TY  - JOUR
A1  - Melliger, Marc André
A1  - Lilliestam, Johan
T1  - Effects of coordinating support policy changes on renewable power investor choices in Europe
JF  - Energy policy : the international journal of the political, economic, planning, environmental and social aspects of energy
N2  - The economic context for renewable power in Europe is shifting: feed-in tariffs are replaced by auctioned premiums as the main support schemes. As renewables approach competitiveness, political pressure mounts to phase out support, whereas some other actors perceive a need for continued fixed-price support. We investigate how the phase-out of support or the reintroduction of feed-in tariffs would affect investors' choices for renewables through a conjoint analysis. In particular, we analyse the impact of coordination - the simultaneousness - of policy changes across countries and technologies. We find that investment choices are not strongly affected if policy changes are coordinated and returns unaffected. However, if policy changes are uncoordinated, investments shift to still supported - less mature and costlier - technologies or countries where support remains or is reintroduced. This shift is particularly strong for large investors and could potentially skew the European power mix towards an over-reliance on a single, less mature technology or specific generation region, resulting in a more expensive power system. If European countries want to change their renewable power support policies, and especially if they phase out support and expose renewables to market competition, it is important that they coordinate their actions.
KW  - Policy change
KW  - Policy coordination
KW  - Renewable energy
KW  - Investment
KW  - decision
KW  - Choice experiment
KW  - Adaptive conjoint analysis
Y1  - 2021
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111993
SN  - 0301-4215
VL  - 148
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Oxford
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Neumann, Anne
A1  - Rosellon, Juan
A1  - Weigt, Hannes
T1  - Removing Cross-Border Capacity Bottlenecks in the European Natural Gas Market-A Proposed Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism
JF  - Networks and spatial economics : a journal of infrastructure modeling and computation
N2  - We propose a merchant-regulatory framework to promote investment in the European natural gas network infrastructure based on a price cap over two-part tariffs. As suggested by Vogelsang (J Regul Econ 20:141-165, 2001) and Hogan et al. (J Regul Econ 38:113-143, 2010), a profit maximizing network operator facing this regulatory constraint will intertemporally rebalance the variable and fixed part of its two-part tariff so as to expand the congested pipelines, and converge to the Ramsey-Boiteaux equilibrium. We confirm this with actual data from the European natural gas market by comparing the bi-level price-cap model with different reference cases. We analyze the performance of the regulatory approach under different market scenarios, and identify relevant aspects that need to be addressed if the approach were to be implemented.
KW  - Regulation
KW  - Natural gas network
KW  - Investment
KW  - Europe
Y1  - 2015
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-014-9273-3
SN  - 1566-113X
SN  - 1572-9427
VL  - 15
IS  - 1
SP  - 149
EP  - 181
PB  - Springer
CY  - Dordrecht
ER  -