TY - RPRT A1 - Kritikos, Alexander A1 - Maliranta, Mika A1 - Nippala, Veera A1 - Nurmi, Satu T1 - Does gender of firm ownership matter? BT - Female entrepreneurs and the gender pay gap T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - We examine how the gender of business-owners is related to the wages paid to female relative to male employees working in their firms. Using Finnish register data and employing firm fixed effects, we find that the gender pay gap is – starting from a gender pay gap of 11 to 12 percent - two to three percentage-points lower for hourly wages in female-owned firms than in male-owned firms. Results are robust to how the wage is measured, as well as to various further robustness checks. More importantly, we find substantial differences between industries. While, for instance, in the manufacturing sector, the gender of the owner plays no role for the gender pay gap, in several service sector industries, like ICT or business services, no or a negligible gender pay gap can be found, but only when firms are led by female business owners. Businesses in male ownership maintain a gender pay gap of around 10 percent also in the latter industries. With increasing firm size, the influence of the gender of the owner, however, fades. In large firms, it seems that others – firm managers – determine wages and no differences in the pay gap are observed between male- and female-owned firms. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 76 KW - entrepreneurship KW - gender pay gap KW - discrimination KW - linked employer-employee data Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-636194 SN - 2628-653X IS - 76 SP - 1 EP - 39 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Andres, Maximilian T1 - Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 75 KW - cooperation KW - communication KW - infinitely repeated game KW - machine learning Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800 SN - 2628-653X IS - 75 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Petrishcheva, Vasilisa T1 - Does communication increase the precision of beliefs? T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior – belief precision. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 74 KW - prisoner’s dilemma KW - communication KW - beliefs KW - strategic uncertainty KW - experiment Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367 SN - 2628-653X IS - 74 SP - 1 EP - 33 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Bruttel, Lisa Verena A1 - Eisenkopf, Gerald A1 - Nithammer, Juri T1 - Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a “good” leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader’s first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader’s statements. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 73 KW - leadership KW - public good KW - voting KW - experiment KW - promises Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952 SN - 2628-653X IS - 73 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Estrin, Saul A1 - Khavul, Susanna A1 - Kritikos, Alexander A1 - Löher, Jonas T1 - Access to digital finance BT - equity crowdfunding across countries and platforms T2 - CEPA Discussion Papers N2 - Financing entrepreneurship spurs innovation and economic growth. Digital financial platforms that crowdfund equity for entrepreneurs have emerged globally, yet they remain poorly understood. We model equity crowdfunding in terms of the relationship between the number of investors and the amount of money raised per pitch. We examine heterogeneity in the average amount raised per pitch that is associated with differences across three countries and seven platforms. Using a novel dataset of successful fundraising on the most prominent platforms in the UK, Germany, and the USA, we find the underlying relationship between the number of investors and the amount of money raised for entrepreneurs is loglinear, with a coefficient less than one and concave to the origin. We identify significant variation in the average amount invested in each pitch across countries and platforms. Our findings have implications for market actors as well as regulators who set competitive frameworks. T3 - CEPA Discussion Papers - 72 KW - equity crowdfunding KW - soft information KW - entrepreneurship KW - finance KW - financial access and inclusion Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623261 SN - 2628-653X IS - 72 ER -