TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance
N2  - This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 44 
Y1  - 2001
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13747
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Endogenous unemployment insurance and regionalisation
N2  - Our analysis is concerned with the impact of a regionalisation of unemployment insurance (UI) on workers’ preferences, on firms’ profits, and on effciency. The existence and the extent of UI are endogenously derived by maximising an objective function of the state. Three different types of regionalisation are considered which differ with respect to the area the UI objective function is related to, and with respect to the policy variable used to maximise it. It comes to light that workers are always in favour of central UI, while it depends on the type of regionalisation whether or not firms are better off with regional or with central UI. The same somewhat surprising result applies for efficiency.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 45 
Y1  - 2001
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13761
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Sanner, Helge
T1  - Regional unemployment insurance
N2  - We examine the effects of regionalising the budget of unemployment insurance (UI) on wages, employment, and on UI parameters, which, for their part, determine the agents’ preferences concerning such a reform. A numerical example shows that, under reasonable assumptions, the intuition that the reform would enhance efficiency and improve the economic situation of agents from the low- unemployment region to the disadvantage of agents from the high- unemployment region is not valid in general.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 41 
Y1  - 2001
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13705
ER  -