@techreport{BruttelFelgendreherGuethetal.2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Felgendreher, Simon and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph}, title = {Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {10}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-43188}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881}, pages = {30}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners' dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelGuethHertwigetal.2020, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and G{\"u}th, Werner and Hertwig, Ralph and Orland, Andreas}, title = {Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {17}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-44446}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444463}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people's payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person's payoff, an individual's envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people's payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13\% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant's payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Andres2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Andres, Maximilian}, title = {Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {75}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-63180}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-631800}, pages = {38}, year = {2024}, abstract = {The present paper proposes a novel approach for equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma where players can communicate before choosing their strategies. This approach yields a critical discount factor that makes different predictions for cooperation than the usually considered sub-game perfect or risk dominance critical discount factors. In laboratory experiments, we find that our factor is useful for predicting cooperation. For payoff changes where the usually considered factors and our factor make different predictions, the observed cooperation is consistent with the predictions based on our factor.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelPetrishcheva2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Petrishcheva, Vasilisa}, title = {Does communication increase the precision of beliefs?}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {74}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-62936}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-629367}, pages = {1 -- 33}, year = {2024}, abstract = {In this paper, we study one channel through which communication may facilitate cooperative behavior - belief precision. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we show that communication not only makes individuals more optimistic that their partner will cooperate but also increases the precision of this belief, thereby reducing strategic uncertainty. To disentangle the shift in mean beliefs from the increase in precision, we elicit beliefs and precision in a two-stage procedure and in three situations: without communication, before communication, and after communication. We find that the precision of beliefs increases during communication.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelEisenkopfNithammer2024, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Eisenkopf, Gerald and Nithammer, Juri}, title = {Pre-election communication in public good games with endogenous leaders}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {73}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-62395}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-623952}, pages = {28}, year = {2024}, abstract = {Leadership plays an important role for the efficient and fair solution of social dilemmas but the effectiveness of a leader can vary substantially. Two main factors of leadership impact are the ability to induce high contributions by all group members and the (expected) fair use of power. Participants in our experiment decide about contributions to a public good. After all contributions are made, the leader can choose how much of the joint earnings to assign to herself; the remainder is distributed equally among the followers. Using machine learning techniques, we study whether the content of initial open statements by the group members predicts their behavior as a leader and whether groups are able to identify such clues and endogenously appoint a "good" leader to solve the dilemma. We find that leaders who promise fairness are more likely to behave fairly, and that followers appoint as leaders those who write more explicitly about fairness and efficiency. However, in their contribution decision, followers focus on the leader's first-move contribution and place less importance on the content of the leader's statements.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Mahlstedt2017, author = {Mahlstedt, Robert}, title = {Essays on job search behavior and labor market policies}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-397081}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {252}, year = {2017}, abstract = {Persistently high unemployment rates are a major threat to the social cohesion in many societies. To moderate the consequences of unemployment industrialized countries spend substantial shares of their GDP on labor market policies, while in recent years there has been a shift from passive measures, such as transfer payments, towards more activating elements which aim to promote the reintegration into the labor market. Although, there exists a wide range of evidence about the effects of traditional active labor market policies (ALMP) on participants' subsequent labor market outcomes, a deeper understanding of the impact of these programs on the job search behavior and the interplay with long-term labor market outcomes is necessary. This allows policy makers to improve the design of labor market policies and the allocation of unemployed workers into specific programs. Moreover, previous studies have shown that many traditional ALMP programs, like public employment or training schemes, do not achieve the desired results. This underlines the importance of understanding the effect mechanisms, but also the need to develop innovative programs that are more effective. This thesis extends the existing literature with respect to several dimensions. First, it analyzes the impact of job seekers' beliefs about upcoming ALMPs programs on the effectiveness of realized treatments later during the unemployment spell. This provides important insights with respect to the job search process and relates potential anticipation effects (on the job seekers behavior before entering a program) to the vast literature evaluating the impact of participating in an ALMP program on subsequent outcomes. The empirical results show that training programs are more effective if the participants expect participation ex ante, while expected treatment effects are unrelated to the actual labor market outcomes of participants. A subsequent analysis of the effect mechanisms shows that job seekers who expect to participate also receive more information by their caseworker and show a higher willingness to adjust their search behavior in association with an upcoming ALMP program. The findings suggest that the effectiveness of training programs can be improved by providing more detailed information about the possibility of a future treatment early during the unemployment spell. Second, the thesis investigates the effects of a relatively new class of programs that aim to improve the geographical mobility of unemployed workers with respect to the job search behavior, the subsequent job finding prospects and the returns to labor market mobility. To estimate the causal impact of these programs, it is exploited that local employment agencies have a degree of autonomy when deciding about the regional-specific policy mix. The findings show that the policy style of the employment agency indeed affects the job search behavior of unemployed workers. Job seekers who are assigned to agencies with higher preferences for mobility programs increase their search radius without affecting the total number of job applications. This shift of the search effort to distant regions leads to a higher probability to find a regular job and higher wages. Moreover, it is shown that participants in one of the subsidy programs who move to geographically distant region a earn significantly higher wages, end up in more stable jobs and face a higher long-run employment probability compared to non-participants. Third, the thesis offers an empirical assessment of the unconfoundedness assumption with respect to the relevance of variables that are usually unobserved in studies evaluating ALMP programs. A unique dataset that combines administrative records and survey data allows us to observe detailed information on typical covariates, as well as usually unobserved variables including personality traits, attitudes, expectations, intergenerational information, as well as indicators about social networks and labor market flexibility. The findings show that, although our set of usually unobserved variables indeed has a significant effect on the selection into ALMP programs, the overall impact when estimating treatment effects is rather small. Finally, the thesis also examines the importance of gender differences in reservation wages that allows assessing the importance of special ALMP programs targeting women. In particular, when including reservation wages in a wage decomposition exercise, the gender gap in realized wages becomes small and statistically insignificant. The strong connection between gender differences in reservation wages and realized wages raises the question how these differences in reservation wages are set in the first place. Since traditional covariates cannot sufficiently explain the gender gap in reservation wages, we perform subgroup analysis to better understand what the driving forces behind this gender gap are.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BruttelStolleyUtikal2019, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Bruttel, Lisa Verena and Stolley, Florian and Utikal, Verena}, title = {Getting a Yes}, series = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, journal = {CEPA Discussion Papers}, number = {2}, issn = {2628-653X}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-42763}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-427638}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game, in which the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator before the latter decides. We find that putting effort into the message, writing in a humorous way and mentioning reasons why the money is needed pays off. Additionally, we find differences in the behavior of male and female dictators. Only men react positively to efficiency arguments, while only women react to messages that emphasize the dictator's power and responsibility.}, language = {en} }