TY  - GEN
A1  - Gross, Sascha
A1  - Tiwari, Abhishek
A1  - Hammer, Christian
T1  - PlAnalyzer
BT  - a precise approach for pendingIntent vulnerability analysis
T2  - Computer Security(ESORICS 2018), PT II
N2  - In this work we propose PIAnalyzer, a novel approach to analyze PendingIntent related vulnerabilities. We empirically evaluate PIAnalyzer on a set of 1000 randomly selected applications from the Google Play Store and find 1358 insecure usages of Pendinglntents, including 70 severe vulnerabilities. We manually inspected ten reported vulnerabilities out of which nine correctly reported vulnerabilities, indicating a high precision. The evaluation shows that PIAnalyzer is efficient with an average execution time of 13 seconds per application.
KW  - Android
KW  - Intent analysis
KW  - Information flow control
KW  - Static analysis
Y1  - 2018
SN  - 978-3-319-98989-1
SN  - 978-3-319-98988-4
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98989-1_3
SN  - 0302-9743
SN  - 1611-3349
VL  - 11099
SP  - 41
EP  - 59
PB  - Springer
CY  - Cham
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Tiwari, Abhishek
A1  - Prakash, Jyoti
A1  - Groß, Sascha
A1  - Hammer, Christian
T1  - A large scale analysis of Android
BT  - Web hybridization
JF  - The journal of systems and software
N2  - Many Android applications embed webpages via WebView components and execute JavaScript code within Android. Hybrid applications leverage dedicated APIs to load a resource and render it in a WebView. Furthermore, Android objects can be shared with the JavaScript world. However, bridging the interfaces of the Android and JavaScript world might also incur severe security threats: Potentially untrusted webpages and their JavaScript might interfere with the Android environment and its access to native features.
No general analysis is currently available to assess the implications of such hybrid apps bridging the two worlds. To understand the semantics and effects of hybrid apps, we perform a large-scale study on the usage of the hybridization APIs in the wild. We analyze and categorize the parameters to hybridization APIs for 7,500 randomly selected and the 196 most popular applications from the Google Playstore as well as 1000 malware samples. Our results advance the general understanding of hybrid applications, as well as implications for potential program analyses, and the current security situation: We discovered thousands of flows of sensitive data from Android to JavaScript, the vast majority of which could flow to potentially untrustworthy code. Our analysis identified numerous web pages embedding vulnerabilities, which we exemplarily exploited. Additionally, we discovered a multitude of applications in which potentially untrusted JavaScript code may interfere with (trusted) Android objects, both in benign and malign applications.
KW  - Android hybrid apps
KW  - static analysis
KW  - information flow control
Y1  - 2020
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jss.2020.110775
SN  - 0164-1212
SN  - 1873-1228
VL  - 170
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - New York
ER  - 
TY  - THES
A1  - Groß, Sascha
T1  - Detecting and mitigating information flow threats in Android OS
Y1  - 2019
ER  -