@misc{Kabeshkin2020, author = {Kabeshkin, Anton}, title = {Rezension zu: {\´O}rdenes, Paula ; Pickhan, Anna (eds).: Teleologische Reflexion in Kants Philosophie. - Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019. - ISBN 978-3-658-23693-9}, series = {Kantian review}, volume = {25}, journal = {Kantian review}, number = {3}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, address = {Cambridge}, issn = {1369-4154}, doi = {10.1017/S1369415420000217}, pages = {508 -- 513}, year = {2020}, language = {en} } @article{Spiegel2020, author = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf}, title = {Is religion natural?}, series = {International journal of philosophy and theology}, volume = {81}, journal = {International journal of philosophy and theology}, number = {4}, publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group}, address = {Abingdon}, issn = {2169-2327}, doi = {10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717}, pages = {351 -- 368}, year = {2020}, abstract = {In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker's recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a 'science first' attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural.}, language = {en} } @misc{Haag2020, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Rezension zu: Willascheck, Marcus: Kant on the sources of metaphysics: the dialectic of pure reason. - New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 298pp. - ISBN: 978-1-108-47263-0}, series = {European journal of philosophy}, volume = {28}, journal = {European journal of philosophy}, number = {2}, publisher = {Wiley}, address = {Hoboken}, issn = {0966-8373}, doi = {10.1111/ejop.12555}, pages = {524 -- 528}, year = {2020}, language = {en} } @article{GodessRiccitelli2020, author = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran}, title = {The cipher of nature in Kant's third Critique}, series = {Con-Textos Kantianos : international journal of philosophy}, journal = {Con-Textos Kantianos : international journal of philosophy}, number = {12}, publisher = {Instituto de Filosof{\´i}a del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient{\´i}ficas}, address = {Madrid}, issn = {2386-7655}, pages = {338 -- 357}, year = {2020}, abstract = {What is it that we encountered with in our aesthetic experience of natural beauty? Does nature "figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms", 2 to use Kant's phrasing in the third Critique, or is it merely our way of interpreting nature whether this be its purpose or not? Kant does not answer these questions directly. Rather, he leaves the ambiguity around them by his repeated use of terminology of ciphers when it comes to our aesthetic experience in nature. This paper examines Kant's terminology of ciphers in the Critique of Judgment and demonstrate through it the intimate link aesthetic experience in natural beauty has with human morality. A link whose culmination point is embodied in the representation of beauty as a symbol of morality.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Krueger2020, author = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter}, title = {Closed environment and open world}, series = {Jakob von Uexk{\"u}ll and philosophy: life, environments, anthropology}, booktitle = {Jakob von Uexk{\"u}ll and philosophy: life, environments, anthropology}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-429-27909-6}, doi = {10.4324/9780429279096}, pages = {89 -- 105}, year = {2020}, abstract = {According to Plessner, both adaptation and selection can be conceived not just as requested by the environment but also as actively proceeding from the organism. In this respect, Plessner finds in Uexk{\"u}ll's new biology a powerful counterweight to the constraints of Darwinism. However, despite all the points in common in their respective understanding of the problem, Plessner reproaches to Uexk{\"u}ll to have entirely missed the intermediate layer of the lived body [Leib] between the organism and its environment. Unlike Uexk{\"u}ll, concerning the more developed animals, Plessner took up elements of animal psychology from Wolfgang K{\"o}hler and Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk. Finally, Plessner finds insufficiencies also in Uexk{\"u}ll's distinction between the notion of world and the notion of environment, which would lead to the parallel positing of different environments. In reaction to Uexk{\"u}ll's leveling of all environments, Plessner drafted a philosophical-anthropological spectrum between the intelligent way of living observed in the great apes, whose intelligence had been demonstrated, and the co-wordly life of the symbolic mind as seen in the personal sphere of human life.}, language = {en} } @misc{GodessRiccitelli2020, author = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran}, title = {Rezension zu: Chaouli, Michel: Thinking with Kant's Critique of Judgment. - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. - Pp. 315. - ISBN: 978-0-67497136-3}, series = {Kantian review}, volume = {25}, journal = {Kantian review}, number = {2}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press}, address = {Cambridge}, issn = {1369-4154}, doi = {10.1017/S1369415420000102}, pages = {313 -- 317}, year = {2020}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Menting2020, author = {Menting, Thijs}, title = {Purposiveness of nature in Kant's third critique}, publisher = {Universit{\"a}tsverlag Potsdam}, address = {Potsdam}, isbn = {978-3-86956-484-5}, doi = {10.25932/publishup-44433}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-444336}, school = {Universit{\"a}t Potsdam}, pages = {xii, 304}, year = {2020}, abstract = {This dissertation aims to deliver a transcendental interpretation of Immanuel Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft, considering both its coherence with other critical works as well as the internal coherence of the work itself. This interpretation is called transcendental insofar as special emphasis is placed on the newly introduced cognitive power, namely the reflective power of judgement, guided by the a priori principle of purposiveness. In this way the seeming manifold of themes, varying from judgements of taste through culture to teleological judgements about natural purposes, are discussed exclusively in regard of their dependence on this faculty and its transcendental principle. In contrast, in contemporary scholarship the book is often treated as a fragmented work, consisting of different independent parts, while my focus lies on the continuity comprised primarily of the activity of the power of judgement. Going back to certain central yet silently presupposed concepts, adopted from previous critical works, the main contribution of this study is to integrate the KU within the overarching critical project. More specifically, I have argue how the need for the presupposition by the reflective power of judgement follows from the peculiar character of our sense-dependent discursive mind. Because we are sense-dependent discursive minds, we do not and cannot have immediate insight into all of nature's features. The particular constitution of our mind rather demands conceptually informed representations which mediately refer to objects. Having said that, the principle of purposiveness, namely the presupposition that nature is organized in concert with the particular constitution of our mind, is a necessary condition for the possibility of reflection on nature's empirical features. Reflection refers on my account to a process of selecting features in order to allow a classification, including reflection on the method, means and selection criteria. Rather than directly contributing to cognition, like the categories, reflective judgements thus express our ignorance when it comes to the motivation behind nature's design, and this is most forcefully expressed by judgements of taste and teleological judgements about organized matter. In this way, reflection, regardless whether it is manifested in concept acquisition, scientific systematization, judgements of taste or judgements about organized matter, relies on a principle of the power of judgement which is revealed and justified in this transcendental inquiry.}, language = {en} } @article{Haag2020, author = {Haag, Johannes}, title = {Transcendental Principles and Perceptual Warrant}, series = {Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy}, journal = {Wilfrid Sellars and twentieth-century philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {Abingdon}, isbn = {978-1-351-20275-6}, pages = {130 -- 150}, year = {2020}, language = {en} } @misc{ScholzAhrensAhrensBarth2020, author = {Scholz-Ahrens, Katharina Elisabeth and Ahrens, Frank and Barth, Christian A.}, title = {Nutritional and health attributes of milk and milk imitations}, series = {European journal of nutrition}, volume = {59}, journal = {European journal of nutrition}, number = {1}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Heidelberg}, issn = {1436-6207}, doi = {10.1007/s00394-019-01936-3}, pages = {19 -- 34}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Purpose Modern food technology allows designing products aiming to simulate and replace traditional food. In affluent societies there is a rising tendency to consume foods derived from plants including milk imitations or plant drinks based on cereals, nuts, legumes, oil seeds or other plant families. Herein we review production and composition of such drinks, summarize consumers' motivations to change from milk to plant drinks and highlight nutritional and health implications of consuming plant drinks instead of milk, in particular if non-fortified and if consumed by infants, children, adolescents and the elderly. Results Whereas the macronutrient concentrations of some plant drinks (soy) may approach in some cases (protein) that of cow's milk, the nutritional quality of most plant drinks, e.g., the biological value of protein and the presence and amount of vitamins and essential minerals with high bioavailability does not. If cow's milk is exchanged for non-fortified and non-supplemented plant drinks consumers may risk deficiencies of calcium, zinc, iodine, vitamins B2, B12, D, A, and indispensable amino acids, particularly in infants and toddlers who traditionally consume significant portions of milk. The vegetable nature, appearance and taste of such plant drinks may be appealing to adult consumers and be chosen for adding variety to the menu. However, in young children fed exclusively such plant drinks severe metabolic disturbances may occur. Conclusion Parents, dietitians, physicians and consumers should be aware of such potential risks, if non-fortified plant drinks are consumed instead of milk.}, language = {en} } @incollection{KayaKopshteyn2020, author = {Kaya, Gizem and Kopshteyn, Georgy}, title = {Dispersing the fog}, series = {Corruption and informal practices in the Middle East and North Africa}, booktitle = {Corruption and informal practices in the Middle East and North Africa}, editor = {Kubbe, Ina and Varraich, Aiysha}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-367-82285-9}, doi = {10.4324/9780367822859-2}, pages = {23 -- 42}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Countries in the Middle East generally fare poorly in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. One of the biggest challenges for the anti-corruption-regime in the Middle East are the many forms of corruption that are not being recognised as such on the local level, if assessed against a culturally relativistic benchmark. Our paper seeks to establish a unifying ground by providing a functional analysis of corruption which is both, normatively guiding and culturally sensitive. We demarcate our work as follows: (1) our reference point will be the phenomenon of institutional corruption, whereas (2) our working definition of corruption will conceive of corruption as a violation of role-specific norms that is motivated by the role-occupier's private motives. In an attempt to offer a comprehensive approach, corruption will be viewed on two differing levels. On the external level, we will begin with an investigation of features within a norm-order that typically instantiate corruption. We will argue that corruption is externally conditioned by an authority's inability to enforce and (re)establish the norms of conduct that ought to be action-guiding in office. This changes the expectation-structure within a norm-order and erodes public trust in the authorities, giving rise to willing perpetrators. Complementing this, the internal level of our framework will emphasize the motivational deficits of corrupt acts. It will be argued that this deficit can typically be found in societies that lack civic virtues. This, we suspect, is the functional reason why corrupt societies have such a hard time to overcome the problem: they lack both features and are, as a consequence, caught in a vicious circle as they struggle to strengthen civil society and consolidate institutional structures - whereas corruption increasingly disappears from the radar as it becomes accepted reality.}, language = {en} }