TY - JOUR A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Wohlfahrtseffekte horizontaler Unternehmensfusionen in einem räumlichen Cournot-Modell mit asymmetrischer Nachfrage JF - Beiträge zur sektoralen und regionalen Ökonomie N2 - In diesem Beitrag wird die Profitabilität und Wohlfahrtseffekte einer horizontalen Unternehmensfusion in einem räumlichen Wettbewerbsmodell mit asymmetrischer Nachfrage untersucht. Die Untersuchung wird für drei Unternehmen durchgeführt, von denen zwei miteinander fusionieren und eins unabhängig von dem fusionierten Unternehmen agiert. Die Standardtheorie über Unternehmensfusionen impliziert, dass Fusionen auf Grund des “business stealing effect” in integrierten Märkten häufig nicht profitabel sind. Die Resultate der Analyse im räumlichen Modell mit asymmetrischer Nachfragestruktur zeigen, dass dies in diesem Modellrahmen nicht zwingend so ist; eine Unternehmensfusion kann profitabel und wohlfahrtssteigernd sein, falls der Transportkostensatz relativ hoch ist und die Märkte eine nicht zu asymmetrische Größe aufweisen. Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-58511 SP - 127 EP - 145 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Abeler, Johannes A1 - Calaki, Juljana A1 - Andree, Kai A1 - Basek, Christoph T1 - The power of apology N2 - How should firms react to customer complaints after an unsatisfactory purchase? In a field experiment, we test the effect of different reactions and find that a cheap-talk apology yields significantly better outcomes for the firm than offering a monetary compensation. Y1 - 2010 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.033 SN - 0165-1765 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Spatial discrimination, nations' size and transportation costs N2 - In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyze the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002), who use related models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 101 KW - Landesgröße KW - Außenwirtschaftstheorie KW - Zwei-Länder-Modell KW - Räumlicher Wettbewerb KW - Transportkosten KW - Neue ökonomische Geographie Y1 - 2010 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-48117 ER - TY - THES A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Horizontale Fusionen bei räumlichem Wettbewerb T1 - Horizontal mergers with spatial competition BT - eine modelltheoretische Analyse intra- und interregionaler Fusionen BT - a theoretical analysis of inter- and intraregional mergers T2 - Potsdamer Schriften zur Raumwirtschaft N2 - Fusionen stellen einen zentralen Baustein der Industrieökonomik dar. In diesem Buch wird der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Einfluss die räumliche Dimension auf eine Fusion ausübt. Dabei wird ein Grundmodell entwickelt und über dieses hinaus eine Vielzahl Erweiterungen präsentiert. Der Leser erhält somit die Möglichkeit ein tiefes Verständnis für Fusionen bei räumlichem Wettbewerb zu erlangen. N2 - The analysis of mergers ia a central element of industrial organization. In this book the influence of spatial competition on mergers is analyzed. A basic model is developed and enhanced to take into account different economic environments. The reader gets the possibility to understand the effects of mergers with spatial competition. T3 - Potsdamer Schriften zur Raumwirtschaft - 6 KW - Fusionen KW - räumlicher Wettbewerb KW - asymmetrische Nachfrage KW - Mergers KW - spatial competition KW - asymmetric demand Y1 - 2014 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-69209 SN - 978-3-86956-279-7 SN - 2190-8702 SN - 2190-8710 IS - 6 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai A1 - Schwan, Mike T1 - Collusive market sharing with spatial competition N2 - This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 105 Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition N2 - This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 104 Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Andree, Kai T1 - A note on merger in mixed duopoly - Bertrand versus Cournot JF - Journal of economics N2 - In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27-42, 2003) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of competition in prices. Further we compare the incentives to merge with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Comparing quantity with price competition we can show that a merger is more likely with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition. KW - Merger KW - Price competition KW - Mixed duopoly Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x SN - 0931-8658 VL - 108 IS - 3 SP - 291 EP - 298 PB - Springer CY - Wien ER -