@article{Wieman2018, author = {Wieman, Dirk}, title = {Make English Sweet Again!}, series = {Hard times : deutsch-englische Zeitschrift}, volume = {101}, journal = {Hard times : deutsch-englische Zeitschrift}, number = {1}, issn = {0171-1695}, pages = {68 -- 76}, year = {2018}, language = {de} } @article{Mueller2019, author = {M{\"u}ller, Christian Th.}, title = {Die Kalaschnikow, eine Kriegsikone}, series = {Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtung}, journal = {Europa : die Gegenwart unserer Geschichte ; Band III, Globale Verflechtung}, editor = {Vogel, Jakob}, publisher = {wbg Theiss}, address = {Darmstadt}, isbn = {978-3-8062-4021-4}, pages = {261 -- 264}, year = {2019}, language = {de} } @misc{DemmerlingKruegerHabermas2016, author = {Demmerling, Christoph and Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter and Habermas, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Communicative Reason Juergen Habermas, interviewed by Christoph Demmerling and Hans-Peter Krueger}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {64}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2016-0061}, pages = {806 -- 827}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Jurgen Habermas explicates the concept of communicative reason. He explains the key assumptions of the philosophy of language and social theory associated with this concept. Also discussed is the category of life-world and the role of the body-mind difference for the consciousness of exclusivity in our access to subjective experience. as well as the role of emotions and perceptions in the context of a theory of communicative action. The question of the redemption of the various validity claims as they are associated with the performance of speech acts is related to processes of social learning and to the role of negative experiences. Finally the interview deals with the relationship between religion and reason and the importance of religion in modern, post-secular societies. Questions about the philosophical culture of our present times are discussed at the end of the conversation.}, language = {de} } @article{Krueger2016, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter}, title = {Critical Anthropology? To the Relationship between Philosophical Anthropology and Critical Theory}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, volume = {64}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\~A}¼r Philosophie : Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, issn = {0012-1045}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2016-0041}, pages = {553 -- 580}, year = {2016}, abstract = {This article compares Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner's foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer's and Plessner's paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno's „negative dialectics" and Plessner's „negative anthropology" (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. J{\"u}rgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner's philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the „life power" in „high capitalism" (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a „critical anthropology" (H. Schn{\"a}delbach).}, language = {de} } @article{vanBuuren2016, author = {van Buuren, Jasper}, title = {The Difference between Moral Sources and Hypergoods}, series = {International philosophical quarterly}, volume = {56}, journal = {International philosophical quarterly}, publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, address = {Charlottesville}, issn = {0019-0365}, doi = {10.5840/ipq201641259}, pages = {171 -- 186}, year = {2016}, abstract = {In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor's descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor's thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergood is the value of our immanent way of relating to that moral source. This interpretation requires that we first differentiate between a narrow and a wide sense of "moral source."}, language = {en} } @article{vanBuuren2016, author = {van Buuren, Jasper}, title = {critique of neuroscience}, series = {Continental philosophy review}, volume = {49}, journal = {Continental philosophy review}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {1387-2842}, doi = {10.1007/s11007-015-9318-4}, pages = {223 -- 241}, year = {2016}, abstract = {Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a "part" of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the "mereological fallacy". Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors' view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker's diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical-anthropological foundation.}, language = {en} } @misc{Gruene2016, author = {Gr{\"u}ne, Stefanie}, title = {Allais on Intuitions and the Objective Reality of the Categories}, series = {European journal of philosophy}, volume = {24}, journal = {European journal of philosophy}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0966-8373}, doi = {10.1111/ejop.12139}, pages = {241 -- 252}, year = {2016}, language = {en} } @misc{Omerbasic2016, author = {Omerbasic, Alina}, title = {The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People}, series = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, volume = {19}, journal = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, issn = {1386-2820}, doi = {10.1007/s10677-015-9614-4}, pages = {273 -- 275}, year = {2016}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{ElKassar2015, author = {El Kassar, Nadja}, title = {Towards a theory of epistemically significant perception}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, address = {Berlin}, isbn = {978-3-11-044563-3}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {360}, year = {2015}, abstract = {How does perceptual experience make us knowledgeable? This book argues that the answer lies in the nature of perceptual experience: this experience involves conceptual capacities and is a relation between perceiver and world. The author develops her position via a critical examination of conceptualist and relationist theories of perception. A discussion of recent work in vision science rounds up this contribution to the philosophy of perception.}, language = {en} } @misc{Krueger2016, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter}, title = {Kritische Anthropologie?}, series = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, journal = {Postprints der Universit{\"a}t Potsdam : Philosophische Reihe}, number = {127}, issn = {1866-8380}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-398024}, pages = {28}, year = {2016}, abstract = {This article compares Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adorno's foundation of the Frankfurt Critical Theory with Helmuth Plessner's foundation of Philosophical Anthropology. While Horkheimer's and Plessner's paradigms are mutually incompatible, Adorno's „negative dialectics" and Plessner's „negative anthropology" (G. Gamm) can be seen as complementing one another. J{\"u}rgen Habermas at one point sketched a complementary relationship between his own publicly communicative theory of modern society and Plessner's philosophy of nature and human expressivity, and though he then came to doubt this, he later reaffirmed it. Faced with the „life power" in „high capitalism" (Plessner), the ambitions for a public democracy in a pluralistic society have to be broadened from an argumentative focus (Habermas) to include the human condition and the expressive modes of our experience as essentially embodied persons. The article discusses some possible aspects of this complementarity under the title of a „critical anthropology" (H. Schn{\"a}delbach)}, language = {de} }