TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
T1  - The Limits of Buyer Power
BT  - Experimental Evidence
JF  - Review of Behavioral Economics
N2  - This paper studies the behavior of buyers confronting an incumbent monopolist and a potential market entrant in a repeated trade situation. In the experiment, buyers have two possibilities to demand lower prices in future trade periods. First, they can withhold demand. Second, they can voluntarily pay a higher price to the entrant in order to encourage future re-entry. Both these forms of buyer behavior occur in the experiment. They are less frequent when the number of buyers is large as opposed to small. A control treatment tests to what extent such behavior can be attributed to strategic motives.
KW  - Buyer Power
KW  - Market Entry
KW  - Experiment
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000082
SN  - 2326-6198
SN  - 2326-6201
VL  - 5
IS  - 2
SP  - 149
EP  - 167
PB  - Now Publishers inc.
CY  - Hannover
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
A1  - Gueth, Werner
T1  - Asymmetric voluntary cooperation
BT  - a repeated sequential best-shot experiment
JF  - International Journal of Game Theory
N2  - This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.
KW  - Best shot game
KW  - Coordination
KW  - Transfer
KW  - Refund
KW  - Experiment
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y
SN  - 0020-7276
SN  - 1432-1270
VL  - 47
IS  - 3
SP  - 873
EP  - 891
PB  - Springer
CY  - Heidelberg
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Bruttel, Lisa Verena
T1  - Is There a Loyalty-Enhancing Effect of Retroactive Price-Reduction Schemes?
JF  - Review of industrial organization
N2  - This paper presents an experiment on the effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes on buyers’ repeated purchase decisions. Such schemes promise buyers a reduced price for all units that are bought in a certain time frame if the total quantity that is purchased passes a given threshold. This study finds a loyalty-enhancing effect of retroactive price-reduction schemes only if the buyers ex-ante expected that entering into the scheme would maximize their monetary gain, but later learn that they should leave the scheme. Furthermore, the effect crucially hinges on the framing of the price reduction.
KW  - Buyer behavior
KW  - Experiment
KW  - Loss aversion
KW  - Rebate and discount
KW  - Regulation of dominant firms
KW  - Risk aversion
Y1  - 2018
U6  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-018-9653-9
SN  - 0889-938X
SN  - 1573-7160
VL  - 54
IS  - 3
SP  - 575
EP  - 593
PB  - Springer
CY  - Dordrecht
ER  -