TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Analytic Kantianism BT - Sellars and McDowell on Sensory Consciousness JF - Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy N2 - Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy. KW - Kant KW - Sellars KW - McDowell KW - Transcendental Philosophy KW - perception KW - intuition KW - judgment Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1092766 SN - 2386-7655 SP - 18 EP - 41 PB - Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas CY - Madrid ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Grüne, Stefanie T1 - Is there a Gap in Kant's B Deduction? JF - International journal of philosophical studies N2 - In 'Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content', Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptualism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has been developed by Kant. But according to 'Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the B Deduction', Kant's non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the categories, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction. KW - Kant KW - concepts KW - non-conceptualism KW - intuition KW - synthesis Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2011.595196 SN - 0967-2559 VL - 19 IS - 3 SP - 465 EP - 490 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER -