TY  - BOOK
A1  - Jann, Werner
A1  - Bach, Tobias
A1  - Fleischer, Julia
A1  - Jantz, Bastian
A1  - Hustedt, Thurid
T1  - Opportunity and feasibility of establishing common support services for EU agencies
Y1  - 2008
UR  - http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/2009_powerpoint_agencies_/ 2009_powerpoint_agencies_en.pdf
PB  - Europäisches Parlament
CY  - Brüssel
ER  - 
TY  - BOOK
A1  - Jann, Werner
A1  - Bach, Tobias
A1  - Fleischer, Julia
A1  - Hustedt, Thurid
T1  - Best practice in governance of agencies : a comparative study in view of identifying best practice for governing agencies carrying out activities on behalf of the European Union
Y1  - 2008
PB  - Europäisches Parlament
CY  - Brüssel
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Jann, Werner
A1  - Bach, Tobias
T1  - Structure and governance of agencies in Germany : a lot of continuity and little change
Y1  - 2009
SN  - 978-82-450-0754-1
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bach, Tobias
A1  - Jann, Werner
T1  - Animals in the administrative zoo : organizational change and agency autonomy in Germany
N2  - Although Germany does not figure among the 'forerunners' of managerial reforms of the public sector, it has a long tradition of agencies and non-departmental bodies at the federal level. Over time, the federal administration has developed into a highly differentiated 'administrative zoo' with a large number of species, questioning the image of a well-ordered German bureaucracy. The article addresses organizational changes among non-ministerial agencies during the past 20 years and ministry-agency relations, drawing on data from a comprehensive survey of the federal administration. The structural changes we observe are neither comprehensive nor planned; they are much more evolutionary than revolutionary, driven by sectoral policies and not by any overall agency policy, supported more by regulatory than by managerial reforms, and most of the changes are horizontal mergers or successions of existing organizations, while we find almost no evidence for hiving-off from ministries to agencies. At the same time, federal agencies report a lot of bureaucratic discretion, whereas they perceive substantial levels of 'red tape' due to administrative regulations. We also find that traditional, hierarchical modes of ministerial oversight are still dominating; only few agencies have performance agreements with measurable goals.
Y1  - 2010
UR  - http://ras.sagepub.com/
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852310372448
SN  - 0020-8523
ER  -