TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Stolley, Florian A1 - Utikal, Verena T1 - Getting a Yes BT - An Experiment on the Power of Asking T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator’s power and responsibility. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 2 KW - dictator game KW - communication KW - inequality KW - text analysis KW - experiment Y1 - 2019 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427638 SN - 2628-653X IS - 2 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion – An experiment T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 19 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-473885 SN - 2628-653X IS - 19 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Stolley, Florian T1 - Getting a yes BT - an experiment on the power of asking JF - Journal of behavioral and experimental economics N2 - This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictators power and responsibility. KW - dictator game KW - communication KW - inequality KW - text analysis KW - experiment Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101550 SN - 2214-8043 VL - 86 PB - Elsevier CY - New York ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Friedrichsen, Jana T1 - How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion BT - a machine learning approach T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 53 KW - cartel KW - collusion KW - communication KW - machine learning KW - experiment Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-562234 SN - 2628-653X ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Petrishcheva, Vasilisa T1 - Does communication increase the precision of beliefs? T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior – belief precision. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 74 KW - prisoner’s dilemma KW - communication KW - beliefs KW - strategic uncertainty KW - experiment Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367 SN - 2628-653X IS - 74 SP - 1 EP - 33 ER -