclear weapons and latent capabilities to produce such.

In this chapter, I first outline how the solutions to the nuclear statuses of the FRG and Israel were finalized after Nixon came to office and then briefly discuss the durability of those solutions and the situation today.

### ***10.1 Finalizing understandings on Israel's and West Germany's nuclear statuses***

Soon after taking office in January 1969, Nixon re-launched the NPT ratification process in the Congress and publicly expressed hope of the FRG (and France) joining the NPT. But he and at least some of his aides did not see the NPT as crucial. Together with Kissinger, now national security aide, he silently ordered the USG not to press other states, especially the FRG, for action on the NPT. Kissinger had in 1965 questioned whether close allies of all states should be the first targets of nonproliferation efforts and whether being the only Western nuclear power was in US interest. But he favored nonproliferation efforts aimed at potential future proliferants such as Israel. But it seems he came to see it as hopeless to try stop, e.g., Israel from going nuclear, and in such situations saw it as better to help client states do so.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> D/4 National Security Decision Memorandum 6, 5 Feb 69, NSA EBB ICT; Kissinger 1965 pp. 169-70; Quester 1973 p. 175; Hersh 1991 pp. 209-11 ref. to his 1991 interview with Kissinger's aide Halperin; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 324-5; Cohen, A. & Burr 2006 p. 24. Hersh argues Nixon and Kissinger even came to *support* proliferation in Israel's case.

### 10.1.1 The FRG joins the nonproliferation treaty

In early 1969, international pressure on Bonn to join the NPT started again to grow. The same demand was made by domestic advocates of nuclear industry, who had from early on favored joining the NPT and trying to influence the safeguards system for West German benefit. But internal discord over the NPT prevented the Grand Coalition from joining the treaty and also contributed to its dissolution. The CDU/CSU moreover wanted to lose no votes due to the NPT to the far right, the rise of which could have damaged the reputation of the FRG. Quester notes that also a desire to see what kind of policies the new USG in general pursued was an incentive against an early signature.<sup>2</sup>

For the advocates of industry, remaining outside the NPT was now harmful especially since it threatened Dutch-British-German cooperation on uranium enrichment<sup>3</sup>. In late 1968, the three governments namely announced a cooperation effort in gas centrifuge technology. This resulted (after all of them had signed the NPT) in 1970 in the establishment of a joint enrichment conglomerate, Urenco/Centec, for the use and further development of centrifuge technologies they had so far worked on separately. The construction of joint enrichment plants in the UK and the Netherlands started in 1979 and in the FRG in 1982.<sup>4</sup>

Both the East and the West took action that alleviated the security-related concerns Bonn had expressed in connection to the NPT. In February 1969, Moscow assured in writing that the UNSC Res. 255 on the security of non-nuclear NPT states applied to the FRG. In the fall, the US and the UK reaffirmed their security guarantees for NATO states. For instance Küntzel argues that also the boost Bonn got for its status through the NPG was making acceptance of the NPT easier for it.<sup>5</sup>

Quester notes that it was at the time debated whether Moscow truly wanted Bonn to sign the NPT at all: non-signature could have weakened Bonn's prestige compared to the GDR and its going nuclear was anyway unlikely. But its failure to sign could have weakened the chances of the NPT coming into force at all, and that was not in Moscow's interest. Delay with its joining reduced pressure on other states to do so, especially since its signature was generally thought to be important.<sup>6</sup>

Bonn's non-action led to delays also regarding the superpowers' ratifications. Since it would have been hard for Moscow to exit the NPT after it had come to force, to preclude the chance that the FRG would join it only thereafter with unacceptable reservations, Moscow did not want to deposit its ratification (and thus enable the NPT to come to force) be-

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<sup>2</sup> Quester 1973 p. 175; Radkau 1983 p. 332; Häckel 1989 pp. 21-2; Küntzel 1992 pp. 198-201; Schrafstetter 2004 p. 135.

<sup>3</sup> Radkau 1983 p. 332.

<sup>4</sup> Krass et al 1983 pp. 199-200; <http://www.urengo.com/> (3 Oct 07). On this cooperation, see Schrafstetter & Twigge 2002. They argue that London favored it because it wanted both a European source for enriched uranium and to weaken special Franco-German ties and Paris's leadership on the continent.

<sup>5</sup> Kohler 1972 pp. 139-41; Häckel 1989 p. 23; Küntzel 1992 pp. 193, 196; Preisinger 1993 p. 152.

<sup>6</sup> Quester 1973 pp. 170-1, 180.

fore Bonn signed. But to avoid an impression that its signature was a condition for Soviet ratification, that the NPT was directed against the FRG, or that it deferred to Soviet desires, Bonn did not want to sign the NPT before Soviet ratification was certain. To protect Bonn from embarrassing pressure, the USG agreed to postpone the deposit of its ratification until that happened. A solution that protected the faces of all sides was that in November 1969, the superpowers jointly announced that they would shortly deposit their ratifications, Bonn soon thereafter signed the NPT, and the others then deposited their ratifications (after the forty other signatures were achieved that also were a condition for the treaty's coming into force).<sup>7</sup>

After fall 1969 elections in the FRG, the SPD, being reformed and abandoning old, rigid stances, formed the government. For it and Chancellor Brandt, joining the NPT was in line with a new foreign policy line, *Ostpolitik*, which aimed at better relations with the East.<sup>8</sup>

When Bonn signed the NPT, it simultaneously presented its treaty interpretations. A key point was that major changes in the security environment would suffice as a reason to exit the NPT: Bonn referred to an understanding that the country's security would "continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system".<sup>9</sup>

Fischer suggests that Bonn attached a *legally effective rebus sic stantibus* -clause to its signature, but Preisinger points out that it made no *legal reservation* (see section 9.7.1) when joining the NPT. Still, since no signatory explicitly opposed Bonn's interpretations<sup>10</sup>, these (similarly as US interpretations) can be argued to have de facto gained some force, even though they were no formal reservations.

The rebus sic stantibus -principle had in the meanwhile gotten some general support from the fact that after negotiations lasting two decades, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties<sup>11</sup>, which codified this and many other general principles related to international agreements, had been opened for signature in May 1969.

Häckel argues that by joining the NPT, the FRG gave up options it would have rather kept open but gained others: by creating a legal basis for its actions and claims, the NPT pro-

<sup>7</sup> Quester 1973 pp. 50, 169, 176-7.

<sup>8</sup> Schwartz 1983 p. 189; Boutwell 1990 pp. 45-51; Paul 2000 p. 41.

<sup>9</sup> Its interpretations included also that, e.g., UNSC Res. 255 applied to the FRG; the NPT would not harm European unification; the promised arms control talks would start promptly; the NPT was only to keep NNWSs from acquiring nuclear explosive devices and implied no restrictions on other uses of or research on nuclear energy (also in case of civilian activities potentially useful for weapon purposes); "the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes" would be facilitated; and Euratom states would jointly conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA so that the roles of Euratom and its members would not change – only thereafter, the FRG was to ratify the NPT. Bonn also stressed that the US and the UK needed to carry out their offers to accept safeguards and expressed hope of similar moves by other NWSs. Declaration and statement of the FRG on signing the NPT, 28 Nov 69, <http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf> (6 March 06). On Bonn's interpretations, see also Küntzel 1992 pp. 201-4, 253; Preisinger 1993 pp. 148-50.

<sup>10</sup> Fischer 1988 p. 18; Preisinger 1993 pp. 149-50.

<sup>11</sup> Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 69.

tected it against suspicions about its nuclear ambitions<sup>12</sup>. It can also be asked, how much Bonn (and other NNWS signatories) really gave up at all. It is debatable whether the NPT was a more important non-nuclear promise than the 1954 pledge that was a part of the deal that laid the basis of its whole national security strategy. And Bonn de facto attached also to its NPT signature some kind of a *rebus sic stantibus* -clause, on which it could have pleaded had its security environment clearly changed so that it would have wanted to produce nuclear weapons – something US guarantees and the security situation anyway kept it from doing for the time being. By securing so much freedom for nuclear activities under the NPT, Bonn secured the option of going nuclear quickly if need be.

Shortly after Bonn signed the NPT, talks started between it and Moscow about renunciation of the use of force. In the resulting August 1970 Moscow Treaty, Bonn recognized the sanctity of European borders and Moscow promised to act according to the principles of the UN Charter towards the FRG.<sup>13</sup>

A detailed NPT safeguards agreement and one between the IAEA and Euratom were still to be negotiated. A long, complicated negotiation process started. The NPT came into force in March 1970 and in June, the IAEA started preparing a detailed model safeguard treaty. Its Board of Governors accepted the model treaty in spring 1971. Owing to, e.g., West German influence, and in the spirit of the safeguard clauses in the NPT, the safeguards came to be limited. Euratom-IAEA negotiations started in fall 1971 and led to a control and verification agreement in July 1972 (principles followed in the two agreements were discussed in section 9.7.2). The non-nuclear Euratom states ratified the NPT in May 1975. At that point, Bonn reaffirmed its NPT interpretations. Thereafter, negotiations started on adjusting Euratom controls to the NPT framework. Only in February 1977, the IAEA-Euratom verification treaty came into force and IAEA controls started also in the FRG.<sup>14</sup>

### 10.1.2 Israel remains an opaque nuclear power

After Nixon took office, US pressure on Israel's nuclear program weakened, and within a year, it was by and far abandoned. The tacit understanding that Israel would not become an *overt* nuclear power crystallized between the two sides.

In spring 1969, *Der Spiegel* reported that Israel had manufactured 5-6 nuclear weapons and been separating plutonium “at a super-secret installation even deeper in the Negev”. The GOI labeled the story “unfounded” and US officials questioned it.<sup>15</sup> But signs of Israel quickly approaching nuclear and missile capabilities did make the DOS and the DOD want

<sup>12</sup> Häckel 1989 pp. 40, 43-4.

<sup>13</sup> Kohler 1972 pp. 140-1; Küntzel 1992 pp. 193-4.

<sup>14</sup> Bonn's ratification declaration, <http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf> (6 March 06); Seaborg 1987 p. 304; “The Bomb Proliferates”, *Le Monde Diplomatique English Ed.*, 3 Nov 05, <http://mondediplo.com/2005/11/03sixtyyears> (18 Jan 06). On IAEA safeguards and IAEA-Euratom negotiations, see Küntzel 1992 pp. 214-33.

<sup>15</sup> “German Magazine Says Israelis Have A-Bomb”, *Washington Post*, 9 May 69.

to try to stop it from going further down the nuclear road. USG officials did not expect Israel to agree to fully abandon its capabilities to produce nuclear weapons but some still hoped it to promise to join the NPT and not to go further in its nuclear efforts or construct or operationalize nuclear weapons. Approaches to persuade Israel to make such promises were planned. But Nixon rejected the idea of using Phantom deliveries to press on the matter (after all, the deal had the cancellation clause).<sup>16</sup> However, since the F-4 sale had already been agreed upon and Israel's stance on the cancellation clause was unresponsive, it would probably anyway have been hard for the USG to now bargain with the aircraft.

USG officials now again inquired of the Israelis about the NPT, the definition of "introduction of nuclear weapons", whether Israel would agree not to "possess" them, and strategic missile deployments. Israel delayed answering.<sup>17</sup>

But Israel's nuclear program was on the agenda when Nixon met Meir, now Prime Minister in fall 1969. By then, the impression spread within the USG that Israel maybe already had nuclear weapons. But that did not need to mean Israel would *declare* itself a nuclear power. Memos related to the meeting show what were now the key goals of the USG: Israeli frankness with it and its not *appearing* as a NWS. A preparatory DOS memo for Nixon said that Israel maybe had a crude weapon but had never revealed its aims to the US; even visits to Dimona had failed to do this. The DOS proposed Nixon to tell Meir that the USG was concerned about Israeli secrecy towards it, which, if continuing, would overshadow US-Israeli relations. The DOS position was that the USG understood why Israel maybe wanted a nuclear *capability* but was convinced that its *having complete weapons* would ensure neither its security nor peace. It did *not* expect Israel to give up its capability to construct nuclear weapons but saw "no reason" why it would not join the NPT – an indication of how much value the USG laid on the NPT as nonproliferation tool.<sup>18</sup>

Nixon indeed stressed to Meir that the key concern of the USG was "that the Israelis make no *visible* introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a nuclear test program<sup>19</sup>". Cohen and Burr argue that the two leaders reached an understanding that Israel would not become an overt nuclear power and the USG would not press it to abandon its nuclear efforts<sup>20</sup>.

After the meeting, Israel answered the earlier US questions that it "will not become a nuclear power" (meaning, it seems, one that has tested the weapons or declared itself a nuclear power) or deploy strategic missiles before 1972. A reply regarding the NPT was given in February 1970: Rabin informed Kissinger that "Israel has no intention to sign the NPT."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>16</sup> See Cohen, A. & Burr 2006 pp. 24-6.

<sup>17</sup> D/22 Kissinger to Nixon, 7 Oct 69, NSA EBB ICT; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 333-5; Cohen, A. & Burr 2006 pp. 26-7.

<sup>18</sup> My emphasis. See SOS Rogers to Nixon with Att. B) Talking points, 16 Sep 69, USNA TSR; Cohen, A. & Burr 2006 pp. 27-8.

<sup>19</sup> My emphasis. D/22 (fn 17) NSA EBB ICT.

<sup>20</sup> See Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 334-7; Cohen, A. & Burr 2006 pp. 27-8.

<sup>21</sup> D/22 (fn 17) NSA EBB ICT; Cohen, A. & Burr 2006 pp. 28-9.

The USG had wanted visits to Dimona in order to find out what Israel was doing, prevent it from producing nuclear weapons in secret, make it harder for it to pursue them, and to be able to reassure the Arabs. As Israel seemed to have been somehow producing weapon material all along and press reports suggested this to everybody, rationales for the visits were vanishing. The DOS requested one more visit in March 1969. During a fairly long but inefficient visit in July, US scientists saw no evidence of weapon production.<sup>22</sup>

But according to a later *NYT* story, dissatisfaction with time and access limitations during the visits in general led the scientists to say that they could not ascertain that no weapon activities took place at the site. Also a USG memo shows that they were dissatisfied with preparatory CIA briefings and felt that the USG did not put them in a position to make real inspections and insist on full answers from the Israelis; they had subtly “been cautioned to avoid controversy”. Though their access to important buildings was limited and the hosts clearly hurried “past points at which they indicated a desire for a closer look”, they therefore acted as guests and did not protest. A DOS/NEA officer concluded that such visits were possibly even counterproductive in enabling Israel to say that it met US demands.<sup>23</sup> No evidence of a formal decision to end the visits was later found, but one was probably made when Nixon met Meir<sup>24</sup>.

By about 1970, Israel was generally seen as a NWS. In July 1970, Helms testified before the SFRC that Israel was capable of constructing a nuclear weapon. Based on Senator S. Symington’s comments on the testimony, the *NYT* reported that the USG had for two years thought Israel had an operational nuclear weapon capability but to protect its general non-proliferation efforts wanted this not to be known. Israel did not directly deny the allegation; the article attracted fairly little public attention.<sup>25</sup> From the Nixon era onwards, the USG also faced the question of whether to assist Israel in making its arsenal safe<sup>26</sup>.

## **10.2 Israel’s and Germany’s nuclear statuses in the 21<sup>st</sup> century**

The solutions thus reached on Israel’s and West Germany’s nuclear statuses proved quite durable: so far, the solutions have survived through almost four decades, the end of the Cold War, and several crises in the Middle East.

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<sup>22</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 330-2 ref. to, e.g., his 1996 correspondence with AEC scientists.

<sup>23</sup> AEC-NEA-Pleat (head of AEC team) mtg, 13 Aug 69, USNA CFPF B/2914; “U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts”, *NYT*, 18 July 70. See also Cohen, A. 1998 p. 332.

<sup>24</sup> See *ibid.* pp. 336-7.

<sup>25</sup> “U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts” and “Israelis Criticize Article in the *Times*”, *NYT*, 18-9 July 70; Crosbie 1974 p. 205; Hersh 1991 pp. 212-3; Cohen, A. 1998 pp. 1, 323-4, 337-8 ref. also to *Ha’aretz* articles, 19 July 70. From the Nixon era onwards, US permissiveness regarding Israel’s nuclear efforts was shown also by the fact that the Congress’s unwillingness to punish Israel restricted its legislative action on nonproliferation. See, e.g., Smith & Cobban 1989 pp. 59, 63.

<sup>26</sup> On this policy question, see Feaver & Niou 1996.



### 10.2.1 Germany after the Cold War: a solidly non-nuclear power?

Though the end of the Cold War and German reunification greatly changed the security situation in Europe, many of the elements on which Germany's non-nuclear status was built remain in place. At the end of the Cold War, the US made clear its intention to stay involved in Europe: in 1990, President G. Bush stressed that US forces were needed to stabilize Europe even after complete Soviet withdrawal from Europe, and in 1991, the USG warned European NATO states against independent defense. As of 2003, DOD military personnel in Germany still amounted to over 70000.<sup>27</sup> For instance Art and Waltz argue that the main task left for NATO and its hegemonic leader is to dampen intra-alliance tension, though the US uses NATO also to maintain its power in Europe, and that Europeans accept this since they cannot agree on any European leadership<sup>28</sup>.

The changes in the security environment have influenced Germany's attitudes towards NATO's nuclear policies: for instance, it has given support for a non-first-use policy and non-modernization of certain missile forces. Kötter & Müller argued in 1990 even that the dominant opinion in the FRG was that Germany should be as a NWFZ. Nevertheless, despite disputes caused in recent years by the Iraq War, the tie to the US and US security guarantees remain the basis of German security policy; a 2006 White Book on German Defense Policy argues that also in the future, basic European security challenges can only be dealt with together with the US. Moreover, the German government sees that a credible NATO deterrent continues to require a nuclear component and that for the credibility of the deterrent and fair burden-sharing in NATO, German role in nuclear affairs is necessary.<sup>29</sup> An estimated 150 US nuclear weapons remain in Germany<sup>30</sup>.

Art suggests that Europeans continued to desire US presence in Europe even after the Cold War especially because of fears of Germany. He argues that since the USG wanted to foreclose the chance of a *neutral*, reunified Germany, after the fall of the Iron Curtain it started actively promoting both German reunification within NATO and NATO's transformation from a military, anti-Soviet alliance to a more political, Soviet-friendly one, and pressing Paris and London to support German reunification – a prospect they considered worrisome. Art sees both advances in European integration in the first half of the 1990s and France's return to fuller participation in NATO as results of French desires to control the reunified Germany. When Paris in 1995 made statements about a possibility of it consulting other

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<sup>27</sup> "President Rebuffs Gorbachev's Plan on Size of Forces", *NYT*, 13 Feb 90; Van Evera 1990 p. 17; Waltz 2000 p. 18; DOD "Base Structure report", FY 2003 Baseline, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf> (11 May 07).

<sup>28</sup> Art 1996 p. 36; Waltz 2000 pp. 25-6. The persistence of Cold War security institutions has caused much debate on whether it supports RI or Realist theses. See, e.g., Mearsheimer 1995 p. 83; Wallander et al 1999 p. 5; Wallander & Keohane 1999 pp. 22-35, 40-6; Waltz 2000 pp. 18-27.

<sup>29</sup> Kötter & Müller 1990 p. 26; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung *Weissbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, 25 Oct 06, pp. 35, 37.

<sup>30</sup> Of course, this is a small figure compared to the Cold War maximum of about 3500. See Norris et al 1999; Kristensen 2005.

Europeans in nuclear weapon issues, this was in the public partially seen as an attempt to preclude German interest in a national nuclear force.<sup>31</sup>

When allowing German reunification, both NATO states and Moscow wanted a reconfirmation of German non-nuclear pledges<sup>32</sup>. Thus the 2+4 Treaty, which the two German states and the Four Powers signed in fall 1990 and which enabled German reunification, removed the rights and obligations of the latter over Germany, restored Germany's full internal and external sovereignty, and confirmed the sanctity of European borders, also included a *reaffirmation* by the German governments of “their renunciation of the *manufacture* and *possession* of and *control* over” ABC weapons and that “the united Germany, too, will abide by these commitments”, the NPT in particular.<sup>33</sup> But though in treaty drafts, German nuclear abstinence was to be *for ever*, this notion is absent in the final treaty. Bonn also rejected an East German initiative to introduce nuclear abstinence in Germany's constitution.<sup>34</sup> Since the 2+4 Treaty *reaffirms* earlier non-nuclear promises, it can be interpreted not to widen those, thus to be similarly limited as the NPT, and to include the *rebus sic stantibus* –clause Bonn in practice attached to its NPT signature. Müller argues that the Four Powers have in principle a right to withdraw sovereignty if Germany acted against the pledge<sup>35</sup>.

Bonn repeated the non-nuclear pledge in the 4<sup>th</sup> NPT Review Conference in summer 1990 and came to favor unlimited continuation of the NPT beyond its initial period of validity until 1995. Häckel and Preisinger argue this was logical: being one of the few states that have made commitments to forgo nuclear weapons also outside the NPT, dissolution of the treaty would leave it in an unequal position. For this reason, Germany now also opposes any further nuclear proliferation.<sup>36</sup>

Though European integration has since the 1960s progressed far, much less attention is today given to the idea of a European nuclear force. Also the hesitancy of some members of the European Union (EU) about a common defense policy means that a joint nuclear force is unlikely to soon emerge on the European agenda, as long as the regional security environment does not much change. But still, the role of the French and British nuclear forces in European defense continues to cause some discussion and even the idea of a European deterrent has not been fully forgotten<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> “France Floats an Offer to “Europeanize” Nuclear Force”, *IHT*, 25 Aug 95; Art 1996.

<sup>32</sup> Müller 1995 p. 182.

<sup>33</sup> My emphasis. “2+4 Treaty”, 12 Sep 90.

<sup>34</sup> See Küntzel 1992 p. 281. He notes Bonn was only prepared to reaffirm earlier non-nuclear commitments.

<sup>35</sup> Müller 2000 p. 11.

<sup>36</sup> Häckel 1989 p. 52; Preisinger 1993 pp. 108-9; Müller 1995 p. 182. On the extension of the NPT, see Simpson 1996.

<sup>37</sup> See, e.g., WEU Assembly fact sheet “European security policy, collective defence and nuclear deterrence”, Feb 07, <http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/Fact%20Sheet%20E%20nuclear%20deterrence.pdf?PHPSESSID=f3137d60> (11 May 07).

Usually Germany is today seen as no proliferation concern. For instance Mackby & Slocombe argue that “today, Germany is arguably the most resolutely non-nuclear major nation in the world” and though it “accepted non-nuclear weapons status only with considerable reluctance”, its “decision to do so has only been reinforced by time and changed circumstances”<sup>38</sup>. But not everybody sees the country’s nuclear status as permanently settled. This is shown by, e.g., an early 2006 statement by Germany’s former Defense Minister R. Scholz that one potential response to the threat of terrorism was to acquire own nuclear weapons, though before doing so Germany was to seek binding NATO guarantees against nuclear threats<sup>39</sup>. Mearsheimer, Van Evera, and Waltz argued in the early 1990s (based on expected security developments in Europe, rather than analyses of German politics) that Germany could be expected to acquire nuclear weapons<sup>40</sup>.

Today, Germany does appear unlikely to produce nuclear weapons early: no security threat demands such a move; its security remains guaranteed by the US; and the anti-nuclear and pacifist sentiments of the electorate are strong. But this might hold rebus sic stantibus only: as long as no major security threat appears that would call for an own nuclear weapons; the US continues to guarantee Germany’s security; and/or the domestic scene remains stable. Thus also in the future, the US and other concerned states should ensure that Germans continue to feel secure enough so that no interest in a national nuclear force will emerge – already that could have grave effects on stability in and further integration of Europe.

### 10.2.2 Israel honors the non-introduction pledge through the decades

Though Israel has made peace with Egypt, its security situation is otherwise still difficult. Its nuclear weapon policy has underwent no big change since the late 1960s when the policy of nuclear opacity was established. Based on, e.g., revelations by a former Dimona technician M. Vanunu, Israel is today thought to have up to 100-200 nuclear weapons<sup>41</sup>. It has neither joined the NPT nor opened the Dimona site for foreign scientists, nor accepted IAEA safeguards on it. But it has not declared itself a nuclear power or clearly admitted be-

<sup>38</sup> Mackby & Slocombe 2004 p. 176. Similarly, Preisinger 1993 argues Germany is a first-rate NNWS with neither chances nor reasons to question its nuclear status; moreover, sensitive parts of its fuel cycle are under international arrangements (p. 171). Müller 1995 adds that the situation is unlikely to change as long as its security environment and domestic system of democracy and welfare state remain stable. Instead, Germany now follows an active nonproliferation policy, a policy change that resulted from 1) a generally weakened status value of advances in the nuclear field and the rise of the FRG as an economic power, which boosted its status in other ways; 2) reunification, which added to its need to act as a responsible great power; and 3) the fact that it started to see proliferation as a security threat (pp. 181-5).

<sup>39</sup> “Germany may need nuclear weapons, ex-defence minister says”, *DPA*, 26 Jan 06. Häckel 1989 argued also that the impression of full acceptance of the NPT by all political forces in the FRG was illusionary (pp. iv-v).

<sup>40</sup> Mearsheimer 1990; Van Evera 1990 p. 54; Waltz 1993. They thought that the US was, moreover, not to condemn such an effort (but Van Evera argued that to prevent a risk of uncontrolled, dangerous proliferation, the US needed to give Eastern Europeans guarantees against German aggression).

<sup>41</sup> Vanunu’s revelations are generally considered reliable. See LC 1988; M. Vanunu: *The Sunday Times* articles, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article830147.ece>; <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/numbers/default.cfm>; <http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=297&contentId=158> (all 9 May 07).

ing one, though Israeli leaders have continued to make statements that clearly hint that. Though the USG has been unwilling to publicly admit that it knows that Israel has nuclear weapons, sometimes it has in practice done so: for instance, SOD R. Gates recently listed Israel among nuclear powers surrounding Iran.<sup>42</sup>

Though Israel has got no formal, overt US security guarantee, from the Nixon era onwards the USG abandoned hesitation regarding security cooperation with it. Israel became the number one beneficiary of US military assistance; the aid to it now yearly values about \$2,4 billion. In 1983, the two states established a joint military planning organ.<sup>43</sup> Art argues that a desire to maintain Israel's ambiguous nuclear status is one reason (together with the goal of preserving democracy and a moral commitment to the survivors of Holocaust) for US support for it, whereas Mearsheimer & Walt give the credit largely to the pro-Israel lobby in the US.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Gates's nomination hearing, 6 Dec 06, [http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/06/america/web.1206gates\\_text.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/06/america/web.1206gates_text.php). Around the same time, Israel's Prime Minister Olmert's statement where he seemed to list Israel among nuclear powers got much public attention. But in fact, he seems to have listed Israel among states that, unlike Iran, do not threaten others' existence. In response to the uproar the statement caused, Olmert declared that Israel's policy of non-introduction would not change. "Israeli PM in nuclear arms hint", with video of the statement, and "Israeli PM dismisses nuclear row", 12 Dec 06, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/6170845.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6170845.stm) and [/6172999.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6172999.stm) (all 11 May 07).

<sup>43</sup> LC 1988; DOS 2007.

<sup>44</sup> Art 1991 p. 48; Mearsheimer & Walt 2006.

## 11 Conclusions

In this final chapter, I draw together the evidence regarding my research hypotheses on the determinants of 1) US nonproliferation and security cooperation policies (section 11.1), 2) whether security cooperation was enough to keep client states from pursuing own nuclear weapons (11.2), and 3) USG bargaining power with its clients (11.3). I conclude the study by highlighting some findings regarding US nonproliferation policies in general.

Through the selection of cases to be studied, certain factors were kept invariable in this study, which affects the validity of the findings of this study in other cases of proliferation. Both Israel and the FRG were relatively open, democratic states, faced security threats that gave incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons, and had relatively close relations with the US. The lessons of this study are thus in the first place applicable to US policies towards other “friendly” regimes with whom security cooperation is an option. The factor of democracy and openness plays a role especially regarding bargaining tactics based on a need for ratification by domestic constituencies, but it also somewhat affects the ability of the USG to monitor a state’s aims and actions and thus probably its willingness to enter institutionalized security cooperation that implies risks of entrapment. But as, e.g., Israel’s case shows, important security policies are not always debated in democratic states, either.

Thus the findings of this study are directly applicable to many of today’s latent nuclear powers that could relatively quickly acquire nuclear weapons if they wanted. Moreover, though the states today causing the most acute proliferation concerns are not close to the US, also they tend to have (potential) patrons among other major powers and thus the lessons can be helpful regarding them, too.

I only study the bipolar era and the time before the NPT regime was established. Still, I expect the findings to be largely applicable also to later situations assuming 1) large differences in the power of patron and client states so that considerations of relative power between them play little role, and 2) only a few great powers so that they have incentives to play a major role in nonproliferation efforts. The changed polarity implies that the balance-of-power against Russia is a less important factor today for the US, but the point that expected effects on the foreign policy orientation of third states influence US willingness to enter security cooperation with some specific state still applies, even if less strongly than during the Cold War. It remains in the interest of the USG to seek to avoid unnecessary risks of entrapment in war, which is likely to affect its willingness to guarantee the security of other states, especially states involved in prolonged conflicts. And as security still is a key reason for states to pursue nuclear weapons, credible security cooperation remains a central way to persuade them not to do so. Despite the fact that the NPT regime is established, the USG continues to play a key role in nonproliferation since it, not the regime as such, can credibly offer protection to other states. Today’s nonproliferation policies are affected by the goal of protecting the NPT regime from erosion, but this indeed

has similar effects as the goal of establishing the regime had earlier on: one case of proliferation implies the risk of a proliferation chain reaction, and especially avoiding open challenges to the regime remains important.

### ***11.1 Security needs determining basic foreign policy choices of the US***

In line with hypothesis 1, the goal of security, and thus protecting the balance-of-power and war-avoidance, can explain why the USG 1) saw nuclear proliferation by both the FRG and Israel as undesirable and 2) gave strong security guarantees for the FRG and was willing to institutionalize them but was not prepared to do likewise in Israel's case.

The facts that the US and the FRG were threatened by the same opponent but it and Israel were not, and that Cold War blocks were less clearly formed in the Middle East than in Europe, led to clear differences in US relations to Israel and the FRG. In the Middle East, alignments and alliances were in flux and the superpowers acutely competed about the foreign policy orientation of Arab states. Unlike Israel, the USG did not see Arabs as its opponents: though some Arab regimes chose cooperation with Moscow, the opponent was Moscow, not Arabs, and the USG remained interested in reversing such alignments. The US and especially Israel wanted to keep Arabs also from forming a genuine alliance among themselves as that could have allowed them to threaten Israel's existence. Because of the Arab-Israel conflict, taking clearly sides with either de facto implied turning one's back to the other side, and thus the US was unwilling to give Israel binding guarantees. As key US interest in the area – denial to Moscow, ensured access through and to the region and its resources – did not imply that it would have been in US interest in all potential regional hostilities to intervene on Israel's side, Israelis felt a need for independent defense. In the Middle East, the superpowers were outside actors, not themselves a part of the regional balance-of-power, and by trying to stick to a middle position, especially the USG tacitly reserved itself a role as an external balancer that could in principle interfere on either side's behalf when stability required that.

On the contrary, the situation regarding the orientation of European states became quite settled during an early part of the period studied: two strong power blocks became established and the superpowers, themselves a part of the regional balance-of-power, had hegemonic positions in them. Beyond propaganda campaigns, the US and the USSR in practice made little effort to win over allies from each other's block – such efforts implied risks of war that neither side was willing to accept<sup>1</sup> – though owing to the lack of formal settlement regarding Germany and historical experiences, many policy-makers in the West and the East feared that the orientation of Germans was not quite as settled as that of other

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<sup>1</sup> Beyond the two power blocks, a few European states were established as neutral powers, whose statuses the superpowers also by and large respected to protect stability in the area.

states in the area. In this situation, both the USG and Bonn recognized and accepted a need for joint defense (whereas Bonn had little choice but to accept it). The US-FRG non-proliferation bargain was embedded in the European security architecture and undistinguishable from the policy of tying the FRG to the West, whereas in the Middle East, US policy-making happened in a much less settled setting where decisions regarding policy towards one state could often affect the orientation of others.

### 11.1.1 Stances towards the prospects of nuclear weapon proliferation

The evidence in this study gives support for hypothesis 1.1 that USG stances towards nuclear proliferation by the FRG and Israel depended on how it expected that to affect the balance-of-power vis-à-vis Moscow and/or the risk for the US of entrapment in warfare. Though potential acquisition of a national nuclear force by either state did as such not directly threaten the security of the US, the USG took a strict stance of opposition to proliferation in each case. The key reason it gave for this was that it expected *other states* – other Europeans and Moscow, or Arabs, respectively – to otherwise react severely. Moreover, proliferation by either state was expected to harm efforts for a NPT and in general increase prospects of proliferation, which the USG overall wanted to avoid because of an expected effect of increase in risks of war and escalation.

Had Bonn seemed to pursue nuclear weapons, a chain reaction of proliferation might have proceeded, first in Europe and maybe then elsewhere, too, Moscow might have taken military action, and US-Soviet relations would have deteriorated, all increasing risks of East-West instability. As any hostilities in Europe were seen to imply a clear risk of escalation, it was crucial for the USG also to preclude any dangerous adventurism by Bonn that could have been the result of its acquiring an own nuclear force. Moreover, even just emergence of interest in such a force in the FRG was feared to endanger the unity and existence of NATO, and as a consequence, US position in Europe and Western defense against the USSR.

The USG expected Israel's acquiring of nuclear weapons to weaken the balance-of-power with the USSR and increase risks of escalation in regional hostilities as Arabs were thought to react by seeking nuclear weapons, making preventive attacks, or allying with Moscow. Even Israel's nuclear weapons alone could heighten risks of escalation for the US in any warfare in the area: as Moscow was expected to help Arabs especially if these were threatened by a nuclear-armed Israel, chances of escalation to superpower level existed.

As preventing Israel's and West Germany's going nuclear was important for it, the USG took action to hinder it and this goal was an important consideration in its security policies towards the two states. In the case of the FRG, this was evident in that, e.g., the USG maintained armament production restrictions on the FRG; supported Euratom as a way to

safeguard especially its nuclear efforts; justified the various nuclear sharing schemes in NATO – cooperation on US weapon stockpiles, ideas of joint delivery system development, consultative schemes, and proposals for a joint nuclear force – with a need to prevent the FRG from pursuing nuclear weapons alone or with France; strongly pressed Bonn to join the PTBT and the NPT; and in general often stressed to it the importance that the FRG would not pursue nuclear weapons on its own – all this often at the price of discord in its relations with Bonn.

And though the US is today blamed for an allowing attitude towards Israel's nuclear program, during the time when Israel pursued a capability to produce nuclear weapons but not yet had them, the USG clearly opposed Israel's doing so and exerted pressure to prevent that. From 1960, when the existence of the Dimona plant was revealed and the USG started to strongly suspect that Israel sought nuclear weapons, until about 1968, when USG officials came to think that Israel had nuclear weapons, the USG tried behind the scenes to make Israel promise to limit its actions, prevent it from being able to produce nuclear weapons secretly, and persuade it to accept safeguards and arms limitation. Kennedy and Johnson themselves led this policy (Eisenhower had little time for policy-making as the Dimona revelation occurred during his last 2 months in office), though Johnson's preparedness to press on the matter weakened over time. Israel did not admit that it was pursuing nuclear weapons even to the USG, though Israelis did repeatedly make comments to USG officials that hinted at that.

However, though the USG saw Israel's non-nuclear status as important for balance-of-power and war-avoidance reasons because of expected reactions by Cairo and others, during the 1960s it came to see gradually that as long as Israel did not go *openly* nuclear, these reactions could be avoided. This somewhat surprising outcome is discussed further in section 11.4. Israel's opaque proliferation thus became something also the USG could accept; as Cohen argues, it was "considerate" of US policies and general nonproliferation agenda<sup>2</sup>. Though also this did increase risks of escalation involved in any hostilities in the area, especially Israel's going openly nuclear would have damaged the effort to establish a global nonproliferation regime, led to infuriated Arab reactions, and put before the USG a hard choice between condemning Israel publicly and following a clear double-standard regarding proliferation<sup>3</sup>. Towards the late 1960s, USG efforts thus became focused on preventing Israel's becoming an *overt* nuclear power.

In West Germany's case, the USG came in practice from the Eisenhower era onwards to allow the ally's becoming a *latent* nuclear power, which also was feasible because other states did not react strongly to such a development. The reasons for this are likewise discussed in section 11.4.

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<sup>2</sup> Cohen, A. 1998 p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Israel's refusal to join the NPT and lack of US condemnation of its opaque status may have over time harmed the regime, but Israel's its failure to join did not kill the treaty or even keep its rivals from signing (though for instance Egypt ratified the NPT only in 1981).



### 11.1.2 Stances towards institutionalization of security cooperation

This study shows that the USG was willing to have deep, institutionalized security cooperation with the FRG but not with Israel because unlike in West Germany's case, the USG expected such cooperation with Israel to overall have a negative effect on the security of the US in terms of the balance-of-power with Moscow and risks of entrapment in warfare.

From about 1950 onwards<sup>4</sup>, the USG was willing to have an close security relationship with the FRG since it saw that as a way to protect the balance-of-power (Moscow was to be prevented from getting the FRG under its control), enable effective defense, allow controlling the FRG in a long-term sustainable way better than in case the US had just unilaterally maintained troops in the FRG (which could have created resentment), and thus prevent war in Europe. At the same time as the West agreed on West Germany's rearmament, it thus agreed on greater institutionalization of security cooperation. By enabling both controlling the FRG and making it secure without own nuclear weapons, such cooperation also helped the USG to keep the FRG from acquiring own nuclear weapons, which was, as already discussed, important for it since it wanted to protect the cohesion of the West, prevent adventurism by Bonn, and avoid instability in Europe. During the 1960s, the USG came to see close US-FRG ties also as a way to prevent a Franco-German anti-US coalition.

All four Presidents saw keeping Western Europe, including the FRG, on the US side and outside the Soviet camp as important for the security of the US. Americans were prepared to commit themselves to West Germany's security and have close security cooperation with it because of perceptions that the Soviet threat on Western Europe was a direct threat to the US, the US and the FRG shared important security interests, and the US would anyway have to intervene in case of Soviet aggression in Europe. The effect of the US-FRG alliance on the balance-of-power with the USSR was positive and unproblematic as it did not negatively affect the orientation of third states: the Western neighbors of the FRG in general favored having the US to control the FRG and its Eastern neighbors were anyway in the Soviet sphere of influence.

At the same time, the USG did not see US security interests as similarly aligned with those of Israel. Thus it was not prepared to tie its hands through close military cooperation with Israel and rejected repeated Israeli initiatives for any formalization or institutionalization of security cooperation. As no one clear threat scenario above others existed in the area from the US perspective and its interests did not require it to intervene on Israel's side in any potential regional hostilities, any measures towards integration of military forces was not in its interest. On the contrary, US administrations saw US interests to require not alienating Arabs, and as Arab-Israel antagonism meant that a formal alliance with Israel could preclude good relations with Arabs, the USG draw the conclusion that it could not

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<sup>4</sup> The USG did not reject the idea of a EDC, which would have implied a weaker US-FRG tie, but its preference was from early on a solution for German rearmament with direct US involvement.

tie such an alliance. An Israeli-Soviet alliance in turn was no risk to the US since Israel had no interest in turning its back to the US and joining the Soviet camp and even if it had done so, that would not have been a major security problem for the US.

The shared security interests and need to prevent Moscow from gaining control over the FRG led the USG to make efforts in the context of NATO (partly in NATO, but also outside NATO fora and directly with the FRG, plus sometimes some other allies) to protect West Germans and their productive resources from ending up under Soviet control and to keep them satisfied and under control in an alliance with the US. Since it saw good treatment of West Germans as necessary to avoid alienating them, the USG tried to please and show strong commitment to them by, e.g., keeping large forces in the FRG, pressing Moscow to agree to pursue a *global* instead of Germany-specific nonproliferation policy, and involving Bonn in its nuclear deterrent. At the same time, it sought to keep the FRG dependent on the US in tangible ways: for instance, West German military forces were integrated in NATO and during the time studied here, the FRG depended on US supply of enriched uranium.

The USG had two ways to deal with the risk of foreign policy adventures by a client and thus of entrapment into hostilities: to maintain distance and to try make the client so dependent that obedience was certain. The Americans were concerned about risks of entrapment resulting from potential adventurism by Bonn but saw close FRG-US ties and a satisfying West German role in NATO as the best way to prevent that and another European war that would have demanded US intervention: it was especially the chance of a *non-aligned* FRG maneuvering between the East and the West that created concern in the USG. Thus the USG chose the latter option with it. With Israel, it on the contrary chose the option of maintaining distance. Since US interest did not make intervention on Israel's side the natural US reaction in any regional hostilities and the acuteness and nature of the regional conflict made warfare and violations of peace by both Israel and Arabs quite possible, risks of entrapment were a real concern for the USG<sup>5</sup>. It *hoped* its (limited) support to have a constraining effect on Israel but was concerned that even close ties might not prevent unwanted moves by Israel but just increase risks of entrapment in regional conflicts. The strong concern about entrapment indeed was central in its opposition to institutionalized security cooperation.

A bargain on US security guarantees and Israeli restraint in security policies, including forgoing nuclear weapons, and towards Arabs was thus hindered by severe collaboration problems that 1) Israel would defect by taking action that would entrap the US in unwanted war or 2) the US would defect by failing to react if Arabs attacked Israel, and USG refusal, resulting from unwillingness to alienate Arabs, to launch measures that would

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<sup>5</sup> The US desire to avoid involvement in warfare was shown also by its guarded stance in the 1967 conflict where Israel's survival was not at stake and intervention could have led to little gain but meant taking a stance against Arabs and a risk of warfare against the USSR.

make defection harder by binding the two states closely together.

But though the USG was unwilling in general and publicly to take Israel's side in the regional conflict or to give Israel security guarantees, it would not let Israel's security to be threatened. Thus when Israel's security was seen to require arms supply, the USG gradually relaxed its arms policy towards it despite expected Arab displeasure. Israel's strength in conventional terms was in US interest as it made it less likely that the US would need to defend it in case of war, reduced Israel's need for an overt nuclear deterrent, and made Arabs less likely to start warfare against Israel.

It is not fully clear how the strong, informal and private USG assurances of security support for Israel until the 1967 war (when their limited value became obvious to all sides) should be seen. That USG officials saw them as basically serious is indicated by comments in internal USG documents about a strong, clear commitment to protect Israel. At the same time, Israeli leaders obviously did not think that the private assurances implied this. Arguing privately to them that they had a *de facto* US security guarantee was also a way for the USG to try to reduce pressure for more overt, binding commitments and to gain freedom to pursue a balanced Arab-Israel policy. That also the USG saw formal, public commitments as a very different matter than informal, private ones is shown by the fact that it opposed public commitments not only because of Arabs' expected reactions but also to maintain its freedom of action – indicating that it did not consider the private, informal assurances to tie its hands.

Despite the effort involved in reassuring West Germans, close security cooperation in sum benefited the US as it prevented the USSR from getting control over valuable resources and gave some leverage regarding Bonn's moves. Close relations with a state that became a large industrial power benefited the US in many ways: the FRG made arms purchases from it, in general became a key trade partner, and contributed to Western defense, which was much more efficiently organized as the efforts of the front-line state were integrated to those of other Western states. Israel could during the time studied offer much less help for American military efforts (its granting of, e.g., overflight rights could sometimes be useful), and was, as an economically dependent and small state, in sum no financially valuable client to the US.

The US took upon itself two key tasks in Europe: first, balancing against the USSR through internal efforts, alliances, and support for clients' internal efforts; second, managing relations among Western European states. Together with measures of European integration (the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC), which the US backed, and with the establishment of close Franco-German cooperation, the US role as the guarantor of peace in the area helped Western Europeans to overcome their fears of each other enough so that other states had less reason to be concerned about the consequences of the rearmament and economic success of the FRG (and though the FRG had no own nuclear weapons, it did not need to be concerned about French or British nuclear forces). Even Moscow was able to

tacitly accept this solution since it kept the FRG under control. Owing to the acute conflict between Israel and its neighbors and the unsettled situation regarding the foreign policy orientations of Middle East states, performing such a management task was not possible for the USG in that area.

Balance-of-power issues posed special problems for the USG in the question of Israel's nuclear ambitions. Had it given Israel overt security guarantees, Arab-Soviet ties would have strengthened, its freedom of action in regional affairs decreased, and risks of entrapment in a regional war (possibly with Soviet involvement) grown. Israel would have probably forgone acquiring nuclear weapons but remained able to press the USG for further concessions with the option to resume weapon efforts. The expected result of not giving guarantees was that Israel would continue to press for security assistance and acquire nuclear weapons, which would encourage Arabs to seek them or to join the Soviet camp. In this situation, Israel's opaque proliferation route, no US-Israel alliance, and sufficient arms supply to make Israel secure without an overt nuclear status was for the USG the best of available options: Israel provided for its security without the US jeopardizing relations with Arabs. The opaque route was feasible because Israel had no need to deter nuclear attacks by regional opponents.

In conclusion, the USG made quite rational and from its perspective sensible decisions about security cooperation with the two states: the course of action it chose – institutionalized security cooperation with the FRG, supply of conventional arms to Israel – was in each case the best available to it. Its options with the FRG included, first, guaranteeing the security of the FRG. Because of perceived requirements of defense and Bonn's demands, this turned out to require close, institutionalized security cooperation. Second, the USG could have helped the FRG to ensure its security alone by helping it to build up independent military (including nuclear) power. But doing so was not in its interest: it, Moscow, and European states all saw the prospect of independent German power as threatening. Third, the USG could have forgone any security assistance for the FRG. But that would have probably resulted in either Moscow's gaining of control over the FRG and its resources, which would have been undesirable regarding the balance-of-power, or later maybe in the West Germany's becoming an independent nuclear power. Not having the FRG to participate in Western defense would also have weakened the security situation of the other allies of the US in Europe. The options of the USG with Israel similarly included, first, guaranteeing Israel's security. But because of Jerusalem's stance, this turned out to require taking clearly Israel's side against Arabs, which was not in US interest. Second, the USG could help Israel ensure its security alone with conventional weapons. Third, in principle it could have secretly helped Israel to do so by aiding its nuclear weapon effort. But the USG expected Israeli nuclear weapons to lead to undesirable reactions by Arabs and harm efforts for a general nonproliferation regime. Fourth, in principle also the option of giving no security assistance for Israel existed, but domestic pro-Israel feelings in practice made this unfeasible.

## ***11.2 Credible protection as a way to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation***

Evidence considered in this study gives support for hypothesis 2 that the level of institutionalization explains whether security cooperation with the US was enough to keep client states from pursuing own nuclear weapons: institutionalization alleviated cooperation problems and was suited to reduce Israeli and West German concerns about defection by the US. Whereas concern about entrapment and de-alignments influenced US policy choices, others' strong fears of abandonment in turn affected their preparedness to accept security dependency on the US and forgo own nuclear weapons. Bonn's preparedness to do so can be explained by the fact that in West Germany's case, several factors made the US commitment credible and reduced chances of abandonment: the existence of a formal alliance, the importance of which the USG often stressed in public and in private; presence of US troops and nuclear weapons in the FRG; a joint military planning system; frequent formal and informal political and military consultations; and Bonn's participation in arrangements for nuclear weapon stockpiles and planning regarding nuclear weapons.

The absence of all these factors in Israel's case in turn explains why Israel was not prepared to forgo producing nuclear weapons. Repeated Israeli statements indicate that exactly the lack of institutionalized security cooperation that would have tied the US to Israel's help made the security support that the USG was giving insufficiently credible in Israeli leaders' eyes and made them see own nuclear weapons as necessary. During the 1967 crisis, the limits of non-public USG security assurances, and the fact that the existing security cooperation did not tie the US to Israel's side, moreover became obvious (albeit Israel's survival was not at stake). This seems to have both strengthened the conviction in Jerusalem that Israel needed nuclear weapons and increased understanding in the USG for that stance. The experience probably was of some consequence regarding Jerusalem's decision to produce a nuclear force especially as it occurred around the time when it achieved a capability to do so.

Participation in the nuclear stockpile scheme and the NPG, together with the (albeit secret) consultation and veto rights regarding the use of nuclear weapons in or from Germany that the USG formally granted at the end of the period studied, also somewhat enhanced Bonn's status and thus weakened the prestige incentive to pursue own nuclear weapons.

The solution, based on the combination of these three measures, that the USG in the end found for West Germany's nuclear role in NATO, as support for the other just mentioned measures that in general enhanced the credibility of the US commitment to the FRG, proved successful in keeping the FRG as a satisfied, non-nuclear member of the West. It is possible that no national nuclear weapon ambitions would have emerged in the FRG even had no so deep security cooperation with the US existed. But since the FRG did face a significant security threat, it is likely that it would have in any case sought some kind of a nuclear deterrent for its protection.

Thus the collaboration problem of West Germany's nuclear protection was solved so that the FRG accepted dependency on the US and the US provided it with strong, credible protection. The solution became stable since both sides had strong *incentives* not to defect: it was in US interest that the FRG remained non-nuclear, and it was in the interest of the FRG to continue to enjoy US protection, which could have been withdrawn had it unilaterally acquired nuclear weapons. In that case, also other states could have reacted strongly. And after the USG had made strong commitments to the FRG, failure to honor them would have probably been generally seen as a major foreign policy failure, which further reduced the likelihood of US defection; though the reputation effects of failing to honor commitments may often be limited, in case of the FRG such would have been likely as the US had made unusually strong, verbal and tangible commitments to it. The collaboration problem was also alleviated through institutional measures that limited both sides' *chances* to defect. West Germany's forgoing of own nuclear weapons was formalized and verified through the armament restrictions and control functions of the WEU and Euratom and bilateral safeguards on nuclear activities, and integrated military planning in NATO allowed its allies to monitor its use of resources and military plans. Sharing of information by the USG about its weapons and strategy, West German involvement in the NPG, and existence of US forces in the FRG in turn strengthened confidence in Bonn that sufficient military forces and plans to use them existed for the defense of the FRG. Moreover, US sales of equipment and weapons helped in the build-up of German military power, which made the FRG more able to itself deal with at least limited aggression.

While Bonn primarily sought credible protection by the US, latent proliferation – especially acquisition of facilities required for production of weapon material (first plutonium production and reprocessing and later also uranium enrichment capabilities) was for it a way to alleviate the effects of a situation where the protection would weaken. Thus its dual policy regarding nuclear protection was to ensure that 1) the US commitment remained credible by seeking thorough, institutionalized security cooperation and 2) as an insurance policy, it would be legally free to and technologically capable of producing nuclear weapons.

A rationale existed to acquire an insurance policy: though the measures that created deep, institutionalized security cooperation and a tangible basis for US security guarantees proved enough to prevent fears of abandonment from pushing the FRG to producing nuclear weapons, the measures did not fully bind the US to West Germany's defense. The USG retained and saw it as crucial to retain the right for the US to alone decide about entering war (because of the Congress's constitutional powers, the USG indeed could not give up this right) and use of nuclear weapons (a partial exception is Eisenhower's preparedness to pre-delegate use decisions to NATO commanders, but only under specific circumstances; Bonn got only a right to veto limited use of nuclear weapons in or from Germany and no way to demand the US to use the weapons). But as US interests were generally seen to require the existence of a free, capitalist Western Europe on its side, the likeli-

hood of the US entering war and even using nuclear weapons if the FRG was attacked was large enough to deter Moscow from attacking<sup>6</sup>.

After the Israelis had repeatedly used the argument that they needed either nuclear weapons or deep security cooperation with the US, they probably would not have backed off in the unlikely case that the US would have offered formal security guarantees and deep security cooperation: doing so could have severed relations with the USG and led to direct confrontation. Israeli willingness to trade the nuclear weapon option for US protection seems to have weakened especially after Eshkol came to power, but this happened simultaneously as it was anyway becoming clear to Jerusalem that though the USG was assuming a greater role in Israel's security by providing arms, it remained unwilling to enter institutionalized security cooperation.

At the same time, the prospects that even far-going security cooperation would have in a sustainable way kept Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons seem weak: Israelis' great concern about security could have made them see or portray US protection as insufficient if any chance remained of the US not supporting Israel in case of hostilities. Especially after they reached a capability to produce nuclear weapons, and thus had an immediate alternative to cooperation at hand, they could have used the option to restart the nuclear weapon effort to press the USG for ever more moves on their behalf. Thus even if the USG had offered deeper security cooperation, the result could have been Israeli threats to go nuclear unless the USG agreed on ever more binding cooperation, which the USG probably would have quite soon not wanted (or due to congressional stances, been able) to accept.

Though the USG rejected institutionalized security cooperation, it came to secure the supply of conventional arms to Israel. The arms supply further increased the attractiveness for Israel of internal balancing, which anyway had compared to security guarantees the benefits of in general allowing action against US wishes and giving a more credible deterrent than US guarantees (it is more likely that Israel would retaliate, even with nuclear weapons, if it were attacked, than that the US would do so on its behalf).

The USG failed to make the Israelis promise not to construct nuclear weapons in return for meeting Israel's conventional arms needs, but it did reach a tacit agreement that Israel would not go *overtly* nuclear<sup>7</sup> (unless Arabs did). From USG perspective, this indeed took care of many problems related to Israeli nuclear weapon efforts. This USG-GOI understanding was based on chances to sanction defection: each side remained *able* to abandon

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<sup>6</sup> As the US remained free to decide, based on its national interests, about helping the FRG in case of an attack even the very close US-FRG cooperation is not against SR expectations. Only such security cooperation that would fully tie the hands of a powerful state would be against them as a state's first priority is its own security. If action that a state commits itself into on another state's behalf is anyway in its national interest, a state can also from SR perspective be expected to make strong commitments.

<sup>7</sup> As Frankel 1993 (p. 53) and Cohen, A. 1998 (p. 4) argue, though the US was unable to keep Israel from going nuclear, the relationship with the US determined *how* Israel did so.

the solution but had *incentives* not to. The Israelis knew that if they went overtly nuclear, world opinion would press the USG towards condemning the move and possibly ending arms supply. The USG knew that if it did not help Israel to remain able to defend itself without an overt nuclear deterrent, Israel could declare itself a nuclear power, which would have put the USG, as its arms supplier and a proponent of nonproliferation, in a complicated position and led to undesirable Arab reactions<sup>8</sup>.

### **11.3 Bargaining between the US and its client states**

This study provides support for hypothesis 3 that existence of outside options, ability to present own freedom of action as limited, and ability to threaten with sanctions or promise rewards affected the relative bargaining power of the USG and the client governments and thus help explain how far and strongly the USG was able to press its nonproliferation preferences on them. USG pressure, together with the role it gradually accepted as Israel's arms supplier, contributed to Israel's taking the opaque proliferation route but did not keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The USG was able to press Bonn to accept a NNWS status, but in return Bonn succeeded to get a role in nuclear planning in NATO and to limit the de facto implications of a NNWS status under the NPT as full freedom of nuclear activities (including plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment) short of production of nuclear explosive devices was guaranteed to all states. In the following sub-sections, I discuss separately how each factor and resulting bargaining tactics affected USG leverage with its clients.

#### **11.3.1 Outside options**

The first of these factors is an impression of significant outside options that enable forgoing specific agreements or even close cooperation in general.

Israel had alternatives to security reliance on the US: to go nuclear in an opaque manner, to do so openly, and to build up own conventional military power. It needed foreign financial assistance and arms supply to be able to defend itself, but this did not give much leverage for the USG. Almost until the end of the period studied here, Israel had willing arms suppliers in Western Europe. It did get much military and economic assistance from the US – government assistance totaled \$1,2 billion in 1950-68 and private financial assistance \$11 billion in 1948-77; the importance of the support is clear when comparing, e.g.,

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<sup>8</sup> It could be argued that the Israeli-US understanding over time became institutionalized as arms supply followed repeatedly when the USG saw Israel's security to require that and the two sides came to share expectations about acceptable behavior. But during the time studied, each major arms sale took place on one-off basis and required negotiations in principle about whether the US would supply major arms systems to Israel (the situation later would require separate study). And the understanding was not institutionalized in the sense that the two sides would have agreed on specific rules for each side's responsibilities and for how to change them or on organized, legitimized functional differentiation (see section 3.2.2.2).



the annual USG aid of \$35,1 million in FY 1951 to Israeli government's budget of \$168 million for FY 1950-51<sup>9</sup> – but domestic sentiments and the Congress's role in appropriating funds limited USG ability to credibly threaten to cut down official assistance to Israel.

Unlike Israel, the FRG was (after the early post-WWII years) economically self-sufficient. But being both a special target of political and propaganda attacks by Moscow and particularly vulnerable as a front-line state in Western defense, the FRG depended on the US for both political support and security. For it, a fully independent policy line was no real option as the US, the USSR, and other European states were opposed to the idea. A formal status of neutrality might have been an option for it in case of a general East-West settlement over Germany, but that was not in sight (and would have most probably implied some controls over Germany to prevent it from being able to threaten peace). And in reality, the FRG had no other equally attractive potential patron as the US. Realignment towards Moscow would have created a new, probably much less favorable dependency, and was in practice not conceivable as long as West Germans wanted to maintain their domestic system of liberal, capitalist democracy. Paris could offer only future protection by a small nuclear deterrent and made clear that it would keep its force under its sole control. For the same reasons, also Israel lacked alternative patrons, but unlike the FRG, it had the option of an independent policy line.

Bonn's dependency on the US prevented it from ignoring or rejecting USG stances. Its demands regarding various kinds of nuclear sharing in NATO were generally in line with and reactions to ideas presented by the USG or SACEUR. Even in case of the FIG initiative, Bonn sought to present the effort in terms acceptable to the USG. It had to join the PTBT because the US insisted on that. Though it succeeded to influence the NPT text so that this came to better protect its interests, it could not reject the treaty. Overall, it was unable to ignore the firm opposition by the US (and the USSR and other European states) to the idea of it producing nuclear weapons.

But others' (more or less realistic) *fears*, which Bonn fed, that Germans could once again become revanchist and nationalist, and in the 1960s that they would choose cooperation with France instead of NATO, gave Bonn some bargaining power with the USG. Though national nuclear weapon efforts were in hindsight against Bonn's interests, others' sensitivity towards the idea gave Bonn some room to use hints at it to press for a greater role in NATO, measures to bind the US to Europe, and a NPT text desirable from its perspective, especially as the FRG emerged as a major power. By meeting the demands, the USG precluded the chance of West Germans using an alleged weakness of the US commitment as a justification or excuse for own nuclear weapon efforts; after West German leaders had portrayed credible US protection and involvement in the US deterrent as necessary for preventing national nuclear ambitions, probably some of them would have seized on the

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<sup>9</sup> For data on US assistance to Israel, see Abed-Rabbo & El-Khawas 1983 and Mark 2004, and on Israel's financial situation, see "History Lesson: Israel's Economy", *Globes Weekend Supplement*, 23 May 96.

opportunity to call for an own nuclear force, had US protection weakened. The fact that such foreign fears, despite their questionable realism, gave Bonn leverage, shows how worst-case assumptions even about close allies' aims affect policies.

USG officials' concern about German nuclear ambitions enabled Bonn to play with and so strengthen the concern. At the same time, some kind of participation by the FRG in NATO's nuclear deterrent started seeming legitimate, though Bonn had first demanded only stronger assurance that the US would use its weapons to protect the FRG if need be. In this way, the role of US-FRG security cooperation as a nonproliferation measure grew.

But hints that nuclear weapon ambitions might emerge in the FRG also added to Bonn's need to reassure others that it had no unhealthy ambitions, strengthened others' opposition to any German access to nuclear weapons, and was unhelpful regarding stabilization of its relations with other states and attainment of equality with the UK and France in NATO. Thus by playing the nuclear card, Bonn did not necessarily enhance its position in NATO. Similarly, though Bonn tried to play with USG concern about Franco-German moves, its inability to risk ties to the US made it necessary for it to assure the USG that the concern was ungrounded.

During rearmament negotiations, the FRG was still under occupation and the Three Powers were in principle in a position to simply dictate, e.g., armament production restrictions and integration of future German military troops under joint command and planning. Nevertheless, Bonn had some bargaining power also in that situation since the USG saw it as important to make the FRG a *willing* member of the West and contributor to Western defense. Especially to preclude feelings of resentment in the FRG, the Three Powers were responsive towards Adenauer's demands especially regarding the form of restrictions and avoidance of overt discrimination.

The possibility of joint European nuclear weapon efforts gradually became a concern for the USG and thus a bargaining lever for Bonn. Eisenhower saw such as a smaller evil than national efforts and, in light of his hope of a third force Europe<sup>10</sup>, maybe not as so bad at all, assuming the efforts had a broad basis. In the 1960s, the USG more clearly opposed joint European efforts because such seemed most likely to take a solely Franco-German, even anti-American form. But owing to de Gaulle's nationalistic line and opposition to sharing control over nuclear weapons with Bonn, and the benefits of US protection, also this option in reality was no attractive early alternative to US protection for the FRG.

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<sup>10</sup> His and Dulles's support for the third force idea was based on conviction that Europe would remain close to the US. This somewhat contradicts the worries about risks of neutralism in Europe and of the FRG maneuvering between the East and the West or reorienting towards Moscow. In light of SR, Eisenhower's and Dulles's stance may be explained by hopes that the US and Europe would by combining forces beat the USSR and make the system (again) bipolar and that Europe was a more desirable bipolar counterpart than the USSR. But for instance Waltz 1979 argues that in many matters, a third force Europe might have cooperated with Moscow instead (p. 202). In practice, the two men's support for the idea probably resulted especially from a desire to withdraw troops from Europe.

To reassure Bonn and dampen its demands in the security field, the USG frequently made statements about the importance of the FRG for the US. At the same time, such reassurances probably added to Bonn's confidence to bargain firmly with the USG: an implication of being a valuable ally is that one's views should count. Thus for instance in spring 1963, the credibility of threats by the USG towards Bonn that the US commitment to Europe was not to be taken for granted suffered from its simultaneous stressing of the value of Western Europe for the US, which the USG did to prevent Bonn from pursuing (French) alternatives for the case the US did abandon it.

### 11.3.2 Tying one's hands

My study provides several examples of how, in line with Putnam's theory, the USG and the client governments used the tactic of referring to existing or making new commitments that tied their hands and limited ability to make concessions. In some situations, the use of this tactic gave either side bargaining leverage; in others, the main effect was just to weaken chances of cooperation by limiting the range of potential agreements.

Growing Senate opposition to new security commitments abroad especially in the 1960s restricted USG ability to make such and thus helped it to resist Israeli pressure for security guarantees. But this fact also in practice eliminated the option of keeping Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons by giving strong security guarantees. Even when studying the idea of exchanging security assurances for Israeli (and maybe UAR) nuclear and missile limitation, the Kennedy administration quickly rejected the idea of any alliance treaty that would require congressional approval and just considered the options of a unilateral policy declaration or executive agreement. The Congress' stances in the 1967 crisis removed even the small chance the USG had had (but not wanted to use) of satisfying Israel's security needs with an executive agreement<sup>11</sup>.

The Congress accepted the US role in the defense of the FRG and Western Europe in general after the opinion became prevalent in the early 1950s that US involvement in Western Europe was required to protect the area against Soviet pressure and the global position of the US. Most Americans came to accept this thinking and not question the general US commitment to Western Europe's defense. But the level of US contributions to its defense was disputed in the US, which enabled the USG to credibly argue to Bonn that unless the FRG acted in ways acceptable to Americans, troop withdrawals could follow.

Congressional opposition to any way of aiding allies towards controlling nuclear weapons helped the USG in case of the MLF proposal: it could credibly argue that allies had to be content with what it offered (a mix-manned, seaborne force under US veto) – or without

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<sup>11</sup> The Congress' stances also limited the ability of the USG during the crisis to give strong public or private assurances on Israel's behalf, an option it might have otherwise considered as a way to calm down the Israelis (though as things turned out, Israel's handling the situation on its own was probably anyway the best for the US).

any force. The fact that the Congress's stance restricted USG freedom of action and might have even made realizing a MLF impossible was not so bad for the top USG officials who saw the proposal as a tactical move, hopefully to be rejected by allies, assuming congressional opposition was not so clear that ratification would have seemed impossible to these.

The facts that the American electorate favored nuclear nonproliferation and that they, Germany's neighbors, and Moscow were suspicious towards Germans and strongly opposed any German control over nuclear weapons helped the USG as it pressed Bonn to accept a NNWS status. The support for nonproliferation in the US also helped the USG to press Jerusalem not to act in ways that would overtly challenge its nonproliferation policy – but was not enough to make Israel forgo acquiring nuclear weapons.

The USG sought to limit its win-sets with Israel with references to a need to protect relations to Arabs, a factor that indeed limited the range of outcomes that it could accept in dealings with Israel. Often Israel rejected that stance, but in some cases, e.g., the 1965 arms sale to Jordan, the USG managed (with the help of the sweetener of promising arms sales to Israel) to persuade Israel to accept such US action that was important from the perspective of US-Arab relations but as such opposed by Israel.

Others' wariness about dealing with the USG because of the requirement of congressional ratification was evident in some matters, for instance as Israelis questioned the value of private security assurances by the USG. Sometimes the USG used somewhat conflicting arguments at home and abroad, with the result of reducing the credibility of its arguments abroad. Its private security assurances to Israel were weakened by its effort in public to maintain a middle position between Israel and Arabs. The general security assurances made in connection to the NPT offer another example: the fact that the USG stressed in Senate hearings that no new commitment was made probably reduced the credibility of its argument to other states that the assurances were valuable. Especially regarding security commitments, foreign leaders probably see the positions the USG takes at home as truer than any private USG promises since major military action to honor such promises requires Senate approval.

Both Israel and the FRG in turn introduced a tradeoff and limitation to their win-sets by arguing that they would be only satisfied with either nuclear weapons or credible US protection; for Jerusalem, this bargaining tactic maybe aimed more at a justification for nuclear weapons than at a security guarantee. As both states faced security threats<sup>12</sup> that gave incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, and as any government has a credible commitment to own nation's security, the USG tacitly accepted the tradeoffs in some forms.

The GOI portrayed its win-set as covering only a formal US security guarantee and an own nuclear force. Nevertheless, it acquired also a conventional defense option. The USG

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<sup>12</sup> However, USG and Israeli assessments of security threats facing Israel in a short to medium term tended to differ. Probably Israel's exaggerated estimates were to some extent a bargaining tactic to secure greater US support, but they suffered from lacking credibility as the USG trusted its own assessments.

came to tacitly accept that Israel would *fully* forgo nuclear weapons only if it got security guarantees. But owing to strong US opposition to both an overt Israeli nuclear posture and security guarantees, US willingness to supply conventional arms, Israeli hesitation to rely on promises of outside help, and advantages of an opaque nuclear posture, Israel's defense strategy for situations short of an existential threat came to be based on conventional arms.

Around the mid-1960s, Bonn tried to limit its win-set to the options of joint NATO and national nuclear forces, but this attempt failed as incredible as it got little support for its interest in a joint force from any side and the USG expected West Germans to remain content also with protection by the US, combined with involvement in nuclear planning in NATO. But Bonn did succeed to portray its win-set as covering only credible (nuclear) US protection and a national (or maybe a French-German) nuclear force. Adenauer initiated the overt bargain between a NNWS status and US protection with referrals to a *rebus sic stantibus* -clause in his 1954 pledge. His successors sustained the tie, Erhard's cabinet to bargain on nuclear sharing and Kiesinger's and Brandt's governments to influence the NPT. As Bonn reserved, in its non-nuclear promises related both to the 1954 treaties and to the NPT, a right to reconsider if its security environment radically changed, US security guarantees increasingly became a nonproliferation measure.

Bonn used references to a risk of nationalistic backlash, or an anti-Atlantist, pro-France turn, to limit its win-set in general regarding policies disadvantageous for Germans. The arguments had some credibility in USG eyes especially because of the earlier experiences of German nationalism and resentment. Also the "Strauss factor" – his demands regarding nuclear weapons and for a pro-France course and the possibility of him gaining followers – helped Bonn to make the argument credibly.

These factors also helped Bonn as it sought to protect and promote its *status*, a goal that characterized much of its foreign policy stances in the 1950s and 1960s. Burdened with the reputation of the predecessor regime, the political survival of the government in Bonn depended on the domestic public's view of it as respected and well-treated by the West, especially as the GDR offered one alternative and a more nationalistic course traditionally another to the government's pro-West course. Thus Bonn could credibly portray status issues as a limitation to its win-set and to demand equal treatment with European allies in a variety of matters studied here, including restrictions to rearmament and nuclear development, Euratom, NWFZs, the PTBT, involvement in NATO nuclear affairs, and the NPT.

US administrations did show understanding for Bonn's status aspirations. Especially Johnson was wary of discriminating Germans in the nuclear field; Eisenhower saw relatively little need to do so and Kennedy and Truman seem to have been more confident about chances to do so without German resentment leading to dangers. The USG tended to be more willing than London and Paris to enhance Bonn's status in NATO, which is not surprising since the relative gains issue played a much smaller role between it and Bonn: increases in Bonn's status did not affect the status of the US as the leader of the West but

threatened to lift Bonn to the same level of status with Paris and London.

Nevertheless, over time it became clear that also the USG would not let the FRG to get a really equal status with the UK and France in the nuclear field; even the Johnson administration did not offer that to Bonn. Bonn was included in the restricted NPG but only Paris and London controlled nuclear weapons. The exclusiveness of the NPG was also somewhat limited by the inclusion of Italy and other allies (albeit on a rotating scheme). Bonn got consultation rights regarding the use of US nuclear weapons in and from Germany but only in secret. In the NPT, it could not help but to accept the division of states into nuclear powers and the rest, though it succeeded to limit the de facto difference between the two categories in that also NNWSs were granted full freedom of nuclear activities short of production of nuclear explosive devices.

Owing to the heat of the domestic debate over the NPT, the requirement of Bundestag ratification helped Bonn's bargaining position when it sought to influence the NPT text and argued that the Bundestag and Germans in general would reject a discriminative NPT. At the same time, world opinion in favor of the FRG joining the NPT made it practice unfeasible for Germans to reject the treaty.

West German leaders sometimes resorted to a tactic of constraining their win-sets with *public* statements: they tied the acceptance of a NPT to the creation of a MLF and in general made public demands regarding the NPT. The USG and the GOI tended to refrain from such risky tactics in matters studied here. On the one hand, the risks of the tactic are shown by the fact that the failure to prevent a NPT even though no MLF was realized was one reason for the fall of Erhard's government. On the other hand, the success of the Grand Coalition in pushing through other demands related to the NPT indicates that the tactic can also be useful.

In dealings over the Dimona plant, Israeli leaders sought to limit their win-set by arguing to the USG that others in the GOI or the Knesset would not accept more thorough, overt, or frequent visits to the site. The USG suspected such arguments to be mere bargaining tactics – but nonetheless failed to make the Israelis accept its demands.

For the success of the USG in bargaining over problematic issues, presidential determination tended to be crucial. In terms of bargaining theory, ability to refer to a strong presidential stance was a commitment tying the hands of US *negotiators*. Such commitments got extra credibility if they reflected a president's public, well-known policy line, such as Kennedy's nonproliferation agenda. Though strong presidential stances made US eagerness to reach agreement clear to others, which in principle was suited to help others to demand concessions regarding side-payments or the form of agreement (assuming the USG stance was not so rigid that the form could not be affected), strong presidential stances overall seem to have worked for US benefit. Presidential pressure indicated to the clients that the USG was very serious about demands it was making and prepared to use its leverage in the matter. After Kennedy insisted on visits to Dimona, the Israelis grudge-

ingly accepted such (albeit only limited ones). After he strongly expressed his stances, Bonn gave up its opposition to the PTBT and after concluding the Elysée Treaty adopted a pro-US course in its statements and regarding, e.g., arms purchases and the MLF. Likewise, as Johnson made it clear to Bonn that the FRG had to join the NPT, Bonn accepted that. When presidential determination was missing, the chances of success of USG policies were often weak. Kennedy's doubts about UAR-Israel arms limitation explain why the USG did not pursue it in a more determined way. Since Johnson was less committed to the Dimona visit scheme than Kennedy, the USG did not demand strict fulfillment of its terms for the visits, and achieved only unsatisfactory visits (but in both issues, it is unknown what the outcome would have been had the USG pursued its goals more determinedly).<sup>13</sup>

### 11.3.3 Promises of rewards and threats of sanctions

Evidence from this study indicates that though the great resources of the US did enable the USG to offer its clients rewards in forms of, e.g., protection by extended nuclear deterrent, civilian nuclear cooperation, or arms sales at favorable terms, its bargaining position suffered because of limitations on its ability to credibly threaten the clients with sanctions.

Though the four presidents had differing levels of ability and will to resist, domestic pro-Israel pressures in general limited their ability to credibly threaten Israel with such sanctions as cutting down economic or military aid, a fact Israelis were well aware of. This factor limited also the chances of the USG to refuse to gradually relax its arms policy towards Israel<sup>14</sup>, which helps explain that the GOI dared to strictly refuse any clear promise of nuclear forbearance in return.

When pressing Israel for nuclear restraint, the USG itself did not go as far as to threaten with *sanctions*; it only made *requests* and sometimes threatened with *weakening support*. Even that threat was not executed and the USG only expressed unhappiness when Israel rejected its requests: for instance, it grudgingly accepted Israel's terms for Dimona visits and backed down from demands to tie arms supply to nuclear restraint. Its record of demanding much but settling for little regarding Dimona visits and conditions for arms sales probably strengthened Israeli confidence to bargain hard over those matters on the next round of negotiations and eroded the credibility of the threats the USG made about negative reactions if Israel acquired nuclear weapons or kept it in the dark. The Israelis also successfully used a tactic of taking the sting out of US pressure by making partial concessions regarding the visits and nuclear restraint. They moreover benefited from ability to

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<sup>13</sup> Similarly, inconclusive talks on a test ban and a NPT first went on for years and treaties were reached only after Kennedy and Johnson made them central on their agendas in about 1963 and 1966, respectively. But in these matters, the primary bargaining occurred between the USG and Moscow.

<sup>14</sup> However, domestic pressures were not the sole or the key reason for the arms sales considered here; decisive was whether the USG assessed Israel to need the arms to deter Arabs.

threaten with campaigns against USG policies by Israel's friends in the US.

The USG was able to credibly make the point towards Bonn that both the US and, even more strongly, the USSR and other Europeans would react severely to any independent moves by the FRG in the field of nuclear weapons: general US, European, and Soviet opposition to such action was clear. But limits existed to USG ability to threaten Bonn with sanctions in case it otherwise did not fully follow its lead because close US-FRG ties were also in US interest and crucial for NATO. This was shown for instance in spring 1963 when the USG, on the one hand, wanted to make Bonn see that the US contribution to the defense of Western Europe was not to be taken for granted if Bonn and Paris pursued policies against its wishes but, on the other hand, assured Bonn that US troops would continue to protect the FRG, so as to keep Bonn from losing confidence in the US and pursuing closer ties to Paris. Similarly, USG ability to threaten with troop withdrawals unless Bonn offset their costs was limited by its desire not to undermine NATO and its strategy (but it still did succeed to press Bonn to largely offset the costs).

USG bargaining options were in practice also limited because *public* pressure on clients was problematic when good relations with them were wished and in particular because public controversy over their nuclear statuses would have attracted unwanted attention by the public and third states. As Bonn was anyway the target of Soviet propaganda attacks and stability in Europe required that both West Germans and their allies saw Bonn as a reliable, respected partner of the West, and domestic backing for the US commitment to Europe required that Americans saw West Germans in favorable light, it was not in USG interest to let the public to think that Bonn had suspicious ambitions. And though the American public might have accepted pressure on Israel in the specific issue of nuclear weapons, it was not in USG interest to publicly blame Israel for nuclear ambitions: the Arabs had to be kept cool and the global and European nonproliferation policy protected from the challenge Israel would have posed had it not bent under public pressure. Ironically, desire to protect nonproliferation efforts towards other states at least in the short term limited US freedom of action against Israel's nuclear aims. The goal of avoiding publicity also further limited USG options as it made direct controversy (which could have become evident to the public and other states) and most kinds of sanctions problematic (it is hard to think of sanctions that would not have been visible to the public or made public by the Israelis and their American friends). Israel's own policy of not admitting nuclear weapon aims and the relative Arab silence on the issue also made avoidance of publicity possible for the USG. Public pressure probably anyway would not have been a more efficient way to influence clients' choices than private pressure: it could have led to hardening of bargaining positions and thus weaker chances of agreement as governments could have been pressed at home to make commitments against concessions.

The cases studied here show that lack of information about foreign counterparts' positions enables clever bargainers to *create* bargaining chips, to be exchanged to concessions by



the other side, by 1) making some issues appear important to them, though they in reality are not, or 2) offering concessions that in the end mean little. A major ostensible bargaining card the USG created in its effort to make its allies accept its strategy for and leadership in NATO in face of de Gaulle's independent moves was the MLF proposal. For Kennedy and his men, this tactical maneuver was to make the USG appear as trustworthy and responsive but to be hopefully rejected by allies as unnecessary or unfeasible. Moreover, since the proposed MLF was under a US veto, it would have anyway given the allies no independent control over a nuclear force (as it was based on surface ships, it would have moreover been of limited military value).

Kennedy's MLF proposal and its ambiguity (a result of the goal of making it seem genuine and interesting to allies) backlashed in the sense that 1) those in the USG who really wanted a MLF persuaded Bonn to demand it and 2) Johnson, who was somewhat unaware of Kennedy's purpose with the plan, allowed more serious pursuing of it. But the fact that the MLF-men in the USG promoted the idea so eagerly also helped to make the USG seem willing to try to solve NATO's nuclear problems, which probably explains why top leaders did not more strongly curb down overly enthusiastic MLF efforts.

Though this was probably no original aim of the MLF proposal, by making it the USG also created a bargaining chip towards Moscow. In summer 1963, Kennedy hoped to reach Moscow's cooperation in preventing China's going nuclear by giving up the MLF plan. Though this did not succeed, the USG in the end bargained away the unwanted MLF in return for Moscow's acceptance of NATO's consultative arrangements under the NPT.

In turn, its keen demands for a MLF/ANF, which it as such did not really want that much, and then agreement to give them up, maybe helped Bonn somewhat to get a stronger role in nuclear planning and the rights of consultation about the US use of nuclear weapons in and from Germany. But the USG realized that Bonn stuck to the MLF/ANF basically for tactical reasons, and probably the most important reason why it agreed to increase Bonn's role in these ways was concern about cohesion of and strategy consensus in NATO.

One case of an Israeli attempt to create a bargaining chip to be traded away in return for concessions may be the issue of informing Nasser about the Dimona visits. Since the Israeli argument that it was good to keep him in the dark is not very convincing (reassuring him seems to have been beneficial for Israel as it helped to dampen his reactions to Israel's nuclear program), the impression is that Israelis objected to the idea largely just to make of the permission to reassure Nasser a bargaining chip with the US.

Also Israel's non-introduction promise was possibly an attempt to bargain away an anyway forthcoming "concession" in order to secure US arms supply: Israel might have taken the opaque proliferation route in any case. As gradually became evident, the opaque strategy was advantageous for Israel in enabling it to get the ultimate deterrent without stirring much overt Arab or world opposition. Had Israel gone overtly nuclear, it would have had to deal with general criticism and especially Arab reactions that could have included seri-

ous efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The opaque strategy was in line with the ambiguity Ben-Gurion followed regarding nuclear aims from the beginning and based on the Israeli idea of “not introducing” nuclear weapons, i.e., that Israel would not be the first state in the area to test nuclear weapons or declare itself a NWS.

This policy innovation took form gradually in 1962-68 in statements by different Israeli officials as a response to US pressure for Israeli promises not to go nuclear and was defined only in response to an explicit USG inquiry during the Phantom negotiations. It is possible that had the US not stressed the need to avoid Arab and world reactions and harm to US nonproliferation policy to the Israelis, these might have failed to conclude in time (before they made the capability overt) that an opaque strategy was advantageous.

Under Kennedy and Johnson, the USG in turn sought to benefit from arms sales it was anyway going to authorize – the Hawks, tanks, the Skyhawks, the Phantoms – by demanding quid pro quos regarding, e.g., Israeli nuclear restraint<sup>15</sup>, refugees, and Jordan. But also the Israelis seem to have counted on getting the arms anyway, which helps explain their tough opposition to quid pro quos.

As the USG tried to use conventional arms supply to bargain for nuclear restraint and the GOI to use the nuclear weapon option to press for arms supply, the two sides ended up using a tit-for-tat -strategy to establish the tacit understanding on nuclear opacity: the USG started making one-off arms sales and went on as Israel continued to show restraint by not becoming an overt nuclear power, and Israel stuck to cooperation as the USG showed its preparedness to help maintain Israel’s conventional advantage over Arabs.

#### **11.4 General lessons regarding nonproliferation policies**

Both the FRG and Israel posed noteworthy, difficult proliferation challenges to the USG. Their going nuclear was expected to create large problems both regionally and for US nonproliferation policy in general, and their being friendly states meant both that the world expected the USG to have leverage regarding their nuclear choices and that the USG had interest in protecting relations to them.

Throughout the time studied, the USG officially opposed the spread of nuclear weapons to further states. But the four presidents differed in how central nonproliferation was on their agendas, which affected how and how strongly the USG pursued nonproliferation. Third states’ expected reactions played a central role in the policy choices, and also because of that, preventing *overt* proliferation was particularly important for the USG in both cases. The USG reacted to the possibility of Israel or the FRG pursuing nuclear weapons primarily by trying to make them more secure through security cooperation, though in the West

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<sup>15</sup> The USG pursued quid pro quos in the nuclear issue partially because in this matter, pressure on Israel was likely to be acceptable to US electorate. But as the USG was unwilling to press Israel for nuclear restraint in public, the stance of the US electorate was less effective as a bargaining lever with Israel.

German case it also took some steps to satisfy the ally's status ambitions.

The USG sought a regional perspective regarding proliferation and use of security assistance as a nonproliferation policy. It wanted to avoid the effect that its policies towards the two states would make third states less secure and possibly more interested in nuclear weapons and considered how its actions affected its other nonproliferation efforts and relations to third states. Expected Arab reactions and general proliferation-fuelling effects made preventing Israel's going openly nuclear important. Similarly, several European states could have followed suit had Bonn pursued a national nuclear force, and had it for instance just rejected the NPT, other states everywhere could have more easily done so. In turn, the FRG was expected to go nuclear if many other states did (in Israel's case, proliferation prospects were not seen to depend on proliferation in other areas).

Other states' reactions' centrality in USG policy choices explains also that the USG accepted latent proliferation by the FRG and gradually tacitly opaque proliferation by Israel when also other states did. The who cases indicate that at least in the short to medium term, it is an *appearance* of nuclear weapon *ambitions* more than the spread of nuclear weapon *capabilities* that begets proliferation. As Israel *silently* acquired nuclear weapons, Arabs (especially Cairo) took no early action to follow suit or to clearly orientate towards Moscow. One explanation for this surprising result, contrary to what the USG first expected, is that as Moscow was not prepared to help Cairo to get nuclear weapons, Cairo probably saw pursuing them as not worthwhile because of uncertainty of success and costs in terms of money and harm to relations to the USSR and the US. Possibly it also counted on Moscow coming to its aid in case Israel threatened it with nuclear weapons; maybe Moscow even privately assured it that it would do so, even though Cairo did not formally ally with it. And as any such threat by Israel implied risks of escalation, Cairo probably expected the USG to do its best to restrain Israel. Moreover, the Egyptians probably expected Israel to threaten to use nuclear weapons only if Arabs threatened its existence. Especially as long as Israel keeps its nuclear posture opaque, its ability to threaten Arabs with nuclear weapons for offensive goals or to blackmail them are very limited. Israel's nuclear weapons eliminated the chance for its neighbors to threaten its existence, but their acquiring nuclear weapons would not re-open that option since Israel is capable of striking them back with nuclear weapons. This situation is maybe unique in some respects, but a general lesson may be that in some circumstances, protection by third parties and lack of realistic scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons can keep proliferation from begetting proliferation. These factors, based on Cairo's cost-benefit calculation about various courses of action and expected reactions by others, in line with game theory and Paul's prudent Realism, also explain the result that at the first glance seems to contradict Realist expectations about the effects of security dilemmas that make states wary of each others' *capabilities* and about a chain reaction of proliferation.

Latent proliferation in turn was acceptable to other states even in West Germany's case:

though it came to acquire nuclear-capable aircraft and short-range missiles and capabilities to produce and reprocess plutonium, to produce mid-range ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines, and later to enrich uranium, and thus became able to produce deliverable nuclear weapons within a short time, other states counted on its political promises not to do so and on safeguards that allowed verifying its activities at the time. However, they also got protection against the risk of the FRG breaking its promises by themselves acquiring nuclear weapons or latent capabilities to produce them. Moreover, other states probably expected the FRG not to pursue nuclear weapons as long as US protection remained credible, and to have time to deal with the situation later if US protection seemed to weaken.

Altogether preventing latent proliferation indeed was unfeasible. Having presented civilian nuclear development as desirable, and because of Cold War competition with Moscow, other states' indigenous capabilities for nuclear development, and the existence of other nuclear suppliers, the USG could not try to prevent nuclear development in industrialized states like the FRG or even such a small but technologically capable state as Israel. As civilian and military nuclear technologies overlap especially as regards to uranium enrichment and plutonium production and reprocessing, USG nonproliferation policy became thus focused on safeguards to prevent others from pursuing nuclear weapons *unnoticed* and seeking political commitments that others would not do so. Also hopes to benefit from technological advances by the FRG and create markets for US companies probably help explain the allowing USG stance towards its nuclear development.

This study also provides an example of states' differing situations regarding whether latent nuclear weapon capabilities seem justified to or worry other states. On the one hand, similarly as today in Iran's case, Israel's nuclear effort was immediately seen as a sign of weapon aims – even though exactly Israel's case is today often seen as an example of Western double standards of letting some states pursue even nuclear weapons without interference but trying to limit others' nuclear programs. On the other hand, in West Germany's case the West accepted broad nuclear development with little protest. Of course, the two states' own attitudes to some extent explain the difference in others' stances. Israel caused suspicious with secrecy and refusal to accept safeguards; the FRG pursued its nuclear program relatively openly and under safeguards. The FRG publicly and in multilateral treaties promised not to produce nuclear weapons (even if the promises were conditioned with *rebus sic stantibus* -clauses); Israel refused to do so. Lacking clear foreign security guarantees, Israel also had more reason to acquire nuclear weapons early than the FRG. Another explanation probably lies in states' sizes and general levels of development: a small, less advanced state needs to use more resources compared to its general level of development to achieve the technological preparedness to produce nuclear weapons than a large, advanced state, in the case of which investments even in a full nuclear fuel cycle may not seem disproportionate or suspicious.

As the core of an effective nonproliferation strategy is to improve the security of potential proliferants, the USG in principle has a powerful way to limit nuclear proliferation by giving credible security guarantees. But making such guarantees seem fully credible and trustworthy to threatened client states is no easy undertaking. The US guaranteed the security of the FRG in unusually strong ways: its security guarantees for NATO, the FRG, and West Berlin were formulated clearly (though even they included no obligation to automatic action) and strengthened and operationalized through a standing military organization, integrated military planning, strong US forces stationed in the FRG, and open-handed arms supply. Still, Bonn constantly sought reassurance about US determination to protect the FRG and portrayed any weakening of US protection as a justification for potential nuclear weapon efforts, with the result of the USG even designing nuclear sharing schemes to make its commitment credible; the USG paid a price for preventing the FRG from acquiring nuclear weapons. Also Israel's case shows that when strong security reasons to acquire nuclear weapons exist, *only* very far-going security cooperation, if anything, can prevent proliferation: economic and political support, informal declarations of support for security, and ensured arms supply were not enough in its case.

Moreover, the potential of security cooperation as a nonproliferation policy is limited because 1) so tight, institutionalized alliances as the one with the FRG create risks and costs that Americans do not want to accept, as many states' interests are less closely aligned with those of the US, and 2) the US lacks resources for such undertakings with many states. Security cooperation is a good way to combat proliferation (only) when US interests in general call for close relations but even then requires a regional perspective because of risks of proliferation chain reactions and to ensure that third states do not become less secure and possibly more interested in nuclear weapons. Even close security cooperation does not *eliminate* the risk of proliferation as alliances can dissolve; also the FRG acquired a latent weapon capability as an insurance policy. Nevertheless, through security cooperation, the US has chances to affect the *form* of proliferation – overt, latent, or opaque – which can suffice to prevent unwanted effects of proliferation. Moreover, since many states with latent nuclear capabilities are under US security guarantees, keeping the guarantees credible is an important way in which the USG can act against overt nuclear weapon proliferation. This implies also that far-going nuclear disarmament that would weaken the effective capability of the US to maintain a credible nuclear umbrella over its allies is not in the interest of nonproliferation.



## Appendix A. Abbreviations and acronyms

- A- airgram  
**ABC** atomic, biological, and chemical (weapons)  
**ABM** anti-ballistic missile  
**ACDA** Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US)  
**ACDA/NPT** (see LBJL)  
**ActSOS** Acting Secretary of State (US)  
**AEA** Atomic Energy Act (US)  
**AEC** Atomic Energy Commission (US)  
**AHC** Allied High Commission for Germany (US-British-French)  
**AHP** Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection, A. Harriman Papers (US)  
    **IM B/543** Israel memcons  
    **TBT B/539-40** Test Ban Treaty  
**Amb.** Ambassador  
**ANF** Atlantic Nuclear Force  
**APD** Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963 (document publication)  
**App.** appendix  
**Art.** article  
**ASOS** Assistant Secretary of State (US) (regarding Assistant Secretaries' responsibility areas, see the abbreviations for US Department of State offices and bureaus)  
**Att.** attachment  
**B/** box  
**Bb** briefing book  
**BDFD** Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Dokumente 1949-1963 (document publication)  
**BFO** British Foreign Office  
**Bg** background  
**BTO** Brussels Treaty Organization  
**C&C** command and control  
**Cb** cables  
**CDU/CSU** Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian-Social Union of Bavaria (FRG)  
**CEA** Atomic Energy Commission (France)  
**Chron.** chronological/chronology  
**CIA** Central Intelligence Agency (US)  
**CIA FOIA** The electronic Freedom of Information Act collection of the US Central Intelligence Agency, accessible at the National Archives (College Park, MD)  
**CINCEUR** Commander in Chief, US European Command  
**CNNWS** Conference of the non-nuclear weapon states  
**Conf.** conference  
**Confid.** confidential  
**COP** Committee of Principals (US)  
**Corresp.** correspondence  
**D/** document  
**DDE** Dwight D. Eisenhower  
**DDEL** Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Abilene, KA)  
    **IF** White House Office of Staff Secretary, International file  
**DDRS** Declassified Documents Reference System (electronic document database)  
**DepUSOS** Deputy Under Secretary of State (US)  
**Desp.** despatch  
**DIA** Defense Intelligence Agency (US)  
**Disc.** discussion  
**DPA** Deutsche Presse-Agentur  
**Doc.** document  
**DOD** Department of Defense (US)  
    **DOD/ISA** Department of Defense, International Security Affairs (US)  
**DOS** Department of State (US) (for the sake of clarity, I often use the abbreviation DOS before the names of offices and bureaus, and therefore my use of abbreviations differs from the DOS practice; in case of non-self-explaining differences, the DOS abbreviation is included here in parentheses)  
    **DOS/AE** Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space (S/AE)  
    **DOS/ES** Executive Secretariat (S/S)

**DOS/EUR** Bureau of European Affairs  
**DOS/GER** Office of German Affairs at Bureau of European Affairs  
**DOS/IAI** Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs at Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
**DOS/INR** Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
**DOS/IO** Bureau of International Organization Affairs  
**DOS/L** Office of the Legal Adviser  
**DOS/NE** Office of Near Eastern Affairs at Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
**DOS/NEA** Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian (and, until Aug 1958, African) Affairs  
**DOS/NR** Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs at Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
**DOS/PM** Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs  
**DOS/PPC** Policy Planning Council  
**DOS/PPS** Policy Planning Staff (S/P)  
**DOS/SA** Office of Science Advisor  
**DOS/RA** Office of European Regional Affairs at Bureau of European Affairs  
**DOS/SCI** Office of International Scientific Affairs  
**DOS/SFP** Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems in Office of Legal Adviser  
**DOS/Euratom** (see LBJL)  
**DNSA** Digital National Security Archive (electronic document database)  
**E/** US Embassy  
**E/B** US Embassy Bonn  
**E/C** US Embassy Cairo  
**E/L** US Embassy London  
**E/M** US Embassy Moscow  
**E/P** US Embassy Paris  
**E/TA** US Embassy Tel Aviv  
**EBB** National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book  
**CNP** The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964  
**HMW** How Many and Where Were the Nukes?  
**IB** Israel and the Bomb  
**ICT** Israel Crosses the Threshold  
**LTBT** The Making of the Limited Test Ban Treaty  
**NIEs** National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem  
**ECSC** European Coal and Steel Community  
**EDC** European Defence Community  
**EDF** European Defence Force  
**EEC** European Economic Community  
**Emb.** Embassy  
**EN** editorial note  
**ENDC** Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference  
**Esp.** especially  
**EU** European Union  
**Euratom** European Atomic Energy Community  
**Exec.** executive  
**FAS** Federation of American Scientists  
**FAZ** Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  
**FBR** fast breeder reactor  
**FDP** Free Democratic Party (FRG)  
**FIG** French-Italian-(West)German  
**FMRG** Foreign Ministry Record Group (Israel)  
**Fn** footnote  
**FOIA** Department of State Freedom of Information Act collection (US)  
**ForMin** Foreign Minister(s)  
**FRG** Federal Republic of Germany  
**FRUS** Foreign Relations of the United States (document publication)  
**GC** Gilpatric Committee (also used: President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation; PTFNP)  
**GDR** German Democratic Republic  
**Gen.** general  
**GFO** West German Foreign Office  
**GOI** Government of Israel



**Gov.** governor  
**GSN** Global Security Newswire (electronic newsletter by National Journal Group)  
**HEU** highly enriched uranium  
**IAEA** International Atomic Energy Agency  
**IAEC** Israel Atomic Energy Commission  
**IANF** Inter-Allied Nuclear Force (NATO)  
**IHT** International Herald Tribune  
**IMD** Israeli Ministry of Defense  
**IMFA** Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
**Internat.** international  
**IR** International Relations (academic discipline)  
**IRBM** intermediate-range ballistic missile  
**ISA** Israel State Archives (Jerusalem)  
**JAEIC** Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (US)  
**JCAE** Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (US Congress)  
**JCS** Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)  
**JFK** John F. Kennedy  
**JFKL** John F. Kennedy Library (Boston, MA)  
**8Q** National security file, regional security B/226 NATO weapons cables France 8 questions  
**ATB** National security file, departments & agencies ACDA disarmament subjects nuclear test ban  
**BMR** Bundy papers 4, White House subject files B/33 Bundy memos for the record  
**BT** G. Ball, telephone conversations  
**GD** National security file, Gilpatric 8, President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation major documents B/10 Tab 3 completed documents  
**GEB** National security file, Komer B/417 Germany Berlin  
**KDH** National security file, Kaysen disarmament subjects Harriman mission instructions  
**KI** National security file, Komer B/427 Israel  
**KSG** National security file, Komer B/427 Israel security guarantee  
**MEC** National security file, Komer B/437 Middle East Cane  
**MLF** National security file, regional security B/216-7 MLF  
**MM** National security file, meetings and memoranda  
**N/G** National security file, countries Germany B/75-80  
**N/I** National security file, countries Israel B/118-9a  
**NCG** National security file, regional security B/226 NATO weapons cables Germany  
**NGF** National security file, regional security B/226 NATO weapons cables Germany FRG-French nuclear cooperation  
**NSF** National security file  
**POF** President's office file  
**PR** President's office file, staff memoranda B/64a-65 Rostow  
**SAC** President's office file, Israel B/119a security arms control  
**SM** President's office file, staff memoranda  
**LBJ** Lyndon B. Johnson  
**LBJL** Lyndon B. Johnson Library (Austin, TX)  
**ACDA/NPT** Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during Johnson Administration II Policy and negotiations B Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons 2<sup>nd</sup> draft 1968, special files administrative histories ACDA B/1  
**BMA** Personal papers, Bator B/29 MLF/ANF  
**BNP** Personal papers, Bator B/30 non-proliferation  
**BNS** Personal papers, Bator B/29 nuclear sharing  
**BPM** Personal papers, Bator B/28 NATO nuclear problem MLF/ANF  
**CM** cables and memos  
**CNP** National security file, committee file Committee on Nuclear Proliferation  
**DOS/Euratom** Department of State during Johnson Administration Vol. I Chapter 3 Europe C Political-Economic Relations 5 The NPT Safeguards and Euratom, 1968, special files administrative histories Department of State B/1  
**DP** Vice President's security file, disarmament proposals Feb 1963  
**FGN** Personal papers, Bator B/26 NATO/France German nuclear sharing pre-Erhard visit  
**GC** National security file, subject files B/35 President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation  
**I:A** National security file, NIEs B/1 4 arms and disarmament  
**I:G** National security file, NIEs B/5 23 West Germany

**I:I** National security file, NIEs B/6 35 Israel  
**JNM** Johnson term National Security Action Memoranda  
**KD** National security file, Komer B/30 Dimona  
**KEV** National security file, Komer B/29 Israel Eshkol visit  
**KI** National security file, Komer B/29 Israel  
**KIMD** National security file, Komer B/32 Israel security missile development  
**KIS** National security file, Komer B/31 Israel security  
**KNP** National security file, Komer B/30 Israel nuclear energy program 1964-March 1966  
**MEC** National security file, Komer B/43 Middle East Cane  
**MLM** National security file, subject files B/25 MLF Bundy 18 Oct 65 mtg  
**MM** Memos & miscellaneous  
**N/I** National security file, country file Israel B/138-45  
**NPT** National security file, National Security Council history NPT B/55-6  
**NRG** Personal papers, Bator B/28 A Nuclear Role for Germany – What Do the Germans Want?  
**NSF** National security file  
**NSP** Vice President’s security file, national security policy B/7  
**S:MLF** National security file, subject files B/22-5 MLF  
**S:NPT** National security file, subject files B/26 NPT  
**VS** Vice President’s security file  
**LC** Library of Congress (US)  
**LTBT** Limited Test Ban Treaty (also used: Partial Test Ban Treaty; PTBT)  
**M** memos/memoranda  
**M/** US Mission  
**M/G** US Mission Geneva  
**M/RO** US Mission NATO and European Regional Organizations (DOS abbreviation: USRO)  
**M/UN** US Mission United Nations  
**MCG** Middle East Control Group (US)  
**Misc.** miscellaneous  
**MLF** Multilateral force (NATO)  
**MRBM** medium-range ballistic missile  
**Mtg** meeting  
**n/a** no author information  
**n/d** undated  
**NAC** North Atlantic Council (NATO)  
**NAT** North Atlantic Treaty  
**NATO** North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NDAC** Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NATO)  
**NIE** National Intelligence Estimate (US)  
**NNWS** non-nuclear weapon state  
**NPG** Nuclear Planning Group (NATO)  
**NPT/N.P.T.** Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
**NSA** National Security Archive (George Washington University, Washington, DC)  
**NSAM** National Security Action Memorandum (US)  
**NSC** National Security Council (US)  
**NSCEC** National Security Council Executive Committee (US)  
**NSCES** National Security Council Executive Secretary (US)  
**NSCS** National Security Council staff (US)  
**NSCSC** National Security Council Special Committee (US)  
**NSG** Nuclear Suppliers Group  
**NYT** New York Times  
**NWFZ** nuclear weapon free zone  
**NWS** nuclear weapon state  
**OCB** National Security Council, Operations Coordination Board (US)  
**OTA** Office of Technology Assessment (US Congress)  
**P/** problem  
**PAA** Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (FRG)  
**PAL** permissive action link  
**PPE** Public Papers of President Eisenhower  
**PPJ** Public Papers of President Johnson  
**PPK** Public Papers of President Kennedy

**PPT** Public Papers of President Truman  
**Prot.** protocol  
**PTBT** Partial Test Ban Treaty (also used: Limited Test Ban Treaty; LTBT)  
**PTFNP** President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation (also used: Gilpatric Committee; GC) (US)  
**PU** plutonium  
**Q&A** questions and answers  
**R/** Referat (FRG)  
**R&D** research and development  
**Ref.** referring/reference  
**Res.** Resolution  
**REU** research memo by the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (US)  
**RG** record group  
**RI** Rational Institutionalism/Institutionalist  
**RSB** research memo by the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (US)  
**S:** subject(s)  
**SACEUR** Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)  
**SACLANT** Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (NATO)  
**SALT** Strategic Arms Limitation talks  
**San.** sanitized  
**SBAH** Stiftung-Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus (Rhöndorf)  
**SC** Special Committee (NATO)  
**SF** subject file(s)  
**SFRC** Senate Foreign Relations Committee (US)  
**SHAPE** Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)  
**SNIE** Special National Intelligence Estimate (US)  
**SOD** Secretary of Defense (US)  
**SOS** Secretary of State (US)  
**SPD** Social Democratic Party (FRG)  
**SR** Structural Realism/Realist  
**SSM** surface-to-surface missile  
**START** Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
**T/** telegram  
**UK** United Kingdom  
**UK PRO** British Public Records Office  
**PREM** British Public Records Office Prime Minister's office files/11  
**UN** United Nations  
**UNEF** United Nations Emergency Forces  
**UNGA** United Nations General Assembly  
**UNSC** United Nations Security Council  
**Univ.** University  
**UP** University Press  
**US/U.S.** Unites States  
**USDel** US delegation  
**USDel/D** US delegation, disarmament talks  
**USG** United States Government  
**USIA** US Information Agency  
**USIB** US Intelligence Board  
**USNA** US National Archives (College Park, MD; Record Group 59 unless otherwise mentioned)  
**AED** Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Lot records rel. to atomic energy matters, country files B/409 FRG atomic energy development 1955  
**AG** Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Lot records rel. to atomic energy matters, country files B/409-411 FRG  
**Ball** Lot records of Under Secretary of State Ball 1961-66  
**BP** Lot records of Under Secretary of State Ball 1961-66 B/29 nuclear proliferation  
**CDF** Central decimal files  
**CDF B/1905** Central decimal files 1960-63 762A.5611 B/1905  
**CDF B/2059** Central decimal files 1960-63 784A.5611 B/2059  
**CFPF** Central foreign policy files  
**CFPF B/4162** Central foreign policy files 1963 AE 11-2 B/4162  
**CFPF B/3068** Central foreign policy files 1964-66 science AE6 Israel B/3068

**CFPF B/2914** Central foreign policy files 1967-69 science B/2914  
**DAC** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, records rel. to disarmament and arms control 1961-66  
**DF** decimal files  
**ERA** Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs at the Bureau of European Affairs, records rel. to atomic energy matters 1956-63  
**FRG** Bureau of European Affairs, Country Director for Germany, records rel. to FRG 1954-67 B/2  
**IAEP** Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, records rel. to Israel B/8 Israel atomic energy program 1961  
**IAI/D** Office of the Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs  
**IR** Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Lot records rel. to atomic energy matters country files B/418 Israel reactor  
**LBM** Lot records of Under Secretary of State Ball 1961-66 B/27-8 MLF  
**LEG** Office of the Legal adviser, European affairs, records rel. to FRG 1955-66  
**MC** Office of the Executive Secretariat, Middle East crisis 1967  
**MWH** Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Lot records of director 1958-63 memoranda to White House  
**ND** Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Lot records of director 1958-63  
**NRA** Office of Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs B/1 records rel. to Near East arms initiative 1963-4 Near East arms  
**NRI** Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, records rel. to Israel  
**NWS** Lot records rel. to disarmament 1953-62 B/24 nuclear weapons sharing  
**PDA** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, records rel. to disarmament and arms control 1961-66  
**PM** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Lot subject files of Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Aerospace 1950-66  
**PP** Policy Papers (RG273; National Security Council)  
**PPS** Policy Planning Staff records  
**RNA** Office of Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs B/1 records rel. to Near East arms initiative 1963-64  
**RRD** Lot records rel. to disarmament 1953-62  
**RRI** records rel. to Israel  
**SAEM** Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Lot records rel. to atomic energy matters country files B/417-8  
**SFRI** subject files rel. to Israel 1955-59  
**SNF** subject-numeric file  
**SRD** subject files rel. to European defense arrangements 1948-54  
**TD** Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Lot records of director 1958-63 B/7 tripartite declaration  
**TSR** Top secret records of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
**USOS** Under Secretary of State (US)  
**USOS/P** Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (for other Under Secretaries of State, see the abbreviations for the Department of State offices and bureaus)  
**USSR** Soviet Union  
**Vol.** volume  
**WEU** Western European Union  
**WG** West Germany  
**WH** White House  
**WHM** White House memos/memoranda  
**WMD** weapon(s) of mass destruction  
**WP** Warsaw Pact  
**WWI** First World War  
**WWII** Second World War  
**WWIII** (potential) Third World War  
  
**Three Powers** the US, the UK, France  
**Four Powers** the US, the UK, France, the USSR

## Appendix B. Laws and treaties

**US Atomic Energy Act**, 1946, <http://www.osti.gov/atomicenergyact.pdf> (21 Oct 2006).

**Control Council Law 25**, 29 Apr 1946, [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military\\_Law/Enactments/law-index.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/law-index.pdf) (10 March 2006).

**Control Council Law 43**, 20 Dec 1946, [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military\\_Law/Enactments/law-index.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/law-index.pdf) (10 March 2006).

**The Brussels Treaty**: Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 17 March 1948, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b480317a.htm> (24 Nov 2007).

**The North Atlantic Treaty**, 4 Apr 1949, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm> (24 Nov 2007).

**AHC Law 22** Control of Materials, Facilities, and Equipment Relating to Atomic Energy, 7 March 1950, *The Official Gazette of the AHC* pp. 122-32.

**Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community**, 18 April 1951, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: European organisations. European Union; 17 Aug 2007).

**Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the FRG**, 26 May 1952, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: historical events, 1950-66, organisation of common defense, EDC; 10 March 2006).

**Treaty on the European Defence Community**, 26 May 1952, unofficial translation without Annex II to Art. 107 in Truman's message to the Senate [http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/01/001669\\_1.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/01/001669_1.pdf) (10 March 2006); the Treaty and Annexes in German, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: historische Ereignisse, 1950-66, die Organisation der gemeinsamen Verteidigung, EVG, die Idee der EVG; 15 March 2007).

**Agreement regarding Article 107 of EDC Treaty** (§ 4-b), 27 May 1952 (in German) <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: historische Ereignisse, 1950-66, die Organisation der gemeinsamen Verteidigung, EVG, die Idee der EVG; 15 March 2007).

**Protocol on NATO states' guarantees to EDC members**, 27 May 1952, <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/annexes/b2.htm> (13 March 2006).

**US Atomic Energy Act**, 1954, <http://www.nrc.gov/who-we-are/governing-laws.html> (21 Oct 2006).

**Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference**, London 28 Sep-3 Oct 1954, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: historical events, 1950-66, organisation of common defense, WEU; 2 March 2006).

**“Deutschlandvertrag”**: Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the FRG, 23 Oct 1954, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: historical events, 1950-6, organisation of common defense, WEU; 2 March 2006) and [http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest\\_vertragDeutschlandvertrag1954/index.html](http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbausInOstUndWest_vertragDeutschlandvertrag1954/index.html) (extract; 24 Nov 2007).

**Paris agreement on the modification of the Brussels Treaty**, Protocol III on control of armaments, 23 Oct 1954, <http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/defense/ueo541023h.htm> (24 Nov 2007).

**Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community**, 25 March 1957, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm> (links: historical events, 1957-68, establishment of EEC and Euratom; 1 March 2007).

**Treaty of Elysée**, 22 Jan 1963, <http://www.sovereignty.org.uk/features/eucon/elysee.html> (10 Feb 2007).

**Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water** (Partial Test Ban Treaty, PTBT), 5 Aug 1963, <http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf> (2 Dec 2006).

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons** (NPT), 1 July 1968, <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/npt/index.html> (24 Nov 2007).

**Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties**, 23 May 1969, [http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1\\_1\\_1969.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf) (29 Nov 2007).

**“2+4 Treaty”**: Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 Sep 1990, <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm> (10 May 2007).

## Appendix C. Key persons

This list concerns only those key positions of each person that are directly relevant for this study. I used various internet sources to put this list together; particularly helpful were persons registers in the FRUS-series and in Naftali's and Zelikov's volumes on the Cuban missile crisis.

**Acheson, Dean** US Secretary of State 1949-53; unofficial advisor to Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations

**Adenauer, Konrad** Chancellor of the FRG Sep 1949-Oct 1963; Foreign Minister 1951-55; CDU Chairman 1950-March 1966

**Allon, Yigal** Israel's Deputy Prime Minister July 1968-Oct 1974

**Alphand, Herve** France's Ambassador to the US Sep 1956-Oct 1965

**Badeau, John S.** US Ambassador to Egypt May 1961-64

**Ball, George W.** Lawyer representing the European Economic Community 1946-61; US Under Secretary of State 1961-Sep 1966; Permanent Representative to the UN June-Sep 1968

**Barbour, Walworth** US Ambassador to Israel June 1961-73

**Barzel, Rainer** CDU politician; (Deputy) Chairman of CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction (1963-) Dec 1964-73

**Bator, Francis M.** senior US National Security Council staff member Apr 1964-Sep 1967; President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Oct 1965-Sep 1967

**Battle, Lucius D.** US Ambassador to the UAR 1964-67; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 1967-68

**Ben-Gurion, David** Israel's founding father; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Feb 1949-Dec 1953 and Nov 1955-June 1963

**Bergmann, Ernest D.** chemist; head of scientific affairs at Israeli Defense Forces Aug 1948-51; Ben-Gurion's science aide and research director at the Ministry of Defense July 1951-66; Chairman of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission 1952-66

**Birrenbach, Kurt** CDU politician and foreign policy expert; member of the Bundestag 1957-67

**Blankenhorn, Herbert A.** Adenauer's assistant 1948-51; senior official at the West German Foreign Office March 1951-; Permanent Representative to NATO 1955-59; Ambassador to France 1960-63; Ambassador to the UK 1965-70

**Bohlen, Charles E.** special advisor to US Presidents and Secretaries of State 1943-69; Ambassador to the USSR 1953-57; Ambassador to France Oct 1962-Feb 1968

**Brandt, Willy (Herbert Frahm)** Governing Mayor of Berlin 1957-Nov 1966; SPD candidate for Chancellor in 1961, 1965, and 1969; Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister 1966-69; Chancellor 1969-74; SPD (Deputy) Chairman (1962-) 1964-87

**von Brentano, Heinrich** West German Foreign Minister June 1955-Oct 1961; Chairman of CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction 1949-55, 1961-64

**Brubeck, William H.** (Deputy) Executive Secretary of US Department of State and Special Assistant to Secretary of State (Aug 1961-) May 1962-63; National Security Council staff member July 1963-Nov 1964

**Bruce, David K.** US Ambassador to France 1949-52; Under Secretary of State Apr 1952-Jan 1953; Ambassador to the FRG 1957-59; and to the UK 1961-69

**Brzezinski, Zbigniew** advisor to Kennedy and Johnson administration officials; member of US Department of State Policy Planning Council 1966-68

**Bundy, McGeorge** President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Jan 1961-Feb 1966

**Bundy, William P.** US (Deputy) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1961-) 1963-64; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs March 1964-69

**Carstens, Karl** State Secretary at West German Foreign Office 1960-66; and Defense Ministry Dec 1966-Jan 1968

- Chaban-Delmas, Jacques** French Defense Minister Nov 1957-May 1958
- Chalfont, Lord A.** British Representative to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference 1965-67
- Cleveland, Harlan** US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Feb 1961-Sep 1965; Ambassador to NATO Sep 1965-May 1969
- Clifford, Clark M.** US Secretary of Defense March 1968-69
- Couve de Murville, Maurice** French Ambassador to the US 1955-56 and to the FRG 1956-58; Foreign Minister June 1958-May 1968
- Cutler, Robert** Eisenhower's National Security Advisor 1953-55 and Jan 1957-58
- Davies, Rodger P.** (Deputy) Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs at US Department of State (Aug 1962-) Sep 1963-65; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Oct 1965-
- Dillon, C. Douglas** US Ambassador to France 1953-Jan 1957; (Deputy) Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (March 1957-) 1959-61; Secretary of the Treasury Jan 1961-65
- Dobrynin, Anatoly F.** Soviet Ambassador to the US 1962-86
- Douglas-Home, Sir Alexander F.** British Foreign Secretary July 1960-63; Prime Minister Oct 1963-Oct 1964
- Dowling, Walter C.** US Ambassador to the FRG Dec 1959-Apr 1963
- Dulles, Allen W.** Director of US Central Intelligence Agency Feb 1953-Nov 1961; Member of President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation 1964-65
- Dulles, John F.** US Secretary of State Jan 1953-Apr 1959
- Eban, Abba** Israeli Ambassador to the US and the UN 1950-59; Minister of Education and Culture 1959-63; Deputy Prime Minister June 1963-66; Foreign Minister Jan 1966-74
- Eden, Sir Anthony** British Foreign Secretary 1951-55; Prime Minister Apr 1955-Jan 1957
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.** NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Dec 1950-May 1952; US President Jan 1953-Jan 1961
- Erhard, Ludwig** (CDU) Chancellor of the FRG Oct 1963-Dec 1966; CDU Chairman March 1966-May 1967
- Erler, Fritz** West German politician; SPD Deputy Chairman Feb 1964-Feb 1967; Chairman of SPD Bundestag fraction March 1964-Feb 1967
- Eshkol, Levi** Israeli Prime Minister 1963-69 and Minister of Defense 1963-June 1967
- Evron, Ephraim** Israeli diplomat in the US
- Feinberg, Abraham** prominent figure in American Jewish community; fund-raiser for the Democrats
- Feldman, Myer** advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson for Israeli affairs 1961-65
- Finletter, Thomas K.** US Ambassador to NATO March 1961-65
- Fisher, Adrian S.** Deputy Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1961-68
- Foster, William C.** Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Oct 1961-69
- Gallois, Pierre** French general and strategist
- Gates, Robert M.** US Secretary of Defense Dec 2006-
- Gates, Thomas S.** US (Deputy) Secretary of Defense (June-) Dec 1959-Jan 1961
- de Gaulle, Charles** President of France 1958-69
- Gavin, James M.** US Ambassador to France March 1961-62
- Gazit, Mordechai** Israeli diplomat in the US 1960-65
- Gilpatric, Roswell L.** US Deputy Secretary of Defense 1961-64; Chairman of President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation 1964-65

- Goldberg, Arthur J.** Permanent US Representative to the UN July 1965-June 1968
- Grewe, Wilhelm C.** West German Ambassador to the US Feb 1958-May 1962; Permanent Representative to NATO Sep 1962-71
- Groeper, Horst** West German Ambassador to the USSR 1962-66
- Gromyko, Andrei A.** Soviet Foreign Minister Feb 1957-85
- Gruenther, Alfred M.** American general; NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1953-56; Member of President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation 1964-65
- von und zu Guttenberg, Baron Karl Theodor** West German CSU politician
- Hailsham, Lord Viscount Quinton** British Minister for Science and Technology; negotiator to test ban treaty 1963
- Hallstein, Walther** Adenauer's advisor; State Secretary at West German Foreign Office 1951-58; negotiator to ECSC, EEC, and Euratom treaties; President of EEC Commission 1958-67
- Hare, Raymond A.** US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Sep 1965-Nov 1966
- Harman, Avraham** Israeli Ambassador to the US 1960-67
- Harriman, Averell W.** US Ambassador to the USSR and the UK in the 1940s; Governor of New York 1955-59; Ambassador at Large Feb-Dec 1961 and March 1965-69; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Nov 1961-63; negotiator to test ban treaty 1963; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Apr 1963-65
- von Hassel, Kai-Uwe** West German Defense Minister Jan 1963-Dec 1966
- Heisenberg, Werner K.** prominent physicist; Adenauer's advisor
- Helms, Richard (Deputy)** Director of US Central Intelligence Agency (1965-) 1966-73
- Herter, Christian A.** US Under Secretary of State Feb 1957-59; Secretary of State Apr 1959-61; Representative for Trade Negotiations 1962-66
- Hillenbrand, Martin J.** Minister and Deputy Chief of US Mission in the FRG 1963-67
- Hoopes, Townsend W.** Deputy US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under President Johnson
- Hornig, Donald F.** President Johnson's Science Advisor 1964-69
- Houghton, Amory** US Ambassador to France 1957-61
- Humphrey, Hubert H.** US Vice President Jan 1965-Jan 1969
- Hussein I, ibn Talal** King of Jordan
- Jernegan, John D.** Deputy US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sep 1963-July 1965
- Johnson, Charles E.** US National Security Council staff member 1962-69
- Johnson, Louis A.** US Secretary of Defense March 1949-Sep 1950
- Johnson, Lyndon B.** US Vice President Jan 1961-63; President Nov 1963-Jan 1969
- Jones, Lewis G.** US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 1959-61
- Kamel, Mustafa** Egypt's Ambassador to the US
- Katzenbach, Nicholas** US Under Secretary of State Oct 1966-69
- Kaysen, Carl** economics professor; President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 1961-63; consultant to RAND think-tank, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency
- Keeny, Spurgeon M. Jr.** member of US National Security Council staff 1961-69
- Kennedy, John. F.** US President Jan 1961-Nov 1963
- Kennedy, Robert F.** US Senator 1965-68
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.** Leader of the USSR Sep 1953-Oct 1964



- Kiesinger, Kurt G.** (CDU) Chancellor of the FRG Dec 1966-69; CDU Chairman May 1967-71
- Kissinger, Henry A.** political scientist; consultant to US National Security Council 1961-62, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1961-68, and Department of State 1965-68; President's National Security Advisor 1969-75; Secretary of State Sep 1973-77
- Klein, David** member of US National Security Council staff Jan 1961-65
- Knappstein, Heinrich** West German Ambassador to the US June 1962-Dec 1968
- Kohler, Foy D.** US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 1959-62; Ambassador to the USSR 1962-66; Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nov 1966-Dec 1967
- Komer, Robert W.** member of US National Security Council staff 1961-65; President's Deputy and Acting National Security Advisor 1965-66
- Kosygin, Alexei N.** Soviet Premier Oct 1964-Oct 1980
- Krapf, Franz** diplomat and senior official at West German Foreign Ministry
- Krone, Heinrich** (CDU) West German Minister for Special Affairs 1961-66
- Lemnitzer, Lyman L.** Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff Sep 1960-62; Commander of US Forces in Europe Oct 1962-66; NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Jan 1963-69
- von Lilienfeld, Georg** West German Minister to the US
- Lodge, Henry C.** US Ambassador to the FRG May 1968-
- Lucet, Charles** French Ambassador to the US Dec 1965-
- Macmillan, Harold** British Prime Minister Jan 1957-Oct 1963
- Marshall, George C.** US Secretary of State Jan 1947-Jan 1949; Secretary of Defense Sep 1950-Sep 1951
- McCloy, John J.** US High Commissioner for Germany 1949-52; advisor to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon; member of President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation 1964-65; Representative to trilateral offset negotiations with the FRG and the UK Oct 1966-Apr 1967
- McCone, John A.** Chairman of US Atomic Energy Commission 1958-61; Director of Central Intelligence Agency Nov 1961-Apr 1965
- McGhee, George C.** Counselor, Policy Planning Council Chairman at US Department of State 1961; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Dec 1961-March 1963; Ambassador to the FRG May 1963-May 1968
- McNamara, Robert S.** US Secretary of Defense Jan 1961-Feb 1968
- McNaughton, John T.** General Counsel of US Department of Defense July 1962-June 1964; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs July 1964-July 1967
- McPherson, Harry C. Jr.** President Johnson's special assistant and counsel 1965-69
- Meir, Golda** Israeli politician; Foreign Minister 1956-65; Prime Minister 1969-74
- Mendès-France, Pierre** French Prime Minister June 1954-Feb 1955
- Menshikov, Mikhail A.** Soviet Ambassador to the US Feb 1958-Jan 1962
- Merchant, Livingston T.** US diplomat; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 1959-61; Special Representative for multilateral force negotiations 1963
- Mikoyan, Anastas** First Deputy Premier of the USSR 1955-64; President 1964-65
- Müller-Roschach, Herbert** diplomat and senior official at West German Foreign Ministry
- Nasser, Gamal A.** President of Egypt 1954-70
- Neustadt, Richard E.** advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
- Nitze, Paul H.** US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Jan 1961-63; Secretary of Navy Nov 1963-67; Deputy Secretary of Defense June 1967-69
- Nixon, Richard** US Vice President 1953-61; President 1969-74
- Norstad, Lauris** NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1956-Jan 1963

- Owen, Henry D.** member of US Department of State Policy Planning staff 1955-62; Deputy Counselor, Vice Chairman of Policy Planning Council 1962-66; Chairman June 1966-Feb 1969
- Peres, Shimon** Ben-Gurion's aide, Israeli military official and politician; Director-General of Ministry of Defense 1953-59, Deputy Defense Minister 1959-65
- Pompidou, Georges** French Prime Minister Apr 1962-July 1968; President 1969-74
- Quarles, Donald A.** US Secretary of Air Force Aug 1955-57; Deputy Secretary of Defense Apr 1957-Jan 1959
- Rabin, Yitzhak** Israeli military official; Chief of Staff 1964-67; Ambassador to the US Feb 1968-72
- Radford, Arthur W.** Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff 1953-57
- Read, Benjamin H.** Special Assistant to Secretary of State, Department of State Executive Secretary 1963-69
- Reid, Odgen R.** US Ambassador to Israel 1959-61
- Rivkin, Steven R.** member in President Johnson's Office of Science and Technology; Chairman's aide in President's Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation 1964-65
- Roshchin, Alexei A.** Soviet Representative to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference 1966-
- Rostow, Walt W.** President Kennedy's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security 1961; Counselor, Chairman of Department of State Policy Planning Council Dec 1961-66; President Johnson's Special Assistant for National Security Apr 1966-69
- Rusk, Dean** US Secretary of State 1961-69
- Saunders, Harold H.** member of US National Security Council staff 1961-74
- Schaetzel, J. Robert** Deputy US Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs Sep 1962-66; Representative to the EEC Sep 1966-72
- Schlesinger, Arthur M.** special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 1961-64
- Schröder, Gerhard** (CDU) West German Foreign Minister Nov 1961-66; Minister of Defense Dec 1966-Oct 1969
- Seaborg, Glenn T.** Chairman of US Atomic Energy Commission March 1961-71
- Smith, Bromley K.** member of US National Security Council staff under Eisenhower; Executive Secretary of the Council 1961-69
- Smith, Gerald C.** Special Assistant to US Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs 1954-57; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning 1957-61; consultant to Department of State 1962-64; Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1969-73
- Spaak, Paul-Henri** NATO Secretary General 1957-61; Belgian Foreign Minister April 1961-March 1966
- Spofford, Charles M.** Deputy US Representative to NATO July 1950-
- Stassen, Harold E.** President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Disarmament 1955-58
- Stevenson, Adlai E. Jr.** Permanent US Representative to the UN Jan 1961-July 1965
- Stikker, Dirk** NATO Secretary General Apr 1961-Aug 1964
- Stoessel, Walter J. Jr.** Political Advisor to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1961-July 1963; Deputy Chief of US Mission in Moscow 1963-65; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Sep 1965-July 1968
- Strauss, Franz J.** West German Minister for Atomic Energy Oct 1955-56; Defense Minister Oct 1956-Nov 1962; CSU Chairman; Chairman of CSU Bundestag fraction 1963-66; Finance Minister Dec 1966-Oct 1969
- Strauss, Lewis** Commissioner, Chairman of US Atomic Energy Commission 1948-50, 1953-8
- Talbot, Phillips** US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Apr 1961-65
- Taylor, Maxwell D.** President Kennedy's Military Representative 1961-62; Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Oct 1962-July 1964

**Thompson, Llewellyn E.** US Ambassador to the USSR 1957-62, Jan 1967-69; Ambassador at Large 1962-66; Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs July 1964-October 1965

**Truman, Harry S.** US President Apr 1945-Jan 1953

**Tyler, William R.** Director of US Department of State Office of Western European Affairs Feb 1957-; Counselor for Political Affairs at Embassy Bonn Apr 1958-; (Deputy) Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (May 1961-) Sep 1962-May 1965

**Warnke, Paul C.** General Counsel at US Department of Defense -1967; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Aug 1967-69

**Webber, Robert T.** US Science attaché in Israel in the 1960s

**Wheeler, Earle G.** Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff July 1964-70

**Wiesner, Jerome B.** Science Advisor of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 1961-64

**Wilson, James H.** British Labor party politician; Prime Minister Oct 1964-70

## Sources

### **Documents**

#### Archives

**W. Averell Harriman Papers (AHP)**, Library of Congress Manuscript Collection, Washington, DC. Visited in June 2006.

**John F. Kennedy Library (JFKL)** in Boston, MA. Visited in July 2006.

**Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL)** in Austin, TX. Visited in July 2006.

**United States National Archives (USNA)** in College Park, MD. Visited in June 2006. All files are of record group 59 (Department of State) unless otherwise mentioned.

**Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (PAA)**, Berlin. Visited in spring 2006.

For all these archival materials, I in the footnotes give a title or description of the document, date, and location in the archive (see also Appendix A). Since names of folders in archives are often very long, I have (when possible without causing confusion) left out some words from the names. I also give folder dates only when the document is not in a folder its date would suggest or when necessary for some other reason.

#### Electronic document databases

**The Digital National Security Archive of the National Security Archive, George Washington University (DNSA)**, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>. An access license is needed for the use of the database. I have primarily used the Berlin Crises (BC), Nuclear History (NH), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NP) collections of the DNSA. For each document, I give a title or description, date, and DNSA item number.

**Declassified Documents Reference System of the Gale Group (DDRS)**, <http://infotrac.galegroup.com>. An access license is needed for the use of the database. For each document, I give a title or description and date.

No primary document that I refer to indirectly based on some other author's reference was available through the DNSA or the DDRS at the time of writing.

**Department of State Freedom of Information Act collections (FOIA)**, <http://foia.state.gov/>. For each document, I give a title or description and date. All documents referred to simply as FOIA are from these collections.

**FOIA collections of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA FOIA)**, accessible from the National Archives in College Park, MD. For each document, I give a title or description and date.

**Public Papers of the Presidents (PP) of the American Presidency Project**, [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index\\_docs.php](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index_docs.php) (by John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters). For each document, I give a title or description, date, and number in the PPT (Truman), PPE (Eisenhower), PPK (Kennedy), or PPJ (Johnson) collection.

#### (Edited) document collections (electronic/printed)

**Foreign Relations of the United States – series (FRUS)**, Washington DC:USG Printing Office. Most volumes from Kennedy and Johnson years available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/> and from earlier years at <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/>. For each document published in this series, I give a title or description, date, the number of FRUS volume, and, depending on the volume, either document number or page numbers.

FRUS volumes used (publication year)

1950

Volume III Western Europe (1977)

Volume IV Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1980)

1951

Volume III/1-2 European security and the German question (1981)

- 1952-54  
Volume V/1-2 Western European Security (1983)
- 1955-57  
Volume IV Western European security and integration (1986)  
Volume XX Regulations of Armaments; Atomic Energy (1990)  
Volume XXVI Central and Southeastern Europe (1992)  
Volume XXVII Western Europe and Canada (1992)
- 1958-60  
Volume III National Security Policy (1996)  
Volume VII/1 Western European Integration and Canada (1993)  
Volume VII/2 Western Europe (1993)  
Volume IX The Berlin Crisis, 1959-1960; Germany; Austria (1993)  
Volume XIII Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa (1992)
- 1961-63  
Volume VI Kennedy – Khrushchev Exchanges (1996)  
Volume VII Arms Control and Disarmament (1995)  
Volume VIII National Security Policy (1996)  
Volume IX Foreign Economic Policy (1995)  
Volume XIII Western Europe and Canada (1994)  
Volume XIV Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962 (1993)  
Volume XV Berlin Crisis, 1962-1963 (1994)  
Volume XVII Near East, 1961-1962 (1995)  
Volume XVIII Near East, 1962-1963 (1995)
- 1964-68  
Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament (1997)  
Volume XIII Western Europe Region (1995)  
Volume XV Germany and Berlin (1999)  
Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967 (2000)  
Volume XIX Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 (2004)  
Volume XX Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968 (2001)  
Volume XXI Near East Region; Arab Peninsula (2000).

**Electronic Briefing Books of the National Security Archive, George Washington University (EBB)**, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/>. For each document, I give a document number, a title or description, date, the name of the EBB, and a sub-title (when applicable). I handle references to EBBs *as such* (as a difference to *documents* posted on them) similarly as references to secondary materials in general; in the footnotes, they are in form “NSA” and posting year.

**Edited volumes of John F. Kennedy recordings during the Cuban Missile Crisis** published as Naftali, Timothy (2001) *The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy. The Great Crises July 30 - August 1962* and Naftali, Timothy & Zelikow, Philip (2001) *The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy. The Great Crises September - October 21, 1962*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. For documents published in this series, I give a title or description, date, and page numbers in either of the two books, which are referred to similarly as secondary literature in general (author, year).

**National Security Action Memoranda of President Johnson’s term (JNM)**, <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsamhom.asp>. For the NSAMs, I give the NSAM number, description, and date.

**Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland–series (APD)**, Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag. For documents published in this series, I give a title or description, date, the number of APD volume where published, and, depending on the volume, either the document number or page numbers.

- APD volumes used (publication year)  
Band 1 Adenauer und die Hohen Kommissare 1949-1951 (AHK 1949-51) (1989)  
Band 2 Adenauer und die Hohen Kommissare 1952 (AHK 1952 ) (1990)  
1949/50 (1997)  
1951 (1999)  
1953 (2001)  
1963 (1994)  
1964 (1995)  
1965 (1996).

**Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Dokumente 1949-1963 (BDFD).** Munich: K. G. Saur. Band 1 Aussenpolitik und Diplomatie (1997). For documents (in German or French) published in this volume, I give the document number, a title or description, and date.

**Documents on Disarmament, 1949-1959.** Published by US Department of State (1960), Washington, DC. The documents I have used concern resolutions of the UN General Assembly. I refer to them similarly as to secondary literature (author, year, page numbers).

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**Electronic document collection of European Navigator of the Virtual Resource Centre for Knowledge about Europe (CVCE),** <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>. Most of the documents I have used from this collection are listed in Appendix B on laws and treaties. For others, I give titles, dates, links to follow to find them, and the dates for when I last viewed them.

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## **Newspapers/ magazines/ electronic newsletters**

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 Le Monde Diplomatique English Edition  
 Newsweek  
 New York Times (NYT)  
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 Washington Post