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The EU, Security and the Baltic Region

Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und der Überwindung der Ost-West-Spaltung haben sich auch für die politischen Entscheidungsträger in den Ländern der Ostsee-Region neue Möglichkeiten für die Gestaltung der Sicherheitsbedingungen ergeben. Verschiedene Faktoren beeinflussen die veränderte Sicherheitssituation im Ostseeraum: Die drei baltischen Staaten Estland, Lettland und Litauen konnten 1991 ihre Unabhängigkeit wiedererlangen und haben trotz komplizierter innerer Transformationsprozesse stabile Fundamente für eine zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung sowie für die Marktwirtschaft gelegt; die EU hat, vor allem nach dem Beitritt Schwedens und Finnlands, ihre gesellschaftliche und ökonomische Anziehungskraft in der Region erhöhen können und förderte damit zugleich die Kooperation zwischen allen Ostseeanrainerstaaten; Polen und die drei baltischen Staaten wünschen die baldige Aufnahme in die EU, nachdem sie bereits seit Anfang der 90er Jahre in eine vertragliche Zusammenarbeit mit ihr eintreten konnten; zwischen der EU und Rußland besteht ein Partnerschafts- und Kooperationsabkommen, das eine Einbindung der russischen Gebiete von St.Petersburg und von Kaliningrad in die sich ausweitende Ostseezusammenarbeit erleichtern soll.

Ausgehend von der wissenschaftlichen Debatte unter den Fachexperten der Internationalen Beziehungen über Sicherheitskonzepte und Sicherheitsregime nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges geht der Autor in einem ersten Abschnitt der Frage nach, welchen Charakter Sicherheit in der Ostsee-Region annehmen wird und welche Rolle die EU hierbei spielen kann. Verallgemeinernd verweist er darauf, daß ein Wandel in den Sicherheitsvorstellungen eingetreten ist, der die veränderte Situation in der Region reflektiert. Während die Sicherheitsdoktrinen in der Phase der Ost-West-Konfrontation vom Prinzip des Überlebens geprägt waren (security of surviving), gewinnt nun gesellschaftliche Sicherheit bzw. Sicherheit durch aktive Stabilitätsförderung (security of thriving) ein immer größeres Gewicht. Tendenziell wird die Erweiterung der EU im Ostseeraum einer stabilitätsfördernden Sicherheit, die auf enger Kooperation, gegenseitigem Verständnis, individuellen Freiheiten und Bürgerrechten sowie auf funktionsfähigen Institutionen beruht, immer größere Spielräume ermöglichen. In einem zweiten Abschnitt wird aufgezeigt, mit welchen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten die EU die Gesamtsituation im Ostseeraum zwischen 1991 und 1999 beeinflusst hat, wobei besonders die verschiedenartigen Hilfen der EU-Staaten für die baltischen Länder im Mittelpunkt stehen. Der Autor verweist darauf, daß eine Erweiterung der EU in den nächsten Jahren auch mit

Unsicherheitsfaktoren für die Gemeinschaft verbunden sein kann. Problemfelder können das Verhalten Rußlands in der Ostsee-Region und sein Verhältnis zu den baltischen Staaten, die Minderheitensituation in den baltischen Ländern und die Rückwirkungen der Strukturanpassungen in den Transformationsländern auf die soziale und gesellschaftliche Sicherheit sein. Offen sei auch, inwieweit der Rat der Ostseestaaten in der Lage ist, einen aktiven Beitrag zur Verbreiterung der stabilitätsfördernden Sicherheit in der Region zu leisten.

Mit den praktischen Sicherheitsauswirkungen der EU auf den Ostseeraum beschäftigt sich der Autor in einem dritten Abschnitt. Er geht von der These aus, daß allein schon die Existenz der EU eine Quelle für erweiterte Sicherheit (rechtlich, sozial, wirtschaftlich, ökologisch) ist und sie bereits die Fähigkeit erlangte, einen „Export“ von Sicherheit durch kooperatives Handeln zu ermöglichen. Angesichts der unterschiedlichen Einbindung der Ostseestaaten in die bestehenden militärischen Sicherheitsstrukturen wirft der Autor die Frage auf, ob die EU in der Lage ist, als Repräsentant kollektiver Sicherheit und Verteidigung wirksam zu werden. Er verweist darauf, daß die EU einschließlich der WEU diese Rolle im Ostseeraum nicht spielen kann und nur die NATO über effektive Fähigkeiten zu einer kollektiven Verteidigung verfügt.

Wie sich die NATO und besonders die USA in einer Konfliktsituation im Ostseeraum verhalten würden, bleibe eine strittige Frage. Gerade darum wird die Herausbildung einer Sicherheitsgemeinschaft in der Ostsee-Region ein langwieriger Prozeß sein, und der entscheidende Beitrag der EU für die Sicherheit sei vor allem die Förderung von gesellschaftlicher Stabilität und Wohlstand.

1. Introduction

The end of the cold war division of the Baltic Sea in 1989 and the returning to independence of the three Baltic states in 1991 created new opportunities for the decision-makers of the area and some new possibilities for the fashioning of security in the region. This article will examine the security debate affecting the Baltic Sea region in the post-cold war period, and, in particular, the relevance of the European Union to that debate. The following section will examine various concepts of security relevant to the Baltic region; the third section looks at the EU and the Baltic area; and the last part deals with the implications that EU membership by Baltic Sea states may have for the security of the Baltic Sea zone.

2. The Security Debate in Europe

During the cold war, the main security focus in Europe was on strategic studies and on the position of the two superpowers. National security studies were seen mainly in political-military terms, and were largely concentrated on the economic factors contributing to the assets of a state available for its defence. The state was the main

referent of the term 'security'. The security debate of that period, reflected in the official doctrines of the major alliances, essentially concerned the *security of surviving*, insofar as it stressed peace as an absence of war, freedom as freedom from communism (or capitalism) and stability as steadfastness.

Since the end of the cold war, however, both the new situation in Europe and novel ways of thinking about that situation have led to an understanding of security, both in the academic scholarship and in government policy, that can be described as the *security of thriving*; this newer concept emphasising peace as a state of harmony, freedom as autonomy and civil rights, and stability as durability. The shift from one concept to the other throughout the 1990s - and the consequences thereof - can be seen in the developing security debate of the Baltic Sea region and the role played in it by the European Union.

Examining the various security concepts of the post-cold war debate is like peeling away the skins of an onion. The layers of these concepts in relation to the Baltic region have already been outlined in Möttölä (1998), but it may be useful to present a slightly revised version of that analysis here; such a presentation may assist with an understanding of the *security order* in the region.

The first layer contains the concept of a *security complex*, under which lies a *security regime* and a *security community*. Within all these there are also the various means, or tools, that can be used to achieve these states of being and doing: collective security, collective defence and co-operative security. Terms can also be used to describe the form of security - adversarial or co-operative security - and its extent, ranging from military to comprehensive security.

At one end of the spectrum of the academic and official literature concerning European and Baltic Sea security in the 1990s, is the fairly traditional view of security as determined by global or continental power considerations, understandable in terms of military-diplomatic power. The writings on the Nordic-Baltic region that have taken this approach have not always reached the same conclusions but have tended to work at the same level of analysis. At this end of the spectrum, the concern is mainly with 'being' and with any threats to the state that may exist; in other words, the security of surviving. The approach is centred on the Buzanist *security complex* within which 'major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed apart from one another' (Buzan 1993, p. 6).¹

A number of authors have thus seen security in the Baltic as being primarily determined by the wider European security complex within which the area exists. This approach allows for a more regionalised notion of security than was possible with the 'overlay' of the cold war. Birthe Hansen, for example, has identified the unipolar security condition which subsisted after the end of the cold war as re-

¹ This is not to say that Barry Buzan, or others cited here, have been concerned *only* with that level of security. Quite clearly they have a much wider interest.

presenting for the Baltic states ‘a comparatively favourable climate in which to better the prospects for consolidating statehood, expanding capabilities and increasing their attractiveness to greater powers’ (1998, p. 90).

Even with a neo-realist understanding of the situation in the Baltic Sea, the action of the Baltic states themselves has some relevance; their relations with Russia, the United States, their Baltic neighbours and both the EU and NATO offer both challenges and opportunities, presumably to be taken up or lost by the decision-makers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (*ibid.*, p. 97). Heurlin makes a number of assumptions about the post-cold war security situation in Europe that are also of relevance for the Baltic Sea region. Under a unipolar system with the US as the surviving superpower, security ‘has become divisible’ and there is ‘increased regionalisation, and in certain cases even subregionalisation’. To prevent its resources being dissipated, the US has established ‘a network of selected allies willing and able to execute the common „new world order“ policy’ and in the Baltic these states are Denmark and Sweden (1998, p. 407). The consequences for the Baltic states is that ‘never before have [they] lived in so positive a security situation’ (*ibid.*, p. 409). Mouritzen sees the dilemma of the Baltic Rim states in terms of the environmental concept of polarity. Given their new salient environment and their decision-makers’ learning processes, the Baltic states have ‘bandwagoned’ away from the Russian pole towards the Western one (Mouritzen 1998a, pp. 4-8; Mouritzen 1998b, p. 285). However, the workings of this system are by no means mechanistic and include an understanding of how decision-makers and bureaucracies respond to their environment (Mouritzen 1998a, pp. 8-9). All these approaches are concerned primarily with the international operational environment within which the Baltic region, and especially the Baltic states, can be found after the end of the cold war, though they are also interested in the perceptions of the decision-makers.

Further studies have placed less emphasis on the more general environment of the Baltic Sea region, and more on the region itself, concentrating on the policies and interactions of the states, and other actors, there. Such an approach tends to allow for a more active involvement of the states and societies of the region in constructing their own security. These studies have tended to examine the institutions available to the Baltic Sea states, the bilateral and multilateral relations between the states and the security policies of the states themselves. They may place emphasis on one state or on the Baltic Sea states collectively (Möttölä 1998; Väyrynen 1997). There have been, for example, a number of studies which outline the security policies of the Baltic states (for example, Haab 1998, Miniotaite 1998, Ozolina 1998, and van Ham 1998), as well as some that have examined the policies of the Nordic countries (Archer 1998, Joenniemi 1998, Knudsen 1998, Mouritzen 1997, chs 4 & 5), Germany (Hyde-Price 1997, Krohn 1998) and Russia (Jonson 1998, Pikayev 1998, Sergounin 1998, Svennevig 1998) in the region. Included in these publications are authors who tend to examine more the security of thriving than the security of surviving (e.g. Archer 1998, Hyde-Price 1997, Möttölä 1998, Joenniemi 1998,

Väyrynen 1997). These writers might see the Baltic region as developing into something a little more mature than just a security complex.²

The notion of a *security regime* is one which was developed in the early 1980s by Robert Jervis (1982) but which has relevance for post-cold war Europe. A regime involves ‘*social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas*’ (Levy, Young & Zürn 1995, p. 274, italics in original). During the cold war, a regime such as that created by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreements, though it could be seen as spanning the historic divisions of East and West and thus trying to bolster the security of surviving, could also be seen as a cautious movement towards the security of thriving. Since the end of the cold war, however, such security regimes have been more attached to the latter concept - as well as being far more comprehensive, covering activities from nuclear arms control to the running of elections. Within the Baltic Sea area a number of overlapping regimes are thriving, ranging from those dealing with trade to the regional manifestation of CFE (Sharp 1998). On the military side, one of the key issues is whether prominence is given to a collective defence regime (based on NATO) or those more concerned with co-operative defence (based on the OSCE, for example).

The idea of a *security community* is one that has been well developed since its introduction in the work of Deutsch et al. (1957); the term was there used to describe the relationship between various communities in the North Atlantic where the common goal was seen as the elimination of ‘war and the expectation of war within their boundaries’. Pluralistic security communities - with separate governments maintaining their independence - are regarded as requiring three pre-conditions for success: ‘the compatibility of major values relevant to major decision-making’, the capacity of each of the political units to respond to each other’s ‘needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to violence’, and the ‘mutual predictability of behavior’ (Deutsch et al 1957, pp. 66-7). An emphasis is placed on increased transactions, such as trade, that assist in bringing about mutual dependence. The Nordic region, for example, has been identified as a pluralistic security community (a subject that will be discussed further in Section 4 below), and it can readily be seen that such a thriving arrangement would be attractive for the Baltic region (Möttölä 1998, pp. 396-7, Väyrynen 1997, pp. 14-15).

Two essential elements in achieving *common security* are those of *co-operative* and *comprehensive security*. The notion of common security has advanced from the cold war days when it was seen as an attempt to shift the emphasis in the security debate away from the essentially competitive nature of East-West relations and towards a greater concentration on both common ‘enemies’ and the threat of nuclear annihilation. In post-cold war Europe, however, it can be seen as a general aim that

² Väyrynen (1997, p. 10) has described the region as ‘a lower-level security complex in a larger European complex’.

reaches beyond the security of surviving to include the creation of a 'good life' of freedom and stability for all Europeans; in other words, the security of thriving. Co-operative security is the principal means that has developed to achieve such common security (Möttölä 1998, pp. 365), and involves co-operation not just between states that were formerly adversaries but also between the various security institutions (Petersen 1997, p. 6). The notion of comprehensive security defines the range of the security concept, in this case not just being limited to the military-diplomatic axis, but also covering environmental, economic and societal issues (Buzan, 1997, pp. 16-18).

However, such usages are not without their problems. For example, one of the elements of comprehensive security, namely *societal security*, has only been brought into the security equation in a very overt form since the end of the cold war and lacks a certain amount of precision. Though there is discussion about the definition of the term 'society', one author differentiates it from an aggregation of individuals' security and refers to it as 'not just a sector of state security, but a distinctive referent object alongside it' (Wæver 1993, pp. 24 & 27). According to this understanding, it is easy to see that the 'security' felt by Estonians or by Slavic groups in Estonia may have a different resonance than what is meant by the security of the state of Estonia.

In summary, to talk of security is no longer to talk only of weapons and armies. These are still important factors in any understanding of the term, but since the end of the cold war in Europe, the minor element in the understanding of security - that which went beyond the security of survival - has come to the fore, providing an opportunity for a wider understanding of security than merely threat, death and destruction. That being said, does it augur a brighter future for the Baltic region, especially for the Baltic states and their inhabitants? And what can the European Union do to contribute to a more secure future for the region?

3. The EU and the Baltic Sea Region

The European Communities (EC), in their various forms, have always had a Baltic Sea presence through the membership of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). When the FRG was West Germany, that presence was modest, though it was strengthened by Denmark's accession to the EC in 1973. The Baltic Sea remained divided by the cold war but a period of détente allowed the signing of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area in 1974, which led to the establishment of the Helsinki Commission (Hjorth 1998, pp. 218-20). This, and the Warsaw Convention on Fisheries in the Baltic Sea, bridged the NATO countries, those from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the neutrals in the region. However, the EC's role, beyond the waters of its two member states, was modest.

The events of 1989 - and then of August 1991 - changed the menu of opportunities open to the EC in the Baltic region. The unification of Germany meant that the EC expanded its shores considerably in the Baltic sea. The end of communism in the

Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) allowed the EC to open up new relations with Poland and, later, the Baltic states and Russia; furthermore, the melting of the cold war icebergs allowed Sweden and Finland to navigate - for them - uncharted seas that led to EU³ membership in 1995. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from East Germany and Poland and finally from the Baltic states reversed the position of the Baltic as a *mare sovieticum*, and, with German unification and Swedish and Finnish EU membership, it started to resemble a Community lake.

The EC's relations with the three Baltic states began in earnest after they had regained their independence in August 1991. 'First generation' trade and co-operation agreements were signed with the EC in May 1992, coming into force in February 1993, and when Sweden and Finland joined the EU on 1 January 1995, the free trade agreements which they (and the other Nordic states) had with the Baltic states were extended to the other EU countries (European Commission 1994, p. 73). Europe Agreements were signed with the three states, coming into force on 1 February 1998, though many of the elements were in place before that date, not least as part of the EU's pre-accession strategy for the CEEC applicants. Each of the three Baltic states had applied for EU membership⁴, though in the end the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 decided that, while enlargement would be 'a comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing process', only Estonia of the three Baltic states would be (with Poland) among the first group with which negotiations would begin (*Agence Europe*, 14 December 1997; Avery & Cameron 1998, p. 72-6). Latvia and Lithuania would have to wait for a later date, though all three states would benefit from the EU's reinforced pre-accession strategy in helping them 'better to meet the obligations of membership' (Avery & Cameron 1998, pp. 72, 76, 80).

Meanwhile, the EC/EU had initiated a number of programmes that helped to firm up the links between the three Baltic states - indeed, the Baltic region - and the EC/EU. Most important of these was the Baltic Sea Region Initiative, approved by the Council in June 1996 and which utilised PHARE, TACIS and INTERREG (especially the INTERREG II-C programme) as instruments to achieve closer co-operation within the region and between the area and the EU. In addition, the planned Via Baltica road corridor became a priority among the Trans-European Networks (Wulf-Mathies 1997, pp. 4-5).

As well as the Baltic states, Poland had signed a Europe Agreement with the EU and was chosen as one of the first states with which to open negotiations for full membership with the Union (Avery & Cameron 1998, p. 60). A Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Russia came into force on 1 December 1997, though an interim agreement had been running for some time (Avery & Cameron 1998, pp. 146-7).

³ During 1993 the European Communities (EC) became the European Union (EU).

⁴ Latvia had applied on 13 October 1995, Estonia on 24 November 1995 and Lithuania on 8 December 1995.

From 1991 to 1999 the security situation of the Baltic states improved in a number of senses, especially in terms of the security of surviving. On regaining independence these countries had to construct their national administrations, continue on the road to democracy and construct market economies. They were faced by an unstable Russia on contested borders and all had Slavic minorities of some size whose status was uncertain. Furthermore, they had ex-Soviet troops and bases on their territory. Today, all three countries have functioning governments and bureaucracies (at various levels of competence); they have held democratic elections; and their economies are well on the way to reform. Russian troops have withdrawn and agreements have been made concerning the remaining military facilities. Border issues are now the subject of negotiation (Forsberg 1998), and the question of minorities, while still a problem in Estonia and Latvia, has had much of the sting taken out of it. On the other hand, international crime has affected the countries badly, there has been a growth in apathy and no noticeable increase in civic culture (Löfgren & Mannonen 1998, Clemmesen 1998, pp. 231-6). All three countries have experienced economic and political instability at various times. Nevertheless, the countries are well established and have not experienced invasion or political coups. In terms of the security of surviving, never before have the Baltic states 'lived in so positive a security situation' (Heurlin 1998, p. 409) - there has been absence of war - and the countries have maintained their freedom and independence. They have worked hard in the area of personal and civil liberties, and have, even if not yet achieved, sought after the security of thriving, a state of harmony and a lasting stability.

While the EC/EU has contributed something to obtaining these gains, the main source of support has come from elsewhere. The EC/EU programmes and agreements have assisted in rebuilding the economies of the three states and have provided a practical hand in constructing the agents of government. Much has been done by the citizens and politicians of the three states themselves, in particular in insisting on a withdrawal of Russian troops (Haab 1998, Miniotaite 1998, Ozolina 1998). Other European institutions such as the OSCE have been invaluable in sorting out ethnic and minority problems (Birckenbach 1998). There has also been assistance by the Nordic states that has covered not just the economy and government, but also military security. This has involved a hands-on aspect, for example, in providing training, but has also seen the Nordic states 'tutoring' the Baltic states in some of the means of security other than that of collective defence (Archer 1998, pp. 7-15, Clemmesen 1998, pp. 249-54). The Nordic countries have also supported the Baltic states' membership of the EU and have pushed for early Baltic membership of NATO.

In summary, since 1991 the economies of the Baltic states and the countries of the wider Baltic region have become more and more integrated into the European Union. This process is most accentuated at the west end of the Baltic Sea with the Nordic states and Germany being either members of the EU or of the European Economic Area (in the case of Norway which flanks the Baltic region). St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad in the Russian Federation are still the least integrated into the EU-system,

but the states in between - Poland and the three Baltic states - are rapidly re-orientating their economies towards the EU magnet.

Politically, not only are Sweden and Finland now full members of the EU but the three Baltic states and Poland have hitched themselves to the Union star. All four have applied for EU membership and Poland as well as Estonia are in the vanguard for CEEC negotiations. There must be the expectation that, within a decade, only Russia - represented by St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad - in the Baltic Sea region will be outside the European Union.

Thus the EU is in a position to affect the security position of the Baltic region in the coming decades, not least because a sizeable part of the region could be within the Union. The next section will examine how this opportunity might be taken up.

4. The Security Implications of the EU for the Baltic

It is difficult to estimate with precision the security implications of the extension of the EU into the Baltic Sea region for the reason that other factors will not remain constant. Some of these other elements should at least be listed, if not dealt with, here:

- the general international situation, including the extent of conflict, and world economic trends;
- the future of Russia and its government;
- whether the US is willing to maintain an armed presence in Europe;
- the enlargement of NATO membership and Russia's response to it;
- to what extent will institutions such as the OSCE be active, especially in the human rights area?
- will the Council for Baltic Sea States (CBSS) become an institution that actively contributes to the security of thriving in the Baltic Sea region, especially in civic security issues?
- how might the Baltic states develop politically and, especially, will they be able to solve their minority problems and develop effective economies?

This difficulty having been accepted, it should still be possible to trace at least the direction in which the EU might push the security situation in the Baltic Sea region. First, the EU has a security influence on the Baltic Sea region, and on the Baltic states in particular, merely because of its *existence* and its current activities. This does not suppose membership by any more of the Baltic Sea states than those which are currently members.

Since its inception in the Schuman Plan in 1950, the Community process has been a 'peace and stability' project. The ECSC was created partly as a way, through functionalist means, to ensure that France and Germany not only would not but *could not* go to war with each other. As the process of integration was to develop, so would, it was considered, the will to threaten force against other EEC member states dissipate as they became recognised as 'insiders' (us) rather than 'outsiders' (them). In that

sense, the Community was to contribute to the peace of Western Europe through integration.

The extent to which the project advanced the collective defence security of Western Europe against the Soviet threat is more arguable. Some - wrongly - have seen this as the main *raison d'être* of the Community project (Mearsheimer 1990). Certainly it can be argued that the renovation of the West European economies in the 1950s and 1960s - assisted by the ECSC and the EEC - allowed the countries in the region not only to manage more of their own defences but also to usher in a greater social and economic peace which, in turn, guarded against the creation of a strong discontented 'fifth column' similar to that seen in France in 1939-40.

Since 1989, an 'existential security' argument for the European Union has evolved. The belief is that the EU is part of a *stability* programme. It is an active part of Cosmos as opposed to Chaos (Tunander 1997). This portrays the EU as contributing to the more positive aspects of the security of thriving. Politically, economically and socially the EU offers an area where change can be managed at a relatively low human cost compared with the almost uncontrolled changes in the CEECs and CIS with their high toll of unemployment, crime, deprivation and social marginalisation. As a bastion of Cosmos, it radiates stability to the east and the south and positively affects them by a mixture of largesse (e.g. PHARE, Europe Agreements) and example through its regime of 'principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs' (Levy, Young & Zürn 1995, p. 274). There seems to be a dominant belief among the political elite of the CEECs, not least the Baltic states, that the EU's very existence is a cause of stability in Europe (Haab 1998, pp. 122-5, Miniotaite 1998, pp.174-6, Ozolina 1998, pp. 148-53). The EU, as a security-community, 'like a magnet' attracts 'weaker states that expect to share the security and welfare' associated with the stronger states (Adler 1997, p. 276).

Ironically, the conclusion drawn from this belief - that their countries should join the EU - might itself lower the 'stability-attraction' of the Union. Currently, the EU has only a few sources of instability within its borders and between its members and the outside world: there are the Basque region, Northern Ireland, divisions between north and south Italy, Gibraltar and the dispute between Greece and Turkey. This list would be substantially increased if membership were extended to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus, let alone any of the other candidates for membership. The EU has been aware of this problem and has, as part of the conditions of membership, sought to exclude states that might bring internal or external conflicts to the Union (Avery & Cameron 1998, pp. 112-3, Balladur 1995). Thus the two concepts of security of surviving and that of thriving come into conflict. On the one hand there is the positive aspect of security (the security of thriving) that looks towards building co-operation and trust; on the other hand is the negative aspect (the security of surviving) that shies away from the 'outsider' and rejects the seemingly insecure.

An intermediate position might be found in the fact that the EU can already 'export' security through a solidarity that implies extending a version of the political assistance clause (Article J.1.2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam) to partner states in the east, thereby creating a *European security zone* (Kux 1996). However, until the Treaty of Amsterdam has been ratified, this is a somewhat precarious position; it is uncertain how this Article may in practice apply to existing member states of the EU, and it is even more doubtful whether, in an implicit form, it can meaningfully be extended to non-members. On the other hand, as the relationships between the EU and candidate members become closer, the level of indifference that the EU can feign over any direct threat to such a country will lower as the elements of a security regime are formed.

Secondly, the EU can be seen as a source of security for the Baltic Sea region, not merely because of its existence but also as *a result of membership* by Baltic Sea states. By extending the EU to cover, say, Poland and the Baltic states, regional security and stability can be improved in a number of ways, less from the EU just 'being' and more from it 'doing'. This could take up the more positive aspect of security, that of thriving.

How might an extended EU contribute to the building of a *security regime* in the Baltic Sea region? If the existence of such a regime presupposes the reciprocal observation of rules, norms and principles, there seem to be a number that already cover the Baltic Sea area: for instance, with respect to the environment, now institutionalised in the CBSS; the military, in relation to the OSCE (Sharp 1998) and a more general security understanding associated with the enhanced Partnership for Peace (Väyrynen 1997, p. 13). The EU is less the institutionalised framework for such a security related regime and more an interlocutor. It was the EU, through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, that advanced the Balladur proposals for a European Stability Pact (Balladur 1995), which now has a Baltic manifestation. Two EC states, Germany and Denmark, with the support of the other members, were behind the establishment of the CBSS.

Should all the Baltic Sea states, save Russia, join the EU, then the CFSP may itself form a security regime for much of the region with a number of principles, norms and rules - as well as institutions - in common for foreign and security policy-making. This would be strengthened if all these states were also full NATO members, though this supposition highlights the problem in creating such a security regime - the absence of Russia. The acceptance of common standards in the crucial area of security would, of course, go a long way to promote peace and stability in the region and would assist in the formation of a security community. However, by not including Russia in such a security regime, which would in effect be tied to NATO and the EU, the danger would arise that the rules and principles of the regime could be challenged by Russia. A very serious attempt would have to be made to gain from Russia an acceptance of the regime. This may be possible for a regime based on the EU's CFSP but currently looks less likely for a NATO membership-based regime. The

advantage of a regime over an international organization is that it does not rely on 'membership', but rather on compliance. Thus a regime that is based on principles, norms and rules in the security sphere laid down by NATO - but also negotiated with non-members - might have greater success than one that encouraged membership by some states but withheld it from others.

An improvement may arise over time as the new members of the EU become part of a *security community*. The close relationships at all levels demanded by EU integration, layered on top of the economic and functional integration already in train since 1991, should mean that these countries will no longer be willing - or able - to settle their differences by force or its threat. Three points should be made here. First, by joining the EU, the new members do not automatically become part of a Deutschan security community (see Adler 1997, p. 256). That status has to be earned over time as the extent and intensity of functional transactions grows to reach that between, say the Nordic states at the time of Deutsch's original study (1957, pp. 65-9). Secondly, the source of the main threat to security in the Baltic region is scarcely the relations between the Baltic states and the Nordic countries or, indeed, between the Baltic states themselves. Thirdly, by excluding the Russian Federation from this security community, its very creation could sharpen the distinction between Baltic 'insiders' (EU members) and 'outsiders' (Russia) and could become a catalyst for conflict (Knudsen & Neumann 1995, p. 1). Nevertheless, being part of a security community *is* important - it rules out (or at least makes extremely expensive) a return to old conflicts between its members.

What might be the effect of extended EU membership in the Baltic region on *societal security*? On the positive side, accepting Poland and the three Baltic states into the EU could be seen as a contribution to stronger societal security in those countries. In each of these, the sovereign state, while not necessarily coterminous with a nation, certainly overlaps fairly strongly, in which case a strong state could provide some protection for at least the majority element of that country. However, it is also clear that since 1991 these states have experienced difficulties in providing the economic wherewithal for their citizens. Membership of the EU might then be seen as a way of rescuing these nation states, in a way similar to that which Milward (1992) suggests was the case for the EEC and continental Western Europe in the 1950s. The economic strength provided by the EU might be a satisfactory source of underpinning of societal groups in the Baltic region.

Leaving aside the obvious point that Russia would in all likelihood be excluded from the benefits of EU membership, though the need to support the elements of civil society there are perhaps greatest, there are other potentially negative aspects of EU membership in relation to societal security in the Baltic region. First, Milward's analysis of the EC can certainly be challenged and so too the claim made that the weakening of the nation-state will continue (Wæver & Kelstrup 1993, p. 89). Secondly, any further intrusion of the EU into the Baltic area may be seen as a challenge to societal security in the region. If society involves 'a feeling of common identity',

societies in the region could come under attack in two ways. First, membership of the EU may take away some of the defences - for example, trade and travel restrictions, currency, and frontiers - that help protect identities. Secondly, membership of the EU may offer an alternative identity. While it is perfectly possible to be a 'good Estonian' and a 'good European', it might be asking too much to expect those resident in Estonia to move from the demands of being good Soviet citizens, through the revival of Estonian nationalism, to taking on EU citizenship. Alienation may result.

What about the methods used to achieve the forms of security mentioned above? Clearly the European Union is seen as an effective agent of *co-operative security* with a fairly *comprehensive* agenda, covering the areas of economics, environment and society, as well as, with increasing competence, the field of defence. The various programmes for the CEECs, including the Baltic states, have reached out to bring these countries closer to the European Union. However, it should not be forgotten that the choice is never between co-operation and conflict in international relations - there is always competition. The need for existing EU states to keep their competitive edge has dampened the co-operative nature of, for example, the Europe Agreements and has probably reduced the prospect of a 'Marshall Plan' for the CEECs, led by the EU. Likewise, while the various contacts between the EU and the non-EU Baltic countries cover a comprehensive area, they are by no means co-ordinated. What may help in the area of economic security may be destructive to environmental or societal security.

Could the EU be an agent of *collective security*? If one takes Chapter VII of the UN Charter as the foundation for any present-day collective security, the EU could play a role, in particular by involvement in diplomatic and economic sanctions. It would be less active as an institution on the military side of collective security, though its members could act as a bloc within the UN Security Council, especially as France and the United Kingdom are permanent members. In reality, any collective security operation in the Baltic region is going to first have to pass muster in the UNSC and then will have to be implemented, most likely by a 'coalition of the willing' such as that involved in the Gulf War. The EU collectively might form the core of such an armed coalition to defend part of the Union. Of course, the hard case is that of a Russian military action against, say, Latvia once it had become an EU member. Given that the UNSC would be hamstrung by the Russian veto, would the EU then take the initiative in a Uniting for Peace Resolution in the General Assembly, or would action be left to NATO led by the US, or would military action be ruled out from the beginning?

Could EU membership provide the Baltic area with a form of *collective defence*? Membership of the European Union allows membership of the Western European Union (WEU), subject to the consent of the existing members. Although the WEU has a collective defence clause that is a lot stronger than that of the North Atlantic Treaty, it does not have the wherewithal to implement it and its role is currently a matter of some debate, even among the present members of the Union. Furthermore,

there is the problem that any use of 'double-hatted' NATO forces by the WEU to undertake a collective defence operation in Europe would be subject to a de facto veto by the United States. The question arises whether, in the case of an intrusion into the territory of a Baltic state that had become a member of the EU and WEU, the United States might consider that some form of action by the WEU might not be a safer first counter-move than NATO action (especially if that country was not a NATO member). More generally, it is recognised that the institutions of the EU - and even the WEU - are a poor substitution for the more developed infra-structure of NATO in the case of collective defence.

5. Conclusions

An easy conclusion is that the link between the EU and security in the Baltic is a complex one. If security is seen in the more traditional light of freedom from war, absence of violence and a continuation of the status quo, then the EU's contribution is likely to be an indirect one. Should security be interpreted more as 'floreat balticum', then the EU's contributions to building a state of harmony, supporting personal and civil liberties and upholding lasting institutions are likely to be seen as more positive. There could be the hope that the Baltic region might become a security community similar to that which exists within much of the EU.

However, a number of concerns should also be voiced. Firstly, by bringing some states into its camp, the EU might be offering them the security of surviving, but this could be at the cost of the *whole* area thriving, especially should Russia feel that it is being excluded from the arrangements.

Secondly, the inclusion of some states within the EU might increase insecurity within the EU rather than strengthen the security of those states. A security community cannot be built overnight, something of which the European Commission is well aware.

Thirdly, firms and states within the EU are in competition with non-EU rivals in the Baltic region, and this must be expected to limit the amount of co-operation that the EU governments will offer non-EU Baltic states both before and after they gain EU membership (if they ever do).

Fourthly, while membership of the EU may help to underpin the existence of small states such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it could have an adverse effect on their societal security, making it less meaningful that such states continue to exist. While the present leaderships of these countries no doubt fear their countries' demise as a result of the KGB and Moscow's Red Army (suitably updated), the same fears may be realised anyway courtesy of the QMV and Brussels' red tape.

Finally, the difficulty of isolating the EU as a security factor from other important factors should be noted. Perhaps most important for the whole region are developments in Russia.

This having been said, the existence and resilience of the European Union provides some of the main elements in the mental set of instructions for 'doing security' for many in the region. Its presence - together with OSCE, Partnership for Peace, CBSS and other institutions - makes it easier to think of the region's security in terms other than just the security of surviving. In building on the security of thriving, the inhabitants of the Baltic region may well find that they spend less time on the security of survival. The EU is an important contributor to the security of thriving, and its role here is set to expand. To that extent, it may offer the peoples and countries of the Baltic region a vital aspect of security - hope.

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