TY  - RPRT
A1  - Andree, Kai
A1  - Schwan, Mike
T1  - Collusive market sharing with spatial competition
N2  - This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 105 
Y1  - 2012
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Andree, Kai
T1  - Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition
N2  - This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 104 
Y1  - 2011
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927
ER  - 
TY  - RPRT
A1  - Andree, Kai
T1  - Spatial discrimination, nations' size and transportation costs
N2  - In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyze the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002), who use related models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose.
T3  - Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge - 101 
KW  - Landesgröße
KW  - Außenwirtschaftstheorie
KW  - Zwei-Länder-Modell
KW  - Räumlicher Wettbewerb
KW  - Transportkosten
KW  - Neue ökonomische Geographie
Y1  - 2010
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-48117
ER  -