TY - RPRT A1 - Wagner, Wolfgang T1 - A simulation of segregation in cities and its application for the analysis of rent control N2 - Social segregation in cities takes place where different household groups exist and when, according to Schelling, their location choice either minimizes the number of differing households in their neighborhood or maximizes their own group. In this contribution an evolutionary simulation based on a monocentric city model with externalities among households is used to discuss the spatial segregation patterns of four groups. The resulting complex spatial patterns can be shown as graphic animations. They can be applied as initial situation for the analysis of the effects a rent control has on segregation. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 71 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14177 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Wagner, Wolfgang T1 - Spatial patterns of segregation BT - a simulation of the impact of externalities between households N2 - Usually, in monocentric city models, the spatial patterns of segregated ethnic groups are assumed to be ring-shaped, whereas in the 1930ies Hoyt showed that empirically wedge-shaped areas predominate. In contrast to Rose-Ackerman.s discussion of the in.uence within a ring-shaped pattern which the aversion which different households in the context of racism have, Yinger showed that, depending on the population mix, a wedge-shaped pattern may arise if it is border length which causes the spatial pattern. In this contribution, a simulation based on a monocentric city model with two or more different household groups is used to derive spatial patterns. Wedge-shaped segregation is shown to be the result of positive externalities among similar households. Differences between households only lead to ring-shaped patterns if the e¤ect of a city center on spatial structure dominates neighborhood e¤ects. If more than two groups of households are being considered, mixed patterns of concentric and wedge-shaped areas arise. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 69 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14153 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Wagner, Wolfgang T1 - Optimal spatial patterns of two, three and four segregated household groups in a monocentric city N2 - Usually, in monocentric city models the spatial patterns of segregated household groups are assumed to be ring-shaped, while early in the 1930ies Hoyt showed that wedge-shaped areas empirically predominate. This contribution presents a monocentric city model with different household groups generating positive externalities within the groups. At first, border length is founded as a criterion of optimality. Secondly, it is shown that mixed patterns of concentric and wedge-shaped areas represent multiple equilibria if more than two groups of households are being considered. The welfare optimal segregated pattern depends on the relative purchasing power of different household groups. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 70 Y1 - 2004 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14165 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Steckel, Jan Christoph A1 - Missbach, Leonard A1 - Ohlendorf, Nils A1 - Feindt, Simon A1 - Kalkuhl, Matthias T1 - Effects of the energy price crisis on European households BT - socio-political challenges and policy options Y1 - 2022 UR - https://www.mcc-berlin.net/fileadmin/data/C18_MCC_Publications/2022_MCC_Effects_of_the_energy_price_crisis_on_European_households.pdf PB - Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) gGmbH CY - Berlin ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schöler, Klaus T1 - Internationaler Handel und räumliche Märkte BT - Handelspolitik aus Sicht der räumlichen Preistheorie BT - trade policy from a theory of spatial pricing perspective N2 - Contents - Introduction - Free trade in a spatial market - Tariff policy in a spatial market - Non-tariff barriers to trade in a spatial market - Conclusion T2 - International trade and spatial markets T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 28 Y1 - 1999 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13567 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schöler, Klaus T1 - Wohlfahrt und internationaler Handel in einem Modell der räumlichen Preistheorie N2 - Contents - Introduction - Free Trade - Optimal Tariff - Import Quota - Comparison of results T2 - International trade and welfare in a model of spatial pricing T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 31 Y1 - 1999 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13590 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schöler, Klaus T1 - Regional market areas at the EU border N2 - Contens - Introduction - Modell with Trade Policy - Some Numerical Results - Conclusions T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 34 Y1 - 2000 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13647 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Schöler, Klaus T1 - Irrwege der Klimapolitik BT - ein ökonomischer Zwischenruf N2 - Inhalt I. Einleitung II. Es gibt kein Normalklima III. Folgen des Klimawandel IV. Folgen der Klimapolitik V. Schlußfolgerungen T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 106 Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-63668 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Sanner, Helge T1 - Price responses to market entry with and without endogenous product choice N2 - Textbook wisdom says that competition yields lower prices and higher consumer surplus than monopoly. We show in two versions of a simple location-product differentiation model with and without endogenous choice of products that these two results have to be qualified. In both models, more than half of the reasonable parameter values lead to higher prices with duopoly than with monopoly. If the product characteristics are exogenous to the firms, consumers may even be be better off with monopoly in average. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 81 Y1 - 2005 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14399 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Sanner, Helge T1 - Instability in competition BT - hotelling re-reconsidered N2 - In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the equilibrium proves stable for a sizeable interval of parameters, however. Even though this procedure is most common in analyzing Hotelling's location problem, it is not satisfying because it exhibits an inconsistent informational structure. The search for a better concept of stability is imperative. T3 - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 79 Y1 - 2005 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14299 ER -