Dokument-ID Dokumenttyp Verfasser/Autoren Herausgeber Haupttitel Abstract Auflage Verlagsort Verlag Erscheinungsjahr Seitenzahl Schriftenreihe Titel Schriftenreihe Bandzahl ISBN Quelle der Hochschulschrift Konferenzname Quelle:Titel Quelle:Jahrgang Quelle:Heftnummer Quelle:Erste Seite Quelle:Letzte Seite URN DOI Abteilungen OPUS4-5377 Arbeitspapier Andree, Kai Collusion in spatially separated markets with quantity competition This paper develops the incentives to collude in a model with spatially separated markets and quantity setting firms. We find that increases in transportation costs stabilize the collusive agreement. We also show that, the higher the demand in both markets the less likely will collusion be sustained. Gross and Holahan (2003) use a similar model with price setting firms, we compare their results with ours to analyze the impact of the mode of competition on sustainability of collusion. Further we analyze the impact of collusion on social welfare and find that collusion may be welfare enhancing. 2011 urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-55927 Wirtschaftswissenschaften OPUS4-5991 Arbeitspapier Andree, Kai; Schwan, Mike Collusive market sharing with spatial competition This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm's home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement. 2012 urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-62146 Wirtschaftswissenschaften OPUS4-4595 Arbeitspapier Andree, Kai Spatial discrimination, nations' size and transportation costs In this paper we develop a spatial Cournot trade model with two unequally sized countries, using the geographical interpretation of the Hotelling line. We analyze the trade and welfare effects of international trade between these two countries. The welfare analysis indicates that in this framework the large country benefits from free trade and the small country may be hurt by opening to trade. This finding is contrary to the results of Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) as well as Tharakan and Thisse (2002), who use related models to analyze size effects in international trade, where the small country usually gains from trade and the large country may lose. 2010 urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-48117 Wirtschaftswissenschaften