TY  - JOUR
A1  - Andree, Kai
T1  - A note on merger in mixed duopoly - Bertrand versus Cournot
JF  - Journal of economics
N2  - In this note we analyze the incentives to merge in a mixed duopoly if firms compete in prices or quantities. Our model framework mainly follows Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (J Econ 80:27-42, 2003) who set up the model with quantity competition. We extend their analysis by analyzing the case of competition in prices. Further we compare the incentives to merge with Bertrand and Cournot competition. Comparing quantity with price competition we can show that a merger is more likely with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition.
KW  - Merger
KW  - Price competition
KW  - Mixed duopoly
Y1  - 2013
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0280-x
SN  - 0931-8658
VL  - 108
IS  - 3
SP  - 291
EP  - 298
PB  - Springer
CY  - Wien
ER  -