TY  - JOUR
A1  - Busch, Per-Olof
A1  - Heinzel, Mirko Noa
A1  - Kempken, Mathies
A1  - Liese, Andrea
T1  - Mind the gap?
BT  - comparing de facto and de jure expert authority of international public administrations in financial and agricultural policy
JF  - Journal of comparative policy analysis : research and practice
N2  - Many authors have argued that International Public Administration can influence policy-making through their expert authority. The article compares de jure and de facto expert authority of IPAs to evaluate their conformity. It comparatively assesses the two kinds of authority for five important IPAs (BIS, FAO, IMF, OECD and World Bank) active in agriculture or financial policy. It shows that, on average, de jure and de facto authority seem to conform. At the same time, it demonstrates that gaps between de jure and de facto authority exist at the level of the IPAs, the policy areas and the IPAs’ addressees
KW  - international public administration
KW  - comparative
KW  - expert authority
KW  - de jure authority
KW  - de facto authority
KW  - international organisations
Y1  - 2020
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2020.1820866
SN  - 1387-6988
SN  - 1572-5448
VL  - 24
IS  - 3
SP  - 230
EP  - 253
PB  - Taylor & Francis
CY  - London
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Heinzel, Mirko Noa
T1  - Mediating power?
BT  - Delegation, pooling and leadership selection at international organisations
JF  - The British journal of politics & international relations : BJPIR
N2  - The selection of the executive heads of international organisations represents a key decision in the politics of international organisations. However, we know little about what dynamics influence this selection. The article focuses on the nationality of selected executive heads. It argues that institutional design impacts the factors that influence leadership selection by shaping the costs and benefits of attaining the position for member states’ nationals. The argument is tested with novel data on the nationality of individuals in charge of 69 international organisation bureaucracies between 1970 and 2017. Two findings stand out: first, powerful countries are more able to secure positions in international organisations in which executive heads are voted in by majority voting. Second, less consistent evidence implies that powerful countries secure more positions when bureaucracies are authoritative. The findings have implications for debates on international cooperation by illustrating how power and institutions interact in the selection of international organisation executive heads.
KW  - decision-making
KW  - delegation
KW  - executive head
KW  - institutional design
KW  - international organisations
KW  - pooling
KW  - selection
Y1  - 2022
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148121992761
SN  - 1467-856X
SN  - 1369-1481
VL  - 24
IS  - 1
SP  - 153
EP  - 170
PB  - Sage
CY  - London
ER  -