@article{Krueger2019,
  author    = {Kr{\"u}ger, Hans-Peter},
  title     = {How is the Human Life-Form of Mind Really Possible in Nature?},
  series = {Human studies},
  volume    = {42},
  journal   = {Human studies},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0163-8548},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10746-017-9429-5},
  pages     = {47 -- 64},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three plateaus (Dewey) or stages (Plessner), between physical (inorganic) nature, psycho-physical (living) nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference (between the precarious and the stable for Dewey, between immediacy and mediation for Plessner) in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Montemayor2019,
  author    = {Montemayor, Carlos},
  title     = {On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system},
  series = {Behavioral and brain sciences : an international journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary},
  volume    = {42},
  journal   = {Behavioral and brain sciences : an international journal of current research and theory with open peer commentary},
  publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press},
  address   = {New York},
  issn      = {0140-525X},
  doi       = {10.1017/S0140525X19000335},
  pages     = {69},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {A central claim by Hoerl \& McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2017,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice},
  series = {Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel},
  volume    = {45},
  journal   = {Philosophia : philosophical quarterly of Israel},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0048-3893},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11406-017-9925-x},
  pages     = {1621 -- 1622},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James' concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant 'mental events' in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one's attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Haag2017,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Analytic Kantianism},
  series = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  journal   = {Con-textos kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  publisher = {Instituto de Filosof{\´i}a del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient{\´i}ficas},
  address   = {Madrid},
  issn      = {2386-7655},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.1092766},
  pages     = {18 -- 41},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell can both be read as proponents of Analytic Kantianism. However, their accounts differ in important detail. In particular, McDowell has criticized Sellars's account of sensory consciousness in a number of papers (most notably in LFI and SC), both as a reading of Kant and on its systematic merits. The present paper offers a detailed analysis of this criticism and a defense of Sellars's position against the background of a methodology of transcendental philosophy.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Haag2017,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {A kantian critique of sellars transcendental realism},
  series = {Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism},
  journal   = {Wilfrid Sellars, Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism},
  publisher = {Bloomsbury},
  address   = {London},
  isbn      = {978-1-4742-3895-3},
  pages     = {149 -- 171},
  year      = {2017},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Spiegel2020,
  author    = {Spiegel, Thomas Jussuf},
  title     = {Is religion natural?},
  series = {International journal of philosophy and theology},
  volume    = {81},
  journal   = {International journal of philosophy and theology},
  number    = {4},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {Abingdon},
  issn      = {2169-2327},
  doi       = {10.1080/21692327.2020.1749717},
  pages     = {351 -- 368},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {In this article I argue that the kind of scientific naturalism that tends to underwrite projects of naturalizing religion operates with a tacit conception of nature which, upon closer inspection, turns out to be untenable. I first distinguish an uninteresting modest naturalism from the more ambitious and relevant scientific naturalism. Secondly I survey three different kinds of attempting to naturalize religion: naturalizing the social aspect of religion, naturalizing religious experience, and naturalizing reference to the transcendent. Thirdly I argue that these projects operate with a conception of nature which is insufficiently clear. I suggest three ways of charitably explicating that tacit conception of what is natural before arguing that neither of these three positions works. Lastly I offer an irenic proposal: we would do good in giving up the scientific naturalism that underlies projects of naturalizing religion in order to embrace Lynne Rudder Baker's recently proposed notion of near-naturalism which allows the naturalist to retain a 'science first' attitude while avoiding problematic, overly restrictive notions of what is natural.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GodessRiccitelli2020,
  author    = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran},
  title     = {The cipher of nature in Kant's third Critique},
  series = {Con-Textos Kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  journal   = {Con-Textos Kantianos : international journal of philosophy},
  number    = {12},
  publisher = {Instituto de Filosof{\´i}a del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient{\´i}ficas},
  address   = {Madrid},
  issn      = {2386-7655},
  pages     = {338 -- 357},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {What is it that we encountered with in our aesthetic experience of natural beauty? Does nature "figuratively speaks to us in its beautiful forms", 2 to use Kant's phrasing in the third Critique, or is it merely our way of interpreting nature whether this be its purpose or not? Kant does not answer these questions directly. Rather, he leaves the ambiguity around them by his repeated use of terminology of ciphers when it comes to our aesthetic experience in nature. This paper examines Kant's terminology of ciphers in the Critique of Judgment and demonstrate through it the intimate link aesthetic experience in natural beauty has with human morality. A link whose culmination point is embodied in the representation of beauty as a symbol of morality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Schneider2017,
  author    = {Schneider, Hans Julius},
  title     = {Buddhist Meditation as a Mystical Practice},
  series = {Philosophia},
  volume    = {45},
  journal   = {Philosophia},
  publisher = {Springer},
  address   = {Dordrecht},
  issn      = {0048-3893},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11406-016-9783-y},
  pages     = {773 -- 787},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation (Zazen, Vipassanā) as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts (longing, suffering, and love) in Buddhism, William James' concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between (on the one hand) a craving for pleasant 'mental events' in the sense of short-term moods, and (on the other) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one's attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{GodessRiccitelli2017,
  author    = {Godess-Riccitelli, Moran},
  title     = {The final end of imagination},
  series = {Filosofia unisinos},
  volume    = {18},
  journal   = {Filosofia unisinos},
  number    = {2},
  publisher = {Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos},
  address   = {S{\~a}o Leopoldo},
  issn      = {1519-5023},
  doi       = {10.4013/fsu.2017.182.05},
  pages     = {107 -- 115},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant's moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man's recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Haag2021,
  author    = {Haag, Johannes},
  title     = {Intuiting the Original Unity?},
  series = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  journal   = {Kantian legacies in German idealism},
  publisher = {Routledge, Taylor \& Francis Group},
  address   = {New York ; London},
  isbn      = {978-1-032-00160-9},
  pages     = {161 -- 185},
  year      = {2021},
  language  = {en}
}