TY  - RPRT
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
T1  - Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior – belief precision. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 74 
KW  - prisoner’s dilemma
KW  - communication
KW  - beliefs
KW  - strategic uncertainty
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2024
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 74
SP  - 1
EP  - 33
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
A1  - Riener, Gerhard
A1  - Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah
T1  - Loss aversion in social image concerns
JF  - Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association
N2  - Does loss aversion apply to social image concerns? In a laboratory experiment, we first induce social image in a relevant domain, intelligence, through public ranking. In a second stage, subjects experience a change in rank and are offered scope for lying to improve their final, also publicly reported rank. Subjects who care about social image and experience a decline in rank lie more than those experiencing gains. Moreover, we document a discontinuity in lying behavior when moving from rank losses to gains. Our results are in line with loss aversion in social image concerns.
KW  - loss aversion
KW  - social image concerns
KW  - lying behavior
KW  - laboratory experiment
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09782-7
SN  - 1386-4157
SN  - 1573-6938
VL  - 26
IS  - 3
SP  - 622
EP  - 645
PB  - Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
CY  - Dordrecht
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Hunold, Matthias
A1  - Petrishcheva, Vasilisa
T1  - Foreclosure and Tunneling with Partial Vertical Ownership
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target (tunneling). Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target’s profit but influence the target’s strategy significantly. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 57 
KW  - Backward ownership
KW  - Entry deterrence
KW  - Foreclosure
KW  - Minority shareholdings
KW  - Partial ownership
KW  - Uniform pricing
KW  - Vertical integration
Y1  - 2022
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-565601
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 57
ER  -