TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian T1 - Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 75 KW - cooperation KW - communication KW - infinitely repeated game KW - machine learning Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800 SN - 2628-653X IS - 75 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty JF - Conflict resolution N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods. KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum KW - Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614 SN - 0022-0027 SN - 1552-8766 VL - 66 IS - 4-5 SP - 755 EP - 782 PB - Sage Publ. CY - Thousand Oaks ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ercan, Habibe A1 - Hartmann, Ulrike A1 - Richter, Dirk A1 - Kuschel, Jenny A1 - Gräsel, Cornelia T1 - Effekte von integrativer Führung auf die Datennutzung von Lehrkräften JF - Die deutsche Schule : DDS : Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft, Bildungspolitik und pädagogische Praxis N2 - The present article reports the effects of school principals' integrative leadership behavior, including transformational and instructional components, on teachers' data use. Results of a structural equation model indicate significant positive direct and indirect effects on teachers' use of various data. Total effects seem to be mainly mediated by teachers' cooperation activities. N2 - Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Zusammenhänge zwischen integrativem Schulleitungshandeln, das transformationale und instruktionale Komponenten enthält, und der Nutzungshäufigkeit verschiedener Datenquellen durch Lehrkräfte. Die Ergebnisse eines Strukturgleichungsmodells zeigen, dass integrative Führung direkte und indirekte Zusammenhänge mit der Nutzung verschiedener Datenquellen aufweist. Die Effekte scheinen vorwiegend durch die Kooperationsaktivität der Lehrkräfte vermittelt zu sein. T2 - Data-based school improvement - direct and indirect effects of integrative leadership on teachers' data use KW - teachers' data use KW - integrative leadership KW - cooperation KW - Datennutzung von Lehrkräften KW - integrative Führung KW - Kooperation Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.31244/dds.2021.01.08 SN - 0012-0731 SN - 2699-5379 VL - 113 IS - 1 SP - 85 EP - 100 PB - Waxmann CY - Münster ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Tröndle, Tim A1 - Lilliestam, Johan A1 - Marelli, Stefano A1 - Pfenninger, Stefan T1 - Trade-offs between geographic scale, cost, and infrastructure requirements for fully renewable electricity in Europe JF - Joule N2 - The European potential for renewable electricity is sufficient to enable fully renewable supply on different scales, from self-sufficient, subnational regions to an interconnected continent. We not only show that a continental-scale system is the cheapest, but also that systems on the national scale and below are possible at cost penalties of 20% or less. Transmission is key to low cost, but it is not necessary to vastly expand the transmission system. When electricity is transmitted only to balance fluctuations, the transmission grid size is comparable to today's, albeit with expanded cross-border capacities. The largest differences across scales concern land use and thus social acceptance: in the continental system, generation capacity is concentrated on the European periphery, where the best resources are. Regional systems, in contrast, have more dispersed generation. The key trade-off is therefore not between geographic scale and cost, but between scale and the spatial distribution of required generation and transmission infrastructure. KW - energy decarbonization KW - self-sufficiency KW - cooperation KW - trade KW - transmission KW - regional equity KW - land use KW - acceptance KW - flexibility Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2020.07.018 SN - 2542-4351 VL - 4 IS - 9 SP - 1929 EP - 1948 PB - Cell Press CY - Cambridge , Mass. ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Nithammer, Juri A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods). T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 20 KW - stochastic uncertainty KW - strategic uncertainty KW - cooperation KW - Ultimatum Game KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500 SN - 2628-653X IS - 20 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Heuer, Leonie A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma BT - an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies T2 - Postprints der Universität Potsdam Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe N2 - Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 107 KW - cooperation KW - experiment KW - human behaviour KW - Prisoner's Dilemma Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435929 SN - 1867-5808 IS - 107 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Heuer, Leonie A1 - Orland, Andreas T1 - Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma BT - an experimental comparison between pure and mixed strategies JF - Royal Society Open Science N2 - Cooperation is — despite not being predicted by game theory — a widely documented aspect of human behaviour in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) situations. This article presents a comparison between subjects restricted to playing pure strategies and subjects allowed to play mixed strategies in a one-shot symmetric PD laboratory experiment. Subjects interact with 10 other subjects and take their decisions all at once. Because subjects in the mixed-strategy treatment group are allowed to condition their level of cooperation more precisely on their beliefs about their counterparts’ level of cooperation, we predicted the cooperation rate in the mixed-strategy treatment group to be higher than in the pure-strategy control group. The results of our experiment reject our prediction: even after controlling for beliefs about the other subjects’ level of cooperation, we find that cooperation in the mixed-strategy group is lower than in the pure-strategy group. We also find, however, that subjects in the mixedstrategy group condition their cooperative behaviour more closely on their beliefs than in the pure-strategy group. In the mixed-strategy group, most subjects choose intermediate levels of cooperation. KW - cooperation KW - experiment KW - human behaviour KW - Prisoner's Dilemma Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.182142 SN - 2054-5703 VL - 6 PB - Royal Soc. Publ. CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Teerling, Annika A1 - Bernholt, Andrea A1 - Asseburg, Regine A1 - Hasl, Andrea A1 - Igler, Jennifer A1 - Schlitter, Theresa A1 - Ohle-Peters, Annika A1 - McElvany, Nele A1 - Köller, Olaf T1 - Affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung mit einer Innovation im Implementationsprozess T1 - Affective-Cognitive Handling of an Innovation in an Implementation Process BT - Eine modellbasierte Erfassung BT - A Model-Based Approach JF - Psychologie in Erziehung und Unterricht : Zeitschrift für Forschung und Praxis N2 - Schulische und vor allem unterrichtliche Implementationsprozesse zielen zumeist auf die Professionalisierung der Lehrkräfte ab. Die intendierte Veränderung des Unterrichts beginnt dabei mit einer gewünschten Veränderung von Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen der Lehrkräfte, welche erst zu einer veränderten Handlungsroutine in der Arbeitspraxis führen kann. Das Modell der Stages of Concern von Hall und Hord (2006) stellt eine der wenigen Möglichkeiten dar, die individuelle Perspektive der Lehrkräfte im Implementationsprozess modellbasiert und standardisiert zu untersuchen. Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet anhand dieses Modells die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung der Beteiligten im Implementationsprozess sowie deren Zusammenhänge mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Kommunikation und der wahrgenommenen Entwicklung. Auf Basis einer Stichprobe von N = 66 Lehrkräften kann dabei gezeigt werden, dass insbesondere die Aspekte Häufigkeit der Kooperation, Kommunikation im Kollegium und Erfahrungen im Team die affektiv-kognitive Auseinandersetzung vorhersagen. Diese Auseinandersetzung - insbesondere mit den Konsequenzen der Neuerung - bedingt wiederum die wahrgenommene Entwicklung im Implementationsprozess. KW - Implementation KW - Stages of Concern KW - change of behavior KW - cooperation KW - communication KW - Verhaltensänderung KW - Kooperation KW - Kommunikation Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2378/peu2018.art21d SN - 0342-183X VL - 66 IS - 1 SP - 33 EP - 50 PB - Reinhardt CY - München ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Felgendreher, Simon A1 - Güth, Werner A1 - Hertwig, Ralph T1 - Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 10 KW - strategic ignorance KW - cooperation KW - prisoners' dilemma KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881 SN - 2628-653X IS - 10 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ette, Ottmar T1 - Languages about Languages BT - Two Brothers and one Humboldtian Science JF - HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; International Review for Humboldtian Studies N2 - In the history of Humboldt research both brothers have been traditionally seen as representing the dichotomy between the humanities and the natural sciences. Today however, their similar approach to using and forming scientific language could be used as a starting point for conceiving a university, museum and even forum under one single Humboldtian science. N2 - En la investigación humboldtiana, los hermanos tradicionalmente representaban la oposición entre las humanidades y las ciencias naturales. Hoy, en cambio, su enfoque similar de usar y construir las lenguas y los discursos de sus respectivas disciplinas se puede usar como punto de partida en concebir una universidad, un museo y un fórum desde una sola ciencia humboldtiana. N2 - In der Vergangenheit sah die Humboldt-Forschung beide Brüder als Vertreter gegenteiliger wissenschaftlicher Ansätze. Heute jedoch kann ihr ähnlicher Zugang zu wissenschaftlicher Sprache als Ausgangspunkt für die Konzipierung einer Universität, eines Museums und Forums unter einer einzigen Humboldtschen Wissenschaft genutzt werden. KW - Wilhelm von Humboldt KW - Alexander von Humboldt KW - cooperation KW - Humboldt brothers KW - Humboldtian science KW - world science KW - epistemology of expansion KW - critical convivence KW - convivence of languages KW - multilingualism KW - energeia KW - Weltansicht KW - Totaleindruck KW - multi-logical Y1 - 2018 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-419414 SN - 1617-5239 SN - 2568-3543 VL - XIX IS - 36 SP - 47 EP - 61 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Päßler, Ulrich A1 - Andress, Reinhard A1 - Durán Casas, Vicente A1 - Ette, Ottmar A1 - Hülsenberg, Dagmar A1 - Schmuck, Thomas A1 - Sundermann, Werner ED - Ette, Ottmar ED - Knobloch, Eberhard T1 - HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz T2 - HIN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; international review for Humboldtian studies N2 - Inhalt: -Ulrich Päßler: Die edition humboldt digital. Dokumente zur Neuausgabe der Ideen zu einer Geographie der Pflanzen (1825–1826) -Reinhard Andress: Eduard Dorsch and his unpublished poem on the occasion of Humboldt’s 100th birthday -Vicente Durán Casas: Immanuel Kant, Alexander von Humboldt and the Tequendama Fall. Two Prussians linked by Geography -Ottmar Ette: Languages about Languages: Two Brothers and one Humboldtian Science -Dagmar Hülsenberg: Alexander von Humboldts Erläuterungen zu Öfen für die Herstellung von Keramik- und Glaserzeugnissen -Thomas Schmuck: Missglückte Begegnung. Der kurze Briefwechsel zwischen Leopold von Buch und Goethe -Werner Sundermann: Alexander von Humboldt und das Persische T3 - HiN : Alexander von Humboldt im Netz ; International Review for Humboldtian Studies - XIX.2018, 36 KW - Pflanzengeographie KW - Humboldt-Nachlass KW - Edition KW - Humboldt, Alexander von KW - Dorsch, Eduard KW - Antiklerikalismus KW - Kant KW - Geographie von Südamerika KW - Tequendama KW - Höhemessung KW - Wilhelm von Humboldt KW - cooperation KW - Humboldt brothers KW - Humboldtian science KW - world science KW - epistemology of expansion KW - critical convivence KW - convivence of languages KW - multilingualism KW - energeia KW - Weltansicht KW - Totaleindruck KW - multi-logical KW - Brennofen KW - Glas KW - Glashafen KW - Kapsel KW - Muffel KW - Porzellan KW - Rundofen KW - Schamotte KW - Schmelzofen KW - Steingut KW - Wiener Ofen KW - Leopold von Buch KW - Geologie KW - Geologiegeschichte KW - Vulkanismus KW - Johann Wolfgang von Goethe KW - Korrespondenz KW - Briefwechsel KW - Persisch KW - Orientalistik Y1 - 2018 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-410919 SN - 2568-3543 SN - 1617-5239 VL - XIX IS - 36 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - GEN A1 - Franzmann, Simon T. T1 - Competition, contest, and cooperation BT - the analytic framework of the issue market N2 - Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters’ demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations. T3 - Zweitveröffentlichungen der Universität Potsdam : Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Reihe - 80 KW - cooperation KW - innovation KW - issue market KW - party competition KW - veto point Y1 - 2017 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-402961 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Böhme, Dimo T1 - EU-Russia energy relations: What chance for solutions? : A focus on the natural gas sector N2 - Public debate about energy relations between the EU and Russia is distorted. These distortions present considerable obstacles to the development of true partnership. At the core of the conflict is a struggle for resource rents between energy producing, energy consuming and transit countries. Supposed secondary aspects, however, are also of great importance. They comprise of geopolitics, market access, economic development and state sovereignty. The European Union, having engaged in energy market liberalisation, faces a widening gap between declining domestic resources and continuously growing energy demand. Diverse interests inside the EU prevent the definition of a coherent and respected energy policy. Russia, for its part, is no longer willing to subsidise its neighbouring economies by cheap energy exports. The Russian government engages in assertive policies pursuing Russian interests. In so far, it opts for a different globalisation approach, refusing the role of mere energy exporter. In view of the intensifying struggle for global resources, Russia, with its large energy potential, appears to be a very favourable option for European energy supplies, if not the best one. However, several outcomes of the strategic game between the two partners can be imagined. Engaging in non-cooperative strategies will in the end leave all stakeholders worse-off. The European Union should therefore concentrate on securing its partnership with Russia instead of damaging it. Stable cooperation would need the acceptance that the partner may pursue his own goals, which might be different from one’s own interests. The question is, how can a sustainable compromise be found? This thesis finds that a mix of continued dialogue, a tit for tat approach bolstered by an international institutional framework and increased integration efforts appears as a preferable solution. N2 - Die öffentliche Debatte über die Energiebeziehungen Russlands und der EU ist verzerrt. Diese Verzerrungen verhindern die Entwicklung einer wirklichen Energiepartnerschaft. Kern des Konflikts ist ein Kampf um Rohstoffrenten zwischen Energie produzierenden, Energie konsumierenden und Transitstaaten. Dabei sind scheinbar nebensächliche Aspekte wie geopolitische Überlegungen, Marktzutrittsbedingungen, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und staatliche Souveränität, die kaum Beachtung finden, von umso größerer Bedeutung. Die EU, die ihre Energiemärkte liberalisiert, sieht sich einer wachsenden Lücke zwischen abnehmenden eigenen Ressourcen und stetig steigender Energienachfrage gegenüber. Vielfältige Interessen innerhalb der Union verhindern die Definition einer kohärenten und allgemein akzeptierten Energiepolitik. Russland seinerseits ist nicht länger gewillt, die Volkswirtschaften seiner Nachbarstaaten mit billigen Energieexporten zu subventionieren. Die russische Regierung verfolgt russische Interessen, und tut dies durchaus mit Nachdruck. Insofern, als dass sie für Russland selbst mehr als die Rolle eines bloßen Energieexporteurs wünscht, verfolgt sie auch eine eigene Herangehensweise an die Globalisierung. Vor dem Hintergrund des zunehmenden globalen Wettstreits um Ressourcen erscheint Russland mit seinem großen Energiepotential als sehr vorteilhafte, wenn nicht sogar die beste Option für die europäische Energieversorgung. In einem solchen strategischen Spiel der beiden Partner sind grundsätzlich verschiedene Ergebnisse vorstellbar. Wählen beide nichtkooperative Strategien, so verlieren letztlich alle Beteiligten. Die EU sollte sich deshalb darauf konzentrieren, ihre Partnerschaft mit Russland zu intensivieren, anstatt sie zu beschädigen. Eine verlässliche Kooperation setzt dabei die Akzeptanz voraus, dass der Partner seine eigenen Ziele verfolgt, die durchaus verschieden von EU-Interessen sein können. Die Frage ist, wie ein dauerhaft tragfähiger Kompromiss gefunden werden kann. Diese Arbeit argumentiert im Sinne einer Kombination aus fortgeführtem Dialog, einer tit-for-tat Strategie, die von einem internationalen institutionellen Rahmenwerk begleitet wird sowie verstärkten Integrationsbemühungen. T3 - Potsdam Economic Studies - 3 KW - EU KW - Russland KW - Energie KW - Gas KW - Kooperation KW - Rohstoffe KW - EU KW - Russia KW - energy KW - gas KW - cooperation KW - resources Y1 - 2013 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-63022 SN - 978-3-86956-278-0 ER - TY - THES A1 - Böhme, Dimo T1 - EU-Russia energy relations: What chance for solutions? : A focus on the natural gas sector T1 - Energiebeziehungen EU-Russland : Welche Lösungen sind möglich? N2 - Public debate about energy relations between the EU and Russia is distorted. These distortions present considerable obstacles to the development of true partnership. At the core of the conflict is a struggle for resource rents between energy producing, energy consuming and transit countries. Supposed secondary aspects, however, are also of great importance. They comprise of geopolitics, market access, economic development and state sovereignty. The European Union, having engaged in energy market liberalisation, faces a widening gap between declining domestic resources and continuously growing energy demand. Diverse interests inside the EU prevent the definition of a coherent and respected energy policy. Russia, for its part, is no longer willing to subsidise its neighbouring economies by cheap energy exports. The Russian government engages in assertive policies pursuing Russian interests. In so far, it opts for a different globalisation approach, refusing the role of mere energy exporter. In view of the intensifying struggle for global resources, Russia, with its large energy potential, appears to be a very favourable option for European energy supplies, if not the best one. However, several outcomes of the strategic game between the two partners can be imagined. Engaging in non-cooperative strategies will in the end leave all stakeholders worse-off. The European Union should therefore concentrate on securing its partnership with Russia instead of damaging it. Stable cooperation would need the acceptance that the partner may pursue his own goals, which might be different from one’s own interests. The question is, how can a sustainable compromise be found? This thesis finds that a mix of continued dialogue, a tit for tat approach bolstered by an international institutional framework and increased integration efforts appears as a preferable solution. N2 - Die öffentliche Debatte über die Energiebeziehungen Russlands und der EU ist verzerrt. Diese Verzerrungen verhindern die Entwicklung einer wirklichen Energiepartnerschaft. Kern des Konflikts ist ein Kampf um Rohstoffrenten zwischen Energie produzierenden, Energie konsumierenden und Transitstaaten. Dabei sind scheinbar nebensächliche Aspekte wie geopolitische Überlegungen, Marktzutrittsbedingungen, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und staatliche Souveränität, die kaum Beachtung finden, von umso größerer Bedeutung. Die EU, die ihre Energiemärkte liberalisiert, sieht sich einer wachsenden Lücke zwischen abnehmenden eigenen Ressourcen und stetig steigender Energienachfrage gegenüber. Vielfältige Interessen innerhalb der Union verhindern die Definition einer kohärenten und allgemein akzeptierten Energiepolitik. Russland seinerseits ist nicht länger gewillt, die Volkswirtschaften seiner Nachbarstaaten mit billigen Energieexporten zu subventionieren. Die russische Regierung verfolgt russische Interessen, und tut dies durchaus mit Nachdruck. Insofern, als dass sie für Russland selbst mehr als die Rolle eines bloßen Energieexporteurs wünscht, verfolgt sie auch eine eigene Herangehensweise an die Globalisierung. Vor dem Hintergrund des zunehmenden globalen Wettstreits um Ressourcen erscheint Russland mit seinem großen Energiepotential als sehr vorteilhafte, wenn nicht sogar die beste Option für die europäische Energieversorgung. In einem solchen strategischen Spiel der beiden Partner sind grundsätzlich verschiedene Ergebnisse vorstellbar. Wählen beide nichtkooperative Strategien, so verlieren letztlich alle Beteiligten. Die EU sollte sich deshalb darauf konzentrieren, ihre Partnerschaft mit Russland zu intensivieren, anstatt sie zu beschädigen. Eine verlässliche Kooperation setzt dabei die Akzeptanz voraus, dass der Partner seine eigenen Ziele verfolgt, die durchaus verschieden von EU-Interessen sein können. Die Frage ist, wie ein dauerhaft tragfähiger Kompromiss gefunden werden kann. Diese Arbeit argumentiert im Sinne einer Kombination aus fortgeführtem Dialog, einer tit-for-tat Strategie, die von einem internationalen institutionellen Rahmenwerk begleitet wird sowie verstärkten Integrationsbemühungen. KW - EU KW - Russland KW - Energie KW - Gas KW - Kooperation KW - Rohstoffe KW - EU KW - Russia KW - energy KW - gas KW - cooperation KW - resources Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-50210 SN - 978-3-86956-120-2 PB - Universitätsverlag Potsdam CY - Potsdam ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Franzmann, Simon T. T1 - Competition, contest, and cooperation the analytic framework of the issue market JF - Journal of theoretical politics N2 - Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations. KW - cooperation KW - innovation KW - issue market KW - party competition KW - veto point Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629811411747 SN - 0951-6298 SN - 1460-3667 VL - 23 IS - 3 SP - 317 EP - 343 PB - Sage Publ. CY - London ER -