TY  - RPRT
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Eisenkopf, Gerald
A1  - Nithammer, Juri
T1  - Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 73 
KW  - leadership
KW  - public good
KW  - voting
KW  - experiment
KW  - promises
Y1  - 2024
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 73
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Bulutay, Muhammed
A1  - Cornand, Camille
A1  - Heinemann, Frank
A1  - Zylbersztejn, Adam
T1  - Measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty that players face with respect to the purposeful behavior of other players in an interactive decision situation. Our paper develops a new method for measuring strategic-uncertainty attitudes and distinguishing them from risk and ambiguity attitudes. We vary the source of uncertainty (whether strategic or not) across conditions in a ceteris paribus manner. We elicit certainty equivalents of participating in two strategic 2x2 games (a stag-hunt and a market-entry game) as well as certainty equivalents of related lotteries that yield the same possible payoffs with exogenously given probabilities (risk) and lotteries with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). We provide a structural model of uncertainty attitudes that allows us to measure a preference for or an aversion against the source of uncertainty, as well as optimism or pessimism regarding the desired outcome. We document systematic attitudes towards strategic uncertainty that vary across contexts. Under strategic complementarity [substitutability], the majority of participants tend to be pessimistic [optimistic] regarding the desired outcome. However, preferences for the source of uncertainty are distributed around zero.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 54 
KW  - risk attitudes
KW  - ambiguity attitudes
KW  - strategic-uncertainty attitudes
KW  - stag-hunt game
KW  - market-entry game
Y1  - 2022
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562340
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 54
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Andres, Maximilian
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Friedrichsen, Jana
T1  - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
BT  - a machine learning approach
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 53 
KW  - cartel
KW  - collusion
KW  - communication
KW  - machine learning
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2022
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234
SN  - 2628-653X
ER  -