TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai A1 - Schwan, Mike T1 - Collusive market sharing with spatial competition N2 - This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 105 Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Andree, Kai A1 - Heywood, John S. A1 - Schwan, Mike A1 - Wang, Zheng T1 - A spatial model of cartel stability BT - the influence of production cost convexity JF - Bulletin of economic research N2 - We uniquely introduce convex production costs into a cartel model involving spatial price discrimination. We demonstrate that greater convexity improves cartel stability and that for sufficient convexity first best locations will be adopted. We show that allowing locations to vary over the game reduces cartel stability but that greater convexity continues to improve that stability. Moreover, when the degree of convexity does not support the first best collusive locations, other collusive locations exist that require less stability and these may either increase or decrease social welfare relative to competition. Critically, these locations that require less stability are more dispersed in sharp contrast to the known result assuming linear production costs. KW - cartel stability KW - convex costs KW - delivered pricing Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12149 SN - 0307-3378 SN - 1467-8586 VL - 70 IS - 3 SP - 298 EP - 311 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER -