TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Güth, Werner
A1  - Nithammer, Juri
A1  - Orland, Andreas
T1  - Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty
JF  - Conflict resolution
N2  - Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods.
KW  - stochastic uncertainty
KW  - strategic uncertainty
KW  - cooperation
KW  - Ultimatum
KW  - Game
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2022
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211066614
SN  - 0022-0027
SN  - 1552-8766
VL  - 66
IS  - 4-5
SP  - 755
EP  - 782
PB  - Sage Publ.
CY  - Thousand Oaks
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Güth, Werner
A1  - Nithammer, Juri
A1  - Orland, Andreas
T1  - Inefficient Cooperation under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods).
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 20 
KW  - stochastic uncertainty
KW  - strategic uncertainty
KW  - cooperation
KW  - Ultimatum Game
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2020
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-475500
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 20
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Felgendreher, Simon
A1  - Güth, Werner
A1  - Hertwig, Ralph
T1  - Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation
T2  - CEPA Discussion Papers
N2  - Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.
T3  - CEPA Discussion Papers - 10 
KW  - strategic ignorance
KW  - cooperation
KW  - prisoners' dilemma
KW  - experiment
Y1  - 2019
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881
SN  - 2628-653X
IS  - 10
ER  -