TY - JOUR A1 - Streck, Charlotte A1 - von Unger, Moritz A1 - Greiner, Sandra T1 - COP 25 BT - losing sight of (raising) ambition JF - Journal for European environmental & planning law N2 - The 25th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-25) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) became the longest COP on record - but yielded few results. It appears that four years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, enthusiasm has waned and political bargaining and bean-counting have taken over. Countries, for even the slightest chance to keep temperatures 'well below' 2 degrees Celsius, must do much more than they have previously committed to and accelerate the shift towards a zero-carbon economy. However, the conference largely failed to heed the rallying cry of the Chilean presidency. The flagship decisions (grouped under the banner "Chile-Madrid Time for Action") neither produced new commitments - enhancing ambition or finance for developing countries - nor new rules that would nudge countries closer to the climate action targets needed. The leftover pieces from last year's negotiations of the "Paris Rulebook" were also not resolved, in particular the unfinished decisions on Article 6 on market- and non-market mechanisms. The procrastination shows that the new architecture of the Paris Agreement, while addressing several of the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, suffers from its own weaknesses. The meager results of Madrid give reason to pause and reflect on the conditions that may hold countries back from fully embracing the Paris Agreement, but also to consider the future and nature of carbon markets and what is making the issue so difficult to resolve. KW - Paris Agreement KW - UNFCCC KW - COP-25 KW - carbon markets KW - Article 6 KW - ambition KW - non-state actors Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1163/18760104-01702003 SN - 1613-7272 SN - 1876-0104 VL - 17 IS - 2 SP - 136 EP - 160 PB - Brill CY - Leiden ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hickmann, Thomas T1 - Private authority in global climate governance the case of the clean development mechanism JF - Climate & development N2 - The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a prominent example of the mix of public and private authority in global climate policy-making. While national governments hold the supreme authority in the CDM, the oversight and daily supervision of the project-based mechanism have been delegated via an intergovernmental body to private corporations that evaluate the environmental performance of individual CDM projects. By focusing on the CDM as a particular instance of private authority in global climate governance, this article analyses the consequences associated with the delegation of authority to private actors. The article critically assesses the role of private auditing corporations, labelled Designated Operational Entities, in the regulatory framework of the CDM and points to serious trade-offs which accompany the privatisation of authority. The article's findings suggest that the promise of innovative modes of governance to increase the effectiveness of international regulation is seriously compromised by the profit-seeking behaviour of private actors. Hence, the article underscores the need to reconsider the balance between public and private authority in global (climate) governance. KW - carbon markets KW - Clean Development Mechanism KW - climate policy KW - global climate governance KW - post-2012 negotiations KW - private authority Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2013.768174 SN - 1756-5529 VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 46 EP - 54 PB - Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group CY - Abingdon ER -