TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Spatial discrimination, nations' size and transportation costs N2 - In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyze the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002), who use related models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 101 KW - Landesgröße KW - Außenwirtschaftstheorie KW - Zwei-Länder-Modell KW - Räumlicher Wettbewerb KW - Transportkosten KW - Neue ökonomische Geographie Y1 - 2010 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-48117 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition N2 - This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 104 Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai A1 - Schwan, Mike T1 - Collusive market sharing with spatial competition N2 - This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 105 Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Audretsch, David B. A1 - Hafenstein, Marian A1 - Kritikos, Alexander A1 - Schiersch, Alexander T1 - Firm Size and Innovation in the Service Sector T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - A rich literature links knowledge inputs with innovative outputs. However, most of what is known is restricted to manufacturing. This paper analyzes whether the three aspects involving innovative activity - R&D; innovative output; and productivity - hold for knowledge intensive services. Combining the models of Crepon et al. (1998) and of Ackerberg et al. (2015), allows for causal interpretation of the relationship between innovation output and labor productivity. We find that knowledge intensive services benefit from innovation activities in the sense that these activities causally increase their labor productivity. Moreover, the firm size advantage found for manufacturing in previous studies nearly disappears for knowledge intensive services. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 4 KW - MSMEs KW - R&D KW - Service Sector KW - Innovation KW - Productivity KW - Entrepreneurship Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427670 SN - 2628-653X IS - 4 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Becker, Ralf E. T1 - Revisiting public investment BT - consumption equivalent public capital and the social discount rate N2 - The consumption equivalence method is the theoretical basis of public cost-benefit analysis. Consumption equivalence public capital prices are explicitly introduces in order to sufficiently care for the opportunity cost of public expenditure. This can solve the dispute about the social rate of discount within public cost-benefit analysis witch was generated on a criterion looking similar to the capital value formula, known as Lind’s approach. The social rate of discount is liberated from opportunity costs considerations and the discounting away of the effects for future welfare vanishes. The corresponding question whether one should accept a positive value of the pure rate of social time preference is an old issue. Its current state between the prescriptive and descriptive view can also be interpreted as a consequence of the oversimplification of standard cost– benefit analysis. But apart from an economic self-process the pure rate of social time preference is also defined as a business-as-usual value of social distance discounting. Hence, a political choice has to be made about this rate which is free in principal. T3 - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 47 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-9025 SN - 0948-7549 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Becker, Ralf E. T1 - General classification of social choice situations T2 - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge N2 - An exhaustive and disjoint decomposition of social choice situations is derived in a general set theoretical framework using the new tools of the Lifted Pareto relation on the power set of social states representing a pre-choice comparison of choice option sets. The main result is the classification of social choice situations which include three types of social choice problems. First, we usually observe the common incompleteness of the Pareto relation. Second, a kind of non-compactness problem of a choice set of social states can be generated. Finally, both can be combined. The first problem root can be regarded as natural everyday dilemma of social choice theory whereas the second may probably be much more due to modeling technique implications. The distinction is enabled at a very general set theoretical level. Hence, the derived classification of social choice situations is applicable on almost every relevant economic model. T3 - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 46 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-9012 SN - 0948-7549 SN - 1864-1431 IS - 46 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Blien, Uwe A1 - Sanner, Helge T1 - Structural change and regional employment dynamics N2 - A casual look at regional unemployment rates reveals that there are vast differences, which cannot be explained by different institutional settings. Our paper attempts to trace these differences in the labor market performance back to the regions' specialization in products that are more or less advanced in their product cycle. The model we develop shows how individual profit and utility maximization endogenously yields higher employment levels in the beginning. In later phases, however, employment decreases in the presence of process innovation. Our model suggests that the only way to escape from this vicious circle is to specialize in products that are at the beginning of their "economic life". The model is based on an interaction of demand and supply side forces. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 82 Y1 - 2006 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14425 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Borck, Rainald A1 - Schrauth, Philipp T1 - Population density and urban air quality T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - We use panel data from Germany to analyze the effect of population density on urban air pollution (nitrogen oxides, particulate matter and ozone). To address unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables, we present long difference/fixed effects estimates and instrumental variables estimates, using historical population and soil quality as instruments. Our preferred estimates imply that a one-standard deviation increase in population density increases air pollution by 3-12%. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 8 KW - population density KW - air pollution Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427719 SN - 2628-653X IS - 8 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena T1 - Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes? T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 5 KW - rebate and discount KW - buyer behavior KW - risk aversion KW - loss aversion KW - regulation of dominant firms KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427688 SN - 2628-653X IS - 5 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Felgendreher, Simon A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Hertwig, Ralph T1 - Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 10 KW - strategic ignorance KW - cooperation KW - prisoners' dilemma KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881 SN - 2628-653X IS - 10 ER -