TY - JOUR A1 - Tucker, Marlee A. A1 - Boehning-Gaese, Katrin A1 - Fagan, William F. A1 - Fryxell, John M. A1 - Van Moorter, Bram A1 - Alberts, Susan C. A1 - Ali, Abdullahi H. A1 - Allen, Andrew M. A1 - Attias, Nina A1 - Avgar, Tal A1 - Bartlam-Brooks, Hattie A1 - Bayarbaatar, Buuveibaatar A1 - Belant, Jerrold L. A1 - Bertassoni, Alessandra A1 - Beyer, Dean A1 - Bidner, Laura A1 - van Beest, Floris M. A1 - Blake, Stephen A1 - Blaum, Niels A1 - Bracis, Chloe A1 - Brown, Danielle A1 - de Bruyn, P. J. Nico A1 - Cagnacci, Francesca A1 - Calabrese, Justin M. A1 - Camilo-Alves, Constanca A1 - Chamaille-Jammes, Simon A1 - Chiaradia, Andre A1 - Davidson, Sarah C. A1 - Dennis, Todd A1 - DeStefano, Stephen A1 - Diefenbach, Duane A1 - Douglas-Hamilton, Iain A1 - Fennessy, Julian A1 - Fichtel, Claudia A1 - Fiedler, Wolfgang A1 - Fischer, Christina A1 - Fischhoff, Ilya A1 - Fleming, Christen H. A1 - Ford, Adam T. A1 - Fritz, Susanne A. A1 - Gehr, Benedikt A1 - Goheen, Jacob R. A1 - Gurarie, Eliezer A1 - Hebblewhite, Mark A1 - Heurich, Marco A1 - Hewison, A. J. Mark A1 - Hof, Christian A1 - Hurme, Edward A1 - Isbell, Lynne A. A1 - Janssen, Rene A1 - Jeltsch, Florian A1 - Kaczensky, Petra A1 - Kane, Adam A1 - Kappeler, Peter M. A1 - Kauffman, Matthew A1 - Kays, Roland A1 - Kimuyu, Duncan A1 - Koch, Flavia A1 - Kranstauber, Bart A1 - LaPoint, Scott A1 - Leimgruber, Peter A1 - Linnell, John D. C. A1 - Lopez-Lopez, Pascual A1 - Markham, A. Catherine A1 - Mattisson, Jenny A1 - Medici, Emilia Patricia A1 - Mellone, Ugo A1 - Merrill, Evelyn A1 - Mourao, Guilherme de Miranda A1 - Morato, Ronaldo G. A1 - Morellet, Nicolas A1 - Morrison, Thomas A. A1 - Diaz-Munoz, Samuel L. A1 - Mysterud, Atle A1 - Nandintsetseg, Dejid A1 - Nathan, Ran A1 - Niamir, Aidin A1 - Odden, John A1 - Oliveira-Santos, Luiz Gustavo R. A1 - Olson, Kirk A. A1 - Patterson, Bruce D. A1 - de Paula, Rogerio Cunha A1 - Pedrotti, Luca A1 - Reineking, Bjorn A1 - Rimmler, Martin A1 - Rogers, Tracey L. A1 - Rolandsen, Christer Moe A1 - Rosenberry, Christopher S. A1 - Rubenstein, Daniel I. A1 - Safi, Kamran A1 - Said, Sonia A1 - Sapir, Nir A1 - Sawyer, Hall A1 - Schmidt, Niels Martin A1 - Selva, Nuria A1 - Sergiel, Agnieszka A1 - Shiilegdamba, Enkhtuvshin A1 - Silva, Joao Paulo A1 - Singh, Navinder A1 - Solberg, Erling J. A1 - Spiegel, Orr A1 - Strand, Olav A1 - Sundaresan, Siva A1 - Ullmann, Wiebke A1 - Voigt, Ulrich A1 - Wall, Jake A1 - Wattles, David A1 - Wikelski, Martin A1 - Wilmers, Christopher C. A1 - Wilson, John W. A1 - Wittemyer, George A1 - Zieba, Filip A1 - Zwijacz-Kozica, Tomasz A1 - Mueller, Thomas T1 - Moving in the Anthropocene BT - global reductions in terrestrial mammalian movements JF - Science N2 - Animal movement is fundamental for ecosystem functioning and species survival, yet the effects of the anthropogenic footprint on animal movements have not been estimated across species. Using a unique GPS-tracking database of 803 individuals across 57 species, we found that movements of mammals in areas with a comparatively high human footprint were on average one-half to one-third the extent of their movements in areas with a low human footprint. We attribute this reduction to behavioral changes of individual animals and to the exclusion of species with long-range movements from areas with higher human impact. Global loss of vagility alters a key ecological trait of animals that affects not only population persistence but also ecosystem processes such as predator-prey interactions, nutrient cycling, and disease transmission. Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aam9712 SN - 0036-8075 SN - 1095-9203 VL - 359 IS - 6374 SP - 466 EP - 469 PB - American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science CY - Washington ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Noonan, Michael J. A1 - Tucker, Marlee A. A1 - Fleming, Christen H. A1 - Akre, Thomas S. A1 - Alberts, Susan C. A1 - Ali, Abdullahi H. A1 - Altmann, Jeanne A1 - Antunes, Pamela Castro A1 - Belant, Jerrold L. A1 - Beyer, Dean A1 - Blaum, Niels A1 - Boehning-Gaese, Katrin A1 - Cullen Jr, Laury A1 - de Paula, Rogerio Cunha A1 - Dekker, Jasja A1 - Drescher-Lehman, Jonathan A1 - Farwig, Nina A1 - Fichtel, Claudia A1 - Fischer, Christina A1 - Ford, Adam T. A1 - Goheen, Jacob R. A1 - Janssen, Rene A1 - Jeltsch, Florian A1 - Kauffman, Matthew A1 - Kappeler, Peter M. A1 - Koch, Flavia A1 - LaPoint, Scott A1 - Markham, A. Catherine A1 - Medici, Emilia Patricia A1 - Morato, Ronaldo G. A1 - Nathan, Ran A1 - Oliveira-Santos, Luiz Gustavo R. A1 - Olson, Kirk A. A1 - Patterson, Bruce D. A1 - Paviolo, Agustin A1 - Ramalho, Emiliano Estero A1 - Rosner, Sascha A1 - Schabo, Dana G. A1 - Selva, Nuria A1 - Sergiel, Agnieszka A1 - da Silva, Marina Xavier A1 - Spiegel, Orr A1 - Thompson, Peter A1 - Ullmann, Wiebke A1 - Zieba, Filip A1 - Zwijacz-Kozica, Tomasz A1 - Fagan, William F. A1 - Mueller, Thomas A1 - Calabrese, Justin M. T1 - A comprehensive analysis of autocorrelation and bias in home range estimation JF - Ecological monographs : a publication of the Ecological Society of America. N2 - Home range estimation is routine practice in ecological research. While advances in animal tracking technology have increased our capacity to collect data to support home range analysis, these same advances have also resulted in increasingly autocorrelated data. Consequently, the question of which home range estimator to use on modern, highly autocorrelated tracking data remains open. This question is particularly relevant given that most estimators assume independently sampled data. Here, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of the effects of autocorrelation on home range estimation. We base our study on an extensive data set of GPS locations from 369 individuals representing 27 species distributed across five continents. We first assemble a broad array of home range estimators, including Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) with four bandwidth optimizers (Gaussian reference function, autocorrelated‐Gaussian reference function [AKDE], Silverman's rule of thumb, and least squares cross‐validation), Minimum Convex Polygon, and Local Convex Hull methods. Notably, all of these estimators except AKDE assume independent and identically distributed (IID) data. We then employ half‐sample cross‐validation to objectively quantify estimator performance, and the recently introduced effective sample size for home range area estimation ( N̂ area ) to quantify the information content of each data set. We found that AKDE 95% area estimates were larger than conventional IID‐based estimates by a mean factor of 2. The median number of cross‐validated locations included in the hold‐out sets by AKDE 95% (or 50%) estimates was 95.3% (or 50.1%), confirming the larger AKDE ranges were appropriately selective at the specified quantile. Conversely, conventional estimates exhibited negative bias that increased with decreasing N̂ area. To contextualize our empirical results, we performed a detailed simulation study to tease apart how sampling frequency, sampling duration, and the focal animal's movement conspire to affect range estimates. Paralleling our empirical results, the simulation study demonstrated that AKDE was generally more accurate than conventional methods, particularly for small N̂ area. While 72% of the 369 empirical data sets had >1,000 total observations, only 4% had an N̂ area >1,000, where 30% had an N̂ area <30. In this frequently encountered scenario of small N̂ area, AKDE was the only estimator capable of producing an accurate home range estimate on autocorrelated data. KW - animal movement KW - kernel density estimation KW - local convex hull KW - minimum convex polygon KW - range distribution KW - space use KW - telemetry KW - tracking data Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1002/ecm.1344 SN - 0012-9615 SN - 1557-7015 VL - 89 IS - 2 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Das Wesen des Menschen in der Philosophischen Anthropologie JF - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie : AZP T2 - Phenomenology of normativity Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.calameo.com/read/006578376d008281a4a01 U6 - https://doi.org/10.12857/AZP.910460120. SN - 0340-7969 N1 - Rezension zu: Schloßberger, Matthias: Entwurf einer materialen Anthropologie im Anschluss an Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner. - Basel: Schwabe, 2019. -259 S. - ISBN: 978-3-7965-4008-0 VL - 46 IS - 1 SP - 121 EP - 126 PB - Frommann-Holzboog CY - Stuttgart ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie? JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Naturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again. KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - worldview KW - Weltbild KW - scientific image KW - metaphilosophy KW - metaphysics Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0003 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 68 IS - 1 SP - 51 EP - 71 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - GEN A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Errata zu: Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf: Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie? - (Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung. -68 (2020), 1. - S. 51 –71. - DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2020-0003) T2 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-8888 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 68 IS - 3 SP - 492 EP - 493 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Verschwörungstheorien und das Erbe der Aufklärung T1 - Conspiracy Theories and the Legacy of Enlightenment BT - auf den Schultern von Scheinriesen BT - on the Shoulders of Bogus Giants JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Conspiracy theories are currently all the rage in philosophy and broader intellectual culture. One of the most common background assumptions in the discourse on conspiracy theories is that conspiracy theorists exhibit certain epistemic vices in the sense of cognitive misconduct. This epistemic vice is mostly seen as a form of irrationality; the corresponding "remedy", as suggested by some commentators, is a return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. This article argues that this idea is wrongheaded. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that conspiracy theorists are actually motivated by the rational Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking in the first place. In contrast to the standard discourse, the article posits that conspiracism is based on a certain form of social scepticism, according to which conspiracy theorists radically mistrust a certain form of expert testimony, namely "official" statements. This form of social scepticism in turn facilitates a naive appropriation of the Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking. The article closes by drawing connections to the ethical and epistemological debate on trust and offers the pessimistic assessment that there are no easy solutions based on individual epistemic virtues. KW - Verschworungstheorien KW - soziale Erkenntnistheorie KW - vice epistemology; KW - Aufklarung KW - Rationalitat KW - Vertrauen KW - Demut Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0015 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 70 IS - 2 SP - 253 EP - 273 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Liberal naturalism without reenchantment JF - European journal for philosophy of religion N2 - There is a close conceptual relation between the notions of religious disenchantment and scientific naturalism. One way of resisting philosophical and cultural implications of the scientific image and the subsequent process of disenchantment can be found in attempts at sketching a reenchanted worldview. The main issue of accounts of reenchantment can be a rejection of scientific results in a way that flies in the face of good reason. Opposed to such reenchantment is scientific naturalism which implies an entirely disenchanted worldview. However, one of the main problems of scientific naturalism are placement problems. A reenchanted worldview does have the conceptual resources to avoid placement problems, yet seems to throw out the baby (a reasonable appeal to science as an authority) with the bathwater (placement problems). A dilemma results: the Scylla of an undesirable scientific naturalism and the Charybdis of a rampant, seemingly prescientific reenchanted worldview. In this article I argue that there is a safe middle passage between these two options, i.e. the recently proposed liberal naturalism which allows for a moderate normative reenchantment. Liberal naturalism lets us have it both ways: avoiding the placement problems while retaining a necessary and reasonable adherence to science, thereby avoiding both an all-too restrictive scientific naturalism. KW - Naturalism KW - Liberal Naturalism KW - Disenchantment KW - Secularism Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.24204/EJPR.2022.3350 SN - 1689-8311 VL - 14 IS - 1 SP - 207 EP - 229 PB - University of Innsbruck CY - Innsbruck ER - TY - GEN A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - The Scientific Weltanschauung BT - (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe N2 - Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 177 KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - Dilthey KW - Jaspers KW - scientific image KW - worldview Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-542910 SN - 1866-8380 IS - 2 SP - 259 EP - 276 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Is religion natural? BT - religion, naturalism and near-naturalism JF - International journal of philosophy and theology N2 - In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker's recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a 'science first' attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural. KW - naturalism KW - religion KW - near-naturalism KW - liberal naturalism KW - naturalization Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717 SN - 2169-2327 SN - 2169-2335 VL - 81 IS - 4 SP - 351 EP - 368 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - The Scientific Weltanschauung BT - (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy JF - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy N2 - Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview. KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - Dilthey KW - Jaspers KW - scientific image KW - worldview Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0016 SN - 2626-8329 SN - 2626-8310 VL - 2 IS - 2 SP - 259 EP - 276 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ; Boston ER -