TY - JOUR A1 - Schneider, Hans Julius T1 - Was heißt "einer Regel nicht folgen"? BT - zur Erklärbarkeit sprachlicher Kreativität JF - Kreativität Y1 - 2006 SN - 978-3-7873-1766-0 SN - 978-3-7873-1766-X SP - 785 EP - 799 PB - Meiner CY - Hamburg ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Faber, Eike A1 - Tipold, Marc T1 - Justice carved into the body BT - Maiming corporal punishments in the pre-modern world Y1 - 2022 CY - Potsdam ER - TY - GEN A1 - Bösch, Frank A1 - Su, Phi Hong T1 - Competing contexts of reception in refugee and immigrant incorporation BT - Vietnamese in West and East Germany T2 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe N2 - Scholars have long recognised the importance of contexts of reception in shaping the integration of immigrants and refugees in a host society. Studies of refugees, in particular, have examined groups where the different dimensions of reception (government, labour market, and ethnic community) have been largely positive. How important is this merging of positive contexts across dimensions of reception? We address this through a comparative study of Vietnamese refugees to West Germany beginning in 1979 and contract workers to East Germany beginning in 1980. These two migration streams converged when Germany reunified in 1990. Drawing on mixed qualitative methods, this paper offers a strategic case for understanding factors that shape the resettlement experiences of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants in Germany. By comparing two migration streams from the same country of origin, but with different backgrounds and contexts of reception, we suggest that ethnic networks may, in time, offset the disadvantages of a negative government reception. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 189 KW - contexts of reception KW - refugees KW - contract workers KW - ethnic social capital Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-543007 SN - 1866-8380 IS - 21 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Khurana, Thomas ED - Berger, Christian ED - Frey, Michael ED - Priesemuth, Florian T1 - Ein Recht gegen das Recht BT - Der Körper des Rechts und die Grenzen des Eigentums T2 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 190 Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-600060 SN - 978-3-11-078466-4 SN - 978-3-11-078498-5 SN - 978-3-11-078506-7 SN - 1866-8380 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - True right against formal right: The body of right and the limits of property T2 - Hegel's philosophy of right: critical perspectives on freedom and history N2 - The conception of property at the basis of Hegel’s conception of abstract right seems committed to a problematic form of “possessive individualism.” It seems to conceive of right as the expression of human mastery over nature and as based upon an irreducible opposition of person and nature, rightful will, and rightless thing. However, this chapter argues that Hegel starts with a form of possessive individualism only to show that it undermines itself. This is evident in the way Hegel unfolds the nature of property as it applies to external things as well as in the way he explains our self-ownership of our own bodies and lives. Hegel develops the idea of property to a point where it reaches a critical limit and encounters the “true right” that life possesses against the “formal” and “abstract right” of property. Ultimately, Hegel’s account suggests that nature should precisely not be treated as a rightless object at our arbitrary disposal but acknowledged as the inorganic body of right. Y1 - 2022 SN - 9781003081036 SN - 9780367532321 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003081036-10 SP - 147 EP - 168 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The stage of difference: On the second nature of civil society in Kant and Hegel T2 - Naturalism and social philosophy Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-5381-7492-0 SN - 978-1-5381-7493-7 SP - 35 EP - 64 PB - Rowman & Littlefield CY - Lanham ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Genus-being: On Marx's dialectical naturalism T2 - Nature and naturalism in classical German philosophy N2 - In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the genus- character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-0-367-54172-9 SN - 978-1-003-09205-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003092056-13 SP - 246 EP - 278 PB - Routledge CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Dialektische Anthropologie – oder romantischer Idealismus? JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2023-0026 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 71 IS - 2 SP - 304 EP - 311 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Die "europäischen Wilden" BT - Kants Verteidigung und Kritik des Kolonialismus JF - Historische Urteilskraft Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-86102-231-2 SN - 2626-8094 VL - 5 SP - 15 EP - 18 PB - Stiftung Deutsches Historisches Museum CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The art of second nature BT - Modern culture after Kant JF - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj20224312 SN - 0093-4240 SN - 2153-9197 VL - 43 IS - 1 SP - 33 EP - 69 PB - Philosophy Documentation Center CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Altera Natura: Das Anthropozän als ästhetisches Problem JF - Dritte Natur N2 - Der Kunst wird seit langem nachgesagt, dem Subjekt ein anderes Verhältnis zur Natur zu eröffnen, als dies die gewöhnliche theoretische oder praktische Erkenntnis ermöglicht. Statt die Natur zum distanzierten Objekt unserer Betrachtung zu machen oder zum bloßen Material und Mittel unserer praktischen Konstruktionen, erschließt sich uns in der Kunst eine Intelligibilität der Natur, die weiter reicht als unsere Begriffe, und eine Natürlichkeit unserer selbst, die uns mit dem verbindet, was uns sonst bloß gegenübersteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheint es nicht verwunderlich, dass die jüngeren Diskussionen um das problematische Verhältnis zur Natur, die das Anthropozän geprägt haben, immer wieder den Blick auf die Kunst richten und ihr Vermögen hervorheben, den problematischen modernen Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt, Geist und Natur zu überwinden, der uns in diese missliche Lage gebracht hat. Wenn die Kunst hier aber weiterführen soll, dann muss sie über die klassischen ästhetischen Paradigmen des Schönen und des Erhabenen hinausführen. Das Schöne träumt von einer Passung von Subjekt und Natur, die im Anthropozän gerade in Frage steht, und das Erhabene verwendet die Übermacht der Natur als Vehikel, um eine Macht im intelligiblen Subjekt zu markieren, die von der natürlichen Übermacht unberührt bleibt. Diese klassischen Figuren ästhetischer Erfahrung verstellen so, wie tiefgreifend wir das Naturverhältnis neu bestimmen müssen, um auf das Anthropozän zu antworten. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-7518-0704-3 SN - 2625-9885 VL - 6 IS - 1 SP - 175 EP - 190 PB - Matthes & Seitz CY - Berlin ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen BT - Husserl – Wittgenstein – Cavell T2 - Trouble Every Day : Zum Schrecken des Alltäglichen Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-8467-6721-4 SN - 978-3-7705-6721-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.30965/9783846767214_006 SP - 91 EP - 105 PB - Brill Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Scholz-Ahrens, Katharina Elisabeth A1 - Ahrens, Frank A1 - Barth, Christian A. T1 - Nutritional and health attributes of milk and milk imitations JF - European journal of nutrition N2 - Purpose: Modern food technology allows designing products aiming to simulate and replace traditional food. In affluent societies there is a rising tendency to consume foods derived from plants including milk imitations or plant drinks based on cereals, nuts, legumes, oil seeds or other plant families. Herein we review production and composition of such drinks, summarize consumers' motivations to change from milk to plant drinks and highlight nutritional and health implications of consuming plant drinks instead of milk, in particular if non-fortified and if consumed by infants, children, adolescents and the elderly. Results: Whereas the macronutrient concentrations of some plant drinks (soy) may approach in some cases (protein) that of cow's milk, the nutritional quality of most plant drinks, e.g., the biological value of protein and the presence and amount of vitamins and essential minerals with high bioavailability does not. If cow's milk is exchanged for non-fortified and non-supplemented plant drinks consumers may risk deficiencies of calcium, zinc, iodine, vitamins B2, B12, D, A, and indispensable amino acids, particularly in infants and toddlers who traditionally consume significant portions of milk. The vegetable nature, appearance and taste of such plant drinks may be appealing to adult consumers and be chosen for adding variety to the menu. However, in young children fed exclusively such plant drinks severe metabolic disturbances may occur. Conclusion: Parents, dietitians, physicians and consumers should be aware of such potential risks, if non-fortified plant drinks are consumed instead of milk. KW - cow's milk KW - plant drinks KW - nutrient bioavailability KW - human nutrition KW - health risks Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00394-019-01936-3 SN - 1436-6207 SN - 1436-6215 VL - 59 IS - 1 SP - 19 EP - 34 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - THES A1 - Schmidt, Christian T1 - Vom Trauma zum bedeutungsvollen Ersterlebnis BT - über die Entstehungsbedingungen von Person und Personalität aus Sicht der medizinischen und der Philosophischen Anthropologie N2 - Ausgehend von Überlegungen des anthropologisch orientierten Psychiaters Erwin Straus geht dieses Buch der Frage nach, welche Bedingungen vorliegen, wenn bestimmte Ereignisse von Personen als bedeutsam erlebt werden. Des Weiteren wird ausführlich erörtert, wie sich Personalität im Menschen ausbildet und inwieweit sie von der gelingenden Integration bedeutungsvoller Ersterlebnisse abhängt. Das dabei zugrundeliegende Person-Konzept stellt einen eigenständigen Syntheseversuch der vier Konzepte von Erwin Straus, Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, Helmuth Plessner und Max Scheler dar. Der Autor arbeitet in oberärztlicher Funktion am Klinikum Schloss Lütgenhof in Dassow, einer Akutklinik für Personale Medizin, integrierte Psychosomatik, Innere Medizin und Psychotherapie N2 - Based on considerations by the anthropologically oriented psychiatrist Erwin Straus, this book explores the conditions which are present when people experience certain events as significant. In addition, it discusses in detail how personhood emerges in humans and to what extent this depends on the successful integration of meaningful first experiences. The underlying concept of the person is an independent attempt to synthesise the four concepts developed by Erwin Straus, Viktor Emil von Gebsattel, Helmuth Plessner and Max Scheler. The author works in a leading medical position at Klinikum Schloss Lütgenhof, an acute clinic for person-centered medicine, integrated psychosomatics, internal medicine and psychotherapy. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-4959-9450-4 SN - 978-3-495-99451-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495994511 PB - Karl Alber CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Hegel’s logic of purposiveness T2 - Kantian legacies in German idealism N2 - I argue that Hegel’s Logic traces an emergent-purposive, logical method that entails two key identities in reason. These identities are (1) between a logic of freedom and necessity, and (2) between the possibilities of a priori and a posteriori reasoning in a purposive method. The purposive method of the Logic is the basis for these identities and, in Hegel’s view, facilitates the transition from Kant’s transcendental idealism to absolute idealism. I suggest that this method is Hegel’s attempt to rework a critique of philosophy according to Kant’s insight about the principle grounding the formal purposiveness of the faculties, what Hegel calls, “one of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy.” Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 SN - 978-0-429-42982-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SP - 36 EP - 70 PB - Routledge CY - New York ; London ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Introduction BT - the legacies of Kant in German Idealism T2 - Kantian legacies in German Idealism N2 - Kant wrote in the Critique of Pure Reason, “For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth.” This unity of reason, taken as a holistic condition, was central to the convictions of the idealists. To them, Kant layed bare the right path forward, but also fundamental failings in his execution of a critique of reason which needed to be overcome in order for reason to secure its own, internal end. In this chapter, I discuss key themes in the positive inheritance of Kant’s thought in classical German philosophy and offer an overview of the arguments and significances of each contribution to this volume. The aim is not to minimize important differences between Kant and post-Kantian Idealists, but rather to emphasize core retentions of Kant’s thought. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-0-42942-982-8 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SP - 1 EP - 12 PB - Routledge CY - New York ER - TY - BOOK ED - Gentry, Gerad T1 - Kantian legacies in German idealism T3 - Routledge studies in nineteenth-century philosophy N2 - Scholarship on German Idealism typically couches the systems of Idealism in terms of a rejection of or departure from Kant's critical philosophy. The few accounts that do look to the positive influence of Kant on the Idealists typically focus on the perceived need among the Idealists to revise Kant's system due to various shortcomings arising from his dualism. This volume seeks to reverse this norm. It does this by bringing together an original set of critical reflections on the ways in which the German Idealists maintain specific and fundamental Kantian qualities in their own systems. At the same time, the aim of this volume is not a reduction of German Idealism to Kant's thought. Instead, this volume highlights a set of core ways in which the German Idealists retain specific, fundamentally Kantian principles and qualities. To that extent, this volume paves the way for new interpretations by laying the ground for identifying those significant components of German Idealism that can defensibly be called "Kantian. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SN - 978-1-138-36736-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429429828 SN - 978-0-429-42982-8 PB - Routledge CY - New York ; London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Brenner, Leon S. T1 - The autistic mirror in the real BT - Autism in Lacan’s mirror stage JF - Theory & psychology N2 - The mirror stage is one of Jacques Lacan's most well-received metapsychological models in the English-speaking world. In its many renditions Lacan elucidates the different forms of identification that lead to the construction of the Freudian ego. This article utilizes Lacan's mirror stage to provide a novel perspective on autistic embodiment. It develops an integrative model that accounts for the progression of four distinct forms of autistic identification in the mirror stage; these forms provide the basis for the development of four different clinical trajectories in the treatment of autism. This model is posed as an alternative to the clinical and diagnostic framework associated with the autistic spectrum disorder. KW - autism KW - Lacan KW - mirror stage KW - psychoanalysis KW - theory Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543211034569 SN - 0959-3543 SN - 1461-7447 VL - 31 IS - 6 SP - 950 EP - 972 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Sala, Lorenzo A1 - Kabeshkin, Anton T1 - A priori philosophy of nature in Hegel and German rationalism JF - British journal for the history of philosophy : Bjhp N2 - Hegel's many remarks that seem to imply that philosophy should proceed completely a priori pose a problem for his philosophy of nature since, on this reading, Hegel offers an a priori derivation of empirical results of natural sciences. We show how this perception can be mitigated by interpreting Hegel's remarks as broadly in line with the pre-Kantian rationalist notion of a priori and offer reasons for doing so. We show that, rather than being a peculiarity of Hegel's philosophy, the practice of demonstrating a priori the results of empirical sciences was widespread in the pre-Kantian rationalist tradition. We argue that this practice was intelligible in light of the notion of a priori that was still quite prominent during Hegel's life. This notion of a priori differs from Kant's in that, while the latter's notion concerns propositions, the former concerned only their demonstration. According to it, the same proposition could be demonstrated both a posteriori and a priori. Post-Kantian idealists likewise developed projects of demonstrating specific scientific contents a priori. We then make our discussion more concrete by examining a particular case of an a priori derivation of a natural law, namely the law of fall, by both Leibniz and Hegel. KW - Hegel KW - Philosophy of Nature KW - a priori KW - Wolff KW - Leibniz Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2022.2044753 SN - 0960-8788 SN - 1469-3526 VL - 30 IS - 5 SP - 797 EP - 817 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruno, Daniele T1 - Being fully excused for wrongdoing JF - Pacific philosophical quarterly N2 - On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12425 SN - 0279-0750 SN - 1468-0114 VL - 104 IS - 2 SP - 324 EP - 347 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Hoboken, NJ ER - TY - BOOK ED - Gunnarsson, Logi ED - Zimmermann, Andreas T1 - 20 Jahre MenschenRechtsZentrum Y1 - 2015 PB - BWV Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Fuchs, Susanne A1 - Koenig, Laura L. A1 - Gerstenberg, Annette T1 - A longitudinal study of speech acoustics in older French females BT - analysis of the filler particle euh across utterance positions JF - Languages : open access journal N2 - Aging in speech production is a multidimensional process. Biological, cognitive, social, and communicative factors can change over time, stay relatively stable, or may even compensate for each other. In this longitudinal work, we focus on stability and change at the laryngeal and supralaryngeal levels in the discourse particle euh produced by 10 older French-speaking females at two times, 10 years apart. Recognizing the multiple discourse roles of euh, we divided out occurrences according to utterance position. We quantified the frequency of euh, and evaluated acoustic changes in formants, fundamental frequency, and voice quality across time and utterance position. Results showed that euh frequency was stable with age. The only acoustic measure that revealed an age effect was harmonics-to-noise ratio, showing less noise at older ages. Other measures mostly varied with utterance position, sometimes in interaction with age. Some voice quality changes could reflect laryngeal adjustments that provide for airflow conservation utterance-finally. The data suggest that aging effects may be evident in some prosodic positions (e.g., utterance-final position), but not others (utterance-initial position). Thus, it is essential to consider the interactions among these factors in future work and not assume that vocal aging is evident throughout the signal. KW - aging KW - prosody KW - voice quality KW - fundamental frequency KW - formants KW - filler KW - particles Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3390/languages6040211 SN - 2226-471X VL - 6 IS - 4 PB - MDPI CY - Basel ER - TY - THES A1 - Batti, Anil Dominic T1 - Schopenhauer's doctrine of salvation in relation to his critique of religion and philosophical teachings N2 - Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) was perhaps the last polymath among the great Germanic philosophers. Switching with ease and elegance between epistemic positions and fields as diverse as idealism and empiricism, fideism and rationalism, realism and nominalism, art and religion, jurisprudence and politics, psychology and occultism, Schopenhauer erected an imposing edifice bearing testimony to his universal learning. This study is an investigation into the very conclusion of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and endeavours to answer the following question: did Schopenhauer’s doctrine of salvation issue forth organically from his intellectual output or was it annexed to his philosophy as a result of his critical engagement with religion? The labyrinthine paths through which Schopenhauer arrives at the soteriological culmination of his philosophy are subjected to critical assessment; the picture that emerges is of a philosopher who seemed convinced that he had solved some of the most pressing cosmic riddles to have tormented mankind through the ages. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-3-83255-735-5 PB - Logos CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Wallage, Martijn T1 - Dotting the “I think” BT - Self-consciousness and punctuation JF - Reading Rödl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity N2 - This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In a statement of the form “I think p”, the words “I think” do not contribute to the content, and yet they are not redundant. In other words, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of “I think”, like Anscombe’s merely negative thesis, endorsed by Rödl, that “I” is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand “I think” by comparison to “hello”. A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation – in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up – i.e., repeated – in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation, and in that sense a part of the world. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-03-234951-0 SN - 978-1-00-095669-6 U6 - https://doi.org//10.4324/9781003324638 SP - 316 EP - 333 PB - Taylor & Francis Group CY - Milton ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Self-knowledge and knowledge of nature T2 - Reading Rödl : On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity N2 - In this chapter, I consider the unity of self-consciousness and objectivity. Starting from the notion that the objective character and the self-conscious character of thought seem in tension, I discuss Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity and his thesis that this tension is merely apparent. This resolution suggests an immediate route to absolute idealism. I recall two Hegelian objections against such an immediate route. Against this background, it transpires that the dissolution of the apparent opposition of objectivity and self-consciousness can only be a preliminary step, opening our eyes to an actual opposition animating the pursuit of knowledge: the opposition of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge. This actual opposition cannot be removed as merely apparent and instead has to be sublated through articulation of its speculative unity. I consider two paradigms for the exposition of such a speculative unity: Kant’s account of judgments of beauty, and Hegel’s account of the speculative unity of life and self-consciousness. I close by contrasting these two approaches with Rödl’s characterization, which strikes me as one-sided. Absolute idealism, properly understood, requires us to develop the speculative unity of knowledge of nature and self-knowledge from both sides, showing us that knowledge of nature is self-knowledge, but equally: that self-knowledge requires knowledge of ourselves as nature. Y1 - 2023 SN - 978-1-03-234951-0 SN - 978-1-00-095669-6 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003324638 SP - 195 EP - 223 PB - Taylor & Francis Group CY - Milton ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Khurana, Thomas ED - Berger, Christian ED - Frey, Michael ED - Priesemuth, Florian T1 - Ein Recht gegen das Recht BT - der Körper des Rechts und die Grenzen des Eigentums T2 - Rechte des Körpers Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-11-078466-4 SN - 978-3-11-078498-5 SN - 978-3-11-078506-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110784985-004 SP - 45 EP - 60 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin, Boston ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Kaya, Gizem A1 - Kopshteyn, Georgy ED - Kubbe, Ina ED - Varraich, Aiysha T1 - Dispersing the fog BT - a philosophical analysis of institutional corruption applied to the MENA region T2 - Corruption and informal practices in the Middle East and North Africa N2 - Countries in the Middle East generally fare poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. One of the biggest challenges for the anti-corruption-regime in the Middle East are the many forms of corruption that are not being recognised as such on the local level, if assessed against a culturally relativistic benchmark. Our paper seeks to establish a unifying ground by providing a functional analysis of corruption which is both, normatively guiding and culturally sensitive. We demarcate our work as follows: (1) our reference point will be the phenomenon of institutional corruption, whereas (2) our working definition of corruption will conceive of corruption as a violation of role-specific norms that is motivated by the role-occupier’s private motives. In an attempt to offer a comprehensive approach, corruption will be viewed on two differing levels. On the external level, we will begin with an investigation of features within a norm-order that typically instantiate corruption. We will argue that corruption is externally conditioned by an authority’s inability to enforce and (re)establish the norms of conduct that ought to be action-guiding in office. This changes the expectation-structure within a norm-order and erodes public trust in the authorities, giving rise to willing perpetrators. Complementing this, the internal level of our framework will emphasize the motivational deficits of corrupt acts. It will be argued that this deficit can typically be found in societies that lack civic virtues. This, we suspect, is the functional reason why corrupt societies have such a hard time to overcome the problem: they lack both features and are, as a consequence, caught in a vicious circle as they struggle to strengthen civil society and consolidate institutional structures – whereas corruption increasingly disappears from the radar as it becomes accepted reality. Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-0-367-82285-9 SN - 978-0-367-42226-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367822859-2 SP - 23 EP - 42 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bösch, Frank A1 - Su, Phi Hong T1 - Competing contexts of reception in refugee and immigrant incorporation BT - Vietnamese in West and East Germany JF - Journal of ethnic and migration studies N2 - Scholars have long recognised the importance of contexts of reception in shaping the integration of immigrants and refugees in a host society. Studies of refugees, in particular, have examined groups where the different dimensions of reception (government, labour market, and ethnic community) have been largely positive. How important is this merging of positive contexts across dimensions of reception? We address this through a comparative study of Vietnamese refugees to West Germany beginning in 1979 and contract workers to East Germany beginning in 1980. These two migration streams converged when Germany reunified in 1990. Drawing on mixed qualitative methods, this paper offers a strategic case for understanding factors that shape the resettlement experiences of Vietnamese refugees and immigrants in Germany. By comparing two migration streams from the same country of origin, but with different backgrounds and contexts of reception, we suggest that ethnic networks may, in time, offset the disadvantages of a negative government reception. KW - Contexts of reception KW - refugees KW - contract workers KW - ethnic social capital Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1724418 SN - 1369-183X SN - 1469-9451 VL - 47 IS - 21 SP - 4853 EP - 4871 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - THES A1 - Tröger, Hannah T1 - Zeitreisen erklären T1 - Explaining time travel BT - Herausforderungen für philosophische Modelle von Zeit und Identität BT - challenges for philosophical models of time and identity N2 - Die vorliegende Arbeit dreht sich um die Frage, wie sich schlüssig und im Einklang mit gängigen philosophischen Modellen von Zeit und Identität über Zeitreisen sprechen lässt. Dabei läuft die Darstellung nicht auf einen einzelnen theoretischen Ansatz hinaus, sondern zeigt verschiedene Implikationen von Zeitreisen angesichts unterschiedlicher Konzepte von Zeit und Persistenz auf. Gearbeitet wird mit den Zeitreise-Modellen von Jack Meiland (1974), Geoffrey Goddu (2003) und Peter van Inwagen (2010) und insbesondere Überlegungen zu growing block-Universen und vierdimensionaler Identität werden weitergeführt. Schwerpunkte der Arbeit liegen einerseits auf Erklärungen zu Veränderungen der Vergangenheit und andererseits auf dem Problem der Bilokation durch Zeitreisen in Zeiten, zu denen die Zeitreisende bereits existiert. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2015) hat als notwendige Voraussetzung für die Erklärbarkeit von Veränderungen der Vergangenheit dia-hyper-chrone Identitätsbedingungen für Jahre gefordert. Ich zeige, dass es sich hierbei um eine zu starke Forderung handelt. Demnach ist die Erklärung von Veränderungen der Vergangenheit durch Annihilation in growing block-Universen, wie Goddu und van Inwagen sie einführen, legitim. Bilokation stellt eine Herausforderung für personale Identität dar. Ich schlage eine überarbeitete Definition von gegenwärtigen zeitlichen Teilen vor, die es zulässt, dass mehr als ein zeitlicher Teil einer diachron identischen Person synchron präsent sein kann. Auf diese Weise muss nicht zwischen zeitlichen Teilen und Personenstadien differenziert werden, wie Ted Sider (2001) es tut. Ich komme im Rahmen dieser Arbeit zu den Ergebnissen, dass erstens bisher kein Modell von Zeit oder Persistenz bekannt ist, für das Zeitreisen grundsätzlich auszuschließen sind. Eine umfangreiche Systematik über Möglichkeiten und Implikationen von Zeitreisen bleibt jedoch lückenhaft, solange keine präsentistischen Modelle von Zeitreisen vorliegen. Zweitens erweisen sich Zeitreisen, die keine Veränderungen verursachen, nicht als weniger problematisch als Zeitreisen, die Veränderungen verursachen. Erstere werfen eigene Probleme auf, wie das Motivationsproblem und die Frage nach der Determination durch Zukunftsfakten. Drittens lassen sich trotz all der geleisteten Erklärungen weiterhin Szenarien entwickeln, die suspekt bleiben. Dies verweist auf die weiterführende Frage, inwiefern Chronologie wesentlich und unverzichtbar ist für die Intelligibilität beispielsweise sozialer Interaktionen und Institutionen. N2 - The present work addresses the issue of talking coherently about time travel and in accordance with current philosophical models of time and identity. Therby it does not boil down to a single theoretical approach, but shows various implications of time travel in the light of different concepts of time and persistence. While operating with the time travel models of Jack Meiland (1974), Geoffrey Goddu (2003) and Peter van Inwagen (2010), the considerations on growing block universes and four-dimensional identity are expanded on in particular. The work focuses both on explanations of changes in the past and on the problem of bilocation through time travel in times when the time traveler already exists. Nicholas J.J. Smith (2015) has requested dia-hyper-chronic identity conditions for years as a necessary precondition for the explainability of changes in the past. I will show that this requirement is too strong. Accordingly, the explanation of changes in the past by annihilation in growing block universes, as introduced by Goddu and van Inwagen, is legitimate. Bilocation constitutes a challenge to personal identity. I propose a revised definition of present temporal parts that allows more than one temporal part of a diachronically identical person to be synchronously present. In this way, there is no need to differentiate between temporal parts and person stages, as Ted Sider (2001) does. Alltogether I come to the conclusion that, firstly, no model of time or persistence is known for which time travel can be fundamentally ruled out. However, a comprehensive classification on the possibilities and implications of time travel remains incomplete as long as there are no presentist models of time travel. Second, time travel that does not cause change proves no less problematic than time travel that causes change. The former raises its own problems, such as the problem of motivation and the question of determination by future facts. Third, despite all the explanations that have been given, there are still scenarios imaginable which remain suspect. This points to the further question of how far chronology is essential and indispensable for the intelligibility of, for example, social interactions and institutions. KW - Zeitreisen KW - time travel KW - personale Identität KW - personal identity KW - Bilokation KW - bilocation KW - growing block KW - Perdurantismus KW - perdurantism KW - Annihilation KW - annihilation Y1 - 2023 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-593039 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Scholz-Ahrens, Katharina Elisabeth A1 - Ahrens, Frank A1 - Barth, Christian A. T1 - Nutritional and health attributes of milk and milk imitations JF - European journal of nutrition N2 - Purpose Modern food technology allows designing products aiming to simulate and replace traditional food. In affluent societies there is a rising tendency to consume foods derived from plants including milk imitations or plant drinks based on cereals, nuts, legumes, oil seeds or other plant families. Herein we review production and composition of such drinks, summarize consumers' motivations to change from milk to plant drinks and highlight nutritional and health implications of consuming plant drinks instead of milk, in particular if non-fortified and if consumed by infants, children, adolescents and the elderly. Results Whereas the macronutrient concentrations of some plant drinks (soy) may approach in some cases (protein) that of cow's milk, the nutritional quality of most plant drinks, e.g., the biological value of protein and the presence and amount of vitamins and essential minerals with high bioavailability does not. If cow's milk is exchanged for non-fortified and non-supplemented plant drinks consumers may risk deficiencies of calcium, zinc, iodine, vitamins B2, B12, D, A, and indispensable amino acids, particularly in infants and toddlers who traditionally consume significant portions of milk. The vegetable nature, appearance and taste of such plant drinks may be appealing to adult consumers and be chosen for adding variety to the menu. However, in young children fed exclusively such plant drinks severe metabolic disturbances may occur. Conclusion Parents, dietitians, physicians and consumers should be aware of such potential risks, if non-fortified plant drinks are consumed instead of milk. KW - cow's milk KW - plant drinks KW - nutrient bioavailability KW - human nutrition KW - health risks Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00394-019-01936-3 SN - 1436-6207 SN - 1436-6215 VL - 59 IS - 1 SP - 19 EP - 34 PB - Springer CY - Heidelberg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - This other life that knows itself as life BT - comments on Karen Ng's Hegel's concept of life JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this paper, I discuss Karen Ng's reconstruction of Hegel's concept of life. On Ng's account, Hegel's conception of life has a remarkable double role to play: Life is both the proper object of judgment as well as a fundamental characterization of the activity of the judging subject. In a first step, I highlight the insight that Ng's account sheds on the internal connection of life and self-consciousness and the peculiar normativity of life. In a second step, I raise three concerns about Ng's strong focus on the logical notion of life which she characterizes as non-empirical and a priori. I argue that in order to uncover the full significance of the notion of life for Hegel we have to turn to his Philosophy of Nature and Spirit. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-0-19-094761-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12745 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 N1 - Rezension zu: Ng, Karen: Hegel's concept of life : self-consciousness, freedon, logic. - New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020. - xiii, 319 p. - ISBN 978-0-19-094761-3 VL - 29 IS - 4 SP - 1136 EP - 1144 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ginev, Dimitri T1 - Die Idee einer Sprachhermeneutik BT - Rekonstruktion ihrer Problemgeschichte JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Any conception in linguistics and linguistic philosophy that prioritizes the world-disclosing function over the world-representing function of language can be regarded as a kind of linguistic hermeneutics. The paper tries to specify this general thesis by picking up and analysing historical trends in the philosophy of language. It spells out the relationship between the situatedness of locutors in the medium of linguistic practices and the way in which they (through their speech acts) articulate this medium by actualizing possibilities for personal expressivity and interpersonal communication. It is argued that the starting point from the medium that always already transcends the particular speech acts offers an alternative to inferential semantics. From the perspective of linguistic hermeneutics, the world is disclosed and exposed to ongoing articulation in characteristic hermeneutic situations of language use. The concepts of linguistic medium and discursive articulation of the world are treated in terms of hermeneutic trans- subjectivity as enabling all forms of communicative intersubjectivity. If one ignores the fore-structuring role of the former, one would hypostatise the latter. With regard to this claim, the theory of formal pragmatics is critically discussed. T2 - The idea of a linguistic hermeneutics reconstruction of its problem history KW - hermeneutics KW - linguistic hermeneutics KW - intersubjectivity KW - pragmatics KW - language Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0049 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 69 IS - 4 SP - 576 EP - 602 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Das Wesen des Menschen in der Philosophischen Anthropologie JF - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie : AZP T2 - Phenomenology of normativity Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.calameo.com/read/006578376d008281a4a01 U6 - https://doi.org/10.12857/AZP.910460120. SN - 0340-7969 N1 - Rezension zu: Schloßberger, Matthias: Entwurf einer materialen Anthropologie im Anschluss an Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner. - Basel: Schwabe, 2019. -259 S. - ISBN: 978-3-7965-4008-0 VL - 46 IS - 1 SP - 121 EP - 126 PB - Frommann-Holzboog CY - Stuttgart ER - TY - GEN A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Errata zu: Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf: Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie? - (Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung. -68 (2020), 1. - S. 51 –71. - DOI: 10.1515/dzph-2020-0003) T2 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-8888 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 68 IS - 3 SP - 492 EP - 493 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ranaee, Mahdi T1 - Rezension zu: Pasnau, Robert: After certainty: a history of our epistemic ideals and illusions. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. - 384 pp. - ISBN: 978-0-19-885218-6 JF - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-2013 SN - 0003-9101 SN - 1613-0650 VL - 103 IS - 1 SP - 189 EP - 194 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Rezension zu: Willascheck, Marcus: Kant on the sources of metaphysics: the dialectic of pure reason. - New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 298pp. - ISBN: 978-1-108-47263-0 JF - European journal of philosophy Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12555 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 VL - 28 IS - 2 SP - 524 EP - 528 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - Der geistig-kulturelle Umgang mit der Covid-19-Pandemie und ihrer Wirtschaftskrise als Testfall BT - Zum Vergleich des globalen Westens und des globalen Ostens Ende 2020 BT - comparing the global West and the global East at the end of 2020 JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Why has the global West (North America, Europe) handled the covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis so much worse than the global East (East Asia)? The crises demonstrate the degree to which the West is shaped by its forms of competition and the East by its forms of cooperation. In the West, we have become habitualised to American neoliberalism over the last two generations. In the East, varieties of neo-Confucianism and neo-Buddhism have been transformed into national cultures. The way humans understand their position in the world intellectually and react to crises according to corresponding habit makes an effective difference. The present comparison between global East and West makes use of Hannah Arendt's conception of politics and the shared world as well as of Helmuth Plessner's conception of mediated immediacy in forms of modern biopower. The pandemic is a catalyst within the decline of the West and the rise of the East. T2 - The intellectual and cultural approach to the Covid19-pandemic and its economic crisis as a test case KW - self in cooperation KW - self in competition KW - future world history KW - global KW - history KW - biopolitics KW - biopower KW - shared world KW - mediated immediacy KW - Hannah KW - Arendt KW - Helmuth Plessner Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0004 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 69 IS - 1 SP - 67 EP - 97 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Godess-Riccitelli, Moran T1 - Rezension zu: Chaouli, Michel: Thinking with Kant's Critique of Judgment. - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. - Pp. 315. - ISBN: 978-0-67497136-3 JF - Kantian review Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415420000102 SN - 1369-4154 SN - 2044-2394 VL - 25 IS - 2 SP - 313 EP - 317 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ranaee, Mahdi T1 - Book review: de Boer, Karin: Kant’s reform of metaphysics: the critique of pure reason reconsidered. - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. - 290 pp. - ISBN: 978-11-0889798-3 JF - International journal of philosophical studies Y1 - 2021 SN - 9781108897983 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1873545 SN - 0967-2559 SN - 1466-4542 VL - 29 IS - 1 SP - 121 EP - 126 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schneider, Hans Julius T1 - What is it that Wittgenstein denies in his philosophy of psychology? JF - Wittgenstein-Studien N2 - Taking up some of W.'s paradoxical remarks about the existence of 'mental things' the paper investigates, what exactly he is criticizing. After a discussion of the mistaken idea of a private baptizing of one's own 'mental events' W.'s general criticism of the 'object-and-name model' is treated with a view on the consequences it has for our understanding of the mental. This treatment includes a discussion of figurative kinds of language use as well as a discussion of the difference between 'things' and 'objects of reference': With respect to figurative uses of language it often makes no sense to treat constituent expressions as names of objects, and not all objects of reference are things in an unproblematic ordinary-life sense. So what at first sight appears to be a limitation of our understanding of the nature of an object and consequently seems to ask for more empirical research often turns out to be a limitation of our understanding of how we use our language. The paper concludes that one important aspect of what the later W. opposes is dualism: The mental cannot be conceived of as an additional 'something' a description of which could be just added to a description of a person as a physical being. Thus W.'s anti-dualism can also be read as turning against a dualism in his Tractatus: The mental realm as well as other provinces of `the higher' are no longer seen as areas of entities about which we have to be silent. Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2020-0006 SN - 1868-7431 SN - 1868-7458 VL - 11 IS - Heft 1 SP - 105 EP - 131 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ; New York, NY ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Godess-Riccitelli, Moran T1 - The cipher of nature in Kant's third Critique BT - how to represent natural beauty as meaningful? JF - Con-Textos Kantianos : international journal of philosophy N2 - What is it that we encountered with in our aesthetic experience of natural beauty? Does nature "figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms", 2 to use Kant's phrasing in the third Critique, or is it merely our way of interpreting nature whether this be its purpose or not? Kant does not answer these questions directly. Rather, he leaves the ambiguity around them by his repeated use of terminology of ciphers when it comes to our aesthetic experience in nature. This paper examines Kant's terminology of ciphers in the Critique of Judgment and demonstrate through it the intimate link aesthetic experience in natural beauty has with human morality. A link whose culmination point is embodied in the representation of beauty as a symbol of morality. KW - aesthetic experience KW - aesthetic judgment KW - critique of judgment KW - figurative language KW - morality KW - natural beauty Y1 - 2020 SN - 2386-7655 IS - 12 SP - 338 EP - 357 PB - Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas CY - Madrid ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Transcendental Principles and Perceptual Warrant BT - a case study in analytic kantianism JF - Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-1-351-20275-6 SN - 978-1-351-20274-9 SN - 978-0-815-38499-1 SP - 130 EP - 150 PB - Routledge CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12675 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 552 EP - 561 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Genazzano, Pablo T1 - Rezension zu: Rogozinski, Jacob: Kanten. Esbozos kantianos Trad. Francisco Caja y Nemrod Carrasco. - Barcelona: Los Libros del Tábano, 2016. - 257 p. - ISBN: 978-84-615-4918-4 JF - Convivium : revista de filosofía N2 - Los Libros del Tábano estrena su carrera editorial con la traducción de Kanten. Esbozos kantianos , un conjunto de ensayos escritos por Jacob Ro - gozinski entre los años ochenta y noventa que se remontan a los aspectos menos estudiados, pero que, irónicamente, resultan ser los más problemá - ticos de la filosofía de Kant. Rogozinski va a los Kanten (palabra alemana que designa los cantos, las esquinas o los bordes de un objeto) para elabo - rar el camino de un «retorno a Kant». Pero este retorno corre en dirección inversa a la de una clásica reconstrucción o estudio, siempre determinado por la intención de dar una «imagen global» del pensamiento kantiano; lo que tenemos enfrente es una lectura a contrapelo. Y1 - 2020 SN - 0010-8235 SN - 2255-2855 VL - 33 IS - 33 SP - 201 EP - 206 PB - Universitat de Barcelona CY - Barcelona ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - Closed environment and open world BT - On the significance of Uexkull's biology for Helmuth Plessner's natural philosophy T2 - Jakob von Uexküll and philosophy: life, environments, anthropology N2 - According to Plessner, both adaptation and selection can be conceived not just as requested by the environment but also as actively proceeding from the organism. In this respect, Plessner finds in Uexküll’s new biology a powerful counterweight to the constraints of Darwinism. However, despite all the points in common in their respective understanding of the problem, Plessner reproaches to Uexküll to have entirely missed the intermediate layer of the lived body [Leib] between the organism and its environment. Unlike Uexküll, concerning the more developed animals, Plessner took up elements of animal psychology from Wolfgang Köhler and Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk. Finally, Plessner finds insufficiencies also in Uexküll’s distinction between the notion of world and the notion of environment, which would lead to the parallel positing of different environments. In reaction to Uexküll’s leveling of all environments, Plessner drafted a philosophical-anthropological spectrum between the intelligent way of living observed in the great apes, whose intelligence had been demonstrated, and the co-wordly life of the symbolic mind as seen in the personal sphere of human life. Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-0-429-27909-6 SN - 978-0-367-23273-3 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429279096 SP - 89 EP - 105 PB - Routledge CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kabeshkin, Anton T1 - Logical and natural life in Hegel JF - European journal of philosophy N2 - In this article, I discuss the specific ways in which Hegel's account of life and organisms advances upon Kant's account of natural purposes in the third Critique. First of all, I argue that it is essential for Hegel's account that it contains two levels. The first level is that of logical life, the discussion of which does not depend on any empirical knowledge of natural organisms. I provide my reconstruction of this logical account of life that answers to the objection made by a number of Hegel scholars to the effect that Hegel does in fact rely on empirical knowledge at this place in the logic. The second level is that of natural organisms themselves. I argue that it is with the help of this separation of the logical and natural levels, as well as his doctrine of the impotence of nature, that Hegel, unlike Kant, (a) is able to claim that not everything in natural organisms is purposive, and (b) provide a philosophical, and not merely empirical, account of the distinction between plants and animals. In both of these respects, Hegel's position can be seen as a welcome advance over Kant. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12647 SN - 0966-8373 SN - 1468-0378 VL - 30 IS - 1 SP - 129 EP - 147 PB - Wiley-Blackwell CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kaya, Gizem A1 - Kopshteyn, Georgy T1 - Die Impfpflicht-Debatte auf dem philosophischen Prüfstand JF - MenschenRechtsMagazin : MRM ; Informationen, Meinungen, Analysen Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-571541 SN - 1434-2820 VL - 27 IS - 2 SP - 94 EP - 110 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas J. T1 - Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie? JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Naturalism is the current orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Naturalism is the conjunction of the (ontological) claim that all that truly exists are the entities countenanced by the natural sciences and the (epistemological) claim that the only true knowledge is natural-scientific knowledge. Drawing on some recent work in Critical Theory, this article argues that naturalism qualifies as an ideology. This is the case because naturalism meets three key aspects shared by paradigmatic cases of ideology: (i) naturalism has practical consequences and implications of a specific kind, (ii) those endorsing naturalism fall prey to a dual deception: having false meta-level beliefs about naturalism as being without alternative, and (iii) naturalism has a tendency towards self-immunisation. The article ends by suggesting we pull naturalism out of our collective cognitive backgrounds onto the main stage of critical discourse, making it a proper topic for philosophical critique again. KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - worldview KW - Weltbild KW - scientific image KW - metaphilosophy KW - metaphysics Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0003 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 68 IS - 1 SP - 51 EP - 71 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kabeshkin, Anton T1 - Rezension zu: Órdenes, Paula ; Pickhan, Anna (eds).: Teleologische Reflexion in Kants Philosophie. - Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019. - ISBN 978-3-658-23693-9 JF - Kantian review Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415420000217 SN - 1369-4154 SN - 2044-2394 VL - 25 IS - 3 SP - 508 EP - 513 PB - Cambridge University Press CY - Cambridge ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - A kantian critique of sellars transcendental realism JF - Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-1-4742-3895-3 SN - 978-1-4742-3893-9 SN - 978-1-4742-3894-6 SP - 149 EP - 171 PB - Bloomsbury CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Khurana, Thomas T1 - Gattungswesen BT - Zur Sozialität der menschlichen Lebensform JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it. KW - sociality KW - recognition KW - species-being KW - G. W. F. Hegel KW - Karl Marx KW - Stanley Cavell Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0023 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 70 IS - 3 SP - 373 EP - 399 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf T1 - Is religion natural? BT - religion, naturalism and near-naturalism JF - International journal of philosophy and theology N2 - In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker's recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a 'science first' attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural. KW - naturalism KW - religion KW - near-naturalism KW - liberal naturalism KW - naturalization Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717 SN - 2169-2327 SN - 2169-2335 VL - 81 IS - 4 SP - 351 EP - 368 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Thiele, Kathrin A1 - Trüstedt, Katrin T1 - Lebenswissen nach Cavell BT - eine Einleitung JF - Happy Days : Lebenswissen nach Cavell Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-7705-4725-8 SP - 9 EP - 16 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Valdivia Orozco, Pablo Emilio T1 - Wiederholte Wiederholung JF - Happy Days : Lebenswissen nach Cavell Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-7705-4725-8 SP - 292 EP - 297 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Thiele, Kathrin T1 - In Quest of Subjectivity JF - Happy Days : Lebenswissen nach Cavell Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-7705-4725-8 SP - 72 EP - 77 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - BOOK ED - Thiele, Katrin ED - Trüstedt, Katrin T1 - Happy Days BT - Lebenswissen nach Cavell Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-7705-4725-8 PB - Fink CY - Paderborn ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Raters, Marie-Luise T1 - Ethisches Argumentieren BT - ein Arbeitsbuch N2 - Moralische Überzeugungen hat jeder. Aber schwierig wird es, wenn die Überzeugungen vor anderen begründet und verteidigt werden sollen. Das Arbeitsbuch führt in die wichtigsten Techniken des ethischen Argumentierens ein. Dabei besteht die Besonderheit darin, dass praktische Übungen präsentiert werden, mit denen sich das ethische Argumentieren an Beispielen einüben lässt. In einem einführenden Teil werden die Grundlagen präsentiert: Es geht um das moralische Urteil und um den Unterschied zwischen deskriptiven und normativen Prämissen eines moralischen Arguments. Im ersten Hauptteil wird dann ein historischer Überblick über die wichtigsten Argumentationsweisen der Ethik gegeben: Wie würde ein Deontologe ein bestimmtes moralisches Problem im Gegensatz zu einer Utilitaristin oder einem Intuitionisten lösen? Im zweiten Hauptteil geht es um etablierte Argumentationsformen der Angewandten Ethik: Wie funktioniert ein Dammbruchargument, was ist ein Doppelwirkungsargument etc.? – In 2-farbiger Gestaltung, mit zahlreichen Übungen, Tipps und weiterführender Literatur. KW - Ethik KW - Argumentation KW - Moralisches Urteil Y1 - SN - 978-3-662-61763-2 SN - 978-3-662-61764-9 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-61764-9 PB - J.B. Metzler CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf T1 - Verschwörungstheorien und das Erbe der Aufklärung T1 - Conspiracy Theories and the Legacy of Enlightenment BT - auf den Schultern von Scheinriesen BT - on the Shoulders of Bogus Giants JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Conspiracy theories are currently all the rage in philosophy and broader intellectual culture. One of the most common background assumptions in the discourse on conspiracy theories is that conspiracy theorists exhibit certain epistemic vices in the sense of cognitive misconduct. This epistemic vice is mostly seen as a form of irrationality; the corresponding "remedy", as suggested by some commentators, is a return to the ideals of the Enlightenment. This article argues that this idea is wrongheaded. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that conspiracy theorists are actually motivated by the rational Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking in the first place. In contrast to the standard discourse, the article posits that conspiracism is based on a certain form of social scepticism, according to which conspiracy theorists radically mistrust a certain form of expert testimony, namely "official" statements. This form of social scepticism in turn facilitates a naive appropriation of the Enlightenment ideal of self-thinking. The article closes by drawing connections to the ethical and epistemological debate on trust and offers the pessimistic assessment that there are no easy solutions based on individual epistemic virtues. KW - Verschworungstheorien KW - soziale Erkenntnistheorie KW - vice epistemology; KW - Aufklarung KW - Rationalitat KW - Vertrauen KW - Demut Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0015 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 70 IS - 2 SP - 253 EP - 273 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - von Kalckreuth, Moritz T1 - Alltägliche Lebenswirklichkeit und ontologische Theorie JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - The aim of this paper is to discuss the relation between our experience in everyday life and ontological reflection. While many accounts in contemporary ontology still defend the idea that the world consists only of material objects, some new views on everyday metaphysics or social ontology which try to articulate the specific properties of the objects used and found in ordinary life have been established during the last years. In the critical ontology of Nicolai Hartmann, the social and cultural dimension of our life is situated in the sphere of spiritual being [Geistiges Sein]. By investigating the methodical relation of phenomenology and critical ontology as well as specific entities (objective spirit, cultural objects), it is established that Hartmann offers a wide and methodologically reflected view which could be able to satisfy the practical significance of these entities. KW - Nicolai Hartmann KW - ontology KW - phenomenology KW - culture KW - objective spirit KW - social ontology KW - artefacts Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0017 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 68 IS - 2 SP - 275 EP - 287 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - THES A1 - Mulamustafic, Adem T1 - The Clash of the Images BT - Why the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image Are Incompatible T2 - Theoria ; 3 N2 - In everyday life, we take there to be ordinary objects such as persons, tables, and stones bearing certain properties such as color and shape and standing in various causal relationships to each other. Basic convictions such as these form our everyday picture of the world: the manifest image. The scientific image, on the other hand, is a system of beliefs that is only based on scientific results. It contains many beliefs that are not contained in the manifest image. At first glance, this may not seem to be a problem. But Mulamustafi? shows convincingly that this is a mistake: The world as it is in itself cannot be both the way the manifest image depicts it and the way the scientific image describes it to be. Adem Mulamustafic studied and completed his PhD in philosophy at the University of Potsdam. His areas of specialization are metaphysics, philosophy of science, and critical thinking. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-7574-0065-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-55816 PB - Schwabe Verlag CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Intuiting the Original Unity? BT - Modality and Intellectual Intuition in Hölderlin’s Urteil und Sein JF - Kantian legacies in German idealism Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-00160-9 SP - 161 EP - 185 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - New York ; London ER - TY - THES A1 - Sperotto, Tommaso U. A. T1 - Axel Honneth and the Movement of Recognition BT - Structure of the Self and Second Nature T2 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie / Sonderbände ; 46 Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-11-077207-4 SN - 978-3-11-077214-2 PB - de Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Godess-Riccitelli, Moran T1 - The final end of imagination BT - On the relationship between moral ideal and reflectivity in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment JF - Filosofia unisinos N2 - One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively. KW - culture KW - final end KW - Highest Good KW - hope KW - imagination KW - Kant KW - moral ideal reflective judgment KW - ultimate end Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2017.182.05 SN - 1519-5023 SN - 1984-8234 VL - 18 IS - 2 SP - 107 EP - 115 PB - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos CY - São Leopoldo ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Tolksdorf, Stefan T1 - Wissen als adäquate Information BT - eine kritische Erörterung der pragmatisch-minimalistischen Wissenstheorie Richard Foleys N2 - Die vorliegende Arbeit verteidigt die von Richard Foley entwickelte Wissenstheorie, der zufolge propositionales Wissen nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger als adäquate Information ist. Wissen ist eine Funktion der Güte von Informationszuständen. Glaubt ein Subjekt wahrerweise, dass p, ohne zu wissen, dass p, so fehlt dem Subjekt mindestens eine wichtige Information im Umfeld der Zielüberzeugung. Die Adäquatheitstheorie ist eine minimalistische und pragmatische Wissenstheorie. Sie ist minimalistisch, weil es über wahre Überzeugung hinausgehend keiner weiteren epistemischen Schlüsseleigenschaft bedarf. Sie ist pragmatisch, weil Adäquatheit epistemische Signifikanz voraussetzt. Klassische Zusatzbedingungen für Wissen, beispielsweise Rechtfertigung oder verlässliche Meinungsbildung, sind lediglich Begleitphänomene. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-95743-258-2 SN - 978-3-96975-258-6 PB - Brill CY - Paderborn ER - TY - THES A1 - Heuberger, Adrian T1 - Das Erste ist das Letzte und das Letzte ist das Erste BT - das Absolute in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik und sein absoluter Anfang N2 - The following paper argues that Hegel’s Science of Logic is a radical attempt to conceive the absolute as having no outside. This can already be noticed in the beginning of the Logic: If there can be nothing outside the absolute, then the beginning cannot be outside the absolute either. Consequently, the beginning must be made with the absolute itself. However, setting the beginning as absolute is at the same time testing the beginning of its absoluteness. And the beginning does not pass this test. For it is the nature of a beginning to be only a beginning and not the whole. And thus it is also not the absolute. The beginning is the most distant determination from being the whole and must therefore be considered as the most non-absolute in Logic. Consequently, the beginning is both: It is a beginning with the absolute and it is a beginning with the most non-absolute. The very beginning of the Logic is already a self-contradiction. The Logic must free itself from this contradiction. And this liberation is what makes the progress that leads beyond the beginning and in which the beginning is sublated. The progress develops subsequent determinations. Each of them is posited as absolute, but none of them can satisfy this absoluteness so that each of them is sublated again in subsequent determinations. Every determination that follows the beginning undergoes this movement of absolutisation, of failing to fulfill absoluteness, and of sublating itself, until – at the very end of Logic – this very movement is recognised as that which alone is capable of fulfilling absoluteness. For if every determination is submitted to this movement, then there is no outside to this movement. And therefore, it must be the absolute. On its progress to elaborate the true meaning of the absolute, the Logic returns repeatedly to the determination of its beginning, in order to catch up with presuppositions that had to be made for exposing its initial determination. The following passages will be of particular interest for catching up with these presuppositions: the transition into the science of Essence, the transition into the science of Notion and the concluding chapter of the Logic. For even at the very end, the Logic returns to its beginning. This led to the following statement by Hegel, which also inspired the title of this paper: The first is also the last and the last is also the first. N2 - Die vorliegende Arbeit vertritt die These, dass Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik mit einer Konzeption von Absolutheit Ernst zu machen versucht, nach der es kein Außerhalb des Absoluten geben kann. Dies macht sich bereits im Anfang der Logik bemerkbar: Wenn es nichts außerhalb des Absoluten geben kann, dann darf auch der Anfang nicht außerhalb des Absoluten sein. Folglich kann der Anfang nur mit dem Absoluten gemacht werden. Das Setzen des Anfangs als absolut ist aber gleichzeitig ein Testen des Anfangs auf seine Absolutheit. Diese Prüfung kann der Anfang nicht bestehen. Denn es liegt im Wesen eines Anfangs, nur Anfang und nicht das Ganze und somit nicht das Absolute zu sein. Der Anfang ist am weitesten davon entfernt, das Ganze zu sein, und muss folglich als das Nicht-Absoluteste innerhalb der Logik betrachtet werden. Also ist er beides: Er ist ein Anfang mit dem Absoluten und er ist ein Anfang mit dem Nicht-Absolutesten. Die Logik widerspricht sich bereits in ihrem Anfang. Von diesem Widerspruch muss sie sich befreien. Diese Befreiung treibt den Gang vom Anfang fort. Dies erzeugt den Fortgang der Logik. Die anfängliche Bestimmung hebt sich auf und geht in ihre Folgebestimmung über. Die Folgebestimmung wird ihrerseits absolut gesetzt, kann dieser Setzung aber ebenfalls nicht gerecht werden und hebt sich in ihre Folgebestimmung auf. Eine jede Bestimmung, die auf den Anfang folgt, durchläuft diese Bewegung des Absolutsetzens, Daran-Scheiterns und Sich-Aufhebens, bis – ganz am Ende der Logik – ebendiese Bewegung als dasjenige erkannt wird, was allein vermögend ist, dem Anspruch auf Absolutheit zu genügen. Denn wenn eine jede Bestimmung dieser Bewegung unterworfen ist, dann gibt es kein Außerhalb zu dieser Bewegung. Und also muss sie das gesuchte Absolute sein. Auf ihrem Weg hin zur wahren Bedeutung des Absoluten kehrt die Logik immer wieder in die Bestimmung ihres Anfangs zurück, um Voraussetzungen einzuholen, die in Zusammenhang mit ihrem Anfang gemacht werden mussten. Für das Einholen dieser Voraussetzungen werden folgende Textstellen von Interesse sein: der Übergang in die Wesenslogik, der Übergang in die Begriffslogik und das Schlusskapitel. Denn auch zuallerletzt, in ihrem Ende kehrt die Logik in ihren Anfang zurück. Entsprechend kann mit Hegel gesagt werden: Das Erste ist auch das Letzte und das Letzte ist auch das Erste. KW - Hegel KW - Dialektik KW - spekulative Philosophie KW - Idealismus KW - Absolute KW - Wissenschaft der Logik KW - absolute Methode KW - Hegel KW - dialectics KW - speculative philosophy KW - idealism KW - absolute KW - science of logic KW - absolute method Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-549846 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schneider, Hans Julius T1 - Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice JF - Philosophia N2 - On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. KW - Experience KW - Mood KW - Meditation KW - Mysticism KW - William James KW - Rationality Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9783-y SN - 0048-3893 SN - 1574-9274 VL - 45 SP - 773 EP - 787 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Meyer-Kalkus, Reinhart T1 - Martin Heideggers Hölderlin-Lesungen – im Zeichen von Norbert von Hellingrath and Stefan George T1 - Martin Heidegger’s Hölderlin recitations – inspired by Norbert von Hellingrath and Stefan George JF - Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte N2 - Martin Heidegger hat Anfang der 1960er Jahre 10 Gedichte Hölderlins für eine Sprechschallplatte des Günther Neske-Verlags in Pfullingen eingesprochen. Die insgesamt rund 50 Minuten dauernde Langspiel-Schallplatte wurde seit 1964 gewerblich vertrieben. Was hat einen Philosophen dazu bewogen, hinter dem Dichter zurückzutreten, um nur noch dessen Sprachrohr zu sein? Heidegger knüpfte mit seinem Hölderlin-Verständnis an Norbert von Hellingraths Auffassung vom Dichterpropheten und der Dichtung als heiligem Wort an. Seine rhythmischen Rezitationen in monoton psalmodierendem Stil leiten sich vortragsgeschichtlich von Hellingrath und der George-Schule her. N2 - Martin Heidegger recited 10 poems by Holderlin for a speech recording made by the Gunther Neske-Verlag/Pfullingen in the early 1960s. These recitations, which last 50 minutes, were published on a commercial long-play vinyl record in 1964. What led the philosopher to step back behind the poet as his voice? Heidegger followed Norbert von Hellingrath in reading Holderlin as a poet-prophet and his verses as holy words. His rhythmic recitations in a monotonous and chanting style derive from Hellingrath and the school of Stefan George. Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s41245-017-0036-0 SN - 0012-0936 VL - 91 SP - 188 EP - 202 PB - Metzler CY - Stuttgart ER - TY - GEN A1 - Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf T1 - The Scientific Weltanschauung BT - (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe N2 - Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 177 KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - Dilthey KW - Jaspers KW - scientific image KW - worldview Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-542910 SN - 1866-8380 IS - 2 SP - 259 EP - 276 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf T1 - The Scientific Weltanschauung BT - (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy JF - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy N2 - Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview. KW - naturalism KW - ideology KW - Dilthey KW - Jaspers KW - scientific image KW - worldview Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/jtph-2021-0016 SN - 2626-8329 SN - 2626-8310 VL - 2 IS - 2 SP - 259 EP - 276 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ; Boston ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ebke, Thomas T1 - Rezension zu: Kelm, Holden: Hegel und Foucault. Die Geschichtlichkeit des Wissens als Entwicklung und Transformation. - Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015. - VIII, 455 S. - ISBN: 978-3-11-040092-2 JF - Hegel-Studien Y1 - 2018 SN - 978-3-7873-3470-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.28937/978-3-7873-3470-4 SN - 0073-1587 VL - 51 SP - 242 EP - 247 PB - Felix Meiner Verlag CY - Hamburg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Transzendentaler Materialismus, Emergenz und Quantengravitation JF - Aufhebung : Zeitschrift für dialektische Philosophie N2 - Bezug nehmend auf Rainer E. Zimmermanns Buch "Metaphysik als Grundlegung von Naturdialektik. Zum Sagbaren und Unsagbaren im spekulativen Denken" wird der von Zimmermann entwickelte Ansatz eines transzendentalen Materialismus in der Traditionslinie Schellingscher Dialektik einerseits und dem Spin-Schaum-Ansatz der Quantengravitationstheorie andererseits erörtert. Die Rückführung von Wirklichkeitsstrukturen auf mathematische Strukturen - auf das Prozessieren von Zahlen - wird problematisiert. N2 - Referring to Rainer E. Zimmermann's book "Metaphysik als Grundlegung von Naturdialektik. Zum Sagbaren und Unsagbaren im spekulativen Denken", Zimmermann's approach of a transcendental materialism is discussed in the traditional line of Schelling's dialectics on the one hand and the spin-foam approach of quantum gravity theory on the other hand. The reduction of reality structures to mathematical structures - to the processing of numbers - is problematized. KW - Dialektik KW - Materialismus KW - Metaphysik KW - Quantengravitation KW - Schelling KW - Spin-Schaum Y1 - 2021 SN - 2567-3629 IS - 16 SP - 93 EP - 98 PB - Gesellschaft für Dialektische Philosophie CY - Berlin ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Transzendentaler Materialismus, Emergenz und Quantengravitation T2 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe N2 - Bezug nehmend auf Rainer E. Zimmermanns Buch "Metaphysik als Grundlegung von Naturdialektik. Zum Sagbaren und Unsagbaren im spekulativen Denken" wird der von Zimmermann entwickelte Ansatz eines transzendentalen Materialismus in der Traditionslinie Schellingscher Dialektik einerseits und dem Spin-Schaum-Ansatz der Quantengravitationstheorie andererseits erörtert. Die Rückführung von Wirklichkeitsstrukturen auf mathematische Strukturen - auf das Prozessieren von Zahlen - wird problematisiert. N2 - Referring to Rainer E. Zimmermann's book "Metaphysik als Grundlegung von Naturdialektik. Zum Sagbaren und Unsagbaren im spekulativen Denken", Zimmermann's approach of a transcendental materialism is discussed in the traditional line of Schelling's dialectics on the one hand and the spin-foam approach of quantum gravity theory on the other hand. The reduction of reality structures to mathematical structures - to the processing of numbers - is problematized. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 176 KW - Materialismus KW - Dialektik KW - Schelling KW - Metaphysik KW - Quantengravitation KW - Spin-Schaum Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-534481 SN - 1866-8380 IS - 176 SP - 93 EP - 98 ER - TY - THES A1 - Seiberth, Luz Christopher T1 - Intentionality in Sellars BT - a Transcendental Account of Finite Knowledge T2 - Routledge studies in American philosophy N2 - This book argues that Sellars’ theory of intentionality can be understood as an advancement of a transcendental philosophical approach. It shows how Sellars develops his theory of intentionality through his engagement with the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The book delivers a provocative reinterpretation of one of the most problematic and controversial concepts of Sellars' philosophy: the picturing-relation. Sellars' theory of intentionality addresses the question of how to reconcile two aspects that seem opposed: the non-relational theory of intellectual and linguistic content and a causal-transcendental theory of representation inspired by the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein. The author explains how both parts cohere in a transcendental account of finite knowledge. He claims that this can only be achieved by reading Sellars as committed to a transcendental methodology inspired by Kant. In a final step, he brings his interpretation to bear on the contemporary metaphilosophical debate on pragmatism and expressivism. Intentionality in Sellars will be of interest to scholars of Sellars and Kant, as well as researchers working in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-1-032-11493-4 SN - 978-1-032-11758-4 SN - 978-1-003-22136-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003221364 PB - Routledge CY - New York, NY ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Gedanken zu Andreas Arndt: „Die Reformation der Revolution.“ JF - Aufhebung : Zeitschrift für dialektische Philosophie N2 - Ausgehend von Andreas Arndt Buch "Die Reformation der Revolution. Friedrich Schleiermacher in seiner Zeit" wird die Bedeutung der von Schleiermacher konzipierten Dialektik für dessen praktisches Wirken erörtert. Mit der Dialektik stieß er eine Revolutionierung von Mathematik und Logik durch die Gebrüder Graßmann an. Mit seinem Engagement im Rahmen der Humboldtschen Bildungsreform hatte er einen wesentlichen Anteil an der inhaltlichen Neugestaltung der Elementar- und Volksschulbildung. Schleiermachers philosophischer Impuls griff dergestalt - in wohl historisch einmaliger Weise - von der Elementarschulbildung auf die Wissenschaft, insbesondere Mathematik, über. N2 - Based on Andreas Arndt's book "Die Reformation der Revolution. Friedrich Schleiermacher in seiner Zeit", the importance of the dialectic conceived by Schleiermacher for his practical work is discussed. With the dialectic he initiated a revolution in mathematics and logic by the Graßmann brothers. With his involvement in the framework of the Humboldt educational reform, he played a major role in the redesign of the content of elementary and primary school education. Schleiermacher's philosophical impulse spread from elementary school education to science, especially mathematics, in what is probably historically unique. KW - Dialektik KW - Schleiermacher KW - Arndt KW - Grassmann KW - Mathematik KW - Ausdehnungslehre KW - Elementarschulwesen KW - 19. Jahrhundert Y1 - 2020 SN - 2567-3629 IS - 14 SP - 51 EP - 63 PB - Gesellschaft für Dialektische Philosophie CY - Berlin ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Gedanken zu Andreas Arndt: „Die Reformation der Revolution.“ T2 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe N2 - Ausgehend von Andreas Arndt Buch "Die Reformation der Revolution. Friedrich Schleiermacher in seiner Zeit" wird die Bedeutung der von Schleiermacher konzipierten Dialektik für dessen praktisches Wirken erörtert. Mit der Dialektik stieß er eine Revolutionierung von Mathematik und Logik durch die Gebrüder Graßmann an. Mit seinem Engagement im Rahmen der Humboldtschen Bildungsreform hatte er einen wesentlichen Anteil an der inhaltlichen Neugestaltung der Elementar- und Volksschulbildung. Schleiermachers philosophischer Impuls griff dergestalt - in wohl historisch einmaliger Weise - von der Elementarschulbildung auf die Wissenschaft, insbesondere Mathematik, über. N2 - Based on Andreas Arndt's book "Die Reformation der Revolution. Friedrich Schleiermacher in seiner Zeit", the importance of the dialectic conceived by Schleiermacher for his practical work is discussed. With the dialectic he initiated a revolution in mathematics and logic by the Graßmann brothers. With his involvement in the framework of the Humboldt educational reform, he played a major role in the redesign of the content of elementary and primary school education. Schleiermacher's philosophical impulse spread from elementary school education to science, especially mathematics, in what is probably historically unique. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 175 KW - Dialektik KW - Schleiermacher KW - Arndt KW - Grassmann KW - Mathematik KW - Ausdehnungslehre KW - Elementarschulwesen KW - 19. Jahrhundert Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-534202 SN - 1866-8380 IS - 175 SP - 51 EP - 63 ER - TY - THES A1 - Omerbasic-Schiliro, Alina T1 - Das Problem der Nicht-Identität und die Grenzen der personenbezogenen Moral N2 - Dass das Wohlergehen künftig lebender Individuen moralische Berücksichtigung verdient, ist unbestritten. Sowohl im Rahmen des öffentlichen Diskurses als auch in der akademischen Umwelt- oder Zukunftsethik wird diese Ansicht vertreten.Durch das Problem der Nicht-Identität wird sie jedoch auf empfindliche Weise in Frage gestellt: Wie kann eine Handlung wie die Verschwendung begrenzt verfügbarer Ressourcen falsch sein, wenn die faktisch davon betroffenen künftig lebenden Individuen nur durch sie in die Existenz gelangen konnten? Gilt dann nicht, dass diese Handlung für niemanden schlecht ist und keine Schädigung darstellt? Dieses Buch verfolgt das Ziel zu verdeutlichen, wie das moralische Unrecht, das künftig lebende Individuen durch Handlungen gegenwärtig lebender Akteur:innen erfahren – trotz des Faktums der Nicht-Identität – mithilfe eines nicht-personenbezogenen Prinzips identifiziert und das Problem der Nicht-Identität somit gelöst werden kann. Y1 - 2022 SN - 978-3-95743-228-5 SN - 978-3-96975-228-9 PB - Brill CY - Paderborn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes T1 - Analytic Kantianism BT - Sellars and McDowell on Sensory Consciousness JF - Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy N2 - Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars’s account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars’s position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy. KW - Kant KW - Sellars KW - McDowell KW - Transcendental Philosophy KW - perception KW - intuition KW - judgment Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1092766 SN - 2386-7655 SP - 18 EP - 41 PB - Instituto de Filosofía del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas CY - Madrid ER - TY - THES A1 - Hoeppner, Till T1 - Urteil und Anschauung BT - Kants metaphysische Deduktion der Kategorien T2 - Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie N2 - Wie hier durch textnahe und argumentative Rekonstruktion erstmals gezeigt wird, entwickelt Kant in der Metaphysischen Deduktion in drei Schritten: (i) einen Begriff des Urteils, auf dem die Tafel logischer Funktionen beruht; (ii) einen Begriff der Synthesis der Anschauung, der die Inhalte der Kategorien erklärt; und (iii) einen Begriff des Verstandes, demzufolge die Kategorien a priori zu demselben Vermögen gehören, durch das wir auch urteilen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung ist eine argumentative Rekonstruktion von Kants Text. Der rekonstruierte Text ist der „Leitfaden der Entdeckung aller reinen Verstandesbegriffe" auf A 64 bis 83 / B 89 bis 113 der Kritik der reinen Vernunft in ihren beiden Auflagen von 1781 (A) und 1787 (B). Zudem werden andere, für ein Verständnis der Überlegungen in diesem Kapitel erforderliche oder zumindest erhellende Textstellen aus der Kritik herangezogen; aus Schriften, die Kant nach der Kritik geschrieben hat; sowie schließlich aus Kants Nachlass-Notizen und aus Nachschriften zu seinen Vorlesungen jeweils seit der Entstehungszeit der Kritik. Von entscheidender Bedeutung sind dabei vor allem vier weitere Passagen der Kritik selbst: i) die rückblickende Beschreibung der Aufgabe der Metaphysischen Deduktion auf B 159, ii) die rückblickende Beschreibung des Vorgehens im „Leitfaden" auf A 299/B 355 f., iii) der Abschnitt „Von den Gründen a priori zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung" auf A 95 bis 110 der Transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien in der ersten Auflage und schließlich iv) die §§ 15 bis 21 auf B 128 bis 148 der Transzendentalen Deduktion der Kategorien in der zweiten Auflage der Kritik. Vor dem Hintergrund einer umfassenden und detaillierten Analyse des „Leitfadens", bei Hinzuziehung verwandter Stellen aus dem umgrenzten Textbestand und nicht zuletzt bei Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses des „Leitfadens" zu den genannten vier Passagen der Kritik legt sich eine Interpretation der Metaphysischen Deduktion nahe, die sich nur schwer bestreiten lässt, sobald diese Texte einmal gemeinsam betrachtet und auf eine bestimmte Weise zueinander ins Verhältnis gesetzt werden. Dabei kann eine durchgehend wohlwollende, argumentative Rekonstruktion dazu beitragen, auch die philosophische Überzeugungskraft der Position Kants deutlich zu machen. KW - Kant, Immanuel [1724-1804] KW - Kategorie KW - Metaphysik Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-3-11-055627-8 SN - 978-3-11-055737-4 SN - 978-3-11-055642-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110557374 SN - 0344-8142 IS - 143 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ; Boston ER - TY - THES A1 - von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander T1 - Philosophie der Personalität BT - Syntheseversuche zwischen Aktvollzug, Leiblichkeit und objektivem Geist N2 - Die Philosophie der Person tritt mit dem Anspruch an, unser Selbstverständnis als Individuen artikulieren zu wollen. Wird die gängige Lesart von Personen als rationalen, selbstbewussten Individuen diesem Anspruch wirklich gerecht? In Auseinandersetzung mit unterschiedlichen Ansätzen der Gegenwart arbeitet Moritz von Kalckreuth neben der rationalen auch die leibliche, emotionale und soziokulturelle Dimension von Personalität heraus und fragt nach der Möglichkeit, sie alle in einem „Syntheseversuch“ zusammenzuführen. Im Anschluss an Helmuth Plessners Philosophische Anthropologie, Nicolai Hartmanns Neue Ontologie und Max Schelers Phänomenologie lassen sich verschiedene Lesarten von Geist gewinnen, die sich für eine solche Verknüpfung der einzelnen Dimensionen von Personalität besonders eignen. Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-3-7873-4026-2 SN - 978-3-7873-4027-9 PB - Meiner CY - Hamburg ER - TY - GEN A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Bildung als Befähigung zur Freiheit BT - Wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution und sozialistische Lehrerpersönlichkeit T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe N2 - Im Aufsatz wird die These erörtert, dass Bildung auch im Zeitalter wissenschaftlich-technischer Revolutionen zuvörderst "Befähigung zur Freiheit" ist. Ausgehend von Kant und Hegel, Marx, Liebknecht, Gramsci und Duncker wird das "Prinzip Freiheit" zerfällt in das "Prinzip des Selbst", das "Prinzip der Kompetenz", das "Prinzip der Antizipation" und das "Prinzip der Partizipation", deren Synthese wiederum in das "Prinzip der Humanität" mündet. Der philosophische Ansatz verweist auf eine Reformbedürftigkeit sozialistischer Bildung unter den Bedingungen des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe - 173 KW - Bildung KW - Freiheit KW - Marx KW - Gramsci KW - Liebknecht Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-506254 SN - 1866-8380 IS - 173 SP - 13 EP - 36 ER - TY - THES A1 - Grosso, Stefano T1 - Anerkennung und Macht T1 - Recognition and power BT - Analyse und Kritik der sozialphilosophischen Theorien von A. Honneth und A. Giddens BT - Analysis and critique of the social philosophical theories of A. Honneth and A. Giddens N2 - In der vorliegenden Untersuchung habe ich das Ziel verfolgt, einen sachlich-eigenständigen Beitrag für eine Debatte gegen Honneths kritische Gesellschaftstheorie zu leisten. In dieser Debatte wird Honneth dahingehend kritisiert, dass es ihm mit seiner kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie entgegen seiner eigenen systematischen Zielsetzung nicht gelingt, in modernen liberaldemokratischen Gesellschaften sämtliche Phänomene von sozialer Herrschaft kritisch zu hinterfragen. Denn soziale Anerkennung, die Honneth als Schlüsselbegriff für diese kritische Hinterfragung behandelt, bei der soziale Herrschaft in Verbindung mit sozialer Missachtung (als mangelnde soziale Anerkennung) steht, kann laut der Kritik faktisch selbst ein Medium für die Stiftung von sozialer Unterwerfung sein. Dies geschieht in Prozessen von Identitätsentwicklung, in denen soziale Anerkennung für Individuen als Anerkannte bestimmte Identitätsmöglichkeiten einräumt und auf diese Weise gleichzeitig andere Identitätsmöglichkeiten ausschließt, womit sie auf diese Identität einschränkend und insofern herrschend wirkt. Es handelt sich um eine Form von sozialer Herrschaft, die durch soziale Anerkennung gestiftet wird. Honneth zieht dem Vorwurf zufolge nicht in Erwägung, dass soziale Anerkennung bei Individuen als Anerkannte einen solchen negativen Effekt erzielen kann. Hieraus ergeben sich die Fragen, ob soziale Anerkennung in Prozessen von Identitätsentwicklung jeweils mit sozialer Herrschaft einhergeht und wie dieser Typus von sozialer Herrschaft kritisiert werden kann. Diese Fragen hat Honneth zuletzt in einem persönlichen Gespräch mit Allen und Cooke (als zwei Teilnehmerinnen der Debatte gegen Honneth) beantwortet. An dieser Stelle vertritt er mit beiden Gesprächsteilnehmerinnen die Auffassung, dass die Operation der Einschränkung von Identitätsmöglichkeiten an sich keine Operation darstellt, welche, wie sonst in der Debatte gegen seine kritische Gesellschaftstheorie behauptet wird, auf soziale Herrschaft zurückführt. Diese Auffassung beruht auf der Idee, wonach soziale Anerkennung sich in jenem praktischen Kontext nur unter der Bedingung als herrschaftsstiftend erweist, dass sie immanente Prinzipien verletzt, die substanziell kritische Maßstäbe definieren. Mein Beitrag zu dieser Debatte gegen Honneth besteht auf der einen Seite in der Erklärung, dass sowohl jene Auffassung als auch jene Idee argumentativ mangelhaft sind, und auf der anderen Seite in der Ausführung des Vorhabens, diesen argumentativen Mangel selbst zu beheben. Gegen jene Auffassung behaupte ich, dass die drei Autoren in ihrem Gespräch nicht erläutern, inwiefern soziale Anerkennung nicht herrschend wirkt, wenn sie die Identitätsmöglichkeiten von Individuen als Anerkannte einschränkt, denn mit dieser Einschränkung wird vielmehr faktisch über diese Individuen geherrscht – die Debatte gegen Honneth, so zur Unterstützung dieser Ansicht, baut hauptsächlich auf ebendiesem Faktum auf. Gegen jene Idee habe ich fünf problematische Fragen gestellt und beantwortet, die Bezug eigentlich nicht allein auf diese Idee selbst, sondern überdies auf weitere, naheliegende Ideen nehmen, welche die drei Autoren angesprochen haben. N2 - In this study, I have pursued the goal of making a factual, independent contribution to a debate against Honneth's critical theory of society. Contrary to his own systematic objective, Honneth is criticised for the fact that his critical social theory fails in critically questioning all phenomena of social domination in modern liberal democratic societies. For social recognition, which Honneth treats as a key concept for this critical questioning, where social domination is related to social disregard (as a lack of social recognition), can in fact itself be a medium for the foundation of social subjugation. This happens in processes of identity development in which social recognition grants certain identity possibilities for individuals as recognised and, in this way, simultaneously excludes other identity possibilities, thus having a restrictive and insofar domineering effect on this identity. It is a form of social domination that is created through social recognition. According to the reproach, Honneth ignores that social recognition can have such a negative effect on individuals as recognised. This raises the questions of whether social recognition in processes of identity development is always accompanied by social domination and how this type of social domination can be criticised. Honneth has answered these questions in a personal conversation with Allen and Cooke (as two participants in the debate against Honneth). At this point, he argues with both participants in the conversation that the operation of restricting identity possibilities is not in itself an operation that traces back to social domination, as is otherwise claimed in the debate against his critical social theory. This view is based on the idea that social recognition only proves to be domineering in that practical context on the condition that it violates immanent principles that define substantive critical standards. My contribution to this debate against Honneth consists, on the one hand, in explaining that both the view and the idea are argumentatively flawed, and, on the other hand, in carrying out the project of remedying this argumentative flaw itself. Against that view, I argue that the three authors do not explain in their discussion how social recognition is not domineering when it restricts the identity possibilities of individuals as recognised, because with this restriction, it is rather factually domineering over these individuals - the debate against Honneth, so in support of this view, is mainly built on this very fact. Against this idea, I have posed and answered five problematic questions, which refer not only to this idea itself, but also to other, more obvious ideas that the three authors have addressed. KW - Axel Honneth KW - Anthony Giddens KW - Anerkennung KW - Macht KW - Sozialphilosophie KW - Kritische Theorie KW - Sozialkritik KW - Praktische Philosophie KW - Gesellschaftskritik KW - Michel Foucault KW - Judith Butler KW - Amy Allen KW - Amy Allen KW - recognition KW - Anthony Giddens KW - Axel Honneth KW - social criticism KW - Judith Butler KW - critical theory KW - power KW - Michel Foucault KW - practical philosophy KW - social philosophy Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-508461 ER - TY - THES A1 - Tamponi, Guido Karl T1 - George Santayana BT - eine materialistische Philosophie der Vita contemplativa T2 - Epistemata Philosophie ; 618 Y1 - 2021 SN - 978-3-8260-7335-9 PB - Königshausen & Neumann CY - Würzburg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Montemayor, Carlos T1 - On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system JF - Behavioral and brain sciences : an international journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary N2 - A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options. Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000335 SN - 0140-525X SN - 1469-1825 VL - 42 PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander T1 - Expansivität, Objektivität und Aktualität des Betroffenseins T1 - Expansiveness, objectivity, and actuality in affection T1 - ЭКСПАНСИВНОСТЬ, ОБЪЕКТИВНОСТЬ И АКТУАЛЬНОСТЬ АФФЕКТИВНОСТИ BT - Nicolai Hartmenn's Theory of Person, it's position in his Ontology of Intellectual Being and it's relations to Phenomenology BT - Nicolai Hartmanns Theorie der Person, ihre Verortung in seiner Ontologie geistigen Seins und ihr Verhältnis zur Phänomenologie BT - ТЕОРИЯ ЛИЧНОСТИ НИКОЛАЯ ГАРТМАНА, ЕЕ МЕСТО В ЕГО ОНТОЛОГИИ ДУХОВНОГО БЫТИЯ И ЕЕ ОТНОШЕНИЕ К ОНТОЛОГИИ JF - Horizon : studies in phenomenology : Studien zur Phänomenologie : fenomenologičeskie issledovanija : études phénoménologiques N2 - The aim of this paper is to discuss Nicolai Hartmann’s conception of personhood as developed in his philosophy of spiritual being. Many contemporary accounts of personhood are systematically focused on rational phenomena as self-consciousness or practical reasoning, which are understood as ‘conditions of personhood’. Apart from having some technical problems, those accounts limit our self-under-standing as persons on distinct rational properties and often fail to consider the sociocultural aspects of the personal situation. Nicolai Hartmann — although respecting the role of reason — understands personhood particularly as participation in a shared spiritual sphere called Objektiver Geist (objective spirit), which includes various intersubjective phenomena as languages, religion, moral, arts, and the sciences. Being part of this sphere seems to be more fundamental than having distinct rational properties, which requests a spiritual frame to be exerted. Further it is shown that Hartmann’s ontology of person also includes a notion of being affected by the existential weight of situations and other person’s actions — an idea often maintained by phenomenological positions. By regarding rational, intersubjective and affective aspects, Hartmann’s philosophy of person succeeds in offering a broad articulation of our self-understanding and may also be seen as providing a background to understand certain phenomena that are part of the personal situation. N2 - Целью данного исследования является анализ концепции личности у Николая Гартмана, разработанной в контексте его философии духовного бытия. Многие современные концепции личности фокусируются систематическим образом на рациональном феномене самосознания или практическом основании, которые и понимаются как «условия личности». Кроме того, что эти концепции имеют ряд технических проблем для своей реализации, они ограничивают са- мопонимание личности определенными рациональными свойствами и зачастую не способны учитывать социокультурный аспект личностной жизни. Николай Гартман — несмотря на его уважительное отношение к рациональному осмыслению — понимает личность в контексте ее участия в общей духовной сфере, названной объективным духом, который включает в себя различные интерсубъективные феномены, такие как языки, религия, мораль, искусство и наука. Способ бытия как часть этой сферы, по-видимому, более фундаментален, чем обладание конкретными рациональными свойствами, что в свою очередь предполагает наличие духовных ограничений. Также в статье показывается, что онтология личности у Гартмана подразумевает понятие аффектации экзистенциальной тяжестью ситуации и воздействием других личностей, что, в свою очередь, является расхожей идеей в феноменологии. Если принимать в расчет рациональные, интерсубъективные и аффективные аспекты, то философия личности Гартмана предлагает широкий спектр самопонимания личности и предлагает условия для постижения определенных феноменов, образующих личностную ситуацию. KW - Nicolai Hartmann KW - personhood KW - person KW - spiritual being KW - phenomenology KW - ontology KW - body KW - affection Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2019-8-1-211-229 SN - 2226-5260 SN - 2311-6986 VL - 8 IS - 1 SP - 211 EP - 229 PB - St. Petersburg University Press CY - St. Petersburg ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pirwitz, Anne T1 - Romanian Migrants in Western Europe BT - Expectations, Challenges and the Importance of their Networks JF - Philologica Jassyensia N2 - This article aims to sum up the main results of a research project made in 2016 and 2017 about the situation of 1190 Romanian migrants in Western Europe and to give an overview about the push and pull factors, transnational family structures, as well as the challenges and difficulties of the Romanian survey respondents living in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy. It also considers the role of personal networks which represent an important motor of migration and constitute the main motive for the choice of a certain destination region. These migration networks lead to the construction of transnational social spaces between Romania and the destination country and have high influence in the search for housing or jobs but can also influence the integration process abroad. KW - Romanian migration KW - migration networks KW - transnational families KW - labor migration Y1 - 2019 SN - 1841-5377 SN - 2247-8353 VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 221 EP - 230 PB - Editura Tracus Arte CY - Bucharest ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - In honour of Seymour Papert BT - "Empirical Modelling" of Logo in Forth N2 - Forth is nice and flexible but to a philosopher and teacher educator Logo is the more impressing language. Both are relatives of Lisp, but Forth has a reverse Polish notation where as Logo has an infix notation. Logo allows top down programming, Forth only bottom up. Logo enables recursive programming, Forth does not. Logo includes turtle graphics, Forth has nothing comparable. So what to do if you can't get Logo and have no information about its inner architecture? This should be a case of "empirical modelling": How can you model observable results of the behaviour of Logo in terms of Forth? The main steps to solve this problem are shown in the first part of the paper. The second part of the paper discusses the problem of modelling and shows that the modelling of making and the modelling of recognition have the same mathematical structure. So "empirical modelling" can also serve for modelling desired behaviour of technical systems. The last part of the paper will show that the heuristic potential of a problem which should be modeled is more important than the programming language. The Picasso construal shows, in a very simple way, how children of different ages can model emotional relations in human behaviour with a simple Logo system. KW - Papert KW - LOGO KW - FORTH KW - Empirical Modelling KW - Construal Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-497302 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - von Kalckreuth, Moritz Alexander T1 - Wie viel Religionsphilosophie braucht es für eine Philosophie der Person? JF - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie N2 - Der vorliegende Beitrag erörtert das Verhältnis einer Philo-sophie der Person zur Religionsphilosophie bzw. einer Philosophie religiöser Phänomene. Dabei soll die These vertreten werden, dass der personale Lebenszusammenhang bestimmte Phänomene aufweist, die nur in einem religiösen Kontext adäquat verstanden werden können. Die Interpretation dieser Phänomene kann einen Zugang zu bestimmten Aspekten von Personalität ermöglichen, die von den meisten Persontheorien der Gegenwart kaum beachtet werden. KW - person KW - personhood KW - religion KW - emotion KW - numinous KW - Max Scheler Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2019-0004 SN - 0028-3517 SN - 1612-9520 VL - 61 IS - 1 SP - 67 EP - 83 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Hoeppner, Till T1 - Denken und Welt – Wege kritischer Metaphysik T1 - Thinking and World - Ways of more critical Metaphysics JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Wird Metaphysik realistisch verstanden, so ist sie mit dem Anspruch verbunden, in objektiver Weise von der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt (oder Realität, Wirklichkeit etc.) zu handeln. Damit beansprucht sie die Möglichkeit von Objektivität, d. h. die Möglichkeit der Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung einer Welt, die von uns und unserer Repräsentation verschieden ist. Realistisch verstandene Metaphysik verfährt dogmatisch, wenn sie ihre eigene Möglichkeit einfach voraussetzt. Eine dogmatische Metaphysik ist unkritisch, weil sie ohne eine Untersuchung der Frage betrieben wird, wie eine objektive und adäquate Repräsentation der grundlegenden Beschaffenheit und Ordnung der Welt überhaupt möglich ist. Im Unterschied dazu nennen wir eine realistische Metaphysik in einem vorläufigen Sinne kritisch, sofern sie ihren Ausgang von einer Untersuchung dieser Möglichkeit nimmt und erst auf der Grundlage positiver Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung einen – vor diesem Hintergrund nunmehr gerechtfertigten – Objektivitätsanspruch erhebt. N2 - We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyses nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can’t be other than the form of thought and it is thus not necessary to analyse anything but that form. We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibilities of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality. KW - critical metaphysics KW - Stroud KW - Kant KW - objectivity KW - transcendental idealism Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0006 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 67 IS - 1 SP - 76 EP - 97 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Krüger, Hans-Peter T1 - How is the Human Life-Form of Mind Really Possible in Nature? BT - Parallels Between John Dewey and Helmuth Plessner JF - Human studies N2 - J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three plateaus (Dewey) or stages (Plessner), between physical (inorganic) nature, psycho-physical (living) nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference (between the precarious and the stable for Dewey, between immediacy and mediation for Plessner) in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute. KW - Evolution of the human KW - Non-reductive naturalism KW - Open holism KW - Life forms KW - Philosophical anthropology KW - Presuppositions of evolution Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-017-9429-5 SN - 0163-8548 SN - 1572-851X VL - 42 IS - 1 SP - 47 EP - 64 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER - TY - GEN A1 - Haag, Johannes A1 - Hoeppner, Till T1 - Errata zu: Denken und Welt – Wege kritischer Metaphysik. dzph. Band 67, 2019, Heft 1, S. 76–97 T2 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyzes nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality can’t be other than the form of thought and is thus not required to analyze anything but that form. We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibility of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality. T2 - Thought and the World - Paths of critical Metaphysics (vol 67, 2019, H. 1, pg 76-97) Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0888 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 67 IS - 2 SP - 326 EP - 327 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - THES A1 - Toenges-Hinn, Joachim T1 - Philosophische Tugenden BT - Eine Verteidigung von J. S. Mills Philosophie der praktischen Philosophie T2 - Wissenschaftliche Beiträge aus dem Tectum Verlag: Philosophie ; 40 N2 - Worin besteht gutes Philosophieren? Und weshalb ist gerade John Stuart Mill ein außergewöhnlich guter Philosoph? Joachim Toenges-Hinn verbindet in diesem Band die metaphilosophische Suche danach, was gute Philosophie ausmacht, mit einer historischen Betrachtung des Philosophen John Stuart Mill. Dabei fungiert Mill zugleich als Urheber von und Verkörperung des Strebens nach zwei philosophischen Tugenden, die Toenges-Hinn aus Mills philosophischem Werk ableitet und anschließend systematisch verteidigt. Diese als „Bentham-Ideal“ und „Coleridge-Ideal“ bezeichneten Tugenden stehen dabei ebenso im Fokus seiner Untersuchung wie die Bedeutung von Lebensexperimenten für philosophische Biografien. N2 - What is good philosophizing? And why is John Stuart Mill an exceptionally good philosopher? In this volume, Joachim Toenges-Hinn combines the metaphilosophical quest for what constitutes good philosophy with a historical study of the philosopher John Stuart Mill. In this, Mill acts as both author and embodiment of the pursuit of two philosophical virtues, which Toenges-Hinn derives from Mill’s philosophical work, and then systematically defends. These virtues, identified as “Bentham’s Ideal” and “Coleridge’s Ideal”, are just as much a focus of his investigation as the importance of “experiments in living” for philosophical biographies. Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-8288-7609-5 SN - 978-3-8288-4556-5 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828876095 SN - 1861-6844 PB - Tectum Verlag CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - GEN A1 - Krämer, Felicitas T1 - Perspectives on embryo donation T2 - Bioethics Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12636 SN - 0269-9702 SN - 1467-8519 VL - 33 IS - 6 SP - 634 EP - 636 PB - Wiley CY - Hoboken ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Müller-Doohm, Stefan A1 - Yos, Roman T1 - Fatale Orthodoxie BT - Kritische Theorie auf der schiefen Bahn des Dezisionismus Eine Replik auf Fabian Freyenhagen JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung N2 - Our reply to Fabian Freyenhagen’s article “Was ist orthodoxe Kritische Theorie?” (DZPhil 65.3 [2017], 456-469) raises the question whether his proposal that Critical Theory only “be adequately and appropriately critical” without a program of justification spares the search for any general criteria. Answering negatively we conversely want to recall, particularly with regard to Horkheimers’s and Adornos’s Dialectic of Enlightment as well as Habermas‘s concept of an emancipatory interest, that such a criterion as a normative foundation of critique is crucial not only for systematical purposes, but also recognised as necessary in this respect by Adorno, who Freyenhagen wants to play off against programs of justification. Critical Theory needs to be clear in this respect. Against this background we are questioning Freyenhagen‘s recourse to an “interest in abolishing social injustice” as the “only criterion for Critical Theory.” Because Freyenhagen ignores the fact that Critical Theory has been understood by its representatives in a twofold manner – as a theoretical program of justification for one and secondly as a cultural diagnosis – his plea for an orthodox Critical Theory is endangered by decisionism. KW - Critical Theory KW - program of justification KW - Decisionism KW - Horkheimer KW - Adorno KW - Habermas Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2018-0056 SN - 0012-1045 SN - 2192-1482 VL - 66 IS - 6 SP - 788 EP - 801 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Rosso, Enrico T1 - Ein „Zusammengehen ohne Zusammenkommen“. Der Entstehungsprozess des intellektuellen Netzwerkes um die Zeitschrift Die Kreatur JF - Naharaim N2 - Eine Gruppe, gar eine innerlich verbundene Gemeinschaft, können Intellektuelle im Normalfall nur bilden, soweit sie von gleichem Denken und Wollen bewegt werden […]. Wo dagegen die von den Intellektuellen vertretenen Ansichten weit divergieren, da kann es nur unter sehr kritischen Umständen geschehen, daß die verschieden gearteten (sozialen, politischen, rechtlichen, kulturellen, religiösen) Standpunkte und Anliegen – auf Zeit – sich zusammenfinden […]. Das polemische Element, das kritischen Intellektuellen ja wesensmäßig zu eigen ist, bringt am ehesten eine gemeinsame Front zwischen ihnen zustande. N2 - This research article aims to deliver an analytical representation of the intellectual environment of the culture journal Die Kreatur (1926-1930), a religious-dialogical quarterly edited by Martin Buber, Joseph Wittig, and Viktor von Weizsacker and enlivened by some of the most prominent figures of German-Jewish interwar culture (among others W. Benjamin, H. S. Bergman, E. Rosenstock-Huessy, F. Rosenzweig, E. Simon, and L. Strauss). Building on a recognition of the problematic relationship between the dialogical model claimed in the programmatic foreword of the journal and the group narratives enacted by its key contributors, the study attempts to outline the formation process of the intellectual plexus of the journal and to provide a differentiated analysis of its singular constituents via a sociologically informed framework. The representation of the intellectual network of Die Kreatur in accordance with the model of a "circle of circles" provides insight into the elusive dialectic of interaction and divergence that determines the relations between the main actors of the journal and thus contributes to unfold the interplay of biographical intersections and conceptual synergies, as well as incongruities, frictions, and contradictory instances that determines its editorial and philosophical profile. T2 - A "Going Together without Coming Together". The Process of Creating the intellectual Network around the magazine Die Kreatur KW - German-Jewish Literature KW - Cultural Journal KW - Buber KW - Martin KW - Rosenzweig KW - Franz KW - Die Kreatur Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/naha-2019-0006 SN - 1862-9148 SN - 1862-9156 VL - 13 IS - 1-2 SP - 73 EP - 97 PB - De Gruyter CY - Berlin ER - TY - THES A1 - Menting, Thijs T1 - Purposiveness of nature in Kant's third critique T1 - Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft N2 - This dissertation aims to deliver a transcendental interpretation of Immanuel Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft, considering both its coherence with other critical works as well as the internal coherence of the work itself. This interpretation is called transcendental insofar as special emphasis is placed on the newly introduced cognitive power, namely the reflective power of judgement, guided by the a priori principle of purposiveness. In this way the seeming manifold of themes, varying from judgements of taste through culture to teleological judgements about natural purposes, are discussed exclusively in regard of their dependence on this faculty and its transcendental principle. In contrast, in contemporary scholarship the book is often treated as a fragmented work, consisting of different independent parts, while my focus lies on the continuity comprised primarily of the activity of the power of judgement. Going back to certain central yet silently presupposed concepts, adopted from previous critical works, the main contribution of this study is to integrate the KU within the overarching critical project. More specifically, I have argue how the need for the presupposition by the reflective power of judgement follows from the peculiar character of our sense-dependent discursive mind. Because we are sense-dependent discursive minds, we do not and cannot have immediate insight into all of nature's features. The particular constitution of our mind rather demands conceptually informed representations which mediately refer to objects. Having said that, the principle of purposiveness, namely the presupposition that nature is organized in concert with the particular constitution of our mind, is a necessary condition for the possibility of reflection on nature's empirical features. Reflection refers on my account to a process of selecting features in order to allow a classification, including reflection on the method, means and selection criteria. Rather than directly contributing to cognition, like the categories, reflective judgements thus express our ignorance when it comes to the motivation behind nature's design, and this is most forcefully expressed by judgements of taste and teleological judgements about organized matter. In this way, reflection, regardless whether it is manifested in concept acquisition, scientific systematization, judgements of taste or judgements about organized matter, relies on a principle of the power of judgement which is revealed and justified in this transcendental inquiry. N2 - Diese Studie verfolgt das Ziel, eine transzendentale Interpretation der Kritik der Urteilskraft von Immanuel Kant vorzulegen, welche sowohl den Zusammenhang mit den anderen kritischen Werken, als auch die interne Kohärenz des Buches berücksichtigt. Ich bezeichne die Interpretation als transzendental, weil das neu eingeführte Erkenntnisvermögen, nämlich die reflektierende Urteilskraft, zusammen mit seinem a priori Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit in den Fokus gerückt wird. Dies sollte es erlauben, die scheinbare Vielfalt der Themen (von ästhetischen Urteilen über Kultur bis hin zu teleologischen Urteilen über Naturzwecke), welche viele Interpreten in die Irre geführt hat, ausschließlich in Abhängigkeit dieses Erkenntnisvermögens und des entsprechenden transzendentalen Prinzips zu untersuchen. Auf diesem Weg wird nicht nur beabsichtigt, die Zugehörigkeit der Kritik der Urteilskraft zum transzendentalen Projekt Kants nachzuweisen, sondern außerdem auch das Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit in unserem reflexiven Verhältnis zur Natur zu etablieren. Der wichtigste Beitrag dieser Studie besteht darin, die Kritik der Urteilskraft in das größere kritische Projekt einzuordnen. Ich habe argumentiert, wie das Bedürfnis für die Voraussetzung der reflektierenden Urteilskraft aus dem eigentümlichen Charater unseres sinnlichen und diskursiven Gemüts folgt. Da wir ein sinnliches und diskursives Gemüt haben, verfügen wir nicht über einen unmittelbaren Einblick in alle Merkmale der Gegenstände der empirischen Natur. Die eigentümliche Beschaffenheit unseres Gemüts erfordert begriffliche Vorstellungen, die sich mittelbar auf Objekte beziehen. Das Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit, nämlich die Voraussetzung, dass die Natur unserem Gemüt angemessen organisiert ist, ist eine notwendige Bedingung für die Möglichkeit der Reflexion auf die empirischen Merkmale der Natur. Reflexion verweist in meinem Ansatz auf den Prozess der Auswahl von Merkmal für eine Klassifizierung, einschließlich die Reflexion auf die Methode, Mittel und Kriterien. Anstatt einen Beitrag zur Erkenntnis drücken Reflexionsurteile also Unwissenheit bezüglich der Intention hinter dem Entwurf der Natur, wie Geschmacksurteile und teleologische Urteile über organisierte Materie, am deutlichsten aus. So betrachtet hängt Reflexion, egal ob sie sich in Begriffsbildung, wissenschaftlicher Systematisierung, Geschmacksurteilen oder teleogischen Urteilen über organisierte Materie ausdrückt, von einem eigenen Prinzip der reflektierenden Urteilskraft ab, das in einer transzendentalen Untersuchung in der Kritik der Urteilskraft dargestellt und begründet wird. KW - Kant KW - critique of judgement KW - epistemology KW - aesthetics KW - philosophy of biology KW - Kant KW - Kritik der Urteilskraft KW - Epistemologie KW - Ästhetik KW - Philosophie der Biologie Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444336 SN - 978-3-86956-484-5 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Einführung JF - Zyklizität & Rhythmik: eine multidisziplinäre Vorlesungsreihe Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-86464-169-5 SP - 9 EP - 11 PB - trafo CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Von Sisyphos und der Kunst zu leben - Dialektik und Selbstorganisation JF - Zyklizität & Rhythmik: eine multidisziplinäre Vorlesungsreihe Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-86464-169-5 SP - 13 EP - 46 PB - trafo CY - Berlin ER - TY - BOOK ED - Petsche, Hans-Joachim T1 - Zyklizität & Rhythmik BT - eine multidisziplinäre Vorlesungsreihe T3 - studieren ++; 5 Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-86464-169-5 PB - trafo CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Büttner-von Stülpnagel, Stefan T1 - Galileis "Platonismus" als Reaktion auf das prinzipielle Manko der aristotelischen Bewegungslehre JF - Philosophie & Weltbild : Philosophie und Wissenschaft im Diskurs - ein interdisziplinäres Projekt Y1 - 2020 SN - 978-3-86464-208-1 SP - 51 EP - 67 PB - trafo CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schneider, Hans Julius T1 - Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice JF - Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel N2 - On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. KW - Experience KW - Mood KW - Meditation KW - Mysticism KW - William James KW - Rationality Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9925-x SN - 0048-3893 SN - 1574-9274 VL - 45 SP - 1621 EP - 1622 PB - Springer CY - Dordrecht ER -